

**CHAIRMEN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S  
LEADERSHIP USING THE JOINT STRATEGIC  
PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE 1990s:  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS**

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**June 2003**

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## FOREWORD

The Joint Strategic Planning System has been considered the primary formal means by which the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff executed his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Yet little has been written about this strategic planning system itself, although some of its products such as the varied *National Military Strategies* and *Joint Visions* have been thoroughly reviewed. One can gain great insight into the Chairman's formal leadership since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act by understanding how this system evolved, reviewing its processes, and examining all of its products.

Colonel Richard Meinhart examines how the three Chairmen—Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton—adapted and used strategic planning to provide direction and shape the military in the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. He identifies five broad recommendations relevant to future leaders on how to use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations. These historic-based recommendations evolve around enduring strategic leadership competencies such as revolutionary versus evolutionary change, vision, flexibility versus bureaucracy, interpersonal relationships, and moral courage.

This research is timely for the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing their processes related to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System and the Joint Strategic Planning System. The author's research and recommendations are relevant for senior leaders of large and complex organizations, which use or try to use strategic planning. Learning from how three Chairmen of diverse leadership styles and when faced with varied external environment challenges used strategic planning to manage change will give needed insight to future leaders when developing planning systems.

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## SUMMARY

This monograph examines how the three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adapted and used the Joint Strategic Planning System from 1990 to 2000 to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. This strategic planning system is the primary formal means by which the Chairman executes his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Understanding this strategic planning system's evolution, reviewing its processes, and examining its products gives one great insight into how the three Chairmen provided direction that shaped the military to respond to the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. Senior leaders can learn from this comprehensive strategic planning and leadership review to enable them to better use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations for the future.

The monograph begins by reviewing the events leading to and the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which expanded the Chairman's responsibilities. The legislation's discussion illustrates the challenges and expectations that a Chairman, using a strategic planning system, must meet in advising civilian leaders and executing decisions. The author then examines the four major revisions of this strategic planning system, as it changes from being rigid and focused on the Cold War to being more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused by the decade's end. The major strategic planning products are analyzed from both a content and process perspective to identify their formal advice and the Chairman's leadership in developing them. These products, which cover subjects such as strategy, vision, resources, plans, and assessments, correspond to many of the Chairman's formal statutory responsibilities.

The monograph then summarizes each Chairman's strategic planning legacies. Based on these legacies, the author provides five broad recommendations for future senior leaders to enable them to better use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations. These recommendations center around the following: (1) Use of a strategic planning system for revolutionary change; (2) Use of a strategic planning system for evolutionary change; (3) Need for a senior leader's vision to lead organizations; (4) Need for

flexibility and bureaucracy balance for success in strategic planning;  
(5) Need for senior leader's energy and moral courage to execute fundamental change.

# **CHAIRMEN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S LEADERSHIP USING THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE 1990s: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS**

## **INTRODUCTION**

This monograph examines how the three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) adapted and used the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) from 1990 to 2000 to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. Although little has been written about this strategic planning system in the defense literature, it has been considered the “primary formal means”<sup>1</sup> by which the CJCS executes his statutory responsibilities identified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Therefore, understanding this strategic planning system’s evolution, reviewing its processes, and examining its products will give one great insight into how the CJCS provided direction and shaped the military to respond to the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s while faced with diminishing resources and increased operations.

To examine the JSPS and the Chairman’s use of it during the 1990s, this monograph first discusses the need to reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (referred to as GNA). The GNA significantly changed the responsibilities of the CJCS in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President, as well as making other significant changes in defense policy and organizations. The GNA’s basic provisions, while undergoing some modification as legislation has been continually revised since 1986, have kept the same fundamental focus in the 1990s. However as this decade progressed, the JSPS significantly evolved in process and content, which enabled the Chairman to execute more fully the major provisions specified in the GNA.

After describing the JSPS’s evolution, this monograph more closely examines its products, as they changed from being somewhat rigid and focused on Cold War bureaucratic planning in 1990 to being more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused through

the 1990s. This planning system produced a series of interconnected, classified and unclassified, documents in a time-phased manner related to the following subjects: strategic environment, vision, strategy, plans, assessments, and resources. These subjects generally correspond to many of the Chairman's GNA responsibilities. The author will then more closely examine how the three Chairmen in the 1990s—Generals Powell, Shalikashvili and Shelton—adapted and used this strategic planning system to accomplish their formal leadership responsibilities in providing advice, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders, to our nation's civilian leaders. Finally, the author provides recommendations for strategic leaders on how to best use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations to meet future challenges.

## **GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT (GNA)**

### **The Call for Reform.**

The 1986 GNA has been considered to be the most significant piece of defense legislation that fundamentally changed the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the National Security Defense Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense after World War II.<sup>2</sup> This legislation was the result of almost 4 years of somewhat contentious study, dialogue, and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration on how fundamentally to best organize the military to advise civilian leaders and better execute in the field to respond to complex and fast-moving national security challenges. These Congressional, military leaders', defense intellectual community, and Reagan administration's views will now be covered, for they illustrate challenges and expectations that a Chairman, using a strategic planning system, must meet in advising civilian leaders and implementing decisions.

Many underlying reasons underpinned Congressional interest to create military reform legislation. There were some long-held views in Congress of inadequate advice from military leaders during the

Vietnam War, partially because of the weak authority that existed in the CJCS. Another reason that underpinned the need for military reform was prevention of the defense command and organization problems which surfaced in the aborted 1990 Iran hostage rescue attempt.<sup>3</sup> This broad Congressional interest for military reform was illustrated by the 1981 founding of the Military Reform Caucus. The caucus was unique, because of its bicameral and bipartisan membership of approximately 50 members of both liberal and conservative persuasion, and its stated and somewhat ambiguous objective of simply fostering consensus on defense issues.<sup>4</sup> What tied the members uniquely together was a sense that, no matter what a person's political views, some type of military reform was necessary or the nation would not be properly served.

Further fueling this early 1980s Congressional interest for military reform was the cumbersome military chain of command problems later realized in the tragic 1983 Marine barracks explosion in Lebanon, and reinforced by the interoperability and cooperation problems that surfaced among various military units in the successful 1983 hostage rescue in Grenada.<sup>5</sup> While unsuccessful military operations typically result in Congressional hearings and often serve as a catalyst event for major change, this reform call went much deeper than just Congressional interest to fix responsibility after failure.

Senior leaders within the Defense Department also were interested in changing the military structure and the Chairman's responsibilities. For example, in 1982, close to the end of his tenure as CJCS, General Jones publicly favored many leadership reforms to include making the Chairman the principal advisor to the civilian leaders vice the corporate Joint Chiefs and giving the Chairman oversight of the unified and specified commands.<sup>6</sup> In 1982, Army Chief of Staff General Meyer, who was about 3 years into his 4-year Service Chief tenure, provided views on military reform more radical than General Jones. He advocated abolishing the JCS and replacing it with an entirely new senior military advisory body called the National Military Advisory Council, to preclude Service Chiefs from performing dual roles as members of the Joint Chiefs and as Service Chiefs.<sup>7</sup> In addition, consensus grew for defense acquisition reform as people knowledgeable of the acquisition process, including

former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, criticized the military service procurement focus driven by parochial views, weak Joint Chiefs' collective positions on cross-service tradeoffs, and the lack of influence of field commanders on weapon systems.<sup>8</sup>

A group categorized as the defense intellectual community also called for defense reform. While there is no one definition or organization that represents the defense intellectual community, this monograph loosely defines them as individuals who regularly wrote or talked about military affairs from either an academic research perspective, news reporter focus, or as a retired diplomat or military officer. Members of numerous "think tank" institutions, many of which were Washington-based such as the Heritage Foundation and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), regularly held defense-related conferences, published on military affairs, and testified before Congress. For example, the 1984 Heritage Foundation sponsored book, *Mandate For Leadership II*, focused on reforming many government organizations and called for JCS reform centered around not only strengthening the role of the Chairman, but also strengthening the Joint Staff by advocating it work for the Chairman vice the corporate JCS.<sup>9</sup> CSIS' thoughtful study of defense organizations, begun in 1983 and culminating in the 1985 report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, provided additional impetus for JCS reform. Most significantly, the CSIS report advocated designating the Chairman as the nation's principal military advisor replacing the corporate JCS; giving the Chairman the needed staff to execute these broadened responsibilities; and giving unified and specified commanders stronger institutional resources and authority over their component commanders.<sup>10</sup> Important about this report was that its reform recommendations, while being less controversial than others, were endorsed by six former Secretaries of Defense. In addition, the 50 distinguished people who contributed to the CSIS study had great influence to develop needed Congressional momentum to create consensus and pass legislation.

While this monograph earlier described different views of two sitting military leaders in 1982 who openly advocated major CJCS reform, most of the existing service and defense leaders in 1985 were not in favor of major reform. While reasons varied, reform proposals calling for expanding advisory and resource responsibilities of the

CJCS and the unified and specified commanders would reduce the influence of service chiefs, service secretaries, or defense department officials. Hence, this created a natural institutional resistance to change by those whose influence would be diminished. More specifically, both Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force clearly were against the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as well as the Marine Corps Commandant.<sup>11</sup>

In essence, the call for defense reform generally centered around three main themes: (1) the need to improve the military advice provided to civilian leadership; (2) the need for a clearer command structure and joint interoperability; (3) and the need to provide for more efficient procurement methods in the “what” and “how” weapon systems were acquired. Leading up to 1985, the question was not whether reform would happen, but what direction it would take.

To gain control of the reform movement, and perhaps stave off more significant reforms that included dissolving the JCS as a formal body, incremental improvements were made by CJCS General Vessey prior to 1985 to strengthen the joint system and increase field commanders’ influence.<sup>12</sup> These improvements were at the margin rather than fundamental in substance, and they did not satisfy those who desired major reform. In 1985 President Reagan established a Blue Ribbon Commission on defense management to gain the administration’s initiative on overall defense reform. This commission, led by noted industrialist David Packard, was more focused on acquisition and overall management, but also included a review of JCS responsibilities. In 1985 the Senate Armed Services Committee published a report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, which included among its 91 recommendations the abolition of the JCS and replacement with a joint military advisory council,<sup>13</sup> not unlike that advocated in 1982 by General Meyers. The CSIS report identified earlier succinctly identified the mood for major change when it stated: “There is a growing consensus in the Congress, in the community of defense officials and specialists, and among the American people on the need for substantial efforts to revitalize and reform the defense establishment.”<sup>14</sup>

The fact that it took almost 4 years to gain the overwhelming consensus within Congress, generate tacit acceptance in the

Administration and the military, and broadly satisfy the defense intellectual community for this legislation spoke volumes about the conservative nature and reluctance to change the military. While members of Congress routinely make ever-increasing incursions into military procurement decisions and take district-focused positions on specific defense budget items, as a legislative body they very infrequently get involved with fundamental military structure or organizational change. For example, in the 15 years after GNA very little change in its fundamental thrust has been made, although numerous defense-related articles and Congressmen have called for additional reform or expressed frustration concerning the need for more progress in the area of military jointness.<sup>15</sup> In addition, in the 1990s the military in the field generally executed its growing missions with distinction, which did not give potential reformers a needed catalytic event to create an environment and generate broad support for more military reform.

### **Provisions.**

This sweeping national security legislation finally was passed in 1986 with almost universal consensus by both Houses of Congress and without significant administration opposition. Congress' intent in passing this, the GNA, is best described by the following paragraph that appeared in Section 3 of the Conference Report:<sup>16</sup>

- (1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense;
- (2) to improve military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) to ensure that the authority of the unified and specified commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of those missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) to increase attention in the formulation of strategy and contingency

planning;

- (6) to provide for the most efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

In examining Congress' intent of this Act, it goes much deeper than just affecting the CJCS. In implementing intent (1), many functions were transferred from Service Chiefs to Service Secretaries, to include acquisition, comptroller, and inspector general. In implementing intent (3) and (4), additional responsibilities and more authority were given to unified and specified commanders to identify requirements, develop operational plans, and control forces. As shown by intent (5), the Act recognized that strategic planning processes had to be fundamentally improved. It is important to note that former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, in testimony before Congress leading up to the GNA, roundly criticized the military's strategic planning system for producing incoherent products.<sup>17</sup> Finally, as evidenced by intent (8), the Act clearly expected better execution in the field and use of resources.

When the 1986 GNA was compared with the 2001 U.S. Code, the major functions and the wording describing the contents of these functions related to the CJCS fundamentally have not changed. This illustrates the wisdom of the people who authored the Act, along with the conservative nature of military reform. However, current law does require additional reports that the CJCS must provide to the Secretary of Defense or Congress either independently or first through the Secretary of Defense, and they are summarized as follows:<sup>18</sup> (1) a report to the Secretary of Defense, which will then be forwarded to Congress, of the CJCS's assessment of the strategic and military risks in executing the National Military Strategy, and (2) an annual report to the Congress of the integrated requirements and readiness deficiencies of the combatant commanders, the Chairman's views on these requirements, and how the budget or future year's defense program addresses these requirements or fixes

the deficiencies. Some of the more important provisions related to the Chairman are found in Chapter 5, Sections 151 through 154, of Title 10 U.S. Code and will be described under the following two general headings: Military Advice and Chairman's Functions.

### **Military Advice.**

Chapter 5 Section 151 (b) states: "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."<sup>19</sup> This simple sentence in the GNA fundamentally increased the responsibilities of the CJCS, for prior to that all members of the Joint Chiefs were considered principal military advisors. Hence this Act could have created a problem of concentrating advice and ultimately too much power in one position.

To counteract a perceived concern of too much power in one position, the Act provided specific guidance as to how and when other members of the Joint Chiefs should provide their advice if it differed from the Chairman's. The Act required that ". . . the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member [other JCS] at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be."<sup>20</sup> In formulating this advice, Section 151 also generally identified meetings of the Joint Chiefs; how the Chairman consults with others to include the other Joint Chiefs and unified and specified commanders; and how recommendations should be provided to Congress. Finally, the strategic planning system itself, through its coordination processes and its products, as we will later examine, also help prevent power from being concentrated in one position.

### **Chairman's Functions.**

Six major functions in the planning advice and policy formulation section of the GNA have remained consistent through the years and are fundamental to understanding the Chairman's formal responsibilities. These are identified in Section 153 under the following major subheadings: (1) Strategic direction, (2) Strategic planning, (3) Contingency planning; preparedness, (4) Advice on

requirements, programs and budget, (5) Doctrine, training, and education, and (6) Other matters.<sup>21</sup> Within these six sub headings, the law identified a total of 18 specific tasks, along with the last all-encompassing task of: "Performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense."<sup>22</sup>

The strategic planning, training, and education functions identified above, although worded somewhat differently in legislation prior to the GNA, were requirements executed by the corporate Joint Chiefs, primarily by their own service staffs, vice a Joint Staff directly supporting the Chairman. For example, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 required that the Joint Chiefs prepare strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces.<sup>23</sup> Each service staff crafted its own War Mobilization Plans, as war planning was accomplished more by the service staffs in the Pentagon than the staffs of the commanders in the field. Similarly, training and education were directed by the services with little joint influence, as the Joint Chief's focus was more on service competencies developed in their dual roles as Service Chiefs. In addition to these responsibilities being executed within the service staffs prior to the GNA, the quality people to do these tasks were more resident in service staffs than the Joint Staff. An assignment on the Joint Staff was generally not as valued as a service staff assignment, so the quality of Joint Staff work naturally suffered. The GNA recognized these problems and created joint promotion and assignment rules that continue today, so that a tour on the Joint Staff would be valued and had the potential to advance promotion. Hence this positively affected the quality of strategic planning in the 1990s.

The one function not specified as a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs in the past was to provide advice on requirements, programs, and budgets. This was essentially a new responsibility of the Chairman and included such specificity as: advising on the requirements of the unified and specified commands; submitting alternative program and budget proposals to conform to the priorities in strategic plans and of the unified and specified commanders; advising on how manpower conforms to strategic plans; and assessing defense acquisition programs.<sup>24</sup> These major resource responsibilities would require considerable effort to execute fully, and this directly affected

the strategic planning system as it slowly evolved to meet them.

In the 1990s, the JSPS directly enabled the Chairman to respond to the first four major GNA functions by producing a variety of documents, both classified and unclassified, under processes that can be described as both collaborative and consensus. The manner by which these functions were performed in the 1990s fundamentally evolved in process and content, as strategic planning became more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused. This decade's evolution will now be examined for it is fundamental to understanding how the Chairman fulfilled his formal advice responsibilities and the importance of this strategic planning system. Where appropriate, this examination will identify major factors that directly influenced the change such as the different leadership styles of the three Chairmen; the new challenges of the global security environment; and the increasing fiscal pressures on defense programs caused by the declining budgets during the 1990s.

## **JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)**

### **Processes.**

The primary formal way the Chairman executed planning and policy responsibilities specified in Title 10 U.S. Code was to use the JSPS's processes and products. Two important adjectives in the above sentence—"primary" and "formal"—have appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that explained this planning system's products and processes during the 1990s. The processes and products were also key to understanding the role of officers on the Joint Staff in meeting the needs of the Chairman and how these officers helped influence the military.

The word "primary" emphasized the importance of this system within the daily internal workings of the Joint Staff. One of the implicit changes of the GNA was to make the Joint Staff more responsive to the Chairman, rather to the other Joint Chiefs as was the case before GNA. Since four of the six major statutory advice and policy functions of the Chairman were directly related to this strategic planning system's outputs, the work associated with developing or executing its processes or products became a primary

focus for many Joint Staff officers.

The word “formal” was emphasized for the guidance that the earlier Memorandum of Policies (MOPs) and then later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSIs) clearly laid out: the documents produced by this system; the general timeframes in which they must be produced; and the overall internal staff assignments to execute these responsibilities. In addition, the formal process also described the conditions of how the Joint Staff interacted with the staffs of others, such as the Office of Secretary of Defense, Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders, which can be either coordination or collaboration.

Coordination was the formal process that produced most strategic planning products and generally started with staffing a draft of the intended product at the lowest level. The lowest level was considered the action officer, who was assigned to a particular division within a joint staff directorate. Many times, however, the general thrust or focus of the document being developed received the “top down guidance” of a general officer prior to starting the coordination cycle. During the formal coordination cycle, which typically had specific directions as to the types of comments and timeframes, the action officer incorporated the comments of the varied offices as the document was continually coordinated and re-coordinated from action officer to Division Chief to Director to Chairman. The Chairman approved all JSPS products.

The coordination objective was generally to gain consensus with a “concur” from all offices involved, and if concur was not achieved, procedures were identified to deal with nonconcurs. However, nonconcurs were the exception rather than the rule, as extraordinary efforts were made by all involved (action officer through flag officers) to wordsmith documents or create needed ambiguity to gain a concur before finally elevating the issue to the next level to resolve.<sup>25</sup> General Jones, in 1982 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, stated that: “. . . each Service action officer may have as many as 100 recommended changes. They quickly learn the art of compromise—each agreeing to support the balance of changes proposed by the other . . .”<sup>26</sup> This formal coordination process to gain consensus took time, was bureaucratic in nature, and could have led to suboptimize the final product; however, it also ensured the drafter

did not get an issue totally wrong. The process that produced the Joint Visions will be discussed later to illustrate formal coordination and the role of senior leaders in the process.

Collaboration, or vetting as some call it, was another formal way, although not as common as coordination, to produce strategic planning products. Collaboration meant that input on the subject was solicited and received by the action officer responsible for the product from other offices inside or outside the Joint Staff.<sup>27</sup> But those from whom input was solicited did not review the wording of the final product for concurrence. This could happen for several reasons. First, the general views of those the document will affect (e.g., Office of Secretary of Defense or Combatant Commander) were solicited to ensure the advice was along certain directions. This ensured there were no surprises in the final document. Second, the product was personal correspondence between the Chairman and someone else (e.g., Secretary of Defense). In this case, while inputs were solicited to enable the Chairman to understand varied viewpoints, the final comments were left to the Chairman alone to approve. The strategic planning collaboration documents of the Chairman's Program Recommendation and Chairman's Program Assessment will be discussed later to illustrate the formal collaboration process and the role of senior leaders in this process.

The word "formal" was also emphasized in another contextual way, for the Chairman carried out his leadership tasks in both a formal and informal manner. The informal manner of leadership primarily revolved around the interpersonal relationships the Chairman had with the nation's civilian and military leaders in executing his responsibilities. At times, these were more important than the formal manner, which involved using the considerable resources of his staff to develop and execute the processes that created the products to directly advise or assist the Secretary of Defense and the President or respond to Congress. As we will now see, some Chairmen used the strategic planning system to a greater degree than others or significantly changed its focus, depending on their leadership style and the magnitude of strategic change needed.

## Overall Evolution.

The JSPS was not a static planning system for it was revised four times in the 1990s. These revisions occurred in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999, as it evolved from a somewhat rigid and Cold War focused system described by the Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 84 dated January 24, 1989, to a significantly more vision and resource focused system described by the CJCSI 3100.01A dated September 1, 1999. Each Chairman modified and adapted it to meet the demands of the external environment and to accommodate his leadership style, which in the aggregate can be considered a legacy to their overall strategic leadership. In addition, as the influence of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff steadily increased in the 1990s in expanding the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the use and importance of this strategic planning system to influence defense resource decisions correspondingly increased.

Prior to 1990, there was a clear realization that the strategic planning system, as defined in the January 1989 MOP No. 84, was not accomplishing its purpose in enabling the Chairman to fully execute his expanded GNA responsibilities. This memorandum, the 17th revision of the strategic planning system since 1952, was described as “unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 major documents every 2-year planning cycle.”<sup>28</sup> Congress and others criticized the overall strategic planning system during hearings related to the GNA for its failure to provide useful strategic advice and to formulate military strategy.<sup>29</sup> The inadequacy of this strategic planning system was also fully realized within the Joint Staff, for in the first section of the memorandum the Director of Strategy and Planning was tasked to “. . . undertake an end-to-end evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System. . . . to seek opportunities for further improvement in the cogency and timeliness of the process and products.”<sup>30</sup> This overhaul included surveying users and authors of the primary documents to determine their efficiency and effectiveness and focused on the linkage between the strategic planning products that link together the guidance in the national security strategy, the operational planning system and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).<sup>31</sup> It is unusual to have such a tasking

within a memorandum, but it served to provide notice that another revision was not being considered, and the intent was a complete overhaul.

### **1990 Revision.**

The outcome of this complete overhaul culminated in Memorandum of Policy No. 7, dated January 30, 1990. This overhaul's intent was to streamline the system by a combination of front-end Chairman's guidance, while at the same time eliminating or combining many other documents into concise products. The front-end guidance part was started with a formal Joint Strategy Review (JSR) to initiate the strategic planning cycle for "gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning and program assessments"<sup>32</sup> and culminated in the publishing of its first formal strategic planning product—Chairman's Guidance. This concise document (6-10 pages), which looked out to the timeframe 1994 to 1999, was scheduled to be published every 2 years starting in December 1990 to provide the principal initial guidance and support for developing the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), the second strategic planning document.<sup>33</sup> The other two remaining formal strategic planning documents—Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)—followed later in the sequential planning cycle.

This revision was important for its effort to simplify the process and make it more responsive to the Chairman. The simplification was evident in that ten separate documents were combined into the four identified above of lesser size. It formally required that the security environment be assessed to identify changes that directly affected the NMSD, rather than developing other documents without first gaining consensus on the security environment. Finally, it was designed to make the rest of the planning be responsive to the "top down" direction of the Chairman by publishing Chairman's Guidance. This formally established the thrust where the Chairman directly focused the subsequent work of the Joint Staff, rather than the Joint Staff working issues of the other Joint Chiefs.

The three remaining documents (NSMD, JSCP, and CPA) were

designed to form the cornerstone of the formal part of strategic planning during Chairman Powell's tenure. First, the NMSD was to provide the encompassing advice of the Chairman "... as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support the attainment of national security objectives during the defense planning period covered by the next Defense Planning Guidance."<sup>34</sup> The scope of this core strategy document, now formally limited to 100 pages, was rather broad and included the following: a National Military Strategy (which was formally sent to the President for approval); recommended national military objectives; updated intelligence assessments; and military force options along with risk assessments. In addition, many annexes from A to G ranged from 5 to 65 pages each on the following subjects: intelligence; nuclear; C3 systems; research and development; mapping, charting and geodesy; manpower and personnel; and long-range planning guidance. These page limits were important for the streamlining intent. This strategy document would serve as the core in executing the Chairman's GNA strategy responsibilities. The JSCP, now limited to 200 pages without annexes, was a direct holdover from the old planning system, as it tasked the Combatant Commanders to develop global and regional plans, while apportioning forces to execute those plans. It served to fulfill the Chairman's GNA planning responsibilities. Finally, the CPA, limited to 175 pages, was designed to accomplish the Chairman's GNA resource advice responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense after reviewing of the Services Program Objective Memorandums, risks with the current force structure, and requirements identified by combatant commanders.<sup>35</sup>

While this strategic planning overhaul was substantially simplified from the earlier process, it was not implemented. The first part of the process of conducting a Joint Strategy Review was never accomplished, which then had a cascading effect on the other three planning documents, which depended on this review.<sup>36</sup> While it is hard to identify the exact reason why this was not done, the rapidly changing world environment (e.g., Berlin Wall falling, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Americans clamoring for the peace dividend) put pressure on the need to quickly react. The streamlined strategic planning system, while still essentially a bureaucratic

system with extensive delineated responsibilities and somewhat rigid coordination time schedules, simply could not keep up with the pace the rapidly changing security environment demanded.<sup>37</sup> Consequently, in lieu of a formal strategy review conducted within the Joint Staff to result in Chairman's Guidance for the later strategy and war plans documents as the top-down directed planning system specified, the Chairman achieved a general consensus of the world environment at an annual 1990 Combatant Commanders conference. After consultation with the Service Chiefs, he used a message to summarize this conference that would suffice as formal Chairman's Guidance.<sup>38</sup> Further, in lieu of the extensive classified National Military Strategy Document specified by MOP No. 7, General Powell replaced it with a short unclassified National Military Strategy (NMS) in 1992. These were examples of Chairman Powell's direct leadership style of not being tied to a formal strategic planning process and outputs, even if it was his own system, when the world situation so dictated and speed in formal guidance was needed.

### **1993 Revision.**

The next major revision to the JSPS in March 1993 essentially served to codify the strategic planning processes that occurred in the few years prior to 1993 rather than designing a new system. This revision, considered "significant" and "more responsive" as reported in that memorandum's summary of changes, separated the strategy from the calendar-driven resource and planning documents and had the following major changes:<sup>39</sup> formally replaced the voluminous classified NMSD with the concise unclassified NMS; established a classified Joint Planning Document (JPD) to provide resource advice to the Secretary of Defense; specified that the JSCP would be revised only when needed but reviewed at least biennially; and clarified that the Chairman's Guidance could be published through a formal endorsement of the JSR or anytime the strategic environment so demanded.

In making these changes, the strategic planning system emphasized flexibility in planning and strategic thinking in developing strategy, while it also recognized the needed bureaucratic discipline and time phasing required for resources and operational

planning. As an example of the greater focus on flexibility, the complex administrative instruction for the JSR, which identified inputs, outputs, suspenses, timelines and formats with multiple sections, was eliminated.<sup>40</sup> As an example of needed bureaucracy, the Services and Combatant Commanders, while they may have felt somewhat disenfranchised by the fast paced and top-down directed strategic planning that occurred during General Powell's tenure, insisted on bureaucratic processes with regularly published strategic planning documents to ensure their influence would continue to be formally stated.<sup>41</sup> Further, as with the previous change in 1990, the JSCP, which tasked Combatant Commanders to develop the various types of plans to implement the NMS and Secretary of Defense Guidance, remained a constant strategic planning requirement. In summary, this 1993 change reflected the formal planning influence of General Powell who desired strategic flexibility vice bureaucracy, but recognized the need for certain structure.

### **1997 Revision.**

The next major JSPS revision formally occurred 4 years later in September 1997 and was codified in CJCSI 3100.01 vice a Memorandum of Policy. This revision was started in March 1996 with the creation of a Process Action Team to formally review the strategic planning system. At this time, the Joint Staff was engaged in implementing total quality management principles and created multifunctional teams to assess many processes.<sup>42</sup> The strategic planning team, composed of members of all Joint Staff Directorates and Service planners, was tasked to produce a strategic planning instruction that not only reflected what had been done but also to identify what should be done. The formal strategic planning team's charter recognized that committees, processes and documents had changed since the last strategic planning revision, most importantly those that included an expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC); the newly established Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process; and a new Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPA) to further influence defense resources.<sup>43</sup> Finally, there was a realization that the programmatic influence of the Chairman needed better structured processes to formally

respond to the significant resource constraints and better execute his GNA's resource responsibilities.

The September 1997 CJCSI 3001.01, *The Joint Strategic Planning System*, was substantially different in style and substance from what it replaced. In style, this instruction clearly identified the sections of Title 10 that specified the Chairman's responsibilities, as it divided guidance into four chapters: Strategic Direction, Strategic Plans, Programming Advice, and Strategic Assessments.<sup>44</sup> This clear structure, along with identifying the key relationships of the Chairman's documents with those that provide guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, Services, and Unified Combatant Commanders, provided much needed clarity to the system, its interfaces, and subsequent products.<sup>45</sup>

In substance, this strategic planning revision was more vision and resource focused and linked to higher guidance. For example, a Joint Vision, in addition to the NMS, was now part of the formal strategic planning system to better enable the Chairman to fulfill his GNA responsibilities for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Resource advice was expanded as the CPR was formally added to influence more directly defense resource planning, in addition to the resource advice provided by the JPD and CPA. Its biggest resource achievement was to fully synchronize these three resource documents and the expanded work of the JROC and the JWCA's, which actually began in 1994, with the Secretary of Defense's PPBS. In the strategic plans area, the JSCP that tasked Combatant Commanders to develop operational, concept, and functional plans was a holdover from earlier guidance, but it added a major new requirement for them to submit theater engagement plans. This was an example of the stronger linkage to higher guidance, as theater engagement plans responded to the peacetime engagement component of the President's National Security Strategy and the **shape** component of the Chairman's National Military Strategy.

This strategic planning system revision retained the needed flexibility that was built into the process by the earlier memorandum. For example, it kept the concept of Chairman's Guidance, not as a separate document, but as overarching strategic direction from the Chairman to the Joint Staff. From one who worked on the Joint Staff during this time period, the directions from the Chairman were

clear. In the area of assessments, it described a Joint Net Assessment process that integrated other work of Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders, rather than producing a separate document. Finally, the *Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010)*, which provided a conceptual template for future capabilities, was broad and flexible rather than narrow and restrictive. These formal changes were a reflection of General Shalikashvili's consensus style of leadership. He built upon General Powell's flexibility in strategy, but added more future and consensus focus through his use of the Joint Vision to shape the service's programs and his use of the JROC and JWCAs to respond to the resource constrained realities of the mid-1990s. It was clear from working on the Joint Staff that one needed to link warfighting initiatives with the guidance provided by the strategic planning documents and have the analytical rigor to pass the JROC's scrutiny for a program to be considered.

### **1999 Revision.**

The final change to the strategic planning system occurred in September 1999 with the formal updating of the 1997 instruction. This change was minor in its impact. It did not add or subtract any documents, but provided expanded guidance on Combatant Commanders' theater engagement plans and further defined the relationship between the strategic planning system and that of the JROC and JWCAs.<sup>46</sup> In addition, General Shelton built upon the consensus and disciplined style of leadership of his predecessor in using the strategic planning process through 2000 to formally manage change. By this time, the JSPS matured in its execution, as it gained greater specificity in resource and operational planning decisions.

### **JSPS Review.**

The JSPS significantly changed from being rigid and Cold War focused to more flexible, vision oriented, and resourced focused, as it went through four revisions under the leadership of three Chairmen. As discussed, the first revision in 1990 brought the Joint Staff out of the Cold War planning mode and simplified what strategic planning

should be, while the second revision in 1993 emphasized flexibility and described what had occurred in strategic planning during the previous 3 years. The third revision in 1997 emphasized resources and vision, while it maintained the earlier flexibility. The fourth revision in 1999 was minor and process oriented. Now that the intent of the strategic planning system's products and processes have been described, this monograph will examine more closely the content and influence of its products. These products helped the three Chairmen shape the military in the 1990s in a time of declining resources and increased operations tempo, while maintaining excellence in responding to the global military missions across the spectrum of the conflict. This success is what the GNA authors envisioned when they created this legislation, and the strategic planning system directly contributed to that success.

## **PRODUCTS: JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM**

The strategic planning system's products will be examined by the way they helped the Chairman respond to four of his six major functions identified in the GNA Section 153. These functions are Strategic Direction; Contingency Planning and Preparedness; Advice on Requirements, Programs and Budget; and Strategic Planning.

### **Strategic Direction.**

At the beginning of 1990, the formal manner by which the Chairman advised the President and the Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces was via a classified and rather voluminous *National Military Strategy Document (NMSD)* and a shorter classified *National Military Strategy*. Admiral Crowe (CJCS 1985-89) published these in 1989 for the timeframe 1992 to 1997. In 1992, General Powell replaced these with an unclassified and concise *National Military Strategy (NMS)* with no formal time period. The unclassified NMS has remained the primary strategic direction document of the Chairman. General Shalikashvili published two NMSs in 1995 and 1997, and General Shelton kept the 1997 strategy as his formal strategic direction during his entire tenure as Chairman. General Shalikashvili provided for longer-range strategic

direction focused more on the operational capabilities needed by the military vice overall strategy when he published *JV 2010* in 1996. General Shelton updated this in 2000 when he published *JV 2020*. These documents (NMSD, three NMSs, *JV 2010*, and *JV 2020*) will be examined for their strategic direction during this decade.

*1989 National Military Strategy Document (NMSD)*. The overall strategy direction document in 1990 was the NMSD 92-97, published August 1989 by Admiral Crowe under a 2-year planning cycle. This document included chapters dedicated to subjects such as: national military strategy, appraisal of U.S. defense policy, national military objectives, intelligence appraisal, fiscally constrained force levels, net assessment options and risk evaluation.<sup>47</sup> In addition to the basic NMSD, there were seven separate classified annexes on functional subjects that supported the strategy such as intelligence; research and development; and command, control, and communications; among others. The size of some annexes (one annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs) exceeded the contents of the basic document. Describing these documents as voluminous, somewhat stove-piped, and highly bureaucratic would be an understatement, but this was indicative of strategic planning products produced in the late 1980s.<sup>48</sup> The Senate Armed Services Committee called this style of strategic planning ineffective, and the former Chief of Naval Operations, in remarking on a strategic planning document, stated it was “. . . as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. . . . a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal.”<sup>49</sup>

A significant part of this formal strategic direction was a separate classified document called the *National Military Strategy*. This was essentially a summary of the NMSD and both were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for review. The Secretary of Defense then forwarded the classified *National Military Strategy* to the President for his approval, before it was routed back for later use in Defense Planning Guidance.<sup>50</sup> The guidance given in the 1989 strategy was focused on the Cold War, which broadly was described as a strategy of forward defense with many forces stationed forward backed up by rapid reinforcement, along with the overarching strategic nuclear deterrent.<sup>51</sup>

*1992 National Military Strategy (NMS)*. The 1992 NMS, which was

unclassified and only 27 pages long, was a complete change from the previous NMSD just described in its clarity and strategic direction. While this strategy was published in January 1992, its roots can be traced to the President's 1990 August speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium and his 1991 *National Security Strategy*, the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, and General Powell's development of the Base Force.<sup>52</sup> This document articulated a strategy that represented a ". . . shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy that is regionally oriented and capable of responding to the challenges of this decade."<sup>53</sup> In essence, this was the most fundamental change in the U.S. military strategy since the global war and containment strategy of the 1950s, as the military's primary focus was now on deterring and fighting regional wars.

This strategy was based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and security and built on four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.<sup>54</sup> It also identified eight strategic principles that reinforced those four foundations, described how forces would be employed, and finally specified the broad military force structure, called the "Base Force," to implement the strategy. The Base Force's composition was determined in earlier work by General Powell, which was done somewhat outside of the formal strategic planning process and was more strongly influenced by his strategic thinking rather than that of the corporate Joint Chiefs.<sup>55</sup> The simplicity of this strategy clearly conveyed to the American people, one of the main target audiences if not the most important audience, why they needed a military and in what size. The American people and Congress were clamoring for a large peace dividend as the Cold War ending sank in and the euphoria of the 1991 DESERT STORM victory ended.

This document's coordination was different than the bureaucratic coordination of other strategic planning documents on the Joint Staff, which illustrated the flexibility in strategic planning General Powell achieved. A Joint Staff Officer Harry Rothman, who was part of the process, gave credit to General Powell's personal relationships and strategic vision of the world that broke down the impediments resident in formal planning processes.<sup>56</sup> General Powell's strategic

vision was not a formal written and coordinated vision, as other Chairmen have later done, but was continually articulated in private conversations and public speeches. The strategy, which had undergone many variations and was interrupted by operational necessity (Gulf War, Soviet turmoil) from its conceptual beginnings in 1990 to the end of 1991, was extensively worked by the J-5 Strategy Division within the Joint Staff.<sup>57</sup> The Chairman finally published it in January 1992. In Rothman's analysis of the entire process of developing the 1992 NMS, he further concluded that: ". . . people and not the process were more important in the forging of the new strategy,"<sup>58</sup> as General Powell spent considerable energy convincing and converting others to his views at his senior level, rather than the broad coordination by others to influence the document at junior or mid levels.

One other significant aspect about this strategy was the foreword of the document, which illustrated General Powell's leadership style. The foreword stated that it was his advice, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of unified and specified commands, and by the GNA it was his responsibility to provide this advice. The foreword also stated that in determining this strategy he listened to his civilian leadership, as the strategy implemented the President's security strategy and Secretary of Defense policies. Another significant difference was that this NMS was not formally approved by the President, as was done previously. Clearly, as the first Chairman totally under the new GNA, General Powell created a legacy in leadership, both in style and substance. As described by Lorna Jaffe in her 50-page detailed examination of the development of the Base Force (a key part of the strategy), she concluded that Powell fully used the enhanced authority of the GNA when she stated:<sup>59</sup>

While he hoped to win the Services to his point of view, he did not aim for either bureaucratic consensus through staff work or corporate consensus through JCS meetings. He never asked the Service Chiefs to vote on either the Base Force or recommending to the Secretary and the President adoption of a new strategy [NMS]. Rather, he thought it was more important to win the Secretary's approval.

*1995 National Military Strategy (NMS).* The 1995 NMS was one

of two produced by General Shalikashvili during his tenure as Chairman and looked very similar to General Powell's in style, but its substance was different in a few key areas. In this strategy of flexible and selective engagement, the military was expected to become more engaged in conflict prevention to include missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance—missions not mentioned in the 1992 strategy.<sup>60</sup> In essence, the military now had three formal strategy components defined as: (1) peacetime engagement component, which was the broad range of noncombat activities to promote democracy, relieve suffering and enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention component, which ranged from the high end of conflict represented by nuclear deterrence to the low end of conflict represented by peace enforcement to restore stability, security and international law; and, (3) the fight and win component, which was defined as the primary mission of the military.<sup>61</sup>

The military forces to execute this strategy were also defined in the document, but again determined outside its formal development by earlier work by the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review. While the military missions were growing in noncombat areas, the force structure was decreasing from the 1992 Base Force, as the active Army divisions were two less, active Air Force fighter wings were two less and Navy combatant ships went from 450 to 346.<sup>62</sup> In addition, reconstitution (defined in the 1992 strategy as forming, training, and fielding new fighting units, to include activating the industrial base)<sup>63</sup> dropped out of the 1995 strategy altogether. Hence, maintaining readiness became ever more important as the force became smaller and was used more frequently.

The development of this document was significantly different than 1992 strategy, as it followed the process and overall structure outlined in the 1993 MOP. The strategy included information that was summarized from another strategic planning product, the JSR; and the conceptual outline of what a strategy should include as defined in the memorandum was reflected in the final document.<sup>64</sup> This illustrated that process as well as people drove this strategy's development. This perhaps also reflected a leadership style of General Shalikashvili that could be characterized as valuing consensus and using strategic planning processes to achieve that

consensus. In addition, since this strategy was similar in style to the previous one, a strategic planning process could more easily produce an evolutionary vice revolutionary product.

*1997 National Military Strategy.* The 1997 NMS was the last strategy document produced by a Chairman during the decade of the 1990s and was known by its three words of “shape, respond, and prepare.” These words were used within the context of: “. . . **Shape** the strategic environment and **Respond** to the full spectrum of crisis while **Preparing** our Armed forces now for an uncertain future.”<sup>65</sup>

This strategy built upon the work of the previous one, but was different in four main areas. First, it focused more specifically on the threats from the strategic environment, which were broadly categorized as regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational dangers, and wild cards. Second, it integrated guidance from the President’s 1997 *National Security Strategy* and the 1997 Secretary of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and strongly made the case for why the military needed to be involved with shaping the international environment. While doing so, it emphasized a two major theater war capability and clearly stated that: “Our Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win our Nation’s wars,”<sup>66</sup> a phrase that has been used countless times since. Third, it identified the force structure to execute the strategy in greater specificity than the previous one. For example, the numbers of Army Corps, cavalry regiments and National Guard enhanced brigades were now specified, along with numbers of civilians and special operations forces. Fourth, in preparing for the future, it established the foundation for the current defense transformation, as it identified the need for an investment program in robust modernization that exploited the Revolution in Military Affairs and Revolution in Business Affairs.<sup>67</sup>

This NMS was also developed within the strategic planning process, as it relied on two other 1996 strategic planning documents. The strategy’s strategic environment assessment was influenced by the Joint Strategy Review, and the section that covered preparing for the future leveraged the concepts identified in *JV 2010*. Finally, this document came out in September, a short time after the President’s May *National Security Strategy* and the Secretary of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which emphasized the interconnectivity and strong collaboration among the military and civilian leadership

in the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*1996 Joint Vision (JV) 2010. JV 2010* was the first time a Chairman formally published a vision to provide long-term strategic direction for the military, as he further executed his GNA responsibilities. While the NMS focused on more of a near-term strategy, Joint Vision focused on the operational capabilities needed by the military for the next 15 years. This 36-page vision went far beyond its logo of a joint force: “America’s Military Preparing for Tomorrow: Quality People Trained, Equipped, and Ready for Joint Operations—Persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”<sup>68</sup> It identified four broad joint operational concepts to serve as the conceptual template to provide a common direction for the Services to develop capabilities. These concepts to achieve full spectrum dominance, the key characteristic of the future military, were identified as: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.<sup>69</sup> *JV 2010* was used by the Services to update or craft their visions and by the Department of Defense to provide guidance to the services to resource the vision’s operational capabilities.<sup>70</sup>

The manner in which this vision was developed, under a mixed method of coordination and collaboration, helped create tremendous institutional acceptance by the Services, Combatant Commanders, and the Secretary of Defense. The process was different than the broad consensus and coordination of other strategic planning documents under General Shalikashvili. Instead of action officer drafts then making their way through the coordination cycle with comments integrated along the hierarchy, the Chairman took a personal interest and provided specific direction in crafting this vision. After the first broad draft was developed from a briefing concept and vetted by a General Officer Steering Group, General Shalikashvili sent personal notes to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs soliciting their comments on the final drafts, with the express desire that their comments be focused on joint vice service oriented operations. While he looked for consensus, he did not require it, as his focus was described as “I want your input and I will listen to it, though I do not promise to use it.”<sup>71</sup> There were many sessions between the Chairman, a few action officers responsible for the product, the J-5

Director and the Director of the Joint Staff, as they collectively went over every recommended change. The Chairman used many of the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commander ideas, as he personally approved all changes to the draft, which took a significant amount of senior leader time and direction.<sup>72</sup>

A lesson for strategic leaders from examining *JV 2010's* development was that if a major change was made to a strategic planning system, as the crafting of this first vision was, then direct senior leader involvement was needed for its success. This involvement used the informal component of strategic leadership within a formal system, which was determined by the interpersonal relationships the Chairman had with the nation's other senior military and civilian leaders. This also followed a style used by General Powell, when he spent great energy and personal involvement on the first National Military Strategy. A major difference, however, was that General Shalikashvili spent more time gaining a "buy in" of Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders. Clearly, from Joint Vision's broad acceptance, it was owned by the joint force rather than one person.

*2000 Joint Vision (JV) 2020.* *JV 2020*, produced 4 years after its predecessor, was fully coordinated within the strategic planning system, as it went from initial action officer draft through Division Chief to Director to Chairman. *JV 2020*, because it built upon the earlier vision, did not have or need the Chairman's direct involvement as *JV 2010* demanded. However, the Chairman provided his direction by formally approving the update process.<sup>73</sup> This update process was described in a CJCS Notice, which identified time frames, working groups, general officer steering committee and the responsibilities of all members from the Services, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Directorates.<sup>74</sup> The 2000 revision, now called *JV 2020*, kept the earlier vision's same four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection, but also emphasized information superiority, innovation, and interagency operations. While the vision's slogan retained the same: "persuasive in peace, decisive in war and preeminent in any form of conflict" part, the words preceding that were changed to: "Dedicated individuals and innovative organizations transforming the joint force for the 21st

Century to achieve full spectrum dominance.”<sup>75</sup> This beginning was more inclusive than the previous one. It now recognized individuals rather than just military, emphasized the team concept of organizations, and reflected the growing importance of transforming to a specific end state capability.

The lesson learned from the successful publishing of *JV 2020* was that a strategic planning system could update effectively an existing product without a great amount of direct senior involvement. *JV 2020* obtained the same Service and Combatant Commander acceptance by using the strategic planning process. It went one step further, for it included a section on vision implementation that had matured under General Shelton’s leadership. General Shelton had placed great emphasis on implementing the joint vision throughout his tenure. For example, in his first article in *Joint Forces Quarterly* since taking over as Chairman, General Shelton stated: “The next task is to operationalize *JV 2010*—transforming its concepts of joint warfighting into reality.”<sup>76</sup>

### **Contingency Planning and Preparedness.**

*Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*. The JSCP was the one constant among all the strategic planning changes in the 1990s. It continued to have the same purpose—to provide strategic war planning guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs based on resourced military capabilities.<sup>77</sup> More specifically, it identified the various types of plans that Combatant Commanders must develop, as the document integrated higher-level guidance from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Contingency Planning Guidance into detailed, executable plans. In tasking the Combatant Commanders, it apportioned forces to them based on completed budgets. Hence the plans were resource constrained, but realistic. The JSCP also had numerous functional annexes to amplify the general guidance on subjects such as intelligence, logistics, nuclear, mobility, etc.

The JSCP underwent some modification in the 1990s as the types of plans it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and the different military strategies.<sup>78</sup> For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold War focused) and regional plans, and they were

replaced in 1993 with Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS), and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. In 1997, the CONPLANS and OPLANS remained constant, but functional plans for contingencies and deterrence replaced concept summaries, as the transition to a regional focus was completed. Most significantly, in 1997 Theater Engagement Plans were first required to implement the **shape** component of the military strategy. No changes to the types of plans were made in 1999, but greater specificity was provided concerning theater engagement. Throughout the decade the various annexes have remained fairly constant in both type and focus. The JSCP was formally reviewed for currency within an overall 2-year planning cycle, as it either was formally extended for an additional year, revised, or amended within this 2-year cycle.

The JSCP's developmental process and use were examples of both bureaucratic consistency (its greatest attribute) and flexibility (lesser extent) of this document within the strategic planning system. This bureaucratic consistency was evident when it disciplined and focused the work of the hundreds of planners in the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders to develop over 50 realistic and fully integrated plans. This flexibility was evident in decisions made to extend or modify its direction from the specified 2-year planning cycle, and it identified plans that did not need the Chairman's review.

### **Advice on Requirements, Programs, and Budget.**

The ability of the Chairman to provide resource advice to the Secretary of Defense on Service programs and Combatant Commander needs remained one of the most difficult and contentious responsibilities to execute in the 1990s. The manner in which this was done, or not done fully, continued to draw criticism of the Chairman. Defense analysts, such as Thomas Davis, have been critical of the JROC's, and by extension the Chairman's, lack of influence on service programs in the mid-1990s, because resource advice was categorized as being at margins of programs rather than at the heart of them.<sup>79</sup> Members of the 1997 Senate Armed Services Committee in hearings criticized the military for its slowness in

building a true joint force.<sup>80</sup> The Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee in April 2000, recognized that the JROC needed to “do more ‘heavy lifting’ at the strategic level”<sup>81</sup> to better affect the overall requirements process and improve joint operations.

On the other hand, however, resource advice throughout the 1990s expanded, as processes were developed to identify resource or system tradeoffs, and key Chairman resource documents were refocused to gain more influence and increase specificity.<sup>82</sup> For example, from a Joint Staff perspective, the expanded Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) in October 1995 argued for shifting significant funds and different approaches for recapitalization, that if accepted, would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.<sup>83</sup> These primary Chairman resource focused documents—*Joint Planning Document (JPD)*, *Chairman Program Recommendation (CPR)*, and *Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA)*—will now be discussed. This discussion will be broad in nature for their specific content, as well as the defense documents they influenced, are classified.

Before covering these three documents, an important point needs to be made that the greatest Chairman’s resource influence in the 1990s resided in the three National Military Strategies. Each one of these strategies, and in greater detail as they progressed in the 1990s, identified the specific force structure needed to execute the strategy in numbers of Army and Marine Corps divisions, Navy combatant ships, Air Force wings and other elements of combat power. Providing resources to sustain this force structure (operations and maintenance, military pay, housing, and medical care) comprised by far the greatest portion of the defense budget. These four broad categories of expenditures have conservatively consumed from 65 to 70 percent of the defense budget during this decade, with the two other main resource categories—procurement; and research, development, testing, and evaluation—consuming the remainder.<sup>84</sup>

*Joint Planning Document (JPD)*. The JPD first appeared within the strategic planning system in 1993, as a biennial product to replace the annexes and other components of the now defunct National Military Strategy Document to satisfy the Chairman’s GNA resource responsibilities. The JPD was actually seven separate volumes on the following subjects: Intelligence; Nuclear; C4 Systems; Future

Capabilities; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy; Manpower and Personnel; and Logistics.<sup>85</sup> The head of a Joint Staff Directorate or appropriate Combat Support Agency (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency or Defense Mapping Agency) took the lead to coordinate with the Services and Combatant Commanders to produce their volumes biennially to influence the Defense Planning Guidance; however, very little overall integration existed among the volumes. In 1997 the JPD changed in focus and process, as it went from seven different volumes to one document with eight chapters, using the work of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs) to provide much of the analytical rigor to the chapters' contents. In addition, with the publishing of *JV 2010* in 1996 and the decision to focus the JPD on the strategic objectives in the military strategy and war plans, it now represented the coordinated Chairman's advice rather than stove-piped volumes submitted separately. The JPD was scheduled for completion 6 months prior to the publishing of the Defense Planning Guidance. This direction remained constant since 1997, although the chapters have changed slightly in title.

The unanswered question was: How effective was this broad Chairman's resource document in influencing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Secretary of Defense's primary resource document it was so designed to influence? The answer remains mixed, because it was difficult to compare and contrast information in both documents for their style and substance differs, as they were written by different organizations for different purposes. For example, while the JPD provided the Chairman's broad advice on planning and programming and to a great degree it represented the Combatant Commander's needs, the DPG had to provide much greater specificity to properly advise the Services and Defense Agencies what programs or capabilities to resource when they built their voluminous Program Objective Memorandums.<sup>86</sup> Individuals who worked on the DPG have commented they did not use it as a guide when developing their document, and the Joint Staff considered eliminating the JPD during the 1997 CJCSI update.<sup>87</sup> Others who worked in the resource arena in the Pentagon say the process, which produced the JPD, educated people who later made decisions on defense and service programs, so its value was in the process of shaping ideas and sharing concepts and not the actual

product.<sup>88</sup>

*Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR)*. Both of these strategic planning products will be considered together, because they represented the personal advice of the Chairman in fulfilling his GNA resource responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Because these two documents were considered personal correspondence, they were kept close hold in addition to their classified nature caused by their recommendations of military programs and capabilities. As such, they did not get the widespread review within the Joint Staff or the Office of Secretary of Defense as other strategic planning products, but they were considered by key senior leaders who ultimately made resource tradeoff decisions or provided broad direction.

The CPA will be considered first, since it had been a formal part of the strategic planning system since 1990. The CPR, although first submitted in 1995, did not become a formal part of the strategic planning system until 1997. Since 1994, these two products were also sequenced and heavily influenced by the expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) processes. By sequencing, the program recommendation came out prior to the Defense Planning Guidance to advise the Secretary of Defense on programs important to the Chairman, so they would then be reflected in defense guidance. The program assessment was submitted about 6 months later to evaluate formally the programs the Services proposed to the Secretary of Defense in response to that same resource guidance. In this way, the Chairman influenced the processes that converted the Service's Program Objective Memorandum to the Defense Future Years Defense Programs (FYDP).

The CPA was a new product in the 1990 revision of the strategic planning system to evaluate the Service programs and fulfill the Chairman's GNA resource responsibilities. While this assessment existed since 1990, it changed significantly in content and influence during this decade. In 1990, the strategic planning memorandum specified that this assessment was scheduled on a biennial basis to assess the Service's Program Objective Memorandums 45 days after they were submitted to the Secretary of Defense, and its length was not to exceed 175 pages.<sup>89</sup> This evaluation, as with many other

strategic planning documents required by the 1990 MOP already discussed, was not produced as specified in the planning directive, as it was just a short memorandum. The 1993 MOP, to reflect the practice that occurred, required this assessment to be a one or two-page memorandum with enclosures to further explain the Chairman's views or identify alternative programs.<sup>90</sup> Prior to 1994, most of the CPAs, while the Chairman had the authority by the GNA to submit alternative programs, simply acknowledged or endorsed the military service's programs by these short memoranda.<sup>91</sup> While an elaborate process was identified to produce a Chairman's assessment, a review of that Joint Staff process revealed no body existed to meet and deliberate on contentious issues.<sup>92</sup>

The 1994 CPA submission would follow a different process than existed earlier. It started with the expansion of the JROC, which was chaired by the Vice Chairman and included the Service Vice Chiefs. Under the direction of Vice Chairman Admiral Owens in April 1994, this council went from validating military requirements and acquisition programs to providing programmatic advice on joint warfighting issues to influencing directly the defense resource system. Because of this expanded focus, the time spent in the council's meetings increased ten-fold from 1994 to 1995.<sup>93</sup>

With the expansion of this joint council's focus, ten Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs), under a Joint Staff Director, were also established in 1994 to examine programs horizontally and jointly. The JWCAs, whose members came from the Joint Staff, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, Defense Agencies and others to provide a synergistic approach to resolve issues, were organized across the following areas: Strike; Land and Littoral Warfare; Command and Control; Strategic Mobility and Sustainability; Sea Air and Space Superiority; Information Warfare; Deterrence/Counter Proliferation of WMD; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Regional Engagement/Presence; and Joint Readiness.<sup>94</sup> Including this diverse service and defense membership in the JWCAs directly improved the interface with the various Pentagon resource processes and boards. In addition, the JROC visited the Combatant Commanders on these same warfighting issues to gain their perspectives and needed buy-in on proposed recommendations. In essence, the JWCAs provided

the analytical rigor in briefs to the JROC members, who would gain Combatant Commander input, then deliberate, and finally provide recommendations to the Chairman. The Chairman ultimately would decide what to include in his program recommendation or assessment.

The CPA's recommendations were designed to ". . . enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more adequately reflect strategic and CINC priorities."<sup>95</sup> The October 1994 assessment, the first document submitted from the process described above, challenged some programs submitted by the Services, called for about \$8 billion in additional funding over the entire defense program, and argued for shifts in \$4 billion more.<sup>96</sup> While this may have been just a very small percentage of the overall defense resources, it established the precedent that the Chairman would not just endorse service programs. In a declining resource environment, shifting of funds becomes ever more important and difficult as resource flexibility can be lessened significantly.

The next year (1995) would start the annual sequencing of submitting a recommendation in the spring and an assessment in the fall. This process first influences the Defense Planning Guidance and then assesses Service programs in response to that guidance to achieve the full integration of Chairman's guidance within the annual Pentagon resource cycle. The Chairman's Program Recommendations, similar to his assessments, were focused to ". . . enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements."<sup>97</sup> In 1995, a CPR was submitted in April and a CPA was submitted in October. The October 1995 assessment was much broader in scope than the 1994 one in that:

It specifically called for shifting significant sums of money over the FYDP period from some programs to others, and recommended reducing some redundant capabilities across military services. It also argued for a very different approach both to recapitalization and to the revolution in military affairs—steps that, taken together, could require an adjustment of up to 12 percent of the projected defense budget over the FYDP period. Very little of this was associated with any additional funding.<sup>98</sup>

The process of using the JROC and JWCA to help craft a Chairman's Program Recommendation and Assessment continued to mature in the later part of this decade. Some refinements occurred in the JWCA process as some areas were added and others were dropped, and by 2000 the JWCAs were tasked to take a more strategic focus. In 1997, the JROC added a formal review board, chaired by a lieutenant general Joint Staff Director and with Service representatives at the major general level, to assist this council in reviewing issues and providing oversight of the JWCAs.<sup>99</sup> Formal links were later established between the JROC and Joint Forces Command in joint experimentation to operationalize *JV 2010* and later *JV 2020*, and the other Combatant Commanders had an open invitation to attend this council's meetings.<sup>100</sup> The intent of these JROC and JWCA changes was to provide more front-end and strategic influence on requirements and enhance joint warfighting. The formal outputs of much of this work continued to be the Chairman's Program Recommendations and Assessments. In the last part of the decade (1998 to 2000), the recommendation was submitted either in March or February and the assessment was completed by August,<sup>101</sup> which allowed more time for these documents to have an impact on defense planning, programming, and budgeting.

The success of the CPR and CPA, as mentioned, remains mixed depending on one's perspective. The quote above from a Joint Staff promoted book, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, was very positive about the CPA's effect, as it identified a potential 12 percent impact. The article, "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?," by defense analyst M. Thomas Davis was more critical of this same October 1995 CPA. It identified the lack of specific recommendations proportionate to the proposals; criticized the late submission of the document in the summer review cycle; and commented on the small dollar value of changes made to defense budgets the CPA was designed to affect.<sup>102</sup> As mentioned, the timeliness of submissions improved as the process matured later in the decade. In addition, success should not be measured only by the amount of funds that were moved within the programs. The extensive JROC and JWCA work led to informed discussions that resulted in changes to programs by the Services or Defense Combat Support Agencies before they needed to appear in the Chairman's recommendation

or assessment. A real measure of success was whether the Secretary of Defense used the advice provided by the Chairman to then make important changes in defense programs that resulted in improved joint operational capabilities, and the overwhelming evidence is that he did.<sup>103</sup>

## **Strategic Planning.**

*Integration.* The fourth directed GNA function of strategic planning was mainly covered in the discussion of the JSPS's evolution and on the documents identified under the strategic direction, plans, and resources sections of this monograph. However, the fact that it was a specific major GNA function in itself reflected Congress' intent to improve strategic planning overall and encourage better coordination and collaboration between the Chairman and the nation's other senior military and civilian leaders. Consequently, the JSPS's guidance and subsequence processes made great strides to ensure inter-connectivity of its products with: the President (*National Security Strategy and Budget*); Secretary of Defense (*Defense Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, Contingency Planning Guidance*), Combatant Commanders (*Integrated Priority Lists, JSCP directed plans*) and the Services (*Program Objective Memorandums*). This planning system tied all of these together as it accomplished the GNA strategic planning responsibilities.

In addition, this system directly affected other processes or boards in the Pentagon and the Joint Staff. For example, the Chairman's readiness assessment system, called the Joint Monthly Readiness Review that began in 1994, frequently identified readiness deficiencies that were later analyzed by JWCA's, briefed to the JROC for recommendations, and ended up in either the Chairman's Program Assessment or Recommendation. Issues identified in the CPA influenced the Defense Department's summer program review, which resulted in Program Decision Memorandums to change the Service programs or in later Program Budget Decisions to change proposed Service budgets.<sup>104</sup> This was just two of many ways this strategic planning system integrated and influenced other processes and decisions.

*Joint Strategy Review (JSR).* The one strategic planning classified

document not covered in any detail as yet is the JSR, for it did not truly fit into any of the GNA categories identified earlier. This review annually assessed the strategic environment to identify threats, opportunities, challenges, issues and any other significant topics that would ultimately affect other strategic planning products, such as the military strategy, vision, or plans.<sup>105</sup> In essence it served as an intellectual foundation or common thread upon which to later develop changes to strategy, capabilities, or resources. As expected, it looked to the future and made heavy use of intelligence, but the working groups included representatives from the Services, Joint Staff Directors, Combatant Commands and other defense organizations as needed. This product (formal reports were issued), or process as some described it, remained a constant in the strategic planning system in the 1990s. While a formal JSR was not completed in the early 1990s, starting in 1993 and thereafter it was completed in different ways and with different focuses. At times a separate report was issued (1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999) while other times the strategy review process was used to help produce a Joint Vision or National Military Strategy.<sup>106</sup> The Joint Strategy Review, started in 1996 and signed in January 1997, also assisted with the Joint Staff input to the Defense Department during work on the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*,<sup>107</sup> which was indicative of its broad influence.

The JSR also illustrated the combination of flexibility and bureaucracy that a strategic planning system needed. For example, instead of completing a formal JSR report, as mentioned, a Joint Vision or the National Military Strategy was the output that used the same intellectual capital of action officers on the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and select others. An example of the bureaucracy was that the detailed process, responsibilities, and coordination to complete a strategy review were identified in Joint Staff Memorandum or Notices. Senior leaders provided guidance to the action officers as to what focus or product the strategy review would take. This guidance reflected their level of involvement in the strategy review's products or process, which varied from light to heavy depending on the review's focus.

## **STRATEGIC PLANNING LEGACY OF CJCS**

When covering the strategic planning system and its products,

this monograph identified changes each Chairman made to the process or products. The leadership influence of the three Chairmen in using the strategic planning system will be briefly summarized, for it serves to educate future senior leaders on how to use a formal strategic planning system to manage change and transform complex organizations.

### **General Powell, 1989-93.**

As the first Chairman to serve entirely under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, he exercised direct leadership within the Joint Strategic Planning System. This was evident as he simplified strategic planning by significantly reducing the number of products from 10 to 4 and increasing the system's flexibility to respond to his direction. He also short-circuited its processes, as he did not wait for a formal Joint Strategy Review to be completed before issuing Chairman's Guidance, but used the results of a Commander's meeting to issue the guidance in a message.<sup>108</sup> He did not wait for the strategic planning's bureaucratic process and countless coordinations to produce another voluminous National Military Strategy Document with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published a 27-page National Military Strategy under his signature when he believed the strategy was right. The coordination of this strategy was more a result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal planning process.<sup>109</sup> In the resource area, while his planning system identified a detailed Chairman's Program Assessment of Service programs not to exceed 175 pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum. While some could criticize such a short assessment, a detailed program assessment may not have been needed or desired for the much smaller force structure documented in the last chapter of the National Military Strategy was essentially the greatest resource influence of any Chairman in the 1990s.

While General Powell may have eliminated too much bureaucracy associated with producing some detailed annexes in the National Military Strategy Document or a more comprehensive program assessment, which provided officers on the Joint Staff with direction and also gained additional input from the Services and Combatant Commanders, he kept the bureaucratic processes associated with

the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This formal direction enabled military planners to grind out those needed plans to execute the President's and Secretary of Defense's planning guidance and kept the military in the field operationally focused.

General Powell also had a strategic planning legacy for when he did not use his strategic planning system. For example, when he developed the Base Force, the most revolutionary military force structure change since the Vietnam draw down during the 1970s, he generally bypassed the existing formal strategic planning system. Using the existing process would have involved developing a National Military Strategy Document with all the annexes, risk analyses, and bureaucratic coordination before submitting it to the Secretary of Defense and President. Instead, he used key people on the Joint Staff to develop the concepts, discussed it with the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders, and presented an overall force structure reduction to civilian leaders before the final structure was agreed to and fully coordinated with the Joint Chiefs.<sup>110</sup> In all that he accomplished, he did not always use existing Joint Staff systems or processes, but used the additional responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Act to provide unmatched leadership during this time of rapid global change.

### **General Shalikashvili, 1993-97.**

General Shalikashvili's legacy in using the strategic planning system to execute his Goldwater-Nichols Act strategic responsibilities was markedly different than General Powell's, but very successful in substance. He kept the flexibility and simplicity General Powell established by limiting the number and complexity of strategic planning products, but emphasized and expanded the strategic planning processes. The 1995 and 1997 National Military Strategies were coordinated fully within the formal strategic planning process, used other strategic planning products in their development, and maintained a straightforward unclassified focus. He used the bureaucracy in providing direction to produce the variety of plans in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and tasked the development

of theater engagement plans to more fully implement the **shape** component of the National Military Strategy.

He went one step further in providing long-term strategic direction to the military when he published *JV 2010* in 1996 and later included this document formally within the strategic planning system. Like General Powell, he used considerable interpersonal skills to develop *JV 2010*, rather than relying fully on the bureaucratic coordination process. He made this vision a truly joint effort rather than accepting service equities.<sup>111</sup> He then used this same strategic planning system to begin an implementing process for *JV 2010*. General Shalikashvili also fostered a very close relationship with defense officials using the strategic planning system and products. *JV 2010* gained wide acceptance within the leadership of the Department of Defense, and his Joint Strategy Review helped focus the initial work of the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.<sup>112</sup>

General Shalikashvili expanded the strategic planning process in the resource areas as he added the Chairman's Program Recommendation. Most importantly, he supported his Vice Chairman Admiral Owens in greatly expanding the Joint Requirements Oversight Council into warfighting areas and directly integrating its work with the budget process. By 1995, this council was spending 10 times the hours they spent prior to 1994, as they also established a formal assessment structure to provide the analytical rigor for their truly joint deliberations.<sup>113</sup> Using outputs from these deliberations, General Shalikashvili's personal correspondence to the Secretary of Defense in the resource area grew in content and influence. His Chairman's Program Assessment argued for \$12B of additional or changes in funding in 1994, and in 1995 he identified more significant shifts in funding that could result in adjustments of up to 12 percent of future defense budgets.<sup>114</sup> He kept the needed senior leader balance between bureaucracy and flexibility within a formal strategic planning process. This bureaucracy was critically important to providing clear direction to the hundreds of mid- and lower-level people within the Joint Staff to execute his guidance and shape the military. This flexibility was demonstrated in how he was open to additional processes, gave expanded responsibility to action officers in crafting products, and developed consensus on tough issues through his considerable interpersonal leadership skills. He

provided visionary leadership within the formal strategic planning system, which was accepted by the other senior military and civilian leaders of his day.

### **General Shelton, 1997-2001.**

General Shelton's legacy in using the strategic planning system can be described as "staying the course." No substantive changes were made to the strategic planning process overall, but his focus was on using the existing system to continue evolutionary changes to the military and providing tough resource recommendations. He kept the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and processes relatively untouched, but more fully integrated the theater engagement plans within the overall strategic planning processes and the defense leadership. He focused on defining a process to implement *JV 2010* by identifying 21st century challenges and their associated desired operating capabilities, while providing direction to Joint Forces Command to conduct experiments to operationalize that vision.<sup>115</sup> At the later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning process to formally update the vision in 2000 to incorporate more fully information, innovation, and interagency in joint operations.

General Shelton improved the process and timeliness of the Chairman's Program Assessments and Recommendations in providing specific resource advice to civilian leaders. He elevated the work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the associated Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments to be more strategic in nature. He used his resource and leadership influence to support "people" programs actively, such as improved health care, substantial pay increases, and retirement reform, all of which occurred during his tenure in a tight fiscal environment.

In assessing his strategic planning influence, it is also important to identify what he did not do. Most significantly, he did not produce an update to the National Military Strategy, even though some argued that it needed to be done. His leadership was more process-oriented than that of his predecessors, as he used existing processes rather than making changes to the strategic planning system itself. He continued to develop a consensus between the civilian and military leaders to make needed evolutionary changes

and investments in joint capabilities and people programs, which significantly improved future warfighting capabilities.

## STRATEGIC LEADER RECOMMENDATIONS

Five broad recommendations for military or defense strategic leaders on how to use a formal strategic planning system to transform their organizations have come from this examination of the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s.

**1. If revolutionary change is needed in the military, the strategic leader should not use an existing strategic planning system.** This recommendation is based on General Powell's nonuse of the existing strategic planning process in developing the Base Force and his boldness in crafting the 1992 *National Military Strategy* that was vastly different from what the formal strategic planning system required. This new strategy and the associated force structure were considered revolutionary in this timeframe. This leadership boldness prevented concepts or strategies from being diluted, which could occur when extensive coordination takes place within a formal planning system to gain consensus and preclude revolutionary change.

**2. When evolutionary change is needed in the military, the strategic leader should use a formal strategic planning system.** This recommendation is based on the very successful evolutionary changes General Shalikashvili and General Shelton made to improve military capabilities by using the Joint Strategic Planning System during an environment of declining resources and increased operations. These evolutionary changes used a strategic planning system that resulted in publishing *JV 2010* and *JV 2020*; developing a formal vision implementation process; publishing two National Military Strategies; expanding the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to a warfighting focus and creating joint analytical assessment processes to add analytical rigor to that warfighting focus; and making specific and sometimes contentious resource and weapon system recommendations in their Chairmen's Program Recommendations and Assessments.

**3. Strategic leaders must clearly articulate a vision to manage long-term change effectively, whether that change is revolutionary or evolutionary.** This recommendation is supported by the three Chairmen's use of vision in different ways. General Powell's strategic vision of the future security environment, while not formally a part of the strategic planning process, was a driving force when crafting the revolutionary unclassified *National Military Strategy* in 1992. General Shalikashvili's formal *JV 2010* was greatly accepted by Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders and the Department of Defense, as it influenced Service visions, provided broad direction for operational capabilities, and shaped resource decisions. General Shelton focused his early effort on implementing *JV 2010* by developing formal implementation and experimentation processes and later updated the vision in 2000 to take greater advantage of information, innovation, and interagency in joint operations.

**4. Strategic leaders must ensure a formal strategic planning system has the right amount of flexibility to provide the intellectual energy for new concepts and the discipline to provide the bureaucratic direction to manage change effectively in complex organizations.** This recommendation is based on the much-needed simplicity and flexibility General Powell put into the overall strategic planning system, while he kept the needed bureaucracy in the plans area. General Shalikashvili augmented that flexibility in refining and disciplining the processes without being too bureaucratic, as he used the planning processes to develop the strategy and resource documents, but kept flexibility in crafting the first vision. General Shelton built upon General Shalikashvili's legacy in further refining the Joint Strategic Planning System's processes to manage change.

**5. Strategic leaders must be prepared to spend the energy to cultivate interpersonal relationships to gain needed support and to exercise moral courage for significant changes to strategic planning processes or products.** This recommendation is based on the interpersonal relationships and extensive communication skills General Powell used in developing the first unclassified 1992 *National Military Strategy*, General Shalikashvili used in developing the first (1996) *Joint Vision*, and General Shelton used in promoting

benefit increases. They spent extraordinary energy and personal capital on these major initiatives that were crafted more by personal interactions than institutional processes. In addition, they exhibited moral courage in providing and expanding their influence in the strategic directions of the unclassified National Military Strategy and first Joint Vision, and in using the Chairman's position to advocate for military benefits. These directions were not always self-evident and were subject to criticism by some within and external to the military and Defense Department.

In total, these five broad recommendations provide today's leaders with the historic context of what can be learned from how three Chairmen of diverse leadership styles used a strategic planning system to respond to the challenges of the 1990s. These recommendations are applicable to today's senior leaders, as they continue to be faced with the tremendous challenges to make the right decisions to transform our nation's military to respond to the complex global security environment of the next decade and beyond.

## ENDNOTES

1. The phrase "primary formal means" has appeared in all of the Joint Strategic Planning System Memorandum or Instructions that described the overall process and products in the 1990s.

2. Robert H. Cole, *et al.*, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995, p. 30.

3. Theodore J. Crackel, "Defense Assessment," in Stuart M Butler eds., *et al.*, *Mandate For Leadership II*, Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1984, p. 432.

4. James W. Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform," in Asa A. Clark IV, *et al.*, eds., *The Defense Reform Debate*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp. 242-244.

5. Cole, p. 29.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

7. Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No.

2, Autumn 1993, pp. 71-72.

8. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, Washington DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996, pp. 4-5.

9. Crackel, p. 443.

10. Philip A. Odeen, Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Melvin R. Laird, *Toward A More Effective Defense*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985, pp. 1-5.

11. Paul B. Davis, *Military Culture at a Crossroads: A Grounded Theory of Strategic Planning Within the Department of Defense*, Dissertation, Walden University, 2000, p. 160.

12. Cole, pp. 27-29.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

14. Odeen, Goodpaster, and Laird, p. 4.

15. Dan Coats, "Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the Promise of the Future," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 17, Autumn/Winter 1997-1998, pp. 13-20; and the thrust of some Congressional concerns during testimony the author attended on Joint Requirements, Capabilities, and Experimentation before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 4, 2000.

16. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report (99-824), 99th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, DC: September 12, 1986, section 3.

17. Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, endnote 43, pp. 36-37.

18. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Title 10 Armed Forces As Amended through December 31, 2000*, Prepared for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2001, section 153 (c) and (d).

19. Cole, p. 206, quoting *Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, section 151(b)(1).

20. *Ibid.*, p. 206. Quoting *Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, section 151(d)(1).

21. Review of current and past legislation revealed no changes in this section of the law, so the GNA has remained consistent in these functions required of the CJCS. References: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Title 10 Armed Forces As Amended through December 31, 2000, Prepared for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives*, Chapter 5; and Cole, pp. 207-209, quoting Public Law 99-433.

22. *Title 10 Armed Forces As Amended through December 31, 2000, Prepared for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives*, section 153 (a)(6)(B).

23. Cole, p. 203, quoting: *Extracts of Public Law 81-216, 10 August 1949, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Section 211.*

24. Cole, pp. 208-209, quoting: *Extracts of Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.*

25. This “concur” process is based on my experience working many documents during my tour on the Joint Staff, 1994-97, and discussion with action officers who have worked on the Joint Staff since 1997.

26. Crackel, p. 439. While this was pre-GNA, it clearly illustrated what action officers go through to get a “concur.”

27. Discussion on collaboration is based on my experience while assigned to the Joint Staff 1994-97 and numerous discussions with action officers who have worked on the Joint Staff since 1997.

28. Lovelace and Young, p. 11.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 11, and explanatory endnote 43, pp. 36-37.

30. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 (CJCS MOP 84), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC, January 30, 1989, p. 3.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

32. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC, January 30, 1990, p. 20.

33. *Ibid.*, Figure 2, p. 12, and pp. 30-31.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

35. The discussions of the contents of the JSPS in this paragraph are drawn from material in CJCS MOP 7.
36. Lovelace and Young, p. 13, and endnotes 45 and 52, pp. 37-38.
37. Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy In A Post Cold War World: A Perspective From The Joint Staff*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996, pp. 12-13.
38. Lovelace and Young, p. 37. See endnote 45 which discussed this situation in detail and identified publishing this message, summarized the annual CINC's conference, and served to be the point where the formal JSPS, as designed in 1990, began to fall apart.
39. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993, pp. 1-2.
40. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Notice 3102 Cancellation of MCM-111-90*, Washington DC, November 30, 1993.
41. Lovelace and Young, p. 13, and endnote 52, p.38.
42. The author served on the Joint Staff from 1994 to 1997 and took quality management training, a requirement of all officers on the Joint Staff involved with Process Action Teams (PATs), although he was not directly involved on this particular PAT.
43. Office of the Vice Director Joint Staff Memorandum, *DJSM-247-96, Joint Staff JSPS Process Action Team*, Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 18, 1996, with attached *Joint Strategic Planning System Process Action Team*, March 15, 1996.
44. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3000.01, Joint Strategic Planning System (CJCSI 3000.01)*, Washington, DC, September 1, 1997, p. v.
45. This assessment comes from comparing the content of two documents (MOP 7 vs. CJCSI 3100.01); working on the Joint Chiefs for Staff from 1994 to 1997 on issues associated with the Joint Strategic Planning System; and listening to a number of speakers, both general officer and colonel, who described the processes and products of the JSPS in various lectures at the U.S. Army War College in a nonattribution manner from 1997 to 2002.
46. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3000.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System (CJCSI 3000.01A)*, Washington,

DC, Summary of Changes, Para. (7).

47. *CJCS MOP 7*, pp. 30-39.

48. Author's assessment from reading the NMSD and many of the annexes.

49. Lovelace and Young, endnote 43, p. 37, referencing U.S. Congress, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization and the Need for Change*, pp. 495-498.

50. *MOP 7*, January 30, 1990, pp. 32-33.

51. Rothman, p. 4.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 1; and Colin Powell, *National Military Strategy of The United States, January 1992 (NMS 1992)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, foreword, no page number.

53. Powell, *NMS 1992*, p. 1.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

55. Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993, pp. 28-37.

56. Rothman, pp. 16-17.

57. Jaffe's book, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, weaved a detailed discussion of the close hold dialogue and debate of various strategy perspectives among Powell, Defense officials, service chiefs, and combatant commanders.

58. Rothman, p. 1.

59. Jaffe, p. 50.

60. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of The United States, 1995 (NMS 1995)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 8-10.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-17.

62. Comparison in gross force structure between the 1992 vs. 1995 strategies.

63. Powell, *NMS 1992*, pp. 7-8.

64. Comparing the six sections in MOP 7 vs. the sections in the NMS indicated a nice conceptual fit.
65. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of The United States, 1997 (NMS 1997)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 30.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
67. Author's assessment critically comparing the 1997 vice 1995 NMSs.
68. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JV 2010*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, *JV 2010*, inside cover, no page number.
69. *Ibid.*, pp 1-5.
70. Author's assessment from reading sections of Defense Planning Guidance, which provide direction to the Services on resourcing the operational concepts of *JV2010*, and reading how the Service Chiefs embraced *JV 2010*.
71. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *JV 2010 Case Analysis*, Strategic Leadership 5050, Lesson 22, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002, p. 6.
72. The substance of this paragraph was based on a May 9, 2002, interview with a former Joint Staff Action Officer who worked on the vision in 1995-96 and reading the *Case Study on JV 2010* by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
73. Interview with Joint Staff Action Officer on May 9, 2002, who worked on this document in 2000.
74. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3116, *2000 Joint Strategy Review (Phase II Instructions)*, Washington, DC, September 10, 1999. While the title of this notice was on JSR instructions, the output of the 2000 JRS was the Joint Vision update.
75. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000, inside cover, no p. number.
76. Henry H. Shelton, "A Word from the New Chairman," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 17, Autumn-Winter, 1997-98, p. 6.
77. These words describing the JSCP's purpose have remained fundamentally the same from the MOP 7 to CJCSI 3100.01A.

78. The types of plans in the following paragraph come from comparing MOP 7 1990 to MOP 7 1993 to CJCSI 3001.01 1997 to CJCSI 3001. 01A 1999, as well as conversations with individuals who have worked directly with or taught this subject at the U.S. Army War College.

79. M. Thomas Davis, "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?" *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1998, pp. 9-15. While VCJCS normally chaired the JROC, Title 10 USC Section 181 identified the CJCS as Chairman of the JROC and specified this leadership can only be delegated to the Vice Chairman.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

81. Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, *Opening Statement*, April 4, 2000.

82. Author's assessment from listening to many lectures on these documents and processes from different nonattribution speakers at the U.S. Army War College from 1997-2000, and reading some of these documents.

83. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, p. 23.

84. Percentage calculated from comparing the Military Personnel, O&M, Military Construction and Family Housing budget authority versus the total budget authority FY 1992 to FY 1999 in the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, Appendix B, p. B-1. In addition, the percentage related to force structure is essentially greater, because much of the procurement and some of the RDT&E expenditures (the two major other categories) are also influenced by the force structure size in modernizing it.

85. *CJCS MOP 7 1993*, pp. IV-1 to IV-4.

86. Comparison was made between the 1999 JPD for the FY 2002-07 and the 2000 DPG for the FY 2002-07 period. The thrust of these documents and specificity differed, but in general they were complementary in some of the overall capabilities.

87. Nonattribution comments from people who have worked on the DPG and spoke at the U.S. Army War College and interview with a former Joint Staff J-5 action officer on May 9, 2002, who worked on the 1997 revision to the JSPS.

88. Author's assessment based on numerous conversations with people who worked within the resource area either on the Joint Staff or Service Staffs in the

mid- to late-1990s.

89. *MOP 7 1990*, pp. 51-52.

90. *MOP 7 1993*, pp. VIII 10-11.

91. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, pp. 11-12.

92. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3100, Assessment Plan For Developing The Chairman's Program Assessment FY 1996-2001*, Washington, DC, February 25, 1994. Author's analysis of this notice revealed that the process was directorate specific and coordinated with no overall senior board review.

93. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, pp. 10-12.

94. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process (CJCSI 3137.01)*, Washington, DC, February 2, 1996, p. A-1.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

96. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, pp. 12, 22-23.

97. *CJCSI 3137.01*, February 2, 1996, p. 3.

98. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, p. 23.

99. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 5123.01 Charter of The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (CJCSI 5123.01)*, Washington, DC, May 2, 1997, Enclosure A.

100. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 5123.01A, Charter of The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (CJCSI 5123.01A)*, Washington, DC, March 8, 2001, Enclosure A.

101. *Joint Processes and Landpower Development*, Course 3, AY 2003, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA: Briefing Slides, Lesson 16.

102. Davis, pp. 14-15.

103. Author's assessment based on numerous lectures given at the Army War College on the JROC and JWCA, interviewing action officers who worked within

the process in May 2002, and personal experience within the Joint Staff from 1994 to 1997.

104. Author worked on readiness issues that were directly involved in this process from 1994 to 1997. In addition, this resource integration was constantly identified in CJCSIs on readiness, JROC, and JWCAs.

105. Description of the purpose and content from the 1993 MOP 7 to 1999 CJCSI show a common focus.

106. Author read many of the classified JSR reports, associated correspondence documenting the JSR process, and interviews with Joint Staff Action Officers who worked on Joint Vision and National Military Strategy.

107. John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 19.

108. Lovelace and Young, endnote 45, p. 37.

109. Rothman, p. 16; and Jaffe pp. 48-50.

110. Jaffee, pp. 15-40. These pages provide a comprehensive discussion of the development of the Base Force and the efforts of CJCS in the summer of 1990 to win over the Service Chiefs on the cuts, although a 25 percent force structure cut was already announced as part of August 2, 1990, speech by President Bush at Aspen. The key would be how that force structure cut would be taken among the services and how quickly it would be accomplished. While General Powell focused on this in the summer of 1990, the Gulf War would also occupy considerable energies.

111. Interview with former Joint Staff Action Officer directly involved with coordinating *JV 2010* on May 9, 2002, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *Case Study on JV 2010*.

112. Schrader, Lewis, and Brown, p. 19; and author's review of Defense Planning Guidance.

113. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, p. 10.

114. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

115. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, Washington, DC, December, 9, 1998; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*,

Washington, DC, August 29, 2000.



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