Recent Articles

In the Dark; Military Planning for a Catastrophic Critical Infrastructure Event Mr Kevin J Cogan Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The earth is situated in a strategic location just 93 million miles from its sun. Since its creation it has survived the cataclysms of temperature extremes, meteor bombardments, and solar storm events. It has survived these events so well that life, including humans, has flourished and prospered in increasing numbers and progressively higher standards of living. For all but the last 150 years, the infrastructure constructed for better human living standards has been relatively unaffected by localized geological disasters or the broader effects of solar storms. But the harnessing of electrical power, begun in the mid-nineteenth century and its distribution via an interconnected grid to which 86% of the U.S. population is now connected, has created the potential for a near certain catastrophe of unprecedented proportion if it fails..."

The Government Assistance Center: A Vehicle for Transitioning to the Host Government Doctor Raymond A Millen, Carolyn Pruitt PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "In this monograph, Professor Raymond Millen proposes a way for non-military organizations to render assistance and development to fragile states through an organizational approach. Accordingly, he proffers the concept of the Government Assistance Center as a vehicle for effective coordination and cooperation in Whole of Government and Comprehensive approaches. Conceptually, the Government Assistance Center embodies a standardized camp and an organizational structure for decision-making."

Cyber Infrastructure Protection COL Louis H Jordan Jr, Dr Tarek N Saadawi Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The Internet, as well as other telecommunication networks and information systems, have become an integrated part of our daily lives, and our dependency upon their underlying infrastructure is ever-increasing. Unfortunately, as our dependency has grown, so have hostile attacks on the cyber infrastructure by network predators. The lack of security as a core element in the initial design of these information systems has made common desktop software, infrastructure services, and information networks increasingly vulnerable to continuous and innovative breakers of security. Worms, viruses, and spam are examples of attacks that cost the global economy billions of dollars in lost productivity. Sophisticated distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that use thousands of web robots (bots) on the Internet and telecommunications networks are on the rise. The ramifications of these attacks are clear: the potential for a devastating large-scale network failure, service interruption, or the total unavailability of service."

The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies Dr Geraint Hughes Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that in Northern Ireland demonstrate, any liberal democracy that uses its armed forces to combat terrorism will incur controversy both domestically and internationally."

Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon Dr Florence Gaub Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Since U.S. operations began in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi armed forces have embarked on a huge transformation. In this groundbreaking monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub focuses on the structural and sociological aspects of rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces, which she observes and comments on through the lens of lessons learned from Lebanon’s experience of rebuilding its own armed forces in the late 20th century following civil war."

Collins Center Update, Volume 13, Issue 2 (Spring 2011) Colonel John Laganelli, Colonel (Ret.) Charles W. Allen, Professor Bernard F. Griffard, Dr. Kent H. Butts Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Mass Atrocity: Prevention and Response Workshop Report Professor Dwight Raymond Workshop Report by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute In December 2010, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy co-hosted a workshop on Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). The event followed the earlier publication of the MARO Military Planning Handbook, and was attended by 85 people from a diverse range of organizations."

Junior Leader Professional Development — Who Has the Time? Dr Steven Metz Op-ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While researching General Matthew Ridgway’s oral history at the Military History Institute, author Tom Ricks came across this astute quote: “My advice to any young officer is read—read—read. And learn from the successes of the great ones and their failures.” Few Americans speak with greater authority on the requirements of military leadership than Ridgway. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II; the 8th Army in the Korean War; replaced Douglas MacArthur as the overall commander in Korea; served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; and then as Army Chief of Staff. He was both an exceptional leader and a strategist. We should heed what Ridgway had to say."

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."