Beyond Violence: Rethinking the Spectrum of War

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Abstract

In classical western theory, war and peace are cognitive shortcuts for the presence or absence of violence. Beyond heuristics, however, the struggle of life endures even in the absence of violence. Contrary to Clausewitz' limited definition of war as an act of "physical force," the true nature of war exists beyond violence. In any age, strategic leaders are pressed to counter the threat of violence presented by the ever-changing character of war. Permanence of the underlying struggle, however, provides fundamental strategic guidance no matter the age. There is no endgame other than the perpetual shaping of life's enduring struggle across a full spectrum of violent and non-violent means. The responsibility of leaders to pursue and defend U.S. interests extends well beyond considerations related to the use of violence. The best manifestation of strategy is the long-term continuous pursuit, support, and defense of a rules-based international order. Complex, adaptive systems theory guides strategic leaders in the use of power and reveals the importance of alliances, monitoring feedback in the use of power, and proactive engagement in the world. Ultimately, strategic use of power is inherently stronger when used in support of an infinite game of survival, rather than a finite game of victory.

Beyond Violence: Rethinking the Spectrum of War

> If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster, and treat those two imposters just the same… Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it…
>
> –Rudyard Kipling[1]

As with Kipling's "Triumph and Disaster," the traditional concepts of war and peace are imposters to be treated just the same. War and peace, like triumph and disaster, are equally ephemeral.[2] Only struggle, strife, and competition, are permanent.[3] In classical western theory, war and peace are cognitive shortcuts for the presence or absence of violence.[4] Beyond heuristics, however, the struggle of life endures even in the absence of violence.[5] It is in this way that war has been equated with life.[6] Life is perpetual war that involves a continuous state of struggle, strife, and competition, whether or not marked by violence. War the imposter requires violence. Authentic war, however, existed before violence and continues unabated after violence has run its course. Authentic peace, on the other hand, owing its condition merely to the absence of violence, shares its true condition with that of authentic war, to wit: continuous struggle, strife, and competition. Peace the imposter remains a false utopia always just out of reach.

As reflected by western military theorist Claus von Clausewitz in *On War*, the character of war is ever changing while the nature of war remains timeless.[7] In this state of simultaneous permanence and change, how should strategic leaders think about war? Do changes in the character of war necessitate complementary adjustments in one's fundamental approach to war? Or, does the permanence of war's nature give way to a permanent foundation for strategic thought?

As advertised above, this paper concludes that war and peace are time-bound concepts equally defined by an underlying struggle, strife, and competition in life that is timeless. As such, while a transactional accounting for the ever-changing character of war is important to any age, it is the permanence of the underlying struggle that must fundamentally chaperon all strategic thought no matter the age. To the extent that western leaders think of war as merely the application of violence to achieve political objectives, they fail to understand the timeless true nature of war and skip over the principal touchstone that should shape every strategic impulse. Moreover, by tying war to violence, western leaders place their thinking about war at a disadvantage to their adversaries who know that the true nature of war exceeds mere use of violence. The west focuses reactively on deterring and defeating violence while the adversary maintains the initiative in the field of non-violence with an offensive mindset that is at war. In doing so, the adversary allows the west to believe in a state of peace while it pursues a long-term offensive through a proper understanding of war.

From this analysis, three basic insights for the future of strategic thought, purpose, and direction arise: 1) there is no endgame other than the perpetual shaping of life's enduring struggle across the full spectrum of violent and non-violent means; 2) the responsibility of strategic leaders to pursue and defend U.S. interests extends well beyond considerations related to the use of violence; and 3) the best manifestation of strategy is the long-term continuous pursuit, support, and defense of a rules-based international order that provides an adequate framework for "freedom and justice" through which the permanent struggle of life may play out with minimal occasion for organized violence.[8]

This paper breaks the analysis into three sections. The first will identify and discuss the current strategic environment and character of war. This section describes the threats, opportunities, and challenges of life's struggle in its current form and, in doing so, presents the immediacy of the need for strategic thought. The second section will examine the timeless nature of war and conclude that true war is an unending enterprise not tied to the use of physical force. The third section suggests that true war, as an unending and ongoing endeavor, is best pursued as an infinite game of survival played out across a spectrum of both violent and nonviolent means. It further offers that a strategic leader's permanent objective best manifests itself in the long-term continuous pursuit, support, and defense of a rules based international order aimed at perpetually balancing the competing values of "freedom and justice."

The Current Strategic Environment and Character of War

In any age, at any time, the prevailing strategic environment and character of war gives the strategic leader cause for concern. It is what presents the current threats, opportunities, and challenges of life's struggle and drives the need for strategic thought.

Since World War II, nuclear weapons, international law, and international institutions have all worked to limit the character of violent conflict, pushing it to the margins away from "open war" between state actors.[9] Violent conflict between nuclear powers has become incredibly dangerous for fear that miscalculation in a multi-deterrent era or a nuclear state's unwillingness to lose a conventional fight would cause the violence to escalate to nuclear holocaust.[10] Additionally, the development of international law, expressed in The Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as customary international norms, has increased the cost of violence by placing limitations on its use and imposing responsibilities on states both during and after the cessation of

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hostilities.[11] Absent arguments for preemptive self-defense or a responsibility to protect, the United Nations Charter has effectively limited the possibility of lawful armed conflict to instances where the use of violence is authorized by the world community and not vetoed by a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.[12]

The current limited character of armed conflict first took form in the reflection of nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. Engaged in a "Cold War," the threat of nuclear escalation and mutually assured destruction effectively circumscribed considerations of violence directed by one nuclear superpower against the other.[13] However, these threats did not cause the nuclear superpowers to feel similar restraint in their use of violence against non-nuclear states. As a result, while carefully avoiding armed conflict with each other, the superpowers nonetheless waged violent conflict by proxy through non-nuclear states. Examples include the U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

In the latter part of the Twentieth Century and the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, even in conflicts involving non-nuclear states, the limited character of interstate conflict has generally held. For example, Iraq's war with Iran in the 1980s remained regional and confined to direct conflict between two non-nuclear states.[14] The 1991 "Gulf War," sanctioned by the international community, stuck to its limited objective of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait.[15] The United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq, while morphing into a longer counter-insurgency fight, still remained limited in character in that it did not escalate into a wider direct conflict between state and/or nuclear actors.[16] The nuclear charged standoff between Pakistan and India included limited violence in 1999 but, since that time, has mostly adhered to a fragile cease-fire.[17] Moreover, while Iran

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currently sponsors terrorism to further its regional hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East, it has carefully remained out of direct state-on-state violence in the Twenty-First Century.[18] Even North Korea's claimed ascendancy to nuclear power status and its destabilizing development and testing of ballistic missiles has not, thus far, provoked state-on-state violence.[19]

Major nuclear powers in the Twenty-First Century, however, are testing the limits of nuclear era provocation through so called "hybrid war" or "competition below the level of war."[20] Conspicuous here is Russia. Insulated from violent rebuke by the threat of nuclear escalation, Russia has seized upon multiple targets of opportunity to expand its interests through ambiguous acts of limited violence without inducing international force in response.[21] Examples include Russia's assertion of control over the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, followed by its backing of Russian separatists in southeast Ukraine.[22] In both instances, Russia took actions that violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, it did so under the cover of Ukraine's political instability and the comfort of its status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council with veto-based immunity from U.N. sanctioned response.[23] Although it still risked an armed response from the international community in Ukraine's defense, Russia calculated accurately that the value of its territorial transgressions were well below the international community's willingness to risk violent confrontation with a nuclear state in the nuclear era. As a result, Russia's actions have elevated the evasion of international law to the art of statecraft.

China is also practicing this art but, so far, has limited its aggression to a strategy of nonviolence underwritten by an implicit future threat of economic punishment and/or

violent confrontation.[24] A salient example is China's contested claim of sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea and its construction and militarization of artificial islands to bolster that claim.[25] As China militarizes the South China Sea, it not only threatens the interests of numerous neighbors who have made conflicting claims, it threatens the navigation rights of the entire international community.[26] Moreover, like Russia, China threatens the international order by engaging in territorial expansion without regard to international law.[27] Rather than resort to international law, China intends to achieve its territorial goals over the long-term by presenting a fait accompli of economic dominance backed by a growing military capability.[28] China's actions, like those of Russia, represent a form of cost-benefit based statecraft that is leveraged on the currently unknown limits of nuclear era provocation.

While nuclear weapons and international law have created disincentives to violent conflict involving major powers, they have not eliminated violent conflict or the underlying interests that give rise to it. Aggression has found violent expression by non-state actors who are able to operate among populations without concern for nuclear or conventional attack, and who do not recognize international law.

Terrorism and insurgency dominate the landscape of violence in the Twenty-First Century.[29] Most prominent by way of terrorism in our time is al Qaeda's flight of passenger jets into New York's World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. Subsequent to its ouster in Afghanistan, the Taliban, aided by the Haqqani network and others, wages an ongoing 16-year insurgency for control of the country it lost after 9/11.[30] Meanwhile, non-state actor Islamic State ("ISIS") continues its fight in Iraq and Syria to establish an Islamic caliphate in the heart of the

Islamic world.[31] Although less prominent than these examples, violent extremism

currently extends to Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Russia, South Sudan,

and Libya, and manifests itself along a spectrum that includes singular acts of terrorism

on one end to outright civil war on the other.[32] Moreover, systematic drug violence

prevails in Mexico while various forms of violent intrastate conflict exist in the Central

African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon,

and China.[33] Finally, the ever-present Israeli-Palestinian conflict endures.[34]

Today, the United States identifies five primary challenges and refers to them as

the "4+1."[35] The "4+1" are Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Violent Extremist

Organizations (VEOs).[36] Lurking within these threats are high-risk questions of how to

advance U.S. interests without triggering direct war between nuclear powers, prevent

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among state actors, and ensure

against the possession and use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.[37]

Too be sure, these questions present "wicked problems" for which the gravest

consequences await failure.[38]

Adding to these threats are pressures to provide adequate government response

to worldwide weather related disasters, the spread of drug resistant infectious disease,

exponential population growth, global displacement, poverty, economic scarcity, and

transnational organized crime.[39] Combined with urban trends toward the growth of

megacities, these factors place a premium on states' ability to provide both security and

responsive government to their people.[40]

Complicating matters further is an explosion of technological advancement

relating to artificial intelligence, genome editing, the internet of things, next-generation

semiconductors, and cyberspace.[41] Like all technology, these advancements are

"neither good, nor bad, nor… neutral."[42] They present opportunities and they present

threats. However, these technologies are developing at speeds that challenge states'

ability to keep pace with legal frameworks that account for security, privacy, and ethical

use.[43] Moreover, the advance of information technology has created unprecedented

worldwide human connectively without full understanding for what it means to the

current Westphalian system of nation-states.[44]

The current strategic environment is, in a word, complex. This complexity is

reflected in a continuous state of maneuver by state and non-state actors who each

possess a quiver of infinite possibilities in pursuit of self-interest. The strategic

environment is not monopolized by nation-states or limited by borders. Moreover,

respect for international law by state actors is by exception– in the absence of sufficient

state power or guile, or where otherwise compelled by self-interest. As state and non-

state actors pursue their interests across a continuum of violent and nonviolent means,

the strategic environment does not lend itself to management or categorization by the

traditional western dichotomy of "war" and "peace."

The Timeless Nature of War

Faced with this global array of "wicked problems," uber complexity overwhelms

the strategic thinker's senses. Limited capacity for rationality takes over urging a "retreat

to the tactical" through a piecemeal, reactive approach to worldwide problem solving.[45]

Under pressure, the idea of asking whether the timeless nature of war adds any value to

confronting the challenges of the day seems quaint. It is either not attempted or is

simply glossed over in quick fashion to give proper attention to the globe's disparate

realities. As a result, the strategic leader engages solely in transactional thinking about

how to exploit or counter the threat of violence presented by the character of war in the current age. Notwithstanding its importance, this thinking is boxed in by the realities of the day's technology and tactics, and relegated to an endless point-counterpoint dynamic informed only by technological advance and antidote.[46]

If realities evident in the current character of war demand the strategic thinker's full attention, does the timeless nature of war have anything to offer? What *is* the so-called timeless nature of war? Is it defined by violence? What about it makes it timeless? If the current strategic environment and character of war presents the transactional and technological problems of the day, does the timeless nature of war present an underlying foundation for strategic impulse in any age?

The true nature of "war" extends beyond violence and allows for no endgame, save for human extinction.[47] It is an infinite game defined by life's perpetual struggle, strife, and competition. As such, the true nature of "war" is a game that cannot be won, only played.[48] Violence and nonviolence are both options in pursuit of war, but war is defined by neither of them. Instead, the contemporary concept of war, as well as that of peace, is actually defined by something more fundamental– something that equally defines both war and peace: The perpetual struggle inherent in life. Philosophers, historians, and military theorists have implicitly acknowledged this to various extents. However, in constructing western civilization, the concept of "war" has generally remained tied to violence and set off from its supposed opposite, "peace."

In fixth-sixth century BC, Greek philosopher Heraclitus equated war with life.[49] For Heraclitus, as related by author Christopher Coker, asking about the essence of war "meant asking [about] the essence of life" and at the heart of both was "change."[50]

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Heraclitus is known for stating, "war is the father of everything."[51] However, as Coker relates, he meant this as a metaphor for life's continuous state of strife brought about by the fact that "everything is in flux."[52] In other words, "change" is the father of everything. Stated another way, "strife" brought about by the fact that "everything is in flux," is the father of everything. Change and strife are at the essence of life and represent the perpetual struggle that is war. As such, Heraclitus saw that life *is* war.[53] Turning his phrase a step further, one might surmise that "life" is the father of everything– to include violence and nonviolence.

In equating war with life, whether he intended to or not, Heraclitus articulated a revelation that the true nature of war exists perpetually beyond the use of violence. Yet, many historians and military theorists have generally associated war and peace with the presence or absence of violence or its intended use to accomplish some goal. Thucydides described war as arising from considerations of "fear," "honor," and "interest."[54] However, his references to war were directly associated with violent conflict. Clausewitz, who forged western thinking on war, expressly defined it as an act of "physical force" "to compel our enemy to do our will," thus binding the very nature of war to its use of violence.[55] Western thinkers enamored with the practical applicability of Clausewitz' work have seemed to followed suit. Indeed, history's subsequent concern with whether war is inevitable (i.e., the philosophical question of the "Thucydides Trap") focuses mainly on whether armed conflict is inevitable.[56] The inevitability of the perpetual "change" and "strife" in life that prevails in the absence of armed conflict and springs the "trap" that is violence has not received the same focus.

For all of the practical value arguably contained in Clausewitz' theoretical approach, his definition of war as an act of "physical force" appears to be an artificial boundary that has obscured its true nature for western thinkers who followed. Perhaps his definition makes it easier to manage the transactional character of both traditional "war" and "peace."[57] Perhaps it enables the regulation of violence, while making it available as an appropriate tool within legal parameters.[58] Perhaps acknowledging the existence of a state of war in the absence of violence risks an undesired escalation to its use. Whatever the case, by adhering to a belief that war is an act of "physical force," Clausewitz artificially narrowed the western perception of war to a transactional utilization of violence to accomplish certain finite goals.

Faced today with aggression occurring in the non-violent realm and at levels of fighting below the cost-benefit threshold for armed response, the western dichotomy between "war" and "peace" is showing cracks.[59] What has traditionally been defined by the presence or absence of violence now includes a middle ground. This middle ground or zone is called "competition" and it includes aggression, physical or otherwise, not deemed sufficient to warrant the cost of armed conflict. Creation of this zone has blurred the line between traditional "war" and "peace" by implicitly and awkwardly acknowledging a state of being that is not quite either. This zone has been described variously as a "gray zone," "hostile… measures below war," "competition below the level of war," or "adversarial competition with a military dimension."[60] However stated, these expressions fail to acknowledge that the true nature of war is not limited by artificial boundaries of violence, non-violence, or competition. It is perpetual, offensive, and ongoing through a spectrum that includes both violent and non-violent means.

To this end, eastern theorists Kautilya and Sun Tzu hinted at a wider understanding of war not limited by violence or checked by finite political objectives.[61] In so doing, they arguably revealed a more fundamental grasp of the nature of war than Clausewitz or current western strategists. Kautilya, in particular, implicitly acknowledged that: war does not require physical force; all instruments of power, whether non-violent or violent, are acts of war in pursuit of conquest; and war in pursuit of conquest is the indispensible condition and reality of the state.[62]

While violent conflict has always been a means to pursue one's preservation, emancipation, growth, and/or expansion, it has not been the exclusive or required means to pursue these interests.[63] Rather, it has been merely an option in a perpetual game that has witnessed endless expansion and contraction of power among entities. American political scientist Hans Morgenthau has identified "three basic patterns" of political pursuit: "to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power."[64] In this light, one might think of the perpetual pursuit of power as civilization's singular organizing principle. Indeed, all of history appears reflected in an unending oscillation of power between peoples and states as they grow, expand, clash, contract and/or collapse, reorganize, and grow again. But, the pursuit of power is not limited to violent means and does not appear to be an end unto itself.[65] Instead, power in any form appears to find its value in its use as leverage to shape or control the "change" that Heraclitus found at the heart of life.[66]

For Kautilya, "expansion… was inevitable, natural, and good…."[67] Expansion brought "material gain" and "spiritual good," increased strength, and kept the peace among the people who fell under the umbrella of that expansion.[68] A realist, Kautilya

knew pursuit of these interests required power.[69] Through the exercise of power, one entity could impose its operating system (i.e., terms of government) on another and bring control to the anarchy of international relations.[70]

Satisfying these interests required the continuous pursuit of conquest (i.e., expansion of the operating system) because the indispensible condition of the kingdom was an ongoing struggle for preservation, emancipation, growth, and/or expansion.[71] For Kautilya, this unending struggle was war. Every act, whether diplomatic, economic, or militaristic was an act of war intended to "weaken an enemy and gain advantages for oneself, all with an eye toward eventual conquest."[72] Even "diplomacy [was] really a subtle act of war."[73] Unlike Clausewitz, Kautilya's war did not require physical force.[74] War did not "break out" due to the occurrence of violence. Rather, war was the reality and violence was just one of the tools available in that reality.[75]

Without doubt, Kautilya's "conquests" involved violence when required, but pursuit of those "conquests" occurred ceaselessly even in the absence of violence.[76] He did not seek conquest for the sake of violence. Rather, he sought conquest for the sake of control.[77] Although his ways included "open war," "concealed war," and "silent war," he preferred to seduce through conciliation and gifts rather than extort through dissension and force.[78] Both he and Sun Tzu emphasized keeping casualties to a minimum.[79] But, for Kautilya, seduction and violence were both acts of war. Seduction was merely part of his war strategy, waged during what his enemy would have believed was a state of peace. Sun Tzu echoed this concept of war without violence when he advised it best to "take a state intact" and declared that the ultimate in skill was "to subdue the enemy without fighting."[80]

Applying this approach to the current strategic environment, the true nature of war comes into view. Nation-states have failed to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence because the true nature of war expresses itself from a source far more fundamental than either the nation-state or violence. This is also true for western attempts to categorize certain forms of aggression as occurring within a "gray zone," as "competition below the level of war," or as "adversarial competition with a military dimension."[81] These expressions do not quite work because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of war, namely, that the competition *is* war. There is no "gray zone."[82] War is not limited by resort to violence. War exists perpetually across a spectrum of violence and nonviolence, and it does not rest. It is the continuous change, struggle, strife, and competition born of life. It is not something that is "inevitable." It simply *is.* The western idea of "declaring war" is just a violence control mechanism, as is the opposite idea of "suing for peace." True war does not wait to be declared and cannot be solved by suit.

One might argue that dispensing with the traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" diminishes an important societal value placed on avoiding violence and, in doing so, makes violence more likely. However, failure to dispense with these concepts diminishes true understanding of what is occurring even in the absence of violence and keeps one from properly placing their focus on the underlying "change" and "strife" that sometimes results in violence. One might also argue that dispensing with the traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" diminishes the prospects for cooperation, making adversaries more likely to pursue annihilation if one does not acknowledge a dichotomy that includes the concept of "peace." However, the reality is that state and non-state

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actors have always perpetually pursued their interests notwithstanding their belief in a "war" and "peace" dichotomy. Arguably, each person's interests in cooperation hold the same possibility no matter what one calls the ongoing struggle. Moreover, arms-length agreements produce more lasting and satisfactory results based on fully articulated interests than agreements emanating from the soft belief that your adversary is looking out for your interests. Just because one dispenses with the false dichotomy of "war" and "peace," does not mean they cannot agree on the relative values of violence and non-violence.

Additionally, acknowledging the true nature of war brings urgency both to the body politic and to the use of all instruments of power– not just the military instrument. With regard to the military instrument, however, this urgency fosters legitimacy in the threat of violence and bolsters deterrence. Conversely, accepting a dichotomous state of peace in the absence of violence allows for a period of soft thinking that the enemy does not entertain. Peace brings rest, changes one's thinking, and provides a false sense of security.[83] As a result, failing to respect the perpetual and ongoing nature of true war can be detrimental. Dispensing with the traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" does not make violence any more or less likely. At its essence, violence is an instrument of power to shape or control "change."[84] Like technology and all other forms of power, violence as a means is "neither good, nor bad, nor… neutral."[85] Its characterization depends on its use by humans and the consequences that ensue. One might easily agree that violence used to repress, enslave, or exterminate other humans is bad. However, violence used to free humans from enslavement, repression, or extermination is good.[86]

With this understanding of the true nature of war, how does one reconcile it with the western dichotomy of "war" and "peace" that oscillates with the presence or absence of armed conflict? Amazon.com Chief Executive Officer, Jeff Bezos, says that leaders should develop their overarching strategy by focusing on what does not change.[87] In the context of the timeless nature of war, what does such a focus yield? If the essence of war and life are intertwined, what does that essence offer the strategic thinker who is confronted with the realities of the current character of war?

A Fundamental Basis for Thinking about War

If the true nature of war is unending and proceeds notwithstanding the presence or absence of violence, war (like life) is a game that cannot be won or lost, only played.[88] All activity, whether violent or non-violent, is activity that at best only shapes war for further war. As a result, the smart long-term pursuit of war is at least as important as any short-term fixation with being dominated by an adversary's violence. In addition to producing a long-term perspective, the true nature of war sires the need for an offensive footing even in the absence of violence. It requires vigilant proactive use of all instruments of power to continuously shape and make viable the "game" of life for further play. As Heraclitus' "change" occurs ceaselessly, a transactional and reactive approach to shaping or controlling that change is not sufficient. However, that is just the strategy-free approach the traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" invite.[89] Understanding that violence is always an option and adversaries will always maneuver for advantage, the strategic leader should proactively calculate all activity with a goal of perpetually shaping and refining the world through elimination of undesirable elements and construction of desirable elements.

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From a practical perspective, the strategic leader's unending objective best manifests itself in the long-term continuous pursuit, support, and defense of a rules-based international order. This order, like that provided by the U.S. Constitution, must provide an adequate framework for "freedom and justice" through which the permanent struggle of life may play out with minimal occasion for organized violence.[90] Such a focus is the modern day form of what Kautilya would have called the perpetual pursuit of conquest. It is not territorial conquest, but the conquest of ideas.[91] It is human nature to create and, in this case, to envision a framework through which the struggle of life may occur and then construct it.[92] Moreover, this unending objective mimics the focus of the Founding Fathers in creating the United States and places that focus on a global arc.

The United States is, at its essence, a rules-based national order that provides a framework for "freedom and justice" through which the individual struggle of life may play out with minimal occasion for organized violence. The U.S. Declaration of Independence expressed our national belief that all are endowed with the "unalienable rights" of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."[93] Our Founding Fathers created the U.S. Constitution to "form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence {sic}, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity…."[94] Taken together, these documents espoused competing values of security, freedom, prosperity, and justice.[95] Dr. Marybeth Ulrich has written that the U.S. Constitution, conceived in the wake of the failed Articles of Confederation, ultimately arose out of the realization for a need to better balance the competing interests of "liberty and order."[96] In this way, the U.S. Constitution formed a framework to manage Heraclitus' "change" by creating a

channel for individual survival, growth, and expansion bounded by rules for just resolution of disputes in the face of friction. In creating a channel through which "freedom and justice" could coexist, the Founding Fathers created a finite game for individual survival flexible enough to endure in a world of infinite change. The genius of the Founding Father's creation was in its implicit recognition of and respect for the perpetual pursuit of "equilibrium" between competing values.[97]

Absent a similar framework to adequately account for "freedom and justice," the international community exists in a state of anarchy, likely unable to endure without resort to organized violence.[98] To avoid this fate, whether acknowledging it or not, the west is currently involved in its own Kautilyan war of conquest, to wit: the expansion of its twin operating systems, Democracy and Capitalism.[99] In pursuit of this conquest, the west non-violently wields the corporate entity, competition and cooperation in international trade, the rule of law, and promotion of what has been called Democratic Peace theory.[100] Taken together these activities form the framework of what has been called globalization.[101]

Competing with the west for control of the globalizing world are several other operating systems, to wit: Islam's Koran-based operating system, as well as various authoritarian, Socialist, and Communist-based operating systems. As Kautilya would likely point out, all are at war right now for world-wide implementation and expansion of their own operating system, whether actively engaged in violent conflict or not, and whether announced or in secret.[102] Constrained by fear of nuclear escalation to the pursuit of aggression by other means, this modern day pursuit of conquest is savvy in its use of all forms of power and is, without question, offensive in nature. It is an infinite

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war, where gains and setbacks occur like short-term gyrations in the stock market and the only indispensable feature is the wise use of power in all forms to ensure continuous ability to pursue long-term expansion.[103] Heraclitus might refer to it as life.[104]

In either case, to assist the wise use of power in pursuit of this perpetual war of conquest, modern social science offers strategic leaders an important view of the world through complex, adaptive systems theory.[105] Complex, adaptive systems ("CAS") theory is a modern-day framework that can be used to analyze the world as a whole; to view the world as that of an ever-changing collective organism of emergent behavior greater than the sum of its parts. It does not necessarily provide prescription for the use of power, but it does provide a means to consider both the effects of intervening in the world and not intervening in the world.[106]

A view of the international community as a complex, adaptive system is represented by the continuous and labyrinthine global interactions of numerous state and non-state actors, as well as the world population in general. As these actors relentlessly interact with each other across a technologically and politically interconnected world that is economically globalized and culturally diverse, they respond and adapt to create a dynamic of constant and perpetual change in behavior.[107] With its focus on "change" at the center of individual and group behavior, Heraclitus might have appreciated this modern framework had it been available in his time.[108] Indeed, for modern day strategic leaders, complex, adaptive systems thinking provides several important considerations for use of power to shape the "change" that Heraclitus found at the heart of life and war. These considerations include entropy, the law of consequences, and self-organizing theory.

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The first consideration is the concept of entropy. Highlighting the laws of thermodynamics, Dr. Andrew Hill has written that "[e]ntropy rules all systems."[109] Generally speaking, all systems exist in a perpetual state of decline and are in need of constant sustainment.[110] Viewed as a complex, adaptive system, the international order exists in a natural state of perpetual decline that can be sustained only by the constant inflow of energy. For the strategic leader pursuing maintenance and development of a rules-based international order, the obvious enormity of energy sustainment required to manage its perpetual decay should give pause to a "go-it-alone" approach. Since the amount of energy in the world remains constant and in search of a pluralistic equilibrium, the only way to use it to sustain an international order is through "buy-in" and cooperation of its participants (i.e., the world community).[111]

Among other considerations, the concept of entropy provides scientific reasoning to the singular importance of alliances. As Athens discovered in the Peloponnesian War, failure to nurture authentic alliances based on mutual interest and shared resolve will drain even the mightiest of states of the reach and influence they thought they had.[112] In the absence of such alliances, the modern day strategic thinker must grasp the futility of unilaterally bounding about the world to impose U.S. will. The finite supply of energy spread across an immense number of global actors will not succumb to global bullying in any way that is sustainable. As a result, pursuit of order in the face of entropy requires cooperation. The strategic leader must nurture alliances, obtain "buy-in," and proceed with a positive balance of sustainable power for any endeavor. This, in turn, implies an infinitely long-term approach to creating, refining, and sustaining a rules-based international order and thus aligns with the true, timeless nature of war.

In addition to the perils of entropy, complex, adaptive systems theory guides the strategic leader to consider the consequences of one's use of power by analyzing its effect on the overall system.[113] According to the law of consequences, every action has an equal and opposite reaction.[114] Moreover, it is generally understood that "we reap what we sow."[115] While these concepts are easily grasped on a one-dimensional level, the ability to predict the consequences of continuous interactions that that affect a complex, adaptive system is not necessarily intuitive or readily apparent. At a global level, the complexity and infinite adaptability of the international order can positively obscure the cause-effect relationship intended by any actor's use of power to influence the system. As a result, the so called "opposite effect," or what might actually be reaped by certain actions, may not be obvious in the planning or intended, in the end.

As applied to the law of consequences, complex, adaptive systems thinking should give pause to feelings of certainty as to how the use of power might actually affect the system. The cautious, well-conceived use of power is absolutely required in all cases. Yet, it is not sufficient. The strategic leader must continuously monitor the system for positive and negative feedback and make adjustments, as needed.[116] The colloquial concept of "fire and forget" as applied to the use of power must be stricken from the strategic thinker's lexicon. Additionally, as Dr. Andrew Hill has written, "systems thinking" requires strategic leaders to "respect equilibrium."[117] Just as a system continually searches for proper equilibrium based on the availability of energy to sustain it, the life struggle that underwrites the traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" seeks equilibrium. Both are perpetually unstable. As a reflection of Heraclitus' "change," the struggle of life (or war) simply oscillates back and forth, reverting to the mean as

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necessary, in search of permanent utopia but finding only temporary equilibrium.[118] As such, strategic leaders must always calibrate considerations of the use of power, violent or otherwise, in relation to its effect on systemic or, in this case, global equilibrium.[119]

Along with entropy and the law of consequences, strategic leaders should also consider self-organizing theory as it relates to complex, adaptive systems.[120] Given the inability to accurately predict the effects of power on a complex, adaptive system, one might argue that a policy of isolation is the strategic leader's best approach. Indeed, the potential to unwittingly sow seeds of one's own demise through impertinent use of power presents notable risk to proactive engagement. Here, however, self-organizing theory provides the strategic leader no comfort.

At its essence, self-organizing theory provides, in relevant part, that complex, adaptive systems are continuously building and arranging the system even in the absence of any central authority, structured planning, or blueprint for organization.[121] For the strategic leader contemplating a policy of isolation, self-organizing theory cautions that the international order will continue to organize with or without their influence. As a result, retreat, isolation, failure to innovate, or failure to engage with the international order all invite the repression of a world shaped by others. From a complex, adaptive systems perspective, the continuous interaction of actors creates constant change. Whether expressed as expansion or contraction, change is always on the move and its effects are unavoidable. As a result, a policy of isolation is futile insofar as it attempts to avoid change. Today's strategic leader must think of power properly wielded as leverage to proactively shape or influence change; not as leverage to avoid change.

If self-organizing theory provides the strategic leader with an urgency to embrace a policy of engagement, it also warns strategic leaders to look out for what Danish theoretical physicist Per Bak has called self-organizing criticality.[122] As related by Roger Hagstrom in his book *Investing: The Last Liberal Art*, systems will self-organize until they become unstable and then, sometimes without warning, break apart only to start the self-organizing process over again.[123] According to Hagstrom, Per Bak used the metaphor of a sand pile. The pouring of sand builds into a perfectly rounded pile of sand until one granule too many is placed on the pile, causing a breakaway or avalanche. The moment just prior to the avalanche is when the system is said to have self-organized to the point of "criticality."[124]

To pursue order in an international system that is constantly self-organizing, the strategic leader must accept the permanent likelihood of violent avalanches. In some cases, the use of power could trigger an unexpected avalanche in the international system. In other cases, it could trigger an intended avalanche. In either case, the nature of self-organization does not lend itself to achievement of organizational perfection (i.e., utopia- for a social system). Rather, as related by Roger Hagstrom, instability appears to set in when actors in the system no longer "share a common interpretation of the different choices" available to them.[125] The lack of what political scientist Diana Richards has called "mutual knowledge" creates instability.[126] In such a way, actors in the system believe they are out of options and, as a result, break away from the system in aggregate.

With this in mind, strategic leaders should heed Dr. Hill's warning to "respect equilibrium."[127] As parts of the system break away, the system seeks equilibrium in an

unending process of organization and reorganization. Heraclitus' "change" is at the heart of it all reminding us that the true nature of his or her endeavor is unending. As such, the strategic leader must proactively engage in shaping the system, with constant awareness to the isolationist dangers of being shaped by the system. They must be oriented to employing power, in all its forms, with a long-term view toward constantly creating and preserving the "game" for further play. The point for the strategic leader, paradoxically speaking, is that Heraclitus' "change" is permanent.

It has been written that America was based on an idea.[128] If so, that idea manifested itself in the physical world because it is human nature to create.[129] Just as Heraclitus' "change" has sired everything, human nature has the ability to create tools to shape and influence that "change," and to account for it with or without resort to violence. Combined with the reality of unending struggle, strife, and competition of life, the primary impulse from which every strategic thought emanates should be in relation to how it affects the continuous creation and refinement of a rules-based international order. If life and, thus, war are games that cannot be won, only played, then of prime importance is the continuous creation and refinement of the game. It is *the* strategic objective and must be informed by the fact that the game is unending and ongoing even in the absence of violence.

In its most fundamental form, the use of power in any form to shape or influence "change" is best used and most justified when one's direct survival is at stake.[130] In particular, the survival interest gives rise to the importance of superiority in the transactional use of violence. It is the impetus for an overriding short-term concern with the prevailing character of war in any age. From this perspective, the strategic leader

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must think in terms of deterring enemy aggression and being in position to defeat it soundly, if necessary. At the essence of the survival interest is the concept of resisting repression, subjugation, or enslavement that comes from having another compel us through an act of physical force to do their will. To resist or to help another resist this unjust subjugation is arguably where violence finds its strength. Conversely, violence likely acts from weakness when it is the subjugator.

With this in mind, strategic leaders should think about using power to shape "freedom and justice" in the world the same way that General George Washington used power to obtain freedom in the American Revolution.[131] General Washington did not use power to impose his will on Great Britain. Rather, he used it to resist the imposition of Great Britain's will upon America.[132] While British Admiral Howe sought a short-term decisive victory that would bring America to heel, General Washington fought a longer war of resistance that combined preservation of revolutionary forces and unity with "opportunistic engagements and militia harassment" aimed at "raising the cost of the war" for Great Britain.[133] In a narrow sense, it was strategy based in desire not to lose– to not be subjugated to Great Britain's will. In a wider sense, General Washington was fighting an infinite war for survival while Admiral Howe was fighting a finite war for victory.[134] Great Britain's use of power was weaker than General Washington's because it was limited by short-term cost-benefit analysis and aligned *against* the human mind's ability to permanently resist. General Washington's use of power, however, was a permanent struggle of self-determination limited only by life itself and was aligned *with* the human mind's ability to permanently resist, even in the face of physical subjugation.[135] General Washington fought to resist through increasing costs on Great

Britain, while Great Britain fought to win quickly with the least expenditure of cost necessary.[136] While less satisfying than short-term decisive victory, power used to resist repression or enslavement recognizes the permanence of life's struggle and is ultimately stronger than violence used to unjustly impose one's will on another.[137]

As with General Washington's strategy, the best long-term, global strategy for today's strategic leader is not merely defensive in nature and not limited to uses of violence. It implies an offensive mindset that operates proactively across an integrated spectrum of violent and nonviolent means. It preserves unity, uses force opportunistically, and raises costs on an enemy it intends to permanently outlast.

From the perspective of violence, this strategy includes the use of force to deter adversaries and destroy them, if necessary and as ability permits. However, beyond necessity for survival, it understands that the offensive use of force to impose one's will on another is an expedient use of power that may yield undesirable results. For example, when it destroys the enemy's physical capability to resist without positively affecting the enemy's will to resist (i.e., without changing the enemy's mind), it has merely traded violence for a short-term illusion of peace. Since the struggle, strife, and competition of life is permanent, the best strategy cannot be a one-dimensional exertion of violence intended to forcefully impose a state of relative permanence on undesirable elements. Rather, the strategic leader should view the use of power as a means to resist and opportunistically counter those undesirable elements in such a way that "freedom and justice" ultimately outlasts them and becomes attractive to them in a game that is unending.

From the perspective of nonviolence, a Washingtonian long-term, global strategy requires much greater prioritization from our strategic leaders. It is not enough to focus on ensuring a transactional, reactive defense against the threats of violence provided by the character of armed conflict today. Innovation in the field of nonviolent means and ways is needed. To best access the field of nonviolent power, strategic leaders should seek innovation by embracing constraints. As "creativity loves constraint," the military establishment should ask itself in a formal way: What if violence was not an option? How would it pursue and defend the nation's interests without violence?[138] By innovating in this way, the military establishment would likely open the aperture of possibilities in pursuit and defense of U.S. interests.

Additionally, while the so-called "whole of government approach" is necessary, it is not sufficient.[139] What is needed is a change in mindset away from the false dichotomy of western "war" and "peace."[140] It requires the creation of an interagency "Department of Offense" to galvanize resolve and signal understanding that true war is unending and ongoing even in the absence of violence. The U.S. must proactively resist and opportunistically counter the will of malign actors, both in the field of violence and nonviolence, or risk a world unfavorably shaped by them. While strategic leaders must engage in wise uses of power, they must also be mindful that power wielded on any part of a complex, adaptive system requires respect for system equilibrium and constant monitoring of system feedback to avoid and mitigate undesirable consequences. Ultimately, malign actors and other undesirable elements that threaten "freedom and justice" must find their path too costly to travel over the long run and change their mind.

Alignment of power with the direct survival interest is a much stronger basis upon which to wield long-term influence and is not unduly restrictive. Within the true nature of perpetual war, the survival interest is at issue every day and is directly aligned with the pursuit and defense of "freedom and justice." When employing power in any form, strategic leaders must reflect upon whether this use of power emanates from a platform of strength that preserves unity while resisting and opportunistically countering unjust repression and enslavement, or whether it arises from a desire to expediently impose the strategic leader's will on another through pursuit of short-term finite victory. Ultimately, a leader's application of power must be sourced in long-term strength through the realization of life's infinite struggle, strife, and competition.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the contemporary concepts of war and peace, like Kipling's "Triumph and Disaster," are equally ephemeral. Only struggle, strife, and competition, are permanent. The essence of life and war are the same; both are driven by what Heraclitus called "change." In this light, life is perpetual war that involves a continuous state of struggle, strife, and competition, whether or not marked by violence.

The complexity of the current strategic environment creates urgency for short-term transactional solutions to the changing character of war and asks whether considering the timeless nature of war adds any value to confronting the challenges of the day. In considering the timeless nature of war, the strategic leader finds that: there is no endgame to war other than the perpetual shaping of life's enduring struggle across the full spectrum of violent and non-violent means; the responsibility of strategic leaders to pursue and defend U.S. interests extends well beyond considerations related to the use of violence; and the best manifestation of strategy is the long-term continuous

pursuit, support, and defense of a rules-based international order that provides an adequate framework for "freedom and justice" through which the permanent struggle of life may play out with minimal occasion for organized violence.

Knowing this, strategic leaders must approach the use of nonviolent power in the same way they approach the use of violent power. Leveraging power in any form to shape and control Heraclitus' "change" is a form of aggression in so far as it affects others. In that sense, strategic leaders must ensure strategically strong and defensible *nonviolent* uses of power, just as they must ensure strategically strong and defensible uses of *violent* power. It both cases, power wielded in resistance to the unjust subjugation of another arguably emanates from its best source of strength.

A long-term, global strategy of resistance however, is not merely defensive in nature and not limited to uses of violence. To the contrary, it implies an offensive mindset that operates proactively and opportunistically across an integrated spectrum of violent and nonviolent means. Such a strategy can never be isolationist without risking a world shaped by others. Heraclitus' "change" never rests. Complex, adaptive systems theory assists the strategic leader in considering the effects of power on the system, advising against a "go-it-alone" approach, requiring constant assessment of the cause-effect relationship in wielding power, but nonetheless dictating a policy of proactive engagement. General Washington's strategic use of power in the American Revolution shows that inherently stronger power is ultimately sourced from deliberate pursuit of an infinite game of survival rather a finite game of victory.

To this end, western leaders should view war through a wider lens than the one provided by Clausewitz. Kautilya and Sun Tzu show the way. Their larger focus

acknowledges reality, is logically consistent, and gives hope to minimization of violence. The arc of history is not just marked by improvements in the technology of violence, but also by improvements in human understanding and ideas.[141] These latter improvements expand the battlefield to include liberal cooperation and constructivism as tools in pursuit of self-interest.[142] Kautilya would warn, however, that it is still a battlefield and the nonviolent pursuit of mutual self-interest is still fundamentally a war of conquest for dominance of one operating system over another (i.e., for control). The reality that Kautilya and Sun Tzu espouse is that while pursuit of self-interest is inevitable, violent pursuit is not. The difference between non-violent and violent conquest lies in the construction and communication of winning ideas more so than the construction and communication of winning violence. This, of course, is the hard part. It requires what Sun Tzu called "the acme of skill."[143]

Endnotes

1 Rudyard Kipling, "If," https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46473/if--- (accessed December 27, 2017).

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6 Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 50.

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9 See generally, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 229-238; Michael Howard, "Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?" in *Just War Theory*, ed. Jan Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 23-34. For usage of the phrase "open war," see Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 17.

10 See generally, Yoshihara and Holmes, *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age*, 229-238.

[11] See generally, Howard, "Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?," 23-34.

[12] For the United Nations' Charter, see http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/ (accessed September 16, 2017)

[13] See Beatrice Heuser, "Wars without Victories, Victories without Peace," in *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 458, 441-70. See also, Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 332-334; Beatrice Heuser, "Nuclear Strategy," in *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 351-83.

[14] For discussion of the Iran-Iraq War see William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 33-39.

[15] Ibid., 138-165. See also George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, "After the Storm," in *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 488-492; James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, "Saddam Stays in Power," in *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace*, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 435-442.

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[18] General Joseph L. Votel, "Statement of General Joseph L. Votel Commander U.S. Central Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the U.S. Central Command," Washington DC, March 9, 2017 http://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/Documents/Votel_03-09-17.pdf (accessed December 27, 2017), 19. See also, Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed November, 27 2017), 5, 23.

[19] See https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/north-korea-crisis (accessed December 28, 2017); Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed November, 27 2017), 7, 16-17. For an outline of the North Korean nuclear problem see Patrick Morgan, "North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Nonproliferation or Deterrence? Or Both?," in Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, Eds., North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017).

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid. See also Fred Dews, "Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on the '4+1 framework' and meeting transnational threats," *Brookings Now*, February 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/ (accessed December 28, 2017); Jim Garamore, "Dunford Details Implications of Today's Threats on Tomorrow's Strategy," *DoD News, Defense Media Activity*, August 23, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/923685/dunford-details-implications-of-todays-threats-on-tomorrows-strategy/ (accessed December 28, 2017); The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf (accessed December 28, 2017).

[38] For a discussion on tackling "Wicked Problems," see Euphemia Wong, "5 Steps to Help You Tackle Wicked Problems by Combining Systems Thinking with Agile Methodology," *Interaction Design Foundation*, April 24, 2017, https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/wicked-problems-5-steps-to-help-you-tackle-wicked-problems-by-combining-systems-thinking-with-agile-methodology (accessed December 28, 2017); Tom Wujec, "Got a Wicked Problem? First, Tell Me How You Make Toast," February 5, 2015, *TED, YouTube*, streaming video, 9:05, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vS_b7cJn2A (accessed December 28, 2017).

[39] Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed November, 27 2017), 1-15.

[40] See generally Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong. "The Case for Megacities." *Parameters* 45, no. 1, Spring, 2015, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1692810108?accountid=4444 (accessed December 28, 2017), 19-32.

[41] See generally Kissinger, *World Order*, 330-360; Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed November, 27 2017), 1-15.

[42] Christopher Mims, "The Six Laws of Technology Everyone should Know; Professor Who Summarized the Impact of Technology on Society 30 Years Ago Seems Prescient Now, in the Age of Smartphones and Social Media." *Wall Street Journal (Online),* Nov 26, 2017; Melvin Kranzberg, "Technology and History: 'Kranzberg's Laws,'" *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 27, No. 3, July, 1986, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3105385 (accessed December 28, 2017), 544-560.

[43] See Kissinger, *World Order*, 344. See also Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community made to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (accessed November, 27 2017), 1-4.

[44] See generally Kissinger, World Order, 1-10, 330-331, 342-344, and 365-374.

[45] For use of the phrase "retreat to the tactical," as well as a good discussion of bounded rationality, bias, heuristics, and cognitive dissonance in decision-making, see William E. Rapp, "Ensuring Effective Military Voice," *Parameters* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016-17): 17-20, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1879964248?accountid=4444 (accessed December 28, 2017).

[46] For an interesting article that indirectly exposes the transactional focus on the pressing need to maintain technological superiority as well as a competitive operational concept, see David A. Fastabend, "That Elusive Operational Concept," *Army* 51, no. 6 (June 2001), http://www.readbag.com/ausa-publications-armymagazine-archive-2001-6-documents-fastabend-0601 (accessed December 28, 2017), 37-44.

[47] For an interesting "Ted Talk" on infinite and finite games under game theory, see Simon Sinek, "What game theory teaches us about war," *Ted Archive,* November 8, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bFs6ZiynSU&feature=youtu.be (accessed December 28, 2017).

[48] This concept of a 'game that cannot be won, only played' is adapted from Steven Pressfield, *The Legend of Bagger Vance: Golf and the Game of Life* (New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1995); Later made into a movie, see *The Legend of Bagger Vance*, Directed by Robert Redford. Performed by Matt Damon and Will Smith, DreamWorks, 2000, DVD. The character Bagger Vance, played by Will Smith, equates golf and life as games that cannot be won, only played. Combined with Simon Sinek's Ted Talk regarding infinite and finite games, the ephemeral nature of Kipling's "Triumph and Disaster" and Heraclitus' "change," it gives life to the true nature of war proposed herein.

[49] Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 48, 50.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Robert B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard D. Bosley, Revis ed. (New York: Free Press, 2008), 16, 43, 48-49, 68, 255.

[55] Clausewitz, "On War," 75.

[56] For modern day invocation of the "Thucydides Trap" question, see Lam Peng Er, "China, the United States, Alliances, and War: Avoiding the Thucydides Trap?," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 43:2 (2016), 36-46; Graham Allison, "Thucydides's Trap has been Sprung in the Pacific," The Financial Times, *FT.Com*, August 21, 2012, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1034530378?accountid=4444 (accessed December 28, 2017).

[57] See generally, Howard, "Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?," 23-34; Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 1-62.

[58] Ibid.

[59] See generally Kissinger, World Order, 344.

[60] For reference to a "gray zone," see Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operating Concept* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, February 1, 2016), http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SOF-Operating-Concept-v1-0_020116-Final.pdf (accessed December 28, 2017) 2-3; and See also U.S. Special Operations Command White Paper, *The Gray Zone*, September 9, 2015 https://army.com/sites/army.com/files/Gray%20Zones%20-%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf (accessed December 28, 2017). For reference to "adversarial competition," see Defense Video Imagery Distribution System, "Dunford Speaks at Air Force Association Conference," September 2, 2016, *DVIDS,* video file, https://www.dvidshub.net/video/484212/dunford-speaks-air-force-association-conference (accessed November 28, 2017), View from 30:18 – 36:54. For reference to "hybrid war" and "hostile… measures below war," see Andrew Monaghan, "The 'War' in Russia's

'Hybrid Warfare'," Parameters 45.4 (Winter 2015/2016), 65-74; Andrew J. Duncan, "New "Hybrid War' or 'Old Dirty Tricks'? The Gerasimov Debate and Russia's Response to the Contemporary Operating Environment," *Canadian Military Journal* 17.3 (July 2017), 6-16; For use of the phrase "competition below armed conflict," see Daniel Burkhart and Alison Woody, "Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War," *Joint Force Quarterly* 86, 3rd Quarter, July 2017 http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-86/jfq-86_20-27_Burkhart-Woody.pdf (accessed December 28, 2017). The phrase "competition below the level of war" was uttered by a senior Army leader in a speech to the FY18 Resident Class at the U.S. Army War College.

[61] See generally, Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 9-37; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[62] Ibid.

[63] Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 15-17, 18, 28. For additional discussion on various triggers and causes of war see John Garnett, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, 4th ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19-39.

[64] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* 5th Revised Ed. (New York: Knopf Inc., 1973), 42, quoted in Azhar Ahmad, "Concepts of National Power," *Strategic Studies*, vol. 32, iss, 2-3 (September, 2012), 83-101 https://search.proquest.com/docview/1313161375?accountid=4444 (accessed December 28, 2017).

[65] If Heraclitus is right that "change" is at the heart of life (and war), then power appears to be the leverage to affect that change—to shape it or control it. Violence appears simultaneously as an expression of power (i.e., a tool) and dependent on other sources of power (e.g., wealth). As such, violence remains an option as leverage to affect or control "change," but "change" occurs regardless of violence.

[66] For discussion of power as a source for "control" and "influence" over the "environment," "other entities," and "outcomes," see Ahmad, "Concepts of National Power," 83. For discussion of Heraclitus, see Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 47-62.

[67] Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 28.

[68] Ibid., 16.

[69] Ibid., 15.

[70] Ibid., 15-16.

[71] Ibid., 15-16.

[72] Ibid., 20.

[73] Ibid., 20.

[74] Compare Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75; with Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 20-22.

[75] Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 19.

[76] Ibid., 19.

[77] Ibid., 15.

[78] Ibid., 21.

[79] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 77; Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 37.

[80] Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," 77.

[81] See endnote 60 herein for a list of sources referencing these terms and other similar terms.

[82] For discussion regarding the "gray zone" concept, see Adam Elkus, "50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray War Concept Makes No Sense," War on the Rocks, December 15, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-conceptlacks-strategic-sense/ (accessed December 28, 2017); Michael J. Mazarr, "Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order," War on the Rocks, December 22, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-thegray-zone-and-world-order/ (accessed December 28, 2017).

[83] The phrase "changes one's thinking" is a play on Kautilya's phrase "strength changes the mind," and is used here to make a different point than Kautilya was making. See Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 15.

[84] See Ahmad, "Concepts of National Power," 83; David Jablonsky, "National Power," *Parameters*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring, 1997), https://search.proquest.com/docview/198027728?accountid=4444 (accessed December 28, 2017), 34-54.

[85] See Christopher Mims, "The Six Laws of Technology Everyone should Know; Professor Who Summarized the Impact of Technology on Society 30 Years Ago Seems Prescient Now, in the Age of Smartphones and Social Media." *Wall Street Journal (Online),* Nov 26, 2017; Melvin Kranzberg, "Technology and History: 'Kranzberg's Laws,'" *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 27, No. 3, July, 1986, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3105385 (accessed December 28, 2017), 544-560.

[86] For discussion of the different sides of war, see generally Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 11-36.

[87] See George Anders, "Jeff Bezos Reveals His No.1 Leadership Secret," *Forbes.com*, April 4, 2012 https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0423/ceo-compensation-12-amazon-technology-jeff-bezos-gets-it.html#41ab02bd5227 (accessed December 28, 2017); Jeff Haden, "20 Years Ago, Jeff Bezos Said this 1 Thing Separates People Who Achieve Lasting Success From Those Who Don't," *Inc.com*, November 6, 2017 https://www.inc.com/jeff-haden/20-years-ago-jeff-

bezos-said-this-1-thing-separates-people-who-achieve-lasting-success-from-those-who-dont.html (accessed December 28, 2017).

[88] Again, this concept of a 'game that cannot be won, only played' is adapted from *The Legend of Bagger Vance*, directed by Robert Redford. The character Bagger Vance, played by Will Smith, equates golf and life as games that cannot be won, only played. Combined with Simon Sinek's Ted Talk regarding infinite and finite games, the ephemeral nature of Kipling's "Triumph and Disaster" and Heraclitus' "change," it gives life to the true nature of war as proposed herein.

[89] The phrase "strategy-free" is adapted here from its use by Secretary of Defense Mattis in another context. See Mohammad Ismail, "US in 'strategy-free time,' not winning in Afghanistan-Pentagon Chief," *RT.com*, June 13, 2017 https://www.rt.com/usa/392117-mattis-strategy-pentagon-afghanistan-syria/ (accessed December 28, 2017); James Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy," *Hoover Institution*, February 26, 2015 http://www.hoover.org/research/new-american-grand-strategy (accessed December 28, 2017).

[90] See Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 30.

[91] For the concept that the U.S. is based on an "idea," see Kissinger, *World Order*, 361; The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," Naval War College Review 27, no. 6 (May-June 1975): http://www.usnwc.edu/NavalWarCollegeReviewArchives/1970s/1975%20May-June.pdf (accessed June 13, 2017), 55. For a discussion of liberal cooperation and constructivist interactions, see Joseph S. Nye and David Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 8th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2009), 58-64.

[92] For a perspective that it is human nature to create, see Deepak Chopra, *The Seven Spiritual Laws of Success*, (San Rafael, CA: Amber Allen Publishing, and Novato, CA: New World Library, 1994), 53-54.

[93] *The U.S. Declaration of Independence*, July 4, 1776 https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration (accessed December 28, 2017).

[94] *Preamble to the U.S. Constitution*, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution (accessed December 28, 2017).

[95] For commentary on the "great problem of the free society… of reconciling order… with the requirements of freedom," see The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," 78. See also, Kissinger, *World Order*, 374.

[96] Ulrich, "American Values, Interests and Purpose," 11.

[97] For the need to "respect equilibrium," see Andrew Hill, "The Devil You Know: Strategic Thinking in Complex Adaptive Systems," *U.S. Army War College Working Paper* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2017), 10. For comment on unity lying beneath the balance of opposites, see Kissinger, *World Order*, 374. Although the game of life (and war) is infinite, the trick is to create a finite game of rules within the overarching infinite game that is flexible enough to account for the competing values of "freedom and justice" in a way that

eliminates the need for resort to organized violence. The flexibility required arises through understanding that a state of permanence cannot be achieved. Rather, it accounts for the perpetual pursuit of "equilibrium" between competing values, which is an infinite game of continuous oscillation.

[98] "International politics is anarchic in the sense that there is no government above sovereign states." See Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 4.

[99] See Kissinger, *World Order*, 6, 361; Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 58-63; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *Conflict after the Cold War*, 4th ed., ed. Richard Betts (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2013), 149-159; Erich Weede, "The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence," *International Interactions*, Vol. 36, Issue 2, (2010), pp. 206-213.

[100] Ibid. For further discussion on the importance of trade, as well as the balance of opposites found in the competing values of free trade and protectionism, see William J. Bernstein, *A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World* (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 314, 352-365. Interestingly, one might replace words "free trade" with the word "freedom" and replace the word "protectionism" with the word "justice" to see parallels in the balance of opposites that equally underwrite trade as well as the infinite game of life (and war).

[101] See Kissinger, *World Order*, 368-369.

[102] See generally Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 15-21, 28.

[103] Ibid.

[104] See Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 48, 50.

[105] See generally Hill, "The Devil You Know," 1-20; Robert G. Hagstrom, *Investing: The Last Liberal Art*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 57-77.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] See generally Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 48, 50; Kissinger, *World Order*, 374.

[109] Hill, "The Devil You Know," 4.

[110] Ibid.

[111] In accordance with the first law of thermodynamics, "[t]he total amount of energy in the Universe remains constant, merely changing from one form to another." It is "always conserved… cannot be created or destroyed," but "can be converted from one form to another" (e.g., potential and kinetic). See *Estrella Mountain Community College*, "Online Biology Book, Laws of Thermodynamics," https://www2.estrellamountain.edu/faculty/farabee/biobk/BioBookEner1.html (accessed December 29, 2017). See also, *The Khan Academy*, "The laws of thermodynamics," https://www.khanacademy.org/science/biology/energy-and-enzymes/the-laws-of-

thermodynamics/a/the-laws-of-thermodynamics (accessed December 29, 2017); *National Aeronautics and Space Administration*, "First Law of Thermodynamics," https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/thermo1.html (accessed December 29, 2017).

[112] See generally, Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 14, 53, 98, 163-167, 351-357.

[113] See generally, Hill, "The Devil You Know," 8-10.

[114] This is Sir Isaac Newton's Third Law of Motion. See *National Aeronautics and Space Administration*, "Newton's Third Law Applied to Aerodynamics," https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/newton3.html (accessed December 29, 2017); *The Khan Academy*, "Newton's Third Law of Motion," https://www.khanacademy.org/science/physics/forces-newtons-laws/newtons-laws-of-motion/v/newton-s-third-law-of-motion (accessed December 29, 2017).

[115] Chopra, *The Seven Spiritual Laws of Success*, 37-48; *Spiritual Awareness Fellowship*, "Understanding Karma – The Law of Cause and Effect" http://www.spiritual-awareness.org/karma.html (accessed December 29, 2017).

[116] See generally, Hill, "The Devil You Know," 8-10.

[117] Ibid., 10.

[118] "[N]o equilibrium is permanent because agents adapt and system structure and composition changes." Hill, "The Devil You Know," 14; See generally Andrew Hill and Stephen Gerras, "Stuff Happens: The Art and Science of Causation in Policy and Strategy," *U.S. Army War College Working Paper* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2016), 1-12; Hill, "The Devil You Know," 14-17.

[119] For a discussion of the dangers of miscalculation when developing policy interventions in complex environments as well as how positive feedback can quickly go wrong, see Hill and Gerras, "Stuff Happens," 1-12; Hill, "The Devil You Know," 9-10.

[120] See generally Hagstrom, *Investing: The Last Liberal Art*, 63-77.

[121] Ibid., 63.

[122] See generally Hagstrom, *Investing: The Last Liberal Art*, 73-77.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid., 74-75.

[125] Ibid., 76.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Hill, "The Devil You Know," 10.

[128] See Kissinger, *World Order*, 361; The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," Naval War College Review 27, no. 6 (May-June 1975):

http://www.usnwc.edu/NavalWarCollegeReviewArchives/1970s/1975%20May-June.pdf (accessed June 13, 2017), 55.

[129] Chopra,*The Seven Spiritual Laws of Success*, 53-54. See also, Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 58-64. The social interactions contemplated by constructivism create structures through the interaction of ideas, whether consciously created or emerging as a characteristic of sum of the interactions.

[130] For discussion of survival as an infinite game and, thus, a game that cannot be won or lost, see Simon Sinek, "What game theory teaches us about war," *Ted Archive,* November 8, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bFs6ZiynSU&feature=youtu.be (accessed December 28, 2017).

[131] See generally Maj. Nathan A. Jennings, "Washington: The First Operational Artist, By George," *Army* 67, no. 8 (August, 2017) https://search.proquest.com/docview/1923669620?accountid=4444 (accessed December 29, 2017), 47-50.

[132] Ibid., 47.

[133] Ibid., 47-48. The use of the word "resistance" should not be construed to mean static, defensive, or reactive. On the contrary, Washington's form of resistance was an infinite game of survival proactively pursued through a flexible strategy that combined actions to preserve revolutionary morale, unity, and forces of the Americans with "opportunistic engagements and militia harassment" aimed at "raising the costs of war on the enemy."

[134] For a discussion of the important distinction between these two strategies, see Simon Sinek, "What game theory teaches us about war," *Ted Archive,* November 8, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bFs6ZiynSU&feature=youtu.be (accessed December 28, 2017).

[135] "[E]verything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of human freedoms – to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way." See Victor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 66.

[136] Jennings, "Washington: The First Operational Artist, By George," 47-50.

[137] World War II is another good example of violence used to resist unjust subjugation, in this case territorial conquest, enslavement, and the holocaust of systematic extermination of Jews. Conversely, an example of poor strategy in the use of violence is the Unites States war in Vietnam. By making the war its own, the U.S. fought a finite war to impose its will North Vietnam while North Vietnam fought an infinite war for survival. The U.S. ultimately succumbed to cost-benefit considerations that did not enter into North Vietnam's calculation for fighting. For a discussion of Vietnam in this context, see Simon Sinek, "What game theory teaches us about war," *Ted Archive,* November 8, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bFs6ZiynSU&feature=youtu.be (accessed December 28, 2017).

[138] For discussion on embracing constraint as a means toward innovation, see Jeffrey H. Dyer, Hal B. Gregersen, and Clayton M. Christensen, "The Innovator's DNA," *Harvard Business*

Review 87, no. 12 (December, 2009), https://hbr-org.usawc.idm.oclc.org/2009/12/the-innovators-dna (accessed December 29, 2017), 7-8. In making their point, the authors relate how one innovative business executive asked: "What if we were legally prohibited from selling to our current customers? How would we make money next year?" Asking how the military establishment would pursue and defend the nation's interests without resort to violence is adapted from these questions.

[139] For various perspectives on the "whole of government approach," see generally Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff, eds., *Conflict Management and "Whole of Government": Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012) http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1102.pdf (accessed December 29, 2017).

[140] For a discussion of false dichotomies, see Gerras, "Thinking Critically," C-19. Indeed, it is the position of this paper that the question of "war" and "peace" is the ultimate "false dichotomy."

[141] For discussion of liberalism and constructivism see, Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," 149-159; Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 58-64; Glenn P. Halstedt, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*, 11th Ed., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 31-32.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," 77.