Communication Synchronization: Case Studies in Transparency, Systems Understanding and Acceptability

by

Colonel John Dorrian
United States Air Force

United States Army War College
Class of 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		*Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188*
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**		

14. ABSTRACT

There is a broad consensus supporting the importance of information as an element of national power, and that consensus has led to a tremendous outpouring of effort, time and money on "strategic communication." The U.S. government and the U.S. Department of Defense have gone through a variety of initiatives and policy changes in the attempt to establish and maintain credibility and trust with stakeholders. This paper examines past communication cases to assess which concepts seem to advance communication objectives and which ones fail. Credibility, trust, systems understanding and effective civil military relations are required for effective public information programs. Perceptions of disinformation or lack of compliance with civilian control of the military inevitably yield poor results.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Public Information, Public Affairs, Media Embeds, Civilian Casualties, National Guard

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 37	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	**b. ABSTRACT** UU	**c. THIS PAGE** UU	UU		**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER** *(w/ area code)*

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Communication Synchronization: Case Studies in Transparency, Systems Understanding and Acceptability

by

Colonel John Dorrian
United States Air Force

Ms. Carol Kerr
Office of Public Affairs
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title:	Communication Synchronization: Case Studies in Transparency, Systems Understanding and Acceptability
Report Date:	15 April 2014
Page Count:	37
Word Count:	6011
Key Terms:	Public Information, Public Affairs, Media Embeds, Civilian Casualties, National Guard
Classification:	Unclassified

There is a broad consensus supporting the importance of information as an element of national power, and that consensus has led to a tremendous outpouring of effort, time and money on "strategic communication." The U.S. government and the U.S. Department of Defense have gone through a variety of initiatives and policy changes in the attempt to establish and maintain credibility and trust with stakeholders. This paper examines past communication cases to assess which concepts seem to advance communication objectives and which ones fail. Credibility, trust, systems understanding and effective civil military relations are required for effective public information programs. Perceptions of disinformation or lack of compliance with civilian control of the military inevitably yield poor results.

Communication Synchronization: Case Studies in Transparency, Systems Understanding and Acceptability

> I have no doubt that free and well-informed people can and will sift through the increasing volumes of information and over time develop a balanced view of our government, our Armed Forces, and our values and principles.

—Donald H. Rumsfeld[1]

There is a broad consensus at the highest levels of the U.S. government that information is an element of national power, and that the information instrument is important. Over the past 13 years, that consensus intensified and encouraged a tremendous outpouring of effort, time and money on "strategic communication." Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States signed an executive order to create an Office of Global Communication;[2] his Secretary of Defense temporarily stood up an "Office of Strategic Influence;"[3] another president gave a speech in Cairo calling for a "New Beginning" in U.S. relations with the Muslim world[4] and developed a National Framework for Strategic Communications;[5] successive secretaries of defense authorized hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures to create new programs and hire "strategic communication" contractors;[6] a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called upon the military to "get back to basics" of strategic communication;[7] and the Defense Department stood down "strategic communication" as a staff element and created a new term, communication synchronization.[8] Despite all this effort, U.S. Government communicators failed to develop momentum for many initiatives, misapplied resources toward unfocused programs and ultimately, created significant confusion among the agencies they were attempting to serve.

It is clear that communicating strategically in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental multinational environment presented many challenges. First, many

elements of strategic communication were redundant--traditionally performed by public affairs or other staff elements. Second, strategic communication as defined by the Department of Defense is the synchronization of products and activities across federal agencies, but no federal agency had overarching authority to direct coordination and synchronization, nor to identify the goals and metrics to recognize satisfactory accomplishment. Without national-level guidance to the departments and agencies with a role in national security communication, there is no structure or process to determine which efforts required coordination and synchronization, and which could be executed independently. These are just a few of the issues that have not been resolved, and the lack of resolution led to ineffectual coordination, increased bureaucracy, and in some cases ambiguity that led to inappropriate programs such as the Lincoln Group placement of American propaganda in Iraqi newspapers outlined below.

As all this transpired, public information programs continued, disseminating and facilitating media access to information about military operations through briefings, public statements, interviews, response to queries, access to operational units, and equipment, transportation and communications support to the media.[9] In some cases these public affairs programs were effective. Others were reorganized as commands struggled to establish strategic communication as a staff function.[10] But public information has long been an essential part of efforts to communicate overseas and maintain support domestically, and it will remain a core communication function. Releasing information and images through media to the public provides context for military policies and actions, educates stakeholders about the ways we conduct operations and organize, train and equip our forces, undermines the propaganda of the

enemy, and ideally, protects and advances our national, strategic and operational objectives.[11]

The omnipresent news and social media environment exposes U.S. government, coalition and enemy actions to constant review and scrutiny, adding complexity to public communication efforts. In this environment commanders and senior leaders must communicate in a manner that advances U.S. interests, earns and maintains the support of disparate stakeholders and maintains the credibility of the United States. Many of our nation's highest profile military policy and strategy endeavors depend on effective communication efforts—indeed, they have little chance of success in the absence of synchronized, effective communication—much of it through public information programs. Results of these efforts have been uneven—ranging from successful programs that advance organizational objectives, to lackluster performances to embarrassing debacles that reflect poorly on the credibility of the military.

This paper reviews several cases where U.S. military senior leaders and their supporting communication enterprises applied various strategies, principles and operating concepts in an effort to advance or protect important campaigns and service objectives. The first section examines the role of transparency in two case studies. One case assesses U.S. policy on embedded journalists, who add context, transparency and "texture" to media coverage of U.S. military efforts, and one reviews the strategic consequences of International Security Assistance Force policies on release of information about civilian casualties. The second section examines two cases about the communication implications of systems understanding—"how the organization fits within the total DOD framework and into the broader international arena."[12] Both cases, one

domestic and one in Afghanistan, demonstrate that successful communication is

unlikely without a proper understanding of stakeholders and the systems in which they

interact. The third section reveals the effect of military communication strategies on

American civil-military relations by examining four cases: the so-called Revolt of the

Admirals in 1949; perceptions the military was deceptive in the "selling" of progress in

Vietnam 1968-9; damaged public perceptions related to the 2010 Rolling Stone

Magazine coverage of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy in

Afghanistan; and military use of strategic communication contractors in Iraq. The fourth

section presents findings from the previous sections as enduring principles to guide

senior defense leaders as they develop communication strategies to support their

policies and objectives.

<p align="center">Transparent Communication Improves Credibility and Trust</p>

The Department of Defense media embed program during Operation Iraqi

Freedom improved credibility by providing direct access to operations so journalists

could transparently assess progress of the campaign. As the military prepared for

operations to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, the Department of Defense

initiated the program, with the goal of providing "long-term, minimally restrictive access

to U.S. air, ground and naval forces," as they conducted operations.[13] According to

Department of Defense figures, 750 journalists embedded with coalition forces at the

beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including both domestic and international media

like the BBC and Al Jazeera.[14]

The program enabled an unprecedented level of media access and transparency

during planning, build-up, movement, logistics and support activities and operations.

The purpose of embedding was to shape perceptions in the U.S., coalition countries,

and in the countries in which operations occurred.[15] The public affairs guidance that

created the embed program specified the intent to defeat enemy disinformation, which

had the potential of increasing cost and duration of the campaign.[16] Embedded

journalists' objective, third party reporting mitigated of the effects of Iraqi propaganda,[17]

allowed journalists to report on the struggles of coalition forces, and developed

understanding of coalition forces' efforts to reach objectives and avoid civilian

casualties. Some coverage provided gripping accounts of operational progress,

including live battle coverage.[18]

     During 11 years of embedded media operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the

military has supported thousands of journalists. Critics point out the potential for media

to lose their objectivity since the military is providing them sustenance, security and

transportation as part of their embed arrangements;[19] however, reporters, editors and

media executives have continued to use embeds as part of their war coverage. On

some occasions, reporters have complained about the level of access they get through

embedding.[20] Critics also cite the fact that embed journalists present a skewed narrative

from the perspective of the troops, rather than the broader picture that's possible as a

result of "independent" reporting.[21] In addition, journalist embeds can mitigate, but not

solve the dilemma posed by enemy use of smart phones and digital technology for

propaganda purposes.[22] Therefore, neither journalists nor the military can rely on

embeds alone to provide full context to what is happening on the battlefield. In

combining embed reporting with coverage of higher level policy and strategy,

supplemented by "independent" reporting outside the scope of military-controlled areas,

news organizations can broaden and deepen coverage of military operations.[23]

Acknowledging those limitations, most media and military leaders agree that embeds offer journalists and the public a better understanding of the war effort than they would have without them.[24]

Another case study demonstrates the value of transparency and synchronization as important concepts in building credibility with stakeholders. In Afghanistan, civilian casualties resulted from both International Security Assistance Force and Taliban operations, but Taliban insurgents deftly created the perception that ISAF was causing a disproportionate number. In turn, public perceptions caused political problems for President Karzai because of his alignment with ISAF, and he harshly criticized ISAF whenever allegations of civilian casualties emerged.

To understand the significance of civilian casualties in the broader construct of counterinsurgency communication strategy, it is important to examine jihadist communication objectives.

> First, they must legitimate their movement by establishing its social and religious viability while engaging in violent acts that on their face seem to violate the norms of civilized society and the tenets of Islam. Second they aim to propagate their movement by spreading messages to sympathetic audiences in areas where they want to expand. Third they seek to intimidate their opponents. This applies not only to existing enemies but to sympathizers in the Muslim world who might think of turning against them.[25]

Jihadists in Afghanistan have used a variety of tactics to intimidate the population, and the most effective ones are to threaten, and then deliberately harm civilians. While this tactic is effective for intimidation, it is also a vulnerability because it is inconsistent with Islamic teaching—particularly when it comes to harming women and children.[26] One coalition tactic that gradually turned the narrative against jihadists in

Afghanistan and Iraq is to focus public statements on instances in which insurgents acted in a manner inconsistent with the teachings of Islam.[27]

ISAF developed a synchronized approach to the issue of civilian casualties which aligned actions with messages. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' direction to authorize U.S. payments to families of Afghan civilian casualty victims in 2008 credibly addressed the perception that international forces were killing Afghans carelessly, or that they did not value Afghan life.[28] Although the initiative did not reduce civilian casualties, it did demonstrate a level of transparency and good faith that the casualties were unintentional. Next, both General Stanley McChrystal and his successor, General David Petraeus, directed limitations on use of force that were designed to avoid civilian casualties, and ISAF publicly released copies of both generals' guidance.[29] The guidance directed ISAF forces to protect the population of Afghanistan from harm, either from antigovernment forces or from inadvertent harm as ISAF forces fought insurgents.[30] In his 2010 guidance, General Petraeus also directed specific communication tactics to intensify communication regarding civilian casualties, including the release of civilian casualty data to human rights advocates, the U.N. and news media. He specified the purpose in his COIN guidance, calling upon his forces to "Fight the information war aggressively. Challenge disinformation. Turn our enemies' extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them. Hang their barbaric actions like millstones around their necks."[31]

As a result of the limitations on use of force, the number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties began to come down—at the same time that insurgent-caused civilian casualties were increasing.[32] As a result, the UN, human rights groups and media all

noted the transparency of ISAF, mentioned ISAF efforts to avoid civilian casualties, and blamed the Taliban for causing civilian casualties.[33]

Recent news reports suggest the strategy is stressing Taliban efforts to legitimize their movement. Although Taliban spokespersons are able to respond to criticism through the international press, their ability to intimidate the population requires them to intentionally cause civilian casualties. The disconnect between their actions and their words has become a more significant liability, resulting in consistent international criticism from the United Nations and human rights groups.

The formal direction to use transparent, synchronized communication about civilian casualties came nearly eight years after U.S. forces first deployed to Afghanistan. Before that time, the Taliban managed to dodge responsibility for civilian casualties while President Karzai, international advocacy groups and the Taliban criticized international forces. By the time ISAF addressed the problem by changing policies, they were trying to undo years of reputational damage.

Several factors contributed to military leaders' belated decision to embrace a strategy of transparency with stakeholders. In many cases, it was unclear which force caused the casualty, as civilians are caught often in the crossfire between pro- and anti-government forces.[34] Second, President Karzai is mercurial and often irrational, and his condemnations likely reduced the enthusiasm of military leaders to expose themselves to further criticism. And, some believed that releasing information about Taliban intimidation or harming of civilians constituted "free publicity" that helped the Taliban maintain the fear they needed to operate and survive.[35]

In his criticism of coalition forces, President Karzai may have inadvertently set the stage for a challenging communication issue as Afghan government forces take full responsibility for maintaining security throughout the country. Afghan security forces were recently criticized for the number of civilian casualties they committed.[36] The credibility of the Government of Afghanistan will be put to the test as its leaders decide how much information to share about civilian casualties caused by Afghan security forces.

Understanding the Role of Systems in Communication and Consensus-Building

Systems thinking is defined as the "discipline of understanding causal relationships in strategic systems, and identifying means either to alter the conditions within the system to achieve a new equilibrium, or to maintain an existing equilibrium."[37] It is clear that systems understanding is an essential, but challenging element of effective communication strategy. The challenge comes from the difficulty of dealing with complex, adaptive, systems that require a leader to shift his or her frame of reference to include all actors in the decision-making system, or the communication system. If a leader fails to adapt, or worse, fails to develop a baseline of understanding about audiences and systems that affect them, effective communication is unlikely, even with the most elegant talking points.[38]

As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, the political discourse about the size, structure and future capabilities of the U.S. military will continue and intensify. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directed a military that would be smaller, leaner, technologically advanced, and rebalanced toward the Pacific. In addition to the Defense Strategic Guidance, the threat of additional deep cuts from sequestration led politicians at local, state and national level to protect the interests of their

constituencies, sometimes directing their ire at each other, and sometimes at the Defense Department.

This dynamic became clear immediately once the Air Force announced its intent to reduce force structure within the Active duty, the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The National Guard Association of the United States argued against cuts to Air National Guard force structure, criticized the Air Force analysis, and faulted the Air Force for not including Guard leaders in decision-making. The Air Force responded that Guard bureau leadership had been included throughout the force structure process.[39] Governors and members of Congress from both parties joined NGAUS in attacking the Air Force's analysis, citing negative local economic impacts, offering legislation to protect local bases, and proclaiming the criticality of their local Guard missions.[40]

The National Guard, through state adjutants general, has a long history of protecting their interests using close ties to members of Congress and state governors. The adjutants general all report directly to the governors, and the Active Air Force does not have command authority over the Guard.[41] Governors and members of Congress value the millions of federal dollars Guard units bring in local economic impact, so every force structure decision is considered as a threat to jobs or federal dollars for facilities, maintenance and training. In addition, governors value the availability of Guard units to respond to state emergencies—another potent reason for opposing force structure cuts.

At the urging of the Council of Governors[42] and NGAUS, Congress inserted a provision into the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act that created a National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force to review Air Force and Air Guard

analysis and to gather public input about proposed force structure changes; President Obama signed it into law. The commission recently released its analysis, recommending larger roles for the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. In parallel, the Air Force created a Total Force Task Force to conduct similar analysis and seek ways to bring the Active duty, Guard and Reserve components of the Air Force together. The Air Force recently announced its intent to transition the task force into a permanent "Total Force Continuum" to assure implementation of the commission and task force findings and integrate the total force into future budget proposals. However, by the time these institutional reforms were in place, the Air Force's influence in the force structure process had been largely usurped by the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. Relations between the Active, the Guard and the Reserve had been deeply undercut, and powerful stakeholders' trust in Air Force leaders had been undermined.[43]

After the initial force structure proposal was rebuffed by Congress, the Air Force continued to push for cuts to the Guard through members of the House Armed Services Committee. The second effort also failed, further alienating Guard supporters and ultimately leading to their endorsement of a national commission to assure their interests were openly and transparently considered.[44] Governor Branstad, whom the Air Force had frustrated with their lack of transparency, became co-Chairman of the Council of Governors.

The power of National Guard-associated stakeholders has long been demonstrated and understood, suggesting an Air Force Headquarters strategy of engagement and close management of their disparate interests driven by intent to build

11

public consensus.[45] What in fact occurred was the opposite strategy—the Air Force

used nondisclosure agreements in an attempt to keep its force structure proposal

secret, which generated suspicion and resentment in the Guard. Governor Terry

Branstad of Iowa summed up his frustration with this tactic in Congressional testimony:

> One item we have identified that contributed to this year's challenges was the Air Force's requirement that National Guard Bureau officials sign non-disclosure agreements on the budget process. Such a requirement creates an unnecessarily restrictive process that fails to adequately incorporate critical information from states. The National Guard Bureau is statutorily required to serve as the channel of communications between states and the President and Secretary of Defense. Unnecessarily restricting the ability to share discreet but critical information with governors and their TAGs limits the flow of information and has resulted in disagreements that could have been largely avoided.[46]

Strategically, the Air Force may have fared better, and would almost certainly

have retained more credibility and trust, had leadership actively and transparently

engaged powerful stakeholders early in the force structure process. The U.S. Army is

currently considering its force structure and the ramifications of significant budget cuts.

Gen Raymond Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, recently announced that if the Army is

forced to take cuts below 490,000 soldiers, that the Guard and the Reserve would have

to be cut too. His justification, that the Guard is "not interchangeable" with the active

component, elicited an angry response from Guard proponents, who have called for a

national commission on the structure of the Army.[47] The high power, high interest nature

of the stakeholders for the Army force structure decision suggests it would be

appropriate to adopt a strategy of transparent consensus building, rather than

confrontation.

Systems understanding becomes even more challenging in a joint, interagency,

intergovernmental, multinational context, because the number of actors in the system

increases exponentially. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush

used an executive order to create the Office of Global Communication, which he

charged with assisting efforts to communicate timely and accurate information about the

American people and their government.[48] From the start, communication efforts were

based on the conventional "message influence" model of communication, with very little

analysis of the multiple audiences and systems involved. The model assumes that by

sending concise, simple messages and repeating them or "changing channels" to

overcome "noise" in the system, that communication will be received and understood by

the receiver.[49] The military followed the White House in use of this model, and it remains

the dominant model in use by U.S. military and government officials today. A U.S. Army

officer summed up the strategy upon his redeployment from Iraq.

> For years, commercial advertisers have based their advertisement
> strategies on the premise that there is a positive correlation between the
> number of times a consumer is exposed to product advertisements and
> that consumer's inclination to sample a new product. The very same
> principle applies to how we influence our target audiences when we
> conduct COIN.[50]

The officer went on to explain how this principle was applied in a coalition

attempt to portray Iraqi Security Force successes through a combination of billboards,

handbills, radio, and television advertisements that aired several times a day across

multiple radio and TV stations.[51]

Unfortunately, the complexity of selling a new product pales in comparison to the

political discourse that ensues as a result of conflict. First, military public affairs

practitioners are bound by regulation to tell the truth, uncluttered by the hyperbole found

in typical commercial product advertising.[52] Second, and even more important, such

strategies fail to recognize the roles of history, culture, power relations, local conditions,

autobiography or other factors that play into the target audience's translation of the message into "meanings."[53] For example, if the target audience contains large numbers of people who had been victimized by corrupt warlords before the Taliban were in power, it may be inappropriate to build support by using images that portray Afghan National Police in a positive light. Corruption within the nascent service has not yet been adequately addressed, so repeating positive messages could lead to a reinforced perception in the population that the U.S. government and the Government of Afghanistan don't understand, or don't care, about the problem.[54]

The "pragmatic complexity" model states that communication occurs within a complex system in which the participants continuously send and react to each others' behavior, and evaluate behavior under the prism of their expectations, interpretations and attributions.[55] The model does not make the promise of quick, decisive influence. In fact, its premise places "failure" in context, calling for leaders to "expect and plan for failure," "deemphasize control and embrace complexity," "replace repetition with variation," and to "consider disruptive moves."[56] To be clear, the expectation of failure is not referring to ultimate failure of communication efforts; it is explaining the need for flexibility, contingency planning and expectation management.

Expectation management may indeed be one of the more underappreciated elements of communication strategy efforts. The United States had reduced involvement in Afghanistan between the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989 and September 11, 2001, and was therefore starting from scratch in attempting to understand the diverse actors in a fractured Afghan society.[57] Afghanistan's weak institutions and infrastructure, dispersed population, diverse cultural landscape,

daunting terrain and high rate of illiteracy made engagement and communication even more of a challenge. In short, it was unrealistic to believe the military could use commercial advertising messaging techniques to establish influence with the Afghan population. The delay in adopting more pragmatic communication strategy has allowed the Taliban to continue exploiting ISAF's ignorance of Afghanistan's culture and local conditions. The new Strategic Landpower initiative, which places emphasis on social science and a more persistent presence for U.S. forces, is consistent with the imperative to improve understanding of stakeholders and the systems in which they reside.[58]

<center>Disinformation and Civil-Military Relations</center>

The military in American society is one of the nation's most respected institutions, but the respect is not guaranteed—it is earned through competence, subordination of self-interest and accountability.[59] Disinformation, the intentional dissemination of false or inaccurate information, and communication that is not consistent with civilian control of the military are practices that commonly lead to poor outcomes. The following four cases capture the effect of such practices on credibility, trust and civil-military relations.

The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals is a case in which senior military officers colluded with civilian counterparts, using disinformation to undermine senior civilian leadership for service-specific goals. Senior Navy officers, led by Chief of Navy Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld, sought funding for a new super-carrier, the *United States*, at the expense of the newly-created U.S. Air Force B-36 bomber. When Defense Secretary Louis Johnson ordered the cancellation of the *United States*, the Navy responded with a bogus memo leaked to Congress, alleging fraud and corruption within the Air Force B-36 program.[60] The memo caused a media firestorm and led to

<center>15</center>

congressional hearings which ultimately exonerated the Air Force and led to the memo's author, civilian assistant to the Undersecretary of the Navy Cedric Worth, being fired, along with several other Navy senior officers. Even after the Air Force program was exonerated, the Navy continued to fight "unification" of the services into a single Department of Defense. Ultimately, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley testified before Congress, criticizing the Navy for "open rebellion against the civilian control" and condemning the insubordination, dishonesty and lack of discipline of the Navy's senior leaders.[61] The Air Force purchased the B-36, and Denfeld was relieved for ethical lapses and enabling senior officers to operate outside expected standards of civilian control of the military.[62]

The Vietnam-era civil-military lapse was related in large part to perceptions the military leadership had misled the public. Military senior leaders in the 1960s had been shaped by the experience of World War II, during which journalists readily cooperated with the Office of Censorship, which generally assured that news reports presented a sanitized version of events from both theaters.[63] In fact, reporters commonly agreed to abide by a voluntary "Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press" which restricted reporting in the interest of operational security.[64]

By the time the Vietnam conflict occurred, the media landscape had evolved substantially and war correspondents did not routinely submit to censorship. Their unsanitized reports and images brought the horrors of war into American homes and fueled wide criticism of the war effort. As a result, some military leaders criticized the media for being unpatriotic and unwilling to help the war effort. Journalist Peter Arnett, a

member of the Associated Press' Saigon bureau during the Vietnam conflict, specifically recalled Admiral Harry D. Felt's admonition to "get on the team."[65]

The Tet Offensive of 1968 vastly changed the public discourse regarding the war. The size of the attack discredited commanding General William Westmoreland's previous optimistic claims of steady progress toward victory and created a propaganda coup for the North Vietnamese.[66] The fact that the Tet offensive was actually a military defeat for the North Vietnamese was generally lost on the American public, but it wasn't lost on the military. The effects of reporting on Tet were immediate and lasting, and they were compounded further by New York Times reporting of the "Pentagon Papers," which alleged that the Johnson administration had lied about Vietnam to the public and to Congress.[67] In the wake of Vietnam, media became suspicious of the Pentagon "official line;" members of the public who expressed "a great deal of confidence" in military leadership plummeted to 32%;[68] and the military developed skepticism about the value of media engagement and transparency.[69]

The military's handling of media in subsequent conflicts—Grenada, Panama, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the military intervention in Haiti reflected this reduced level of trust and access for media, with strict controls placed upon media access and reduced efforts to give media access to the front lines. Media responded with sharp criticism of the military, citing the public's right to know and speculating about the military's motives for reducing access.[70]

The embedded journalist trip and subsequent *Rolling Stone* magazine article that led to General Stanley McChrystal's resignation was later investigated by the Department of Defense Inspector General, who could not corroborate the insubordinate

statements alleged in the article. However, the mere possibility of such insubordination was unacceptable and widely viewed as undermining the cohesion of President Obama's national security team. The President's statement made clear that the breach of civil-military relations was the reason he let McChrystal go.

> The conduct represented in the recently published article does not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general. It undermines the civilian control of the military that is at the core of our democratic system. And it erodes the trust that's necessary for our team to work together to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan.[71]

The military has longstanding regulations and doctrine that military personnel are to tell the truth, and that accurate information should be provided in a timely fashion.[72] Nevertheless, a media firestorm ensued in 2005 when the Los Angeles Times reported that a military contractor, the Lincoln Group, was paying Iraqi media outlets to publish news reports written by U.S. military writers, and that the U.S. military had also taken over an Iraqi newspaper and a radio station.[73] Although basically accurate, the Iraqi-published reports were not balanced, and misled readers about the U.S. military source. In some cases stories were written as if they had been generated by Iraqis. The White House distanced itself from the program, and members of Congress demanded that the Defense Department explain the purpose of the initiative. Later a Department of Defense review determined that no rules or regulations had been broken. However, the Defense Department never answered questions about the appropriateness of a communication strategy that places unattributed media stories in a manner that undermined what Secretary Rumsfeld cited as one of Iraq's successes—the growth of free press.[74] Notably, no military or Department of Defense employee directly involved in the program would comment for the *Los Angeles Times* story, nor would any employee of the Lincoln Group.[75]

Such programs should not have been a surprise. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Defense Department created the Office of Strategic Influence, which was intended to influence global audiences. Anonymous sources leaked the plans to the press, including consideration of plans to "to provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign news organizations."[76] The resulting media furor forced Secretary Rumsfeld to cancel the program, but he later explained to media that the concepts of the OSI had continued:

> And then there was the office of strategic influence. You may recall that.
> And "oh my goodness gracious isn't that terrible, Henny Penny the sky is
> going to fall." I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to
> savage this thing fine I'll give you the corpse. There's the name. You can
> have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to
> be done and I have.[77]

Providing disinformation to either U.S. or foreign press is controversial, and members of Congress, interagency partners, and senior officials within the Department of Defense are on record disagreeing with such programs. Those dissenting views find their way into the press, undermine public support and place valuable information operations programs under pressure. There have been few, if any, measures of effectiveness indicating that manipulation of foreign press has influenced target audiences.[78] In short, the blurring of lines between public information programs and information operations has not been proven to significantly influence target audiences, but it does appear to undermine domestic support. The programs' lack of consistency with freedom of the press makes them counterproductive and not executable as an interagency effort.

Conclusions

Transparency Enhances Trust and Credibility

Both media embeds and ISAF's handling of civilian casualties in Afghanistan are examples of how synchronized, transparent communication enhances the credibility of coalition efforts. Violent extremists like the Taliban cannot match the transparency effort because they rely on intimidation to continue their influence, and the mismatch between their actions and their words reduces their credibility. Afghan media outlets have joined international media, the United Nations and human rights groups in attributing most civilian casualties to the Taliban. The government of Afghanistan can maintain the pressure on the Taliban by avoiding civilian casualties and being transparent about any civilian casualty incidents government forces cause.

Media embeds enable journalists to evaluate the effectiveness of theater strategy, reduce the effectiveness of enemy propaganda, and document military efforts in a transparent, credible way. Although tactical setbacks are likely to be a part of the resulting coverage, allowing media observation of the campaign at tactical level improves media, and as a result, public understanding of the sacrifice and dedication of coalition forces.

Achieving Trust and Influence Takes Time

It was unrealistic to have expected immediate influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, given the lack of understanding that coalition forces had for stakeholders in those countries at the beginning of both conflicts. A consistent approach that emphasizes long term engagement and persistent presence is likely to yield more influence than activities under the "message influence" model. Along with more persistent engagement, additional study of culture and social science holds promise for improving trust with

stakeholders—a prerequisite for influence in the "human domain."[79] As landpower

advocates are fond of saying, "you can't surge trust.[80]" Logically then, you can't surge

influence.

Synchronization of Enduring Themes is Critical

Synchronization is the way our government achieves consistency in our actions,

words and images. Actions demonstrate themes in a tangible way, and words and

images shape the meaning that stakeholders assign to the action they are observing. If

any element of this "communication trinity" is not aligned with the others, the

communication effort is likely to fail. Synchronization is essential to preclude

"information fratricide." For the issue of civilian casualties, the military took the lead;

however, for other issues like development or governance, it is probably appropriate for

other agencies to take the lead in coordinating communication efforts. Coordination

between strategic and tactical efforts is important as well—media embeds assess the

viability of strategy as they observe its implementation at tactical level. If tactical level

personnel don't have a basic understanding of their role in implementing the overall

strategy, do not appear to be implementing the strategy or if the strategy does not

appear to be working, communication efforts are likely to fail.

Communication Efforts Are Adversely Impacted by Poor Systems Understanding

Military leaders play an advisory role in policy—particularly when their decisions

affect the flow of resources to powerful stakeholders. Understanding the communication

environment is critical, whether communicating in a theater environment like

Afghanistan or within the context of domestic political discourse. In either case, systems

understanding underpins the development of strategy. It is systems understanding that

informs strategic leaders how best to manage stakeholders. Likewise, systems

understanding informs a theater commander that COIN and "pragmatic complexity" communication strategies[81] are the correct course in a theater like Afghanistan or Iraq.

Communication Efforts, Accountability and Civil-Military Relations

Disinformation presented to domestic or foreign press results in loss of credibility, as does information that is perceived to "blur the lines" between public information and disinformation. Likewise, military senior leaders who communicate in a manner inconsistent with the concept of civilian control of the military risk more than ineffective communication—their continued ability to serve is at risk. Commanders should use their supporting public affairs office to coordinate with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (P) (Global Engagement) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to assess the viability of public communication initiatives. The purpose of the coordination is to assess the risk of the programs to the credibility of the theater commander and the Department of Defense. These two offices will have a deep understanding of the acceptability of such programs to the administration, to Congress and to the press. The bottom line is that the program can be perfectly legal but still fail the "acceptability" test because of its counterproductive effect on domestic audiences and stakeholders. Ultimately, the credibility of the Department of Defense and the commander are more important than any temporary advantage to be gained with unilateral implementation of a public information effort.

Endnotes

[1] Donald Rumsfeld, "War of the Words," *The Wall Street Journal Online*, July 18, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB112164930948087989 (accessed March 6, 2014).

[2] *White House Office of Global Communications Home Page,* http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/ (accessed March 2, 2014).

[3] Lynne Duke, "The Word at War," The *Washington Post Online,* March 26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/AR2006032500983.html (accessed March 9, 2014).

[4] President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on a New Beginning," June 4, 2009, linked from *The White House Home Page* at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09 (accessed March 15, 2014).

[5] President Barack Obama, "National Framework for Strategic Communication," https://www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf (accessed March 9, 2014).

[6] Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, "U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly," *USA Today Online,* February 29, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-29/afghanistan-iraq-military-information-operations-usa-today-investigation/53295472/1 (accessed February 9, 2014).

[7] U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, "Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics," *Joint Forces Quarterly,* 4th Quarter 2009, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Strategic%20Communication%20JFQ%20-%20Mullen.pdf (accessed March 15, 2014).

[8] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little, "Communications Synchronization—a Local Coordination Process," Memorandum for Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Washington DC, November 28, 2012.

[9] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs,* Joint Publication 3-61, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) August 25, 2010, III-1.

[10] Erik Holmes, "Public Affairs, Strategic Communications Merge," *Air Force Times Online,* November 17, 2008, http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20081117/NEWS/811170347/Public-affairs-strategic-communications-merge (accessed March 10, 2014).

[11] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs,* Joint Publication 3-61, I-2.

[12] Stephen Gerras, *Strategic Leader Primer*, 3rd Edition, (Carlisle PA: Department of Command, Leadership and Management, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 31.

[13] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)," Washington DC, January 17, 2003.

[14] David Vaina, "The Vanishing Embedded Reporter in Iraq," *Pew Research Journalism Project,* October 26, 2006, http://www.journalism.org/2006/10/26/the-vanishing-embedded-reporter-in-iraq/ (accessed April 4, 2014).

[15] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)."

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ NBC News, "Iraq War 10 Years Later: Where Are They Now? Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf ('Baghdad Bob')," *NBC News Online,* entry posted March 19, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/19/17374006-iraq-war-10-years-later-where-are-they-now-mohammed-saeed-al-sahaf-baghdad-bob?lite (March 12, 2014).

¹⁸ Amy Mitchell, et al., "Embedded Reporters," *Pew Research Journalism Project,* April 3, 2003, http://www.journalism.org/2003/04/03/embedded-reporters/ (accessed April 4, 2014).

¹⁹ Stephen Farrell, "Embedistan," *The New York Times Online,* June 25, 2010, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/embedistan-2/ (accessed February 17, 2014).

²⁰ Heath Druzin, "Positive Spin? Some messages from military not entirely accurate," *Stars and Stripes Online,* June 11, 2013, http://www.stripes.com/positive-spin-some-messages-from-military-not-entirely-accurate-1.225393 (accessed April 4, 2014).

²¹ Andrew Linder, "Controlling the Media in Iraq," *Contexts,* Spring 2008, http://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/04/contexts_spring08_lindner.pdf (accessed March 9, 2014).

²² Rumsfeld, "War of the Words."

²³ Ibid; Farrell, "Embedistan."

²⁴ Tom Rosenstiel et al, "Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans Getting?" *Project for Excellence in Journalism,* April 3, 2003, http://www.journalism.org/files/legacy/pejembedreport.pdf (accessed March 15, 2014).

²⁵ Steven R. Corman and Jill S. Schiefelbein, "Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of Ideas," April 20, 2006, http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/119.pdf (accessed online January 29, 2014).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Dennis Murphy, "In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication," *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-2010): 105, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09winter/murphy.pdf (accessed January 28, 2014).

²⁹ Stanley McChrystal, "ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance," http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf (accessed December 12, 2013); David Petraeus, "COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance," *Stars and Stripes Online,* August 1, 2010, http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.113197.1280774784!/menu/standard/file/COMISAF's%20COIN%20Guidance,%201Aug10.pdf (accessed December 12, 2013).

³⁰ Petraeus, "COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance."

[31] Ibid.

[32] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (New York: United Nations, March 2011), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf (accessed April 8, 2014).

[33] John Bohannon, "Counting the Dead in Afghanistan," *Science*, March 11, 2011, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6022/1256.full (accessed online December 10, 2013).

[34] Jan Kubis, "Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," February 2014, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf (accessed February 17, 2014).

[35] Nushin Arbabzadah, "The All New, Same Old Taliban," *The Guardian,* August 6, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/06/taliban-new-manifesto-afghanistan-elections (accessed March 15, 2014).

[36] Ibid.

[37] Andrew Hill, "An Introduction to Complex Adaptive Systems," https://app.box.com/files/0/f/1015890913/1/f_9552195447 (accessed April 13, 2014).

[38] Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall, "A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity," April 3, 2007, http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/114.pdf (accessed January 25 2014).

[39] Kate Brannen and Marcus Weisgerber, "U.S. Air Force, Air Guard Lock Horns over Cuts," *Defense News Online,* March 12, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120312/DEFREG02/303120002/U-S-Air-Force-Air-Guard-Lock-Horns-Over-Cuts (accessed February 8, 2014).

[40] Office of U.S. Senator Jerry Moran, "Sen. Moran Offers Amendment to Protect National Guard Role in Cyber Missions," November 20, 2014, http://www.moran.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=f94bd7ff-ad50-43a4-badf-5b223eb6ee5b (accessed February 8, 2014).

[41] Jim Drinkard, "National Guard Has Formidable Lobbying Power," *USA Today Online*, December 17 2001, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/12/17/guard-politics.htm (accessed online February 9, 2014).

[42] The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed a Council of Governors to address matters pertaining to the National Guard, Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Council, which was formally established in 2010, is made up of five governors from each party appointed by the president. The organization has proven effective at aligning state interests and intensifying pressure on the federal government.

[43] Sydney Freedberg Jr., "Guard Association Decries 'End Run' To Push Cuts through Conference – BREAKING," *Breaking Defense*, December 13, 2012,

http://breakingdefense.com/2012/12/guard-association-decries-end-run-to-push-cuts-through-confere/ (accessed online February 22, 2014).

[44] National Guard Association of the United States, "HASC Members, Air Force Trying 'End Run' on Air Guard Budget Talks," http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/news/hasc-members-air-force-trying-end-run-air-guard-budget-talks (accessed February 22, 2014).

[45] Gerras, *Strategic Leader Primer, 3rd Edition,* 32.

[46] Iowa Governor Terry Branstad, *Department of the Air Force Aircraft Force Structure Reductions Proposed in the 2013 President's Budget Request,* House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness, July 12, 2012, 4.

[47] Paul McLeary, "Trouble Brewing between US Army's Active Duty and Guard Forces," *Defense News Online,* January 13, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG02/301130024/Trouble-Brewing-Between-US-Army-s-Active-Duty-Guard-Forces (accessed January 28, 2014).

[48] *White House Office of Global Communications Home Page.*

[49] Corman, Trethewey and Goodall, "A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity."

[50] Ralph O. Baker, "Information Operations: From Good to Great," *Military Review,* July-August 2011, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20110831_art004.pdf (accessed January 27, 2014).

[51] Ibid.

[52] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs,* Joint Publication 3-61, I-7.

[53] Corman, Tretheway and Goodall, "A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity."

[54] Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham, and Lee Rowland, "The Effectiveness of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND Missed the Point," December 2012, http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/library/central-asian-series/20121214_Whyrandmissedthepoint_U_1202a.pdf (accessed March 15, 2014).

[55] Corman, Tretheway, and Goodall, "A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity."

[56] Ibid.

[57] Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 24, 2002), 2.

[58] Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, "Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills," *Strategic Landpower White Paper*, 2013,

http://www.ausa.org/news/2013/Documents/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper%20May%202013.pdf (accessed March 1, 2014).

[59] Andrew Hill, Leonard Wong, and Stephen Gerras, "The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military," *American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1056 (accessed April 4, 2014).

[60] Phillip Meilinger, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," *Parameters* XIX, no. 3 (September 1989): 91, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211927.pdf (accessed March 1, 2014); Keith D. McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals," *Parameters,* 1980, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1981/1981%20mcfarland.pdf (accessed March 9, 2014).

[61] McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals."

[62] Phillip Meilinger, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today."

[63] PBS, "News and Censorship," September 2007, http://www.pbs.org/thewar/at_home_communication_news_censorship.htm (accessed February 23, 2014)

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ralph Blumenthal, "Images of Vietnam That Divided an Era," *New York Times Online,* September 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/arts/design/images-of-the-vietnam-war-that-defined-an-era.html?_r=0 (accessed February 26, 2014).

[66] R.W. Apple, "25 Years Later; Lessons from the Pentagon Papers," *New York Times Online,* June 23, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/23/weekinreview/25-years-later-lessons-from-the-pentagon-papers.html?ref=pentagonpapers (accessed February 27, 2014).

[67] Ibid.

[68] David King and Zachary Karabell, *The Generation of Trust: How the U.S. Military Has Regained the Public's Confidence since Vietnam* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2003), 20.

[69] Alexander Alben describes how the rancor over Vietnam continued well after the conflict, when General Westmoreland sued CBS News for libel after a *60 Minutes* broadcast claimed he ordered suppression of unfavorable intelligence reports to avoid a "political firestorm." Ultimately, Westmoreland agreed to an out-of-court settlement with CBS after some of his subordinates corroborated CBS' story. The suit became one of the most well-known libel cases in history. For more information, see "The Truth Defense - Lessons Learned from Westmoreland v. CBS," *Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review,* March 1, 1990, http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1189&context=elr (accessed March 9, 2014).

[70] Pascale Combelles-Siegel, "The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today," May 1996, linked from *The United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Home Page* at "Publications,"

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=325 (accessed February 26, 2014); Richard Halloran, "The Pentagon; Weinberger and the Press: An Ebb and Flow," *The New York Times Online,* August 25, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/25/us/the-pentagon-weinberger-and-the-press-an-ebb-in-the-flow.html (accessed February 17, 2014); "Military Censorship Lives," *The New York Times Online,* September 21, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/21/opinion/military-censorship-lives.html (Accessed February 17, 2014).

[71] Major Garrett and Associated Press, "Obama Relieves McChrystal Over Critical Remarks, Names Petraeus as Replacement," *Foxnews*, June 23, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/23/mcchrystal-afghanistan-fate/ (accessed March 9, 2014); Thom Schanker, "Pentagon Inquiry Into Article Clears McChrystal and Aides," *The New York Times Online,* April 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/politics/19military.html (accessed March 9, 2014).

[72] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication 3-61 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 25, 2010), X.

[73] Mark Mazzetti and Borzou Daragahi, "U.S. Military Covertly Pays to Run Stories in Iraqi Press," *The Los Angeles Times,* November 30, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/30/world/fg-infowar30 (accessed February 9, 2014).

[74] Thom Shanker, No Breach Seen in Work in Iraq on Propaganda," *The New York Times,* March 22, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/politics/22lincoln.html?ex=1300683600&en=3bc7b03a5c92b0b2&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0 (accessed February 9, 2014).

[75] Mazzetti and Daragahi, "U.S. Military Covertly Pays to Run Stories in Iraqi Press."

[76] Jeff Gerth, "Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive," *The New York Times Online,* December 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/politics/11propaganda.html?pagewanted=all (accessed March 8, 2014).

[77] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Chile," November 18, 2002, linked from the *U.S. Department of Defense Home Page* at "News Transcripts," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3296 (accessed March 9, 2014).

[78] Arturo Munoz, "U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010," 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.sum.pdf (accessed February 19, 2014); Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, "U.S. 'Info Ops' Programs Dubious, Costly."

[79] Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, "Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills."

[80] John Grady, "USMC Commandant: 'You Can't Surge Trust,'" *USNI News Online,* April 10, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2013/04/10/usmc-commandant-you-cant-surge-trust (accessed February 12, 2014).

[81] Corman, Trethewey and Goodall, "A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity."