Strategy Research Project

Reprioritizing Development and Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa: Strategic Opportunity

by

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Reprioritizing Development and Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Strategic Opportunity

> When the first response to a challenge is to send in our military--then we risk getting drawn into unnecessary conflicts, and neglect the broader strategy we need for a safer, more prosperous world.
>
> —President Barack Obama[1]

To the south of the third largest desert in the world lies the vast geographic region of sub-Saharan Africa.[2] This nine million square miles is home to over 960 million ethnically and linguistically diverse people.[3] Emerging from the legacy of colonial rule, sub-Saharan Africa is also home to the youngest collection of sovereign states in the world, most having achieved their independence in only the last four decades.[4] Despite the newness to the world stage, these countries are rapidly becoming an integral part of the globalized economy as well as the global security dialogue.

The United States has had a long and evolving relationship with sub-Saharan Africa. Following the strategic entanglements of the Cold War, the U.S. focus on the region became primarily economic and humanitarian in nature.[5] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) led concerted work to develop education systems, free markets, and stable democratic governments throughout the continent for decades.[6] Despite coordinated terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the U.S. has primarily focused on actively combating violent extremist threats in the Middle East, with sub-Saharan Africa represented only a "minor stage" in this fight.[7]

The war against violent extremist groups who use terrorism as a tactic, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, has elicited large-scale lethal U.S. military action in several Middle Eastern countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. The absence of another large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil is often attributed to this

military-focused "reflexive" approach to addressing the threat; however, global violent extremism shows no sign of waning and sub-Saharan Africa is not immune.[8] Prior to 2001, there were no U.S.-designated foreign violent extremist groups in the region.[9] In the intervening years, however, groups such as Boko Haram, Ansaru, and al-Shabaab have organized, grown and, in some cases, focused outward by aligning their interests to other violent extremist groups in the Middle East.[10]

While the U.S. has forged ahead with a primarily military-dominated security approach, strategic thinking has evolved to consider what contributes to violent extremism and alternative approaches to address it. Some researchers have identified that violent extremism exists and prospers within the context of many underlying instability-causing conditions such as population growth, unemployment, economic imbalances and identity entrenchment.[11] While the relationship is not causal, the expression of violent extremism can be considered as merely a symptom of ills from a complex system of underlying conditions. In light of this revelation, the discourse now includes the argument that the military-dominated U.S. counterterrorism approach of the last decade has only treated the symptom of violent extremism and in so doing has potentially done more to contribute to the problem than to solve it. Therefore, according to this argument, long-term solutions to the growth of violent extremism must significantly re-balance the use of the military with other instruments of national power.[12]

Since the U.S. has not had to militarily confront large-scale violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa, this region now provides the U.S. an exceptional strategic opportunity to move away from the military-dominated reflexive approach and instead fully commit to a more proactive human-focused approach to address the underlying

conditions which allow violent extremism to grow and prosper. The U.S. should prioritize and adequately resource long-term development activities in several human-centered foundational areas focused on setting the conditions for stability in sub-Saharan Africa over military-centered counterterrorism approaches.

To analyze this alternative long-term development strategy and prioritization, this paper describes the evolution of the U.S. approach to violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa toward military-dominated reflexive responses. This paper then describes an alternative approach using a Human Factor theory of development and highlights three foundational human-centered areas to help set the conditions for stability and better achieve long-term U.S. interests in the region. Finally, this paper offers recommendations to inform future strategy development and implementation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Evolution of U.S. Approach to Violent Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

The idea of violent extremism as a security threat to the U.S. has evolved over the last 25 years, especially in reference to sub-Saharan Africa. Viewing U.S. national security strategies and actions within the context of global events over the last two decades highlights the evolution in the dialogue and response to violent extremism in the region. The analysis reveals a trend toward increased use of the military to *combat* the threat in terms of military presence in the region, control of operations and engagements, and targeted lethality against violent extremist group leadership.

<u>1990-1999</u>

Prior to the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa was largely absent from the U.S. security dialogue and was not part of the combatant command structure until after 1983.[13] Early in the decade, discussions of the continent in the national security strategy realm

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primarily focused on the promotion of democracy as the "ideology on which our victory in the Cold War was based" and on humanitarian assistance and crisis response.[14] Violent extremism received only a brief mention as a transnational threat.

During this time, the Clinton Administration stayed true to the national security strategy and deployed U.S. military forces in support of the humanitarian intervention in Somalia to stem famine after the collapse of the regime.[15] U.S. forces remained to participate in the United Nations Operation in Somalia with the expanded mission to restore "peace, stability, law and order."[16] In October 1993, U.S. Special Operations forces engaged al-Qaeda trained Somali militia forces in Mogadishu resulting in dozens wounded and 18 dead.[17] This event and the associated gruesome globally-broadcast images had a profound effect on the U.S.'s appetite for future participation in interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.[18]

This mindset also permeated the *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa* released in August 1995. According to the strategy, "America's security interests in Africa are very limited" and "ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," however, the strategy also stated the U.S. would maintain a "leading role in Africa despite the lack of vital interests."[19] In direct reference to the U.S. experience in Somalia, the most telling words of the strategy state that for humanitarian interventions Department of Defense (DoD) efforts "must act within clearly defined mission limits and with an up-front, accepted exit strategy."[20]

Just prior to the release of the 1998 *National Security Strategy*, al-Qaeda struck the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania with near-simultaneous truck bombs on August 7, 1998.[21] The updated security strategy, released soon after, was one of the

most detailed to date and outlined individual regional approaches, including Africa. The

strategy specifically discussed a policy to counter international terrorists based on

several principles including making no concessions to terrorists and helping other

governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.[22] The strategy also outlined

new roles for the DoD in relation to the continent: the African Crisis Response Initiative

to "promote prosperity, stability and peace" and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

to "promote the exchange of ideas and information tailored specifically for African

concerns."[23] By the close of the decade, the U.S. security dialogue now included

references to sub-Saharan Africa; however, the approach to countering violent

extremism did not prompt large-scale military responses in the region.

2000-2009

The 21st century brought violent extremism to the shores of the U.S. and

therefore, to the forefront of national security strategy discourse. While the DoD had not

been "fully engaged in the mission of countering al-Qaeda" prior to September 11th, the

subsequent national security and counterterrorism strategies of the decade reflect the

increasing role of the military in combating violent extremism.[24]

Released almost exactly one year to the day after the September 11th attacks,

the 2002 *National Security Strategy* emphasized the relationship between "weak states"

and safe havens for violent extremists, including those cells in sub-Saharan Africa, and

directed the military to identify and destroy the threat before it reached the borders of

the country.[25] As one response to the strategy, U.S. Central Command established the

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in October 2002 to detect, disrupt and

defeat violent extremists in the region.[26] In 2003, the first-ever published *National

Strategy for Combating Terrorism* introduced a "4D strategy [defeat, deny, diminish and

defend]" approach to addressing the threat with *defeating* violent extremists using the U.S. military as a top priority.[27] According to the strategy, the U.S. would "focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally."[28] The DoD began to secure access for the U.S. military to facilities in western and southern Africa as part of implementing this strategy.[29] While both strategies briefly discussed efforts to address the underlying conditions which allow violent extremists to exist and prosper, they clearly placed the U.S. military in the lead of combating the immediate threat.

Violent extremist activity grew in sub-Saharan Africa while the U.S. was fighting the war on terrorism in Iraq.[30] In response to several attacks, the second half of the decade saw an increase in both the vigor of combating violent extremism using the U.S. military and the priority level of sub-Saharan Africa in that fight. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* begins with words that place into context the perception of the violent extremist threat: "America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001."[31] The strategy specifically addressed Africa stating the continent held "growing geo-strategic importance" and was a "high-priority" for the Bush Administration.[32] The accompanying 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* noted the "ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq" was being "twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry."[33] This strategy differed from the 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in that it placed greater emphasis on denying violent extremists sanctuary in rogue, failed and underdeveloped countries, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.[34]

During this time, the U.S. Congress also supported the military's role in countering violent extremism. The 113th Congress passed the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which included the Section 1206 provision of authority to the Secretary of Defense "to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces" to perform counterterrorism operations.[35] Prior to the FY2006 NDAA, the authority to train and equip foreign military forces resided with the Department of State (DoS) under Title 22 of the U.S. Code.[36] While there is a requirement for DoD to seek concurrence from DoS on projects, in congressional testimony, a former Associate Director at the Office of Management and Budget summarized criticisms of the authority. His arguments warned that providing this authority further weakened the "civilian toolkit" of development and diplomacy, reduced the funding's visibility to Congress, and further placed a "uniformed face on U.S. international engagement."[37]

The provision of Section 1206 authority to DoD was followed shortly by another significant increase in U.S. military engagement and operational control in sub-Saharan Africa. On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the creation of a new unified combatant command to "enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and to promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa."[38] From its inception, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was touted as a combatant command "plus" with all of the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command but also incorporating efforts of other civilian U.S. government agencies, such as the DoS and USAID, to address violent extremism and other challenges facing the region.[39] Despite

the integration, some analysts argue that with the advent of AFRICOM, the DoD became the lead strategic planning organization for combating violent extremism throughout the continent, including sub-Saharan Africa.[40]

2010 to Present

The year after taking office, President Barack Obama traveled to Ghana in July 2009 and delivered a speech outlining his Administration's policy toward the region. In regards to violent extremism, the President stated it is "never justifiable to target innocents in the name of ideology" and that "America has a responsibility to work with you as a partner to advance this vision [of a strong regional security architecture], not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity."[41] The subsequent strategies of the early part of this decade reflected this direction.

The 2010 *National Security Strategy* focused more on "whole-of-government" approaches to responding to challenges and distinctly addressed the use of force stating "we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction" and "when force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy."[42] The 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*—note removal of the word *combating* from the title—echoed this approach by stating that U.S. responses to violent extremism must be "done in a thoughtful, reasoned, and proportionate way" and, for the first time in recent counterterrorism strategy, conceded that "certain tactical successes can have unintended consequences that sometimes contribute to costs at the strategic level."[43] The 2012 *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* introduced a four "pillar" approach to the region placing actions to advance peace and security and

counter violent extremism alongside actions to strengthen democratic institutions, spur

economic growth, and promote opportunity and development.[44]

Despite this rhetoric, DoD's Section 1206 programs in sub-Saharan Africa have

increased substantially. From FY2012 through FY2014, Section 1206 spending in sub-

Saharan African countries totaled approximately $1.22 billion as compared to $286

million in Europe and $200 million in the Middle East and South Asia over the same

period.[45] In addition, Section 1206 in the FY2015 NDAA expanded DoD's authority to

train foreign counterterrorism and police units residing outside of a country's national

military force.[46] The authority to train civilian security forces had been reserved only for

DoS.[47]

Throughout the decade, the violent extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa

continued to carry out lethal attacks throughout the region with a trend toward operating

outside their traditional borders. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the

number of incidents nearly quadrupled from approximately 300 in 2010 to nearly 1,200

by 2013.[48] In light of the expanding violence, the restraint on the use of force outlined in

U.S. strategy has been tested. Since successfully executing its first operational

campaign, named Operation Odyssey Dawn, in Libya in 2011, AFRICOM has overseen

an increasing number of lethal remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) strikes in sub-Saharan

Africa from bases in Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger and the Seychelles.[49] For example, since

September 2014, the U.S. has killed al-Shabaab's leader, intelligence chief, and head of

external operations in separate RPV strikes.[50]

Alternative Approach to Address Violent Extremism in the Long-Term

The U.S. approach to addressing violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa is at a

crossroads today. To date, the U.S. military has still maintained a fairly light footprint in

the region and has not conducted large-scale "boots on the ground" missions. Therein lies the opportunity to stem the increasingly militarized approach to counter violent extremism and embrace a new strategy. It is not too late to take lessons learned from combating violent extremism in the Middle East for the last 25 years and instead fully commit to the application a human-centered, development approach to addressing violent extremism as a symptom of other challenges. As articulated by former AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham, the U.S. must "ensure that our military efforts are fully coordinated with a broader comprehensive strategy that addresses the underlying issues of instability," including focusing on education, governance and economic development.[51]

At the most recent U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014, President Obama stated "we recognize Africa for its greatest resource, which is its people and its talents and their potential."[52] This line of thinking offers the basis for an alternative prioritization of resources to address violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. The Human Factor theory of development as described by economics professor Dr. Senyo Adjibolosoo provides a framework to develop a long-term strategy focused on developing foundational human factors required to build stability and enduring institutions. The term "human factor" is described as:

> the spectrum of personality characteristics and other dimensions of human performance that enable social, economic and political institutions to function and remain functional, over time. Such dimensions sustain the workings and application of the rule of law, political harmony, a disciplined labor force, just legal systems, respect for human dignity and the sanctity of life, social welfare, and so on.[53]

The six primary components of the human factor are *moral capital*, *human capital*, *human abilities*, *human potentials*, *spiritual capital*, and *aesthetic capital*.[54] The

descriptions for each of these components, as well as the associated dimensions, are

highlighted in the following table.

Table 1. Composition of the Human Factor[55]

Factor	Description	Dimensions
Moral Capital	• Qualities individuals possess that lead them to conform or not to conform to ethical principles and standards of conduct • Furnishes the individual with the ability to perceive principles and universal laws as the primary foundation for acceptable or unacceptable human behavior and action	• Integrity • Humility • Honesty • Tolerance • Forgiveness • Flexibility • Collegiality
Human Capital	• The know-how and the skills that are acquired by men and women, are used to enhance productivity, and have market value • Technical, conceptual, intellectual, analytic and communication skills, includes physical well-being and emotional health	• Understanding • Astuteness • Intelligence • Aptitude
Human Abilities	• The power or capacity of an individual to undertake projects competently or effectively perform tasks requiring mental and physical effort • Enables people who possess them to execute excellently given duties and functions when these abilities are working in conjunction with other components of the HF	• Wisdom • Vision • Courage • Judgment • Reasoning • Self-Control • Objectivity
Human Potentials	• Talents that may or may not be harnessed and employed for human-centered development • Unused dimensions of the HF • Visualizing uncreated worlds of potentials	• Imagination • Conscience
Note: For the purposes of this paper, spiritual capital and aesthetic capital are not discussed.		

According to the theory, a nation's ability to address complex contributors to

instability, such as population growth, unemployment, economic imbalances and identity

entrenchment, does not come simply from the availability of natural resources, capital,

and infrastructure. Rather, development requires people with fully developed human

factors who can "use effectively and apply acquired knowledge and information to identify and solve everyday problems" and "exhibit responsibility in leadership, dedication through commitment, resourcefulness in the use of available resources, resilience and tolerance in adversity, inventiveness, innovativeness and imagination in relation to their chosen vision."[56]

While the U.S. has long had development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, addressing violent extremism with the U.S. military in the short term has held a higher priority position.[57] Prioritizing and adopting a long-term approach with concerted and well-resourced efforts in developing three basic, foundational human factor-centered areas could better help set the conditions for stability and, ultimately, better achieve U.S. interests the region. These key development focus areas are: 1) increasing literacy and education; 2) developing civilian and military leaders; and 3) building science, technology and innovation capacity.

Figure 1 depicts how focusing efforts on the human factors contributes to the key development areas that are foundational to achieving long-term U.S. national interests in the region. The next section of this paper further describes the key development areas.

Figure 1. Relationship between Human Factors, Development Areas, and U.S. Interests[58]

Literacy and Education

Literacy and education go hand-in-hand and are integral to developing the *human capital* and *human abilities* dimensions of human performance. Literacy is considered foundational to effective participation in democratic institutions and facilitation of peaceful conflict resolution because it "empowers individuals, broadens their critical thinking and provides them with the ability to act."[59] In essence, a country will struggle to experience stability and democracy to its fullest potential without a literate and participating populace. In addition, sustained economic growth is severely hampered with failing education systems in the region.[60]

Despite significant progress over the last four decades, universal literacy and access to education remains a major challenge for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The United Nations has pressed for improvements in both areas during its Literacy Decade (2003-2012) and the global Education for All efforts; however, current data

shows the momentum is now waning in the region.[61] Adult literacy rates are still below

50 percent in 11 sub-Saharan African countries and almost one quarter of the global

illiterate population still lives in the region.[62] On the education front, one in every four

primary school age children is not attending school and that number is projected to rise

in 2015.[63] Additionally, only 28 percent of youth are enrolled in secondary school

"leaving 90 million teenagers struggling for employment" in low-paid jobs."[64]

While there are several factors which affect movement toward universal literacy

and education, the influence of culture on access across socioeconomic and gender

lines is significant. The political cultures and value systems of many clans, tribes, and

local and national governments in sub-Saharan Africa often prioritize education access

for the rich male members of the society. For example, girls from the Hausa ethnic

group in northern Nigeria "average less than one year in school, while wealthy urban

males get nine years."[65] It is especially problematic to have large illiterate and

uneducated female populations since women in sub-Saharan Africa primarily have the

"responsibility for the nurturing, upbringing, socialization and education of their children"

and are, therefore, "key actors in the process of human development."[66]

The U.S. should prioritize literacy and education programs focused on

developing the *human capital* and *human abilities* characteristics as long-term

investments in a future, stable sub-Saharan Africa capable of being free from violent

extremism. These types of efforts should be greatly expanded as a literate, educated

sub-Saharan population with fully developed human factors is also foundational to the

long-term development of a new post-liberation cadre of leaders who can transcend

resilient cultures that can be resistant to change.[67]

<u>Civilian and Military Leadership Development</u>

History shows that at a critical time, such as after national liberation, the negative or positive power of individual civilian and military leadership is undeniable. Some regimes "transform themselves into corporate states . . . to constitute a monolithic power block, essentially serving its own members and deaf to the needs and demands of ordinary people excluded from it."[68] Heavy-handed military leaders have often abused their power and overthrew elected leaders. On the positive side, other more developed and sophisticated leaders have used their individual leadership qualities to set their states on an enduring path of stability and growth. Individual leaders with the fully developed *moral capital, human capital and human abilities* dimensions are at the crux of success or failure.[69]

For example, Zimbabwe's first post-liberation (and current) president Robert Mugabe was "locked within the mindsets of the liberation war" and rather than facing the challenges of governing has instead simply enjoyed exercising power.[70] Mugabe, and despots like him in other newly independent sub-Saharan African countries, established neo-patrimonial systems which exert authoritarian tendencies by using state institutions to sustain patrons and factionalize societies to threaten retribution against opponents and weaken political opponents.[71] Conversely, Sir Seretse Khama possessed the human factor characteristics of *moral capital* and used his visionary leadership skills as the first president of Botswana to propel the country forward after liberation. His policies of limited government closely linked to the population, stable taxation and liberalized trade, freedom of the press, and racial inclusion set Botswana on a path of stability which endures today.[72]

While the relationship between literacy, education and leadership acumen is not causal, the human factors are foundational in that it can contribute to the tolerance, ethics, integrity, accountability, understanding, self-control, reasoning and vision required for success. Leaders who embody these dimensions can govern sub-Saharan countries in ways that enhance achievement of U.S. national interests in the region, therefore, concerted development of these types of civilian and military leaders should be a priority for the long-term.

U.S. programs such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) are excellent examples of a human-centered approach to developing the relevant human factors in future African leaders. Launched by the Obama Administration in 2010, YALI focuses on "investing in the next generation of African leaders, and has committed significant resources to enhance leadership skills, bolster entrepreneurship, and connect young African leaders with one another, the United States, and the American people."[73] In addition, in 2015 four Regional Leadership Centers in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa will be opened as public-private partnerships to "improve the availability and quality of leadership training programs and professional development opportunities for young African leaders."[74] On the military side of leader development, the AFRICOM executes the DoS-funded IMET program for the region. This program allows current and future African military leaders to attend U.S. military professional training programs to enhance professionalism, promote democratization, and emphasize rule of law and the protection of human rights.[75]

Ethical, accountable and transparent leaders in both the military and civilian sub-Saharan governments are vital. Continuing to expand efforts in human-centered programs such as YALI and IMET can help ensure there are national level African government leaders in the future capable of setting the foundational conditions for stability, making it more difficult for violent extremism to grow or prosper. These leaders—rich in the human factors—are also integral to building long-term economic prosperity through the third recommended human-centered area of science, technology and innovation capacity.

Science, Technology and Innovation Capacity

Sub-Saharan Africa receives almost 25 percent of all U.S. foreign assistance and the total dollar amount provided has quadrupled over the last decade.[76] The 2012 *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* identifies spurring "economic growth, trade and investments" and promoting "opportunity and development" as objectives for this investment.[77] While economic development has not been shown to stop the existence of violent extremism, it can help countries better address underlying structural issues and impediments to stability such as the growing youth populations and associated unemployment prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa.[78]

The Brookings' Africa Growth Initiative cites that 10 to 12 million youth enter the labor market of this region each year and while this growth "provides the opportunity for a demographic dividend—where the number of working-age people outweighs the number of dependents—it also presents the risk for soaring rates of youth unemployment."[79] Unemployment and underemployment of an increasingly educated and globalized youth can act as a sort of "ticking time bomb" undermining political stability and social cohesion.[80] Concurrently, years of poor governance has left most

sub-Saharan countries without the level of private sector investment necessary for growth. The International Monetary Fund recommends governments should "intensify their efforts to create an environment that encourages private investment" which includes promoting and sustaining confidence in appropriate and sound macroeconomic policies and ensuring the availability of a qualified labor pool."[81] According to one violence and group conflict researcher, however, economic opportunities alone may not "turn people away from the path" to violent extremism, rather, "youth must be given hopes and dreams of achievement, and plausible means to realize such hopes and dreams."[82]

A focused agenda on building science, technology and innovation (ST&I) capacity in sub-Saharan Africa could enable the development of the *human potentials*, and to a lesser extent the *human capital* and *human abilities*, factors in the youth of the region, providing them not only the "hopes and dreams," but also the means to realize them. This agenda could involve a range of activities from developing scientific, technological and institutional capacity and infrastructure (e.g., research laboratories, equipment and instruments, and technology innovation centers) to supporting a regional fund for joint research activities that would strengthen existing institutions, help establish new ones, and provide challenging science and technology opportunities for sub-Saharan Africa's youth.[83] Investment in scientific and technological advancement provides the region the tools to address internal challenges, expands productivity, and offers "surer and higher returns than continuously funneling aid dollars for short-term fixes."[84]

While currently only a small part of the USAID budget, the new "Global Development Lab" is an effort in the right direction for focused development of *human potentials*.[85] As described by the former USAID chief scientist, the purpose of the Lab is to "harness the power of the crowd and America's leading research institutes and universities, coupled with the democratization of science and technology, to lead to new breakthroughs that can bring it to scale."[86] The Lab's International Research and Science programs focus on several human-centered areas, including empowering scientists to build domestic S&TI capacity and fostering global relationships to broaden scientific progress.[87] Expanded efforts to encourage the development of *human potentials* dimensions through building ST&I capacity in sub-Saharan Africa can ultimately help create jobs, spur private sector investment and bolster sustainable economic growth.

<div align="center">Recommendations</div>

As stated previously, the U.S. approach to addressing violent extremism in the region is at a crossroads today. Both the 2012 *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* and the recently released 2015 *National Security Strategy* rightly allude to the power of the African people as the basis for setting the future course for the continent. The U.S. must follow these words with action by prioritizing efforts to aid in the development of foundational human factors to help ensure the success of the people. While security remains a foundation for development, the U.S. must better balance efforts to achieve long-term success in the region. As such, there are three strategy-related recommendations focusing on resources, organizational structure and creativity, and two policy-related recommendations focusing on restraint and risk acceptance.

<u>Strategy Recommendations</u>

Recommendation 1: Resource Reprioritization

The human-centered development approach requires a re-examination and re-prioritization of the resources allocated to USAID and DoD for efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. must consolidate gains made through the last decades of development efforts in the region and provide increased resources to USAID to significantly expand programs focused on literacy, education, leadership development and ST&I capacity-building. This is not a new idea; however, following through and actually implementing the re-prioritization of resources to align the "means" with the "ways" of the strategy would be truly monumental.

In the short term, AFRICOM and USAID should:

- Conduct an in-depth examination of current Theater Security Cooperation Strategies (TSCSs) and Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs) for sub-Saharan Africa to identify where efforts could be shifted from the defense to development portfolio.

- Use the results to develop recommendations for a 5-year funding plan reflecting the shift in resource priorities.

- Communicate the recommendations to stakeholders, including senior staff from DoD, USAID, the National Security Council and Congress.

In the longer term, the U.S. should:

- Institutionalize the re-prioritization, via budgets, authorities, and processes, and continue to increase and strengthen USAID resources and personnel for engagement in sub-Saharan Africa.

- Analyze the results of the emphasis on human-focused development and determine applicability to other regions.

Recommendation 2: Collaborative Strategy Development and Planning

To accompany these resource changes, civilian presence and leadership should be significantly strengthened within the AFRICOM organizational construct. In a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment, the military command risks an incomplete picture of the operational environment and associated problems if strategies and operational plans are simply coordinated between agencies or departments. Coordination can inherently focus more on simple de-confliction rather than finding and creating synergies. By increasing the civilian leadership within the command, a more collaborative approach with participation from representatives of all of the elements of national power could be employed, ultimately helping to ensure a clear connection between policy, political goals and the resulting strategy and plans.[88]

In the short term, AFRICOM and USAID should:

- Build on the resource prioritization to identify additional leadership and operational-level positions and locations where AFRICOM and USAID personnel can be permanently integrated.

- Develop a formalized program to offer AFRICOM and USAID personnel the opportunity to share expertise through short-term personnel exchanges.

In the longer term, the U.S. should:

- Develop a more integrated collaborative strategy development, planning process, and improved assessments methodology to craft an overarching engagement strategy for each sub-Saharan Africa country. The

comprehensive strategy would fully integrate diplomacy, development and

defense issues for the region and be nested under the National Security

Strategy. Future CDSCs and TSCPs would flow from this high-level strategy.

- Once developed and tested, export these strategies to other regions where

    this whole-of-government collaborative approach could be applied.

Recommendation 3: Creative Uses of DoD Resources for Development

Since resources will likely remain constrained in the future, the U.S. will need to

find and expand creative ways to use DoD resources to support the human-centered

approach efforts. For example, in the literacy and education area, the command

recently donated approximately $50,000 in "science kits" for South Africa's Youth

Development Program benefiting over 3,000 children from disadvantaged schools in the

area.[89] In the civilian and military leadership development area, the U.S. should formally

bring together participants in the YALI and IMET programs to jointly participate in

training, education and exercises. This would provide the future leaders the opportunity

to not only learn about civil-military relations but actually put the concepts into action.

The creation of the Global Development Lab within USAID provides increased

opportunities for DoD to collaborate in the ST&I capacity-building area. For example,

the Lab's International Research and Science programs could leverage efforts such as

the recently-held Joint Services and Office of the Secretary of Defense Africa Technical

Exchange and other ongoing efforts executed as part of DoD International S&T

Engagement Strategy.[90] Creative collaboration could help maximize the benefits of

DoD's basic research funding toward achievement of Global Development Lab goals in

sub-Saharan Africa.

In the short term, AFRICOM and USAID should:

- Establish working groups to identify additional program-level areas where AFRICOM resources could be used to support specific development efforts.

- Identify, execute and publicize any "quick wins" where development projects were assisted by defense resources. Incorporate projects requiring a longer planning and approval cycle into the 5-year funding plan outlined earlier.

In the longer term, the U.S. should:

- Analyze the long term results of reprioritized development-led engagement in sub-Saharan Africa and institutionalize the changes in DoD and USAID.

Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Exercise Restraint

The U.S. must exercise restraint in the use of military force to counter violent extremism in the region for two reasons. First, research from Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that civilian casualties from lethal military operations affects future violence through increased recruitment into violent extremist groups after civilian casualty incidents.[91] This same phenomenon could occur in sub-Saharan Africa if the U.S. does not practice restraint in lethal military efforts to counter violent extremism. Second, the U.S. should recognize that engagement with some sub-Saharan governments could create a "Catch 22" situation. One professor describes this argument by stating "state instability in Africa has generated the conflicts that have merely served to intensify the conditions of underdevelopment and the economic and social injustices that lead to further conflict."[92] In terms of U.S. interests, military efforts to support sub-Saharan African governments that are not accountable to their people in the quest for security serves to exacerbate the grievances often contributing to the existence of violent extremism. When planning for counter violent extremism military operations, the criteria

should be set very high for lethal engagement and only focus on the highest priority

threats to the U.S. A truly collaborative strategic planning process at AFRICOM as

recommended earlier can also help utilize civilian expertise in order to best predict 2nd

and 3rd order effects of such operations.

Recommendation 2: Practice Strategic Patience and Accept Some Risk

Finally, a commitment to the human-centered approach requires long-range

vision, strategic patience to sustain necessary focus, and risk acceptance in the short

term. Inherently, the approach concentrates on the future and primarily relies on the

engagement of those sub-Saharan Africans born post-independence in a globalized

world. The children at the center of the literacy and education efforts today will be the

culturally transcendent civilian and military leaders of tomorrow who will be capable of

paving the way to economic prosperity. These are not the type of changes which

happen in five years, rather they may take generation or more, and therefore, will likely

have to endure short-term problems, set-backs and repeated tests of restraint. While

conflict may continue in some areas, the U.S. will need to exercise strategic patience

and not let the quest for immediate security de-rail efforts toward the future.

Conclusion

In a 2008 speech then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated the U.S.

cannot "kill or capture our way to victory" against violent extremists; instead, "kinetic

operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government,

economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that

often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which the

terrorists recruit."[93] Sub-Saharan Africa provides the U.S. an exceptional strategic

opportunity to move away from the military-dominated reflexive approach and instead

fully commit to a more proactive human-focused approach to address the underlying

conditions which allow violent extremism to grow and prosper. The U.S. should prioritize

and adequately resource long-term, human-centered development activities focused on

setting the conditions for stability in sub-Saharan Africa over military-centric

counterterrorism approaches. While there are no panaceas to solve complex global

problems, this shift in approach could provide strategic options for achievement of U.S.

interests worldwide.

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