

## Counter Ideology: An Information Based Strategy to Defeat Ideological Threats

by

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## **Abstract**

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## **Counter Ideology: An Information Based Strategy to Defeat Ideological Threats**

To defeat the aggressors is not enough to make peace durable. The main thing is to discard the ideology that generates war.

—Ludwig von Mises<sup>1</sup>

Most Americans trace the start of the American Revolution to July 4, 1776 when the 56 delegates of the Second Continental Congress approved and signed the Declaration of Independence, concluding “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”<sup>2</sup> However, in the years that followed, John Adams expressed a different perspective.

As to the history of the revolution, my ideas may be peculiar, perhaps singular. What do we mean by the Revolution? The War? That was no part of the Revolution; it was only an effect and consequence of it. The Revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington. The records of thirteen legislatures, the pamphlets, newspapers in all the colonies, ought to be consulted during that period to ascertain the steps by which the public opinion was enlightened and informed concerning the authority of Parliament over the colonies.<sup>3</sup>

Between 1760 and 1775 the American colonies underwent an astounding ideological transformation. The British aristocracy was cast aside and America embarked upon a grand experiment to create a new form of government, a constitutional republic, rooted in the ideals of democratic liberalism, limited government, the rule of law, and freedom of expression.<sup>4</sup> The Revolution was not merely a struggle for control of territory. It was an ideological and political movement, a movement of thought which was “rapid, irreversible, and irresistible.”<sup>5</sup> This ideological beginning has left an imprint upon the American psyche which is carried forth today. Some might argue that American foreign policy is motivated by ideology more so than by narrowly defined national interests.<sup>6</sup>

In the twentieth century, America faced several ideological challenges: fascism, communism, and nationalism to name a few. In World War II, expanding fascism was met with an exceptional degree of force. However, after the Soviets attained a nuclear weapon, force alone could no longer be relied upon to counter a rival ideological adversary without unconscionable consequences. As a result, diplomat George Kennan's "Long Telegram" and National Security Council paper NSC- 68 (entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security") guided a new strategy; one which harnessed all instruments of national power to contain communism by countering its ideological appeal. However, when force was employed in a limited fashion, it was often found to be wanting. The Vietnam War demonstrated that a determined, ideologically motivated adversary could withstand an enormous amount of pain and suffering, and not submit. The United States discovered that forceful measures short of "virtual genocide" may not be enough to defeat a determined insurgency.<sup>7</sup> Vietnam revealed that America was not willing to go to the same lengths as ancient empires in order to absorb or destroy a smaller adversary.<sup>8</sup>

The limited utility of military force in countering ideologically motivated groups was confirmed in a 2008 RAND study which examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. Of the 268 movements that ended in that time frame, only 7% were stopped through military force compared to 43% that were stopped through a political solution. In further contrast, 10% of these movements achieved outright victory despite military intervention.<sup>9</sup> These statistics should serve as a stark reminder for strategists operating at the dawn of the 21st century, facing a rising militant Islamic movement that is erasing borders across the Middle East and North Africa. There are

limits to what military power can achieve. In some cases, the violent true believer can only be stopped if the ideas nurturing violence are discredited.<sup>10</sup> In that vein, this paper examines a counter ideological strategy and proposes a framework by which to address ideological challenges. It outlines the basic process that ideological movements use to gain momentum in pursuit of geopolitical change and suggests approaches to counter them. Finally, recommendations are provided in applying this framework to the militant Islamic problem to outline a possible strategy by which the United States can address the challenge the militant Islamic movement presents.

### Counter Ideological Strategy

The obvious first step in formulating a counter ideological strategy is to glean a thorough understanding of the ideology in question and the supporting cultural context of the society in which it has developed. Despite the multicultural composition of the United States, it has demonstrated time and again to be a poor student of socio-cultural dynamics in the international arena. Failure to study foreign thought adequately has often led to a widespread perspective that, “there really are no ‘others,’ and that enmity, hostility, and misunderstandings are passing phenomena, always amenable to conciliation or some sort of settlement.”<sup>11</sup> This perspective ignores the real world ideological cleavages that not only cause friction in the international environment, but if handled indelicately, can and do lead to confrontation and conflict. Americans are conditioned by their history to believe that universal rights such as liberty, freedom of expression, and equality are the birthright of humankind everywhere.<sup>12</sup> However, not every culture finds such rights to be universal, many prioritize other cultural values over individual rights. This aspect may be particularly relevant in societies heavily influenced by religion. Freedom of expression and religion are foundational principles in the United

States, thus Americans often have a deep aversion to analyzing conflict through a religious lens.<sup>13</sup> However, Americans must overcome this tendency as such socio-cultural knowledge and intelligence is vital to developing counter ideological strategy. Developing a socio-cultural analytic model is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that strategists must be well informed about a society's cultural dynamics in regard to values, worldview, and social groupings in order to obtain a reasonable understanding of that society's ideology.<sup>14</sup>

If strategy formulation can be thought of as a measured balance of ends, ways, and means, then the appropriate next step in developing a counter-ideological strategy is to define the desired end.<sup>15</sup> All too often military strategists seek a specific end, a virtual binary success or failure proposition. This problem is amplified when military strategists become overly ambitious and choose unobtainable objectives as their desired end. A better approach is to create a range of acceptable outcomes. The United States often seeks to spread democracy and hopes to alter another target society's hostile ideology. This is simply unrealistic. Such ideological change requires deep shifts in a society's culture and is only likely to happen over long intervals, if at all. While this might be a long-term optimal end, a wise strategist will convince decision makers to seek smaller incremental shifts as an acceptable outcome. The goal ought to be to divert a rival ideology from pursuing a direct collision course with United States' values and interests. Correspondingly, a wise strategist and a prudent leader will ensure U.S. ideology is not driving toward the same collision. If the rival ideologies are so diametrically opposed that a mutually satisfactory equilibrium cannot be reached, a different approach must be taken. In this contingency, the overall object should be to

develop a containment strategy to limit potential violence to the smallest possible geographic area while hindering expansion of the rival ideology.

An illustration of the desired incremental shift is useful for conceptualization. The bell curve in figure 1 represents the ideological spectrum of the target society.<sup>16</sup> The extreme right side of the graph represents the active adherents to the rival ideology.




Figure 1. Population Distribution across Ideological Spectrum<sup>17</sup>

The extreme left side of the graph represents active opponents of the ideology. In cases of an emerging ideology, both of these groups are likely to be numerically small as depicted on the graph and bounded by the heavy vertical lines. Just inside the heavy vertical boundaries are groups that will provide passive support (e.g., funding, cover, etc.) to the adherents or opponents respectively, but are not willing to conduct easily observable action in support the cause<sup>18</sup>. The next set of groups to the inside of the graph represent portions of the population that do not yet support either side, but lean

one way or another. These groups are more susceptible to ideological pressure.<sup>19</sup> The much more densely populated center section of the graph represents the majority of the population that is ambivalent towards the ideology and is disengaged from the “battle of ideas”.<sup>20</sup> Generally, this group simply seeks to live in peace and will follow the path of least resistance to achieve that goal. Figure 2 depicts the desired incremental change within the target society. The overall distribution of the population (bell curve) has




Figure 2. Shifted Population Distribution

shifted to the left, indicating greater opposition the ideology.<sup>21</sup> Though the change is small, this is the type of incremental success that the counter ideological strategy should seek to achieve.

Once the end is defined, the strategist must determine the strategic concepts, or ways, by which to influence the rival ideology. Further detail will be provided in the next section, but in overview, the strategist must seek to exert continuous pressure on all

fronts against the rival ideology. As will be detailed below, there is limited potential for the United States as a democratic culture to alter a rival ideology singlehandedly. To be successful the United States must find members within the foreign society that already oppose the rival ideology, particularly if their outlook and interests align with those of the United States. Further, the United States must also seek other outside groups with cultural similarities to the society in question, yet do not share the rival ideology.<sup>22</sup> Again, it is critical that their interests and outlook roughly align with those of the United States, otherwise the United States will be merely trading one ideological problem for another. This is not to say that these groups must share every aspect of the United States' perspective in regard to universal rights, democracy, and other enduring beliefs. Instead, the objective is to ensure that these groups are not working in violent opposition to American principles.

To enable the strategy, these strategic concepts (ways) must be supported by resources or instruments of national power (means). U.S. means have typically been formulated around the so-called DIME construct which describes the instruments of national power as capabilities in the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic arenas. Specific uses of these instruments will be made clear when applying the counter ideological strategy to the militant Islamic movement. However, in general terms, diplomatic initiatives will primarily seek to develop allies among nations and non-state actors to support efforts against the rival ideology. Of particular concern is locating culturally similar groups and enlisting their aid in nudging the ideological target in a more neutral direction. Informational efforts will be essential to this counter ideological strategy and messaging. Initiatives must include efforts to temper U.S. ideological

measures that may worsen the problem. The objective is to ensure the disinterested portion of the target society remains neutral or is influenced in favor of the United States.<sup>23</sup> Allies that are culturally similar to the target will be utilized to counter and discredit the adversary's ideological initiatives. Military efforts will be ideally limited to defensive operations to contain violence and protect U.S. and allied interests. Offensive operations will be minimized to prevent escalation and potential complications. Such offensive operations will only be considered if the gain significantly outweighs potential damage to the informational campaign. Economic initiatives will seek to disrupt and deny the adherents' access to resources.

While weighing strategic approaches to a problem, it is imperative to consider the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of the options under consideration. Is the option feasible, that is, does the United States possess the capabilities and resources required to execute the end effectively? Is it suitable, that is, does the option have a realistic probability of success to achieve the desired end? Finally, is the option acceptable, does the proposed option fall in line with our culturally established domestic norms and values? Does it fall within the bounds of internationally accepted norms? Deficiencies in any of these areas result in the risk of not attaining that objective or end. Finally, the strategist must think beyond direct results and consider possible second and third order effects that are likely to result from implementing the policy objective. Actions that achieve short-term results at the expense of long-term strategic objectives are rarely worth pursuing, particularly in the long arc of time required to counter an ideology.

### Ideas Build Into Movements

In order to craft an effective counter ideology strategy, it is vital to understand how a lone political visionary builds an idea into a widespread movement. Most

analyses of revolutionary movements focus on the armed conflict stage of expansion and often skip the emergence of the idea which necessarily precedes it. If the U.S. goal is to stop the effective spread and influence of an idea, primarily through nonviolent means, it is useful to have a model for understanding how an ideology spreads. At its core, the expansion of an ideology involves generating change in the geopolitical status quo in order to overturn an existing system. In his book *Leading Change*, John Kotter developed an eight step model for implementing change in the corporate world. This model, with slight modification, is also applicable for generating change in the geopolitical arena.

Table 1. Kotter's Eight Steps for Implementing Change<sup>24</sup>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Establish a Sense of Urgency</li><li>• Create a Guiding Coalition</li><li>• Develop a Vision and Strategy</li><li>• Communicate the Change Vision</li><li>• Empower Subordinates for Broad-Based Action</li><li>• Generate Short-Term Wins</li><li>• Consolidate Gains and Produce More Change</li><li>• Anchor New Approaches in the Culture</li></ul>
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Kotter recognized that the initial obstacle to disrupting the status quo is complacency.<sup>25</sup> In order to overcome this impediment, a leader must attract attention and create a sense of urgency, thus highlighting problems in the present state of affairs.<sup>26</sup> A significant way to generate this sense of urgency is to precipitate a crisis.<sup>27</sup> No matter how capable a visionary is, he or she cannot implement substantial change alone. Thus, a leader must cultivate a core group of initial followers and groom them into a guiding coalition to propel change. These first followers are vital to the success of

a nascent movement.<sup>28</sup> Ideally, first followers bring expertise, credibility, leadership, and management skills to the movement.<sup>29</sup> This guiding coalition must then further develop the movement's vision and strategy.<sup>30</sup> To be effective, the vision must appeal to a broad spectrum of the desired population. It must be feasible, focused enough to provide guidance, flexible enough allow for individual initiative in a dynamic environment, and perhaps most importantly, be easy to understand and communicate to others.<sup>31</sup> Once the vision is defined it must be communicated to the masses. Crucial elements to effective communication of the vision are simplicity, accessibility, emotional and logical appeal, repetition across multiple forums and formats, and explanation of any apparent inconsistencies.<sup>32</sup> To promulgate the vision the leader and guiding coalition must then empower followers to take action and enact the desired change. This step requires developing a shared sense of purpose, providing requisite training, and creating organizational structures needed for action.<sup>33</sup> As action begins to move forward, it is vital to achieve short-term gains to generate momentum. These successes will provide evidence that any sacrifice has been worth the effort as well as undermine the opinions of cynics, transform neutral parties into supporters, and turn reluctant supporters into activists.<sup>34</sup> These initial actions generate information and lessons with which to fine tune the vision and strategy and thereby prompt additional gains.<sup>35</sup> After any initial successes, it is necessary to consolidate gains and expand the base of support. The guiding coalition can now leverage the attention and credibility they have attained to address weightier challenges, recognize and advance talented adherents, and spur further change.<sup>36</sup> As the movement succeeds, new cultural norms and values are created and new cultural symbols emerge.<sup>37</sup> This change must be captured and

firmly anchored in the growing ideological movement. The emerging culture helps unify a sense of purpose and imparts an impression of permanence. If successful, the emerging culture can provide standing and status within the wider society, thus aiding recruitment that will grow the movement.

This process is iterative. In fact, overlapping cycles of this change process are likely to occur simultaneously as the movement grows. To affect the widest possible audience the vision must be continually refined to attract more adherents. New guiding coalitions must be created to adapt the movement to different regional environments and perfect the message for acceptance by the local audience. If any part of the process is halted, the movement will begin to stagnate and energy will be lost. If the vision loses its luster or if additional successes cannot be achieved, the movement will start to wither.

#### Counter Ideological Strategy Detailed

To slow the growth, stall, and eventually reduce a rival ideological movement, a wise strategist will apply pressure against each step in the change process and impede it.<sup>38</sup> Table 1 provides a side-by-side analysis of each step in the change process and the recommended approach to counter it. As strengths and weaknesses are discovered, pressure must be tailored and applied so effort is not wasted by attacking unassailable portions of the process, but instead acting to maximize efforts against vulnerabilities.

While the rival ideology attempts to generate urgency, the United States must seek to defuse the situation, avoid a crisis, and prevent the rival from gaining attention.

Table 2. Change Model and Recommend Counter Actions

<b><u>Change Process Steps</u></b>	<b><u>Counter Initiative to Hinder Change</u></b>
Establish a Sense of Urgency	Defuse Situation / Avoid Crisis
Create a Guiding Coalition	Discredit Leadership and Sow Discord
Develop a Vision and Strategy	Discredit Vision & Strategy
Communicate the Change Vision	Hinder Dissemination of Vision
Empower Subordinates for Broad-Based Action	Sow Discord & Limit/Disable Subordinate Freedom of Action
Generate Short-Term Wins	Prevent / Reverse / Tarnish Gains
Consolidate Gains & Produce More Change	Complicate Governance
Anchor New Approaches in the Culture	Hinder Cultural Development

In most cases, a new ideology grows as a result of real or perceived oppression. In the case of the American Revolution, as an example, the revolutionary idea resulted from successive measures imposed by Great Britain, the mother country, which impinged upon the colonists' perceived rights as Englishmen.<sup>39</sup> In the case of Marxist-Leninism during the twentieth century, this was exemplified by economic class conflict and perceived oppression of the proletariat at the hands of the bourgeoisie.<sup>40</sup> Thus, the strategist's objective in this line of effort is to identify the source of tension that instigates the real or perceived grievance and mitigate it.

As the rival ideology attempts to create its guiding coalition, the United States must take action to discredit its leadership and sow discord among its membership. Trust is vital within the inner circle in order to function effectively as a team.<sup>41</sup> Every effort should be taken to destroy this trust. It is likely that groups agitating for

geopolitical change are already fearful that they are under surveillance and at risk from authorities. The intent is to stoke this fear, and create opportunities for members of the guiding coalition to doubt each other's motives and, if possible, create the impression that certain members are colluding with authorities or otherwise betraying the cause. Moreover, members of the guiding coalition must also exemplify the values that they purport to uphold. Any personal behavior contrary to those beliefs and values must be publicized to tarnish the leadership's image as paragons of the cause.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, egotism is common among leaders in any group. Thus, when possible, depict the leadership as arrogant, foolish, silly, and absurd. Never allow the rival movement to appear legitimate and distinguished. In undertaking this effort, humor may be the best approach, for "Ridicule is man's most potent weapon."<sup>43</sup> If that fails, the strategy should seek to divide and conquer.<sup>44</sup> Ensure the lesser members of the guiding coalition obtain undue attention and are publicly credited for work or effort that was not their own. In addition, portray first followers as the true leaders of the movement. Exploit any divisions in the guiding coalition that begin to emerge. Far too frequently authorities seek to capture, arrest, or even kill members of a rival ideological group's inner circle. That approach typically serves to enhance the rival's prestige and helps depict the authorities as oppressive.<sup>45</sup> In many cases, it may be far more valuable to pressure a rival ideological group into tearing itself apart from the inside and simply allow the movement to wither away and be forgotten.

In order for an ideological group to gain traction it must have a vision for the future that is attractive to the wider society and it must have a strategy to show how that vision can successfully come to pass. That vision must be thoroughly discredited and

shown be detrimental to the society as a whole. How to go about achieving this goal will vary and is necessarily situation dependent. However, in general terms, it is imperative to address any significant inconsistencies between the emerging ideology and the culture of the wider society.<sup>46</sup> Thus, it is productive to attack the vision from multiple angles: that it has no basis in reality, that it is intellectually or morally bankrupt, or that it is culturally revulsive. The intent is to create a social stigma surrounding the ideology that makes it unpalatable to society at large. Stigmatization induces cognitive stress which threatens self-esteem and social identity.<sup>47</sup> Thus, even if an individual finds the ideology appealing, he or she is likely to reject it, or at least publicly reject it, out of fear for potential loss of social status.

To be useful, the emerging ideological vision must be communicated to the wider population. Through history this has transpired through an ever increasing array of means—oration, the printed word, radio, film, television, and in the modern era, the internet.<sup>48</sup> The wide array of available means of communication poses a significant challenge to authorities seeking to hinder the dissemination of an emerging ideology. New technology continues to make it easier to reach a larger audience at an ever decreasing cost. In today's world, it is simply impossible to block every means of communication.<sup>49</sup> As such, efforts should focus on identifying the most effective means used by the rival. Once identified, steps must be taken to disrupt communication to the extent possible, raise the cost of continuing to communicate in that fashion, and attempt to push the rival to a less effective means of communication.

Once the message has been communicated, elements of the rival party must venture out and undertake action to advocate for their cause. If the rival group is to

grow, it eventually becomes necessary to decentralize operations and empower lower echelons to undertake autonomous action.<sup>50</sup> This step presents a hazard to the overall group as lower level functionaries are rarely as capable as the inner circle and they may not possess a thorough enough understanding of the vision and strategy to be effective. The lower level groups are far more likely to inappropriately deviate from the core strategy, miscalculate, and take action detrimental to the overall effort. Pressure on the rival's command and control capabilities can amplify these problems. Authorities must force and exploit such errors, thus creating discord between the guiding coalition and the lower level leaders. The inner circle is then faced with the decision to remove the lower level's freedom of action, hindering the expansion of the entire group, or risk additional mistakes which may discredit the entire organization. If the schism continues to grow, then it is likely to splinter the organization into competing factions.<sup>51</sup>

In order to gain and maintain impetus, the rival ideological group must achieve and publicize successes. This step might be as simple as growing a larger organization or as complicated as winning elections or conducting physical attacks. Small successes are needed to begin to create a sense of inevitable victory for the rival ideology.<sup>52</sup> In contrast, authorities need to create a sense of inevitable failure. Preventing gains in the first place is an obvious objective, but any success must be answered with a quick reversal of fortune. If the gain cannot be prevented or quickly reversed, it must be tarnished by showing that the gain was not worth the sacrifice needed to achieve it. Repeated failures will eventually show the incompetence of the rival movement, dampen enthusiasm for their cause, and shrink their organization.

Each victory by the rival group creates pressure to maintain that gain. To do so, a growing organization must begin to transition from rabble rousing to effective management. For ideological movements looking to displace standing systems, this requires moving beyond the philosophical and into the practical world of governing.<sup>53</sup> This is a significant challenge. For example, premature implementation of communist land reform in Russia and China led to severe famines.<sup>54</sup> In both cases, the nascent communist system was only held together through governmental force. Such failures in timing can harden resolve to resist further expansion of the ideology. Therefore, pressure should be placed upon the rival to complicate their governance problem. Any detrimental results and failures to govern effectively must be publicized as the logical conclusion of a bankrupt system.

Finally, in order to succeed in the long term, a burgeoning ideological movement must be able to anchor successes in a newly emerging culture, firmly establishing norms and values. Heroes must be recognized and advanced for their successes, their traits characterized and emulated.<sup>55</sup> Coveted symbols must be created to imply status, thus propelling new members to seek greater achievements. To be successful in countering these elements, authorities must tear such cultural development asunder. The greatest aid in this effort is defectors from the rival ideology and neutral parties that have escaped life in their camp.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, every effort must be taken to separate dissenters from the rival's rank and file. They alone will have the inside story of what is happening on the other side and can relay it in explicit detail. They can pierce whatever aura of cultural prominence the ideological group manages to create and show it to be an empty vessel.

## Application to the Militant Islamic Challenge

Within this framework the author will attempt to outline a strategy by which the United States can roll back the challenge presented by the militant Islamic movement. This case presents a number of challenges. Foremost, this ideological group grew slowly over decades and has become firmly entrenched within the wider Islamic community. The United States is particularly disadvantaged in combating religiously-based ideologies due to its liberal notions regarding freedom of expression and freedom of religion, no matter how abhorrent.<sup>57</sup> Serious steps were not taken to begin countering this threat until repeated physical attacks against U.S. interests occurred, culminating in nearly 3,000 casualties on September 11, 2001. As such, the movement achieved years of small gains and formed a robust network with the demonstrated capability to overpower regional governments as well as dominate under-governed spaces. Countering this movement necessitates a blended approach of armed force to contain the violence and an information campaign to drain support away from the ideological wellspring which feeds the movement.

Despite more than 14 years of conflict since the 2001 attacks, the United States still lacks a common definition of the threat presented by militant Islamic groups.<sup>58</sup> In a recent interview on this topic, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael Flynn, stated, "You can't defeat an enemy that you don't admit exists and I think that we have to clearly define what the enemy is."<sup>59</sup> In this regard, there are two distinct camps who have framed the problem in different manners. One group believes that the root problem is political Islam.<sup>60</sup> This group believes that a fundamentalist polity based upon adherence to Islam, and by extension sharia law, is incompatible with the liberal democratic tradition of the West. They believe that political

Islam will inevitably lead to radicalization of the fundamentalist population and result in unending warfare with the West. This line of thought creates a challenge as many within the Islamic faith do not see divisions among religion, politics, and the state. The other group believes that the problem is not Islam, or even fundamentalist political Islam, but rather the specific ideology of militant Islamists who seek to impose their vision of an Islamic utopia upon the world through violence.<sup>61</sup>

The Obama administration, as well as the George W. Bush administration that preceded it, has taken the latter position. To emphasize this point, the 2015 *National Security Strategy* states, “We reject the lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam.”<sup>62</sup> To further prevent such a misperception, the administration generically refers to the adversary as “violent extremists.”<sup>63</sup> Unfortunately, this description can apply to a host of unrelated problems or groups and fails to focus the nation on the core issue.

Youssef Aboul-Enein explains this challenge in his work *Militant Islamist Ideology*.

Without a realistic, sound, and doctrine-based definition of the threat, we shall be stuck between two extremes in American national policy discourse—that is, between those who argue that all Islam is evil and those who insist that all Islam is peaceful. These extremes are not effective in deriving effective policy, addressing nuances, or capturing the distortions that Militant Islamist Ideology has wrought upon Islam, distortions that are just beginning to outrage many Muslims.<sup>64</sup>

The world needs a name which appropriately focuses the global security community on the ideological threat. The terms ‘Islamism,’ ‘Militant Islam,’ ‘Radical Islam,’ ‘Islamofascism,’ or ‘Jihadism’ all pose the problem of further alienating the Islamic community. Use of such terms may only serve to drive mainstream Muslims to support the adversary or simply refuse to join the rest of the world in solving the problem.

What is needed is a term taken from the Muslim lexicon, a term familiar to the community whose support is needed to resolve this challenge. In that vein, the author

recommends labelling the adversary in this conflict as the *Hirabah Movement*. While jihad is a legitimate action taken by faithful Muslims to defend their community, *hirabah* is a wrongful, unholy war perpetrated against society.<sup>65</sup> The individuals that succumb to this movement can also be labelled as *Mufsidoon*, evil mischief makers who deviate from true Islam.<sup>66</sup> While the use of terms with such religious connotations may seem shocking to Americans, it will resonate with the Islamic community and immediately draw a stark line for the Islamic faithful.

By understanding the nuances and schisms within the Muslim community, the United States can reframe this conflict.<sup>67</sup> The goal should be to address the problem of the *Hirabah Movement* as a civil war within Islam rather than a conflict between the West and Islam. In that framework, it will be easier for mainstream Islamic society to see that the *Hirabah Movement* is merely using the West as a scapegoat to distract it from the daily assault it is perpetrating against the *ummah*, in an effort to consolidate power and control.<sup>68</sup> Unfortunately, the United States will not be able to reframe this matter alone. Non-Muslims have little standing within this community to make such an argument. Thus, Muslims will be required to convince other Muslims that al Qaida and their like form a *Hirabah Movement* poisonous to the Islamic faith.<sup>69</sup> However, when American officials and the media discuss these issues it is imperative that they all have a fundamental understanding of the matter and use the same language to reinforce the effort. Doing so will help isolate the *Hirabah Movement* and drain any support it receives from the mainstream Islamic society. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's current leader, has recognized this is a threat and has publically acknowledged that the mujahedeen cannot survive without public support.<sup>70</sup>

## Removing Urgency

Al Qaida and others within the *Hirabah Movement* have spent decades generating a grievance narrative. The Arab world has experienced numerous authoritarian governments, which has provided the *Mufsidoon* ample fodder for their case. Attacks and suppression of dissent through civil institutions has left the mosque as one of the only remaining avenues for the expression of popular discontent.<sup>71</sup> The *Hirabah Movement* took full advantage of this situation and highlighted American support for most of these authoritarian governments, in stark contrast to the democratic ideals upheld by the United States.<sup>72</sup>

America's attempt to democratize former authoritarian governments often made matters worse. These actions were typically viewed with resentment, suspicion, and resistance.<sup>73</sup> As the United States tried to recreate these societies in their own image, including a robust separation between church and state, Muslim populations perceived that their religion was under assault.<sup>74</sup> In a way, American actions could be viewed as unintentionally suppressing the population's freedom of religion and expression.<sup>75</sup> The 2003 invasion of Iraq further exacerbated the situation. The occupation that followed only served to grant al Qaida legitimacy in its guise as the defender of the Muslim community.<sup>76</sup> Further missteps such as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and the Haditha massacre only drove the grievance narrative to a fever pitch.<sup>77</sup>

To reverse this trend and remove the urgency from the grievance narrative, the United States must moderate the inclination to rebuild societies in its own image. Values should be upheld, but upheld as a model to aspire to—not as a dictatorial mandate that must be obeyed. Freedom of expression and self-determination are also key values to instill in a society emerging from an authoritarian tradition. Many argue that the extreme

*Hirabah* elements are the only ones organized enough to seize control after the fall of an authoritarian regime.<sup>78</sup> This is a rational fear; however, this potential outcome makes it all the more important to work with liberal or moderate elements within the society as early as possible to teach these groups how to organize and how to push for their position in the marketplace of ideas.

### Discrediting the Guiding Coalition

While reducing the urgency of the grievance narrative, it is crucial to discredit the leadership within the *Hirabah Movement*.<sup>79</sup> Despite the leadership's efforts to cloak themselves with an aura of religious authority, their demonstrated expertise of the Islamic faith is actually quite weak.<sup>80</sup> The *Hirabah Movement's* leadership projects their philosophy through a notably narrow understanding of the Quran and an astounding ignorance of the Prophet Muhammad's life.<sup>81</sup> The Quran is a complicated work which may justify war and peace, forgiveness and punishment within and across verses—the *Hirabah* leadership will present one while flagrantly ignoring the other.<sup>82</sup> In fact, the *Hirabah* leadership general ignores 98% of the Quran, focusing almost exclusively on the most militant passages they can find.<sup>83</sup> Additionally, the *Hirabah* leadership favors a select commentary in analyzing the Quran, primarily using the works of Sayyid Qutb, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Jawziyyah. However, they neglect the other six hundred commentators, beginning with scribes that directly drafted the Quran from the Prophet's recitation.<sup>84</sup> It is a grave sin to alter the teachings of the Quran as this supplants the wisdom and judgment of God revealed through the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>85</sup> Such apostasy can be easily critiqued by a true Islamic scholar. Thus, it is essential to leverage indigenous clerics and elders to discredit the *Hirabah* leadership.<sup>86</sup> These

individuals can provide the theological counterweight needed to show the limited depth of *Hirabah* philosophy.<sup>87</sup>

It is also imperative to remember that *Hirabah* leadership is not a monolithic entity. Factions are pervasive across the movement, with leaders of each groups vying with one another for control. Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has publicly rebuked the Islamic State in the Levant's (ISIL) leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's, as illegitimate.<sup>88</sup> Al-Baghdadi is known to have clashed with the leaders of al Qaida's al-Nusra Front in Syria.<sup>89</sup> Boko Haram in Africa has previously sworn allegiance to al Qaida, only to later swear allegiance to ISIL.<sup>90</sup> These ever shifting power struggles must also be exploited through deception as well as overt and covert messaging.

#### Discrediting the Vision and Strategy

Many of the same approaches used to discredit the *Hirabah* leaders will work to discredit their vision as well. Particular emphasis should be made on the movement's dishonor by focusing solely on the warrior aspect of Muhammad's life and ignoring his wider role as arbiter, husband, and father.<sup>91</sup> In doing so, the *Hirabah* reduces the Prophet to a simple warlord and casts aside the roles through which Muhammad rose to prominence and established the core tenants of the Islamic faith.<sup>92</sup> Neither Muhammad nor the Quran prescribed a specific form of government.<sup>93</sup> In fact, the Quran states that governing was to be conducted in consultation with others; Muhammad exemplified this notion throughout his life.<sup>94</sup> Further the Prophet insisted that compelling individuals to convert to Islam through force was wrong, to be a true Muslim one must willingly submit to God without coercion.<sup>95</sup> The *Hirabah* are destroying the faith, by corrupting its practices and calling into question its tenets and traditions.<sup>96</sup> For example, the practice of giving *zakat*, alms for the needy, has been tainted by the *Hirabah* diverting such

funds to violent purposes.<sup>97</sup> The violence perpetrated by the *Hirabah*, stains the faith beyond measure for the Quran says, “Whoever kills a person for any reason other than for sowing corruption in the land, it will be as if he had killed the whole of humankind.”<sup>98</sup> Another verse states, “And for the one who kills a believer intentionally, his recompense in Hell, to abide therein; and the wrath of Allah is upon him and His curse, and a tremendous punishment has been prepared for him.”<sup>99</sup> Thus, the seed of militant Islam’s own destruction lies at the heart of organizing philosophy.<sup>100</sup>

Labelling the movement as *Hirabah* instead of *Jihad* strips away any notion of legitimacy and bares the directing coalition’s focus on war verses in the Quran as a pathetic attempt to justify their lifestyle of violence. Emphasizing the leadership’s preference for violence is a powerful message that will dissolve public support by creating a stigma around the movement. To communicate this message, the West must encourage moderate Muslim voices to speak out. This should include religious leaders and well as laymen. Media outlets directly supported by the United States such as Radio Sawa and Al Hurra television are seen as mouthpieces for the American Government and should not be used for this purpose. Instead, funding ought to be provided independently so that these indigenous voices can make use of local and regional media completely unaffiliated with the United States Government.<sup>101</sup>

As this message begins to propagate, additional steps should be taken to drive it home. As stated in the overview for the counter ideological strategy, humor and ridicule are devastating weapons. Americans are very familiar with the impact that “Saturday Night Live” or “The Daily Show” can have on public figures. Biting political satire of this nature in the Islamic world should be sought out and nurtured. Several such programs

are in fact emerging. Bassem Youssef is quickly becoming known as the Jon Stewart of Egypt, poking fun of Egypt's politics and militant Islam.<sup>102</sup> Lebanon's "Kitr Salbe Show" demonstrates no fear in producing Looney Tunes-style cartoons lampooning ISIL.<sup>103</sup> Even in Iran, television shows such as "Parazit" and cartoonists find ways to work around censorship and mock the mullahs.<sup>104</sup> Ridicule in the mass media will unerringly erode the credibility of the *Hirabah* and help reinforce the social stigma directed by legitimate Islamic scholars and leaders that will discredit this violent movement.

### Disrupting Communications

As previously stated, completely disrupting the communications of an ideological movement is virtually impossible in the 21st century.<sup>105</sup> There are simply too many avenues available for the *Hirabah* message to emanate. However, even an imperfect defense is likely to block and even discourage other attempts to utilize modern communications.<sup>106</sup> Efforts should first focus on communications designed to spread the *Hirabah* ideology. This should include specific propaganda mechanisms such as ISIL's *Dabiq* and al Qaida's *Inspire* online magazines as well as video of extreme violence used to incite lone wolf actors in the West.<sup>107</sup> Any method of communication defeated is likely to regenerate, but the regeneration is likely to come at increasing costs in manpower, time, and money.<sup>108</sup> Any capability to drive up costs through targeted hardware damage or denial of service should be pursued. While many communication outlets are directly controlled by the *Hirabah* leadership, some are likely managed by individual members of the movement, or at least individuals sympathetic to it. These elements are unlikely to have the resources to continue to regenerate if repeatedly targeted. Opportunities should also be pursued to outsource communication

denial to regional allies who may be better equipped to limit access to communication nodes within their geographic authority.

#### Sow Discord, Limit Subordinate Freedom of Action

The leader/subordinate relationship across the *Hirabah Movement* is informal and fluid. Often this means that the leadership merely provides general guidance and the subordinate groups interpret the guidance and plan their own operations. This approach presents the potential for regional sub-groups to take action that would not be approved by the leadership and may work counter to the leadership's intentions. Such a situation transpired between core al Qaida leadership and al Qaida in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006. Zarqawi's forceful initiative to create sectarian discord between Sunni and Shia elements in Iraq caused an escalation in violence far beyond al Qaida's expectations. This result created a sizable rift between al Qaida leadership and al Qaida in Iraq, eventually splitting the organization into autonomous groups with al Qaida in Iraq eventually morphing into ISIL. . Zarqawi further overstepped by targeting Sunni tribal leadership, which in turn encouraged the tribes to defect and support U.S. forces. This rift among former supporters of the *Hirabah Movement* led to the Sunni "Anbar Awakening" which enabled unparalleled insight into how the group operated. Follow-on efforts led to significant degradation of al Qaida in Iraq between 2006 and 2010.<sup>109</sup> Such opportunities are often fortuitous, and cannot be planned; however, every opportunity must be taken to exploit such fissures as they appear. If the command and control relationship and methods of the adversary are known well enough to support denial and deception operations, then they should be utilized to instigate such problems and force the adversary into making errors.

### Prevent, Tarnish, and Reverse Gains

Though every reasonable effort should be taken prevent the *Hirabah Movement* from making symbolic or actual gains, some victories by the adversary are inevitable. In cases of the movement's failure, ridicule is useful to demonstrate the futility of their cause. In cases of the movement's success, a means to discredit the gain must be found. Inconsistencies between their ideological philosophy and means by which they achieved success can be ripe target.<sup>110</sup> Emphasis on collateral damage, loss of innocent life, and hostility against factions formerly amenable the movement may be another route to achieving this goal. These factors played a heavy role in the Anbar Awakening.<sup>111</sup> Another powerful method to tarnish gains by the *Hirabah Movement* is to strongly advertise what life under their rule is truly like. In areas conquered by ISIL, basic management of urban infrastructure has broken down. Sanitation, water purification, and electrical systems have quickly failed.<sup>112</sup> Repression is rampant, food shortages are common, and the economy is declining.<sup>113</sup> The dire conditions may not be enough for the local citizenry to overthrow ISIL control, but calling attention to this dysfunctional governance is likely to stiffen opposition to further ISIL gains. In lieu of another viable approach, sheer ridicule at the hyper-violent nature of the *Hirabah Movement* may be enough to discredit their activities and hinder the movement's ability to attract future followers.

### Prevent Anchoring, Hinder Recruiting, and Reinforce Social Stigma

The final step of the counter ideology strategy is to prevent anchoring of successes in the burgeoning culture. The steps above outline various means to discredit the movement's leaders and vision as well as tarnishing gains that have been achieved. Similar tactics can be used to taint "rising stars" within the movement. Once

again, ridicule is a powerful weapon. However, the single most critical mechanism to preclude is recruitment. Without a steady flow of new recruits the *Hirabah Movement* will stagnate and eventually stall. Many recruits suffer from the typical emotional struggles of adolescence, and are seeking a sense of identity, purpose, and direction.<sup>114</sup> Those young men and women drawn to the *Hirabah Movement* rarely do so simply because they are Muslim; in fact, the average recruit does not come from a particularly strong religious background which makes him or her more susceptible to misrepresentations of the Islamic faith.<sup>115</sup> As such the West should support mainstream Islamic faith organizations to provide guidance to youth and provide early warning of vulnerabilities within the Islamic diaspora. Positive depictions of the Muslim faith are also useful, particularly in the case of very young children. One initiative produced by Dr. Naif A. al-Mutawa, a Kuwaiti psychologist, is a comic book series and an online game titled *The 99* which features Islamic superheroes and encourages international cooperation among Muslim and non-Muslim children.<sup>116</sup>

An even more powerful tool in the effort to prevent recruitment are defectors from the *Hirabah Movement*. Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Singapore have made significant strides in developing education and reintegration programs for former extremists and those who were in the process of radicalization.<sup>117</sup> These programs seek to reeducate the participants and deepen their previously shallow understanding of the Islamic faith which made them susceptible to recruitment by the *Hirabah*.<sup>118</sup> In addition, these individuals can provide keen insight to the movement, recruitment tactics, and the allure of this dangerous ideology. As such, they can greatly aid efforts to prevent

recruitment and radicalization; much like the al Qaida in Iraq defectors were able to provide critical insight to help shrink the movement in Anbar Province.

### Conclusion

Like the Cold War, the conflict with militant Islam is a battle of ideas. The United States has focused significant effort in combating this battle of ideas through a contest of arms. The current approach has expended precious blood and treasure, but has not achieved the desired end. In fact, the extensive use of armed force may have exacerbated the situation. This brief work has outlined a framework through which to examine ideological movements in order to understand how they grow and flourish. By extension, this framework highlights critical vulnerabilities that ideological movements face in attempting to affect change in the geopolitical environment. Information focused strategies based upon this framework are far more likely to constrain the growth of hostile ideological movements, thus safeguarding the security of the United States and enhancing the overall stability of the international environment.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> revised ed. (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), 832. Ludwig von Mises (1881 - 1973) was an Austrian economist and philosopher. *Human Action* is widely considered to be his magnum opus. Mises firmly believed laissez-faire capitalism and democracy were the keys to achieving maximum effective utilization of resources through rational human decision making based upon rational economic interest and calculation. He believed that autocratic forms of government that attempted to control markets could never be satisfied with current possessions and must expand through conquest to satiate their greed and lust for power. Mises' solution was a government of the people who through free trade could achieve peace and prosperity. As such, Mises could be considered a firm believer in Democratic Peace Theory.

<sup>2</sup> The Declaration of Independence, (1776), paragraph 5, [http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration\\_transcript.html](http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html) (accessed March 29, 2015).

<sup>3</sup> John Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 24 August 1815, <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2127> (accessed Mar 30, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Dominic Tierney, "Why Are Americans So Ideologically United?," *The Atlantic*, Aug 23, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/why-are-americans-so-ideologically-united/243951/> (accessed March 29, 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1971), vii, 232.

<sup>6</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 2, 50.

<sup>7</sup> William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), xvii.

<sup>8</sup> Cedric Richardson, *Culture Warfare: A War Against Culture*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 16, 2013), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008) 18-19.

<sup>10</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Global Jihad: Understanding September 11* (Falls Church, VA: Sound Room Publishers, Inc., 2002), 15.

<sup>11</sup> Adda B. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992), 14.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>13</sup> William Rosenau, "Waging the 'War of Ideas'," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. David G. Kamien, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 1132. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND\\_RP1218.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf) (accessed March 10, 2015).

<sup>14</sup> For samples of socio-cultural analysis see Marcus Banks, *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions* (London: Routledge, 1996); Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, "The Psychology of Worldviews," *Review of General Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2004): 3; Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

<sup>15</sup> For a review of the Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework see the Army War College Department of Distance Education webpage, <https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/LLL/DSC/Lessons/L2.cfm>. (accessed March 20, 2015).

<sup>16</sup> Adapted from Victor G. Garcia, *Strategic Influence: A Framework to Counter Violent Extremist Ideology*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 3, 2013), 16.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 16, 20.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 14-18.

<sup>24</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 33-158.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 4, 35-42.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 35-49.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 45-46.

<sup>28</sup> First follower is a term coined by entrepreneur Derek Sivers during a TED Talk in 2012. The first follower is the spark that helps ignite a movement by overcoming potential social stigma and publicly showing others how to follow, thus drawing additional followers. In essence, “the first follower transforms a lone nut into a leader.” See Derek Sivers, “Leadership Lessons from Dancing Guy,” <http://sivers.org/ff> (accessed March 3, 2015).

<sup>29</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 51-66.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 67-83.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 72-79.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 85-100.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 102-115.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 122-130.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 131-142.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 145-158.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>39</sup> Baily, *The Ideological Origins*, 184-189, 193-194.

<sup>40</sup> Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009) 9-39.

<sup>41</sup> See the concept of conditional and unconditional trust in relation to organizational cooperation in Gareth R. Jones and Jennifer M. George, “The Experience and Evolution of Trust: Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork,” *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 531-546, in ProQuest (accessed Mar 5, 2015).

<sup>42</sup> Saul D. Alinski, *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Random House, 1971), 129.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 100.

<sup>45</sup> Egyptian action to suppress dissent during Mubarak's rule provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. See Justin Marozzi, "Egypt's Moderate Face Conceals an Oppressive Nature," *The Times*, July 5, 2002, in ProQuest (accessed March 17, 2015); David D. Kirkpatrick, "Mubarak Orders Crackdown, With Revolt Sweeping Egypt," *The New York Times*, January 29, 2011, in ProQuest (accessed March 17, 2015); Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, eds., *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond* (New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2012).

<sup>46</sup> The Sunni Awakening in Anbar province provides an example of this ideological and cultural impasse. In this case, al Qaida in Iraq and the Sunni tribes of Anbar Province had much in common culturally and ideologically; however, al Qaida's pressure to supplant tribal leadership resulted in tribal defection and alignment with U.S. forces. See Matthew T. Penney, "The Anbar Awakening in Context - and Why it is so Hard to Replicate," *Military Review* 95, no. 2 (March 2015): 106-117, in ProQuest (accessed March 20, 2015).

<sup>47</sup> Brenda Major and Laurie T. O'Brien, "The Social Psychology of Stigma," *Annual Review of Psychology* 56, (2005): 393-421, in ProQuest (accessed March 20, 2015).

<sup>48</sup> Terence P. Moran, *Introduction to the History of Communication: Evolutions and Revolutions* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2010), 75-296.

<sup>49</sup> Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, ed., *Responses to Cyber Terrorism* (Fairfax, VA: IOS Press, 2008), 57.

<sup>50</sup> The limited control over the Sons of Liberty groups in colonial America demonstrates the challenge of decentralized operations for a nascent ideological movement. Multiple Sons of Liberty organizations were created across the thirteen colonies to organize resistance to various acts imposed on the colonies by the British parliament; however, there was no effective control across the entire system. Acts of violence were discouraged, but at times they were not preventable. See Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

<sup>51</sup> Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 13, 19, 89.

<sup>52</sup> For an example of small gains reinforcing a sense of inevitable victory during the American Revolutionary War, see Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 129-131, 141-142, 146-151, 266-269.

<sup>53</sup> For an example of challenges faced by an ideological movement's transition to governance in the Soviet Union, see Brown, *Rise and Fall of Communism*, 56-77; for an example of similar challenges in the early United States of America, see Richard B. Morris, *The Forging of the Union: 1781-1789* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1988).

<sup>54</sup> Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 5-6; C.M. Chang, "Mao's Stratagem of Land Reform," *Foreign Affairs* 29, no. 4 (July 1951): 550-563, in JSTOR (accessed March 3, 2015).

<sup>55</sup> Orrin E. Klapp, "Heroes, Villains, and Fools, as Agents of Social Control," *American Sociological Review* 19, no. 1 (February 1954): 56-62.

<sup>56</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Illustrated Art of War*, 232-239.

<sup>57</sup> Rosenau, "Waging the War of Ideas," 1132.

<sup>58</sup> Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), xv.

<sup>59</sup> Michael T. Flynn, "President Obama's ISIS Strategy Falling Short," Interviewed by Chris Wallace, *Fox News Sunday*, February 8, 2015, <http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2015/02/08/president-obamas-isis-strategy-falling-short-plus-dr-ben-carson-measles-outbreak-vaccines#p/v/4039127183001> (accessed March 20, 2015).

<sup>60</sup> For a detailed perspective on this argument see Moorthy S. Muthuswamy, *Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009).

<sup>61</sup> For a detailed perspective on this argument see Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*.

<sup>62</sup> Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 9.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 9, 20, 27.

<sup>64</sup> Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*, xvi.

<sup>65</sup> Jim Guirard, "Hirabah versus Jihad: Rescuing Jihad from the al Qaida Blasphemy," *The American Muslim*, blog entry July 6, 2003, [http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/terrorism\\_hirabah\\_versus\\_jihad\\_rescuing\\_jihad\\_from\\_the\\_al\\_Qaida\\_blasphemy](http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/terrorism_hirabah_versus_jihad_rescuing_jihad_from_the_al_Qaida_blasphemy) (accessed March 20, 2015); Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*, 90-91.

<sup>66</sup> Guirard, "Hirabah versus Jihad."

<sup>67</sup> Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*, 48.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>69</sup> Brent A. Grometer, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa'ida*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 3, 2013), 5; Wing Kai Chan, *Defeating the Logic of Islamist Terrorism*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2007), 6; Garcia, *Strategic Influence*, 16.

<sup>70</sup> Chan, *Defeating the Logic*, 4.

<sup>71</sup> Angel Rabasa et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2007), 1.

<sup>72</sup> Muthuswamy, *Defeating Political Islam*, 188.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 35; Chan, *Defeating the Logic*, 7; Douglas W. Little, *Empowering United States Public Diplomacy for the War of Ideas*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 5, 2009), 6.

<sup>74</sup> Muthuswamy, *Defeating Political Islam*, 12, 26.

<sup>75</sup> Grometer, *Faith-Based Diplomacy*, 18-19.

<sup>76</sup> Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 85-86.

<sup>77</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 3-8, 41.

<sup>78</sup> Rabasa, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, 2-4.

<sup>79</sup> Muthuswamy, *Defeating Political Islam*, 195.

<sup>80</sup> Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*, 10-11.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-11, 24-25, 69.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 27, 78.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-11, 73.

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, xvii.

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<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 53-54, 57.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 60-64.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 88; *Quran* 5:35.

<sup>99</sup> Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamic Ideology*, 88; *Quran* 4:93.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 90-96.

<sup>101</sup> Rabasa, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, xxii-xxiv.

<sup>102</sup> Mick Krever, "Satire is no joke for Egypt's Jon Stewart," *CNN*, March 10, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/09/world/amanpour-bassem-youssef/> (accessed March 20, 2015).

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 162l.

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<sup>109</sup> Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 83, 91, 94.

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