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Aug. 29, 2024

Avoiding the Escalatory Trap: Managing Escalation during the Israel-Hamas War

C. Anthony Pfaff
©2024 C. Anthony Pfaff

ABSTRACT: Israel finds itself in a trap: escalate or maintain the status quo; absent a political solution, it must develop capable threats that deter future Hamas attacks and dissuade Hezbollah and Tehran from providing the support Hamas requires to carry them out. This special commentary executes an analysis of Israel’s precarious position and, in doing so, confronts the larger question of how to avoid escalation when engaging with violent extremist organizations with clear but unverifiable state support. The analysis provides a clear picture of the problem and offers tentative, evidence-based solutions for evading escalation or an untenable status quo.

Keywords: Israel, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Israeli Defense Forces, violent extremist organizations

 

The Israeli strikes that killed top Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on July 31, Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr on July 30, and senior Hamas leader Mohammed Deif on July 13, 2024, have sparked greater fears of escalation of the ongoing war in Gaza to a broader regional conflict. At one level, these concerns seem misplaced. Given that Israel and Hamas both seek the other’s destruction, it is hard to see where there is any room to escalate. There may be variances in each side’s capability for violence; however, absent a change in ends, prospects for a settlement are dim, as evidenced by Hamas’s recent rejection of a US-brokered ceasefire agreement. The most one can likely hope for is a ceasefire that would, without significant concessions on both sides, return the conflict to an unstable status quo.1

Choosing between escalation or the status quo favors Hezbollah and Tehran more than Israel. Returning to the status quo would likely represent a defeat for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), disincentivizing concessions necessary for anything more than a pause in fighting. Avoiding that defeat further incentivizes Israel to risk escalation, even where gains may not be proportionate to that risk. For Israel, the only way out of that trap, absent a political solution to the conflict, is developing credible and capable threats that deter future Hamas attacks and dissuade Hezbollah and Tehran from providing the support Hamas requires to carry them out.

How far the current escalatory spiral will go is uncertain. While Israel killing a Hamas leader may not represent an escalation, killing a Hamas leader in Tehran does. Predictably, the Iranian government has called for revenge. After the anticlimactic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missile attack in April 2024, it is unclear how they will do so. In response to an Israeli attack that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leaders in Syria, Iran responded with an attack by 170 UAVs, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles. While visually stunning, the attack itself had little effect. Only five ballistic missiles got through, doing little damage. It does appear that Iran calibrated that attack to avoid escalation by signaling its advance.2 Thus, despite the limited effects, Tehran offered to “[consider] the matter closed” as long as Israel refrained from retaliating. Israel retaliated anyway a few days later, when it launched a small UAV attack against an Iranian base in Isfahan. Iran played that attack down, ending that escalatory spiral. Because these responses were less destructive than the attack that prompted them, both sides were eventually able to walk away—at least temporarily.3

Hezbollah denied responsibility for the July 27, 2024, strike on Majdal Shams that killed 12 children. Even so, the Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib reportedly advised the organization to expect an Israeli response and not escalate in return. Whatever the organization actually expected and was willing to tolerate, Israel’s decision to strike Beirut in return involved civilian casualties, which, from Hezbollah’s perspective, raised the stakes. More importantly, it challenged an informal understanding between Hezbollah and Israel that attacks on Lebanese civilians would prompt Hezbollah attacks on Israeli towns in the north. Of course, from an Israeli perspective, killing Shukr was a way of enforcing norms protecting civilians. While Israel stated that it intends no further attacks of that kind, the Lebanese government has asked the UN to condemn the strike. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed to respond, saying further escalation would depend on Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s promised retaliation. At the time of this writing, it is not clear this spiral has ended.4

The Escalatory Trap

If Israel escalates, it fuels the escalatory spiral that could, at some point, exceed its military capability to manage. If it chooses the status quo, where Hamas remains capable of terrorist operations, then it has done little to improve its security situation. Neither outcome achieves Israel’s security objectives, which would represent a defeat for the IDF and could threaten the survival of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Under these conditions, any ceasefire would be temporary, simply allowing each side to prepare for an inevitable future and potentially more destructive round of violence.5

Forcing the choice between escalation and the status quo gives Iran, and, by extension, Hezbollah, an advantage and is a key feature of its proxy strategy. In the previous escalatory cycle, the IDF struck what they claimed was a military target associated with the IRGC and what Iran claimed was a consulate building in Damascus, killing two IRGC generals and five other officers, who the Israelis believed were supporting Hezbollah operations. From the Iranian perspective, this attack not only violated international law protecting diplomatic facilities but also undeclared “rules” that established “red lines” to prevent escalation.6

By making a direct attack against Iranian facilities and personnel, even those actively participating in hostilities, a potential trigger for escalation, Tehran could portray what would otherwise be legitimate acts of defense as acts of aggression. This strategy works because international norms regarding self-defense generally only apply to direct armed attacks. They say little about more indirect acts of aggression, such as providing lethal support to a proxy. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the legal bar for holding proxy sponsors accountable is high and likely would not apply to Iran. For it to apply, one would need to prove either that Tehran ordered attacks against Israel or that Hamas was effectively part of the IRGC—not simply a supported organization. As a result, Israel finds itself on the rhetorical defensive, constantly having to justify offensive operations against an enemy that, when able, would attack again.7

Managing the Escalatory Spiral

American officials have also expressed concerns that these killings could derail ceasefire negotiations. That criticism may be true; however, a ceasefire for its own sake may also be unhelpful if all it does is set conditions for greater violence in the future. For it to be helpful, it will need to be accompanied by a deterrent strategy that makes Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran believe they will be worse off if they ignore it and that Israel will be better off if they act on it. These are the conditions for a credible and capable deterrent threat.8

Unfortunately for Israel, deterring violent extremist organizations (VEOs) like Hamas is difficult. Successful deterrence depends on there being a clear demand that gives an adversary an alternative way out it can accept. If the demand is “cease to exist,” then any threat will have little utility, as ceasing to exist is not an option an actor would rationally choose. Even where there may be such accommodation, constructing a capable threat is still difficult. Unlike state actors, VEOs are often decentralized organizations untethered to territory. This decentralization allows them to distribute costs so that they will have the least effect on decision making.9

This feature characterizes much of the Iranian proxy network. Because Hamas can survive independently of Gaza, its senior leaders (many of whom live elsewhere, like Haniyeh did) are generally insulated from the losses the Israelis impose. As long as they can accept Iranian support, they will always be able to recruit more fighters and conduct more attacks. For Iran’s part, as long as it can provide that support, it can further insulate itself from any losses the proxy suffers. To make matters worse, this dynamic is self-reinforcing. Where costs are imposed largely on the proxy, the sponsor maintains its incentive to provide support. The more costs the proxy bears, the more it depends on that support, reinforcing the sponsor’s interests.10

Imposing costs directly on sponsors will likely be inadequate to deter future support or will require disproportionate force relative to the original VEO attack. Depending on how disproportionate that force is, it could count as an act of aggression under international law, whereas the original proxy attack might not. The UN, for example, defines an act of aggression as an attack against “the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.” Attacks by VEOs may not cross that threshold because VEOs are generally incapable of, or uninterested in, exercising sovereignty or seizing territory. A state actor attacking another state actor could, however, especially if the attacks destroyed critical military capabilities necessary for self-defense or denied access to territory, even if that territory provided a safe haven for VEO operations.11

This use of proxies is part of the trap. Attacks against proxies are ineffective, while attacks against sponsors are self-defeating. They are self-defeating because they often cost more than they gain. The US strike that killed Qassem Soleimani in 2020 raised concerns of legality within the international community, including US partners, and made the US presence in Iraq less tenable while having little effect on Iran’s willingness or ability to continue supporting proxy attacks. This point does not mean that no force used directly against Iran will be effective, but it does mean that it will have to be carefully calibrated.12

Escaping the Escalatory Trap: Deterring Violent Extremist Organizations and Sponsors

Fortunately for Israel, some features of VEO networks that make them resilient against attrition strategies make them vulnerable in other ways. While VEO leadership may be insulated from losses, they are not protected from failure. To the extent operations do not have the desired political effect, leadership will lose support. Thus, Hezbollah may be in a trap of its own as escalation may trigger protests by the Lebanese public, who already face grim economic conditions that war would only worsen, while the status quo may diminish Hezbollah’s credibility as part of the axis of resistance.13 The political effect necessary to get out of that trap can be realized in two ways:

  1. terrorizing a population to the extent it pressures its government to give in to VEO demands; or
  2. increasing support among sympathizers for VEO operations.

Hamas has unintentionally helped Israel prevent Hezbollah from achieving the first condition. Given Hamas’s objective to destroy Israel and the viciousness of the October 7, 2023, attacks, Israelis will likely continue to prefer operations against Hamas to a settlement under unfavorable conditions. According to a May 2024 poll by the Pew Research Center, 73 percent believed the response had so far been “about right” or had “not gone far enough.” While 61 percent of Israelis also fear escalation to a regional conflict, 67 percent of the population believes Israel will “probably” or “definitely” achieve its security objectives. While Israelis were divided over what a postwar settlement should look like, only 2 percent would accept Hamas continuing to govern Gaza in a postwar settlement. For Hezbollah, Israel’s and Hamas’s inability to de-escalate makes it hard for Hezbollah to avoid escalation. Without a ceasefire, Hezbollah has to continue some level of operations against Israel; otherwise, as mentioned above, it risks losing credibility.14

Preventing the second condition may be more difficult. The suffering caused by the Israeli response has galvanized many in the international community, especially in the Global South, against continued Israeli operations, however, that political support has not translated into materiel support. While Chinese, North Korean, and Russian weapons have been found in Hamas’s hands, there is some uncertainty about whether these actors provided them directly or if they were purchased by Iran, which has frequently done so over the years, and provided to Hamas with or without their knowledge. Given Iran’s central role in supporting Hamas, deterring or disrupting their future lethal assistance would likely neutralize what other international support Hamas enjoys.15

The most direct way to accomplish that deterrence is for Israel to attack the Iranian assets the regime cares about. The obvious difficulty with that approach is that it is also the most direct path to region-wide escalation, which is arguably not in Israel’s (or anyone’s) interest. The IDF is decisively engaged in Gaza, suggesting that increasing demands on its forces could be a strategic mistake, especially if it alienates its partners in doing so. For Israel’s partners, a region-wide conflict could stress an already weakened global economy, lead to inflation and food insecurity, and further embroil them in the fighting, as Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping have already done.16

However, as Israel’s strike against the IRGC in Syria suggests, there may be room for attacks against Iranian assets without risking regional escalation. Whether doing so would have an enduring deterrent effect is unclear. However, the decreasing cycle of violence after April’s attack suggests Tehran is prepared to accept more risk outside its territory than inside, as evidenced by its response to Haniyeh’s killing. This makes sense. In Syria, Iran is risking proxies and the personnel and assets it uses to support them. In Iran, the regime risks appearing vulnerable, which diminishes its deterrent capability and risks political instability. This point suggests that, if nothing else, attacks against Iranian military personnel and assets in combat zones may not have the escalatory effect that many fear. Even if that is not true, attacking Iran’s proxy support infrastructure would likely have some disruptive effect on proxy operations, diminishing the options Iran would have to retaliate.

A less direct way would be to reduce Hamas’s effectiveness as a proxy. Here is where targeted strikes on Hamas leadership can play a role. In 2003, during the second intifada, Hamas paused operations after Israel killed some of its senior leaders. That pause did not come immediately. In the beginning, Hamas escalated after senior leaders were killed, and their attacks increased. At some point, however, Hamas leadership had to choose between escalation and losing their current leadership, many of whom played important roles in the organization’s history. At the end of 2003, Hamas deliberately ceased operations within Israel’s pre-1967 borders in exchange for a halt to Israel’s targeted killings of Hamas leadership. Thus, there seems to be a threshold for when targeted killings work for rather than against conditions for a ceasefire.17

While several factors undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in attacks, it seems the scope and frequency of targeted killings against leaders who were integral to the organization’s identity had an effect. Of interest, Hamas was more likely to retaliate when it perceived it was exercising restraint or abiding by a ceasefire. When violence was high, however, Hamas reduced attacks to disincentivize Israelis from killing its leaders. Hamas would not be compelled, but it could be deterred. This observation raises an important point regarding the role informal norms can play in escalation management. Where they evolve, as it seems in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, they perform at least two functions. First, setting expectations for what responses are legitimate places boundaries on escalation. Second, observing those boundaries signals an acceptance of the other, which is necessary for deterrence. When these norms lose their effectiveness, as seems to be the case here, the likelihood for escalation increases until a new normal is established.18

The point here is not to endorse continued targeted killings but, rather, to point out that the ability to target multiple senior leaders in succession offers Israel leverage to push for a ceasefire, if not a settlement, on more favorable terms than the status quo. This approach is not without risk. There is insufficient study to differentiate the disruptive effects of targeted killings from the deterrent ones. Even if there were deterrent effects, VEOs, perhaps more so than state actors, even totalitarian ones, are more dependent on personality and relationships when it comes to decision making, which makes generalizations difficult. The Hamas that paused operations in 2003 may not in 2024.

Conclusion

Force can play a de-escalatory role, even in intractable conflicts. Where belligerents establish expectations regarding legitimate resistance, attacks intended to enforce those expectations are less escalatory than those simply intended to impose costs. However, when such attacks are also norm violating, they can exacerbate conditions for escalation as all sides seek to establish a new normal for legitimacy and recalibrate deterrent thresholds. In the conflict between Israel and Hamas, those norms have likely been shattered. Even if there is a ceasefire, as long as their goals remain mutual destruction, the potential for future escalation remains high. Reinforcing norms regarding legitimate resistance would be one way to reduce that potential.

It is also not entirely clear what ceasefire terms would be enduring. While recovering the hostages would be a significant gain for Israel, there are likely no security guarantees that Hamas can give that Israel can trust, and vice versa. Under these conditions, deterrence is Israel’s only option to achieve a more stable status quo. However, capability and credibility depend on convincing Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran that escalation on their part would make them worse off and Israel better off for responding. To do that, there need to be alternatives they can choose that adequately accommodate their interests while not making Israel less secure.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine what those alternatives might be. Whatever they are, threatening further targeted killings, continuing military pressure to disrupt Hamas and Hezbollah operations, and disrupting Iran’s proxy support infrastructure could incentivize their acceptance. Doing so both disincentivizes and reduces Iran and its proxies’ capacity for escalation. However, these measures also set conditions for a new normal with rules of engagement that could be self-defeating. Targeted killings outside combat zones risk normalizing assassination. Military pressure that causes civilian harm in populations not already involved in a conflict incentivizes rather than deters a similar response. Where a sponsor’s support infrastructure is difficult to differentiate from critical defense capabilities, destroying them raises the stakes and forces the sponsor to establish new deterrent capabilities and thresholds. Thus, for a more stable status quo, these measures must incentivize acceptance of more restrictive norms that protect civilians and limit the scope of operations rather than replace them.

 

C. Anthony Pfaff
Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is the interim director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He is also a senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council and a distinguished senior researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. He is the author of Proxy War Ethics: The Norms of Partnering in Great Power Competition and the forthcoming Bargaining for Justice: Ukraine, Gaza, and the Ethics of Conflict Termination.

 

Endnotes

  1. Barak Ravid, “Hamas Rejects New U.S. Proposal for Gaza Hostage and Ceasefire Deal,” Axios (website), August 18, 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/08/18/hamas-rejects-us-ceasefire-hostage-proposal; Abby Sewell, “Hamas’ Top Political Leader Is Killed in Iran in Strike That Risks Triggering All-Out Regional War,” AP (website), July 31, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/iran-hamas-israel-30968a7acb31cd8b 259de9650014b779; Maya Gebeily, “Hezbollah Confirms Top Commander Killed in Israeli Strike on Beirut Suburb,” Reuters (website), July 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-says-top-commander-was-building-targeted-by-israeli-strike-fate-2024-07-31/; and Melanie Lidman and Samy Magdy, “Israel Says It Has Confirmed That Chief of Hamas’ Military Wing Was Killed in a July Strike in Gaza,” AP (website), August 1, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-war-mohammed-deif-9524d7d5c8f7321f4d8c931fde664556. Return to text.
  2. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer. Return to text.
  3. “Iranian Leaders Call for Revenge during Tehran Funeral for Hamas Leader Haniyeh,” France 24 (website), August 1, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240801-iran-to-hold-funeral-for-hamas-chief-haniyeh; Haley Ott, “What Iran Launched at Israel in Its Unprecedented Attack, and What Made it through the Air Defenses,” CBS News (website), April 16, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-israel-attack-what-weapons-launched-how-air-defenses-worked/; Barak Ravid, “Iran Signals It Will Limit Response to Israel Attack to Avoid Escalation,” Axios (website), April 11, 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/04/11/iran-response-israel-attack-damascus; Susannah George and Mohamad El Chamaa, “Israeli Strike on Iranian Consulate in Damascus Kills Key Commander, Iran Says,” Washington Post (website), April 1, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/01/syria-iran-embassy-strike-israel/; Bethan McKernan et al., “Iran Warns It Will Strike Again with Greater Force if Israel or US Retaliate,” Guardian (website), April 14, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/14/iran-warns-strike-again-greater-force-us-israel-retaliate; and Parisa Hafezi and James Mackenzie, “Tehran Plays Down Reported Israeli Attacks, Signals No Retaliation,” Reuters (website), April 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-missiles-hit-site-iran-abc-news-reports-2024-04-19/. Return to text.
  4. Mohanad Hage Ali, “Hezbollah Doesn’t Want a War with Israel: And the United States Can Reinforce Restraint,” Foreign Affairs (website), July 26, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/hezbollah-doesnt-want-war-israel; “Israel Says Top Hezbollah Commander Fuad Shukr Killed in Airstrike in Beirut Suburb,” CBS News (website), July 31, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lebanon-israel-strikes-hezbollah-commander-beirut-suburb/; Kareem Fahim et al., “Israel Says It Killed Hezbollah Commander in Beirut Suburb,” Washington Post (website), July 31, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/30/israel-hamas-war-news-gaza-lebanon-hezbollah/; and “Hezbollah Chief Says Response to Israeli Assassination ‘Inevitable,’ ” Al Jazeera (website), August 1, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/1/hezbollah-chief-says-response-to-israeli-assassination-inevitable. Return to text.
  5. Tia Goldenberg, “Proposed Gaza Cease-Fire Puts Netanyahu at a Crossroads That Could Shape His Legacy,” AP (website), June 3, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-biden-politics-ca984e5fc518f4f5f0fbd041b5c39ddb. Return to text.
  6. If the building were a consulate, the strike may have been illegal from the perspective of international law as well. Peter Beaumont and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Why Israel’s Attack on Iranian Consulate in Syria Was a Gamechanger,” Guardian (website), April 14, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/14/why-israel-attack-on-iranian-consulate-in-syria-was-a-gamechanger; George and El Chamaa, “Key Commander in Damascus”; and Helen Regan, Hamdi Alkhshali, and Tamara Qiblawi, “Iran Vows Revenge as It Accuses Israel of Deadly Airstrike on Syria Consulate in Deepening Middle East Crisis,” CNN (website), April 2, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/02/middleeast/iran-response-israel-damascus-consulate-attack-intl-hnk/index.html. Return to text.
  7. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence, ILP WP 05/01 (London: Chatham House, October 2005), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/ilpforce; and C. Anthony Pfaff, “The Legal Challenges in Holding Iran Accountable for Supporting Hamas,” New Atlanticist (blog), Atlantic Council (website), October 24, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-legal-challenges-in-holding-iran-accountable-for-supporting-hamas/. Return to text.
  8. For an account of America officials expressing concerns about targeted killings, see Barak Ravid, “U.S. Concerned Hamas Leader’s Assassination Could Derail Gaza Hostage-Ceasefire Talks,” Axios (website), July 31, 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/07/31/us-hamas-leader-assassination-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal. For more on coercion, see C. Anthony Pfaff, Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2022), 8–9,https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/952/. Return to text.
  9. Alex Wilner and Andreas Wenger, “Linking Deterrence to Terrorism: Promises and Pitfalls,” in Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice, ed. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 4. Return to text.
  10. Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader selected to replace Haniyeh, is Gaza based, however, he is reportedly in hiding, where it is difficult to direct Hamas operations. Sinwar’s presence does not diminish the point that Hamas still has a stable of leadership who are outside the country and able to avoid risks and costs associated with fighting, which gives the group the ability to reconstitute, regardless of losses. See Al Jazeera Staff, “Who Is Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh’s Successor as Hamas Chief?,” Al Jazeera (website), August 6, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/6/who-is-yahya-sinwar-ismail-haniyehs-successor-as-hamas-chief. See also Samia Nakhoul and Stephen Farrell, “Hamas’ Qatar-Based Leader Haniyeh Named in ICC Warrant Arrest,” Reuters (website), May 20, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-qatar-based-leader-haniyeh-named-icc-warrant-request-2024-05-20/; and “While Gazans Suffer, Hamas Leaders Live in Luxury,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies (website), January 13, 2024, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/13/while-gazans-suffer-hamas-leaders-live-in-luxury/. Return to text.
  11. “The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Médecins sans Frontières (website), August 7, 2024, https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/aggression/. Return to text.
  12. Bill Chappell, “U.S. Killing of Iran’s Gen. Soleimani ‘Was Unlawful,’ U.N. Expert Says,” NPR (website), July 7, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/07/07/888179625/u-s-killing-of-irans-gen-soleimani-was-unlawful-u-n-expert-says. Return to text.
  13. Hage Ali, “Hezbollah.” Return to text.
  14. Laura Silver and Maria Smerkovich, “Israeli Views of the Israel-Hamas War,” Pew Research Center (website), May 30, 2024, pages 1, 4, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/30/israeli-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/. Return to text.
  15. Sarang Shidore, “UN Gaza Vote: US Isolation in the Global South near Total,” Responsible Statecraft (website), December 13, 2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/un-ceasefire-vote/; Michael Biesecker, “Hamas Fights with a Patchwork of Weapons Built by Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea,” AP (website), January 15, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-guns-weapons-missiles-smuggling-adae9dae4c48059d2a3c8e5d565daa30; Mansur Mirovalev, “Unverified Rumours of Russia Arming Hamas Persist, as War Rages in Gaza,” Al Jazeera (website), November 14, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/unverified-rumours-of-russia-arming-hamas-persist-as-war-rages-in-gaza; and Bill Gertz, “Chinese Weapons Found in Gaza, Report Claims,” Washington Times (website), April 4, 2024, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/apr/4/chinese-weapons-found-gaza-report-claims/. Return to text.
  16. Julia Frankel and Jack Jeffery, “Israel Says It Will Retaliate against Iran. These Are the Risks That Could Pose to Israel,” AP (website), April 16, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-retaliation-explainer-d9145465e2e2d54d3c975e51af95275b; Indermit Gill and M. Ayhan Kose, “Commentary – The Middle East Conflict Is Threatening to Cripple a Fragile Global Economy,” Brookings (website), November 16, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-middle-east-conflict-is-threatening-to-cripple-a-fragile-global-economy/; and “Who Are the Houthis and Why Are They Attacking Red Sea Ships?,” BBC, March 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911. Return to text.
  17. Charles Kirchofer, “Targeted Killings and Compellence: Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 3 (June 2016): 18–23, https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/303-targeted-killings-and-compellence-lessons-from-the-campaign-against-hamas-in-the-second-intifada-by-charles-kirchofer.pdf. Return to text.
  18. Kirchofer, “Targeted Killings,” 23–24. Return to text.
 

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