

Strategy Research Project

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Vital to Stability of the Middle East

by

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Simon
United States Marine Corps

Under the Direction of:
Professor John F. Troxell



United States Army War College
Class of 2016

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188		
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2016		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Vital to Stability of the Middle East			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Simon United States Marine Corps			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor John F. Troxell			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. Please consider submitting to DTIC for worldwide availability? YES: <input type="checkbox"/> or NO: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (student check one) Project Adviser recommends DTIC submission? YES: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> or NO: <input type="checkbox"/> (PA check one)					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6,500					
14. ABSTRACT Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position. Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs. For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan's influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt. Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States. If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the Levant and potentially the Arabian Peninsula could unravel changing the Sikes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country's economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan's survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS ISIL, IS-Sinai, Economic Sabotage, Military Assistance Program, Eager Lion					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Vital to Stability of the Middle East

(6,500 words)

Abstract

Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position. Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs. For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan's influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt. Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States. If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the Levant and potentially the Arabian Peninsula could unravel changing the Sikes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country's economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan's survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Vital to Stability of the Middle East

Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position.¹ Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs.² For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan's influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt.³ Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States.⁴

Since the 2011 Arab Spring, Jordan's Arab neighbors - in particular Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia - have grown more insular and reluctant to provide economic assistance. Jordan is consequently more reliant on the U.S. and other international donors for economic assistance to support the Kingdom. Last year, the U.S. agreed to provide Jordan with \$1 billion per year for the next 3 years.⁵ This U.S. foreign assistance, promised until 2017, and a \$2 billion loan deal from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are economic lifelines that keep Jordan afloat as the fallout from war goes unabated in the Levant.⁶ If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the region could descend into chaos changing the Sykes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country's economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan's survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.

A Geopolitically Strategic State

The Kingdom of Jordan's continuing role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, and its geopolitical relationship with the U.S. are vital for the advancement of peace in the region. Since the post-World War I Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement, Jordan found itself immersed in the middle of significant regional turmoil: deterring an assertive Israel, and managing the unpredictable behavior of Arab neighbors.⁷ A former UK protectorate dating back to 1921, Jordan has been a progressive and moderate Middle Eastern country since its independence in 1946.⁸ Historically, the Kingdom attempted to maintain its neutrality in Middle Eastern affairs after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, but always found itself caught in regional turmoil.⁹ As a result of its geostrategic position in the Middle East, Jordan plays the great game of political survival among its neighbors.¹⁰

Throughout the 1980's and 90's, Jordan's international relations with its powerful neighbors was characteristic of "bandwagoning", especially with regional powers such as Saddam Hussein's, Iraq.¹¹ King Hussein of Jordan viewed Iraq as a strategic offset to Israeli aggression and expansion in the Middle East.¹² In 1991, when King Hussein failed to support the U.S. led Desert Storm coalition, the U.S. suspended economic aid to Jordan.¹³ The U.S. Congress consequently perceived Jordan as a tacit supporter of Saddam Hussein. In fact, Jordan's lack of support for the Desert Storm coalition was economically motivated, and King Hussein thought it best to remain neutral due to the vital importance Iraq's economy played in maintaining Jordanian livelihood. For years, Iraq provided tremendous economic benefits to Jordan, and in the early twentieth century Iraq was ruled by King Faisal I of the Hashemite tribe. Congress' ethnocentric viewpoint in response to a lack of Jordanian support not only hurt strategic relations with

Jordan, but failed to take into account Jordan's cultural ties with Iraq, and its long term economic interests to ensure survival. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Israel lobbied the U.S. Congress to restart economic assistance to Jordan. From the Israeli perspective, Jordan represented a strategic buffer to a still dangerous Iraq. On the other hand, Jordan perceived Israel as surreptitiously designing plans to create the next Palestinian homeland in Jordan by causing major influxes of West Bank Palestinian refugees. Despite their differences, Jordan and Israel began bilateral talks at the 1991 Madrid Conference which later led to a formal peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In the years following Desert Storm, Saddam's abhorrent behavior caused Jordan to eventually shift towards the U.S. as its strategic partner and protector in the region.¹⁴

Upon the death of King Hussein in 1999, his son Abdullah assumed the throne.¹⁵ Soon after 2 years ruling the country, Abdullah was put to the test following the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. homeland. President George W. Bush's speech on 21 September 2001 highlighted a pivotal moment in U.S. - Jordan relations when the president stated to the world, "You are either with us, or with the terrorists".¹⁶ King Abdullah's strategic choice to support U.S. policies created political fallout for the monarchy due to the unintended consequences of a transformative post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy. With a population that is predominantly Palestinian, including at least two million Palestinian refugees,¹⁷ Jordanian society risks becoming more fundamentally Islamist.¹⁸ The post 9/11 U.S. invasion of Iraq coupled with ongoing U.S. support to Israel fuels anger among a disenfranchised populace that perceives a pro-western agenda as a threat.¹⁹ King Abdullah therefore assumes high political risk by supporting U.S. policies.

At present, Jordan cooperates with the U.S. on a variety of issues ranging from counterterrorism to Israel-Palestinian conflict mitigation.²⁰ Jordan is an active participant in the counter Islamic State (ISIL) coalition by contributing to Operation Inherent Resolve - more so than any other Arab coalition member. Due to the implosion of Syria and Iraq, continued unrest in Egypt, and a Saudi Arabia distracted by the Houthi insurgency in Yemen, Jordan is under tremendous pressure to protect its sovereignty. ISIL and other Islamic totalitarian groups pose significant national security challenges for King Abdullah.²¹

A diverse country that borders Israel, the Palestinian West Bank, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Jordan is naturally situated to physically block the spread of ISIL, and Islamic State - Saini (Egypt) from spreading further.²² Yet, this geographic arrangement puts Jordan under tremendous stress along its northeastern frontier with Iraq and Syria. Most of the border crossing sites with Iraq and Syria for trade and



Figure 1. CIA Map of Jordan²³

commerce are closed due to conflict.²⁴ The economic impacts of regional war are proving difficult for Jordan and it is estimated that the country is losing tens of millions of dollars monthly.²⁵ Some goods are arriving in the southern port of Aqaba, Jordan, the Kingdom's only access to the sea. All of the major overland routes with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Israel are closed, and border crossings with Israel and Saudi Arabia close occasionally for political or security reasons.

Complicating matters further, Jordan is a resource scarce country with minimal oil, natural gas, minerals, and especially water.²⁶ Most of the underground aquifers in the Amman - Zarqa basin are drained placing the Azraq oasis in jeopardy.²⁷ This is significant because Amman's population has tripled in size since the 1980's, and Amman is now larger in geographic size than Los Angeles, CA.²⁸ By 2025, urbanization pressures will drive Amman's population beyond 6.5 million people.²⁹




Figure 2. Urban Population Growth Amman, Jordan; Azraq Oasis also Depicted³⁰

Subsequently, the threat of conflict over water rights and natural resources with Jordan's neighbors is a growing national security concern. Israel's acquisition of water resources in Syria's Golan Heights during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war is one of the underlying reasons Israel went to war, and serves as an example of this growing reality.³¹ Over 55% of Israel's total water, and water that enters the Jordan River originates from the Golan highlands.³²

Major destabilizing factors impacting Jordanian national security are the current fight over regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the present day Israeli-Palestinian conflict.³³ The Mesopotamian cradle of civilization where the Persian and Arab empires fought for more than twelve centuries is once again center stage in the twenty-first century. In its modern day context, the Iranian - Saudi rift is a regional feud that stems from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the projection of power and influence by the Ayatollah Khomeini across the Middle East. This sparked an ideological-religious struggle between Saudi Arabia, the leader of Sunni Islam, and Iran, the leader of Shi'a Islam.³⁴ Since the revolution, concerted efforts by Iran to impose Shiite interests upon a Sunni dominated Middle East through Shiite proxy groups like Hezbollah spawned sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites.³⁵ Iraq and Syria represent the latest battlegrounds over the Sunni - Shia divide. Iran's overt economic and military support to fellow Shiite, Syrian dictator Bashar Assad,³⁶ and Iran's military activities in support of the Shia dominated Iraqi government are illustrative of the current Ayatollah's (Ali Khamenei) interests in the Middle East. Thus, these conflict areas are breeding grounds for Sunni extremism to counter Iranian influence resulting in a mosaic of terrorism, insurgency and the emergence of Islamic totalitarian groups such as Al

Nusra Front (Al Qaida affiliate located in Syria) and ISIL.³⁷ The influx of foreign fighters in the Syria conflict, further exacerbates violence in the region. By 2015, an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters illegally crossed into Syria,³⁸ and an estimated 1500 Jordanians entered Syria to join various extremist groups.³⁹

If unabated, the severity of the Levant conflict will lead to widespread humanitarian strife, the weakening of the U.S.'s regional partners, and will have far-reaching security implications for the U.S. homeland. The conflict has already surpassed foreign fighter numbers from the Soviet Afghan War.⁴⁰ Since 2011, the crisis has slowly metastasized into other countries of the Middle East, North Africa, and Southwest Asia, extending into parts of Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Until Iranian encroachment and the Israeli-Palestinian issues are resolved, Jordan will remain increasingly under stress and prone to conflict. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the international community to support the Kingdom of Jordan because its demise will have cascading effects across the region. The key to ensuring Jordanian resilience, and preventing the Kingdom from becoming a weak and failing state is to bolster its economy and military. Despite substantial U.S. assistance to Jordan, the growing internal threat from disaffected youth and their gravitation towards ISIL may destabilize Jordan if societal conditions worsen.

Jordan's Economic Condition as an Internal Threat

In the face of continued regional turmoil, bolstering Jordan's economy to sustain the monarchy and promote social well-being will mitigate socioeconomic unrest.⁴¹ Economic support to Jordan via Middle East allies and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries dwindled after the 2011 Arab Spring. The fallout from the Levant conflict is

damaging commerce and trade, tourism, and overall investor confidence in Jordan.⁴² In 2015, Jordan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate dropped to 2.5% due to the fall in crude oil prices.⁴³ The drop in oil prices is creating a regional economic downturn, and will affect how much Gulf nations donate to Jordan in 2016. Saudi Arabia has already announced cuts to its social welfare programs because of falling oil prices.⁴⁴ Tourism has accounted for 12.5%⁴⁵ of Jordan's \$35 billion GDP,⁴⁶ and was down by 40% in the first half of 2015 due to regional turmoil.⁴⁷ Based on analysis of these figures, the estimated economic losses in the tourism industry cost Jordan nearly \$2.5 billion in 2015.

One of the major impacts upon the Jordanian economy is the growing refugee populace from the civil war in Syria. This past year, the energy and medical sectors struggled to meet the demands of over 600,000 registered refugees residing in Jordan.⁴⁸ Undocumented immigrants (non-refugee status) from throughout the region accounted for nearly double this amount, and these numbers certainly increased over the past year.⁴⁹ The mass migration of West Bank Palestinian refugees into Jordan has been a major national security concern for the King since 1967 because it forms the basis of opposition against the Hashemite tribe and the monarchy.⁵⁰ Without continued U.S. and IMF support to absorb the economic burden from a growing refugee populace, socioeconomic conditions will worsen in Jordan. Currently, the overall unemployment rate is about 12.5%,⁵¹ but what is hidden within this percentage is a 32% unemployment rate of young adults between the ages of 15-19 and 20-24 years old.⁵² This represents a vulnerable portion of Jordanian society susceptible to recruitment by Islamic totalitarian groups due to poor socioeconomic conditions.⁵³ On a positive note, the

overall 15-24 year old demographic represents about 20% of the total population.⁵⁴ This is a good indicator of social stability because countries normally face instability with a youth bulge of 35% or higher.⁵⁵ The influx of refugees will skew the youth bulge percentage even higher in years to come. On the other hand, the economic plight of Jordanian youth remains a security concern because the high percentage of young unemployed males are vulnerable to exploitation by fundamental Islamists who are growing more affiliated with ISIL.⁵⁶ Thus, Jordan's socioeconomic condition places the monarchy at risk to emerging internal threats.

For the 15 years of King Abdullah's reign, the country's dependence on foreign sources of economic support has not been a promising economic indicator.⁵⁷ Jordan is seen as a rentier state because of its overreliance on foreign financial support.⁵⁸ One of the major ways that the U.S. is trying to transform Jordan from its rentier status towards a sustainable economy is through a diversified energy strategy. Jordan is over reliant in the consumption of foreign energy imports; 96% of its energy resources are imported from the region.⁵⁹ This economically unsustainable strategy could eventually trigger socioeconomic unrest in Jordan.⁶⁰ Additionally, the ISIL insurgency in Iraq and Syria is weakening Jordan's ability to secure its national interests regionally. The destruction of key energy infrastructure in the region coupled with border closures is affecting major lines of communication to Jordan. Filling the void are Bedouin smuggling routes along the Darb al-Sultana that don't necessarily stop at international borders.⁶¹ These ancient smuggling routes enable a shadow economy to flourish and meet popular demands while major energy development projects are slow to take root.⁶²

Until 2012, Jordan imported up to 80% of its energy needs from Egypt through the trans-regional Arab gas pipeline.⁶³ However, with instability in Egypt and the destruction of major oil infrastructure on the Sinai, both Jordan and Israel can no longer rely on cheap Egyptian oil and natural gas exports.⁶⁴ In 2010, Israel commenced offshore oil and gas exploration in the Levant Basin and discovered the Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea.⁶⁵ These fields can provide up to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to meet Jordanian domestic demand until 2050.⁶⁶ In an effort to replace the lack of Egyptian output, Jordan is on the verge of signing a \$15 billion deal to import Israeli natural gas from the Leviathan field for the next 15 years.⁶⁷ The negotiations are being conducted quietly between Israel, the U.S. State Department, and Jordan.⁶⁸ Citing concerns over political backlash from its 60% Palestinian citizenry, the Jordanian government is reluctant to commit to the Israeli natural gas deal.⁶⁹ If Jordan does not sign the pragmatic \$15 billion deal with Israel, it



Figure 3. Levant Basin; Darb al-Sultana Depicted ⁷⁰

could side track the country's near term energy needs and add to the growing problem of fuel shortages and smuggling from nearby oil rich countries.⁷¹

In an effort to reduce foreign energy dependence, the Jordanian government is implementing wind and solar energy programs. Jordan has set a target of 1,800MW, or 10% of the country's energy supply to come from renewable energy sources by 2020.⁷² The strategy calls for 600MW to be provided by solar power.⁷³ Jordan lies within the world's solar belt and the restive city of Ma'an is strategically nestled in the sunniest area of the country. Ma'an is an area where illicit activities and organized crime flourish, but the city could yield legitimate financial benefits if energy development programs take root.⁷⁴ Subsequently, an increase in government presence in Ma'an to establish a more secure environment for solar development initiatives could cause a backlash with residents of Ma'an. Organized crime syndicates, smugglers, and anti-monarchy sympathizers could fear a government crackdown will disrupt cash flow from their illicit activities.⁷⁵ To avoid further exacerbating the situation, international corporations and government controlled companies developing areas of Ma'an must permit locals to participate and reap economic benefits from these projects. The situation in Ma'an will not ameliorate unless the Jordanian government adopts a carrot and stick approach, and cracks down on organized crime along with financial incentives for tribes that allow legitimate energy development.

With nearly one-third of Jordan's populace living below the poverty line,⁷⁶ cheaper fuel and other commodities are required to support Jordanians in poorer areas of the country. Illicit oil bunkering activities along the southern Jordanian border with Saudi Arabia are prominent where governmental services are either costly or limited. In

the quaint southern port city of Aqaba, Jordan, the trading and utilization of illegally smuggled gasoline is an important source of subsistence and economic benefit for many people.⁷⁷ In Aqaba, it is possible to buy petrol from Hafayer owners and fuel smugglers at up to 40% less than the commercial price.⁷⁸ The increase in smuggling indicates that the government either lacks the capacity to control it, or turns a blind eye in an effort to placate those living below the poverty line. Informal economies can create tremendous job growth and opportunity, but the government loses its ability to tax and provide adequate social benefits to the populace.⁷⁹ Informal banking networks are also common in the region. The hawala system which originated in South Asia provides an economic lifeline for people in developing countries through remittances.⁸⁰ Money transferred through the hawala system ranges from \$100 - 300 billion annually, with \$35 billion in the Middle East alone.⁸¹ It is estimated that in developing countries, illicit economies represent on average 15% of the GDP.⁸²

In the long run, legitimate and affordable energy independence is vital to the stability of the Kingdom, and could also enable greater regional stability. The clear path for Jordan to meet its near term energy security needs is to agree to an energy sharing deal with Israel, and provide incentives to its own populace such as tax and subsidy programs to promote energy development.⁸³ If brokered, a future energy deal with Israel could potentially renew economic and political cooperation between Israel and other eastern Mediterranean countries, thereby reducing economic stress and conflict. More importantly, the deal could bolster Jordan's economy in a region that is growing more unstable. Diversified and sustainable energy programs is just one way in which the U.S. and international partners are assisting Jordan in transforming their economy.

Other ways the U.S. and Jordan are working together to transform Jordan's rentier status include shifting from foreign aid to promoting regional and international trade through diversified investments in the private economic sector.⁸⁴ In 1999, Jordan established an association agreement with the European Union, and entered the World Trade organization as a member nation.⁸⁵ A special economic zone at the Port of Aqaba was established in 2001 along with a very important U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which established Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs). These geographic areas were established by the U.S. Congress as part of the FTA and are designed to promote Arab-Israeli peace and economic prosperity between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Gaza, and the West Bank. In 2010, the U.S. FTA was fully implemented with Jordan.⁸⁶ Jordan also established FTA's with Singapore (2005), Canada (2010), and Turkey (2011).⁸⁷

Additionally, a fully funded U.S. governmental agency called the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) established in 2004 under the George W. Bush administration, helps developing nations (including Jordan) with long-term development and economic growth.⁸⁸ The MCC was established out of frustration over corrupt practices and democracy deficits by foreign governments that received direct U.S. financial support.⁸⁹ The unique nature of the MCC places eligible countries "under the microscope" through a bidding process that evaluates the level of transparency, free market economy, and willingness of foreign governments to adopt democratic reforms.⁹⁰ Developing countries that demonstrate proven performance in these areas are eligible for MCC funds.⁹¹ MCC funds are highly sought after by eligible countries because the aid permits countries to invest in areas of their own national interest.⁹² In 2006, Jordan signed a threshold grant for \$25 million to improve democracy deficits and transparency

within the government.⁹³ Jordan was also granted a full MCC compact in 2010 totaling \$275 million to help the Jordanian government solve water scarcity problems, and improve water management.⁹⁴ Transforming Jordan's economy from its rentier status will take years, and an enduring partnership with the U.S. is vital in keeping Jordan on a positive trajectory. Overall, the U.S. economic strategy in Jordan is critical to ensuring Jordan maintains its resiliency in an increasingly destabilized region.

The U.S. and Jordan Security Relationship

Complementing these economic reforms and programs is the U.S. and Jordanian security relationship. For both countries, military cooperation is key to the effective prosecution of the war against ISIL, and demonstrates strategic resolve and deterrence to emerging threats to Jordan. The Obama administration's indirect approach of working through regional allies and partners,⁹⁵ the push to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. political dealings with Iran, have affected relations with regional monarchs and Israel. Furthermore, the complicated dynamics of the 2011 Arab Spring coupled with the rise of the Islamists in the region has resulted in unprecedented political challenges and few opportunities likely to result in positive outcomes.

Transformational opportunities were seized upon in countries such as Libya where Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown by the U.S. supported NATO operation Odyssey Dawn. In other areas of the Middle East and North Africa, however, the U.S. decision to tolerate Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, confused Middle East monarchs. The uprisings in Egypt and the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak by the Muslim Brotherhood serves as an awkward example of the challenges the U.S. faces in promoting democratic principles, without being perceived as disloyal towards long standing allies. Furthermore, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 followed by the

opening of negotiations with Iran has left Middle Eastern allies (including Israel) feeling abandoned by the U.S. brokered P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action framework. The outcome of these events spawned Sunni collectivism between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, a majority of the Gulf countries, and Turkey to counter Iranian encroachment upon the Middle East. Turkish involvement in a predominantly Arab pact is significant as it represents a major shift in Arab – Turkish relations not seen since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War I. Jordan’s role as part of this Arab collectivism is unclear especially with Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic initiative to establish a joint Arab military force via the Arab League.⁹⁶ The concept behind the joint Arab force is “to intervene in Middle East conflict zones,”⁹⁷ and is similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s, Peninsular Shield Force. As of late 2015, the Arab League has not voted on the establishment of the force because countries can’t agree on operational matters.⁹⁸ With Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in turmoil and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in countering Iranian influence in Yemen, King Abdullah’s strategic decision to fully come under the umbrella of U.S. support is to ensure Jordan’s stability and long-term survival.

Analysis of funding lines and authorities in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reveals that the U.S. military supports Jordan along several tracks: security cooperation, security assistance, and counterterrorism. In 2012, Jordan spent 4.65% of its GDP on defense,⁹⁹ yet in 2014, its defense spending was reduced to 3.5% of GDP.¹⁰⁰ This reduction was largely due to an influx of direct foreign assistance from the U.S. Congress. To protect its northeastern frontier with Iraq and Syria, Jordan has increased its border forces with U.S. economic and military assistance through the U.S. Embassy totaling \$1 billion in 2015.¹⁰¹ The U.S. State Department and Defense

Department provide assistance through the 1206 Build Partner Capacity Fund, Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, and Defense Department Operations and Maintenance Funds.¹⁰² Additionally, the 2016 NDAA permits the U.S. military in conjunction with the State Department to support defense programs in Jordan to the sum of an estimated \$700 million.¹⁰³ In 2015, Congressional authorizations along the security assistance track included roughly \$77 million in counterterrorism funds, and \$18 million in 1206 funds. These programs are meant to bolster U.S. - Jordanian border security initiatives to prevent ISIL expansion and adequately contain the threat. But the U.S. - Jordanian security relationship must develop a more balanced approach that manages internal defense with border security to mitigate a looming and dangerous “Trojan Horse” scenario by extremist groups within Jordan.

At the heart of this scenario is the desire of the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and Egypt (Sinai) to merge with a mosaic of other fundamental Islamists who seek to adhere to strict interpretation of Islam, and instill this form of Islam through force.¹⁰⁴ Hypothetically, fundamentalists in Egypt, the West Bank, and in refugee camps within Jordan could unite with ISIL sympathizers in the Jordanian cities of Rusaiyfa, Ma’an, and Zarqa. These cities have historical ties to Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqa is the birthplace of founding AQI member Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.¹⁰⁵ For this plausible and dangerous scenario to play out, several conditions must exist outside Jordan: (1) Damascus falls and Assad is replaced with an Islamist totalitarian leader,¹⁰⁶ (2) Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood unites with Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (both organizations are now outlawed by Egypt and Jordan),¹⁰⁷ and (3) a near simultaneous political-military upheaval in the West Bank and Gaza elicits a major Israeli military

response. This worst case scenario would likely set the conditions for violent extremists within Jordan to mobilize against the monarchy while Israeli operations trigger mass migrations of West Bank Palestinians inundating Jordan security forces. The most important event – the downfall of Bashar Assad – would cause a series of cascading events that destabilizes Jordan. Such a result would be similar to the situation in Libya following the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi.¹⁰⁸ Libya became lawless, multiple tribal factions split the country into thirds, and the Islamic State gained a foothold causing violence to spill over into neighboring countries. A Syria without a central governing authority could have similar consequences for Jordan.¹⁰⁹

The overall objective of ISIL's strategy is to isolate the various tribes loyal to the Hashemites, overwhelm Jordanian government capacity, and turn the conflict into an ideological and sectarian fight. To exacerbate instability, ISIL would likely target existing refugee camps within Jordan to spread panic and displace the Syrian refugees. One of the most effective ways for this ISIL mosaic to cripple the Jordanian government is through asymmetric warfare similar to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front's (FMLN) methods during the 1980's communist insurgency in El Salvador. The FMLN understood that the survival of the Salvadorian government was overly reliant on U.S. economic and security assistance. Therefore, as part of its strategy, FMLN leaders wanted to make the economic costs of war unsustainable for the U.S. and El Salvador governments. The FMLN attacked the country's infrastructure through economic sabotage, "bled out" the nation's economy, and destroyed the public's confidence in the government. Such a strategy constrained the Salvadoran Army in a resource intensive defensive posture to secure vital infrastructure.¹¹⁰ This strategy is relevant to ISIL

because it cannot defeat the combined U.S. - Jordanian militaries, however, attacking the economic underpinnings of the relationship could have dire consequences for Jordan.

As part of ISIL's economic sabotage strategy in Jordan, the targeting of key infrastructure would include major roads, highways, bridges, telecommunications, the energy sector, and cultural tourism sites. The Islamic State Sinai's targeting of natural gas pipelines in Egypt serves as a model for large-scale sabotage of critical infrastructure that could bring Jordan to its knees. In 2012, Egyptian natural gas accounted for 80% of electrical production in Jordan.¹¹¹ As a result of attacks against the Egypt-Jordan pipeline and the disruption of natural gas flows, the cost to the Jordanian government averaged \$3-5 million per day. Jordanian budget deficits since the disruption are estimated at \$6 billion¹¹² because the country shifted to more expensive heavier fuels.¹¹³ To offset economic losses, Jordan secured a \$2 billion loan from the IMF and increased taxes to reduce the deficit.¹¹⁴

The modern day international economic trade system is founded on globalization.¹¹⁵ Consequently, terrorist organizations are increasingly attacking critical infrastructure and economic sources of power to inflict damage, and influence political outcomes with nation states.¹¹⁶ Al Qaida's strikes on the World Trade Center in 1993, and then later in 2011 highlight this growing trend. In 2014, the global economic impacts of terrorism cost \$52.9 billion.¹¹⁷ With the latest U.S. efforts to help Jordan transform towards a more globalized economy, attacks against the QIZs in Jordan cannot be discounted and could worsen Jordan's socioeconomic condition.

To counter this highly dangerous scenario, the U.S. and Jordan must implement a 4-part bilateral defense program. First, the U.S. and Jordan must agree to a comprehensive Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program and the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to guard against internal threats to the monarchy. The JSOTF would operate under Operation Inherent Resolve authorities and work in concert with the U.S. Embassy to support Jordan against “lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to internal security.”¹¹⁸ A close example of how to conduct FID in Jordan is the 13 year success of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. The apparent dissimilarities of Jordan and the Philippines disguise what are in fact strong parallels. Similar geopolitical circumstances exist in Jordan as in the Philippines regarding political sensitivities of U.S. troops operating within its sovereign borders, both countries have geographically remote areas (archipelago/desert) that inhibit governance and rule of law, and both countries are dealing with internal threats such as violent Islamic extremist groups.

Second, investing in security assistance programs, such as developing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and fixed wing aviation that best supports counterinsurgency operations, will help maintain territorial protection against insurgents. Aircraft with long loiter times, low maintenance costs, and other sustainable low-tech but effective defense programs must take precedence over high tech, high maintenance, money making programs. The selling of F-16 multi role fighters, and air-to-air missiles to Jordan by the U.S., although lucrative for the military industrial complex, does little to address the irregular warfare challenges posed by ISIL.¹¹⁹ Accordingly, the U.S. strategy should also build sustainable small unit level

capacity such as a small arms and crew-served weapons maintenance and repair programs for the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). Other military investments required to support Jordan against ISIL is interoperable Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C4I) platforms. Better surveillance capabilities and intelligence sharing authorities will enable the U.S. and the JAF to counter the growing asymmetric threats in the region. If militants adopt an economic sabotage strategy to weaken the monarchy, Jordan's critical infrastructure will require protection. The best way to counter these threats is to physically secure the most vital infrastructure, and to rely on Joint U.S. - Jordanian FID activities that are supported through capable ISR, and C4I networks. The U.S. will have to consider increases in direct foreign aid to Jordan to offset an economic sabotage strategy by ISIL.

Third, along the security cooperation pillar, the U.S. military must continue to assist the JAF through security cooperation programs and events. The Military Assistance Program, a bilateral program heavily supported by the U.S. Marine Corps,¹²⁰ is designed to help Jordan defend its borders from infiltration and promote interoperability with U.S. forces.¹²¹ Major bilateral exercises such as the U.S. – Jordanian Exercise “Eager Lion” should be revamped from an outdated, largely conventional force exercise that focuses on defending Jordan from external nation state aggression. Future exercises must focus more on internal defense, and on development that assists Jordan in formulating its own Internal Defense and Development Plan, as well as supporting border protection initiatives. As part of the exercise, the U.S. and Jordan could explore the establishment of “buffer zones” in training scenarios along its northern and eastern borders with Syria and Iraq. The bilateral U.S.-Philippines

exercise “Balikatan” is a good example of how Special Operations Forces under the auspices of a routine bilateral military exercise can simultaneously assist the host nation government with overt FID activities. U.S. supported and JAF led military civic action programs that promote economic development, rule of law, and social well-being of Jordanians, is a way to operationalize future Eager Lion exercises.¹²²

Finally, the creation of a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) that ties in U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military capabilities along with coalition partners is required in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). A CJIATF with specific legal authorities under Operation Inherent Resolve designed to counter foreign fighter infiltrations, curtail illegal drugs, reduce weapons and oil smuggling used to finance war, is an important step for U.S. strategy in the region. The CJIATF would not replace the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – Operation Inherent Resolve. Rather, it would complement the CJTF and focus across the entire CENTCOM AOR to include geographic seams with other Combatant Commands.

The JSOTF in Jordan would play a significant part in supporting the CJIATF’s larger role to protect the U.S. homeland against asymmetric attacks by ISIL or Al Qaida. Al Nusra Front and the Khorasan Group (Al Qaida affiliates in Syria) are significant threats to the U.S. homeland, and the ungoverned spaces in Syria are allowing these groups to plan and potentially export terrorism outside of Syria. As stated in the U.S. National Military Strategy, the defense of the homeland by countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the highest U.S. national security interests in the twenty-first century.¹²³ The Syrian regime’s chemical weapons program and the use of chemical weapons against its citizens in 2013 was a “red line” that was crossed with

little consequence for the regime.¹²⁴ In spite of the last minute political agreement between the U.S. and Russia for Syria to handover chemical stockpiles averting a U.S. strike, the accountability of these weapons is highly suspect. Some weapons stockpiles may still exist with the regime,¹²⁵ or could be sold on the black market.¹²⁶ Additionally, the proliferation of man portable air defense systems and other weapons stockpiles from Gaddafi's regime and the ongoing fighting in Libya by ISIL affiliated groups could haunt the U.S. and Europe in the not too distant future. With the recent standing-up of Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism coalition of 34 Sunni nations, the co-location of the CJIATF at the counterterrorism coalition's Riyadh headquarters could prove fruitful.¹²⁷

Concluding Thoughts and Way Ahead

The post-World War I Balfour Declaration and Sykes-Picot borders that created Israel, Palestine, and the greater Middle East, could change forever due to the continued reverberations of the 2011 Arab Spring. Jordan's precarious geographic position has caused the country to become drawn into nearly every major conflict in the modern day Middle East. Typically, Jordan's role has been one of consequence manager and negotiator in dealing with its Middle Eastern neighbors. With no end in sight to the civil war in Syria, the Kingdom of Jordan is under tremendous pressure. At the micro level, internal threats from Islamic totalitarian groups¹²⁸ coupled with economic stressors on Jordanian society from a rising refugee population could pose a serious threat to the monarchy. Since the rise of ISIL in 2014, Jordan may have the legal right to defend its territory by occupying buffer zones in Iraq and Syria to protect its sovereignty. The potential occupation of buffer zones within Iraq and Syria are controversial, but the Turkish military has informally implemented these zones through episodic military deployments in northern Syria and Iraq to undermine Kurdish

statehood.¹²⁹ Moreover, the strategically important Golan Heights and its water resources could become a future flashpoint in the event the Assad regime is overthrown, or if water sources in the Levant grow even more scarce.

A strong economy is vital to counterbalance the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, and a way to mitigate rising internal threats to the Kingdom. Creative work programs that permit refugees to assimilate and become productive members of Jordanian society will help Jordan overcome the challenges of absorbing over 600,000 refugees.¹³⁰ Such programs will mitigate problems of disaffected youth joining militant groups. Sustainable long term renewable energy initiatives in Jordan will also help alleviate the country's economic woes. The future of Jordan's energy sharing deal over natural gas importation with Israel remains tenuous due to anti-Israeli sentiments among the Palestinians that reside in Jordan. In light of the security situation in the region, Israel is realistically the only reliable partner for Jordan's near term energy security needs.

Lastly, a potential sequel to the fall of Damascus is the linking of ISIL with other regional Islamic fundamentalists and Islamic State sympathizers inside Jordan. Of the 1,500 Jordanians that are fighting in Syria, at least one third of these fighters originate from Zarqa, Jordan.¹³¹ Someday, these fighters will return to their homeland and sow the seeds of discontent against the monarchy. These fighters could mobilize against the monarchy and attack the cooperative U.S. - Jordanian economic strategy similar in ways to the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador. If ignored, these groups could gravely damage the economy, the military, and psychologically affect the populace's perceptions of the King's legitimacy.¹³² By devising ways to protect Jordan's critical

infrastructure, the Kingdom can reduce the potential for economic collapse of the state. The U.S. strategy must therefore enable Jordan to develop a national campaign plan for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) to offset internal threats and ISIL expansion. If the security situation worsens, a JSOTF with authorities to “combat advise” along the borders and assist the JAF’s implementation of the IDAD will help bolster the overall security situation. Complementing these foreign internal defense initiatives is the continued security cooperation through the U.S. Embassy’s Military Assistance Program tailored to counter internal threats and maintain border protection.¹³³ The standing up of a CJIATF to coordinate U.S. interagency efforts across geographic seams between other Combatant Commands involved in Operation Inherent Resolve is also critical to the overall success of the counter ISIL strategy. Establishing the CJIATF in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is a political opportunity for the U.S. to make significant progress as a member of the newly emerging counterterrorism coalition, and stem the foreign fighter flow in the region. Programs leveraging the intergovernmental community in deradicalizing foreign fighters are also key components of the coalition’s strategy.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II sums up the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for a region undergoing transformational changes. In a 2004 speech at Georgetown University, the King stated, “The Arab world is writing a new future; the pen is in our own hands. But we need and welcome the support of friends throughout the world.”¹³⁴ For the foreseeable future, the U.S. - Jordanian relationship must be reinforced to endure the current challenges, yet seek opportunities to forge a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Endnotes

¹ Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, *Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1.

² *Ibid.*, 2.

³ Asher Sussner, *Jordan Case Study of a Pivotal State*, Policy Papers no.53 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 37.

⁴ International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, "Jordan, General Government Gross Debt," October 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2001&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=439&s=GGXWDG&grp=0&a=&pr1.x=45&pr1.y=17> (accessed December 20, 2015).

⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 2, 2014), 14, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/234976.pdf> (accessed November 2, 2015). The loan is nonbinding memorandum of understanding with the Jordanian government.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Sussner, *Jordan Case Study*, xii.

⁸ Terrill, *Jordanian National Security*, 5.

⁹ Sussner, *Jordan Case Study*, 93

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, xii.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 109, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887109000045 (accessed November 4, 2015).

¹² Sussner, *Jordan Case Study*, 49.

¹³ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, 2.

¹⁴ Sussner, *Jordan Case Study*, 5, 53, 69, 71, 75, 76, 84, 93.

¹⁵ Terrill, *Jordanian National Security*, 7.

¹⁶ "Transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night," *CNN*, September 20, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (accessed December 20, 2015).

¹⁷ CIA World Factbook, "Jordan," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html> (accessed January 30, 2016). Population numbers are estimated on 2014 figures.

¹⁸ Mona Alami, "Jordan's Salafists Switch Allegiance to IS," *Al Monitor*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/jordan-amman-is-nusra-militants-salafi-jihadists.html#> (accessed April 29, 2015).

¹⁹ Shibley Telhami, "How to Not Spread Democracy," September 17, 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/09/middleeast-telhami> (accessed March 10, 2016).

²⁰ Dr, Nader Inrahim M. Bani Nasur, "Jordan-United States Relations during the Reign of King Abdullah II (1999-2013)," *The International Institute for Science, Technology and Education* 4, no. 26 (2014): <http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/view/17646> (accessed November 14, 2015).

²¹ Dr. Douglas Streusand and LTC Harry D. Tunnel IV, "Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism," *Small Wars Journal*, May 23, 2006, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/nducsc1.pdf> (accessed May 20, 2016).

²² Terrill, *Jordanian National Security*, 1.

²³ CIA Map Library, "Jordan Map," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/Jordan.html> (accessed February 20, 2016).

²⁴ Karin Laub and Mohammed Daraghme, "Jordan's Overland Trade Paralyzed by Iraq, Syria Border Woes," *Alarabiya*, April 30, 2015, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/04/30/Jordan-s-overland-trade-paralyzed-by-Iraq-Syria-border-woes.html> (accessed May 1, 2015).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Terrill, *Jordanian National Security*, 2.

²⁷ The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Geography and Environment," http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/geo_env3.html (accessed December 22, 2015).

²⁸ "Urbanization and Environmental Change in Jordan," *Sustainable Jordan*, blog entry posted September 18, 2012, <https://bwardam.wordpress.com/2012/09/18/urbanization-and-environmental-change-in-jordan/> (accessed February 20, 2016).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Myriam Ababsa, *Atlas of Jordan* (Open Edition Books, June 2014). <http://books.openedition.org/ifpo/4560> (accessed February 20, 2016). 1979 and 2004 population maps. Maps were modified to include the annotation of Amman Jordan and the Azraq Oasis.

³¹ Lilach Grunfeld, "Jordan River Dispute," *The Inventory of Conflict & Environment (ICE), Case Studies*, no.6 (Spring 1997): <http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/jordan.htm> (accessed February 20, 2016).

³² David Eshel, "Syria's Price Tag: Israel's Water Resources," 2007, <http://defense-update.com/newscast/1206/analysis/analysis-291206.htm> (accessed December 22, 2015).

³³ COL Ahmed Elersaway, Seminar Discussion, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, January 7, 2016.

³⁴ Daniel Benjamin, "Iraq's Problem Is Power Politics, Not 'Ancient Hatreds', Today's Sunni-Shiite Rifts Stem from Years of Jostling by Modern States—Above All, Iran and Saudi Arabia," *Wall Street Journal Online*, June 27, 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqs-problem-is-power-politics-not-ancient-hatreds-1403888860> (accessed December 22, 2015).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Sam Dagher, "Syria's Alawites: The People behind Assad," *Wall Street Journal Online*, June 25, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-alawites-the-people-behind-assad-1435166941?cb=logged0.4533422685112743> (accessed March 19, 2016). "Mainstream Sunni Muslims have long regarded Alawites as adherents of an obscure, even heretical cult. Alawites believe that Imam Ali—a cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and a figure also revered by Shiites—was an incarnation of God, who revealed himself in six other people before Ali's seventh-century caliphate."

³⁷ Streusand and Tunnel, "Choosing Words," 6.

³⁸ "20,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Syria, Iraq to Join Terrorists," *CBS News*, February 2015, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-20000-foreign-fighters-flock-to-syria-iraq-to-join-terrorists/> (accessed December 22, 2015).

³⁹ Peter R. Neumann, "Western Foreign Fighters in Syria," *The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence*, January 26, 2015, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/> (accessed December 23, 2015).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Cole and Hsu, *Guiding Principles For Stabilization And Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 2-8, 2-9.

⁴² International Monetary Fund, "IMF Staff Statement at the End of a Mission to Jordan," November 18, 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15527.htm> (accessed December 23, 2015).

⁴³ The World Bank, "Jordan Overview," September 29, 2015, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview> (accessed December 23, 2015).

⁴⁴ Kate Drew, "Saudi Arabia's Big Welfare Spending Faces the Oil Abyss," *CNBC*, December 3, 2015, <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/03/biggest-cash-issue-for-saudi-arabia-goes-beyond-oil.html> (accessed December 23, 2015).

⁴⁵ Andrea Borgarello, "Stunning Sights, Wild Experiences: Nature-Based Tourism A Boon for Emerging Economies," December 7, 2015, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan> (accessed December 23, 2015).

⁴⁶ Areej Abuqudairi, "Jordan's ISIL Campaign Scares Away Tourists," *Al Jazeera News*, June 21, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/jordan-isil-campaign-scares-tourists-150614071545151.html> (accessed December 24, 2015).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Jordan, *Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2013-17* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2015), 2.

⁴⁹ Ian Black, "Patience Running Out in Jordan after Influx of Syrian Refugees," *The Guardian*, December 1, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/01/jordan-syrian-refugees-patience-running-out> (accessed December 24, 2015).

⁵⁰ Sussner, *Jordan Case Study*, 71.

⁵¹ The World Bank, "Jordan Economic Monitor, Fall 2015: A Hiccup Amidst Sustained Resilience and Committed Reforms," <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/jordan-economic-monitor-fall-2015-a-hiccup-amidst-sustained-resilience-and-committed-reforms> (accessed December 26, 2015).

⁵² Jordan, *Country Development*, 2.

⁵³ Streusand and Tunnel, "Choosing Words," 6.

⁵⁴ CIA World Factbook "Jordan Population," July 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html> (accessed March 25, 2016).

⁵⁵ Therese F. Azeng and Thierry U. Yogo, "Youth Unemployment and Political Instability in Selected Developing Countries," May 2013, 3, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_171_-_Youth_Unemployment_and_Political_Instability_in_Selected_Developing_Countries.pdf (accessed May 20, 2016).

⁵⁶ Aida Alami, "Sympathy for ISIL Runs High in Jordan's Restive Maan," *Al Jazeera*, November 4, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/sympathy-isil-runs-high-jordan-restive-maan-151104055011196.html> (accessed December 26, 2015).

⁵⁷ Nadim Zaqqā, *Economic Development and Export of Human Capital. A Contradiction?* (Kassel, Germany: Kassel University Press 2006), 96.

⁵⁸ Ellen Lust, *The Middle East*, 13th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014), 576. Rentier states are solely reliant on external sources of income. Rentier states typically derive rents from exports of their natural resources. An example of this is the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) exclusive rights for exploitation of Saudi oil. The Saudi economy is built on the oil industry and money generated by ARAMCO goes directly into the State's coffers. Rentier states may generate rents externally by manipulating the global political and economic environment. Such manipulation may include monopolies, trading restrictions, and the solicitation of subsidies or aid in exchange for political influence or conversely the solicitation of loans in exchange for the reserve currency. Jordan's geopolitical stature and geographic

position to block the spread of the Syrian civil war enables King Abdullah to secure financial rents and economic security from the U.S.

⁵⁹ Faredon Hartoqa, "Jordan Renewable Energy Market," May 2015, http://www.export.gov/jordan/static/Jordan%20Renewable%20Energy%20Market_Latest_eg_io_034925.doc (accessed December 26, 2015).

⁶⁰ Elizabeth Whitman, "Jordan Scrambles to Avoid Energy Crisis Amid Regional Turmoil," *Middle East Eye*, July 24, 2014, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-scrambles-avoid-energy-crisis-amid-regional-turmoil-986749875> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁶¹ Emanuel Marx, *Bedouin of the Negev* (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester, 1967), 15, <https://books.google.io/books?id=Lfu8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=bedouin+smuggling++Jordan&source=bl&ots=z9TO2m6qVc&sig=L-> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Karen Ayat, "Jordan Looks to Benefits of Oil Shale Projects," *Natural Gas Europe*, June 30, 2013, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/jordan-oil-shale-projects> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁶⁴ Mohammad Tayseer, "Jordan Halts Talks on \$15 Billion Deal for Israeli Gas," *Bloomberg Business*, January 4, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-04/jordan-halts-talks-on-15-billion-accord-to-import-israeli-gas> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁶⁵ Tareq Baconi, "A Pipeline against Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, January 26, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-01-26/pipeline-against-peace> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Juman Asmail, "The 15 Billion Dollar Deal That Will Make or Break Israel's Regional Hegemony," *MONDOWEISS*, February 23, 2015, <http://mondoweiss.net/2015/02/israels-regional-hegemony#sthash.LYxRMuuh.dpuf> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁷⁰ Energy Information Agency, "Levant Basin Map," August 20, 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/images/2013.08.20/maplarge.png> (accessed February 20, 2016).

⁷¹ Baconi, "A Pipeline against Peace."

⁷² Hartoqa, "Jordan Renewable Energy Market."

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Areej Abuqudairi, "Jordan Reels from Week of Violence in Maan," *Al Jazeera News*, April 28, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/jordan-reels-from-week-violence-maan-20144281256437277.html> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁷⁵ Suha Philip Ma'ayeh, "New Violence Raises Concerns About Jordan," *Wall Street Journal Online*, July 29, 2013, <http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/07/29/new-violence-raises-concerns-about-jordan/> (accessed April 25, 2015).

⁷⁶ Omar Obeidat, "Third of Jordan's Population Lives below Poverty Line at Some Point of One Year - Study," *Jordan Times*, July 2, 2014, <http://jordantimes.com/third-of-jordans-population-lives-below-poverty-line-at-some-point-of-one-year---study> (accessed April 26, 2015).

⁷⁷ Nafal Nawaf, "Jordanian Backyards Used as Stores for Smuggled Saudi Petrol," *Reportage Online*, June 8, 2013, <http://www.reportageonline.com/2013/06/jordanian-backyards-used-as-stores-for-smuggled-saudi-petrol/> (accessed April 26, 2015).

⁷⁸ Ibid. "Makeshift storage tanks, used for keeping fuel smuggled into Jordan from Saudi Arabia, are known as al-Hafayer, the Arabic term denoting 'holes in the ground'. Hafeyra — the singular form of Hafayer — is now the common name for homes that sell smuggled petrol in the slums of Aqaba such as Shalala, al-Khazzan, al-Alamiya and the Old Town."

⁷⁹ Diane Coyle, *GDP, A Brief but Affectionate History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 107,108.

⁸⁰ Jillian Schwedler, *Understanding the Contemporary Middle East*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2013), 232.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Whitman, "Jordan Scrambles."

⁸⁴ Lust, *The Middle East*, 580.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Office of the President, Free Trade Representative, "Jordan Free Trade Agreement," <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta> (accessed February 13, 2016).

⁸⁷ Royal Scientific Society, "The Future of Jordan's Qualified Industrial Zones," *Royal Scientific Society of Jordan and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Amman Office*, 2013, 5, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10677.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2016).

⁸⁸ Curt Tarnoff, *Millennium Challenge Corporation* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2014), 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, 2.

⁹³ The Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Jordan Threshold Grant,” <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/jordan> (accessed February 13, 2016).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ General Martin Dempsey, *2015 National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Defense, June 2015), 8.

⁹⁶ “Egypt, Saudi Arabia Form Council to Implement ‘Cairo Declaration’,” *Al Arabiya News*, November 11, 2015, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/11/11/Egypt-Saudi-Arabia-form-council-to-implement-Cairo-Declaration-.html> (accessed December 20, 2015).

⁹⁷ “The Arab League to Create Joint Arab Military Force,” *South Front, Intelligence Analysis*, June 11, 2015, <https://southfront.org/the-arab-league-to-create-joint-arab-military-force/> (accessed March 22, 2016).

⁹⁸ MEE Staff, “Meeting on Arab Joint Force ‘Postponed Indefinitely’,” *Middle East Eye*, August 26, 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/meeting-arab-joint-force-postponed-indefinitely-1054743930#sthash.Y8rxbtgG.dpuf> (accessed March 22, 2016). “Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced the accord during the March summit, setting a four-month timeframe for the Arab League to decide on the composition and rules of engagement of the joint force, which according to him would fight “terror” in the region.” The countries comprising the joint Arab force include member nations of the Arab League.

⁹⁹ CIA World Factbook, ‘Jordan Military Expenditures,’ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html> (accessed December 20, 2015).

¹⁰⁰ The World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹⁰¹ Sharp, *Jordan: Background*, 17.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ “Combatant Commanders Direct Mission Support,” *2016 National Defense Authorization Act*, Line 120, 114th U.S. Congress, 911.

¹⁰⁴ Mehran Kamrava, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective,” *Perspectives in Global Development and Technology*, 2007, 196, <http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-33103.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹⁰⁵ Interview with confidential source, January 2016. Source requested anonymity.

¹⁰⁶ Streusand and Tunnel, “Choosing Words,” 6.

¹⁰⁷ Michael J. Totten, “The Muslim Brotherhood Takes Off its Mask,” *World Affairs*, May 21, 2015, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/muslim-brotherhood-takes-its-mask-0> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹⁰⁸ Interview with confidential source, January 2016. Source requested anonymity.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Tom White, "Civil War in El Salvador and United States Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Perspectives of the Past*, <http://perspectivesofthepast.com/terrorism-and-insurgency-in-the-contemporary-world/civil-war-in-el-salvador-and-united-states-counterinsurgency-strategy/> (accessed December 22, 2015).

¹¹¹ Jordan, *USAID*, 1.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Laila Azzeh, "Return to Liquefied Natural Gas a 'Boost for Country's Energy Sector'," *Jordan Times*, October 1, 2015, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/return-liquefied-natural-gas-boost-country%E2%80%99s-energy-sector%E2%80%99#sthash.WCSLn1xJ.dpuf> (accessed March 22, 2016).

¹¹⁴ International Monetary Fund, "Jordan Gets \$2.0 Billion IMF Loan to Support Economy," August 3, 2012, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/int080312a.htm> (accessed March 25, 2016).

¹¹⁵ Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 224.

¹¹⁶ Brian A. Jackson, Lloyd Dixon, and Victoria A. Greenfield, *Economically Targeted Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), iii, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR476.pdf (accessed March 24, 2016).

¹¹⁷ Sangwon Yoon and Andre Tartar, "The Global Economic Cost of Terrorism Is Now at Its Highest Since 9/11," *Bloomberg Business*, November 16, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-17/the-global-economic-cost-of-terrorism-is-now-at-its-highest-since-9-11> (accessed March 22, 2016). "In 2014, acts of terror cost the world \$52.9 billion — roughly the size of Bulgaria's entire annual gross domestic product — compared with \$51.51 billion in the aftermath of Sept. 11, according to the latest annual Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace, which has been collecting data since 1997."

¹¹⁸ U.S. Army Special Operations Command Center of Excellence, "Foreign Internal Defense in Iraq," <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2501/SW2501ARSOFCoreTasksEnableIraqiCombatingTerrorismCapability.html> (accessed December 23, 2015).

¹¹⁹ Sharp, "Jordan: Background," 16.

¹²⁰ Matthew L. Schehl, "In Battle with IS, Marines Bolster Jordanian Military," *Marine Corps Times*, December 3, 2015, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/12/03/battle-isis-marines-bolster-jordanian-military/76705322/> (accessed December 20, 2015).

¹²¹ U.S. State Department, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "U.S. Relations with Jordan," July 3, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹²² Cole and Hsu, *Guiding Principles*, 2-8, 2-9.

¹²³ Dempsey, *National Military Strategy*, 9.

¹²⁴ Patrice Tadonnio, "The President Blinkered: Why Obama Changed Course on the 'Red Line' in Syria," *PBS*, May 25, 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinkered-why-obama-changed-course-on-the-red-line-in-syria/> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹²⁵ Amos Harel, "Israeli Intelligence: Syria Retains Small WMD Capacity," *Haaretz News*, October 1, 2014, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.618543> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹²⁶ Desmond Butler and Vadim Ghirda, "AP Investigation: Nuclear Black Market Seeks IS Extremists," *Associated Press*, October 7, 2015, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6fd1d202f40c4bb4939bd99c3f80ac2b/ap-investigation-nuclear-smugglers-sought-terrorist-buyers> (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹²⁷ Aya Batrawy, "Saudi Arabia Forms Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition," *Washington Times Online*, December 15, 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/15/saudi-arabia-forms-islamic-counterterrorism-coalit/?page=all> (accessed December 28, 2015).

¹²⁸ Streusand and Tunnel, "Choosing Words," 6.

¹²⁹ Saif Hameed and Ece Toksabay, "Iraqi PM Says Turkey not Respecting Agreement to Withdraw Troops," *Reuters News*, December 30, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-turkey-idUSKBN0UD1GJ20151230> (accessed January 1, 2016).

¹³⁰ Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, "Help Refugees Help Themselves, Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labor Market," *Foreign Affairs*, October 20, 2015, 4, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/levant/2015-10-20/help-refugees-help-themselves> (accessed January 1, 2016).

¹³¹ Ben Hubbard, "In Jordan Town, Syria War Inspires Jihadist Dreams," *New York Times Online*, April 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/world/middleeast/in-jordan-town-syria-war-inspires-jihadist-dreams.html?_r=0 (accessed February 15, 2016).

¹³² Col John D. Waghelstein, *El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 1, 1985), 18.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹³⁴ King Abdullah II, "Speeches, Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at Georgetown University," Washington, DC, March 21, 2005, http://www.kingabdullah.io/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/73.html (accessed March 22, 2016).