Collections

Transitional Public Security: Establishing Security in the “Golden Hour” Dr. Karen Finkenbinder PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "TPS is necessary to ensure that communities in post-conflict environments, or when law and order has broken down, are stabilized; thus, preventing bad actors from flourishing. It may well be that Department of Defense (DoD) is tasked to conduct TPS in accordance with DoD policy. A lot of work has been done to ensure that DoD is prepared to implement the policy and much more needs to be done. This is the story of where we are now and how we got there."

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs for Military Practitioners Dr. Raymond A. Millen PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs for Military Practitioners serves as a guide for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing activities in support of such operations. As the book underscores, the military’s supporting role is not passive; instead, it practices active engagement by incorporating the experience and expertise of DDR partners. Achieving a sense of teamwork among diverse organizational cultures requires creative thinking. While recognizing that DDR is essentially a civilian-led venture, the military can furnish key enablers that enhance performance and effectiveness. PKSOI regards this book as a valuable reference for military and civilian organizations coming together to implement meaningful DDR."

Human Security in U.S. Military Operations: A Primer for DOD Sarah Petrin PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "The U.S. Army has always worked among people in areas of conflict. In recent times, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are wrestling with what human security means, how military operations impact it, and what can be done to mitigate the harm. This primer is published to inform those within DOD working in this area, whether commanders, planners or curious soldiers and civilians. If we have learned nothing else in the past 20 years of war and its aftermath, it should be that the human domain is complex. If we fail to get our efforts right in these areas, we may well have tactical successes and strategic failure."

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency through a National Reconciliation Program Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq Dr. Raymond A. Millen PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency."

Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center "The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. “Riding the Hydra,” however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war."

A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice..."

Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities..."

“Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)."

Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect Dwight Raymond, Annie Su PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "This paper discusses the two prominent frameworks for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. The 2001 R2P report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presented three phases for R2P (prevent, react, rebuild)..."