The Forward Edge of the Fifth US Army War College

David C. Hill, David D. Dworak, and Aaron Blair Wilcox

Keywords: Joint Force, professional military education, information age, human-machine teaming, war gaming

The War College marks a great change in the thinking or, let us say, the formal education of officers of our armed service The strength of a nation can never be measured merely in guns, planes, tanks, and ships. The real influence of a nation in the world is measured by the product of its spiritual, its economic, and its military strength. And so, realizing that war involves every single facet of human existence and thinking, every asset that humans have developed, all of the resources of nature, here [at the US Army War College] education deserts the formerly rather narrow business of winning a tactical victory on the battlefield; it is now concerned with the nation.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower US Army War College Address, 1966¹

Since its establishment in 1901, the US Army War College (USAWC) has adapted to meet the needs of the Army and a nation during episodic changes in the security environment. Most of this adaptation occurs incrementally as the college adjusts its courses and processes during its annual curriculum review processes. Periodically, significant shifts occur when the character of war reaches inflection points (times of profound change).

Four Army War Colleges

The US Army War College has experienced four broad evolutions during nearly 125 years of dedicated work “[n]ot to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression,” in the words of Elihu Root, its founder, as the cornerstone was laid for the college’s first building. The college’s first evolution (1903–17—General Staff training) graduated 256 Army officers for specific utilization as part of the General Staff. Ultimately, this limitation in scope discouraged innovation and did not account for the political, social, and economic dimensions of warfare. World War I demonstrated that the Army and the country needed officers educated beyond the practical application of military science. It needed strategic thinkers and leaders. The college’s second evolution (1918–40—General Staff education) adapted a broader strategic education. As the world descended into its second global conflict, the Army closed the US Army War College, reconvening a decade later.²

Reopening in 1950, the US Army War College confronted a more complex world and increased requirements for preparing Army leadership. The college’s third evolution (1950–89—US “great-power” status) concentrated on great-power competition in a bipolar world. It ended much as the previous evolutions did—with an exogenous shock stemming from the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the information age. In describing the college’s fourth evolution (1990–2022—information age adaptation), the then USAWC Commandant Richard A. Chilcoat emphasized information-based technologies and war gaming to achieve continuing dominance over America’s adversaries during counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The college’s fifth evolution now begins with a renewed focus on great-power conflict against near-peer adversaries.³

Coinciding with the college’s fourth evolution almost 30 years ago, historian Harry P. Ball recognized four dynamics driving change at the US Army War College:

1. America’s position in the global order;
2. the Army’s position as a national institution;
3. the role of the military profession; and
4. the changing nature (character) of war.

The United States is experiencing a change in the international environment, familiar to great powers historically, that demands political and military adaptation. The return of great-power competition, the rise of a multipolar order, rapid advances in human-machine teaming and artificial intelligence, ground wars in Europe and the Middle East, and persistent tensions in Asia demand political and military leaders’ attention. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley characterized Ball’s first and final assertions—geostrategic shocks and the changing character of war driven by technological adaptation—as occurring now. Similarly, Chief of Staff of the Army Randy A. George has demanded a reemphasis on strengthening the profession and combat readiness during continuous transformation in contact to deliver combat readiness as a pillar of the Army vision, reflecting Ball’s second and third observations.⁴

The US Army War College is adapting amid the drivers of change. In academia, civilian institutions and professional military institutions are fundamentally adjusting their educational approach by focusing on what is learned, rather than what is taught. The adoption of outcomes-based and experiential education is changing how faculty teach and assess learning levels. Institutions are shifting away from industrial-age, teacher-centered approaches toward modern methods prioritizing students.⁵

Changes in educational theory, combined with the changing character of war and global order, form a strategic inflection point for the US Army War College. A new evolution is underway—one that incorporates technology, experimentation, research, student choice, and problem-solving skills in groundbreaking ways. At this strategic inflection point, the college emerges as a strategic center of thought for the US Army in the global application of Landpower. The goal is simple: produce graduates with the intellectual overmatch to outthink competitors and adversaries today and in the future.⁶

The “Fifth” US Army War College: “Tailorable Education and Adaptive Leadership”

While the USAWC mission—to produce strategic leaders and ideas that are valuable to the Army—is unchanged, its graduates must operate in unprecedented conditions. The Army needs officers who know how to use data, understand that determining the truth in data often hinges on asking the right questions (as incorrect or misguided inquiries can lead to flawed conclusions), can react to changes in the operating environment at a rate never encountered previously, and effectively communicate and use information in a world where everyone with a smartphone is a news reporter and networks are exponential. The Army and Joint Force need an educational program that provides a core foundation in strategic Landpower application while also offering students a more tailored experience to make the most of this opportunity. Tailorable options enhance student outcomes by leveraging existing expertise to produce relevant, experiential, and problem-based coursework rather than spending time on concepts students already know. The fifth USAWC evolution will focus on what is learned and how it is learned.

The US Army War College employs four broad lines of effort to achieve its mission:

1. develop strategic leaders;
2. advance knowledge regarding national security with an emphasis on the global application of Landpower;
3. connect partners and the American public with the US Army; and
4. create a values-based experience (the “Carlisle Experience”) that enables and strengthens our workforce, students, and families. The following describes how the US Army War College is accomplishing these lines of effort during the current strategic inflection point.

Develop: Assessment-Informed, Tailored Education

With a few exceptions for special programs, the USAWC seminars historically followed the same course and lesson schedule. This approach allowed students and faculty to learn from one another but insufficiently challenged students who had significant experience within the discussion topic and required faculty to deliver the same material regardless of their academic fields or professional backgrounds. The fifth evolution in the curriculum provides a better way.

The rapid evolution of the security environment and extraordinary increase in knowledge across multiple domains means professional military education must make the most of every learning event. The Army and its educational institutions must assess student performance honestly and ensure courses are as rigorous as possible to prepare graduates for service in peace and war. This goal requires senior service college programs to offer varied educational options to meet individual learners’ needs.

With tailorable education, the US Army War College is exploring how to offer different levels of courses and different models to leverage faculty expertise. Some students might select special programs (for example, advanced strategic arts) to deepen particular skill sets. Others may elect to learn about fields in which they have little background. Some may desire to improve cognitive or interpersonal skills. Piloting and experimentation with deliberate assessment plans determine optimal approaches to deliver students what they—and the nation—need most.

For the greatest effect, individual student competency assessments should inform selections for tailorable education. Do students choose courses or programs because they look appealing, or do they choose them because assessment tools identified a need to develop those skills? To make informed choices, the institution must offer several developmental assessments at the beginning of academic programs, which students and faculty can then partner to interpret.

While conceptually simple, implementing these assessments is challenging. Developmental assessments (which are different from assessments of student learning) are a growing field the Army has only begun to explore. Key questions include:

• What knowledge, skills, and behaviors are essential to leaders’ success?
• Of these factors, which ones are malleable through educational programs?
• Finally, of these malleable factors, which ones can we directly assess?

The Army is implementing the initial concepts in the command assessment programs underway. While many assessment tools are under development Army-wide, work remains to determine what data should be shared across organizations and how the data should be used.

Offering a menu of institutional course choices is also complex and difficult to implement. How does the college ensure the attainment of core program learning outcomes across numerous learning paths? How does the college manage faculty expertise to allow the most students to benefit from exposure to the best instructors? What is the right number of choices available to students?

The college’s fifth evolution must offer a generalist and tailorable education. Delivering the same curriculum the same way for all students may not provide the desired results, while an approach of 380 individual degree programs is unrealistic and unfeasible. Ultimately, balancing student demand and faculty capacity will determine the optimal approach. Finding this balance will require several years of piloting and experimentation but will allow for incremental improvement and the development of the necessary assessment tools.

Advance: Enable Informed Decision Making

Feedback from alumni and Army senior leaders highlights an essential skill for senior leaders: executive communication. Senior leaders must be able to deconstruct issues, develop plans on how best to communicate responses, collect and quickly assess data, then develop and deliver the written, verbal, and visual communication that produces desired effects. Strategic communication is concise, convincing, and focuses on underlying problems rather than symptoms. Developing this skill is part technical, part cognitive, and requires repetition to improve. The US Army War College refers to this process as the “Carlisle Method.”

With faculty guidance and mentoring, students assess contemporary problems through strategic teaming, problem deconstruction, information collection, analysis, and production. The Carlisle Method’s tailored education and mentorship has produced original research and recommendations in more than 17 recent reports for senior Army decisionmakers, including the United States Army Futures Command, United States Army Pacific, the Army G-2, and the needs of Joint senior leaders and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Recent student and faculty research products like the June 2024 Russia-Ukraine lessons-learned report and the protracted war with China assessment demonstrate the power of integrated research to leverage student talent and experience with faculty expertise to advance Landpower application. The Carlisle Method institutionalizes research questions and processes that support the Joint Force, capitalizing on student interest and career experiences to increase the Army’s combat lethality and inspire the profession.⁷

In addition to critical research, the US Army War College has been a center of war gaming for several years. Beyond developing and executing war games for students and government stakeholders, the fifth evolution of the college now offers war games and courses in war-game development. Organizations across the government greatly need this expertise as they explore issues like conflict over the Arctic and effective negotiation strategies. International partners are also participating in these courses, and the demand exceeds the supply. War gaming will continue to be an area of growth as big data and artificial intelligence mature into useful resources for solving problems within complex adaptive systems.

The US Army War College is also harnessing the burgeoning utility of artificial intelligence within institutional processes and decision making. The college is exploring how large language models can assess curricula and offer recommendations on individual student courseloads and gaps or overages in subject material. Results matter; survey data and assessments of operational performance post-graduation will shape ongoing curricular adaption.

Further adapting to the nation’s needs, the US Army War College established the China Landpower Studies Center in January 2024. While the other services have centers that focus on Chinese airpower and sea power, senior professional military education institutions have been more limited in their examinations of Landpower in Chinese strategic and operational approaches. The China Landpower Studies Center fills this void in research, allowing the Army and Joint Force to gain a better understanding of Landpower as an element of Joint power in the People’s Liberation Army.

Connect: Extend National and International Impact

Fundamentally, USAWC graduates must be prepared to fight and win in a Joint and Combined environment. Moreover, graduates must be effective across the continuum of cooperation, competition, crisis, and conflict. Ideally, skilled leaders should successfully navigate through the first three parts of the continuum and avoid the risks associated with the last. To achieve this goal, leaders need expansive networks, effective interpersonal skills, and the ability to exercise strategic empathy.

Multinational operations provide the United States and its friends, partners, and allies a distinct advantage when dealing with potential adversaries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The foundation for multinational operations rests on relationships built during peacetime. The expansion of the USAWC International Fellows Program in professional military education provides the perfect opportunity for building these relationships.

The US Army War College hosts more than 80 international officers in its resident and nonresident programs annually. The relationships built in Carlisle are the US Army War College’s superpower—they pay dividends for decades after the International Fellows have walked across the Wheelock Bandstand, diplomas in hand. There is a growing tension, however, between the need to incorporate international officers into senior service college programs and a desire to increase classified instruction. There is a real benefit to having international perspectives in seminars when discussing contemporary challenges, but there is also a value in exposing US students to classified planning documents. In practice, this form of instruction resembles contingency planning within a combined headquarters. Schools must develop creative approaches that incorporate classified material without excluding the possibility for international student involvement. This task is easier said than done, especially given the lack of educational spaces equipped for classified discussions.

Creating broad allied or partnered networks cannot occur solely within the United States. A targeted strategy of engagements with international professional military institutions is essential to develop and maintain enduring relationships across nations. For example, NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Programme and the Department of State’s Africa Military Education Program provide opportunities to share best practices and develop contacts with nations worldwide. The USAWC International Fellows Continuing Education Program reinforces long-term US security goals with allies and partners while sustaining professional and personal relationships with alumni across the globe. The USAWC staff and faculty currently support Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Ukraine with faculty and curriculum development, institutional improvement, and war-gaming instruction. These engagements directly support President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy and play a vital role in achieving the goals of combatant commands and country teams.⁸

Testing strategic and operational concepts through tailored Joint war gaming is a pillar of the Carlisle Method and essential to training Joint war fighters. The Joint Land, Air, and Sea Strategic Enhanced Program exemplifies how senior leader education, war gaming, and international engagement can synergize. The program is a strategic war game that evolved from the Strategic Crisis Exercise of the fourth war college and engages students in a global, strategic, and competitive environment set 10 years in the future. Students role-play various organizations at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels. It is a Jointly focused professional military education war game where teams are formed from across US senior service colleges and international war colleges from Europe and Africa. This program provides participants with in-depth knowledge of the National Security Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Joint Staff, all US geographic combatant commands, and notional multinational task force organizations. The result is a greater appreciation for national security processes, employment considerations, and the capabilities of Joint and coalition partners.

The US Army War College is experimenting with human-machine teaming at the strategic level in the classroom and through operational outreach. Recognizing that strategic leaders must be data literate and comfortable adapting to advances in artificial intelligence, the college conducts use-case research to increase its understanding of this expanding technology. Artificial intelligence–enabled strategic advisers actively integrate with faculty and students across the enterprise. Training and educating strategic leaders in the practical application of human-machine integration to achieve decision dominance faster than the adversary and with trusted data is critical for the future application of Landpower. The US Army War College coordinates across professional military education to explore the implications of human-machine integration with the goal of future application within large-scale war games like the Joint Land, Air, and Sea Strategic Enhanced Program.

Create: Create a Community of Academic and Nonacademic Activities

The USAWC vision is to be an institution of choice for students, staff and faculty, families, and stakeholders. This vision has several components, which collectively form the “Carlisle Experience.” The Carlisle Experience is the totality of academics, extracurricular affairs, family programs, and a supportive small-town environment that provides a war college experience unlike any other professional military institution. The goal is for everyone who studies and works at Carlisle Barracks to say that if they had to do it all over again, they would not go anywhere else.

The fifth USAWC evolution involves critically reassessing all the components of the Carlisle Experience to ensure that academic and nonacademic programs, community events, research, and support services collectively support the needs and desires of a changing force. Families increasingly prioritize work-life balance over professional opportunities. More students attend programs as geographic bachelors. Nonresident programs must be as impactful and rewarding as resident programs. The college must, therefore, evaluate all aspects of the educational experience and meet these changing needs across a career continuum. Meeting these needs may include reinvesting in premier graduate certificate programs to promote enduring intellectualism throughout officers’ careers, rather than during episodes of residential learning.

The Carlisle Experience applies to more than those who study or work at Carlisle Barracks. The US Army War College is a place to explore critical issues of national importance with and for the Army, the Joint Force, and other governmental leaders. The USAWC school, centers, institutes, and programs provide opportunities to explore issues from a past-present-future approach. The United States Army Heritage and Education Center archives are a national resource. Research faculty at the Strategic Studies Institute can focus on the most complex issues, while the Center for Strategic Leadership develops war games to explore these issues using a different methodology. Staff and faculty within the School of Strategic Landpower and the Army Strategic Education Program provide world-renowned expertise in senior leader education. Collectively, this team represents a unique capability for the Army to explore any issue and to make informed recommendations. The fifth evolution of the US Army War College is global in reach, scope, and service.

A Fifth Army War College

The US Army War College recognizes the requirements for continued adaptation during periods of systemic and technological change. Currently on the forward edge of its fifth evolution, the college is adapting to provide assessment-based, tailorable education to its students and deliver impactful leader-development programs, research, and war gaming to inform strategic leaders about critical national security choices. Adapting strategic education to keep pace with the needs of the future operational force is essential to maintain the war-fighting edge for the Army of 2040 and beyond. This fifth evolution of the Army War College reinvigorates education requirements in the global application of Landpower. In a testament to the quality of adaptive curricular processes and design, the college is envisioning new means and methods to answer the call that Secretary of War Root issued more than a century ago, “[n]ot to promote war but to preserve peace through intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.”⁹

David C. Hill
Major General David C. Hill is the 53rd commandant of the US Army War College.

David D. Dworak
Dr. David D. Dworak is the senior academic officer and provost at the US Army War College. In addition, he teaches classes in history, military logistics, and strategic planning.

Aaron Blair Wilcox
Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Blair Wilcox is an assistant professor and deputy director in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group, US Army War College.

Endnotes

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address to the US Army War College” (address, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 21, 1966), as cited in Luke A. Calvert, Sowing the Seeds of Victory: The US Army War College in the Interwar Period (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1070981.pdf. Return to text.
2. Parameters Editors, “From the Archives: Elihu Root on the Army War College,” Parameters 31, no. 1 (Spring 2001), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol31/iss1/2/; and Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College, rev. ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1994), 86, 137, 141–42, 211, 491. Return to text.
3. Ball, Responsible Command, 253; and Richard A. Chilcoat and Roderick R. Magee II, “Strategic Leadership and the ‘Fourth’ Army War College,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1996): 75, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA525164.pdf. Return to text.
4. Ball, Responsible Command, 491; Mark A. Milley, “Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—while the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty,” Joint Forces Quarterly 3, no. 110 (2023): 7–8, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-110/jfq-110_6-15_Milley.pdf; and Michael R. Weimer, Randy A. George, and Christine E. Wormuth, “Message to the Army Team,” memorandum, October 26, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/271225/october_26_2023_message_to_the_army_team. Return to text.
5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCS Instruction 1800.01F (Washington, DC: JCS, 2020), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800_01f.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102430-580. Return to text.
6. JCS, Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington, DC: JCS, May 2020), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision.pdf. Return to text.
7. John A. Nagl and Katie Crombe, A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2024), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/968; and Marco J. Lyons, “War with China: A View from Early 2024,” Strategic Studies Institute (website), April 11, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3738629/war-with-china-a-view-from-early-2024/. Return to text.
8. See Joseph R. Biden Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. Return to text.
9. Parameters Editors, “Elihu Root,” 1. Return to text.

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