The Middle East and Central Asia: The United States Central Command Area of Operations
The Middle East remains a volatile theater underpinned by historical political and civil-liberty challenges, weak economies that struggle to support growing populations, and limited access to critical resources like water. Although a gradual US withdrawal over the last few years has shifted the emphasis on the region, recent events remind the defense community of the Middle East’s strategic importance for national security. Consequently, current events are drawing the United States back into the Middle East. The region is trending toward chaos, fueled by the eruption of violence in Gaza, the horizontal escalation of the Yemeni Civil War, an emboldened Iran that is filling a regional power vacuum, and great-power influence in Central Asia.
The Fight for Gaza
On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a complex attack against Israel that reignited long-standing hostilities and plunged a vital US ally into a deadly conflict. Israel’s response was swift, and the world shifted its focus away from the Russia-Ukraine War to observe the Israel-Hamas War. Although the United States is prioritizing its military efforts in the Pacific, an attack on Israel was a tangible reminder of the importance of the Middle East. The US government has historically supported Israel and continues to provide military assistance while remaining only indirectly involved in any operations.
Civilian casualties inherent in the urban conflict have increased opposition to the war, which has placed pressure on Israel to cease operations short of its military and political goals. In turn, the US population has scrutinized Israeli operations, with pro-Palestine protests occurring across the country. The subsequent arguments against Israel’s actions echoed earlier debates about discrimination in urban warfare that dominated the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, continued US support to Israel became a contested issue as the situation transformed into a humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by the fact the belligerents’ aim is the eradication of the other. The broader challenge of Arab-Israeli relations will remain a complex issue for anyone assessing the region, regardless of what type of resolution the combatants eventually reach. The ramifications of the current violence will likely be long lasting, as negotiations between interested actors remain slow and uncertain. To complicate matters, some spillover from the conflict is already affecting other regional issues, like the Yemeni Civil War.
The Yemeni Civil War
For nearly a decade, the Yemeni Civil War has garnered little attention in the United States, likely overshadowed by the war on terrorism and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia leads a regional coalition in the fight against the Houthi movement, which has grown to represent a broader regional proxy fight with Iran. The Yemeni Civil War was contained in Yemen, but the recent fighting in Gaza provided a justification for the Yemeni Civil War to spill over and escalate horizontally.
In November 2023, Houthi rebels, as part of the broader Iranian axis of resistance against Western influence, began targeting international shipping with increased intensity. Although the Houthis’ actions are not new, the expanded operations and public justification signified a transition in the conflict. Houthi forces have conducted dozens of attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using drones and missiles. The Houthis are attacking shipping explicitly to impose costs on Israel's supporters. While the drone and missile strikes are regional, the impact is much broader.
The United States and its allies responded in December 2023 by creating Operation Prosperity Guardian, whose mission is to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Shortly after, in January 2024, the coalition began a series of air strikes and naval bombardments against critical Houthi positions in Yemen, code-named Operation Poseidon Archer. The coalition’s highly publicized strikes represent a shift in the Yemeni Civil War, an escalation that adds to the tensions between the West and an increasingly emboldened Iran.
Iran the Spoiler
Iran has gradually expanded its influence in the Middle East, often using proxies. Notably, Iran has varying levels of control over proxy forces, giving the nation a level of deniability that has reduced the likelihood of a major regional war. But recent actions—by proxies and by Iran proper—have created an unstable situation in the region. As already discussed, the actions of the Houthis in Yemen and the actions of Hamas in Israel have fostered direct confrontations with the West. At the same time, Iranian-backed forces have increased attacks on US installations across the Middle East, including locations in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Although most of the forces’ actions are negligible, in January 2024, a drone strike killed three US servicemembers in Jordan. Iran denied involvement. Still, the United States responded, striking critical facilities associated with the Iranian proxy forces the United States believed to be involved.
But in April 2024, Iran’s engagements expanded beyond the deniability of proxy forces. At the beginning of the month, an Israeli-Iranian proxy fight in Syria escalated when Israel conducted a strike against the Iranian consulate in Syria, killing high-level Iranian officers. A tit for tat followed. On April 13, 2024, Iran launched a massive volley of drones and missiles at Israel, most of which Israeli and partner air-defense systems defeated. Even though the resulting attack achieved minimal damage, it was a clear escalation. Israel responded in kind. On April 19, 2024, Israel conducted a strike on Iran. The details of the extent of the damage from either strike and, more importantly, the results of such engagements are unclear. Iran has been increasing its actions for years, and Iran’s efforts to secure a regional hegemony seem to have come to a head. What comes next may shape Department of Defense efforts for the foreseeable future. But the United States cannot become hyperfocused on Iran, as competition between great powers is ongoing more broadly in the region.
Central Asia: The Center of Chinese-Russian Interaction
Compared to the rest of the region, Central Asia seems stable and quiet, but its placid surface obscures significant changes underway. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been the primary regional security manager. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s sometimes bellicose rhetoric toward Central Asia—especially Kazakhstan—have regional governments seeking other partners.
China had long been content to focus on its economic interests in the region, especially its Belt and Road Initiative investments: Central Asia is vital to China’s goal of creating a global trading system with China at the system’s center. Beijing is increasing its diplomatic and military presence in the region. China has created its own C5+1 format, engaging Central Asian governments without Russia in the room, and China has recently acknowledged a security presence in Tajikistan in the form of a base in the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan region along the border with Afghanistan. Even Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state, has become more closely connected to China via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But Pakistan’s existential crisis with India over Jammu and Kashmir continues to make Central Asia unstable and the world uncomfortable. Additionally, Pakistan is marred by an internal struggle between its army and its civilian political parties, which recently led to the former prime minister being jailed and the formation of a tenuous political coalition.
At the moment, Chinese and Russian security interests in Central Asia are aligned. But the fall in Russian power and influence in Central Asia, coupled with China’s rise in the region, may prove difficult for the two to manage. As Russia’s influence declines, China will likely fill that vacuum.
High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems with the 1-94th Field Artillery, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, fire missiles at simulated targets during the US-Thai exercise Cobra Gold 2024 on a range near Lop Buri, Thailand (US Army National Guard photo by Sergeant Alec Dionne).
An Emerging Iraq
When Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani visited Washington, DC, in April 2023, his message was clear: Iraq is ready for the United States to treat relations between the countries as an opportunity rather than a problem.1 As al-Sudani pointed out during his US engagements, the threat from the Islamic State has significantly diminished, and Iraqis are ready to transition from military operations to policing in the former areas of conflict.2 Concurrently, he has signed the ambitious National Strategy for Iraq Security Sector Reform to build an administration system capable of responding to emerging risks, threats, and challenges that incorporates the security services, judiciary, and oversight organizations.3 Moreover, despite calls for the withdrawal of US combat forces, the Iraqi government is engaging its US and European partners for assistance with these reforms.4
While calls to withdraw US forces may be partly politically motivated, they also reflect a revised understanding of Iraq’s security needs. During a closed-door session, al-Sudani described the security situation within Iraq as stabilizing, indicating a need to bolster police forces as military forces transition to more peacetime roles.5 Under these conditions, combat forces are not only unnecessary but also create the impression that Iraq remains unstable, which undermines international and domestic investment. While assessments of the Islamic State’s diminished capacity may be optimistic, the desire to create a professional and responsible security sector capable of addressing a range of security challenges (as stated in the strategy) is genuine. In fact, the Iraqis have formed reform committees in each security sector ministry and agency, underscoring their commitment to a professional and responsible security sector.6
Security sector reform remains an important area for international assistance, and facilitating this trend toward stabilization will require international partners to shift focus from security assistance to economic and social development. Iraq’s non-oil sector showed a strong recovery, with non-oil GDP growth estimated at 6 percent, driven by increases in public expenditure and agricultural output.7 However, overall economic performance was tempered by oil production cuts due to OPEC+ agreements and interruptions in the pipeline with Türkiye. Economic growth for 2024 is projected to rebound amid fiscal expansion, with continued strong performance expected in the non-oil sectors.8 Iraq’s unemployment rate is around 15.6 percent, having risen steadily since 2008 when it was around 8 percent. Over the last two years, the rate declined from a high of 16.2 percent.9 Although unemployment is declining, it remains a significant concern.
Al-Sudani’s Washington visit underscored Iraq’s readiness to pivot from aid recipient to equal partner. Doing so builds on the relations built during the fight against extremism to create a sustainable and mutually beneficial relationship that grows opportunities for all partners. To achieve lasting stability, international partners should complement security assistance with initiatives focused on economic growth, entrepreneurship, education, and health care. These efforts can transform Iraq into a more resilient and prosperous nation, leveraging the expertise and support of global partners to foster a secure and thriving society.
Conclusion
The Middle East is a theater on the precipice of a regional war, as terrorism and proxy war push the region to a broader and more significant conflict. Complex relationships define the region, and an assortment of interrelated conflicts is testing the region’s complex relationships. Numerous conflicts of varying scales are ongoing in places like Iraq, Israel, Syria, and Yemen. None of the conflicts have an end in sight. At the same time, Iran’s efforts to achieve regional hegemony continue. Although the actions of the rogue state will not go uncontested, to what extent great powers will directly intervene is not clear, and their focus may be elsewhere in the region. The region’s complexity has no straightforward solution. Instead, any actions the United States undertakes, including a noninterventionist decision, are likely to be contentious.
Endnotes
- Rend Al-Rahim, “Iraq’s Sudani Runs the Risks of Sustained Relations with the United States,” Arab Center Washington DC (website), May 7, 2024, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/iraqs-sudani-runs-the-risks-of-sustained-relations-with-the-united-states/. Return to text.
- “Iraq’s Prime Minister on Building a Stronger Relationship with the United States,” Atlantic Council TV, April 19, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.tv/events/iraq-s-prime-minister-on-building-a-stronger-relationship-with-the-united-states. Return to text.
- Muhammad Shiyaa Al-Sudani, The National Strategy for Iraq Security Sector Reform (2024–2032), Government of Iraq, March 27, 2024. Return to text.
- Rabi’ Al-Awwal, “Iraqi PM: Security Reforms Top Government Priorities,” Asharq Al-Awsat (website), October 1, 2023, https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/4577926-iraqi-pm-security-reforms-top-government-priorities. Return to text.
- Author attended a meeting with Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani at the Willard Hotel in Washington, DC, on April 19, 2024. Return to text.
- Christopher Caitlin, deputy director for security sector reform, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, interview with author, July 1, 2024. Return to text.
- John Lee, “IMF: Iraq Economic Growth ‘to Continue amid Fiscal Expansion,’ ” Iraq-Business News (website), March 5, 2024, https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2024/03/05/imf-iraq-economic-growth-to-continue-amid-fiscal-expansion/. Return to text.
- Elias Al Helou, “Iraq’s Economic Growth to Decline in 2023, 2024 Due to Oil Production Cuts: IMF,” Middle East Economy (website), December 20, 2023, https://economymiddleeast.com/news/iraq-economic-growth-oil-imf/. Return to text.
- “Iraq Country Page,” World Bank Group (website), n.d., accessed July 1, 2024, https://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq. Return to text.
Photo Credit
Nataja Ford, Eager Lion 2024 Tank Range [Image 3 of 4], May 15, 2024, DVIDS, link.