

# Strategy Research Project

## Increasing JIIM Interoperability in the Security Cooperation Environment

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Tomich  
United States Marine Corps



United States Army War College  
Class of 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 15-04-2014		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Increasing JIIM Interoperability in the Security Cooperation Environment				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Tomich United States Marine Corps				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Colonel Randolph White Jr. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> Word Count: 6,084					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) organizations participate in the Theater Security Cooperation environment. Each of these organizations' roles and responsibilities contribute to a holistic approach in the development of defense relationships. The Theater Security Cooperation environment is complex and plagued by disparities in terminology, doctrine, and policies of the U.S. military and interagency organizations, as well as those of our partner nations. These issues create interoperability gaps that impede their ability to synchronize actions and ensure complementary efforts are occurring to achieve unity of effort and action. This paper will analyze the various directives and publications to develop an understanding of the goals of security cooperation, the key organizations involved in security cooperation at the various levels of control, the roles and responsibilities of these organizations, and how these organizations contribute to the holistic approach to security cooperation. Lastly, the paper will provide recommendations on ways to better integrate organizational efforts to increase JIIM interoperability in the security cooperation arena and follow-on unified actions.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Joint, Interagency, Planning					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 35	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> UU	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UU	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UU			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)</b>



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Increasing JIIM Interoperability in the Security Cooperation Environment**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Tomich  
United States Marine Corps

Colonel Randolph White Jr.  
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute  
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **Abstract**

Title: Increasing JIIM Interoperability in the Security Cooperation Environment

Report Date: 15 April 2014

Page Count: 35

Word Count: 6,084

Key Terms: Joint, Interagency, Planning

Classification: Unclassified

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) organizations participate in the Theater Security Cooperation environment. Each of these organizations' roles and responsibilities contribute to a holistic approach in the development of defense relationships. The Theater Security Cooperation environment is complex and plagued by disparities in terminology, doctrine, and policies of the U.S. military and interagency organizations, as well as those of our partner nations. These issues create interoperability gaps that impede their ability to synchronize actions and ensure complementary efforts are occurring to achieve unity of effort and action. This paper will analyze the various directives and publications to develop an understanding of the goals of security cooperation, the key organizations involved in security cooperation at the various levels of control, the roles and responsibilities of these organizations, and how these organizations contribute to the holistic approach to security cooperation. Lastly, the paper will provide recommendations on ways to better integrate organizational efforts to increase JIIM interoperability in the security cooperation arena and follow-on unified actions.





## **Increasing JIIM Interoperability in the Security Cooperation Environment**

We based our strategies on the principle that it is much more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than it is to stop one once it's started. I cannot overstate the importance of our theater security cooperation programs as the centerpiece to securing our Homeland from the irregular and catastrophic threats of the 21st Century.

—General James L. Jones

For as long as man has walked the Earth, there has been competition for land, power, and ultimately survival. Man developed the understanding that there is strength in numbers and that two is generally better than one. From this understanding, armies were developed to achieve their objectives. This theory expanded as armies coupled their efforts to build stronger alliances to achieve greater things.

The United States has long been committed to the development of relationships with nations around the globe. These relationships have aided in the protection of our national interests abroad, added depth to the defense of our homeland, and set the foundation for the establishment of future coalitions to win our nation's wars. The Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) environment has been a major catalyst in the development of these modern day defense relationships.

The TSC environment has many participants and contributors. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) organizations participate in the TSC environment and have the potential to ensure that a holistic approach is taken in the development of defense relationships. Each of these organizations' roles and responsibilities contribute to the TSC environment but also add to its complexity. The JIIM organizations often struggle to understand the roles and responsibilities of other organizations and how to integrate their efforts to complement those of others in the TSC environment. The environment is further confused by disparities in terminology,

doctrine, and policies of the U.S. military and interagency organizations, as well as those of our partner nations. These matters often result in a lack of interoperability that impedes our ability to synchronize actions and ensure complementary efforts are occurring to achieve unity of effort and action.

This paper will analyze the various directives and publications to develop an understanding of the goals of security cooperation, the key organizations involved in security cooperation at the various levels of control, the roles and responsibilities of these organizations, and how these organizations contribute to the holistic approach to security cooperation. Lastly, the paper will provide recommendations on ways to better integrate organizational efforts to increase JIIM interoperability in the security cooperation arena and follow-on unified actions.

### What is Security Cooperation?

Simply defining security cooperation can prove futile as definitions vary throughout organizations at various levels of control. In order to achieve a mutually inclusive definition, this paper will begin with an understanding of what security cooperation aspires to achieve and then work across the strategic national level organizations towards a common definition.

The President of the United States communicated his guidance through the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). It is within this document that our nation's interests, goals and priorities are delivered to all organizations within the United States Government. The NSS identifies security, prosperity, values, and international order as the United States national interests. A recurring theme conveyed is the importance of cooperation within our organizations and with partner nations in order to achieve our national interests. The President further expresses the importance of cooperation by

stating, “We must build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our interests and the interests we share with other countries and peoples”.<sup>1</sup>

From the President’s guidance, the United States Department of State (DOS) identifies Security Cooperation (SC) as “Those activities that directly contribute to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”<sup>2</sup> DOS serves as the lead and provides oversight for SC efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. The definition further recognizes that SC activities must be coordinated through the staff of the senior regional military commander since the SC activities will be conducted within their area of responsibility (AOR).<sup>3</sup>

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) states that SC includes “Activities that are undertaken by DOD in order to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.”<sup>4</sup> SC activities include all programs that are managed by DOD in order to build defense and security relationships that promote U.S. security interests.<sup>5</sup> The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) provides the most complete definition of Security Cooperation. Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02) defines SC as “All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”<sup>6</sup>

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the bridging organization between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in regards to security cooperation. It is within Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03 that the

following commonalities, which are highlighted below, are synthesized into the final cohesive DSCA definition of security cooperation.

- Department of State: “Activities that directly contribute to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”<sup>7</sup>
- Department of Defense: “Interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to an host nation.”<sup>8</sup>
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency: “Activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.”<sup>9</sup>

#### Who are the Participants in a Security Cooperation Environment?

This section will identify the organizations that play a role in the security cooperation environment as it spans the levels of control from the national strategic level down to the tactical level. The environment is not mutually exclusive and could benefit from a holistic approach to ensure that we achieve our strategic objectives.

At the national strategic level, the Department of State conducts higher level planning through its Washington DC offices. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the DOS’s principal link to DOD.<sup>10</sup> PM provides direction in the form of policy regarding international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.<sup>11</sup> The counterpart within the Department of

Defense to the Bureau of Political Military Affairs is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). USD(P) is the primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense on security cooperation.<sup>12</sup> The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) acts under the authority, direction, and control of USD(P). The Director of DSCA serves as a bridge between the PM and USD(P). The Director of DSCA is responsible for providing DOD-wide guidance to the service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard) and the military personnel at the various U.S. missions throughout the world to support the execution of security cooperation programs.<sup>13</sup>

The theater strategic level contains a vast cast of characters. This cast includes the Ambassador, members of the country team, the Combatant Commander, the Geographic Combatant Command staff, members of the Security Cooperation Office, Defense Attaché Office, and the Senior Defense Official.

At the country level, each U.S. mission has a staff that is called the country team. The country team includes representatives from many federal agencies as well as the key players from the departments of Defense and State, all under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador. The Ambassador, also known as the Chief of Mission (COM), directs and supervises all activities in the country. The COM ensures that the proper coordination of U.S. Government resources and programs occurs through the country team with the support of the individuals under the command of the regional combatant commander.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the COM provides oversight of SC activities, while the country team handles much of the administrative and financial issues pertaining to security cooperation.

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is a biennial DOD document that is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and signed by the President of the United States. The most current UCP was published in 2011 and identifies the roles and responsibilities of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) throughout the six global areas of responsibility (Africa, Middle East, Europe, North America, South America, and Pacific). The Combatant Commander (CCDR) of a particular GCC is the senior military representative within a specified region. Each GCC is organized and staffed slightly different with a mix of military and interagency personnel to assist in closing the interoperability gaps identified during the planning and execution of previous unified actions. One of the many GCC responsibilities is “Planning, conducting, and assessing SC activities.”<sup>15</sup>

Within the U.S. Embassy’s (AMEMB) are Security Cooperation Offices (SCO) and Defense Attaché Offices (DAO). The SCO’s are staffed by a small group of U.S. military personnel to reduce the interoperability gaps between the DOS country team and the DOD GCC. An SDO Chief leads this staff under the supervision and direction of the COM within a given country. The SCO’s are responsible for shaping country specific security cooperation programs in conjunction with guidance provided by the GCC to achieve theater campaign plan objectives.<sup>16</sup> This requires the SCO to coordinate their efforts with the country team, GCC and the host nation in order to successfully fulfill the security cooperation mission. Like the SCO’s, the DAO’s are staffed by a small group of U.S. military personnel. The DAO represents the Secretary of Defense, the Service Components, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the U.S. Military Services and the Combatant Commander.<sup>17</sup> The Defense Attaché (DATT) serves as the DAO lead and

represents the Department of Defense to the host nation government and military, and advises the U.S. Ambassador on military matters.<sup>18</sup>

The Senior Defense Official (SDO) is the top DOD official in a U.S. embassy as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO is the COM's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues. This individual also serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The SDO is the primary point of contact within the embassy fostering the security cooperation relationship between the GCC and the host country. The Defense Attaché (DATT) is generally the SDO, however, the SCO Chief may be the SDO in certain cases.<sup>19</sup>

Lastly, the United States service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) and Special Operations Command have the responsibility to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain their forces in support of geographic combatant command requirements at the operational and tactical levels.<sup>20</sup>

Special Operations Forces (SOF) may consist of units from the Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and Marine Corps Special Operations Command. These units normally contribute to the SC efforts under operational control of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) commander, who has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of special operations in support of the GCC.<sup>21</sup>

The General Purpose Forces (GPF) are sourced by the service components to the geographic combatant command and consists of conventional military units not designated as special operations units. The GPF is often tailored to conduct SC

activities that make a unique contribution to theater campaign plans and ensures the success of security cooperation activities in a particular region.<sup>22</sup>

### What Directs Security Cooperation Activities?

The National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the President's vision for providing enduring security for the American people. The most recent NSS was published in 2010 and called for a renewal of international engagement, deepening of cooperation, and an investment in the capacity of strong and capable partners. The strategy serves as a way to advance the enduring U.S. national interest in international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.<sup>23</sup> The NSS sits on top of the hierarchy of documents that provides guidance to DOD and the interagency to ensure security cooperation activities support the U.S. security objectives.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the Secretary of Defense's national strategic guidance to the Department of Defense. The NDS describes the overarching goals and strategy to support the objectives outlined in the NSS.<sup>24</sup> The most recent NDS was published in 2008 and addressed how DOD will work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict. The USD(P) then takes the guidance provided in the NDS and produces Secretary of Defense security cooperation goals and priorities which are released in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF).<sup>25</sup> The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) develop Strategic Plans from the NSS. The Strategic Plans provide direction and priorities for both organizations and present how these organizations will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years.<sup>26</sup>



The GEF and Strategic Plans provide the theater strategic guidance and direction that allows the next level of planning to occur. “As the U.S. defense budget decreases, security cooperation programs, activities, and missions that build stronger partnerships and partner capacity are likely to become the primary focus of all GCC’s.”<sup>27</sup> The Geographic Combatant Commands have the primary responsibility for developing country plans in coordination with the Security Cooperation Office. The development and revision of these plans and the associated support plans should occur in parallel with the development of the theater campaign plan and theater campaign support plan. Theater campaign planning should incorporate country planning and the GCC’s country plans or, in some cases, regional plans. The GCC planning effort must align with the COM’s goals since the activities normally occur at the country level. The coordination between the GCC and the SCO’s is crucial when confirming that planning efforts align with the COM’s objectives within the country.<sup>28</sup> This process ensures that planners nest the objectives of country plans with those of the theater campaign plan.<sup>29</sup>

At the operational level, the Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) is the primary planning document for defining U.S. objectives in a foreign country. The AMEMB develops goals, strategies, tactics, and performance indicators to obtain the objectives. Once the annual MSRP is produced, it is reviewed and approved by the COM. Following the COM’s approval, the annual MSRP is submitted to DOS for final review. For countries eligible to receive foreign aid, including military assistance, the MSRP serves as the instrument by which the AMEMB submits its funding requirements. DOS prioritizes the MSRP funding requirements from the various AMEMB’s and approves them from the available allocated financial resources. The SCO chief’s

involvement in the development of the MSRP is vital to building the trust and support of the COM and ensuring DOD activities are in sync with national and theater strategic guidance to achieve our national objectives with partner nations.<sup>30</sup>

#### How to Improve the Collaboration in the SC Environment

The following recommendations are available to the combatant commander and their staff. These solutions demonstrate the importance of security cooperation activities and their ability to mitigate interoperability challenges prior to the execution of operations in support of a crisis.

#### Doctrine

Joint Publication 1 (JP 1) is the capstone publication that links joint doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other government departments, agencies, and multinational partners.<sup>31</sup> JP 1 states, “The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces toward a common objective.”<sup>32</sup> Following the most recent decade of combat operations in support of the war on terror, many lessons have been learned regarding the planning and execution of operations at every level of control. These lessons have resulted in the review and revision of joint doctrinal publications. As of 2 October 2013, the joint doctrine hierarchy consisted of 79 publications with 28 under review, two pending deletion, and three under development.

While joint doctrine is meant to serve DOD, it can provide a commander and their staff a common starting point during planning and the guidance to overcome the initial challenges of operating in the JIIM environment. Joint doctrine serves a synergistic function by providing a common frame of reference and point of departure in terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures to a commander and their staff.<sup>33</sup>

A unified action is defined in Joint Publication 1 as the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of joint, single service, and multinational operations with the operations of other U.S. government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.<sup>34</sup> The achievement of unity of effort is an opportunity for the combatant commander to have a force that is stronger than the militaries and organizations of multiple nations acting independently within their Area of Responsibility (AOR).

After years in the making, a planning group was established to support collaboration between DOS, USAID, and DOD at the national strategic level. The purpose of the planning group was to develop a reference tool that assisted planners in understanding the purpose of each agency's plans, the processes that generate them, and, most importantly, to help identify opportunities for coordination.<sup>35</sup> As a result of the planning teams efforts, the 3D Planning Guide was written in July 2012 to further assist in achieving unity of effort. A pre-decisional working draft was produced to "Bridge the gap between DOD and the Interagency by establishing a common lexicon, understanding of authorities and responsibilities, and signatory support from the highest levels of each organization."<sup>36</sup> The ultimate long-term goal of the 3D Planning Guide is the continued improvement of collaboration to achieve unity of effort in the advancement of U.S. national interests.

A similar planning effort occurred at the theater strategic level that resulted in the creation of a document to assist military and interagency planners in lessening the interoperability gap. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) published the Interagency

Planning Handbook as a working document in order to allow for continued improvement by the individuals who use it. The EUCOM Interagency Planning Handbook states that the handbook is “A practical enabler and perspective that may inform and promote enhanced interagency planning efforts...It is not directive in nature and is not a statement of command policy. It is an informed professional tool for the intended audience’s consideration.”<sup>37</sup>

Documents such as the 3D Planning Guide and Interagency Handbooks at the regional command level are the current remedy to doctrinal shortfalls in the JIIM environment. This is an adequate short-term solution to the doctrinal interoperability problem. In order to provide a long-term solution at the national and theater strategic levels a joint/interagency doctrinal publication with signatory approvals from the highest levels within each organization must be created. The signatory approvals will add legitimacy to the document and ultimately force its use.

At the operational and tactical level, joint doctrine serves to close the gap between GPF and SOF by creating a common lexicon regardless of service or functional branch. Joint Publication 3-0 identifies that military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict across a range that spans from joint operations to unified action.<sup>38</sup> Joint operations are a cross service combination in which the capability of the joint force has the potential to be more powerful than its parts. Joint doctrine bridges service gaps to achieve this jointness when DOD forces conduct operations executed by two or more services.

Operation Unified Response is an example of a unified action that was executed in January 2010 as a result of a devastating earthquake that struck Haiti. A unity of

effort occurred between U.S. military, interagency, and non-governmental organizations to provide support to hundreds of thousands who were affected by this disaster. The overall U.S. government response was headed by Rajiv Shah from USAID with military support from Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H) commanded by Lieutenant General Ken Keen from U.S. Southern Command. The U.S. military provided forces from each service component and SOCOM to JTF-H. These forces synchronized, coordinated, and integrated with one another as well as the interagency and non-governmental organizations to achieve common objectives regardless of command structure.<sup>39</sup> Operation Unified Response, demonstrated how the current operating environment required service components and interagency organizations to work together towards a common objective. Lessons learned from this event also identified the continued requirement for a common set of lexicons and procedures to increase interoperability during future unified actions.

### Organization

Complex or unclear command relationships; organizational integration and individual augmentation support can be challenges that prevent synergy in the JIIM environment.<sup>40</sup> The establishment of Combined Joint Interagency Task Forces Headquarters (CJIATF HQ) can provide the opportunity to understand and develop these command relationships, lines of authorities, organizational responsibilities, organizational direction and guidance, and individual support requirements for the planning and execution of security cooperation activities.<sup>41</sup>

The establishment of a standing CJIATF HQ, while beneficial, can be extremely taxing on the manning and time requirements of all organizations that seek to benefit from its establishment. A possible remedy is the establishment of a standing Joint

Manning Document (JMD) and Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to aid in the ease and speed of establishing a CJATF HQ when required. Joint Publication 1-02 on Joint Personnel Support states, “Key to this process is creating a JMD that will define the overall manpower requirements needed to complete its mission. The JMD can be filled through multiple sourcing methods to include units, coalition, other government agencies, and contractors. The JMD provides the venue for requesting the individual augmentation necessary to staff the HQ.”<sup>42</sup>

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has established a joint manning website to assist in filling manpower requirements for specified missions and ease the speed and establishment of these HQ from times of peace to war. A similar manning system could be used by all geographic combatant commands to aid in the establishment of a CJATF HQ JMD in support of security cooperation exercises and future operations. The specific billet requirements could be identified and tasked to organizations required to support the given billet. A MOA would provide a written understanding of the agreement on what the organizations agree to achieve and provide in support of a given JMD requirement. The organization identified on the JMD and in the MOA would then be required to identify and keep current the name of a specific individual to fill the requirement. This effort could lay the foundation for HQ support to exercises and provide a more effective of HQ during future crises.

An example of a CJATF that is currently up and operational is in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR. CJATF 435 was established as a subordinate command of U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to close the interoperability gaps between services and the interagency when conducting detainee operations in Afghanistan. The

CJIATF includes U.S. service members from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, Department of Defense civilians, contractors and Coalition members.

Additionally, these organizations partner with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Afghan National Army Detention Operations Command (ANA DOC), the U.S. Department of State's Division of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the U.S. Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC), and the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

### Training

Phase 0 is the first of six phases used to identify the various stages in joint operations. Phase 0 describes shape operations that include normal and routine military and interagency activities that are performed to discourage potential adversaries. The remaining phases (phase I-V) are to deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.<sup>43</sup>

Security Cooperation is a phase 0 activity that includes exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military staff talks.<sup>44</sup> For decades, the United States Government has worked with allies and partners through various security cooperation activities to aid in the development and interoperability of DOD, the interagency and foreign militaries through continuing interaction.<sup>45</sup> This long-term engagement has built and solidified defense relationships and cooperation over time in preparation for future crises.<sup>46</sup>

The planning that occurs during SC activities is as important as the execution at every level of control. The planning during SC exercises provides an opportunity to establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other services, branches, agencies,

and nations. Exercises present an opportunity to develop a team from a group of individuals and refine their understanding of their duties and responsibilities. This team building also serves as an opportunity to develop cohesion and trust for later phases of operations. These staffs can be assembled during exercises to conduct deliberate and crisis action planning. These exercises provide feedback to their parent organizations to help synchronize requirements or activities for future phases. Additionally, participation by all organizations in the planning and execution of exercises develops interoperability and identifies gaps and challenges to the CCDR. Interoperability developed during exercises provides an effective action to ensure that all organizations operate more effectively.<sup>47</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Training Manual states, “The Joint Exercise Program (JEP) is a principal means for combatant commanders to maintain trained and ready forces, exercise their contingency plans, support their theater campaign plan, and achieve joint and multinational (combined) training.”<sup>48</sup>

In the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR, Exercise Flintlock has taken place since 2006 among African, Western, and U.S. counterterrorism forces. This exercise is directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sponsored by AFRICOM, and conducted by Special Operations Forces, Interagency, and Multinational participants.

Exercise Flintlock is executed annually in nations across the Sahel region of Africa. Planning occurs with Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), interagency organizations, and partner nations to develop capacity and collaboration. Flintlock participation has included forces from over 16 countries across a broad spectrum of operations.<sup>49</sup> A major element of the 2011 Flintlock exercise was “The



addition of the Trans-Sahara Security Symposium (TSS), a civil-military cooperation and interagency capacity-building event coordinated in collaboration with the U.S. Agency for International Development.”<sup>50</sup>

“By the end of the next week our partners are running the entire planning process as we take a step back. That's the ultimate goal.”<sup>51</sup> Joint Exercises like Exercise Flintlock, incorporate organizations into the planning and execution of operations. Most of these exercises are limited to one or two weeks in which to accomplish all of their training objectives due to time or fiscal constraints. Individual military and civilian members operating in the security cooperation environment would be well served by operating off a common lexicon when planning and executing at all levels of control. With this in mind, the remainder of this section will discuss additional training opportunities to better prepare individual members prior to arriving in an exercise or crisis planning group.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is an excellent opportunity to close the gaps and increase cooperation between the functional branches, services, and interagency. The optimal solution would require all inbound personnel filling a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billet to attend resident JPME prior to arrival. The Joint Duty Assignment List identifies specific billets on a joint staff that are considered highly important and that the individual assigned should be trained and oriented toward joint matters.<sup>52</sup> Joint professional military education (JPME) prepares individuals entering the joint force by gaining a better understanding of joint and service perspectives through the introduction of joint plans, national military strategy, joint doctrine, joint command and control, and joint force requirements. This can be accomplished through resident or

non-resident attendance in one of the following institutions; Air War College (AWC), Army War College (USAWC), College of Naval Warfare (CNW) at the Naval War College, Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), National War College (NWC), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), and Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at JFSC.<sup>53</sup>

Unfortunately, there may not be enough school seats, time, or organizational structure to allow for attendance in a resident course. This holds true for military and interagency personnel alike. To compensate for these issues, the GCC should provide an indoctrination class to be offered online or at a resident class hosted annually by the combatant command staff. Additional follow-on training could be conducted with exercise planning and execution on an annual basis. This training would provide individuals filling billets in the SC environment a clearer understanding of duties, responsibilities, and command relationships for themselves and the organization. This understanding would aid in reducing friction, boost trust, build rapport and assist in gaining unity of effort.

### Material

A primary material challenge in the JIIM environment is communications equipment incompatibility.<sup>54</sup> A communications mismatch can prevent information sharing at all levels of control. Communications standardization has occurred and improved interoperability between the service components within DOD. Challenges remain between DOD, the IA and partner nations. Left unanswered, gaps in communications interoperability can lead to deterioration in trust amongst organizations.

Exercise Combined Endeavor takes place in U.S. European Commands (EUCOM) AOR and is the largest command, control, communications and computers (C4) interoperability event in the world. This exercise has provided an environment to identify gaps and develop solutions for interoperability problems in a multinational environment.<sup>55</sup> Each year, approximately 1,400 communications professionals from the U.S. military and interagency, more than 40 NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, and other strategic security partners participate in the exercise. This exercise prepares nations to collaborate, plan and execute on complex C4 systems using NATO and commercial equipment to increase interoperability between the organizations and nations.<sup>56</sup> "In 2010 we faced an incompatibility problem, pulled out of the exercise, found the solution, and learned which pieces of hardware and equipment we needed. In the 2011 exercise we tested our solution. All the tests that were red in 2010 were green in 2011, meaning compatible."<sup>57</sup>

Once a requirement is identified, the formal DOD acquisition process known as the joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) can begin. The JCIDS process exists to support Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements. JCIDS ensures that senior DOD leadership remains informed on the process as stewards of the taxpayer's dollars while ensuring that requirements are prioritized and filled for the warfighters.

The actual information being shared is the second part of this problem. The sharing of information is an extremely sensitive area and is governed by strict U.S. policy. The release of classified information to individuals who are not cleared for certain

classifications can be another challenge to the CDR commander and staff. This is a challenge that personnel at every level need to be concerned with. It can create tension as organizations question why information is not openly shared when acting to address a common challenge, but it is also a challenge that must be understood and worked through to ensure transparency in a unified action. Phase 0 exercises are an opportunity to identify information sharing challenges and develop a process to facilitate the authorized disclosure to support mission success. "Information sharing interoperability problems were identified in previous years and solutions were produced for future iterations of the exercise. This year, these nations meet a certain level of accreditation (minimum level of trust) before they were allowed to join the network and exchange information in real time."<sup>58</sup>

### Leadership

Security Cooperation activities can be an opportunity to build the trust and rapport that are crucial to success in the JIIM environment. Commanders, staffs, and individual participants should establish ongoing relationships to foster a harmonious environment. Leadership at every level of control are encouraged to conduct engagements with counterparts from sister services, functional branches and the interagency. "Interpersonal relationships are paramount. Building relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence usually takes time. KLE is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises, it is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis."<sup>59</sup>

This requires personal and direct contact that can develop a relationship over time. Good rapport will also improve teamwork at all levels of control during planning

and execution. This may also assist in the effective integration of interagency and multinational partners into future collaborative efforts.

The AFRICOM Security Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) conducts an annual conference that brings key DOD and interagency partners together to discuss security cooperation activities in Africa. The weeklong conference includes members of the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, military service components, and Defense Attaches and Security Cooperation Office chiefs serving across the African continent. The AFRICOM SCWG is an extremely important venue that promotes interaction of key leadership and builds teamwork between the members of all organizations involved.<sup>60</sup>

### Personnel

This paper has demonstrated that there are many ways to prepare an individual to succeed in the security cooperation environment. Joint Professional Military Education and exercise participation are two that accomplish this task quite well. Once trained, it is equally important to track these qualified individuals for later employment.

Service components and interagency organizations currently maintain organizational databases that provide the qualifications of DOD and civilian personnel who have been trained at JPME institutions or participated in theater exercises. A common database or service system interoperability for joint personnel sections (J-1) would take much of the guesswork out of identifying the right individuals during a crisis. This could be tested as part of an annual exercise that requires planning and execution in support of a unified action.

## Law

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, “Caused major defense reorganization, the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947.”<sup>61</sup> The Act was an attempt to resolve the interservice rivalry and interoperability issues that had culminated during the planning and execution of the joint operation in support of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980.<sup>62</sup> After a decade at war in support of the global war on terror, the military and the interagency have grown closer than possibly ever before. However, these relationships hold no authorities and will most likely diminish over time. The question must be asked when, if ever, will the time be right to propose a new law that forces unity of action between the joint force and the interagency? This is an area that will cause concern over loss of identity, authority, and independence by many organizations.

## Conclusion

Security Cooperation activities provide time and resources to identify and address interoperability challenges at every level of control. Material and non-material solutions identified in this paper can serve to lessen gaps and standardize actions making organizations more interoperable.

Unfortunately, most of these solutions are not permanent and only provide short-term solutions to interoperability problems. The previous long-term solution was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. A decade of operations following the events of September 11, 2001 created a new dimension in which DOD and non-DOD forces and agencies conduct daily planning and execution of joint operations and unified action. The next Goldwater-Nichols type act stood its best chance at becoming a reality during

the past decade at war, yet no additional act is on the horizon to establish true unity of command between the U.S. military and the interagency.

It isn't all gloom and doom; there is still hope, as opportunities exist as demonstrated in this paper. The combination of these recommendations will take some considerable planning efforts but will greatly improve integration and interoperability. The solution may resemble identification of qualified individuals to fill the billets on standing JMD's. These standing JMD's would then support the establishment of regionally aligned CJATF HQ's during exercises and crises. The participation of key leaders, such as the Combatant Commander and Ambassador, would stress the importance of exercise participation and aid in building trust and rapport across the JIIM environment. The Joint Exercise Program is an outstanding tool that has the potential to ensure participation across all levels of control, functional areas and services. Additionally, MOA's could be established to ensure interagency participation in the exercise program. Solutions would also be required to ensure communication interoperability and information sharing in support of the exercise program. Documents such as the 3D Planning Guide and IA handbooks could be reviewed, refined, and eventually agreed upon for signatory approval. All recommendations would serve to lessen the fear of things we don't understand while increasing integration and interoperability at every level. Security cooperation has endless possibilities and will only remain limited by those who lack imagination or the willingness to open their doors to new organizations and people.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 3.
- <sup>2</sup> Department of Defense and Department of State, *Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013*, Joint Report to Congress, Volume I (Washington, DC: Department of Defense and Department of State), II-1.
- <sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, Army Field Manual 3-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January, 2013), 1-1.
- <sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 29, 2013), vii.
- <sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-1.
- <sup>6</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15, 2013), 235.
- <sup>7</sup> Department of Defense and Department of State, *Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013*, Joint Report to Congress, Volume I, II-1.
- <sup>8</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-1.
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Department the Defense, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, DOD Directive 5132.03 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2008), 11.
- <sup>10</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, ix.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, II-3.
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Department the Defense, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, 4.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.
- <sup>14</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, ix.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, ix.
- <sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)," April 30, 2012, <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-2> (accessed January 8, 2014).
- <sup>17</sup> *Embassy of the United States London UK Home Page*, <http://london.usembassy.gov/dao/> (accessed February 26, 2014).



<sup>18</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, "Military," <http://www.dia.mil/Careers/Military.aspx> (accessed 26 February 26, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-17.

<sup>20</sup> United States Marine Corps, "Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation," 2012, 5, <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/2012%20USMC%20Security%20Cooperation%20Narrative.pdf> (accessed January 25, 2014).

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, ix.

<sup>22</sup> United States Marine Corps, "Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation," 5.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-3.

<sup>24</sup> Robert M. Gates, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008), 1.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department the Defense, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, 4.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan," <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/> (accessed February 5, 2014).

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-1.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, ix.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 3-20.

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)."

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, ix.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 141.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 15.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *3D Planning Guide – Diplomacy, Development, Defense (Pre-decisional Working Draft)* (Washington DC: Multi-Agency, July 31, 2012), 8.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>37</sup> United States European Command ECJ9 Interagency Planning Directorate, *Theater Strategic Level Interagency Planning Handbook 2012*, i.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), X.

<sup>39</sup> United States Southern Command, "Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010," <http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Unified-Response-Support-to-Haiti-Earthquake-Relief-2010.aspx> (accessed February 14, 2014).

<sup>40</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Joint Publication 3-33 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 16, 2007), I-3.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2013), II-2.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Personnel Support*, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 24, 2011), III-1.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), xxiii.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, 1-7.

<sup>45</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, I-4.

<sup>46</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, V-8.

<sup>47</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, X.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.03C (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 15, 2011), A-2.

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Flintlock," <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock> (accessed February 28, 2014).

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Flintlock 11 Kicks Off February 21 in Senegal/Media Opportunities," <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/7979/flintlock-11-kicks-off-february-21-in-senegal-medi> (accessed February 28, 2014).

<sup>51</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Flintlock: Multi-National Forces Combine at Exercise Center in Burkina Faso," <http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/7394/flintlock-multi-national-forces-combine-at-exercis> (accessed February 28, 2014).

<sup>52</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Personnel Support*, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 24, 2011), GL-6.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01D. (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 15, 2009) A-A-4.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, III-20.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. European Command, "Combined Endeavor: Working Together and Developing Solutions," <http://www.eucom.mil/article/24198/combined-endeavor-working-together-developing-solutions> (accessed February 12, 2014).

<sup>56</sup> U.S. European Command, "Combined Endeavor," <http://www.eucom.mil/key-activities/exercises-and-operations/exercise-combined-endeavor> (accessed February 12, 2014).

<sup>57</sup> U.S. European Command, "Combined Endeavor: Working Together and Developing Solutions."

<sup>58</sup> U.S. European Command, "Combined Endeavor 2013 Comes to a Close," <http://www.eucom.mil/article/25432/combined-endeavor-2013-comes-to-a-close> (accessed February 12, 2014).

<sup>59</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy Version 3.0*, June 24, 2010, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/sc\\_hbk10.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/sc_hbk10.pdf) (accessed January 10, 2014).

<sup>60</sup> U.S. Africa Command, "Africa Theater Security Working Group Begins Weeklong Conference in Germany," <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/6141/africa-theater-security-working-group-begins-weekl> (accessed February 12, 2014).

<sup>61</sup> Roberts, Lee Staff Sgt. U.S. Air Force, "Shalikashvili Grades Goldwater-Nichols Progress," December 18, 1996, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41637> (accessed January 29, 2014).

<sup>62</sup> Ronald H. Cole, "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 34 (Spring 2003), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-34.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2014), 67.