Recent Articles

MAPRO: Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options Professor Dwight Raymond Guides and Handbooks by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "This Handbook is designed to be a reference for policy makers to monitor, prevent, and if necessary respond to genocide and other mass atrocity situations. It addresses topics promulgated in the August 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10) as well as recommendations contained in Preventing Genocide, the 2008 study published by the Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF)."

Collins Center Update, Volume 14, Issue 1 (Winter 2012) Colonel Barry Di Ruzza, Dr. Mark A. Van Dyke, Professor William Waddell, Colonel Sam White, Professor Bert Tussing, Colonel Steve Carney Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach Dr Paul Kamolnick Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the past 2 decades, America and the world have witnessed the ignoble rise and now-pending destruction of the al-Qaeda terrorist entity, one of the modern world’s most vicious and successful transnational organizations. Scholars and national security personnel have dedicated vast resources to dissecting and analyzing al-Qaeda’s ideological, strategic, organizational, and tactical strengths and weaknesses. Notable in this entire debate, however, has been the repeated refrain among scholars and U.S. policymakers that we have yet to design and execute a successful messaging campaign that effectively attacks and delegitimizes al-Qaeda in the eyes of potential recruits. Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph is designed to address that present lacuna..."

Once Again, the Challenge to the U.S. Army During a Defense Reduction: To Remain a Military Profession Dr Don M Snider Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The U.S. Army has been through three reductions-in-force since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. The first one, roughly 1972-78, actually birthed the All-Volunteer Force. The second one occurred in the late 1990s after the end of the Cold War when the U.S. Army was reduced by approximately one-third in both force structure and budget (Total Obligational Authority). The third one is just now beginning in 2011-12 as the Army returns from a decade of war in the Middle East..."

Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or Traditional Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Strategic concepts and the theories they encourage and enable are discretionary intellectual constructions. Strategic concepts are not dictated to us; rather, we choose them and decide how they can serve as building blocks for the edifice of theory we prefer. When strategic theory is confusing, misleading, and not fit for its practical purposes of education and even advice, then it is akin to bad medicine that we take in the mistaken belief that it will do us good. Unfortunately, it is necessary to alert Americans to the inadvertent self-harm they are causing themselves by the poor ways in which they choose to conceptualize strategic behavior."

Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 2, Issue 2 Mister Robert C Browne Peace and Stability Journal by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "The U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations co-hosted this year’s annual International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) conference, from 14 to 18 November 2011."

The United States and China in Power Transition Dr David Lai Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States and China have experienced many changes in their relations in the past 30 years. Some international security experts posit that the most profound one has begun—an apparent power transition between the two nations. This potentially titanic change, it is argued, was set in motion by China’s genuine and phenomenal economic development over the past decade, or so. Clearly, China's impact on the United States and the U.S.-led international system has been growing steadily."

Real Leadership and the U.S. Army: Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct Adaptive Work COL John B Richardson IV Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Former Army Chief of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey has highlighted “failure of imagination” as a major obstacle in an organization’s ability to learn, adapt, and find solutions to complex problems. As a former Commanding General of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Dempsey led the redesign of the Army’s conceptual foundation. He and other Army officials, reflecting on the previous decade’s conflicts, aggressively instituted a campaign of learning, which TRADOC describes as “a broad set of initiatives designed to produce an Army capable of rapidly adapting to defeat unforeseen threats.”"

The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma Dr Max G Manwaring Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the end of World War II and beyond the Cold War period, the prevailing assumption was that interstate warfare would continue to be the dominant threat to global peace and prosperity. Today’s wars, by contrast, are intrastate conflicts that take place mainly within—not across—national borders. As a consequence, the disease of intrastate conflict has been allowed to rage relatively unchecked across large areas of the world, and has devastated the lives of millions of human beings. At the same time, indirect and implicit unmet needs (e.g., poverty) lead people into greater and greater personal and collective insecurity."