Asia: The United States Indo-Pacific Command Area of Operations
In the Asian strategic security environment, as in the world, the People’s Republic of China and its growing power, ambitions, and assertiveness pose the most significant challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners. The United States–China rivalry, which features competition in security affairs, economics, technology, and visions for the future of the world order, raises the possibility of military conflict in potential hot spots in the Indo-Pacific.
Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific
United States–China relations reached a low point in 2023 when a Chinese spy balloon crossed the United States before being shot down. The spy-balloon incident occurred only a few months after China conducted large-scale military exercises near Taiwan in response to then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to the island. Following Pelosi’s visit, China closed formal military-to-military communications channels with the United States. The spy-balloon incident, the events surrounding Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, and other issues, including China’s continued close relationship with Russia amid the Russia-Ukraine War, contributed to rising tensions in the United States–China relationship.
The United States sought to use President Joe Biden’s November 2023 meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping to stabilize the bilateral relationship. The two leaders discussed cooperation in regulating artificial intelligence, stemming the flow of fentanyl precursors from China, and other issues. Military-to-military ties resumed, resulting in US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s video teleconference with Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun in April 2024, Austin’s first meeting with his Chinese counterpart since becoming the secretary of defense. In the renewed military-to-military discussions, US officials have expressed concern about unsafe Chinese intercepts and encounters with US aircraft and ships, challenging the limitations of current crisis-management mechanisms.
Despite efforts to stabilize the relationship, US concerns about China’s capabilities and intentions continue to grow. China is increasing the scale, tempo, and frequency of its military activities near Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China’s concerns about Taiwan’s trajectory will likely increase following the victory of Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te in Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024. China sought to pressure Taiwanese voters not to elect Lai, who rejects the notion Taiwan is part of China and argues Taiwan should maintain its free and democratic way of life. Lai’s May 2024 inauguration marks the third consecutive presidential term for the Democratic Progressive Party, heightening the People’s Republic of China’s concerns its prospects of gaining control of Taiwan are fading. In turn, US concerns that China could invade Taiwan or mount a blockade of the island sometime in the coming years are increasing.
China has also increased its aggressive activity in the South China Sea, especially toward the Philippines. In defiance of a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal, China claims ownership of nearly the entire South China Sea, including the Second Thomas Shoal, which lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. On several recent occasions, Chinese coast guard vessels fired water cannons at Philippine vessels that were resupplying troops stationed onboard a warship the Philippines grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal to stake the Philippines’ claim to the area.
China’s continued close relationship with Russia is also a source of tension in its relations with the United States. Since Russia mounted its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has maintained a position of pro-Russian neutrality concerning the Russia-Ukraine War. China has joined Russia in blaming the West for provoking the conflict and has offered crucial economic support to Russia, including through increased purchases of energy resources. Still, China has refrained from providing Russia with lethal assistance. But in spring 2024, US officials accused China of helping Russia strengthen its industrial base by providing chips, cruise-missile engines, and dual-use technologies that contribute to the Russian war effort. The United States threatened to impose sanctions on Chinese companies and financial institutions involved in transactions with Russia.
Xi’s consolidation of power in recent years strengthened his ability to pursue assertive foreign and security policies. Xi secured a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 and as president in March 2023, subsequently stacking the top Chinese leadership with loyalists. The overall emphasis of Xi’s policies has shifted toward national and regime security, even at the cost of some economic growth. In 2023, Xi dealt with a corruption scandal in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force that resulted in the removal of many officials. Defense Minister Li Shangfu also disappeared from his position and was eventually replaced.
Despite the corruption scandal, China’s military modernization continues, featuring significant investments in naval, nuclear, missile, and space capabilities and hypersonic-weapons development. China’s military buildup complicates US efforts to defend allies and partners against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. The People’s Republic of China has also advanced a series of initiatives to attract support from countries worldwide, particularly in the Global South, and to lay the groundwork for a revised international order conducive to China’s one-party, authoritarian system flourishing. China’s initiatives include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Development Initiative. China’s efforts to expand nontraditional security cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, have achieved varying results but are still in their early stages.
In addition to the challenges China poses, North Korea’s increased assertiveness is also a source of growing concern for the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. In early 2024, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells in waters near South Korean border islands, abandoned its policy of peaceful reunification with South Korea, and said it had tested an underwater nuclear drone. North Korea’s military buildup and accelerated pace of weapons testing led some observers to conclude North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un seeks to gain recognition of his country’s nuclear status and to gain concessions from the United States. Some observers even raised alarms North Korea might be preparing for a military assault on South Korea. North Korea appeared to be emboldened by its increasingly close relationship with Russia, which North Korea has supplied with artillery shells, missiles, and other munitions for the Russia-Ukraine War. In June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, where he and Kim Jong-Un signed a defense pact in which they pledged to provide immediate military assistance to each other in the event of war. The Russia–North Korea relationship is a potential source of irritation for China,which has long been the country with the greatest influence over the regime in Pyongyang.
A Concerted Response
American allies in the Indo-Pacific have responded to the increased threat they perceive from China by strengthening cooperation with the United States and among themselves. In August 2023, Biden hosted Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol for a summit to strengthen a three-way alliance. Japan and South Korea have a long history of mistrust dating to the era of Japan’s colonial occupation of South Korea. But Japan and South Korea’s shared concerns about China have spurred greater cooperation, including in a trilateral format with the United States.
In April 2024, during Kishida’s visit to Washington, the United States and Japan announced what they called the most significant upgrade in the history of the US-Japanese alliance. The upgrade features a restructuring of the US military command in Japan to strengthen bilateral operational planning and exercises. The perception of a growing threat from China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the increasingly close China-Russia partnership have together prompted a shift in Japan’s military and security policies. Japan issued a new National Security Strategy in 2022, significantly increasing Japan’s defense spending. In addition to its growing cooperation with South Korea, Japan has also sought closer collaboration with other US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems with the 1-94th Field Artillery, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, fire missiles at simulated targets during the US-Thai exercise Cobra Gold 2024 on a range near Lop Buri, Thailand (US Army National Guard photo by Sergeant Alec Dionne).
During Kishida’s visit to Washington in April 2024, he also participated in a trilateral summit with Biden and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., during which the three leaders vowed to strengthen the deterrence of China in the South China Sea. Japan and the Philippines have discussed deploying Japanese troops to the Philippines on a rotating basis. Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States announced they would hold a joint military exercise in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (known as AUKUS) has also discussed inviting Japan to join Pillar 2, which involves cooperating on advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, undersea capabilities, and hypersonic weapons. In 2023, Japan also signed a security-cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom that allows Japan and the United Kingdom to deploy forces in each other’s countries.
Japan continues to engage actively in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, along with Australia, India, and the United States. India is vital to the US Indo-Pacific strategy, despite not being fully aligned with US policies. A bloody clash between Indian and Chinese troops along the two countries’ disputed Himalayan border in June 2020 helped push India toward closer cooperation with the United States and other Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members. But India has declined to join efforts to support Ukraine in its resistance against Russian aggression, preferring to maintain India’s long-standing ties to Moscow. India has also refrained from fully embracing the US strategies for restraining China or defending Taiwan. Given India’s preference for strategic autonomy, its ultimate role in US strategy in the Indo-Pacific remains uncertain and is likely to depend primarily upon the threat India perceives from China.
Conclusion
The challenges China poses to the interests of the United States and US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are likely to grow in the coming years. China’s actions toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea make both locations potential hot spots, and China’s tenuous relations with Japan and India are also sources of regional tension. Additionally, the Korean Peninsula remains a source of concern, especially in light of North Korea’s increasingly provocative behavior. The United States has responded to the China challenge by combining deterrence and assurance. The US response involved increasing the US military posture in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening cooperation with regional allies and partners, bilaterally and in multilateral groupings. In the years ahead, maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific will depend on the success of US efforts.
Photo Credit
Alec Dionne, HIMARS Range at Cobra Gold 2024 [Image 2 of 5], March 3, 2024, DVIDS, link.