

Strategy Research Project

Garrison Leadership--Creating a New Paradigm

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Abstract

Installations play a vital role in power projection capability and contribute to overarching unit, Soldier, and Family readiness during the force generation process. Given current realities result in reductions to force structure, the Army can still provide military professionals with the training, education, and experiences to enhance installation leadership. In a resource-constrained, complex operating environment, Garrisons require strategic leaders to maintain the foundation of Army readiness, navigate the challenges of community partnership, and ensure preparedness to serve as joint power-projection platforms. Garrisons can better accomplish the myriad of complex strategic tasks by creating a military career path specifically aligned to Installation Management. Deftly applying resources to develop a core of military leaders, knowledgeable in the complexities of installation management programs and policies, allows the Army to lead, sustain, and guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future.

Garrison Leadership--Creating a New Paradigm

One must change one's tactics every ten years if one wishes to maintain one's superiority.

—Napoleon Bonaparte¹

If Napoleon's axiom is correct, then the time to transform Army installation management is at hand. Established in 2006, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) enters its tenth year leading Army installations worldwide, improving base support and quality of life at locations where the Army Family lives, works, and plays. Despite IMCOM's impressive evolution, sustaining tempo in a complex strategic environment requires organizational change to achieve IMCOM's strategic vision.

The 2015 *National Military Strategy* appropriately labels the environment as the "most unpredictable" in the last 40 years with the U.S. facing "multiple, simultaneous security challenges" in conflicts that will "come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield."² Global threats, ranging from state balance of power rivalries to increasingly capable transnational non-state actors, however, only represent one daunting aspect. Domestic pressure, including manpower and budget reductions directed by sequestration, also hinder the Army's ability to preserve capabilities necessary to "prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars."³ Consequently, the 2014 *Army Operating Concept* notes the ability to "adjust to fiscal constraints" and maintain "resources sufficient to preserve the balance of readiness, force structure, and modernization," as two leading assumptions.⁴ Global threats coupled with domestic pressure will likely challenge these assumptions and increase the importance of 'getting right' any decision to change Army structure.

Over the past decade, the Army converted from a forward deployed to a capability based force that is “expeditionary, tailorable, scalable, and prepared to meet the challenges of the global environment.”⁵ In this context, installations play a vital role in power projection capability, with units increasingly deploying from continental United States (CONUS) bases, and contribute to comprehensive Soldier, Family, and unit readiness during Army force generation. Given environmental realities, the Army must leverage this important opportunity and provide military professionals with training, education, and experiences to enhance installation leadership over the long-term while meeting national security objectives in the near-term. In a cost-conscious, risk-informed environment, Army Garrisons require strategic leaders capable of maintaining the foundation of Army readiness, navigating the challenges of community partnership, and ensuring joint power-projection capability. The Army better serves Soldiers and their Families, as well as accomplishes a myriad of complex installation missions, by deftly applying resources to create an Installation Management military career path, or core of skilled installation management professionals, coalescing leadership and management to guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future.

This paper begins by defining garrison leaders in a strategic context through a review of academia, statutory authority, and Army doctrine. Subsequent analysis of installation and leader development studies expose trends supporting change to the current approach for identifying and selecting garrison leaders. Finally, assessing gaps between strategic context and leadership trends reveal viable alternatives to providing leadership at Army installations worldwide.

Garrison Leaders as Strategic Leaders

Analyzing attributes associated with leading Army installations begins with understanding installations' roles as strategic force projection and readiness platforms. With 154 installations worldwide, the Army manages installation personnel, resources, and infrastructure to perform steady state and crisis response activities across all Land Holding Commands (IMCOM, Army Reserve, National Guard, Army Material Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and Army Central). As an enterprise, IMCOM's mission "delivers and integrates base support to enable readiness for a self-reliant and globally-responsive All Volunteer Army."⁶ In addition to furnishing training and force projection facilities, installations support human domain readiness by providing customers with a diverse range of resiliency programs. As such, IMCOM leads "all facets of installation management such as construction; barracks and Family housing; Family care; food management; environmental programs; well-being; Soldier and Family morale, welfare and recreation programs; logistics; public works; and installation funding."⁷ IMCOM's enterprise approach and improved business practices ensures garrisons provide the right services, at the right cost, and at the right time based on available resources.

While standardized business practices and organizational structure create efficiency and predictability, Army installations are not homogenous, with each tailored to support unique mission requirements. The Army traditionally categorizes installations by population size, combining assigned Service Member and Department of Defense Civilian strength, reported annually in the Army Stationing and Installation Plan.⁸ Informally, major mission roles define them as Command and Control Installations (Major Army Commands, Headquarters), Fighting Installations (Maneuver Units and/or Major Training Areas), Training Installations (Initial Entry Training and/or Professional

Development Schools), Industrial Installations (Depots and Arsenals), Reserve Component Installations, or Other (Corps of Engineers and Hospitals).⁹ Alternatively, installations are categorized as “power projection platforms” (deploy one or more high priority Active Component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army Reserve Component (RC) units)¹⁰, “power support platforms” (deploy individuals from all services, the civilian force, and mobilized RC; house RC training facilities and equipment), or sustaining bases.¹¹ The Army’s installation investment accounts for a \$20.8 billion budget, employs over 75,000 civilians, covers over 13.5 million acres of land, maintains over 120,000 buildings covering more than 925 million square feet valued in excess of \$315 billion, and houses approximately one-third of Army Families and over 200,000 Soldiers.¹² Despite distinctions, all installations inherently support the Army’s warfighting mission by delivering base support to Senior Commanders and universally provide land management, community partnership, environmental stewardship, utilities, housing, administration, communication, and storage facilities to the military community, with mission and population driving requirements.¹³ For this reason, we can tie a core set of strategic leader attributes to installation management professionals.

As the Army’s readiness epicenter, installations demand adaptable strategic leaders who thrive in complexity. In their seminal work, *In Search of Excellence*, Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman describe eight leader attributes found in successful corporations.¹⁴ For simplicity, we will only discuss attributes most applicable to Garrison Command. The first, “Bias for Action,” depicts leaders with decisive decision-making skills who meet challenges or exploit opportunity by establishing

dynamic cross-functional teams to address problem sets.¹⁵ “Bias for Action” personifies strategic leaders’ application of critical, creative, and systems thinking concepts to develop environmental understanding, frame problems, and create operational approaches to effect competitive advantage and strategic success. Military leaders display this capacity in context of military operations; a Garrison Commander, however, must account for local, state, and federal jurisdictions within the installation’s environment and consider effects, even in the simplest of decisions, on missions and quality of life for numerous stakeholders with vastly different interests; most of whom answer to a separate chain of command. Understanding the complex installation environment for active decision-making only develops through direct experience.

“Close to the customer,” the second attribute, utilizes customer input to facilitate continuous improvement and new product development.¹⁶ One difference between a Garrison Commander and their operational counterpart is “customer” diversity. While operational commanders serve a hierarchical military chain of command, Garrison Commanders serve military and civilian customers, individually and collectively, as well as vertically and laterally. In this light, supporting a Senior Commander’s mission and providing readiness related services to Soldiers and Families are central to the garrison mission, while knowing what the customer (Senior Commander, Soldier, or Community) requires is critical to providing relevant, reliable support. Garrison Commanders use multiple avenues to get “close to the customer” with internal customer (units, commanders, Soldiers, Families, and civilian employees) feedback offered through Town Hall Meetings, Open Door Policies, Brown Bag Sessions, Housing Area Meetings, and the Interactive Customer Evaluation form. External customer (local community,

political leaders, corporations, contractors) feedback includes Board Council Meetings, Joint Land Use Studies, and Community Surveys. Despite operational units sharing community partnership efforts, the Garrison is often the most visible and approachable entity for external customers to seek information, gain understanding, or air grievances.

Autonomy, the final attribute, deconstructs large organizations into component parts to encourage independent thought and competitive spirit.¹⁷ Empowered to act within acceptable risk and promoting innovation at the lowest level, excellent leaders recognize resource constraints and capitalize on readily available human or capital resources. Garrison Commanders face challenges in this area as the Army turns to contract solutions, such as outsourcing and privatization, to address resource shortfalls. Outsourcing is the process of contracting installation support and services, formerly accomplished by organic garrison resources, to private business. A brief outsourcing example is an installation, with limited Human Resources personnel, establishing a service contract to manage the installation's Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System or Identification Card program. Privatization, conversely, refers to transferring control or management of installation assets to an external agency. The Residential Communities Initiative, which transferred Army Family Housing oversight to independent contractors, is a common privatization example. Given outsourcing and privatization trends continue, Garrison Commanders require contracting acumen and, with many contracts locally procured, autonomy to ensure quality installation support and services remain in place.

While academia aligns garrison and strategic leadership descriptively, Army doctrine provides prescriptive alignment. *Army Field Manual (FM) 100-22* defines

installation management as “the process of directing and integrating the provision of all functions... resources needed to operate the installation on a day-to-day, long-term, strategic basis.”¹⁸ As such, Garrison Commanders balance installation activities with support roles to allow Senior Commanders to focus on sustaining, training, and projecting the force. While some activities represent common management challenges found in any military organization, many installation actions support strategic outcomes. Senior Commanders charge Garrison Commanders, as installation managers, to provide a suite of base support services (training area/facility management, fire and emergency services, communication, financial management, public works, environmental compliance, housing, medical, childcare, family services, and recreation) to assigned units, tenants, and customers.¹⁹ Likewise, Senior Commanders expect Garrison Commanders, as installation leaders, to anticipate, identify, and remain cognizant of current and future mission requirements to ensure the installation meets “regular modernization and new construction...to maintain efficient and sustainable operations and enable the provision of effective services to Soldiers, Families, and Civilians.”²⁰ Garrison Commanders also exercise strategic communication and public outreach by interfacing with the civilian community and meeting federal, state, and local legislation where installations serve as the Army’s “face to the nation and the world.”²¹

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in line with Peters and Waterman’s work, identifies core values to lead a successful organization: those required for leading change, for leading people, for being results driven, for business acumen, and for building coalition/communication.²² Leading change defines the ability to meet organizational goals by establishing an “organizational vision and to implement it in a

continuously changing environment” and includes competencies such as creativity, external awareness, strategic thinking, and vision.²³ Leading people reflects an ability to inspire people “toward meeting the organization's vision, mission, and goals” through a positive work climate based on inclusiveness, teamwork, constructive discourse, and developmental opportunities.²⁴ The results driven area stresses aptitude to meet “customer expectations” by applying technical knowledge, problem solving, and risk management to yield positive outcomes aligned with organizational goals.²⁵ Business acumen is managing “human, financial, and information resources strategically,” while building coalitions describes an ability to work “internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals” through partnership, political savviness, and consensus.²⁶

Given FM 100-22 and OPM depictions of strategic leadership, a Garrison Commander's roles compare favorably to a City Manager. As installation managers, Garrison Commanders oversee the installation's mission, support programs, facilities, and lands to guarantee availability and adequacy to support warfighter and community needs. Additionally, Garrison Commanders ensure force projection facility readiness and pre-, during, and post-deployment service support to units, Soldiers, and Families. Finally, the Garrison Commander buttresses community well-being by providing force protection, emergency services, and an environmentally safe community along with a broad range of programs to build “resilience, increase professionalism, and equip them [Units, Soldiers, Army Civilians, Family members] with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and support needed to maintain physical and emotional health.”²⁷ City Managers,

similarly, provide public services to residents including building and maintaining streets, parks, and schools, supplying clean water, and providing waste management services. City Managers also oversee first responder activities to include law enforcement and fire protection as well as foster wellness by offering recreation services across community demographics. In summary, Garrison Commanders and City Managers provide public services to maintain an acceptable quality of life reinforced by resource management, long-range community planning, policy development and implementation, and organizational value setting.²⁸

Despite similarities, to say a Garrison Commander and City Manager are synonymous is a myth. Position titles, Commander versus Manager, represent the dominant difference, and a Garrison Commander's role in supporting Army warfighting and readiness exemplifies a second. While management functions include planning, organizing, coordinating, communicating, evaluating, and encouraging, Command represents the sum of management functions and leadership qualities. Command is the "power or authority earned by rank, position, experience, or expertise," whereas, management is the "application of the functions necessary to achieve the aim."²⁹

Based on installation size and complexity, the Army divides garrison commands between Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel level commands. Under the existing Headquarters, Department of the Army Centralized Command Selection process, a Senior Army Officer Board selects Commanders, to include Garrison Commanders, from an available Officer pool ensuring quality leaders assume command at the Battalion or Brigade level equivalent. Officers selected for Garrison Command, like their operational colleagues, are "products of a system that views leadership as paramount to

the management of the organization,” regardless type, with leadership skills transferable to any organization.³⁰ While noting challenges to installation leadership development later, this point introduces the Army’s challenge to provide consistent, professional installation management.

To offset limited military experience and expertise in installation management, Department of the Army (DA) Civilians, identified under Career Field 29 (Installation Management), assume leadership roles at Army installations.³¹ While not undervaluing their advisory role, civilian leaders do not possess equivalent command authority as prescribed in Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, as authority derived from the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army to the Senior Commander, to their military counterpart, nor do they possess the current expertise in Army warfighting missions and doctrine necessary to support the Senior Commanders requirements. The division of installation responsibility between military and civilian leaders, while feasible, is less optimal when one or both leaders lack acumen to translate Senior Commander or IMCOM directives into installation planning and operations.

In sum, Garrison Commanders are quintessential strategic leaders charged to maintain the Army’s valued infrastructure and enable the Army to meet crucial readiness, resilience, and force projection requirements. A Garrison Commander is a manager in one sense, but more importantly, a leader, in accordance with AR 600-22, accountable to those supported and served as well as embodying qualities such as “judgment, bearing, willpower, integrity, intelligence, confidence, courage, and knowledge.”³² Assessing Garrison Commander roles and responsibilities in practice, against strategic leadership attributes offered by academia and doctrine, clearly portray

them as vision makers, alignment creators, and change agents. Equally important, Garrison Commanders balance ends, ways, and means to meet Senior Commanders' requirements within a risk-informed, cost-conscious, and volatile strategic environment. While IMCOM and its subordinate regions provide strategic direction, it is ultimately a Garrison Commander's responsibility to develop the ways to achieve IMCOM's desired ends within resource constraints.³³ Revisiting OPM's framework, Garrison Commanders demonstrate strategic leadership by providing vision, influencing culture, establishing policy, allocating resources, and building consensus amongst a diverse range of customers and stakeholders, with equally varied requirements and interests.³⁴

Garrison and Leadership Trend Analysis

Over the past thirty years, the Army has invested resources to study how installations work and manage them effectively. The Army also routinely deploys surveys to gain insight on how leaders prepare and perform in leadership positions. Examining these approaches to assess garrison leadership trends confirms that despite progress in installation management efficiency, inconsistent garrison leadership continues to impede realizable growth to enhanced readiness, community partnership, and force projection capability.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Army conducted one of the first installation studies in 1969 to improve the management of Defense installations through performance evaluation, problem identification, and goal setting.³⁵ Producing a range of findings on doctrine, leadership, and structure, the study asserted Garrison Commanders require "trained senior subordinates experienced in installation management" and an organizational structure to facilitate management by "capable senior subordinates."³⁶ Notably, the study raised three central questions to effective

installation management that reemerge in later studies as well as this paper – Should key installation positions be civilian or military? What installation management training opportunities exist for civilians and military? Should there be a military installation management career field?³⁷ In some measure, civilianizing installation staffs and implementing Standard Garrison Organization over the past decade accounts for the military's shortfall in experience and ability to execute installation management identified in this initial study.

In 1983, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) conducted a DoD level study to identify methods to provide efficient base operating services by comparing creation of a single Defense agency to operate all installations against retaining the Services base operation responsibilities.³⁸ The study identified several advantages to centralized control to include providing trained, experienced professionals to manage installation support, inter- and intra-service support at closely located installations, integrated management information systems, and allowing Senior Commanders to focus on their readiness mission.³⁹ Nearly 20 years removed, the study realized the fruit of its labor with Installation Management Activity (IMA) activation in 2002 as well as the well-intentioned Joint Basing concept adopted by IMCOM in the 2010s following the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure.

In 1988, the Army contracted American Management System, Inc. (AMS) to conduct a comprehensive study to recommend solutions to consistent installation management shortcomings. Unlike previous studies, AMS included installations outside the United States in the process interviewing 250 Installation Managers and Garrison Commanders at 54 Army installations worldwide.⁴⁰ The study reiterated numerous

installation deficiencies ranging from personnel and training to insufficient doctrine and resources. Notably, AMS found Command level training and development leaned heavily to operational command and lacked instruction on installation leadership. Furthermore, without a military equivalent to a City Manager in the Army personnel system, AMS recommended developing a prototype Garrison City Manager position and improving training and attendance at available installation management courses.⁴¹ AMS recommendations, ironically, revisited several unanswered 1969 Comptroller questions.

While acknowledging the OSD and AMS premise that installation management might improve under civilian leadership, Garrison Command, in accordance with AR 600-20 authorities, remains an inherently military function. In this vein, AMS' study noted training at the three-week Army Installation Management Course (AIMC) at Fort Lee, VA did not compare favorably to the training and education operational commanders received through formal command courses and by successive commands at Company, Battalion, and Brigade level. Additionally, by AMS' admittance, civilianizing installation positions limited military opportunities for on-the-job training and experience. AMS also found a majority of Civilian Garrison Managers and Deputy Garrison Commanders were retired military personnel, a stark contradiction in goals to establish continuity through civilianization.⁴² By assigning retired military personnel to key installation leader positions, the Army, by default, added challenges to installation management by hiring the same military personnel that already lacked experience and expertise in installation management.

Historical studies consistently cited a lack of pre-command training for prospective Garrison Commanders, and one might argue the more things change, the

more they stay the same. As much as the Army relied on the AIMC in the 1980s through early 2000s, it continues to rely on a two-week Garrison Pre-Command Course (PCC) at Joint Base San Antonio, TX as the pinnacle preparation of future Garrison Commanders. Despite professional course presentation, Garrison PCC remains an overarching introduction to installation management lacking sufficient time to understand the depth and complexity of installation management in such a condensed format. Towards this end, the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) offers valuable insight to installation management and leadership. Noting the critical nature of training and leader development, ASPG states, “Soldiers, civilians, leaders, and units cannot accomplish an assigned mission without the knowledge and skill needed to survive first contact, seize the initiative, and prevail.”⁴³ The Comptroller’s 1969 questions remain eerily applicable; with limited experiential opportunities to prepare leaders, does a two-week introduction to installation management provide Garrison Commanders with skills necessary to “survive first contact” let alone seize the initiative and prevail?

The 2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) is an excellent starting point to answer this question. According to CASAL, Army Officers favor operational experience for leader development with nearly 90% of Field Grade and 75% of Company Grade Officers reporting access to experiential learning as “effective or very effective” in preparing them to assume positions of increased responsibility.⁴⁴ The report also found shifting attitudes to self-development with only 80% of Officers reporting self-development as effective to assume leadership in 2014 compared with approximately 87% in 2009.⁴⁵ While still positive, institutional education lags behind operational experience and self-development to enhancing

leader development with only 62% of leaders rating it effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership.⁴⁶

To wit, *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication* (ADRP) 6-22 illustrates the Leader Development Model's link between its three pillars (training, education, and experience) and three domains (operational, institutional, and self-development).⁴⁷ By design, a majority of leader development occurs during operational assignments and through self-development.⁴⁸ While leader development pillars and domains address developing leaders to serve in positions of increased responsibility, they do not necessarily translate to preparing Officers to lead Army installations. For example, Company (Basic Officer Leaders Course, Combatant Commander Course) and Field Grade (Intermediate Level Education, Command and General Staff College) level institutional training emphasizes developing branch-centric tactical/operational and technical expertise through progressive and sequential education and training.⁴⁹ With the exception of IMCOM's Garrison PCC, installation management is not "taught," or only tangentially discussed, in the Army's Professional Military Education institutions. Operationally, "training by doing" installation management does not fare better. Operational assignments follow a clearly defined path associated with an Officer's branch to maximize opportunities to apply, refine, or broaden skills acquired during institutional training. The value of experiential learning during an operational assignment contributes to an Officer's ability to serve at positions of increased responsibility and complexity.⁵⁰ With only a limited number of installation related assignments available prior to their selection as Garrison Commanders, the capacity to develop installation management expertise in a cadre of Officers is significantly degraded.

Correspondingly, Ellen Goldman's 2007 study, *Strategic Thinking at the Top*, investigated the "totality of experiences (educational, job related or other)" contributing to high performing executives considered "top strategic thinkers in their industry."⁵¹ Goldman concludes the process to acquire strategic expertise "is not the product of innate ability and pure serendipity. It arises from specific experiences (personal, interpersonal, organizational, and external)..." which typically take a decade or more to develop.⁵² While Goldman does not dismiss well-rounded experience to support leader development and predict success at higher levels of responsibility (akin to the Army's centralized command selection methodology), the study found continuous experience or exposure in a specific field correlated to overall development and "confidence...dealing with increasing levels of business complexity and ambiguity."⁵³

In concluding this section, reviewing historical studies provides a relatively consistent view of challenges to create efficiencies in installation management while promoting effective installation leadership. Procedural challenges are often the most tangible and likely to dominate any large organization. The intangible challenges, experience and leadership, however, require focused resources and activity to achieve an organization's vision. For example, IMA/IMCOM enacted several efforts to address procedural shortfalls identified since the Comptroller's first study in 1969. Implementing the Standard Garrison Organization in 2004 is an excellent example to correct deficiencies in organizational structure as well as improve predictability in delivering installation services to a diverse range of installation "customers." Additionally, adopting Common Levels of Support (CLS) and Installation Status Report supported strategic focus on service delivery costs, performance, and resources to support Senior

Commander and installation customers. Cumulatively, these efforts reinforce stewardship in a corporate environment by advocating standardization, accountability, and equitable distribution of resources. These actions, however, only focus on reinforcing mechanisms to correct structural or procedural challenges in installation management. Failing to address embedding mechanisms to inculcate change will result in installation management continuing to wane with adequate, not excellent, garrison leadership.⁵⁴ The CASAL findings, reinforced by Goldman's study, strengthen the argument regarding insufficient embedding mechanisms to prepare garrison leaders to assume their roles. Some leaders develop leader attributes and competencies from the organization's mission, core values, or culture while others build their own through introspective study of leadership theory, or some combination of the two.⁵⁵ Limited operational experience and institutional training in installation management, however, coupled with downward trends in self-development, harbinger potential failure without deliberate intervention to better identify, prepare, and select future garrison leaders.

Garrison Command--Creating a New Paradigm

"Resistance to change is a natural tendency of both humans and large organizations, but in this world characterized by accelerating change it is a strategic liability."⁵⁶ James Locher's quote segues nicely into this paper's final section. The complex environment places a premium on 'getting right' any decision to change Army structure. While IMCOM continues to promote professional credentialing opportunities to improve garrison leadership, exploring alternative options remains available. One possible reason the Army shies from changing the current approach is the centralized command selection process, in fact, does place quality leaders in command. Today's Army leaders, however, must follow the example set by Secretary Thomas White in

2001-2002 when he galvanized Army efforts to transform installation management and Army culture by establishing IMA, and seize another opportunity to transform the way installations are led as strategic assets.

Organizational environment and culture play significant roles in studying organizational change. An organization's environment includes two parts for analysis: the task and contextual environments. The task environment is an organization's day-to-day interactions with "individuals and organizations that have an immediate influence on the organization's well-being."⁵⁷ Alternatively, the contextual environment includes broader forces that "shape the organization's overall operations."⁵⁸ The two environments, in many ways, mirror internal and external customers alluded to by Peters and Waterman. Using the task and contextual environment framework, installations execute steady-state operations within a task environment comprised of routine support to units, Soldiers, and their Families; continuous support to Senior Commander readiness requirements; and routine reporting with IMCOM staff. An installation's contextual environment, comprising interactions and influence of political, social, economic, cultural, and demographic aspects of society, is more complex.⁵⁹ Examples of an installation's contextual environment include, following local, state, and federal (or host nation) laws and regulations, engaging elected leaders and the local community, and, operating within resources provided by the DoD, DA, and IMCOM. While described independently, the two environments are not exclusive. Instead, an installation represents a complex adaptive system where changes in one environment affect one or more activities in the other and the magnitude of a Garrison Commander's challenge is greater due to the density and scale of physical and human terrain resident

at an installation. The 2005 BRAC, and, more recently, sequestration, represent two significant contextual environment changes that shape the manner installations operate in their task environment, notably adopting CLS to account for reduced resources.

While Army installations provide quality support to meet readiness requirements, and studies capture systemic problems addressed through incremental changes to IMCOM structure or procedure, the difference between a “good” and “excellent” installation resides in installation leadership. Several alternatives exist to improve installation leadership to include retaining the status quo, fully civilianizing garrison leadership, or establishing an Installation Management functional area for military officers.

The solution most offered to improve installation leadership is employing DA Civilians in expanded roles as City Managers at each installation. As highlighted earlier, numerous similarities exist between the roles and responsibilities of a City Manager and a Garrison Commander. While considering this strategy feasible (means) and suitable (ends), it may not pass acceptability (ways) without a change in law given inherent authorities bestowed to military leaders. In this light, Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, highlights command remains privileged to a

commissioned or WO [warrant officer] who...exercises primary command authority over a military organization or prescribed territorial area that under pertinent official directives is recognized as a "command." A civilian, other than the President as Commander-in-Chief (or National Command Authority), may not exercise command. However, a civilian may be designated to exercise general supervision over an Army installation or activity (for example, Dugway Proving Ground).⁶⁰

While noting a DA Civilian may “supervise” an installation, AR 600-20 highlights shared responsibilities to military counterparts excludes “UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and command authority” which are exclusive to military service members.⁶¹

Another challenge to this strategy resides in the relationship between the Senior Commander and Garrison Commander and in a larger sense in Civilian-Military relations. While a Civilian leader displays technical expertise in installation management policy and procedure, they often lack access to the depth of information and network necessary to understand or remain current with Army (or Joint) doctrine, systems, missions, and timelines. Consequently, the current Army command selection process, while producing quality organizational leaders, does not necessarily account for previous installation experience with most Garrison Commanders having limited exposure and a two-week PCC to base their knowledge of installation management. Additionally, no formal system currently exists to ensure experience gained by a Lieutenant Colonel Garrison Commander logically transfers to the more complex Colonel-level Garrison Command or other installation management related position. While military leaders retain a certain depth of understanding and networks for Army/Joint doctrine, systems, and missions, they may lack understanding in the complexities of installation management programs and policies to lead, sustain, and guide installations independently. The nexus of these challenges places installations at risk to undermining Army readiness in an already strained environment.

This paper recommends an alternative to the Civilian City Manager solution. Establishing an Installation Management Corps and Officer Career path, akin to the successful venture in the Army Acquisition Corps, would fully acknowledge Garrison Commanders and installations as strategic assets necessary to support Army readiness and Joint power projection. Furthermore, installation management's complexity and

importance follows suit with the Army's recognition of acquisition being vital to accomplishing the Army mission when establishing the Army Acquisition Corps.

The Army Acquisition Corps formed in response to the Packard Commission study of defense management that concluded acquisition represented one of DoD's largest and most important business enterprises.⁶² Based on the commission's report, the Army created an independent command structure under a Three-Star military deputy to control funding, resources, and accountability from the Secretariat through the military deputy to Program Executive Officers (general officers and senior civilians) down to Program Managers (centrally selected colonels and lieutenant colonels plus senior civilians).⁶³

While not a carbon copy, creating an Army Installation Management Corps shares many of the goals cited in the DoD Implementation Report for Acquisition: reduce overhead costs while maintaining military strength; enhance program performance; reinvigorate the planning and budgeting process; reduce micromanagement; and improve ethical standards.⁶⁴ Offering an Installation Management career track also offers opportunity to support Army talent management by following a logical progression of assignments to ensure promotion and command potential as well as providing marketable skills in a complex and challenging field. An example career path (see Table 1) for an Installation Management Officer begins with functional area selection as an Army Captain. At entry level, a Captain could serve on an installation staff or as part of the Garrison Headquarters Battalion at one of the Army's larger installations. As a Major, the Officer could continue to serve as an Operations or Executive Officer in the Garrison Headquarters Battalion or as a junior

Field Grade Officer at Region or IMCOM staff. As a Lieutenant Colonel, Officers compete for their first opportunity to command a small garrison, command a Garrison Headquarters Battalion, or serve as seasoned staff members at the Region or IMCOM headquarters. Finally, as a Colonel, Officers may compete for a second command opportunity at a larger garrison or serve as principal staff members at Region or IMCOM Headquarters. Residential or Distant Learning opportunities at Institutional or Professional Military Education schools and courses support an Officer's professional development and retain currency in Army and Joint doctrine and policy, allowing them to employ relevant knowledge in installation management to support warfighting requirements upon return to operational assignments. In this manner, establishing an Army Installation Corps provides a nucleus of high quality, skilled Officers capable of understanding and meeting the unique demands of installation management in a complex and dynamic mission environment.

Table 1. Example Installation Management Functional Area Career Path⁶⁵

Rank	Institutional Training	Operational Experience
CPT (O-3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete Captain Career Course (CCC) • Complete Installation Management Transition Course 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned to Garrison Staff Position • Assigned to Garrison HQ BN Staff Position
MAJ (O-4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete Intermediate Level Training (ILE) --- Army or Joint Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned to Garrison HQ BN Staff Position (S3 and/or XO) • Assigned to Regional Support Team (Deputy) • Assigned to IMCOM HQ Staff (Support Staff)
LTC (O-5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete Garrison Pre-Command Course (as required) • Complete Installation Management Senior Management Course 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compete for Garrison Command (BN Level) • Assigned to Regional Support Team (Lead) • Assigned to Region/IMCOM HQ Staff (Deputy Staff)
COL (O-6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete Garrison Pre-Command Course (as required) • Complete Senior Service College (SSC) --- Army or Joint Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compete for Garrison Command (BDE Level) • Assigned to Region/IMCOM HQ Staff (Primary Staff)

Beyond overt organizational change recommendations, incremental improvements to the status quo remain warranted to improve operational and intuitional opportunities. The continued transition or elimination of military coded positions on a Garrison's Table of Distribution and Allowances to DA Civilians exacerbates the military's dearth of Officers with installation experience.⁶⁶ Furthermore, installation management does not currently include successive assignments at the Company, Battalion, and Brigade level to prepare Officers for garrison assignments. One option is to provide Officers with greater opportunities to serve on an installation staff through "broadening assignments." This option allows Officers to gain valuable experience by serving on the installation staff, fill critical installation staff vacancies, or augment existing managerial positions in critical garrison areas such as Director/Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security, Directorate of Public Works, or Resource Management Office. As academia, doctrine, studies, and trends indicate, operational experience remains a vital arrow in a leader's quiver to instill confidence and capability in positions of increased responsibility.

Conclusion

Studying installation management is clearly not a new endeavor. Given the complex strategic environment, however, the Army has a responsibility to reflect on past work, assess lessons learned, and carry that understanding forward to implement change. The Army retains an opportunity to enhance installation leadership by applying resources to develop a core of military leaders, knowledgeable in the complexities of installation management programs and policies, to lead, sustain, and guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future. In a resource-constrained and complex

operating environment, Garrisons require strategic leaders capable of maintaining the foundation of Army readiness, navigating the challenges associated with community partnership, and ensuring joint power-projection capability. Academia and doctrine both support defining garrison leaders in a strategic context while historical studies expose trends supporting change to the current approach for identifying and selecting future garrison leaders. Assessing gaps between strategic context and leadership trends reveals the Army can better serve Soldiers and their Families, as well as accomplish the myriad of complex tasks required at the installation level by creating an Installation Management military career path.

Endnotes

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