Collections

  •  Strategic Insights: Five Myths Associated With Employing Private Military Companies

    Strategic Insights: Five Myths Associated With Employing Private Military Companies

    Strategic Insights: Five Myths Associated With Employing Private Military Companies Dr Edward Mienie, Dr C. A. Pfaff Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press
    • Published On: 4/5/2019
  •  Two Case Studies of Successful Strategic Communication Campaigns

    Two Case Studies of Successful Strategic Communication Campaigns

    Two Case Studies of Successful Strategic Communication Campaigns Dr Thomas P. Galvin Report by the US Army War College, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "Strategic communication has historically been cited as a weakness in U.S. military operations, both at the operational and strategic levels. Numerous studies have highlighted problems with U.S. abilities to promote a coherent message and influence the environment to be favorable to its strategic interests. Failures are easy to identify. The effects of poor communication can manifest themselves quickly; however, what about successes? Rarely are they discussed, perhaps because it is difficult to know when a campaign achieved enough of the desired effects such that leaders can claim success."
    • Published On: 3/5/2019
  •  What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

    What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

    What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States? Mr Keir Giles Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the continuities and changes in the foreign policy posture of Russia’s front-line states following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014. As a British scholar on Russia, Keir Giles explains that Moscow already voiced its opposition when the Baltic States accessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the color revolutions presented a democratization model on Russia’s doorstep. However, at that time, Russia did not possess the confidence or the capability to counter what it perceived as Western expansionism by using direct military action."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect

    Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect

    Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect Dwight Raymond, Annie Su PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "This paper discusses the two prominent frameworks for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. The 2001 R2P report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presented three phases for R2P (prevent, react, rebuild)..."
    • Published On: 2/1/2019
  •  Peace & Stability Journal, Special 25th Anniversary Edition

    Peace & Stability Journal, Special 25th Anniversary Edition

    Peace & Stability Journal, Special 25th Anniversary Edition Peace and Stability Journal by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
    • Published On: 11/27/2018
  •  Creating Great Expectations: Strategic Communications and American Airpower

    Creating Great Expectations: Strategic Communications and American Airpower

    Creating Great Expectations: Strategic Communications and American Airpower Dr Conrad C Crane Letort Paper by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Of all the American military services, the two most active and adept in strategic communications in the last century have been the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). As the smallest service, the Marines have pursued a very successful public relations campaign to trumpet their accomplishments and ensure their survival. It is a standing joke that a Marine rifle squad consists of eight riflemen and two cameramen.,,"
    • Published On: 11/5/2018
  •  Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never

    Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never

    Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never Dr M. Chris Mason Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press
    • Published On: 10/23/2018
  •  Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End?

    Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End?

    Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End? Azeem Ibrahim Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Prior to 1912, Libya was a province within the Ottoman Empire and subdivided into two regions (Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east) reflecting a long-standing ethnic and geographic division in the country. Although not administered separately, the large region reaching south into the Sahara had a different ethnic make-up compared to the rest of the country and was more connected to sub-Saharan Africa than to the Mediterranean. Ottoman control in the south was limited to a few towns, which gave them some oversight of the trade routes; but by the start of the 20th century, Ottoman authority was notional rather than effective in this region."
    • Published On: 9/26/2018
  •  Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End?

    Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End?

    Strategic Insights: ISIS in Libya: A Threat or a Dead-End? Dr Azeem Ibrahim Article by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Prior to 1912, Libya was a province within the Ottoman Empire and subdivided into two regions (Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east) reflecting a long-standing ethnic and geographic division in the country. Although not administered separately, the large region reaching south into the Sahara had a different ethnic make-up compared to the rest of the country and was more connected to sub-Saharan Africa than to the Mediterranean. Ottoman control in the south was limited to a few towns, which gave them some oversight of the trade routes; but by the start of the 20th century, Ottoman authority was notional rather than effective in this region."
    • Published On: 9/26/2018
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