Collections

Transitional Public Security: Establishing Security in the “Golden Hour” Dr. Karen Finkenbinder PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "TPS is necessary to ensure that communities in post-conflict environments, or when law and order has broken down, are stabilized; thus, preventing bad actors from flourishing. It may well be that Department of Defense (DoD) is tasked to conduct TPS in accordance with DoD policy. A lot of work has been done to ensure that DoD is prepared to implement the policy and much more needs to be done. This is the story of where we are now and how we got there."

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency through a National Reconciliation Program Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq Dr. Raymond A. Millen PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application of national reconciliation programs to undermine insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national reconciliation programs. Such programs have received little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study provides insights of particular interest for US assistance to countries suffering from an insurgency."

A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice..."

Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities..."

Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center "The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. “Riding the Hydra,” however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war."

“Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)."

Stability in Multi-Domain Battle COL Stephen C. Marr PKSOI Paper by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "Stability is a fundamental component of Multi-Domain Battle (MDB). Integrating stability activities with MDB provides the entire Joint Force with increased decision space and expands freedom of operation. Stability actions during competition build partner capability, capacity, and resilience; identify and counter adversary destabilization efforts; and support deterrence. Stability actions during armed conflict increase the options for the application of all instruments of national power and protect the legitimacy of the United States Government (USG) integrated campaign. Finally, stability actions following armed combat prevent an adversary from reversing friendly gains, reestablish civilian control, and enable a sustainable future. Stability is the common thread that weaves Multi-Domain Battle, the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), and our national strategic documents together."

Stabilization: A New Approach to Whole of Government Operational Planning and Execution Professor William J Flavin PKSOI Paper by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. Such an operational environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. Government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners and supported by the affected nation to achieve their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities."

2017-2018 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: Civil Affairs: A Force for Consolidating Gains Colonel Christopher J Holshek PKSOI Paper by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, The Civil Affairs Association In coordination with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School/Special Operations Center of Excellence, International Peace & Security Institute, Alliance for Peacebuilding and the Foreign Area Officer Association " 'The problems we face are much too complex for one organization to take on,' concluded 2017 Civil Affairs Symposium keynote speaker Maj. Gen. Kurt L. Sonntag, Commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School/Special Operations Center of Excellence, or USAKJFKSWCS/SOCoE – the “schoolhouse” for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. 'We need everyone’s help in this room to safeguard our future and consolidate our own Civil Affairs gains that have been hard fought and won for so long.' "