Recent Articles

Mass Atrocity: Prevention and Response Workshop Report Professor Dwight Raymond Workshop Report by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute In December 2010, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy co-hosted a workshop on Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). The event followed the earlier publication of the MARO Military Planning Handbook, and was attended by 85 people from a diverse range of organizations."

Junior Leader Professional Development — Who Has the Time? Dr Steven Metz Op-ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While researching General Matthew Ridgway’s oral history at the Military History Institute, author Tom Ricks came across this astute quote: “My advice to any young officer is read—read—read. And learn from the successes of the great ones and their failures.” Few Americans speak with greater authority on the requirements of military leadership than Ridgway. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II; the 8th Army in the Korean War; replaced Douglas MacArthur as the overall commander in Korea; served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; and then as Army Chief of Staff. He was both an exceptional leader and a strategist. We should heed what Ridgway had to say."

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."

A Colloquium on U.S. National Security Policy, Military Strategy: Understanding the Environment for Contemporary Warfare Mr Dave Lewis, Dr Steve Maxner, Dr Dennis Patterson Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Texas Tech University "No problem facing the United States is more important than national security, particularly in the context of our contemporary wars. In addition, no institution is more involved and more affected by this problem of protecting national security in the context of contemporary wars than the U.S. Army (and the U.S. military overall). The problem of contemporary wars has created numerous challenges for the U.S. Army."

Other People's Wars: PLA Lessons from Foreign Conflicts Mr Daniel Alderman, Mr Joe Narus, The National Bureau of Asian Research Colloquium Brief by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The National Bureau of Asian Research "The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought in a major war since 1979, but has studied the lessons of modern foreign conflicts from throughout the world. In some cases, those lessons have resulted in observable changes to the PLA’s strategic, tactical, or operational posture."

Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict COL Tony Pfaff Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Colonel Tony Pfaff explores the ethical challenges facing the Army in an era of persistent conflict dominated by a variety of irregular threats. Pfaff argues that these challenges arise because irregular adversaries change the character of their war from imposing one’s will on the enemy to compelling the enemy to accept one’s interest. While this shift may seem subtle, Pfaff argues, it suggests a number of important practical and ethical implications for our way of war. Formerly, civilians were largely separable from warfighting, meaning that our strategies of annihilation and attrition were the most effective—and ethical—paths to victory. But now, when combating irregular threats, civilians are no longer separable from warfighting. Consequently, strategies of annihilation and attrition not only undermine a successful resolution of the conflict, but they are unethical."

Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The concept of soft power, that is the influence attained through the co-option of foreigners by the attractiveness of our values, ideas, and practices, understandably has great appeal. Soft power is much cheaper than the hard power of military force, and it is more compatible with the culture of a principally liberal American society. All too often, military force seems to fail as an instrument of policy and, as a consequence, it invites the view that it is becoming obsolescent and even anachronistic. Dr. Colin Gray subjects hard and soft power to close critical scrutiny and finds that the latter is significantly misunderstood and, as a consequence, misassessed as a substitute for the threat or use of military force. Each kind of power has its limitations, but the obvious and familiar challenges characteristic of military force do not mean that therefore soft power should be our policy instrument of choice. The author warns against expecting too much of soft power."

Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The papers collected in this volume pertain to Central Asia. Indeed, they offer us two foreign views of the strategic situation evolving there—a Russian and a French analysis. For obvious reasons: the war in Afghanistan, proximity to major global actors, large energy holdings, and for less obvious reason, i.e., the possibility that domestic instability in one or more of these states could spread to other Muslim states as we now see in the Arab revolutions of 2011, Central Asia is an increasingly important and interesting strategic region. As such, it merits sustained critical attention and analysis of the sort we are presenting here and that we have presented in the past."

Implementing a New Vision: Unity of Effort in Preparing for and Responding to Catastrophic Events Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 17-18 November 2010, the Consortium for Homeland Defense and Security in America – consisting of the United States Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership, George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Heritage Foundation – held its annual symposium to examine pressing issues of shared concern regarding the domestic security of the United States and its allies. Conducted at Carlisle Barracks, the event was constructed around four panels, each devoted to a topic of interest specifically selected by the consortium partners. The first of these panels addressed the challenges of achieving Unity of Effort in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events."