Changing Army Culture to Instill Mission Command

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United States Army War College
Class of 2015

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 01-04-2015	2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Changing Army Culture to Instill Mission Command			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
			5b. GRANT NUMBER
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Isaac J. Peltier United States Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER
			5e. TASK NUMBER
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Edward J. Filiberti Department of Command, Leadership, and Management			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 5,041			

14. ABSTRACT

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15. SUBJECT TERMS

Education, Training, Leader Development, Special Operations Forces, Auftragstaktik

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU	UU		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(w/ area code)*

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Title: Changing Army Culture to Instill Mission Command

Report Date: 01 April 2015

Page Count: 32

Word Count: 5,041

Key Terms: Education, Training, Leader Development, Special Operations Forces, Auftragstaktik

Classification: Unclassified

This strategic research project begins by examining the history, theory, and doctrine of Mission Command to arrive at an understanding of why changing military culture is important to successfully instilling a new command philosophy. The project then examines the Army's systems of institutional education, unit-based training and leader development and analyzes these systems using findings from the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Survey of Army Leadership to evaluate the challenges facing the Army and offer recommendations for improvement. Finally, the project examines how Special Operations Forces successfully changed their organizational culture in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve effectiveness in employing the principles of Mission Command and highlights those best practices that the Army could adopt.

Changing Army Culture to Instill Mission Command

The Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha exited the ramp of the MC-130 aircraft at approximately 0400 at an altitude of 13,000 feet above ground level. Descending into darkness somewhere over the western desert of Iraq, the team hoped to achieve total surprise in capturing a key foreign fighter facilitator. The daring mission, conceived entirely by the team, was innovative in its use of a specialized infiltration capability. It was also risky, but measures to mitigate the risk were in place. However, "Murphy's Law" would come into effect on this operation when an unforeseen sandstorm rolled in over the drop zone significantly reducing visibility between the descending operators causing dispersion. The dispersion resulted in the team taking longer than anticipated to assemble and make communication. Nevertheless, their company commander trusted the team and decided to give them more time before launching the reaction force. Despite the fog and friction of war, the team quickly adapted to the situation. They understood the mission and their commander's intent and instinctively converged on the target in small groups until they linked up as a whole. They made communication, but now dawn was fast approaching. The Team Leader made the decision to initiate the assault. They achieved complete surprise.[1]

This real-world event captures the essence of Mission Command. It demonstrates how a highly disciplined and cohesive team with shared understanding can, in the fog and friction of war, exercise initiative, take prudent risks, and make independent decisions within the commander's intent to accomplish the mission. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have inculcated in today's small unit leaders a practical appreciation for initiative and adaptability. From these wars, the philosophy of Mission Command has re-emerged as a major tenet for how the Army fights. Indeed, Mission

Command is the Army's command philosophy, but according to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the force does not fully understand Mission Command doctrine and its application.[2] Mission Command represents an intellectual and cultural shift for the Army that will require new and improved ways of educating and training to instill the philosophy.[3] The conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan promise an opportunity for the Army to fully embrace Mission Command and embed the philosophy in Army culture. However, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in his farewell address to the United States (U.S.) Military Academy, "The tendency of any big bureaucracy is to revert to business as usual at the first opportunity--and for the military, that opportunity is, if not peacetime, then the unwinding of sustained combat."[4] The danger for the Army is a return to a risk averse, zero-defects culture that rewards control vice Mission Command.[5] If Mission Command is going to survive as the Army's new command philosophy, then the Army's culture and its institutions must stay aligned with its tenets. Successfully instilling Mission Command will require the Army to transform its systems of education, training, and leader development, and effect a re-alignment of its organizational culture.

This strategic research project begins by examining the history, theory, and doctrine of Mission Command to arrive at an understanding of why changing military culture is important to successfully instilling the relatively new command philosophy. The project then examines the Army's systems of institutional education, unit-based training, and leader development. Analysis of these systems using findings from the 2013 *Center for Army Leadership Survey of Army Leadership* (CASAL) reveals the challenges facing the Army in implementing Mission Command. Finally, the project

examines how Special Operations Forces (SOF) successfully changed their

organizational culture in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve effectiveness in employing the

principles of Mission Command and will highlight those best practices that the Army

should adopt.

<center>History and Theory of Mission Command</center>

The concept of Mission Command in the U.S. Army is not new and first appeared

in Army doctrine in the 1982 Army Field Manual 100-5 under the title of "Battle

Command." The following excerpt from FM 100-5 describes how the Army envisioned

battle command more than three decades ago. "As battle becomes more complex and

unpredictable, decision making must become more decentralized. Thus, all echelons of

command will have to issue mission orders. Doing so will require leaders to exercise

initiative, and imagination--and to take risks."[6] Although the concept of Battle Command

evolved into Mission Command, the origins of Mission Command actually date back

more than 200 years to the German philosophy of Auftragstaktik. An examination of the

evolution of Auftragstaktik reveals that implementing a new command philosophy not

only takes time, but also requires a change in culture.

The defeat of Frederick the Great by Napoleon at the battles of Jena and

Auerstadt in October 1806 set in motion a series of military reforms in the Prussian

army that eventually gave birth to the command philosophy of Auftragstaktik.[7] The chief

of the Prussian General Staff, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, spearheaded these reforms by

developing an officer education system designed to create leaders who could think

independently, which was a significant departure from the rigid style of Prussian

warfighting of the time.[8] The Prussian military also had to adapt to the emergence of

new technologies brought on by the Industrial Revolution. New technology increased

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the speed and lethality of war causing increased dispersion on the battlefield; thus creating a demand to have leaders at all levels that could operate independently and exercise initiative.[9] However, it was the Prussian Chief of Staff Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder whose theories of command in war gave form and function to the philosophy and practice of Auftragstaktik.[10]

Moltke believed that initiative on the part of all commanders should be encouraged and that independent judgment in commanders was essential.[11] Auftragstaktik held that commanders should only give instructions on *what* to do, allowing subordinate leaders maximum latitude to determine *how* to do it.[12] Thus, leaders at all levels needed to be able to operate and think independently within the commander's intent. One aspect of German Army culture that helped inculcate Auftragstaktik was the expectation that all leaders were duty bound to act decisively, take prudent risks, and make independent decisions.[13] Another important aspect of German Army culture was the belief that every commander's primary responsibility was the development of their subordinate leaders.[14]

German Army commanders were expected to spend time with subordinate leaders to train and educate them on how to think, not what to think.[15] The purpose of this method of training and education was to broaden the leader's knowledge and to teach them to be critical thinkers so that they could develop creative and innovative solutions to the complex problems they would face in battle.[16] Moltke's dictum that "no plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond first meeting with the major forces of the enemy" necessitated having leaders who could think and solve problems on their own.[17] However, being able to think independently was only one aspect of

Auftragstaktik. Having confidence to make decisions and trusting the chain of command to support those decisions was equally important.

German Army leaders were expected to be confident in their delegated authority and freedom to make decisions even if it meant making mistakes. To instill this attribute, commanders were careful to avoid damaging their subordinate leaders' self-confidence when they made mistakes and reinforced the view that mistakes were a means for developing a subordinate leader's judgment.[18] Moreover, the teacher-student relationships that existed between seniors and subordinates were essential to building trust up and down the chain of command.[19] Indeed, trust is a defining element of the Mission Command philosophy that has helped enable its application within the U.S. Army during recent conflicts. What remains is the permanent embedding of Auftragstaktik principles within U.S. Army culture and institutions.

<center>Mission Command Doctrine</center>

Mission Command is a foundational element of the Army's warfighting doctrine of Unified Land Operations and is defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."[20] Six principles guide the philosophy. The first principle is to build cohesive teams through mutual trust. Building trust takes a deliberate effort on the part of the commander and requires the commander to interact with his or her subordinates while sharing experiences and communicating effectively.[21] It takes time to earn trust, but through managed activities that develop close interpersonal relationships, the commander can help foster mutual trust and build a cohesive team.[22] The second principle is to create shared understanding. The commander and staff create a shared

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understanding of the operational environment and the purpose of military operations

through effective communication and collaboration.[23] The third principle is to provide a

clear commander's intent. The commander's intent articulates the purpose, key tasks,

and desired outcomes of an operation.[24] The commander's intent guides subordinate

actions in a complex and dynamic environment, especially when units disperse and

communications are sporadic.[25] The fourth principle is to exercise disciplined initiative.

An effective commander's intent instills confidence in subordinates to vary from the plan

and exercise initiative in the absence of orders when key underlying assumptions of the

plan prove invalid.[26] An effective commander's intent allows subordinates to exercise

creativity in solving complex problems and to seize on opportunities to maintain

operational initiative and momentum in battle.[27] The fifth principle is to use mission

orders. Coupled with commander's intent, the use of mission orders give subordinates

freedom of action by emphasizing what to achieve rather than how to achieve it.[28] The

sixth and final principle of the Mission Command philosophy is to accept prudent risk.

Uncertainty exists in all military operations and commanders must accept prudent risk to

allow subordinates to seize opportunities in accomplishing the mission.[29] The principles

of the Army Mission Command philosophy and Auftragstaktik are remarkably similar,

but Army doctrine further designates Mission Command as a warfighting function.

The Mission Command warfighting function is composed of a set of specific tasks

for the commander and his staff, and for the supporting systems that enable a

commander to balance the art of command and the science of control.[30] For the

commander, there are three primary tasks: driving the operations process; developing

teams; influencing and informing audiences.[31] For the staff, there are four primary tasks:

conduct the operations process; manage knowledge and information; synchronize

information-related capabilities; and conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.[32] In

addition to these primary tasks, the following five additional tasks are also included as

part of the Mission Command warfighting function: conduct military deception; conduct

civil affairs operations; install, operate, and maintain the network; conduct airspace

control; and conduct information protection.[33] Enabling these tasks is a Mission

Command system that consists of personnel, networks, information systems,

processes, procedures, facilities, and equipment.[34] The Army's doctrinal publication for

Mission Command is comprehensive. It shows how the principles of Mission Command

guide commanders and staff in the exercise of Mission Command while bridging with

the Mission Command warfighting function.[35] However, it is worth examining in more

detail how well the Army has implemented the philosophy.

Most Army leaders are unfamiliar with Mission Command doctrine. According to

the 2013 CASAL, less than 20% of Active Component Army leaders reported being very

familiar with the Mission Command philosophy.[36] Of those reporting being most familiar

were senior officers and Non-commissioned officers who had recently completed some

form of professional military education.[37] Army Regulation 350-1, the Army's regulation

governing Army training and leader development, stipulates the application of the

Mission Command philosophy in both garrison and deployed environments. The

regulation further stipulates that development of proficiency in Mission Command is

attained through education, training, and leader development.[38] Given that only 20% of

Army leaders have a deep understanding of Mission Command suggests that there is

room for improvement in the way the Army educates, trains, and develops leaders to understand and implement the philosophy.

<div align="center">Institutional Education</div>

Instilling Mission Command in the Army will require the Army to change its system of institutional education. Army Regulation 350-1 states that the role of Army institutional training and education is to provide Soldiers and leaders with the knowledge and skills they need to perform their duties.[39] Consider the Army's education model for officers. As a company grade officer, lieutenants attend the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) and captains attend the Captains Career Course (CCC). Both courses focus on warfighting skills and preparing the officer to lead small units, companies, or to work on staffs.[40] As a major, officers attend Intermediate Level Education where the focus is on operational level warfighting doctrine and leadership skills.[41] Finally, as a lieutenant colonel and colonel, selected officers attend a senior service college where the focus is on the strategic level of war and preparing officers to serve as strategic leaders in high-level positions within the Department of Defense.[42] Notwithstanding the Army's mandate to develop leader skills through its institutional education system, 83% of Army leaders view operational experience as the most preferred way of developing leadership.[43] However, with the winding down of overseas operational deployments, the Army's cultural preference of relying on operational experiences to develop its leaders will become more difficult and the Army will need to rely on its institutional education and unit-based training systems to develop its leaders.

There continues to be varying opinions among Army leaders for how well their institutional education has prepared them to do their jobs and lead others. Although 61% of active component and 71% of reserve component leaders feel their institutional

education prepared them for new duty responsibilities, only 49% felt their institutional educational experience improved their leadership abilities.[44] The BOLC and CCC are specifically highlighted as needing to improve in the area of developing an officer's leadership abilities.[45] A notable exception is the Army War College where over 90% of graduates consistently assess their institutional education experience as being highly effective in terms of quality of education, preparing for the next level of service, and improving leadership abilities.[46] These findings suggest that while it is necessary to train officers in the skills they will need to do their jobs, the Army should place more emphasis on leader development in its institutional education systems. One possible solution is for the Army to adopt the Army War College's seminar model and educational approach of "education-for-judgment" in which the focus is on how to think rather than what to think.[47] The Army should also feature Mission Command as the central theme in its formal education of leaders at every level of education starting at the beginning of their careers.

In their report "Changing Minds in the Army: Why it is so difficult and what to do about it," Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, describe the theory of imprinting. They argue that the most impressionable time for a young leader is in their first assignment and the frames of reference established during this early period would stay with an officer throughout their entire career into the senior ranks.[48] They conclude that officers need to be more self-aware, open minded, and cognizant of reverting to early frames of reference when confronting new situations, particularly if those frames of reference are outdated.[49] While their thesis points to some hazards of imprinting, especially in perpetuating outdated cultural norms, imprinting leaders with the Mission Command

philosophy at the outset of their careers may actually contribute to changing Army culture. Furthermore, while an officer's first assignment will likely leave lasting frames of reference, before reaching that first assignment, the officer is going to attend a formal professional military education course. Therefore, the Army's educational institutions will leave the first and perhaps the most enduring impression on these young leaders. Imprinting leaders in the philosophy of Mission Command at the outset of their service will establish a frame of reference that, over the course of a career, will contribute to embedding Mission Command in the Army culture. However, placing the responsibility of instilling Mission Command solely on the shoulders of the Army's education institutions is impractical and unwise. It is also necessary for the Army to instill the Mission Command philosophy through all facets of unit-based training and leader development.

Unit-Based Training

If the Army is to live up to its maxim that you should train as you fight, the Army's system of training must change. The decentralized operations that defined the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq portend that the Army will continue to operate in a decentralized manner in future conflicts. However, the Army's predilection for centralization has resulted in a paradigm that has made training a top-down driven rather than a bottom-up activity that has been exacerbated by a decade plus of employing a "road to war" training philosophy.[50] The Army's practice of relentlessly adding to the number of mandatory training requirements has made it virtually impossible for units to fulfill their training obligations to the Army and has effectively eliminated any discretionary time a commander has to pursue their own training objectives.[51] For example, an Army War College study determined that the Army's

mandatory training requirements required 297 days to complete, but company

commanders only had 256 available days in which to complete these requirements and

this leaves zero time for decentralized discretionary training designed by subordinate

leaders.[52] The Army needs to exercise restraint for requirements it imposes on units.[53]

The Army also needs to change its approach to training by giving commanders the

freedom of action to develop realistic and challenging training scenarios that grows

leaders who can think independently and are capable of developing creative solutions to

the complex problems they will likely face in the future.

Conducting realistic and challenging training is essential for preparing Army units

for conducting operations in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment.

However, there is a disparity between how officers and noncommissioned officers view

the effectiveness of their current unit-based training.[54] For example, while 76% of

battalion and company commanders hold a favorable view that unit-based training is

challenging and realistic, only 54% of platoon sergeants and 52% of squad leaders feel

that training is sufficiently challenging.[55] One recommendation offered by the CASAL is

that commanders should seek greater input from junior leaders in developing realistic

and challenging training scenarios.[56] Commanders will cultivate trust and build teams

that are more cohesive by incorporating junior leader input into unit training plans.

However, commanders must also ensure that their unit-based training programs

develop their subordinates' leadership skills.

One of the most alarming findings from the CASAL is that only 51% of leaders

feel unit-based training activities had a positive impact on leader development.[57] Indeed,

the Army's leadership manual states "Mission Command requires leaders to receive

training . . . to become critical and creative problem solvers that are agile and able to make decisions in operational environments with uncertainty, complexity, and change."[58] This may require the Army to discard its current approach of "Task-Conditions-Standards" and adopt a training model where leaders have to develop creative concepts within the framework of a higher purpose (commander's intent).[59] Realistic training scenarios that focus on outcomes rather than compliance with a fixed set of "Task-Conditions-Standards" will produce leaders who can think independently and who can use judgment to solve complex problems. Commanders should also use these training scenarios to develop a leader's ability to exercise disciplined initiative while taking prudent risks. While institutional education and unit-based training will certainly develop the kind of "thinking" leaders that are required to execute Mission Command, commanders must also personally develop others within their organization.

Leader Development

As stewards of the profession, Army leaders have an obligation to develop subordinates for the next level. The three principle ways a leader develops subordinates is through coaching, counseling, and mentoring.[60] Leaders who coach, counsel and mentor, cultivate trust with subordinates and this leads to unit cohesion. As noted earlier, trust and unit cohesion are vital to Mission Command. According to the CASAL, developing others is a leadership competency that consistently receives the least favorable rating among Army leaders.[61] For example, only 63% of leaders across the Army rate their immediate superior as being effective in developing the leadership skills of their subordinates.[62] One of the essential components of Auftragstaktik was the commander's duty and responsibility to train, educate, and develop their leaders. The same is true for the U.S. Army. In fact, Army Regulation 600-20, the Army's command

policy, clearly states that, "Commanders are responsible for the professional development of their Soldiers."[63]

The most elementary way for leaders to develop their subordinates is through counseling. However, according to the CASAL, only one third of Army leaders feel the developmental counseling they receive from their superiors is effective.[64] Of notable concern to the Army is the growing trend among active component company and field grade officers who report that they almost never receive any formal or informal counseling at all.[65] Many Army leaders report knowing at least one or more instances in which counseling was supposed to occur and did not.[66] One of the main reasons subordinates feel that counseling does not occur is that superiors are not held accountable when it does not happen.[67] Other reported reasons for why counseling does not occur is that leaders do not know how to effectively counsel others or they try to avoid confrontation that might occur during a counseling session.[68] Further, some subordinates feel leaders do not have the time to conduct developmental counseling citing high operational tempo and heavy workloads as being responsible.[69] Further still, many subordinates report negative perceptions of counseling, that is to say, counseling is used more for disciplinary reasons rather than to reinforce positive behavior.[70] Finally, many subordinates see developmental counseling as not being a priority for the chain of command.[71] These findings point to a serious cultural problem for the Army that could undermine the embedding of Mission Command. Commanders and leaders who fail to take the time to develop others risk damaging the critical foundational trust that Mission Command requires between leaders and subordinates. A trust deficit eventually leads to the erosion of unit cohesion further complicating the implementation of Mission

Command. Commanders and their subordinate leaders are the only ones who can change the current culture to improve the development of others. Correspondingly, commanders at all levels must commit to setting a personal example in developing their subordinates.

<div align="center">Organizational Culture</div>

The Army's predilection for hierarchical organizational structures and centralized control of processes and procedures is another cultural impediment to instilling Mission Command. This impediment is most prevalent at the organizational level, where large headquarters and staffs lack the agility to keep pace with dynamic threats in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. Part of the problem is with the way large headquarters communicate internally and externally. The tendency in large military headquarters is for information to flow vertically, also called stove piping. Hierarchical military organizations also have high power-distance relationships between members of the organization. Power-distance refers to the unequal distribution of power among members of an organization.[72] In organizations with high power-distance, subordinates accept that superiors have power by virtue of their position in the hierarchy of the organization.[73] Organizations with high power-distance, such as military organizations, use the power associated with hierarchy to control the actions of the organization. However, this can result in suppressing subordinates' expressions of alternative views, the questioning of assumptions, and from disagreeing with the planned activities of the organization.[74] In organizations with low power-distance relationships, the opposite is true. Members are seen more as equals, are encouraged to offer their views, allowed to disagree, and are expected to contribute to the organizational leader's decision-making process.[75] The SOF typically have low power

distance relationships due to their relatively small size, maturity of their force, and the high level of skill of their operators. An examination of how SOF transformed their organizational culture over the past decade of war may provide a framework for how larger organizations can change their culture to improve organizational effectiveness.

The counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq employed SOF on an unprecedented scale and required SOF to adapt. The story of Task Force (TF) 714 as told by General (Retired) Stanley McChrystal in his memoire, *My Share of the Task*, illustrates the effective implementation of Mission Command. As SOF found itself taking on an increasing role in the war in Iraq, General McChrystal realized that his organization needed to transform in order to keep pace with an ever-changing adversary, specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq. General McChrystal reorganized TF 714 to be more like that of a network. The mantra of the TF was "it takes a network to defeat a network."[76] As the commander, McChrystal was at the center of the transformation and saw his role as creating the freedom of action necessary to realize the full potential and skill of his organization.[77] In order to be as effective as possible, the TF needed to leverage the capabilities of the interagency, which meant they needed to become more inclusive. SOF's tendency towards insularity is a cultural bias. To overcome this bias, the TF changed their organizational systems and processes to prolifically share information. The widespread sharing of information across the TF supported McChrystal's emphasis on transparency and inclusion and he reinforced this by personally setting the example.[78] Authority delegated across the TF to the lowest possible level facilitated agility, creativity, and innovation. General McChrystal admits there were times he had to overcome his desire to grab control of the organization,

particularly one that was operating in a fast paced and seemingly frenetic manner.[79] In flattened organizational structures like TF 714, the real power of organizational adaptability emerged from what General McChrystal termed shared consciousness and purpose.[80]

Peter M. Senge, in his book *The Fifth Discipline*, describes shared vision as being vital to an adaptive learning organization.[81] Organizational vision provides a spark that motivates its members and provides a shared sense of purpose.[82] A shared vision empowers members to act, fosters risk taking, and experimentation.[83] Senge further adds that successful adaptive organizations do not seek compliance but rather commitment, which comes from a sense of belonging and personal mastery.[84] According to Senge, shared vision comes from leaders who communicate their vision in such a way that others are inspired to adopt it as their personal vision.[85]

Similarly, Mission Command doctrine describes the principle of shared understanding. According to Army doctrine, shared understanding is created through effective collaboration in which participants share information and ideas, question assumptions, and learn from one another to create joint solutions while maintaining a common understanding and purpose.[86] Establishing this type of culture is difficult and takes time and effort.[87] So how did General McChrystal achieve shared consciousness and purpose across a geographically dispersed organization like TF 714? McChrystal and TF 714 found the answer to that question by establishing a battle rhythm centered on a daily event called the operations and intelligence (O&I) update.

From forward operating bases and embassies around the world, the O&I kept the TF 714 enterprise connected and proved a powerful tool for McChrystal to lead a

dispersed organization, communicate his vision, and allow his organization to adapt in stride with the changing operational environment.[88] However, according to McChrystal, the O&I was not so much about keeping the commander informed, but rather a mechanism that allowed the entire organization to self-synchronize.[89] The O&I was meant to liberate the organization by fostering decentralized initiative and creative thinking while decentralizing control to the lowest possible level.[90] In an organization that has shared consciousness, the commander does not need to be the first to know and the organization will self-organize and swarm problems as they arise. Many SOF organizations continue to operate in this manner today and the methodology has proven to be an effective method of keeping pace and, in some cases, even out pacing the many adaptive threats our nation faces. The Army, indeed the joint force, could apply the organizational model described to realize the full potential of Mission Command at the organizational-level.

Conclusion

Years of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the Army to operate in a decentralized manner. A generation of leaders have matured and developed on battlefields where survival required the exercise of initiative, creativity, and innovation. With the end of major troop deployments to the Middle East, and a rapidly downsizing military, there lurks in the return to a peacetime Army the danger of returning to the old ways of doing business. The Army must capitalize on the hard-won lessons of nearly a decade and a half of war. The military has begun the adoption of Mission Command across the force, but has not yet fully embedded it within its culture. There is a clear and present danger that the garrison Army whose culture is predisposed towards micro-management and over control will drown these hard-won

advances in a sea of information technology enabled guidance and reporting requirements.

The Army has made some meaningful progress in fulfilling its mandate to instill Mission Command across the force. The publication of Mission Command doctrine, the creation of an Army Mission Command Strategy, and the establishment of the Mission Command Center of Excellence all represent necessary first steps. The Army can further improve its system of educating leaders by incorporating Mission Command in course curricula early in a leader's career and in focusing on educating leaders for judgment and not just knowledge transfer. The Army can improve its system of training by exercising restraint in mandating requirements and instead programming decentralized training opportunities. Junior leaders should also be included in the development of complex training scenarios and given the latitude to innovate while executing decentralized scenario-based training. The Army can also improve its system of leader development. Commanders must make the development of others a priority and lead by example in counseling subordinates. Finally, the Army can change organizational culture by removing superfluous bureaucratic layering, rigid staff processes, and stove piping of information. The Army should seek to flatten its organizations, decentralize control, share information prolifically, and push decision-making down as far as possible. The Army that will succeed in the future is an Army with shared consciousness and purpose; an Army that that can self-organize to swarm problems at a sustained operational tempo that is faster than that of the adversary in an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment.

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