

Missing Element of Modernization: The U.S. Army Constabulary Brigade

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Abstract

The U.S. military has experienced tremendous success in winning the conventional combat phases of its wars since World War II, but struggles to win the peace during post-combat hostilities. Informed by the lessons of OIF and the historical success of the U.S. Zone Constabulary in Germany after WWII, the Army should develop conventional units focused on a hybrid combination of stability and limited Irregular Warfare operations. These units, referred to in this paper as U.S. Army Constabulary Brigades, serve as a force modernization effort that supports “the process of improving the Army’s force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.” Constabulary brigades balance the efforts of the U.S. military’s unmatched ability to succeed in conventional warfare, and its decade’s long struggle to win the peace during post-conflict stability operations. Several options exist for forming a constabulary force including reassignment of stability operations as service specific roles and converting existing structure to fill this capability gap. This paper recommends the U.S. Army convert selected BCTs to constabulary brigades, who serve as soldier-police trained and focused on stability and limited IW operations.

Missing Element of Modernization: The U.S. Army Constabulary Brigade

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan display a recurring theme the United States has experienced since the end of World War II: America possesses unmatched ability to wage conventional warfare, but still experiences “military frustration, stalemate, and loss”¹ in seeking a victorious outcome to its major wars. The U.S. military holds the world’s most technologically advanced aircraft, ships, tanks, and weapons, yet none of these high-tech capabilities have enabled America to achieve favorable, lasting outcomes in four of five major conflicts since the end of World War II: Korea, Vietnam, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).² The fifth major conflict, Operation Desert Storm, displayed the tremendous power of the U.S. military’s conventional warfighting capacity against an advanced military adversary, but the outcome of the war fell short of a WWII style unconditional surrender.³ Under the fear of a Vietnam-like quagmire, U.S. military and political leaders hastened the end of Desert Storm as military objectives and “Weinberger-Powell doctrine” exit strategy conditions were satisfied, preventing the U.S. from continuing the war beyond major combat operations (MCO) and into the post-war stability and governance phases that plagued the other four wars.⁴

Twelve years after the U.S. successfully drove the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, the second war in Iraq displayed a military endeavor where the U.S. once again demonstrated its overwhelming ability to dominate in combat. However, with fears of the failed Vietnam counterinsurgency forgotten and confidence in U.S. military superiority high, OIF quickly fell into chaos as the war transitioned from conventional to irregular warfare (IW).⁵ The initial planning, force projection, and attack into Iraq revealed the power of a U.S. military that seemed

invincible, but the weapons, training, planning, and leadership behind the success of the “shock and awe” conventional phase of the invasion proved ineffective in creating a secure and stable post-combat environment.

The lack of a cohesive “whole of government” approach to develop a unified post-war occupation strategy holds much of the responsibility for the post-war failures. An essential element of the solution, the U.S. military’s pre-war focus on MCO at the expense of properly anticipating, planning, and preparing for post-combat stability operations holds military leaders at every level culpable for this oversight.⁶ An example of these uncoordinated efforts, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the governing body established by the U.S. to transition Iraq’s government after the end of hostilities, enacted hasty decisions to eliminate Baath Party leadership, disband the Iraqi military, and dismiss indigenous police forces without proper military coordination, creating an enormous power vacuum that quickly overwhelmed the military’s ability to manage Iraq’s unstable, post-war security environment.⁷ These combinations of misinformed political policies, inadequately sized occupying forces, and troops untrained and unprepared to conduct post-war stability operations provided the recipe that allowed Iraq’s sectarian violence and lawlessness to grow unchecked into a powerful post-combat insurgency.

A set of tasks aimed at establishing a safe and secure environment, providing essential government services, conducting emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and providing humanitarian relief, stability operations serve as one of the triad of missions of the Army’s Decisive Action (DA) concept for unified land operations.⁸ The other two tasks, offensive and defensive operations, dominated OIF war plans, and continue to

remain the focus of today's readiness and modernization efforts. Army leadership and emerging doctrine recognizes the significant security challenges and complex operating environments anticipated in future conflicts, but continue to perpetuate the requirement for the same combat formations charged with conducting offensive and defensive operations to simultaneously conduct stability tasks. While this approach addresses one potential solution to fulfill stability operations requirements, it fails to acknowledge the historical significance stability operations play in achieving the nation's strategic objectives, dooming future military efforts to the same fate as OIF.

This paper argues that the most effective means to prevent repeated post-war failures, similar to the one experienced in OIF, requires the U.S. Army to invest significant resources into developing force structure charged primarily with execution of stability operations and limited IW tasks. Joint Publication 1-02 defines stability operations as:

an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.⁹

Stability operations require a concerted effort between military, Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and non-U.S. and host nation partners to achieve successful conditions for host nation governance and capacity.¹⁰ Informed by the lessons of OIF and evolving doctrine on the conduct of stability operations, the Army should develop conventional units focused on a hybrid combination of the stability tasks outlined in ADRP 3-07 and the joint operational concept for IW operations. These units, referred to in this paper as U.S. Army Constabulary Brigades, serve as a modernization effort that supports "the process of

improving the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration."¹¹ Constabulary brigades balance the efforts of the U.S. military's unmatched ability to succeed in conventional warfare, and its decades long struggle to win the peace during post-conflict stability operations.

The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) acknowledges this gap between the General Purpose Forces (GPF) focus on conventional warfighting and their lack of organization, training, education, and equipping aimed at conducting "protracted IW on a global scale in the current or envisioned future operational environments."¹² Defined as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)," IW serves as a major activity during stability operations requiring a shift in mindset from the decisive action and overwhelming combat power approach used in conventional warfare.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) currently serves as the primary joint capability assigned to conduct the IW tasks of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Forces Augmentation (SFA), and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, but training and employing the constabulary brigade for these tasks provides a larger, more persistent force to assist with, or assume responsibility for, these missions.¹³ The employment of ad hoc formations such as the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and Military Transition Teams (MITTs) used in Iraq and Afghanistan have fallen short of achieving the IW mindset needed to win the popular support and legitimacy required for successful stability operations.

In their thesis on IW operations, Painter, Weaver, and White point out improper organizational structure as a causal factor for the post-MCO failures in Afghanistan and

Iraq, and recommend formation of a separate DoD organization designed solely for operating in the IW environment.¹⁴ Understanding the limitations of creating additional force structure in the military's current resource constrained environment, the U.S. Army already possesses formations suited to assume the constabulary role and mission with no additional growth required. By converting one light infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in each U.S. Army active duty and National Guard light division to a constabulary brigade, the Army can modernize its conventional formations to include a large, dedicated, and highly trained pool of Soldiers ready to manage the stability and IW challenges of any operational environment.

Unfortunately, the preponderance of the U.S. military's financial resources and doctrinal concepts continue to modernize the force to win the next conventional war at the cost of investing in trained and ready forces tailored to win in the post-combat phases of war. Volumes of academic papers, books, and after action reviews (AARs) underscore the U.S. Army's capability gap in executing stability and IW operations, but modernization efforts remain focused on major weapons systems and technologies aimed at defeating conventional enemy combat forces and enemy actors such as insurgents and terrorists, not on gaining and controlling influence over the indigenous populations and political climate of the operational environment (OE)¹⁵.

Conventional forces have very little training and expertise in maintaining law and order, establishing essential services, and enabling good governance, all essential competencies of a military attempting to create post-war stability.¹⁶ Filling this capability gap requires balancing modernization efforts between materiel and human solutions, ensuring organizational structure remains as relevant to the future operating

environment as modernized weapons systems. Taking a page from the post-WWII Germany playbook, it's time for the U.S. Army to modernize its formations for the future, and resurrect the U.S. Army Constabulary.

History of the U.S. Army Constabulary

Formed in the aftermath of Germany's surrender in World War II, the U.S. Constabulary, also known as the U.S. Army Zone Constabulary, employed nearly 40,000 U.S. Soldiers who provided civil and military security, enforced good governance, and controlled the borders of the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany. New York Herald reporter, Robert Strand, summarized the mission of the constabulary in his 1952 article on the unit's deactivation:

The Constabulary functioned as a fast, hard-hitting police force providing protection for a disorganized Germany. It controlled displaced persons over which Germans had no authority, watched borders and frequently was involved in dramatic raids breaking up black-market and smuggling operations. It also served as a mobile striking force giving military protection to the German zone.¹⁷

Referred to as the "Blitz Polizei" by the Germans, constabulary soldiers wore distinctive uniforms with yellow scarves, shoelaces, and gloves, Sam Brown belts, and striped helmets with a distinctive "Circle C" emblem on the front.¹⁸ Leaders of the U.S. Constabulary carefully screened and selected every soldier-policeman of the constabulary force, who received specialized training in law enforcement, criminal investigations, border security, and other policing actions. To ensure quality control of constabulary actions in the field, the unit's first commanding general, Major General Ernest Harmon, formed the U.S. Constabulary School at Sonthofen. The academy provided three phases of instruction starting with cadre training, three months of field

solider training, and an on-the-job final phase to ensure complete indoctrination into the duties and functions of the constabulary force.¹⁹

As outlined in the United States Constabulary Zone Trooper's Handbook, the duties of the constabulary force included operating permanent and temporary road blocks, participating in planned raids, cooperating with the established US and German (Austrian) law enforcement and investigative agencies, and assisting in apprehension and detention of arrested individuals.²⁰ Formed into troops equipped with jeeps, motorcycles, horses, and armored command vehicles with heavy weapons, the units operated highly dispersed throughout the Zone of Occupation, requiring tremendous discipline and integrity to resist the temptations of the German black market, illegal border crossing bribes, and fraternization with the German people. Over time, many constabulary units eventually handed over their duties to their partnered German police forces as the zone achieved stability, law, and order.²¹ Scarred by the devastation of their country after WWI, the German population readily accepted the professional U.S. Constabulary who allowed the Germans to focus on rebuilding their devastated economy and war-torn infrastructure without fighting the chaos and disorder caused by the post-WWII power vacuum of caused by demilitarization, reparations, and loss of resources throughout the country.²²

While Germany was not the only military operation where the U.S. played a constabulary type role, the U.S. Constabulary in Germany provides an example of a post-war effort where thorough planning and dedicated, highly trained forces achieved tremendous success in achieving post-war legitimacy and influence over the population. The U.S. Zone Constabulary continued their policing-type functions until Germany

assumed its own internal security, preventing the mission creep and emphasis on military capabilities witnessed during the early 20th century constabulary missions in the Philippines and Central America, and more recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.²³ Applying the lessons of the U.S. Zone Constabulary to joint doctrine provides a solid, viable solution addressing the post-combat problems encountered in the U.S.'s recent wars, better preparing the joint force for success across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in future OEs.

The U.S. Army Constabulary in the Contemporary Operating Environment

Comparing post-WWII Germany to the civil, economic, and security situations of post-combat Iraq and Afghanistan highlights a significant chasm between these environments. Primarily a homogenous society whose rules and laws were universally accepted throughout the country, German citizen's years of poverty and wholesale destruction of their infrastructure beginning with the aftermath of World War I (WWI) and extending through their surrender in World War II (WWII) invited the opportunity for a professional occupying force to provide the law and order needed to allow Germany to focus on reconstruction efforts.²⁴ In the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, however, generations of people have adapted to the combative environments of their countries, growing calloused to the foreign invaders, ethnic and religious fighting, ruthless dictators and regimes, and violent brutality experienced throughout their lives. Aggravating this dynamic, the U.S.'s continued focus on fighting and weeding out terrorist organizations rather than employing a trained and disciplined force focused on establishing law, order, and security delegitimized the post-war efforts within these countries, leading to a loss of popular support for the occupying forces. As stated by a former Iraqi general meeting

with Paul Bremer during the initial failing days of the Iraq occupation, “the Coalition promised regime change but instead brought about state collapse.”²⁵

The differing security environments between post-WWII Germany and post-combat Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the most significant challenges facing each of the occupying forces who attempted to establish post-war stability and governance in these countries. The commonalities include the previous reign of brutal regimes and dictators who ruled their people through violence and use of force, starving their country’s economies by over-spending on military capabilities despite widespread poverty and hunger among their people. The defeated Germans initially met the U.S. occupation with caution, but through the professionalism and tireless efforts of the constabulary forces to provide a secure environment, they warmed up to their U.S. occupiers and focused on their country’s reconstruction efforts.²⁶ Contrastingly, the Afghanis and Iraqis initially viewed their U.S. occupiers as liberators, grateful for the destruction of the brutal Taliban and Hussein regimes ousted by U.S. led military efforts. However, as the security situations in these countries deteriorated, these citizens lost confidence in their American occupiers and resorted to violent sectarian infighting and attacks to protect and preserve their own security and interests. Although the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have numerous other causal factors beyond the lack of internal security, the inability of the U.S. to establish law, order, and good governance in either country undeniably fueled their post-war insurgencies.

Two major contributing factors point to the differences between Germany’s acceptance of her occupation versus Afghanistan and Iraq’s rejection of theirs. First, Germany benefitted from a deliberately planned post-war occupation. Although the

initially agreed upon Morgenthau plan changed radically from the final Marshall plan, the acknowledgement and awareness by the allied powers of resurrecting a healthy, productive Germany into the European community proved essential in her reconstruction.²⁷ Contrarily, the lack of post-war planning for Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in a highly reactionary, piecemealed occupation effort that directly contributed to the chaos which ensued in both post-war countries, and fueled the loss of support for their U.S. occupations. In her article comparing post-WWII Germany to the nation building efforts in Iraq, Miriam Benze provides estimates of 67% approval rating by Germans of the American occupation, largely attributed to the efforts of the occupying force, compared to 80% disapproval of the American occupation of Iraq in 2007.²⁸

The lack of a dedicated, highly trained occupying force in Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the second contributing factor. Germany benefitted from the professional, dedicated U.S. Constabulary, while Afghanistan and Iraq employed ad hoc advise and assist units of various sizes and compositions, often formed by individually tasked Soldiers from differing backgrounds and specialties, all required to execute unfamiliar roles and missions.²⁹ Under the German occupation, the constabulary provided a unified, full-time policing force trained and dedicated to establishing rule of law, governance, and stability in the German Zone of Occupation. In Afghanistan and Iraq, combat forces often bounced back and forth between advisory roles and traditional combat roles, a concept the Army defines as “decisive action.”³⁰ Regardless of the type of force employed, the results speak for themselves – Germany’s occupation was successful, Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s were not.

While these two factors do not reveal any “magic bullets” to post-war occupation and nation building, the need for the Army to assign and employ a dedicated constabulary force appears evident. Applying the post-WWII German constabulary model to Afghanistan and Iraq may have provided the essential element that closed the gap between the successes of Germany, and the failures of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Operationalizing the U.S. Army Constabulary

Forming and establishing the U.S. Army Constabulary requires a short review of joint and Army doctrinal concepts, and a review of existing Army formations tasked with execution of stability operations. The Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) serves as the Army’s primary land based maneuver force, forming as an armored (ABCT), Stryker (SBCT), or infantry BCT (IBCT) based on unit mission, equipping, and structure. These combat units possess organic combat battalions and companies such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and sustainment capabilities which enable the BCT to execute all Army warfighting functions, and with proper augmentation can operate across a larger or more complex area of operation (AO) to accomplish missions across the ROMO.³¹ To address the ability of these warfighting formations “to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution,” an Army operational concept known as Unified Land Operations (ULO), the Army has developed a concept known as Decisive Action (DA). DA serves as the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks required to successfully achieve the nation’s objectives for any military operation. Further divided into the two core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS), BCTs conduct these activities simultaneously and inseparably as the Army’s primary activities for supporting joint operations.³²

In simplest terms, CAM serves as the primary warfighting competency requiring BCTs to maneuver offensively and defensively to defeat the enemy, defend land areas, and seize the initiative in conflict; i.e., conventional warfare. WAS serves as the set of tasks aimed at establishing security and stability in an operational environment, and includes sub-tasks such as establishing civil security and control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development, i.e., stability operations. These competencies span the ROMO, requiring significantly different skill sets and capabilities to successfully accomplish either. But rather than designing a two-brigade force structure focused on the specific roles and missions of CAM and WAS, the Army employs one brigade required to simultaneously execute both – the BCT. One force, two critical missions.

The overarching mission essential tasks (METs) of a BCT include: conduct mission command, conduct offensive operations, conduct defensive operations, conduct security operations, conduct stability operations, and provide fire support – an overwhelming set of tasks for any brigade-sized military organization.³³ Primarily a warfighting organization focused on offensive and defensive maneuver tactics, BCTs were not designed for WAS, but their large size and available manpower make them the Army's only viable option to conduct these tasks. FM 3-96, *Brigade Combat Teams*, states BCTs lack “the organic capability to stabilize an assigned area of operation independently,” requiring external support from SOF, other governmental and non-governmental organizations, and host nation security forces to properly conduct stability operations.³⁴ Reviewing the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for the BCT reveals a force structure designed for lethal operations such as attacking and

defending against enemy forces, but lacking the skill sets, resources, and capabilities required to execute primary stability tasks such as restore essential services and support economic and infrastructure development. The lack of structure needed to properly execute stability operations translates to loss of focus and preparation, as witnessed in a 2012-2013 survey by COL Robert Campbell which showed only 1% of BCT training guidance and instruction mentioned stability operations.³⁵

Normally focused on training offensive and defensive maneuver tactics to remain proficient in CAM, BCTs rarely focus training plans and resources on stability operations. Recent years have seen the re-missioning of BCTs to execute advise-and-assist missions, a rank-heavy mission requiring BCTs to reform as Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) charged with executing Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Forces Augmentation (SFA) missions that prepare foreign security forces and militaries to assume responsibility for their nation's security. The AAB construct separates unit leadership from their Soldiers as they train for and deploy the AAB, reducing the collective offensive and defensive warfighting readiness of the BCT and removing key leadership from, and thus losing supervision of, the BCT's junior Soldiers.³⁶ AAB effectiveness remains in question, as doctrinal assessment standards do not exist, and insurgent activities in Afghanistan and Iraq fail to show a consistent decline despite AAB efforts to improve regional security and governance.³⁷ Furthermore, the Army provides vague guidance on training standards and deployment preparation activities required for stability operations, substituting generic, non-country, and non-regional focused training instead of tailored, focused preparations for each AAB's assigned AO.³⁸

Activating and employing the constabulary brigade addresses these concerns, as these brigades would focus their training primarily on stability operations and the fundamental stability tasks associated with the Army's core competency of WAS. Merging programs of instruction and doctrine from various AAB training programs, the Army's military police regiment, and special operations IW training programs provides foundational education aimed at preparing constabulary brigades to succeed in executing stability and limited IW operations such as FID, SFA, and COIN. Constabulary brigades with regionally aligned focus or specified mission assignments can receive immersive education on language, culture, and other dynamics of their assigned AO to increase readiness and preparations for operations within their assigned AO. Similar to the Zone Constabulary in Germany, Army leaders can screen Soldiers to identify those possessing background, education, and experience in foreign languages, civil service, civil engineering, city management, and other stability oriented skill sets to provide tacit knowledge to the organization. Selecting brigade and battalion leaders with backgrounds in Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Military Police, and Corps of Engineers provides leadership familiar with the challenges of training and preparing for stability and IW tasks while mentoring and fostering the stability "mindset" among their subordinates. Through proper education, training, and leadership development of the constabulary brigade, the Army can fill the WAS capability gap by employing a two-brigade concept to execute missions across the ROMO.

Assigning CAM as the primary mission of BCTs while training, manning, and equipping the constabulary to focus primarily on WAS provides several advantages. First, BCTs can concentrate their training activities on core warfighting and conventional

maneuver operations, reducing the distractions associated with training and preparing for post-combat stability operations. Recent trends at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) show a lack of competency among mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in employing and integrating their primary battlefield systems during CAM operations, a problem stemming from years of COIN and stability operations where some combat systems and maneuver tactics were largely unused.³⁹ The lack of focus on one tenet of DA has proven ineffective in Iraq and Afghanistan, where continued violence and illegitimate governance have plagued the efforts of BCTs charged with simultaneously conducting CAM and WAS operations.

Employing a two brigade concept where the BCT and constabulary each focus their efforts on the unique problems of CAM and WAS, respectively, reduces the overgeneralization of these forces and allows each brigade to train and prepare for their operational core competency. Using division and above leadership to plan and coordinate transitions and simultaneous operations between the BCTs and constabulary brigades would ensure continuity of effort throughout a joint campaign, providing joint force commanders highly trained forces tailored to handle the unique challenges of the combat and stability environments of a joint operation.

Employing the constabulary in crisis response and limited contingency operations provides a second advantage of a two-brigade construct. Outside of major military campaigns and MCO, the constabulary brigade provides a trained and ready force better suited than BCTs to conduct security cooperation and stability activities during these missions. Constabulary brigades also provide forces better prepared to conduct

Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) missions during homeland security contingencies, augmenting national, state, and local authorities during disaster response and emergency situations. These additional roles for the constabulary not only supports U.S. security cooperation and homeland defense priorities, they also provide unique opportunities for the constabulary to develop its soldier-police competencies for the conduct of stability operations during war, similar to the combat training center opportunities for the BCTs to hone their CAM skills. Combining the competencies of these two brigades during major campaigns and operations provides land forces trained and prepared to execute all phases of an operational campaign, significantly improving the options and flexibility afforded to the joint force commander during MCO.

Acknowledging that joint operations rarely flow linearly from combat to stability operations, but instead ebb, flow, and overlap throughout a campaign, this two brigade construct allows joint force commanders the option of reinforcing success by employing the constabulary in zones where major combat hostilities have receded, while continuing CAM with BCTs in areas where major fighting continues. In non-linear, non-contiguous environments, BCTs may receive constabulary battalions or companies who work with indigenous security forces to improve internal security, establish law and order, and improve governance while the rest of the BCT continues to battle enemy forces. This type of security cooperation effort achieves the DA tenet of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations using forces highly trained and prepared to fulfill their CAM and WAS roles.

A third advantage afforded through the constabulary brigade deals with the reduction of strain on special operations forces (SOF). A high demand, high operational

tempo (optempo) capability limited by its small force structure, SOF have experienced increasingly higher demands for their expertise and specialized skills over the last 15 years.⁴⁰ As the joint force lead agent for IW, SOF serves as the lead element to initiate, lead, and advise the joint force on IW activities, but the high demand for these skills places tremendous strain on the small sized force. Developing a highly interdependent relationship between SOF and constabulary forces provides flexibility to the joint force commander to employ constabulary forces to conduct FID, SFA, and COIN activities. This option preserves SOF for strategic level engagements, nationally directed missions, and highly specialized missions such as Counter Terrorism (CT), Direct Action (DA), and Unconventional Warfare (UW). Assigning key leaders and staff officers with prior backgrounds in SOF, civil affairs (CA), and/or psychological operations (PSYOPS) to the constabulary brigade provides expertise for the IW tasks, reinforces the interdependent relationship between SOF and the constabulary, and provides additional relevant command opportunities for officers in these fields.

In addition to the advantages of forming and operationalizing the constabulary brigade discussed above, national and strategic level guidance fully supports the formation of a specialized stability force to augment other government and national-level efforts to ensure national security. The 2015 National Security Strategy directs the military to “preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges,” a list of tasks in line with the outlined roles and missions of the constabulary.⁴¹ Echoed in the National Military Strategy, conducting security activities

aimed at strengthening alliances and increasing the capacity of partnered military forces also supports activation of a constabulary force.

Current forces available to accomplish these tasks include SOF, Army BCTs, and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), but re-missioning or reassigning constabulary type roles and missions for these units comes at the cost of traditional warfighting readiness. The formation of the constabulary brigade provides a large, highly trained force tailored for security cooperation activities without overstressing SOF or distracting combat maneuver units from training and preparing for CAM.⁴² Army doctrine and the AOC also address the criticality of stability operations, and the Army has recently initiated efforts to explore the development of AABs to fill this role, although the constabulary concept discussed in this paper expands beyond a pure advisory and assistance role. These precedents, our historical struggle to win peace after succeeding in combat, and the anticipated challenges of future OEs all point toward establishing a constabulary brigade, but forming these brigades in a financially strained, downsizing Army poses another challenge.

Recommendations

Forming the constabulary brigade in today's fiscally constrained environment requires the military to look within its existing force structure to build the capability with no total end strength growth. To achieve this requirement, the Department of Defense has three options. First, the department can maintain the status quo but place stronger emphasis on training BCTs and MEBs to conduct stability and limited IW operations. Under this option, the Department and the services must mandate specific training and certification requirements to ensure these units avoid over-focusing on MCO and maneuver tactics, and build capacity for execution of post-hostility security and stability

operations. The primary advantage of this option is self-evident – no growth or structural changes, with nothing more than policy development and implementation to ensure compliance. Fifteen years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have created vast knowledge and experience in conducting stability operations, primarily in the form of advisory and assistance roles. Leveraging this experience by placing carefully selected, highly qualified personnel into key command and leadership positions will aid in the development of training plans and preparations for stability operations. The primary disadvantage to this option, as outlined previously, is the lack of focus on developing capacity and competency within the core warfighting skills for which BCTs and MEBs were designed. This option does not address the concern of developing specialized structure to handle stability operations, leaving the Department in the current situation of employing one force structure to conduct the two critical missions of CAM and WAS.

A second option involves re-missioning USMC MEBs to serve primarily as stabilizing forces, allowing the Army to focus on conflict phases of joint operations and CAM. The Marine Corps has historical precedent in fulfilling this type of role, as they have served as the “Army of the State Department” in the conduct of their Marine Security Guard (MSG) mission since implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.⁴³ Prioritizing stability and limited IW operations as the primary competency of the USMC provides numerous advantages to the joint force. A highly mobile and responsive force, MEBs already maintain a global forward presence as the landing force element of Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG), providing a quick reaction force to handle crisis and contingency operations across the ROMO. Focusing the MEBs on crisis response roles such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Humanitarian Assistance

and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and security and stability operations provides a trained and ready force able to react quickly during these situations, or to train and prepare for regional security cooperation activities as part of a pre-planned deployment.⁴⁴

Similar to Army BCTs, the MEBs have gained tremendous stability operations experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era, and combined with the USMC's training and experience executing the MSG mission these units have a solid foundation for serving in a constabulary role focused on stability and limited IW operations. The primary disadvantages of re-missioning the USMC to fulfill a non-combat role is an emotional one, as the Marines have a rich history of warfighting and bravery in battle. Putting aside these emotions, employing the Marines as a stability force would require the Army to prepare for amphibious assault and entry operations, although the Marines must maintain limited combat fighting competency to fulfill its crisis response roles. Many of the major weapons systems assigned to the USMC designed purely for combined arms operations may require divestment, providing cost savings to the Corps to apply to other programs. While the USMC option has viability, further exploring this option is outside the scope of this paper, which is focused on the Army's role in filling the stability operations gap.

The final, and preferred, option requires the U.S. Army to re-mission one IBCT per light division to a constabulary brigade. Applying this logic to the Total Army, the Army would convert four active duty IBCTs from the 10th, 25th, 82nd, and 101st Divisions to constabulary brigades, and four to five BCTs from the National Guard and Army Reserves. Building on a model Advisory Corps concept developed by retired LTC John Nagl, the constabulary brigades would have similar structure to the Advisory Corps

outlined in his article, minus the three-star headquarters, separate division headquarters, and using a rank structure identical to existing BCT rank structure. The Army's existing operational headquarters at the corps and division level already have stability operations oversight as part of their METs, and providing a brigade headquarters focused on these operations improves these operational headquarters' ability to assess readiness for the critical task of "conduct stability operations".

At the brigade level, the constabulary brigade would have a colonel brigade commander, four constabulary battalions commanded by lieutenant colonels, and five companies in each battalion commanded by captains. Using this model, the Total Army would have approximately 20,000 constabulary forces, tailored for stability and limited IW operations, available to employ during contingencies and campaigns. The constabulary battalions would focus primarily on the policing role of the brigade, such as establishing civil security and control, SFA, FID, and COIN activities. The brigade's Special Troops Battalion (STB) would provide engineers, CBRN, medical, CA, PSYOP, legal, and other specialized capabilities to give the required expertise and oversight for the restore essential services, support economic and infrastructure development, and support governance aspects of the stability operation. Integrating these forces into joint operations as previously described by leveraging the expertise of SOF and other agencies, and employing BCTs to augment and reinforce security roles, allows the joint force commander to tailor the force based on the size and complexity of the AO.

With any option for designing a force trained and focused on stability operations, the military must conduct a full DOTMLPF crosswalk to establish formal doctrine, structure, manning, training, and equipping requirements for the chosen organization.

Converting Army BCTs, as recommended, minimizes costs and structural changes, and may result in excess Soldiers and equipment from the former BCT's combat forces, such as field artillery and air defense, who can fill shortages in other BCTs. The constabulary provides additional opportunities for SOF to serve in relevant command and key leader positions, while allowing the Army to reinvest the significant training, education, and knowledge of SOF in the conventional force.

The force modernization process normally requires lengthy analysis, reviews, coordination, and high-level decision making to initiate movement on these changes. However, leveraging the Army's current AAB initiative, the Army can develop the constabulary concept rapidly, quickly filling the stability operations capability gap. The final recommendation of this paper requires this exact mindset – convert one IBCT to a constabulary brigade now, assign stability operations and limited IW as its primary role and mission, and leverage current knowledge and experience formed over the last 15 years to immediately prepare the force to properly manage future stability challenges.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated the need for a dedicated, specialized force structure charged primarily with execution of stability operations and the limited IW tasks of FID, SFA, and COIN. Strategic guidance, doctrine, and history all support the need for such a force, and forecasts of the nation's future OEs expose the capability gap in the military for managing post-MCO security and stability tasks. Several options exist for filling the gap, including policy changes that mandate more focus on stability operations among warfighting units, creation of service specific roles tailored for different phases of joint operations, and re-missioning existing force structure to serve primarily as a stabilizing force during post-MCO, crisis, and contingency operations. A rapid, efficient, and

effective way ahead to address this capability gap requires the U.S. Army to convert selected BCTs to constabulary brigades, who serve as soldier-police trained and focused on stability operations. Learning from our history and modeling the recommended constabulary force similar to the structure which proved highly successful during post-war stability operations in Germany provides a critical enabler for the success of future military operations.

Endnotes

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² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 11.

⁴ William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 60-61.

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⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2012) 2-2. Stability operations occur in overseas employment of the military, whereas Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) occurs when employing U.S. forces to operate within the homeland.

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