The Space Domain
The space domain has become an important focus for the Department of Defense. Satellites greatly enhance American, allied, and partner nations’ military power, providing positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IRS); environmental monitoring; and communication. Satellites enable battlefield awareness, all-weather precision attacks, beyond line-of-sight targeting, global command and control (C2), early missile warning, over-the-horizon unmanned aircraft system operations, and more. Space products and services have become critical enablers of modern conventional military operations, nuclear command and control, and global power projection.
Satellite Vulnerabilities
Still, American reliance on space systems creates vulnerabilities. Potential rivals have developed weapons to target space systems and prevent space systems use in conflict, crisis, and competition. The satellite, the ground stations, and the link between them are all part of the attack surface. China, India, Russia, and the United States have demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites using interceptors launched from Earth. China and Russia have tested on-orbit systems they could use to attack satellites physically. In a worst-case scenario, nuclear weapons could be used to damage or destroy large numbers of satellites.
Satellite systems (both on-orbit and terrestrial) are vulnerable to electronic and cyberattacks, which China and Russia consider integral to modern war. Satellite ground stations and the link between the satellite and the ground may be easier to attack than the satellite itself. Not just military satellites are at risk; increasingly, military forces across the world are using commercial service providers, putting companies at risk. Disruptions to civilian service providers would not just impact the military but could affect the global economy.
Seeing how space services enhance nearly every aspect of America’s military forces, China has been rapidly developing space capabilities to support its military operations. Since 2018, China has more than tripled its number of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, leaving China second only to the United States in the quest to conquer outer space. China has developed a fully operational positioning, navigation, and timing constellation and operates more than 60 communication satellites. Space systems provide China with long-range strike capabilities and other capabilities the United States has long benefited from. Although Russia’s military also uses satellites and Russia has a long history in space, its program is more narrowly focused due to economic constraints and technological setbacks. In the face of challenges in the space domain, General B. Chance Saltzman, the chief of space operations, said the US Space Force will seek to achieve space superiority, ensuring the use of US space systems in war while denying adversaries the use of their space systems. Like superiority in other domains, space superiority will involve domain awareness, defensive operations, and offensive operations. The United States will apply space superiority in space, on Earth, and in cyberspace.
Certain features specific to the space domain make achieving superiority especially difficult. The destruction of satellites can create debris that remains in orbit, threatening other satellites and potentially endangering the use of entire orbits. Because of the threat posed by debris, Saltzman has written, “domain control in space cannot rely on overwhelming destructive force.” Other difficulties include satellites’ vulnerability to nuclear attack and the potential for escalation. The challenge is to achieve superiority without causing or provoking massive destruction in the domain.
Russell Vela, chief of US Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s Multi-Domain Technologies Division, briefs General Stephen N. Whiting, commander of US Space Command, on the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command SPECTRE (Space Emerging Commercial Technology Rapid Engagement) transportable distributed aperture research system (US Army photo by Jason B. Cutshaw).
Satellite Defense
Proliferation and disaggregation appear to be the US Space Force’s primary approach to ensuring a constant flow of space services and products. By orbiting numerous relatively inexpensive satellites, including large constellations of networked satellites, the government and private firms can make defeating the system and denying services much more difficult and expensive for adversaries. Proliferation will not solve all problems. The United States still relies on legacy systems that are more vulnerable to attack. Certain types of attacks, like nuclear detonations, cyberattacks, or threats to the supply chain, can still affect many satellites at once. Budgets, and even the carrying capacity of certain orbits, also limit proliferation. Other approaches, like satellite protection or rapid reconstitution, may also be necessary.
Nonkinetic offensive capabilities will also likely be part of the space-superiority campaign. The United States seeks to limit debris creation and has already pledged not to conduct debris-producing tests of anti-satellite weapons. The US emphasis suggests the US Space Force will prefer electronic and cyber capabilities for offensive operations. Currently, the only known offensive system in the US Space Force is for electronic warfare.
Space in the Russia-Ukraine War
The Russia-Ukraine War offers a window into the role of space on the modern battlefield: space services include persistent surveillance, communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing. In response to the reliance on space in the Russia-Ukraine War, military forces are using electronic and cyber warfare to deny access to space services. The possibility of escalation and the sheer number of satellites in orbit have likely deterred on-orbit kinetic attacks, apart from a debris-producing, anti-satellite missile test Russia conducted a few months before the war began.
Ukraine’s use of commercial satellites for communication and imagery shows countries without their own space assets may use space capabilities. Space services are a way to project power by supporting allies and partners without entering into direct conflict with an adversary. Space services introduce complicated questions about the obligations companies and governments have to each other. Of course, lessons about space power must be applied carefully. China is a far more capable space power than Russia, and other countries are growing more capable of using space.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense labels space a war-fighting domain. The Department of Defense’s assessment focuses specifically on the military use of satellites along with satellites’ vulnerabilities and the efforts to mitigate them. Other space-domain issues, including exploration, commerce, and governance, will also shape the strategic environment in years to come.
Photo Credit
Jason Cutshaw, SPACECOM Commander Visits Army Space Command, February 12, 2024, DVIDS, link.