

Strategy Research Project

Leader Development: Opportunity in a Resource Constrained Army

by

Colonel Michael J. Loos
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-04-2014		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Leader Development: Opportunity in a Resource Constrained Army				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Michael J. Loos United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Robert M. Mundell Department of Command, Leadership, and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 5,005					
14. ABSTRACT The mission appears simple: make the Army smaller after more than a decade of continued conflict, and prepare the Army and its leaders for contemporary war. Yet, while the Army has started laying out plans to rapidly reduce force structure, changes affect more than buildings, bases, and equipment. The human enterprise and specifically the Army's leaders are a critical resource that must also undergo change. The Army has been in this position before and its actions during the post Vietnam and Gulf Wars are two examples from which the Army could glean valuable leader development lessons that will aid in keeping the Army ready. This research project examines leader development actions and initiatives that proved decisive in previous eras of fiscal constraint, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to develop competent and committed leaders of character, and maintain the Army's future competitive advantage.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Leadership, Drawdown, Professionalism, Readiness					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Leader Development: Opportunity in a Resource Constrained Army

by

Colonel Michael J. Loos
United States Army

Colonel Robert M. Mundell
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Leader Development: Opportunity in a Resource Constrained Army
Report Date: 15 April 2014
Page Count: 30
Word Count: 5,005
Key Terms: Leadership, Drawdown, Professionalism, Readiness
Classification: Unclassified

The mission appears simple: make the Army smaller after more than a decade of continued conflict, and prepare the Army and its leaders for contemporary war. Yet, while the Army has started laying out plans to rapidly reduce force structure, changes affect more than buildings, bases, and equipment. The human enterprise and specifically the Army's leaders are a critical resource that must also undergo change. The Army has been in this position before and its actions during the post Vietnam and Gulf Wars are two examples from which the Army could glean valuable leader development lessons that will aid in keeping the Army ready. This research project examines leader development actions and initiatives that proved decisive in previous eras of fiscal constraint, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to develop competent and committed leaders of character, and maintain the Army's future competitive advantage.

Leader Development: Opportunity in a Resource Constrained Army

The dynamic nature of the 21st-century security environment requires adaptations across the force. The most important adaptations will be in how we develop the next generation of leaders, who must be prepared to learn and change faster than their future adversaries. Simply put, developing these adaptive leaders is the number-one imperative for the continued health of our profession.

—General Steven Martin Dempsey¹

The Army and its sister services are facing difficult and turbulent times following years of continuous combat, exacerbated by sizable force reductions and budget constraints. Despite the gloomy prospective, the Army might consider that turbulence is not always bad, particularly if innovative and creative leaders seek emerging opportunities during periods of change that could significantly benefit an organization. During this period of fiscal constraint and force structure reductions, the Army has an opportunity to transform leader development programs in a manner that can actually improve readiness, and ensure a competitive future advantage in the global security environment, because leader development is the most decisive factor that enables the Army to adapt to future uncertainties.

The Army has been in this position before, and senior leaders during previous periods of fiscal uncertainty faced similar dilemmas with regard to increasing readiness despite total force reductions. The Army's actions during previous drawdowns following major conflict provide valuable lessons learned for today's senior leaders as they seek to maintain and improve readiness. After a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must capitalize on leader development, as an opportunity to improve readiness.

Given the contemporary environment and the desire to re-shape Army-wide leader competencies, two important questions provide clarity in guiding future leader development approaches: 1) What are key development methods and areas of personnel investment that will enable the Army to adjust swiftly and meet national security requirements, and 2) How might the Army best implement leader development methods to maximize the benefit of investments? The contemporary environment is filled with risks and opportunities for the Army, and leader development is uniquely an area that contains both risk and opportunity. If leader development is not addressed properly the nation is placed at risk, and Army capabilities will become rapidly diminished. Conversely, sustained focus and improvement within the Army's learning and development systems will greatly improve the Army's future as the world's premiere landforce.

This paper examines two post-war drawdown periods from recent history: post Vietnam War and post Gulf War. First, the paper examines existing leader development practices to underscore the vital role leader development fulfills in preparing the Army to execute a range of challenging missions in a complex global security environment. Second, in setting the strategic context, the paper describes previous Army initiatives that successfully addressed leader development as a means to improve readiness. These actions will then be juxtaposed against today's challenges to determine those best practices and lessons learned that can be applied in addressing current conditions. Lastly, the paper will discuss the means by which the Army might successfully implement the recommended actions through organizational change.

Leader Development in Context

Leader development is a vital aspect of Army organizational performance and is central to every action the Army undertakes. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, states “that leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”² In further codifying the importance of leader development, the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) was developed and implemented in June 2013. This comprehensive strategy notes that leader development is a deliberate, continuous and progressive process designed to grow Soldiers and Army civilians into competent and committed leaders of character.³ The strategy builds on the concepts contained in ADP 6-22 and emphasizes the need to synthesize actions, initiatives and efforts along three interconnected lines of effort: training, education, and experience.

The guiding vision, mission, and framework in the strategy provide an overarching construct that allows the Army to focus its efforts in support of national level guidance and intent, and center the institution’s focus on developing Army leaders capable of executing an array of mission sets. These mission sets range from the conduct of counterterrorism and irregular warfare missions, to defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities, to providing a stabilizing presence, and the conduct of humanitarian and disaster relief operations.⁴

One of the strategy’s most significant aspects is the leadership requirements model that identifies what the Army expects from leaders at all levels and aligns leader development activities to the types of values based characteristics common in prototypical Army leaders. These character traits are communicated in terms of attributes that allow leaders to apply competencies while leading the Army during the

types of mission sets described above. In simple terms, attributes are descriptive in conveying behavior patterns and character traits that are vital in the Army's envisioned operating environment. The positive behavior patterns conveyed as attributes in turn allow Army leaders to apply the types of competencies required at all levels to lead with distinction in the global security environment. The requirements model identifies competencies such as building trust, leading others, creating positive environments, and developing others as examples of important competencies. Together, attributes and competencies describe in conceptual and descriptive terms what an Army leader "Is" and what they must "Do" to influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. In the current era of fiscal constraint and force structure reductions, the ability to develop leader attributes and competencies will require senior leaders to apply innovative and creative thought to achieve the desired outcome described in the ALDS, "An Army of competent and committed leaders of character with the skills and attributes necessary to meet the challenges of the 21st century."⁵

As the Army takes action in adjusting its strategic focus from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and seeks to align with the vision communicated in the ALDS, its officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will lead the Army through a planned drawdown of forces and simultaneous change to strategic mission. The Army will need to train, develop, and retain adaptive leaders and maintain a combat-seasoned, all-volunteer force of professionals.⁶ These professionals, who are the Army's foundation, must be prepared for challenging complexities in future environments. Therefore, ensuring the necessary professional development and education for leaders is a strategic imperative

for the Army. Moreover, the Army must imbue the right culture and change models to ensure Army institutions and organizations embrace, adapt, and improve developmental systems to support future Army leaders.

Of all the areas in which the Army is emphasizing during this lean period, Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, articulates developing “adaptive Army leaders for a complex world” as his number one strategic priority.⁷ General Odierno’s mission is to train and prepare Soldiers and units for war, and leader development is a critical component of Army readiness. Leader development is not a new or novel concept and has been a point of focus at or near the top of most leaders’ personal priorities. Senior leaders must seek all available possibilities to improve leader development and must even consider this drawdown as a period strategic opportunity, critically important towards the Army’s current balancing and transition activities. Actions taken within this opportunity will prove instrumental in enabling success during these turbulent times.

General Dwight Eisenhower stated:

The qualities and characteristics of the American soldier have contributed so much to our victory. The challenge this calls for is the exercise of the highest degree of justice, imagination and initiative to exploit and develop the potentialities of the young Americans in our charge.⁸

Eisenhower’s call for investment in the development of Soldiers is similar to messages expressed by many senior leaders today. Current investments include professional military education, training, and the development of our officers and NCOs across the Army. Yet, the unparalleled pace of global combat operations over the past decade has eroded the attention necessary for sustained quality leader development. Therefore, the Army must be able to apply experiences and lessons learned during the past decade of combat operations and must also sustain adaptation and innovation.

Post Vietnam War Environment and Leader Development Actions

The Army went through a period of tremendous change following the Vietnam War. In five years, between 1968 and 1973, the Army decreased its force structure by nearly one-half, from 1.5 million to about 850,000 soldiers. This drastic reduction occurred as the Army continued combat operations in Southeast Asia, retrograded supplies and equipment from Vietnam, and refocused on the Cold War conflict in Europe.⁹ The Army also transformed its conscription manning policy to one that relied solely on volunteers.

The post-Vietnam drawdown spanned between two Army Chiefs of Staff, General William Westmoreland and General Creighton Abrams, both of whom, amongst other priorities, had great interest in improving the professionalization of the Army. Westmoreland implemented the “All Volunteer Force” and increased its professionalism while Abrams, who continued these policies, also implemented a vision leading towards a smaller but better manned, equipped and trained Army.¹⁰ Four decades later, the Army Posture Statement of 2012 captures and reinforces the vision and wisdom of these two Army Chiefs:

The all-volunteer force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth, versatility and unmatched experience to the Joint Force. We must continue to train, develop and retain adaptive leaders and maintain this combat-seasoned, all volunteer force of professionals. We will continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and complex future environments. Our leader development model is an adaptive, continuous and progressive process grounded in Army values.¹¹

Westmoreland's most significant enduring impact was in the area of professionalism. Problems of professionalism pervaded the Army's ranks.¹² In response to the malaise, Westmoreland initiated a series of reports to gauge the problem and determine solutions. Two of the most significant studies were conducted by the United

States Army War College (USAWC) and illuminated the terrible state of professionalism and leadership in the army.¹³ One USAWC professionalism study concluded that, “A lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers,” as a significant challenge in the Army, and that in rectifying this issue, “the implementation of corrective measures must be comprehensive.”¹⁴

Westmoreland was not only concerned with professional skills; he was also intensely focused on restoring the Army’s professional ethic and altering what he characterized as a dysfunctional organizational culture.¹⁵ Many of his concerns stemmed from deplorable acts and atrocities committed during the Vietnam War, such as the My Lai massacre, that stained the Army’s reputation and violated the trust and confidence of the American public. A March 1970 report detailing the events and circumstances surrounding My Lai, revealed that while several senior field grade and general officers within the 23rd (Americal) Division were well aware of atrocities committed by subordinate officers, deliberate efforts were made to conceal this information which resulted in the suppression of war crimes of great magnitude. This report, along with a myriad of day to day reported acts of ill-discipline in the Army prompted Westmoreland to launch several initiatives centered on officer professionalism.¹⁶

By early 1972, Westmoreland implemented a new system of managing officer and enlisted members by developing and implementing an Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) and Enlisted Professional Management System (EPMS).¹⁷ Selection boards, 24-36 month command tours, and mandatory Professional Military Education (PME) became a matter of course in the Army.¹⁸ Simultaneously,

several steps were taken to improve the Noncommissioned Officer Corps Education System through the creation of primary, basic and advanced leadership schools. These compulsory schools were a means to ensure NCOs had the necessary technical, leadership and counseling skills to serve and lead effectively.¹⁹ NCO and officer education processes were tied directly to career roadmaps and ensured formal development commensurate to a leader's career progression. These processes further linked education and training to performance, potential, and promotions. Although the officer and noncommissioned officer corps could not be reformed overnight, an NCO roadmap, including foundational PME, culminated in a Sergeants' Major academy – parallel to senior service colleges such as the USAWC. The existence of modern U.S. Army professional competencies are in many respects founded in the creation of a professional, well-educated NCO corps, and might well be the most important legacy of the post-Vietnam War drawdown.

Given the rash of unethical conduct that has plagued today's Army, such as the 2004 detainee abuse incident in Baghdad Iraq, and the civilian killings perpetrated by the 5th Stryker brigade in Afghanistan, Westmoreland's innovative and creative leadership provides a worthy example to emulate. While the recent emphasis placed on codifying the Army Profession of Arms campaign is laudatory, the continued reliance on training programs such as on-line mandatory blackboard ethics training and archaic chain teaching regimes pale in comparison to the detailed and comprehensive initiatives spearheaded by Westmoreland. Many of these initiatives underscore stalwart leader development programs still in place today.

General Abrams' emphasis on the future vision of the Army set the foundation for the establishment of two key organizations that exist today; the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). TRADOC was established to oversee the development of training and doctrine whereas FORSCOM was established to oversee the continental United States based portion of the Army.²⁰ The benefit of TRADOC became readily apparent in developing standardization to fuse doctrinal foundations with education and experience relevant to training. FORSCOM was also beneficial to leader development efforts through developmental experience gained at the newly conceived Combat Training Centers (CTCs). These training centers even today continue to develop Army leaders through rigorous and realistic training. The CTCs quickly became the pinnacle of stressful and evaluated training to exercise all dimensions of organizational and leader abilities.²¹

The Post Gulf War Environment and Leader Development Actions

The Army, consisting of 780,000 active personnel in 1987, was greatly reduced to 535,000 by the mid-1990s, as part of one contiguous Department of Defense force reduction, merely delayed by the first Gulf War with Iraq.²² The decision and actions stemming from the combination of a waning Soviet threat, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and agreements to reduce military budgets and manpower led to a more than 30% cut in force structure, resulting in the smallest Army since 1939.²³ Follow on studies of the Army's success during the Gulf War validated a more technology-focused approach toward warfare, and Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin initiated a "Bottom Up" review that resulted in recommendations for further reductions bottoming out at 495,000 Soldiers.²⁴

General Gordon Sullivan was Chief of Staff of the Army after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Gulf War, and became the principle implementer of the ensuing

drawdown.²⁵ Sullivan recognized the need for a guiding vision for the Army given a new era of security driven by the Cold War's decline, reduction of forces, declining defense budgets, and the start of global technology proliferation.²⁶ While Sullivan is best known as the author of the Army's strategic road map, he was instrumental in guiding thoughts concerning Army transformation. Sullivan thought Army leaders lacked flexibility and were slow to adapt, so he changed the content and programs of various military courses to impart the necessary rigor and education required for innovative and creative thinking within the Army.²⁷ Sullivan states, "Managing processes are not going to get you to the future. Leadership gets you to the future. (It is) telling somebody what you want to do and moving out, not managing processes."²⁸

Sullivan also emphasized the development of the Army's Active Component/Reserve Component program to accommodate a smaller, more modular continental United States based Army. He applied lessons from the Gulf War in which organizational readiness, and in particular, leader skills and competencies of mobilized non-Active force leaders, challenged the Army's ability to project ready forces rapidly.²⁹ Correspondingly, a key product of post-Gulf War studies was the designation of TRADOC as the sole accrediting authority for schools across all three components of the Army.³⁰ This "One Army" perspective standardized the education and development of leaders.

Take Aways

Actions taken following these two drawdown periods are indicative of the Army's emphasis on leader development. Despite force structure, budget and manpower reductions, the Army expanded its efforts within leader development. It created officer and NCO management systems, established more military education and schooling,

standardized training, and developed individual and unit level assessment methods to improve leader and organizational abilities. The substantial increase in the number of Soldiers attending military schools was an investment made by Army leaders to develop the foundation of the service while also hedging against uncertain future conflict.

The character of contemporary war may be hard to define, but the leader attributes necessary for winning any war have historically remained constant: agility, innovativeness, strategic thinking, technical and tactical competence, and doctrinal proficiency to name a few. The Army's priority today is to develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world. It seeks to accomplish this by training leaders through replicating challenges with greater fidelity and realism, and broadening leaders to build critical thinking skills and creativity in developing innovative solutions. Moreover, reinforcing the Army profession as one with the right values, requisite skills, and an unassailable degree of trust creates adaptive Army leaders. Finally the implementation of suitable evaluation and assessment tools to better identify talent, and encourage self-improvement through self-awareness will ensure sustained leader development improvements in the future.

Ideas and actions generated by previous Chiefs of Staff over the past four decades can, for the most part, address some of the Army's priorities of today. Education relevant to the contemporary environment is essential in solidifying the Army's foundation. Expanding schooling opportunities and not accepting shortcuts on proven PME progression is a start. General Paul Gorman's comments further emphasize this belief:

The primary difference between the Army as it was when TRADOC was formed, and the Army of today is the professionalism of its leaders, from

the fire team within the rifle squad, to the tank commander, to the platoon sergeant, and up the ranks of officers. But that difference was brought about as much in the Army's units as in its schools, and TRADOC played a role in both.³¹

Implementing Change

There are both alignment challenges and opportunities in the Army in realizing drawdown goals. In general terms, a decade of continued conflict has caused laser focus in specific attributes of individual and unit readiness while other areas have atrophied. Army Soldiers and leaders are members of an existing culture that has not had the opportunity to truly focus on the complicated tasks associated with training for conflict in complex and ambiguous environments. Conversely, the Army has been absorbed with preparing units and Soldiers for overseas contingency operations focused on a specific environment, and has been fortunately enabled with nearly limitless resources. As a result, the Army must address changing the Army's perspective and associated individual, leader and organizational foci.

Leadership and the programs that successfully develop desired leader attributes have a strong bearing on successfully implementing solutions for the myriad of issues the Army will face while undergoing rapid change. Strong positive leadership consistent with the attributes and competencies that combine to define what a leader "Is" and must "Do" will greatly aid in delivering our senior leaders' guidance. In addressing command climate, Steven Jones writes, "Management must be aware that organizational climate (specifically perceived rewards and care for subordinates) impacts employee attitudes and behavior."³² Leaders at all levels are critically responsible for establishing an environment and climate by leveraging both positional and personal power to influence units in the positive sense. Leader development cannot simply be just an Army program

or process. Rather, it must be directly influenced by commanders to ensure proper nurturing and focus.

Despite some organizational tendencies that appear to foil constructive problem solving and the idea of change within Army units, there are some positive aspects within the Army that are well-aligned with the implementation of solutions to this problem. Using John Kotter's "Eight-Stage Process" framework as depicted in Figure 1, the Army does seem to be on its way to successfully implementing change as an organization underscored by a strong guiding coalition of senior general officer leadership that have quickly established a sense of urgency across senior and line ranks in the Army.



Figure 1. "Eight-Stage Process" framework³³

Guiding coalitions without robust and resilient line leadership will not attain the drive and purposeful enterprise to overcome organizational friction and bureaucratic lethargy.³⁴ The Army is also well aligned within its cultural distinctiveness of mission accomplishment ethos. The Army's mission-first culture, which is tied to an underlying assumption of performance orientation, is unique.³⁵ This combination of task focus and achieving results are key strengths and create a real likelihood of success with improved leader development and should be leveraged to the maximum extent possible.

In 2012, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published his strategic direction to the joint force. He describes a need to reform and leverage the PME system to better advance education and leadership. General Dempsey calls on all military leaders to seize the opportunity as the United States draws down from the current conflict to reflect and adapt. Greater importance must be placed on doctrine, education, training and leader development to take advantage of material and technological superiority. Strategic leaders must possess key competencies to successfully implement and operationalize General Dempsey's guidance. Some examples of these competencies include the ability to create organizational alignment, effectively convey vision, and synchronize strategic communications.

The Army is a monstrous organization, and an equally monstrous effort is needed in aligning Army level focus and effort towards organizational change to the common purpose, method and direction set forth by strategic leaders. Given myriad opinions and beliefs, leaders will be more successful by creating a clear vision of

expectation. The vision must be simple yet coherent to the changes and results desired. It will be most effective if it answers, in the minds of our Soldiers, “WHY” actions directed for implementation are so important. The process of communicating the change vision is as critical as the quality of tires designed to harness and deliver the immense horsepower of a professional racecar. Kotter’s thoughts on the key elements in the effective communication of vision suggest that the real power of a vision is realized only when the vast majority of people in an organization have a common understanding of its goals and direction.³⁶

Strategic leaders must also create effective communication synchronization. A communications plan is vital to dealing with an accident, disaster or in this case, an all-encompassing effort to better the organization. The plan must include the nesting and the execution or operationalization of the senior leaders’ vision. Strategic leader communication synchronization might consider two principles that demonstrate concern and assumes control quickly: people always come first and speed.³⁷

The Army is already well on its way in creating a leader development path towards the Army of 2020. A 2013 Army Chief of Staff Leader Development Task Force recommends concepts including the value of mission command to leader development, a renewed focus on developing others, and the transformation of career management.³⁸ There are four additional recommendations brought forward from previous drawdown lessons that might also develop leaders for contemporary and future operations. First, the Army should increase PME opportunities to better support OPMS and EPMS career path guidelines. Second, the Army must instill a culture that advocates the idea of leadership taught and practiced begins at squad and platoon levels where leaders,

empowered by commanders, and not compelled into compliance by bureaucratic mandated policies, are in charge. Third, the Army should develop skills through education and provide the necessary tools for junior leaders to learn and develop those in their charge to become the next generation of leaders. Lastly, the Army must ensure leader development is standardized across the entire Army.

The last decade of war has caused many leaders to deviate from PME models. In extreme cases, officers and NCOs were promoted despite not having attended schooling and education normally required prior to advancement. Wartime priorities being an exceptional circumstance, the Army now has the opportunity to correct its approach and ensure leaders attend the requisite PME as recommended by their career management system. The Army may have to increase the frequency of courses and may also have to increase the academic rigor to warrant timely and quality educational opportunities for leader development as it did during the post-Vietnam war period.

Leader development is often considered within realm of officers and senior NCOs, but numerically and pragmatically, the Army's business is done day-to-day down, amongst the lower ranks. Team leaders, Squad leaders, Platoon leaders, and Platoon sergeants turn the Army's wheels. The amount of accurate and deliberate attention placed on junior leaders in the Army, and in particular on NCOs, by Westmoreland and successive Army Chiefs of Staff, proved critical to the growth and development of the Army that emerged in the 1990s. Similarly, appropriate focus on the same demographic today will have a huge impact on the Army of 2020, because Army business starts with first line supervisors.

The Army must implement and rely on formal education processes to teach leaders at all levels to better implement solutions to complex problems. We chain teach just about everything in the Army, yet this overused approach does not always meaningfully provide the requisite education for leaders directly involved in the day-to-day Army operations. Leader development is commanders' business and many of our commanders are indeed inadequately trained as suggested by some national level stakeholders. This is a critical element in empowering our leaders to put the new vision to work.³⁹ Moreover, we can maintain momentum in this period of formidable development through continued education and the socialization of an education and development first ethos.

As the Army reduces the size of the active component, the importance of competencies and leader abilities within the remaining components is critical to the Army's ability to comprehensively maintain total Army readiness. Programs of instruction, content, and standards of military education and leader development must be common across the Army. The Army addressed leader competency lessons learned during the mobilization process preceding the first Gulf War, enabling the Army to leverage the total force during the last decade of conflict. This approach must not be lost as the Army rebalances manpower and force structure across the components.

As previously noted, the Army has a solid guiding coalition and this core group of senior leaders has a defined sense of urgency with respect to leader development. Senior Army leaders including the Secretary of Army and the Army Chief of Staff have developed and started communicating a change vision. The recommendations outlined previously are really about empowering leaders in broad-based action. However, there

is risk here. Barriers to empowerment such as organizational structure that dilute vision, a lack of skills and knowledge, competing actions and processes, and simple disagreement could impede senior level vision.⁴⁰

Strategic leaders can overcome these barriers by empowering people to fully execute the vision and assume ownership of the vision. Empowering leadership practices are essential in enacting and realizing the promise of mission command, and are an integral ingredient in establishing mutual trust and building cohesive teams. Implementing empowering leadership practices requires senior leaders to first ensure the vision and intent is clearly understood through a series of vision backbriefs to higher headquarters and commanders at every level. This will assure a common understanding and shared sense of purpose.⁴¹ Eventually, leader development changes could even become a reportable feature within Unit Status Reports to ensure sustained emphasis and attention. The Army should also remove procedural bureaucracy and align efforts within organizations. Strategic leaders should critically and deliberately identify and remove structural barriers within organizations, and confront leaders, trainers and Soldiers who are negative or even neutral towards the vision and solutions. Special emphasis is needed in identifying leaders and commanders who are toxically resistant to concepts designed to improve leader development. This might necessitate interviews and frank dialogue to eventually change the opinion of these organizational inhibitors.

In addition to overcoming barriers, strategic leaders need to identify some quick wins. Given the scope of the enterprise, the Army will most likely not experience any “homerun” solutions. Rather, leaders must capitalize on a series of “base-hits” that will

initiate and maintain momentum, while still pursuing the change vision. These identified short-term wins should have at least three characteristics: be visible, be unambiguous, and be clearly related to the change effort.⁴² In all cases, these short term wins must occur as a result of a planned effort and not simply an accident of success.

In implementing these recommendations, leaders must also consider how to sustain change. Methods and ideas of sustaining holistic leader development, as an Army focal point, must take hold in terms of generations to be truly defined as a success. Shortsighted education programs and simply a few quick wins is not the objective. The goal is to change how the Army thinks about leader development.⁴³ Any solution must contain program elements that enable longevity and be emboldened through repetitive analysis to measure and assure effectiveness.

Conclusion

The Army faces many challenges related to structure and modernization and readiness in future years. Despite the strategic significance of these challenges, we must not lose sight that the Army will always be a people-centric enterprise. As such, we are heavily influenced by less measurable and intangible organizational qualities like competency, character, climate and trust. Future leader development centers equally on these qualities and the readiness of our Army rests on how we decide to implement ideas and initiatives quickly. Furthermore, the manner in which all leaders and Soldiers across the Army recognize and embrace the development of the human domain as decisive amongst all drawdown actions is paramount to creating inertia in a change environment. The Army must draw upon its previous experiences and apply lessons learned during past eras of similar conditions in realizing the development of future

leaders, who have the capacity to fight, maintain, and exploit the initiative for the Army of 2020 and beyond.

Endnotes

¹ General Martin E. Dempsey, "Leader Development," *Army Magazine*, February 2011, 26.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, ADP 6-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 2012), 1.

³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2013), introduction.

⁴ The four missions highlighted in this paper are derived from a list of 10 missions initially outlined in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* published by the Defense Department in January 2012. U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2012*, Posture Statement presented to the 112th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2012), 11.

⁷ General Raymond Odierno, *CSA Strategic Priorities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2013).

⁸ James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, and Leonard Wong, ed., *Out of the Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT: Jai Press, 1999), xvi.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Tasks for the Seventies, An Analysis of the Decade of the Seventies: Perspectives and Implications for the United States Army* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1972), 2.

¹⁰ Michael J. Meese, *Defense Decision Making under Budget Stringency: Explaining the Downsizing in the United States Army* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 206-213.

¹¹ McHugh and Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action*, 11.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Tasks for the Seventies*, 28.

¹³ Meese, *Defense Decision Making*, 211.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Study on Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1970), vi.

¹⁵ William M. Donnelly, "Professionalism and the Officer Personnel Management System," *Military Review*, May 2013.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Meese, *Defense Decision Making*, 247.

¹⁸ Ibid., 248.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 225-226.

²¹ Greg Reeson, "Train as You Fight: The Development of the U.S. Army's Combat Training Centers," <http://voices.yahoo.com/train-as-fight-development-us-armys-48801.html> (accessed January 30, 2014).

²² Andrew Feikert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2013), 24.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Will King, "Former Army Chief Discusses Challenges in Army's Future," *Leavenworth Lamp*, October 1, 2009.

²⁶ James L. Yarrison, *The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers* (The United States Army Center for Military History, 1999), v.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ King, "Former Army Chief Discusses Challenges in Army's Future."

²⁹ Bernard Rostker, *Right Sizing the Force, Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military Personnel* (Center for a New American Security, June 2013), 9.

³⁰ John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, *Prepare the Army for War, A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command* (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 40.

³¹ General Paul Gorman, *The Secret of Future Victories* (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1992), III-43.

³² Steven M. Jones, *Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative*, SSI Monograph (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 2003), 2.

³³ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

³⁴ Ibid., 7.

³⁵ Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong and Charles D. Allen, *Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army*, Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2008), 12.

³⁶ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 85-90.

³⁷ Peter F. Anthonissen, "No Thrillers, But Hard Reality," in *Crisis Communication* (Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2008), 60.

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *2013 Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force Final Report* (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 2013), 10-11.

³⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 102.

⁴¹ Ibid., 115.

⁴² Ibid., 121.

⁴³ Ibid., 131-144.