Europe & Russia

John A. Nagl, Project Director, and Michael T. Hackett, Chief of Staff; Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press; Following the 2024 A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, which explored military lessons learned from the first year of the Russia-Ukraine War, this book examines the changing character of war as the second year of the war unfolded. This year’s authors explore the conflict from four different angles: information advantage (intelligence, information operations, and cyber); landpower operations (fires, maneuver, force protection, mission command, and mercenaries); multi-domain operations (air and maritime); and crosscutting themes (diplomacy, sustainment, and innovation and adaptation). The second year witnessed the innovative approaches to combat of the first year—drones, unmanned aerial systems, and electronic-warfare offensive and defensive capabilities—combined with entrenched warfare not seen at the current scale in Europe since World War I. The use of mercenary private military companies like the Wagner Group generated moments of high suspense (with a failed mutiny in July 2023) and led to changes in Russian force structure and tactics. Delays in continued allied support tested the resolve and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which nevertheless kept up the fight and held Russia back. Through it all, the conflict offers a compelling picture of the war of the future, along with lessons for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to prepare the Joint Force to meet the challenges of the large-scale combat operations of tomorrow. ©2026 John A. Nagl. All rights reserved.

By Colonel Larry A. Wyatt, Dr. Michele Devlin, Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Weather-induced instability, such as the 2023–24 dzud (a slow-onset Mongolian winter disaster characterized by large-scale livestock mortality), creates schisms adversaries use to expand their soft power, Mongolia’s movement toward US adversaries could indirectly threaten US national security by heightening instability, increasing competition, and disrupting global economic systems. Conversely, through increased environmental diplomacy, investment, and resilience building—and by promoting democratic partnerships to bolster regional stability and showcase US leadership while mitigating adversarial exploitation of vulnerable regions—the United States can mitigate the impacts of ecological challenges on its national security interests.

Antulio J. Echevarria II; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Such leverage would prove especially useful because Kyiv is unlikely to be permitted to join NATO and the United States may reduce its presence in Europe. Western analysts have not given Russian deterrence enough credit for the alliance’s deterrence failure on February 24, 2022. The alliance did not act fecklessly, nor did it self-deter. Rather, NATO’s deterrence measures were calibrated more for hybrid/gray-zone attacks of the sort it saw in 2014, not for the large-scale combat operations the alliance witnessed in 2022, which involved a nuclear-armed adversary with stronger interests in Ukraine than NATO had. To be sure, the alliance’s leaders acted responsibly in managing the risk of escalation. But in so doing, they also facilitated Russian deterrence efforts, which succeeded in keeping Washington and Brussels from intervening in the war. The alliance thus demonstrated its need for a strategy that would increase the risks and costs of war for Russia without unduly raising NATO’s. In short, the alliance needs a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war,” whereby NATO can provide its full political, economic, and military support to Ukraine without running the risk of putting alliance troops in harm’s way.

John R. Deni and Jeffrey D. Rathke, Editors; Collaborative study from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, American-German Institute, US Army War College Press; The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Copyright: Chapter 1 - ©2025 John R. Deni. All rights reserved; Chapter 2 - ©2025 Marina E. Henke. All rights reserved; Chapter 3 - ©2025 John R. Deni. All rights reserved; Chapter 4 - ©2025 Aylin Matlé. All rights reserved; Chapter 5 - ©2025 Sophia Besch. All rights reserved; Chapter 6 - ©2025 Tim Bosch. All rights reserved; Chapter 7 - ©2025 Angela E. Stent. All rights reserved; Chapter 8 - ©2025 Jeffrey D. Rathke and Theresa Luetkefend. All rights reserved; Chapter 9 - ©2025 May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon de Cet. All rights reserved;

R. Evan Ellis, ©2025 R. Evan Ellis; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; Innovative new thinking on the security dimension of the challenges posed by the PRC’s engagement in Latin America and the DoD’s role in the whole-of-government US response is needed. This monograph highlights risks from PRC influence networks, digital architectures, and dual-use commercial facilities in the region, particularly at ports and in the space sector; shows how PRC economic engagement and other support sustains illiberal regimes, indirectly contributing to the risks these regimes pose by hosting criminal and terrorist groups and other US adversaries, such as Russia and Iran; and illustrates how commercial, people-to-people, and security engagements create options for the PRC to exploit against the United States in times of war. It advocates for new effects-based strategic concepts for how the DoD can strengthen cooperation with the region and limit PRC access through enhanced security cooperation and leveraging partners’ valuation of their relationships with the United States to influence their choices regarding cooperation with the PRC and gain better situational awareness for responding to China. Finally, it discusses how the United States should work with regional partners to plan for likely PRC actions in the region in times of war, leveraging the presence, relationships, and knowledge created through engagement.

Ron Gurantz, ©2024 Ron Gurantz; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US strategy in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine appeared to undermine Russian efforts to justify the war. While studies of international crises typically focus on the goals of deterrence and escalation management, recent events in Ukraine show that counterjustification is another important objective. Russia used covert activities and deception to try and create a pretext for its invasion, and the United States aggressively countered these efforts. This monograph presents an exhaustive study of the US military, diplomatic, and informational strategy in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine and derives lessons about counterjustification that can be applied in future crises. The study should help military officers and government officials develop effective counterjustification tactics.

COL Mike Flury, COL Andi Tallman, LTC Troy Johnson, LTC Nick Panepinto, LTC Patrick Ryan; Publication from US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; China’s Strategic Blueprint: Creating a Multipolar World Through 2035 is a comprehensive analysis exploring China’s strategic ambitions to establish a China-led international order by 2035. The report delves into China’s likely use of hybrid warfare tactics, including economic and cyber warfare, to challenge the current U.S.-led global norms. It also examines China’s strategic partnerships, particularly with Russia, and its initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, which aim to expand its influence without forming traditional military alliances, reflecting China’s preference for flexible partnerships over rigid alliances.

The Future Role of Strategic Landpower Dr. Gregory L. Cantwell, Major Justin M. Magula Integrated Research Project by the US Army War College, US Army War College Press, Center for Strategic Leadership "Recent Russian aggression in Ukraine has reenergized military strategists and senior leaders to evaluate the role of strategic Landpower. American leadership in the European theater has mobilized allies and partners to reconsider force postures for responding to possible aggression against NATO members. Although Russian revisionist activity remains a threat in Europe, the challenges in the Pacific for strategic Landpower must also be considered. At the same time, the homeland, the Arctic, climate change, and the results of new and emerging technology also challenge the application of strategic Landpower..."

Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century Dr C. A. Pfaff Monograph by the US Army War College, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete."