

Strategy Research Project

Transforming the Reserve Component to Meet Future Operational Demands

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Abstract

Designated as an operational force the Reserve Component is poised to support the Army and the joint force in routine operations. With a continually shrinking force the Army must look to provide capabilities once asked of BCTs and other units on the battlefield. The theater army's role in protection is discussed along with current force structure in the RC to conduct protection missions. Five recommendations are made to cover the gap in protection: create a theater protection command (TPC); re-designate theater engineer commands as TPCs; re-designate maneuver enhancement brigades (MEB) to expeditionary protection commands (EPC); increase the three Army Reserve MEB/EPCs to five; re-designate existing military police commands as expeditionary Internment/resettlement commands (EI/RC) while creating two additional. The recommended changes in force structure will produce an integrated command structure able to coordinate and provide protection and produce readiness during peace time.

Transforming the Reserve Component to Meet Future Operational Demands

Recently the United States Army announced reductions in brigade combat teams (BCT) from 45 to 30 by the end of fiscal year 2017.¹ The BCT is the Army's main modularized combat fighting force and the unit of action the Army has relied on to conduct maneuver over the last 12 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.² While reduction in personnel end strength and the number of BCTs takes place, the Army is required to maintain their capacity to provide capabilities to the joint force as the primary land component.³ In order to maintain a robust operational force, the U.S. Army embraced the total force concept placing reserve component (RC) units into rotational plans for operational force projections.⁴ In October 2008 the Department of Defense (DOD) officially codified the RC as "an operational reserve" versus the "strategic reserve."⁵

With the designation as an operational force the RC is poised to support the Army and the joint force in routine operations. With a continually shrinking force the Army must look to provide capabilities once asked of BCTs and other units on the battlefield. This leads to the questions: is the RC structured appropriately as a force provider? How can the RC ensure timely and capable support to the U.S. Army and the joint force? To refine these questions and determine where the RC can provide capacity and capability freeing up BCTs to conduct maneuver, a look at the protection Warfighting Function (WfF) at the theater and operational levels follows. The theater army's role in protection will be discussed along with current force structure in the RC to conduct protection missions. The two key units in the RC protection role, the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) and the regional support group (RSG), will be examined, with recommendations for new force structure to support theater level protection. Then,

a focus on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) will discuss how RC units and the new force structure recommendations are capable of supporting Globally Integrated Operations (GIO), the main concept of the CCJO, as part of the joint function of protection. A conclusion will follow the discussion of key recommendations.

Protection

Army Doctrine Publication 3-37, *Protection*, states “the goal of protection integration is to balance protection with the freedom of action throughout the duration of military operations.”⁶ In both Iraq and Afghanistan freedom of action, or movement across the battle space, resulted in half or more of the casualties in each conflict due to improvised explosive devices (IED).⁷ IED casualties have slowed since 2010 with force reductions in Iraq and a small U.S. presence in Afghanistan, yet IEDs have become a global threat used by insurgents/terrorists and are a future threat in any hybrid or failed state conflict.⁸ With the largest threat to service members in the current conflict being improvised devices placed on movement routes, the protection WfF is key in reducing this threat and achieving economy of force. Improving the military’s understanding of the IED threat is one aspect of the IED issue that led to creation of a joint agency dedicated to training and defeating the IED. Control of the movement corridors is the other aspect that must be achieved to allow freedom of action, this is discussed later with the MEB.

The impact of IEDs could be felt across the services, and in 2006 DOD authorized the creation of the joint improvised explosive device defeat organization (JIEDDO) to counter the IED threat. JIEDDO implemented three training lines of effort: working to stop the network placing the IED, defeat the devices once found, and train the force.⁹ To stop the network, JIEDDO trains units to merge intelligence, use partnership and conduct offensive action to interrupt the IED supply chain at any point

from emplacement back to finance and production. Defeating the device uses emerging technology and information to ensure ordnance technicians have the tools and training to neutralize or mitigate the effects of the IED. Information gained in post blast forensics merges with intelligence analysis from raids in stopping the network.

Training the force begins with pre-deployment training and includes information sharing with partners and continual updates to IED tactics, techniques and procedures.¹⁰ IED use peaked in 2007, and although the effectiveness of IED attacks remains around 25-30%, the U.S. and coalition forces are defeating and rendering ineffective 70-75% of attacks. The success of the JIEDDO led to the organization being named a permanent organization under the department of defense (DOD) threat reduction agency to counter IEDs globally as the joint improvised-threat defeat organization (JIDO).¹¹ Linking the JIDO to theater protection entities increases efficiency in trend analysis and provides updated technology and enemy tactics, techniques and procedures.

Defined in several joint military and army doctrinal publications, operational force protection is the synchronization, integration, and organization of capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards.¹² The protection joint function includes; missile defense, fire support, base camp defense, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRNE), consequence management capability, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).¹³ Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, is dedicated to theater security operations and force protection is mentioned in many joint pubs placing protection responsibility on commanders and staff as well as the service component commanders or the theater

level service commands.¹⁴ The concept of operational force protection is woven into a joint security framework using: combat power, anti-terrorism, law enforcement, counter-intelligence, information security, personnel security, operations security (OPSEC), and emergency management/response to create an integrated, multi-disciplinary all-hazards approach to risk management.¹⁵

Operational protection at its base is the application of the army's risk management process of identifying individual threats/hazards, assessing the threat/hazard, determining mitigation methods or controls, implementing mitigation methods or controls, and supervising.¹⁶ Although practiced at every command-level at theater-level the coordination for the joint security framework can encompass many joint security areas.¹⁷ Pulling this multi-faceted warfighting function together at the theater level is crucial to the success of the overall mission. This requires coordination and operational understanding between several command levels with real-time/near real-time reactions, not over-reactions. Protection at the theater-level is delegated to a joint security coordinator (JSC).¹⁸

The JSC heads the protection cell supported by: the provost marshal; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; antiterrorism; force protection; personnel recovery; and safety staff sections.¹⁹ This cell has direct coordination with the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and the area air defense commander (AADC) as well as multi-national (MN) and host nation (HN) entities.²⁰ The JSC is also responsible for consequence management capability and explosive ordnance disposal.²¹ Protection at theater-level and below is managed by the corresponding staffs and commanders.

Corps and divisions may be assigned a MEB to control a support area as an area of operation; as well as manage protection and maneuver support tasks.²²

Operational protection is “the” economy of force mission encompassing coordination of many entities at the theater-level to ensure mission success.²³ Understanding the role of the theater army and how they fit into the protection mission is vital to understanding the need for increased support to the joint protection cell. A dedicated command element for theater force protection, similar to that of logistics, medical and engineering, would greatly enhance the joint operational area security framework while freeing BCTs from being diverted to these tasks.

Theater Army

As the combatant commanders’ army service component commander (ASCC), the theater army has operational control of assigned/attached army forces not sub-assigned to a separate joint task force. The theater army maintains administrative control over all Army forces operating in the area of operation. The theater army is tasked to provide the theater campaign plan, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation plans, theater global force management plans, deliberate plans, crisis action plans, protection and army support to other services (ASOS).²⁴

ASOS can be divided into a few categories managed by different command elements that directly report to the theater army. To provide logistics, the theater army relies on the theater sustainment command (TSC) with subordinate expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC) and the medical command (MEDCOM) to manage logistics and medical support. The TSC is a two-star division-level logistical command controlling much of ASOS, common user logistics, executive agent actions as directed, and logistics to all Army units; allowing the army theater, corps, and division

headquarters to manage maneuver, maneuver support, and fires.²⁵ The TSC manages transportation, fuel distribution, and logistics management while the MEDCOM manages intra-theater medical evacuation and veterinary services. A theater engineer command (TEC) manages general engineering while the DOD information network (DODIN) and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command work with the signal command (theater) to manage strategic communications.²⁶

The theater army's primary role is to be the ASCC managing all Army units assigned to the combatant command. The theater army is deeply tied into steady state activities to include theater security cooperation.²⁷ The theater army has limited ability to act as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and its contingency headquarters has limited ability to act as a joint task force (JTF) command post.²⁸ The theater army headquarters requires augmentation from other services to assume JTF duties.²⁹ When the theater army is assigned as the JSC or JFLCC by the combatant commander, the theater army commander assigns the task of coordinating protection to an assistant chief of staff for protection.³⁰ During steady state activities and during security cooperation activities the theater army staff is adequate for protection management; during contingency operations and implementation of an operational plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN) the theater army staff requires augmentation.³¹

The Army currently has BCT, MEB and RSG units at the tactical level managing site or area of operations protection duties linking their individual base or base cluster defense centers to the division, corps or theater army staff protection center. Movement control battalions linked into the TSC/ESC distribution management center (DMC) conduct movement control boards that manage supply route status designations based

on reports of enemy activity. This conglomeration of units each manages a piece of the protection system while reporting up to division, corps, JTF or theater army. This process provides commanders a good operational picture; however, it is a reactive system and siloes response by separate areas of responsibility.

These facts present the question: once an OPLAN or CONPLAN is initiated and an increase of theater assets begins, is the theater army staff the correct entity to directly manage the enlarged mission of theater protection? The seriousness of failed protection and need to coordinate limited capacity strategic defense capabilities dictates a need for dedicated oversight of protection assets.

Since protection is a vital joint and army warfighting function, it should be staffed at the theater level with a two-star division equivalent theater protection command (TPC). Theater level protection commands, provided in the RC structure, would augment the theater army staff and provide the overarching protection plan and management across multiple operational areas. Similar to the use of the existing TSC, TEC, MEDCOM, and ESCs, the TPC would act as the theater protection operations center (TPOC) linking the multiple BDOC, BCOC, and MEBs. Supervising operational force protection at theater level as a command element versus a staff element, the TPC could better integrate information coordination, improving IED response across the battlespace and better informing JIDO enhancing training of future force rotations. This concept builds upon efforts by the Maneuver Support Center in 2006 at FT Leonard Wood, MO} to achieve an inter-component joint protection effort.³² Functioning at the two-star level as a theater command to the MEBs managing movement corridors and

linking the RSGs managing bases with air defense and WMD detection and response, the TPC would act as the appointed JSC for the theater.

The TPC is designed for execution, oversight, and technical supervision of operational protection and functional branch missions of its subordinate units within the operational area. The TPC commander can also act as the JFC's chief of detainee operations (CDO), deputy area air defense commander (DAADC) and chief of engineer requirements.³³ The task organization of the TPC would incorporate a protection coordination cell, air defense cell, functional branch deputy commanders as well as up to two deployable operational command posts.

The TPC main headquarters provides mission command of all functional branch missions of assigned units and inherent protection coordination responsibilities. BCTs, divisions, and corps will still maintain their organic assets focused at mobility/counter-mobility at each level. The TPC engineer, military police and air missile defense duties that follow highlight several key responsibilities of the consolidation of the current branch specific commands.

Engineer responsibilities include mission command of all U.S. coalition, and contracted engineering and construction activities. Provide quality assurance to engineer projects through out theater while overall theater engineer planner for the army service command, land component command and JTF headquarters. Direct mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, EOD support, theater level infrastructure restoration, civil engineer planning and other engineer theater level services.³⁴

Military police responsibilities involve mission command of military police services at the theater and operational level. These include: I/R detainee operations, host nation

(HN) police support, MP support, coordination with federal (US) and civil (HN) I/R activities, and police intelligence operations. Inherent to this is a coordination of HN/MP civil law enforcement interaction enhancing protection as well as stability and security operations.³⁵

Air and missile defense (AMD) responsibilities include planning, synchronizing coordinating and conducting joint air and missile defense operations with integration of information on AMD across the battlefield.³⁶ Coordination external to the TPC includes that with the service component commanders and integrating AMD into U.S, coalition and host nation rear/area defense plans. Mission command is provided for air defense artillery (ADA) brigades, joint tactical air ground stations and attached units to include LNO teams to all theater and joint task force air elements.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

The recent National Commission on the Future of the Army (January 2016) recommended reduction in risk to mission and force can be accomplished by stationing, force structure, positioning, and force utilization.³⁷ Force structure redesign is the concept of adapting to more agile units versus the current BCT construct. MEB's exemplify this, and although not currently designed to primarily command infantry or armor units in offensive operations, the MEB is fully capable of employing these units as a battalion-size tactical combat force for level III threats.

The MEB was formed in the army's transformation process in 2005 to act as a tailorable, multi-functional headquarters performing maneuver support or support area operations.³⁸ Although created with the transformation to the BCT system, the MEB has not been used to capacity in the current conflicts of Iraq or Afghanistan. The MEB has tremendous force-multiplication potential and use in shaping the operational

environment, stability operations and defense, sensitive site exploitation, and support to civil authority (DSCA); however, since its conception, the MEB has been an under-employed capability.³⁹

Maneuver support includes mobility, protection, and sustainment. These tasks enhance the maneuverability of the BCTs the MEB supports under a division headquarters. The MEB enhances freedom of action through mobility and counter-mobility operations while conducting area security and intelligence collection with military police (MP) and engineer (EN) units. The MEB controls chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) assets as early warning, consequence management and in support of mobility conducting battlefield obscuration effects.⁴⁰ Explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) elements ensure the MEB is capable of finding and eliminating enemy obstacles to freedom of action. The sustainment portion of the MEB refers to the ability to complement or reinforce the BCT engineer assets.⁴¹ MEB engineering can provide survivability enhancement and with some staff augmentation could provide construction or infrastructure repair.

There are several support area operations the MEB can conduct; these include terrain management, clearance of fires, area operational security, area damage control/management and protection, personnel recovery and coordination of base camp/base cluster defense.⁴² Due to the MEB's unique integrated functionality, it is the key Army unit to be assigned support area terrain management at the corps and division level.⁴³ Unique to the MEB versus other non-combat arms commanders is the integrated ability to manage a tactical combat force (TCF) and manage fires. Placing the MEB as a support area terrain manager integrates several base camp defense

operations centers (BDOC) or base cluster operations centers (BCOC). This links the BDOC/BCOC's with a headquarters running routine security and mobility operations in the area of operation that can implement fires and TCF actions with no outside coordination bogging down response. The MEB in affect links the populace (army units) with a police department (MP units) and public works (EN, CBRNE and EOD units) to ensure safety and security while being able to respond to critical all-hazard incidents with organic specialty assets.

The proliferation of the IED threat affects movement across the battle space in current and future military operations, requires the U.S. military to reevaluate its protection focus.⁴⁴ The employment of both MEBs to control the movement corridors/lines of communication and the intense anti-IED efforts of the JIDO coalesce the protection of units moving from one inter-theater location to another. The MEB capabilities provide military police, engineer and EOD assets working in concert to maintain the security of a movement corridor between major logistics hubs.⁴⁵ In order for the MEB to integrate with the base and base cluster operations centers, the MEB will need direct liaison authorization (DIRLAUTH) with the regional support group, other base commands, and the TPC.

One issue with the MEB is its designation as a brigade. In current army language this places the MEB in equal standing with a BCT, a colonel command, while the MEB is a one-star command. Re-designating the MEB as an expeditionary protection command (EPC) will remove confusion in task organization. Although this may be viewed as technical semantics, the MEB is a one-star brigade headquarters that works in concert with division and corps while maintaining its own area of operation. This re-

designation will make the EPC a deputy commander and a staff fill to a division or corps headquarters versus a subordinate brigade as the TSC is to a theater army. This will also eliminate confusion in joint operations with a marine expeditionary brigade, also labeled a MEB.

There are currently twenty MEBs in the RC, three in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), and seventeen in the National Guard (NG) with no active duty MEBs.⁴⁶ Each MEB is tied to an active duty division headquarters, ensuring the unit maintains capability to train and function in all key task areas. Increasing the three USAR MEBs to five or linking two NG MEBs to USAR units for an entire force generation cycle will provide an available MEB each year to train and prepare with RSGs and subordinate units for deployment. The current force generation cycle is a 1:4 for the RC or one year deployed or available to four years in refit and training.⁴⁷

Despite these specified coordination links, RC units face obstacles to training brigade headquarters in the protection function during USAR training exercises. The majority of USAR training exercises focus at platoon or lower. Providing a command post exercise where exercise staff notionally role play lateral and higher units at brigade or higher levels, would provide a much needed void. In order to fully train the RSG and MEB in interaction and response to protection functions, the two units will need to be required to work together in scenario training to create protection plans and crisis management response plans.

Regional Support Group

The Army and Marine Corps jointly published Army Techniques Publication 3-37.10/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-17.7N, *Base Camps*, in April of 2013, attempting to standardize base camp concepts for both services. In this manual the

regional support group is noted as the only army unit specifically designed and missioned to run large base camps.⁴⁸ Despite this, the designation of the base commander is often times delegated to the senior commander on the base camps.⁴⁹

The base camp commander is responsible for the protection, survivability and management of services/infrastructure to the inhabitants of the base camp, both permanent and transient.⁵⁰ The RSG is a headquarters designed to act as a deployable garrison command element capable of managing basing infrastructure, contracting, protection, and reception-staging-onward movement-integration (RSOI) actions. Recent RSG deployments to Afghanistan have highlighted the RSG role in protection as the BCOC controlling unit. There is currently one RSG in the active component, nineteen RSGs in the NG and twenty-four RSGs in the USAR.

To run a BDOC/BCOC, RSG's must be augmented with personnel from the intelligence, fires and maneuver units.⁵¹ Working in concert with a MEB, the RSG could provide the internal protection management for a base cluster while the MEB supports on an area basis, with fires and external response. This mutually supporting relationship is capable of supporting large base camps or multiple medium/small base camps in a base cluster.

Ensuring there is a defined base camp/base cluster defense plan and integrated into the area security plan is a key task to providing protection.⁵² The RSG is organized to be the managing agent for both the base defense and a base cluster defense operations center. Tying the RSG into a MEB for base cluster defense and area security as well as level III threat responses would provide the tactical unit commanders the ability to focus their efforts on their primary mission vs survivability and protection. This

use of both combat support units will increase the availability of the combat units to conduct missions even with reduced force structure.

Current RC Military Police / Engineer Structure

The reorganization of the USAR in 2008-2012 followed as a result of force structure changes from modularity. This reorganization replaced several one-star command headquarters in the Army Reserve with colonel-level brigade commands.⁵³ Prior to the transition military police and engineer units reported to one-star commands, which were deployable headquarters for theater-level prisoner of war and engineer management. Supporting the BCT/modularity concept, the loss of these one-star headquarters did not significantly affect mission success when USAR units were deployed and attached to units in a theater of operation. Choke points in personnel management resulted from the transition in peacetime operation due to the reduction of general officers in a chain of command and funneling of documents to the “first general officer in the chain of command.”⁵⁴

The Army Reserve’s current force structure in engineer, signal and military police units have several brigade-level commands reporting to a two-star headquarters or brigade-level commands reporting to a division-level command.⁵⁵ The USAR TECs each have a one-star MEB reporting as a brigade and not a command managing subordinate brigades. The logistics units in the USAR, however, have brigade-level commands reporting to a one-star command in the ESCs.⁵⁶ The difference in this reporting is the ability to more closely manage units in training, personnel and equipment while providing deployable one-star expeditionary units of action, fully prepared to excel in mission command as practiced daily, supporting division and corps-level units.

MP unit reductions also affected the availability of the one-star level MP commands responsible for theater level internment/resettlement (I/R) responsibilities. In 2003, with the large unexpected influx of persons detained across Iraq after debaathification, the USAR's 800th MP command showed abysmal ability to manage the detainee operations process.⁵⁷ Despite having several non I/R units assigned, the 800th should have been able to fulfill the mission as combined joint task force—seven (CJTF-7) detention operations headquarters with the commander dual-hatted as MP commander and provost marshal of CJTF-7.⁵⁸ This failure led to the creation of joint task force 134 (detainee operations) with the eventual loss of one-star MP I/R commands in the USAR.

JTF 134 was an ad hoc two-star joint headquarters managing detention operation in Iraq through the MP brigades who managed combat support (CS) and I/R MP units.⁵⁹ Task force coordination was interrupted by non-standard command relationships between subordinate brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters and eventually companies that led to many mission command problems.⁶⁰ Task force 134 had direct oversight of the MP I/R brigades at Camp Bucca where the entire brigade ran I/R operations. Joint task force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO), another ad hoc two-star level command, was created to run the Afghanistan theater-level detention center location in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In establishing JTF-GTMO the USAR MP one-star commands were not initially used and saw limited use as detention operations command units in support of JTF-GTMO.

After the 2008-2012 modularity transformation, the RC was left with two theater level two-star MP commands, the 200th MP command USAR and the 46th MP Command NG; neither command has deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to run theater

detention operations due to Task Force 134 and Task Force GTMO operating in their stead. Soldiers and subordinate units of each may have deployed, yet the commands remained to support steady-state administrative and readiness duties. Despite the usefulness of these commands for peacetime management and preparation of subordinate units for deployment, the trigger point for deployment of these commands is at expected detainee populations of some 80,000 or more.⁶¹

MP I/R brigades are doctrinally capable of managing up to five battalion elements with a total detainee population of 20,000. A theater expecting 40-60,000 detainees could see an ad-hoc task force again versus the deployment of the MP commands. The obvious issue with an ad-hoc versus established approach is a continual reinvention and relearning of the valuable lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom's detainee adjudication processes.⁶² The mass of detainees, which the U.S. forces secured and processed between May of 2003 and June of 2005, overwhelmed the capacity and capability of Army MP and MI units, and future task organization should reflect lessons learned.⁶³

A secondary yet very important issue in I/R management between the task force approach and command approach is logistics. While the task force coordinated and managed detention process and approach as well as specific detainee supplies, the core of logistics for U.S. troops and feeding detainees were processed through the specific units' higher brigade headquarters and the brigades designated supporting elements. Any future task force managed I/R force should meld the elements of command and support to ensure continuity of operation. For units stationed at Camp

Bucca this was not an issue; for units at distant locations, the support/command and control lines led to discord with the task force lines of effort.⁶⁴

Re-designating the two-star MPCs as one-star expeditionary I/R commands (EI/RC) while establishing two additional EI/RCs to conduct division/corps/JTF level I/R management subordinate to the theater protection command is a needed piece of the overall I/R and personnel management process. These one-star commands would manage operations of two to four MP brigades while ensuring integration of adjudication processes were enforced in theater-level orders. These units should contain structured integration cells for: release and review boards, adjudication/case management teams, an interrogation/internment legal team, a point of capture to confinement tracking cell, and point of capture reception cells that are placed forward with special forces units. These commands will provide peacetime command and control of all types of MP units as well as ensuring I/R training processes are linked to up-to-date methods and equipment.⁶⁵

RC Role in Globally Integrated Operations

The future operations of the Joint Force are doctrinally conceived in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) published by the joint chiefs in September of 2012. Integral to the CCJO, the concept of globally integrated operations (GIO) has eight elements of future joint operations: mission command, seizing-retaining-exploiting the initiative, global agility, partnership, flexibility, cross-domain synergy, minimizing unintended consequence, and low signature capabilities.⁶⁶ The RC is an integral part of this concept as it contains many of the force multiplying assets in; projection, sustainment, protection, medical and force generation. The RC is highlighted as providing the depth to the active components (AC) initial response in

many current doctrinal concepts, yet the RC is also recommended as a force of first choice in some future operations and as a cost effective force for sustaining long term operations.⁶⁷

Army doctrine highlights the RC as the first choice force for Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) missions.⁶⁸ Proper management inside a force generation concept will allow a prepared reserve component force to mobilize and deploy for theater security cooperation and shaping operations in equal operational status to active component forces.⁶⁹ Integrating a one-star level protection commands into the division or corps level headquarters will allow tailoring smaller joint task forces to meet mission requirements, fully supporting the GIO concept in the CCJO.

The use of the operational reserve force has also proven less costly than using active component forces in all but armored BCTs.⁷⁰ In addition to this cost saving, structured operational deployments will sustain trained reserve forces at higher readiness levels than stagnant non-deployed sources.⁷¹ Thus, to ensure the U.S. Army maintains its ability to support operational requirements, full operational integration of reserve units along with adjustment of force structure to cost effective forces in each component should be attained. Tailoring of force generation to provide consistent contingency pools on a steady-state is a must to ensure the RC units are prepared to deploy along with active component units.⁷²

Projected RC Force Structure

The USAR, having no BCTs, is a cost effective component providing ready enabling units for operational missions. In the future, though, the USAR can transform its force structure to maximize efficiency and incorporation into globally integrated operations. The following force structure recommendations mitigate the deficiencies

noted in the prior discussion as well as incorporate changes that will allow modularity and tailoring of forces at the JTF and theater levels.

Recommendation One

Creation of TPC will merge the force protection tasks from the multiple branches that conduct individual protection tasks into one entity designed to produce a holistic protection effort. Functioning at the two-star level as a theater command to the MEBs managing JSAs and movement corridors and linking the regional support groups managing bases with air defense and weapon of mass destruction detection and response, the TPC would act as the appointed JSC for the theater. IEDs have also become a proliferated global threat used by insurgents and are a future threat in any hybrid or failed state conflict. Control of the movement corridors is a key aspect that must be achieved to allow freedom of action.

Recommendation Two

Re-designate TECs as TPCs to better use force structure and fully support GIO. The RC engineer commands provides the best force structure fit for managing the protection function and branch functions while creating the least chaos and change for Soldiers, leveraging current basing and retention of experienced staff. The TECs are well established headquarters and adding deputy commanders and small staff sections to run I/R and other functions will cause little impact. This also fits well with recommendation five as the MPCs will be reduced to one-star commands not eliminated.

Recommendation Three

Re-designate the MEB to EPC to eliminate confusion from mission command and task organization processes. The MEB is a one-star brigade headquarters that works in

concert with division and corps while maintaining its own area of operation. This re-designation will make the EPC a deputy commander and staff fill to a division or corps headquarters versus a subordinate BDE, as the TPC and TSC are to a theater army. This also eliminates confusion in joint operations with a marine expeditionary brigade, also a MEB.

Recommendation Four

Increase the number of EPC/MEB from the current three USAR MEB/EPCs to five or link two NG MEB/EPCs to USAR units for an entire force generation cycle. Force generation processes currently call for a 1:4 cycle; thus, five EPC/MEB could cycle through the Army's force generation cycle smoothly. The ability to cycle linked units each year through the same training process allows ease of USAR specific training programs to integrate protection units in the same generation year to train together before available year.

Recommendation Five

Re-designate the 200th MPC USAR and the 46th MPC NG to one-star EI/RCs while creating two additional EI/RCs to provide continuity in task organization and detention support to operations. The creation, training and deployment of EI/RCs will bridge the gap in smaller detention operations, allowing the internment-resettlement commands to fall under the TPC or directly support the theater army. The TPC can manage multiple EI/RCs; thus, the two-star MPCs can be re-designated.

Conclusion

The RC has been designated an operational force fully integrated with the AC with the total army policy. The requirement to maintain capabilities with reductions in force end strength and BCT's capacities begs the questions is the RC structured

appropriately as a force provider? How can the RC ensure timely and capable support to the U.S. Army and the joint force? In answering these questions, the protection joint and Army WfF, the theater army, the MEB and RSG were all discussed, showing a gap in force protection at the theater army level. This gap is the lack of a command element at the theater army conducting mission command in force protection connecting the base camps and movement corridors in support of maneuver units.

Five recommendations were made to cover the gap in protection: create a TPC to enhance force protection, secure maneuver corridors, and enhance basing management; re-designate TECs as TPCs to better use force structure and fully support GIO; re-designate MEBs to EPCs to eliminate confusion in task organization; increase the three USAR MEB/EPCs to five or link two NG MEB/EPCs to USAR units for an entire force generation cycle; re-designate the 200th MPC and the 46th MPC to EI/RC while creating two additional EI/RCs to provide operational support of detention operations and eliminate need for ad-hoc joint task forces. The recommended changes in force structure will produce an integrated command structure able to coordinate and provide force protection and produce readiness during peace time administration and training.

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