

# Strategy Research Project

## Character and Competence: Assessing Army Strategic Leaders

by

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United States Army War College  
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## **Abstract**

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## **Character and Competence: Assessing Army Strategic Leaders**

Competence and loyalty are two necessary leadership attributes, but the gold standard is trust.

—GEN Martin E. Dempsey<sup>1</sup>

The strategic environment is an ever-changing, complex system. Domestic and international challenges influence how the nation and its military interact around the world.<sup>2</sup> There are many national actors who play a central role in how the United States pursues its national interests and policy. Among these diverse actors, the military strategic leader is a critical member of the national security apparatus charged with leading and coordinating elements of national power in pursuit of strategic objectives.<sup>3</sup> To this end, the military strategic leader must possess the character traits and professional competencies to successfully operate in the Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment.<sup>4</sup>

Over the last decade, the Army experienced a decline in the perception of the character of its strategic leaders.<sup>5</sup> Numerous high-profile scandals and a recorded uptick in officer misconduct caused stakeholders to express growing concerns with how the Army develops and selects strategic leaders.<sup>6</sup> These domestic concerns, coupled with the evolving global environment, create a significant problem for the Army. As a national security issue, it is critical strategic military leaders maintain trust with its stakeholders while meeting the unique challenges of the future strategic environment. Without stakeholder trust, can Army strategic leaders effectively inform policy and strategy formulation, educate senior civilian leaders, and maintain an Army institution that fosters moral character as its foundation?

These emerging conditions require the United States Army to re-examine how it recruits, develops, and assesses strategic leaders. Analysis of the political, inter-agency, inter-service, and emerging threat environment strategic leaders are required to operate in is important to determining necessary leader attributes. Assessing the Army's current leader assessment methodology highlights effective processes as well as possible shortcomings. After reviewing future leader requirements and comparing them to the Army's leader assessment process, this analysis recommends modifications and initiatives to assist the Army in improving the recruitment and assessment of strategic leaders to meet the demands of the future strategic environment.

### Thesis

As conditions in the strategic landscape change and increasing concerns of senior leader character arise, the United States Army must consider modifications to how it currently recruits and assesses strategic leaders to meet the challenges of the future environment.

### Framework

There are many studies that examine the required attributes and characteristics of military and corporate leaders.<sup>7</sup> Arguments abound on what personal qualities are required for military leaders to effectively lead in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. For the purposes of this study, reviewing Joint Doctrine and the Army's leader competencies as outlined in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, are considered.<sup>8</sup> From this review, this study highlights the most important strategic leader qualities that promote necessary character and competent behavior. Furthermore, this analysis examines how the Army recruits and assesses its officers to ensure they possess strategic leadership skills upon entrance into the Army and throughout the span of an officer's career.

Review of the Army's current recruiting criteria and assessment processes assist in determining the effectiveness of current initiatives and what changes are necessary. Additionally, this study compares existing recruiting and assessment methodologies with those of other military services, inter-agency partners, and the business community. The primary purpose of this research is offering affordable, achievable solutions to improve overall recruiting, development, and retention of effective strategic Army leaders. Some of the identified shortcomings within the Army's recruiting and assessment process are not fully examined as a result of this study. Therefore, this research identifies additional questions to encourage and inform further examination.

### Relevance

There are changes in the internal and external environment that beckon consideration for altering how the Army recruits and assesses leaders. Foremost, Army strategic leader misconduct is beginning to erode the faith and confidence of the nation's leadership and the American people.<sup>9</sup> If this trend of mistrust continues, the possibility exists that Army strategic leaders will be less effective in influencing national security policy. As more national leaders lacking military experience assume positions across the Executive and Legislative branches of the government, a void in informed policy and strategy formulation could appear in the policy developmental process.<sup>10</sup> This vacuum in military understanding and influence expands the gap between civilians and the military promoting opportunity for our adversaries and increased risk to our nation.<sup>11</sup>

Another relevant factor is the recent deviation in the nation's economic vitality that has, and will continue, to reduce fiscal commitments to the military. With decreased monetary resources, the Army must continue to recruit and retain the best officers possible while maximizing limited resources. Additionally, the changes in the character

of warfare generally trend toward less protracted decisive action conflicts to shorter, more technical engagements.<sup>12</sup> This dynamic can influence strategic leader capability requirements for the future.

Other factors in the environment germane to this study are alterations in society. When the fabric of humanity changes through technology and human interaction, the Army must strongly deliberate and adjust what methods are used to recruit, train, and assess strategic leaders. Methods that worked in the past may not work today or in the future. With advances in science and technology, the Army should consider how to maximize these achievements to enhance the selection and assessment of the Army Officer corps. Given these monumental shifts in the environment, and many more unanticipated at this time, the Army must tailor its assessment techniques to achieve the desired outcomes the nation demands in a most uncertain environment.

## Future Environment and Leader Requirements

### Future Strategic Environment

The strategic environment continuously evolves. This volatile and uncertain global system remains more sophisticated and interconnected. In light of the ever-changing conditions in which the nation expects Army officers to effectively lead, determining the right characteristics and attributes required of future leaders is vitally important.<sup>13</sup> Reviewing environmental forecasts and current doctrine allows comparisons to how future environmental conditions and officer attributes align. Through this lens, it is possible to consider the appropriate criteria to evaluate potential Army officers. Describing the future operational environment is a necessary step to determining essential leadership traits.<sup>14</sup>

Experts routinely argue the aspects of the future environment. There are, however, some common characteristics most agree on. Foremost, the future operational setting is expected to routinely change.<sup>15</sup> As Colin S. Gray, a Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, so eloquently stated, “Expect to be surprised (by the future).”<sup>16</sup> At the surface, this condition seems consistent with the past. However, the recent emergence of technology and globalization shorten the time and enhance the ability for geographically separated groups and individuals to connect with common purpose.<sup>17</sup> GEN Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), articulated this aspect of the emerging environment in his white paper on Mission Command when he stated, “Joint Force 2020 will operate in a dynamic security environment that is different from today. The pace of change and speed of operations will continue to accelerate.”<sup>18</sup> The rapid changes in the environment will likely add complexity when multiple nations and agencies are operating to achieve shared strategic and operational outcomes.

Another distinctive component shaping future conditions is the diplomatic and military requirements to conduct combined, joint, and multinational operations.<sup>19</sup> The U.S. military experienced this recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Political influences and constrained economic resources demand the Army frequently operates in situations that rely more heavily on regional allies and partners. Furthermore, operations will require the integration of other military services, inter-agency partners, and non-governmental agencies. These conditions further complicate the Army’s ability to effectively execute required missions.

These factors, combined with the new face of hostile entities, create challenges that will surely test our most capable leaders.

A significant characteristic of the future battle space is the non-state actor.<sup>20</sup> Throughout history, non-state actors have influenced militaries' attempts to carry out national strategy.<sup>21</sup> Due to advances in technology, increased access to disruptive technologies, and the inter-connected nature of modern civilization, the capabilities of non-state actors are unique to history.<sup>22</sup> The rapidity and effectiveness of radical non-state actors to muster resources and inspire ideology across the geo-political spectrum is improving. While non-state actors are not decisive against traditional state actors or coalitions, they can significantly degrade efficiency and effectiveness.

Changes in the U.S. national security structure also yield new challenges to the Army strategic leader. Specifically, the number of U.S. government senior civilian leadership who have military experience is declining compared to historical averages. Currently, "only 22% of members of U.S. Congress have served in the military—the lowest number since World War II."<sup>23</sup> This circumstance likely creates further obstacles and division in the civilian-military relationship impacting policy and strategy formulation.<sup>24</sup> These changes in the internal and external strategic environment combined with more capable radical actors establish the necessity for Army officers who can envision, lead, and direct in the most demanding conditions.

### Leader Requirements for the Future

The forthcoming global circumstances awaiting the Army promise to provide fluid, flexible, and unprecedented levels of complexity in which to conduct operations. "U.S. military forces will be continually engaged in some dynamic combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction."<sup>25</sup> In this environment, Army

strategic leaders are required to be adaptable, anticipate problems, and find workable solutions. Military doctrine defines a framework of mission essential leader attributes necessary for solving complicated strategic problem sets.<sup>26</sup> United States Joint Forces and Army frameworks for leadership traits provide an adequate point for which to measure candidates for service as an Army officer.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* outlines a baseline for strategic leader attributes. *Joint Operations* describes the necessity for strategic leaders to possess the ability to have a “broad vision, anticipate events in the environment, and able to plan, prepare, execute, and assess.”<sup>27</sup> Joint doctrine further describes the requirement for strategic leaders to “encourage discourse, leverage dialogue, and collaborate to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems.”<sup>28</sup> These traits and abilities allow the strategic leader to more effectively lead diverse groups to accomplish complicated missions.

The strategic thinking framework developed by the United States Army War College delivers another comprehensive list of attributes for leaders at the strategic level of war.<sup>29</sup> The aspects of critical and creative thinking, synthesis, culture, and self-awareness foster successful problem solving within leaders and groups. This framework defines in more detail, the foundation of leader attributes that enable this required behavior.<sup>30</sup> These foundational traits include self-awareness to egocentric tendencies, assumptions, and biases as well as awareness to cultural influences, ethics, values and reflection.<sup>31</sup> Strategic leaders who possess these attributes increase the probability of successful interaction with other national actors across the governmental spectrum.

More effective relationships and cooperation create the conditions for unity of effort during Joint and inter-agency operations.

Strategic leader attributes described in Army doctrine align with Joint doctrine. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22 states, “The Army requires leaders at all levels that understand their environment, learn quickly, make sound decisions, and lead change.”<sup>32</sup> In addition, Army doctrine places emphasis on other imperative leader requirements including adaptable and innovative minds, prudent risk acceptance, and the ability to operate effectively in an uncertain, continuously changing environment.<sup>33</sup> The Army places three primary leader attributes above all: character, presence, and intellect.<sup>34</sup>

The *Army Leader Developmental Strategy* is another military source that outlines critical leader traits. These traits include the ability to understand the environment and complex problems, visualize solutions, and act with that situational understanding.<sup>35</sup> It further relates the need to foster relationships with unfamiliar people and organizations to accomplish difficult missions.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to military doctrine, numerous strategic leadership studies from the private sector yield conclusions that align required attributes with current military leadership doctrine. Case in point, a strategic leadership study from an organizational consulting firm, The Hayes Group International, determined five critical traits for tomorrow’s strategic leaders. These traits included “adaptive capacity, concentration and in-depth thinking, leadership, keen self-awareness, and strategic and tactical versatility.”<sup>37</sup> Additional studies from Gallup, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and others demonstrate that effective application of these leadership attributes

help motivate organizations and create leadership climates that facilitate organizational growth.<sup>38</sup> These studies share many of the same attributes articulated in Joint and Army publications and reinforce the relationship between leaders with the right behavior tendencies and effective organizations.

The strategic leader attributes expressed in Joint and Army doctrine, as well as private sector studies, provides an effective behavior foundation for which to measure Army officers. The critical attributes described by character, presence, and intellect are among the most critical strategic leadership behavior traits needed to succeed in the complex future environment. These critical traits allow Army strategic leaders to better interface with senior civilian leadership as well as more effectively operate in the Joint, Inter-agency, and multi-national setting. Next, it is important for this analysis to review the current Army Leadership model to examine the Army's leadership logic and methodology. This review allows for a better understanding of how the Army strives to develop strategic leaders and where more effective measures can be applied across the existing leader developmental model.

### Current Army Leadership Model

#### Current Army Leadership Logic

For centuries, experts have debated whether individuals are born as leaders or developed over time.<sup>39</sup> Doctrine indicates the Army believes the answer is both. The Army presumes that a strategic leader is trained and developed from an individual with a basic foundation of leader attributes.<sup>40</sup> ADP 6-22 states "that through training and experience, leader proficiency can be developed."<sup>41</sup> Examining the Army's leadership logic is important to this study. Understanding how the Army views the born versus

developed question informs why the current methodology is employed and highlights areas for improvement.

The Army believes that individual leaders given the right support and opportunities can progress as a leader over a career timeline.<sup>42</sup> The support structure that allows this professional growth hinges on multiple actors. Primarily, the Army asserts the individual officer must first demonstrate the desire and ability to develop. An equally important part of the equation is the support of the officer's senior leaders who create a positive learning environment.<sup>43</sup> These aspects, when combined with training and operational experience, provide the nucleus for the development of the Army's officer corps.<sup>44</sup>

During the course of an officer's career, the Army also provides centralized officer schooling. This formalized education instills doctrinal understanding, operational lessons learned, and encourages peer-to-peer education.<sup>45</sup> These opportunities are provided at the company and field grade levels. Each of these opportunities are necessary and provide much needed time to educate emerging leaders and prepare them for more advanced positions of rank and command.<sup>46</sup> Leader education opportunities appear consistent with the Army's developmental logic and align with critical junctions of officer responsibility within the force.

The review of the Army's logic on leader development showcases two important points. First, the Army asserts that there is a baseline of attributes required for individuals to effectively serve as officers in the Army and eventually develop into strategic leaders. Second, with that baseline, the Army's leader development process can produce strategic leaders. A logical premise drawn from these points is that if an

individual does not have the baseline leadership attributes when first entering the leader developmental process, it is possible that individual will not have the ability to develop into a strategic leader. Considering this premise, reviewing the current assessments of individual officer candidates is relevant.

### Current Army Recruitment and Assessment Methodology

Reviewing how the Army assesses officers during the recruiting process and throughout their careers is paramount to understanding where challenges exist in the process. As a fundamental methodology, the Army relies primarily on subjective measures to select, retain, and promote its officers.<sup>47</sup> While some objective tools are utilized, they primarily reside in the recruitment phase of an officer's career and are notably absent in later stages of an individual's military timeline.

The Army has four officer commissioning sources: United States Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), Direct Commission, and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Examining each of these commissioning sources reveals few differences in the assessment tools employed by each to determine the suitability of officer applicants. Common assessment methods include physical fitness tests, high school diplomas, SAT/ACT testing, medical screening, and age limitations. Additional measures include letters of recommendation from active duty officers and congressional nominations for acceptance into USMA.<sup>48</sup> Increased importance is placed on those applicants that have previous experience in organized athletics, community groups and school activities.<sup>49</sup> These methods allow a fairly comprehensive examination of physical and intellectual attributes of all personnel considered for service as Army officers.

Currently, the Army has many formalized systems to fairly determine the best-qualified officers to advance in rank and command. Foremost, the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) provides a record of performance and assessed potential. Reported, at a minimum, every 12 months, the OER currently serves as the most influential assessment tool in the Army. This report provides a subjective assessment of the rated officer from senior officers one and two positions above the rated officer.<sup>50</sup> Army centralized promotion and command boards primarily review an officer's history of OERs to determine suitability and best-qualified officers.<sup>51</sup> The Officer Evaluation Report, in conjunction with other formal tools, provides the Army and the individual officer with subjective assessments of performance and potential.

Complimentary assessments to the OER are Academic Evaluation Reports (AERs) and 360-degree assessments. The AER reflects an officer's academic performance at Army Professional Development courses and is reviewed by board members during Army centralized promotion and command boards.<sup>52</sup> The 360-degree assessment is feedback from an officer's subordinates, peers, and superiors.<sup>53</sup> This feedback is not shared with anyone beyond the evaluated officer. The 360-degree assessment allows for "self-correction" in areas that were identified as requiring improvement by the surveyed population.<sup>54</sup> These assessment tools provide the Army a subjective view of individual officers during the duration of their career.<sup>55</sup> They are well established as the norm for promoting and selecting Army senior leaders.

Upon review of the Army's officer assessment tools, several key inferences can be drawn to contribute to this research. Foremost, the Army has a well-established and arguably effective subjective process for assessing leader traits during the recruitment

process and throughout an officer's career. However, a scientific or objective approach is absent from the current methodology. As a result of this discovery, further examination of the challenges in the Army's officer assessment methodology assists in determining shortcomings within the existing system that require modifications or enhancements.

### Challenges of the Army's Current Leader Assessment Process

As in any large complex adaptive system (CAS), the Army is subjected to numerous environmental factors that influence operations. Because of its size, external stakeholders, and subordination to civilian authorities, the Army operates in a dynamic and sometimes uncontrollable environment. Influences the Army cannot control play a large role in determining how it performs its required missions. Recognizing these factors, a thorough analysis of the challenges with the Army's current recruitment and assessment tools allows this research to pinpoint areas for possible improvement in the Army's assessment methodology.

To highlight the challenges of the system requires an examination of how the system achieves or fails to produce the desired outcome. The Army's intent for officers is to produce quality, positive, capable leaders who possess the skills to adapt, understand, and solve problems in a complex environment.<sup>56</sup> This includes the ability to build teams and foster positive climates within Army units that facilitate development and most of all, mission accomplishment. However, considering a future environment of increased complexity and fiscal constraints, is the Army achieving the desired outcome? Increasing questions of officer character and performance from Congress and other stakeholders may indicate the Army can do better in this selection process.<sup>57</sup>

The Army commissions 5,000-8,000 officers every year.<sup>58</sup> Given such a large population, some officers will fail to achieve Army leadership standards over the span of a 20-year military career. For example, the Associated Press reported in 2014 that the number of Army officers removed from service because of misconduct tripled in the last three years.<sup>59</sup> GEN Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented his perspective to the Associated Press in February 2014 when he said, "I wouldn't say lack of character was tolerated in (war) theater, but the fact of the last 10 or 12 years of repeated deployments, of the high op-tempo—we might have lost focus on this issue. Sometimes in the past we've overlooked character issues because of competence and commitment."<sup>60</sup> This aspect further reinforces the necessity for implementing the best procedures to assess and develop officers to lead at the strategic level.

Many of the poor outcomes of the Army's strategic leader assessment process have been recently played out on the national stage. Presented in testimonies before Congress and in the national press, the increased attention on negative leadership in the Army is front and center.<sup>61</sup> Specifically, toxic leadership has been a trend and focal point for the Army.<sup>62</sup> The Army defines toxic leadership, a form of negative leadership, as a "combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance."<sup>63</sup> One inherit trait typically seen in toxic leaders is inflated self-interest that supersedes the organizational goals and values.<sup>64</sup> Toxic leadership is an example of failed personal traits and development that prohibits positive leadership climates and organizational interoperability. These negative traits prevent a leader from successfully leading diverse

organizations that rely on climates that foster creative and critical thinking to solve complex strategic problems.<sup>65</sup>

Examining behavior traits is important, because they exemplify the true inner beliefs and tendencies of people.<sup>66</sup> For this reason, a thorough understanding of officer candidates' behavior traits prior to joining the Army is critically important. Currently, the Army does not have a method of objectively testing the behavior traits of its officers at any time during the recruitment, assessment, or promotion phases. All behavior trait assessments are accomplished through subjective personal observation and documented for the approving authority's consideration in selecting an individual to serve or continuing to serve as an officer in the Army.

While subjective assessment is important and likely most influential, objective assessments are a proven enhancement to many successful organizations.<sup>67</sup> Case in point, the special operations community, other governmental agencies, and many organizations use the combination of objective and subjective tools to assess future employees.<sup>68</sup> Specifically, the use of scientific testing to measure individual behavior traits has had a tremendous positive influence on the recruitment of business leaders.<sup>69</sup> "These characteristics can be used for developmental purposes to help managers gain insight and develop their leadership skills."<sup>70</sup> The Army's system falls short in this area. Without fully understanding an individual's behavior traits and personal values, how can the Army know that an individual has the attribute baseline to advance along the leader developmental continuum?

Not only is gaining understanding of the individual officer's behavior traits during the recruitment phase important, but understanding this evolution at all stages of the

officer's career is equally important. Throughout an officer's career, life events and experiences can affect behavior. These circumstances can highlight deep-rooted individual qualities that may have been previously masked by learned, institutional expectations.<sup>71</sup> For this reason, behavior trait assessment at key junctures in an officer's career could prove beneficial in selecting the best-qualified officers for advancement in rank and position.

The Army's reliance on primarily a subjective assessment of officers challenges the prospect of achieving the desired form of leadership necessary for successful mission accomplishment at the strategic level of war. As previously noted, these procedures are highly subjective and provide opportunity for a skewed assessment, because they are influenced solely by the perceptions, capabilities, and professionalism of the subjective evaluator. A compilation of objective and subjective assessments to fully understand how individual officers will develop and perform is worthy of consideration.

### Recommendations

After analyzing the challenges with the Army's current officer recruitment and assessment system, the identified shortcomings beckon the need to offer possible enhancements to the program. The following recommendations address challenges created by a subjective-based process that dominates the current system. The recommendations resulting from this research addresses a more comprehensive assessment along the officer developmental continuum. Important to these offerings is the requirement to ensure the proposals provide a cost-benefit advantage, are sustainable, and are easily adjustable as conditions change in the strategic environment. Finally, the recommendations provide options for implementation.

The first recommendation is the implementation of an objective assessment for recruiting and assessing officers. This entails several key aspects: (1) Develop a “gold standard” for determining character traits needed for service in the Army as an officer; (2) Develop and implement scientific assessments that measures the individuals traits, values, and attributes against the Army’s gold standard; (3) Implement across all existing commissioning sources as a pre-requisite for attending USMA, OCS, or receiving an ROTC scholarship or direct commission; and (4) Include scientific assessments of officers at all Department of the Army Centralized Selection List (CSL) and promotion boards, conducted at all ranks.

Developing a “gold standard” for determining character and behavior traits required to train and develop strategic leaders is critical to these initiatives. Using the most critical leadership attributes from the strategic thinking framework and Army Leadership Model will guide the determination of the essential attributes. This study recommends focusing objective assessments on the supporting attributes linked to current Army doctrine of character, presence, and intellect.

Once the Army’s “gold standard” criteria are established, developing an assessment tool that effectively evaluates an individual’s character and behavior traits affords the Army a better understanding of an officer’s tendencies. A short questionnaire is recommended to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness in the selection process. With this technique, the Army has the ability to implement across the entire recruiting and human resource domain. This will also allow for a centralized evaluation system that is conducted using encrypted software within a secure technology platform. Using the existing Army Knowledge Online (AKO) architecture, this system could facilitate quality

control and ease of administering to a distributed population. Ultimately, this will require limited means to inform, implement, evaluate, and present findings in a usable fashion for authorized selection board members.

Recommended implementation begins during the accessions process for officer candidates. This allows the Army to identify those officer candidates who possess the necessary behavior traits that correspond with Army requirements. It is essential that the objective behavior trait assessment is incorporated in all commissioning source assessment systems. This includes OCS, ROTC, Direct Commission, and USMA. Once this assessment is introduced into the current process, it serves as another source of feedback for determining the best-qualified officer candidates.

Objective assessments during the recruitment phase provide the baseline assessment for identifying leadership attributes. Next, it is critical to incorporate this methodology into Army centralized promotion and command selection boards. Administering this assessment as part of the My Board File review conducted by officers for each board is recommended. This process allows the infusion of the assessment results with existing personnel files for promotion board member consideration. It is further recommended that these assessments are conducted for every promotion and command board. This will enable the Army, through the centralized selection board process, to recognize changes in officer behavior that are not within the “gold standard.” Through this process, significant trends are identified and permit a centralized review to consider appropriate actions for those with negative deviations.

### Conclusion

As the strategic environment continuously evolves, there are many changes in the internal and external landscape that demand alterations in how the Army recruits

and assess leaders. Changes in the nation's perception of military leaders, economic vitality reducing fiscal commitments to the military, shifts in the character of warfare, and social changes with the advance of technology are just a few of those factors. This volatile and uncertain global system remains more sophisticated and interconnected than ever. In light of these ever-changing conditions, the nation expects military officers to continue to effectively lead.<sup>72</sup> Joint and Army doctrine provides a baseline of necessary leader attributes to help assess Army officers for development as future strategic leaders. Critical leader attributes encompassed by character, presence, and intellect is essential for Army leaders to perform to the highest standards in the complex, strategic environment.

This examination revealed several key recommendations to assist the Army in developing effective strategic leaders. Focused around objective assessments for recruiting and assessing officers, these initiatives include several key aspects: (1) Develop a "gold standard" for determining character traits needed for service in the Army as an officer; (2) Develop and implement scientific assessment that measures the individuals traits, values, and attributes against the Army's gold standard; (3) Implement across all existing commissioning sources as a pre-requisite for attending USMA, OCS, or receiving an ROTC scholarship; and (4) Include scientific assessment of officers at all Department of the Army Centralized Selection List (CSL) and promotion boards, conducted at all ranks. Through the implementation of this additional level of scrutiny to officer assessments, it is highly probable that the Army can deliver the best-qualified officers, maximize declining fiscal resources, and operate more effectively in a Joint, Multinational, and Inter-agency global environment.

Research also revealed important components outside the scope of this examination's scope. A more in depth review of specific technologies and implementation measures is necessary to determine the most efficient methods of managing a scientific assessment process. Also, understanding the linkage of desired leadership traits and measurable attributes allow for more effective assessments. The Army has completed this research for subjective assessments in the recent past.<sup>73</sup> It is recommended that the Army assemble a development team from Human Resources Command (HRC) to develop objective (scientific) assessment criteria and implementation models for the Secretary of the Army consideration. In addition to incorporating objective assessments for officers, it is recommended that this approach is applied across the Army for all personnel---military and civilian. These areas are worthy of further research and compliment this work. The nation and U.S. Army must continue to research and develop the best possible assessment measures in order to maintain the most capable Army strategic leaders for the future.

## Endnotes

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