

Politics Versus Capabilities: Tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance

by

Colonel Thomas J. Verell Jr.
United States Army

Under the Direction of:
Professor Donald W. Boose Jr.



United States Army War College
Class of 2018

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188		
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2018		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Politics Versus Capabilities: Tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Thomas J. Verell Jr. United States Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Donald W. Boose Jr.			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. I understand this document will be included in a research database and available to the public. Author: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 7594					
14. ABSTRACT This SRP will examine how the Government of Japan (GOJ) has historically made choices in favor of decreased U.S.-Japan Alliance operational capabilities and readiness for short term political gains that cater to sensitivities in communities hosting facilities and areas, which leads to a decrease in optimal effectiveness. This trend occurs primarily in GOJ-provided facilities and areas and the current realignment initiatives in Japan. It will highlight examples of the GOJ negotiating agreements to appease local communities and support local elections to the detriment of U.S.-Japan Alliance operational capability. The support of local Japanese communities is vital to maintaining a U.S. presence in Japan, which creates tension between operational capability and the U. S.'s strategic access to the region. To mitigate this, the U. S. should conduct a capabilities analysis to identify U.S.-Japan Alliance mission-critical requirements and share these with the GOJ. Shared understanding of the mission critical capabilities will strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and enable the Alliance to maintain strategic access along with the required operational capabilities, force posture, and readiness.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Realignment Initiatives; Okinawa; Northern Training Area; Joint Committee					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

Politics Versus Capabilities: Tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance

(7594 words)

Abstract

This SRP will examine how the Government of Japan (GOJ) has historically made choices in favor of decreased U.S.–Japan Alliance operational capabilities and readiness for short term political gains that cater to sensitivities in communities hosting facilities and areas, which leads to a decrease in optimal effectiveness. This trend occurs primarily in GOJ-provided facilities and areas and the current realignment initiatives in Japan. It will highlight examples of the GOJ negotiating agreements to appease local communities and support local elections to the detriment of U.S.–Japan Alliance operational capability. The support of local Japanese communities is vital to maintaining a U.S. presence in Japan, which creates tension between operational capability and the U. S.'s strategic access to the region. To mitigate this, the U. S. should conduct a capabilities analysis to identify U.S.-Japan Alliance mission-critical requirements and share these with the GOJ. Shared understanding of the mission critical capabilities will strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and enable the Alliance to maintain strategic access along with the required operational capabilities, force posture, and readiness.

Politics Versus Capabilities: Tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Since the end of World War II, the Japan and United States relationship has served as the foundation for peace and stability in East Asia as well as the rest of the Indo-Pacific Region. However, Japanese political issues have sometimes affected the U.S.-Japan Alliance operational requirements. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) will examine the history of this issue, provide examples of Government of Japan (GOJ) taking politically-motivated actions to the detriment of operational readiness, and make recommendations for actions to balance mission effectiveness with sensitivity to local Japanese concerns.

The Government of Japan (GOJ) has historically and repeatedly made choices in favor of decreased U.S.–Japan Alliance operational readiness, capabilities, and posture for short term political gains that cater to sensitivities in communities hosting facilities and areas, which leads to a decrease in optimal effectiveness. This trend occurs primarily in the domain of GOJ-provided facilities and areas for U.S. use and in the current realignment initiatives in Japan and Okinawa. There are numerous examples of local political gain taking precedence over national and alliance issues. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is based on the *Treaty of San Francisco* signed on 8 September 1951, which laid out the initial articles of peace between the allied powers and Japan. This treaty was shaped by the National Security Council's four basic tenets for shaping postwar Japan. It sought to assist in the development of an appropriate Japanese military force with low-cost military material, to assure Japan's United Nations Membership, and to orient Japan toward democracy.¹ The United States defined its bilateral treaty agreement with Japan in the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan* in 1952. This treaty was later

amended in 1960 and serves as the foundational document for the U.S. binding relationship with Japan. The foundational tenets of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* are to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship and uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The treaty goes on to describe the desire for closer economic cooperation, collective defense, and maintenance of international peace in the Far East.² Article V of the treaty identifies one of the ways to achieve the foundational tenets, and specifically collective defense, by stating that each party, “recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger...”³ If Japan is attacked, the United States is obligated by Article V to take direct action against the attacker to defend Japan. Article VI of the 1960 *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* describes one of the means for collective defense as follows: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of the international peace and security of the Far East, The United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”⁴ In order to further define the U.S. integration with the defense of Japan, Article VI of the treaty further directs the establishment of an additional agreement to define how Japanese facilities and areas will be used as well as the status of U.S. Forces in Japan.⁵ The Agreement Under Article VI of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan* was signed the same day as the 1960 Treaty:⁶ from this point forward, it is referred to as the U.S.–Japan SOFA.

United States permanent presence in Japan must have a bi-lateral mechanism for discussing external and internal alliance challenges and the associated impacts on each country individually. Article II of the U.S.–Japan SOFA refers to Article XXV which establishes the U.S.–Japan Joint Committee. The Joint Committee is the bilateral organization that provides the principal interface between the United States and the Government of Japan (GOJ) to conduct consultation on all matters regarding implementation of the U.S.–Japan SOFA. It further determines the facilities and areas in Japan that are required by the United States to carry out its obligations outlined in the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*.⁷ The facilities and areas provided to the United States are essential to fulfilling the treaty obligations described in Article V of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*. This United States obligation still applies today, and requires that U.S. Forces be forward deployed to facilities and areas in Japan provided by the Government of Japan.

Over the past sixty plus years, regional and global threats have evolved and changed; so too have military capabilities and defense strategy. This evolving operational, technological, and political environment requires defense strategy and force posture to adapt quickly. The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) 2017 White Paper assesses; “the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.”⁸ This is the very first sentence of their “Trends of the International Community” section of the document, which clearly demonstrates its primacy. The GOJ understands the changing dynamic of the region and increased interrelation of all the Asian countries and each country’s increased ability to impact one another. JMOD goes on to highlight

North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and China's continuous attempts to change the status quo in both the South and East China Seas as destabilizing to the region.⁹ Adaptation of force posture may require the repositioning of forces as well as the modernization of facilities and areas in order to support new capabilities.

The U.S.-Japan SOFA recognized the potential requirement for changes to Article II. Article II acknowledges the two governments may agree that some existing facilities and areas may be returned to Japan or Japan may need to provide additional facilities and areas. Article II also stipulates that if a facility and area is no longer required to fulfill treaty obligations, the United States will return it to Japan.¹⁰ The Joint Committee is the first level forum to discuss bi-lateral agreements to change U.S. personnel stationing in Japan as well as how they are distributed within Japan-provided facilities and areas. All the facilities and areas provided to the United States operate within the social and geographic landscape of Japanese society. Japanese local villages, cities, and other prefectural communities surround these facilities and areas. The GOJ gives local communities that host U.S.-operated facilities and areas much consideration in national and alliance decisions and agreements about facilities and areas in their community. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SSC) Joint Statement confirms that the U.S. and GOJ must take into account the impact of the robust U.S. presence on Japanese local communities in order to enhance alliance operations and activities.¹¹ As a result, local interests and politics will impact the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Alliance's ability to fulfill the obligations of the *Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan*. This local influence can and does cause tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

This SRP will describe several historic examples of GOJ initiatives that decreased U.S.–Japan Alliance operational readiness, capabilities, and posture in favor of short term political gains for communities hosting facilities and areas. This SRP will discuss the Special Action Committee for Okinawa (SACO), the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas on Okinawa (OCP), the combined and joint training, and the shared use and GOJ requests for early land return. This SRP will also make recommendations for actions to balance mission effectiveness with sensitivity to local Japanese concerns.

To understand these initiatives and their relevance it is important first to discuss the organization of the Joint Committee and the Alliance Transformation Framework specific to facilities and realignment as well as the history of the local community and alliance tension that dominates Joint Committee dialog.

The U.S.–Japan SOFA establishes the Joint Committee and its supporting structure of sub-committees, panels, and working groups. The Joint Committee usually meets twice a month and is co-chaired by the Deputy Commander, United States Forces Japan (USFJ), and the Director General, North American Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). These two are the signature authorities for all bi-lateral agreements at the Joint Committee. In addition to the co-chairs, both the Deputy Director General for the Bureau of Local Cooperation (BLC) – Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) and the U.S. Embassy Minister for Political Affairs serve as the deputy co-chairs. The Joint Committee consults on all U.S.–Japan SOFA matters and conflicts. There are over forty different sub-committees, panels, and working groups to address and work the multitude of potential different U.S.–Japan SOFA issues. This paper only

describes the sub-committees, panels, and working groups established for facilities and areas and realignment topics. The Facilities Sub-Committee is one of the oldest standing sub-committees. It is co-chaired by the USFJ Command Engineer and Deputy Director General of BLC. The Facilities Sub-Committee's primary function is to bi-laterally address and coordinate most U.S. base related challenges and Host Nation Construction Programs' planning, implementation, and execution. This sub-committee also negotiates and prepares base access agreements, temporary use agreements, and real estate actions for the Joint Committee approval. The Environment Sub-Committee is one of the newest sub-committees in the Joint Committee framework. The Environmental Sub-Committee is co-chaired by the USFJ Command Engineer and the Director, Policy and Coordination Division, Environmental Management Bureau, Ministry of the Environment. The primary function of the Environmental Sub-Committee is to coordinate all matters related to environmental stewardship on and around U.S. Facilities and Areas. It also negotiates and prepares base access agreements for environmental purposes for the Joint Committee's approval. These are the two standing Joint Committee Sub-Committees that have the most interaction with the operations, use, and changes to U.S. Facilities and Areas in Japan. There are a number of non-permanent panels and working groups established to oversee and manage alliance transformation initiatives and the associated U.S. force realignment and relocation throughout Japan. The Alliance Transformation initiatives are detailed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI).

Based on the changing operating environment in Asia, the United States led the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) in 2006. The results of the review

recommended or directed significant changes to the U.S. force posture and disposition in the Pacific. Japan bore a significant cost of implementing the DPRI findings and recommendations, which drove the United States and Japan to develop and publish the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Roadmap)” and the associated Agreed Implementation Plans (AIP) in May of 2006.¹² The AIPs direct significant U.S. military unit moves inside Japan as well as unit moves from Japan to other locations throughout the Pacific. The United States and Japan agreed that this multi-billion dollar initiative needed a separate and distinct structure under the Joint Committee to enable timely realignment implementation. An Alliance Transformation Oversight Panel (ATOP) was established to provide oversight of all base realignment initiatives related to DPRI. The ATOP established multiple ad-hoc working groups and panels to implement the agreements and report progress to the ATOP. There is one panel for implementation and six ad-hoc working groups for each of the DPRI initiatives. The Alliance Transformation Implementation Panel (ATIP) provides recommendations to the Facilities Subcommittee on matters related to Alliance Transformation projects such as new construction, reconstruction, relocation, and renovation of buildings and structures funded by the GOJ. These panels and working groups are all co-chaired by the United States and the Government of Japan. The majority of the GOJ representation throughout the Joint Committee and its subordinate sub-committees comes out of the Ministry of Defense.




Figure 1 – U.S.-Japan Joint Committee Structure¹³

The Ministry of Defense’s Bureau of Local Cooperation is the primary interface on all facilities and areas issues and deals directly with the USFJ staff at the national or central government level. The JMOD established eight Regional Defense Bureaus (DB) in critical locations throughout Japan for implementation of measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting bases and for carrying out various activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents.¹⁴ In addition, BDs also provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination for relevant local governments when implementing bi-lateral realignment of U.S. Forces.¹⁵ Realignment activities include the contracting and management of realignment construction. As mentioned above, the changing security environment requires adjustment to force posture, structure, and capabilities. Force structure changes, repositioning, and modernization have second and third order effects. One of

the potential effects is the impact on local populations and communities. This tension consumed the U.S.–Japan Alliance even before the *Treaty of San Francisco* was signed in 1952.

The tension between local communities, the Government of Japan, and the U.S.–Japan Alliance tracks all the way back to the end of War World II. The most prevalent example of the tension between local communities and the alliance is on the small island of Okinawa in the Japanese southern archipelago. In Yuko Kawato’s book on military bases in Asia, he states, “the first wave of protests occurred under the American occupation in the 1950’s, in which protesters (Okinawan) mobilized against forced expropriation of privately owned land for American military use.”¹⁶ Yuko Kawato goes on to say, “... many Okinawans’ [believe] that the United States failed to provide adequate compensation for the land use.”¹⁷ These Okinawan perceptions were not limited to the United States. There is an Okinawan distrust of the Government of Japan as well. This distrust of Tokyo also tracks back to World War II, and specifically the Japanese preparations for the Battle of Okinawa. The Japanese military forced Okinawan men into the Imperial Army and forced women and children to build airfields and bases while the Japanese soldiers raped, looted, and took food from the locals.¹⁸ The forced construction of Japanese airfields and fortifications also annexed Okinawan privately owned real estate and property, which served as the initial American bases after the surrender of the Japanese. In addition to forcing thousands of Okinawan women into “comfort stations” as sex slaves, the Japanese soldiers forced the Okinawan citizens to take on the brunt of the U.S. attack on the island. All of these actions stirred Okinawan resentment and animosity toward the Japan mainland.¹⁹

In 1972 Okinawa and the smaller islands in the southern archipelago reverted back to Japanese control. The reversion of Okinawa was viewed as necessary to maintain American security interests in both Okinawa and Japan.²⁰ Maintaining the U.S. bases on Okinawa was also of critical American interest, which did not alleviate the tension between the Okinawan locals, the Government of Japan, and the U.S.–Japan Alliance. As a result, Okinawans saw the 1972 reversion as a limited policy change focusing more on maintaining U.S. military effectiveness than supporting the Okinawan people.²¹ This view of the Alliance first, Okinawa and Okinawan people second still permeates within the local communities today. The Request for Base Measures by the National Governors Association published on 31 July 2009 shows how this perception has spread to the local communities on the mainland as well. The Request for Base Measures includes early return of bases, prior consultation with local communities on all U.S. base activities and construction, significant SOFA revisions, and stricter environmental standards in and around United States bases, to include noise.²² The U.S.–Japan Alliance is at the heart of this tension, which requires constant consultation between the United States and the Government of Japan on SOFA and U.S. facilities and areas in all of Japan.

The importance of local community politics gained significant strength in 1995 on the island of Okinawa. On 4 September 1995, three servicemen kidnapped a twelve-year-old girl in northern Okinawa. The three men taped her eyes and mouth shut, bound the child, drove to an isolated part of the island, and raped her.²³ The United States military detained the three servicemen on 6 September but did not hand them over to Japanese authorities until the 29th of September after the formal indictment by

the Naha Court.²⁴ The U.S. Marine Corps refused to turn the three service members over to Japanese authorities prior to their indictments.²⁵ This fueled the anger of the Okinawans, who demanded the U.S. impose stricter discipline on U.S. forces, provide the rape victim an apology and compensation, and immediately revise the U.S.–Japan SOFA to reduce / realign the number of U.S. bases in Okinawa.²⁶ On 7 March 1996 the three servicemen were found guilty and sentenced to at least six and a half years in a Japanese prison.²⁷ The rape and associated demands placed a great strain on the U.S.–Japan Alliance and required action. The Okinawan outrage was equally focused on both the United States and the GOJ.

The U.S. and Japanese governments understood the need for action and established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to examine all the local communities' demands.²⁸ SACO was a bi-lateral committee that reported directly to the Security Consultative Committee (SSC). The SSC is co-chaired by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense with the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The SSC charged the SACO to “develop recommendations on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* and other related agreements.”²⁹ The SACO was to develop recommendations that responded to local demands and ensured the operational readiness of the Alliance. The SSC approved the final SACO report on 2 December 1996. The final report had twenty-seven different initiatives in four categories. The categories are U.S.–Japan SOFA, training and operations, noise reductions, and land returns. The land return initiatives include:

1. The total return of Marines Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma once adequate replacement facilities in Okinawa are completed and operational.
2. Return a major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 9,852 acres).
3. Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 19,509 acres).
4. Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 149 acres) after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
5. Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 132 acres) after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
6. Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 471 acres) after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
7. Return most of Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) (approx. 245 acres) after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
8. Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 151 acres) after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station.
9. Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after impacted facilities are relocated within Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser).

10. Return of Naha Military Port (approx. 140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35 ha/87 acres).

11. Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas (approx. 206 acres at Camp Zukeran; and approx. 85 acres at Camp Kuwae).

The total land returns recommended by SACO includes approximately 12,361 acres.³⁰ The majority of these facilities and areas are training and communications areas. The SACO-approved training and operations reductions are the elimination and relocation of all artillery and para drop training from Okinawa. The noise reduction initiatives include reorganization of Kadena Air Base, relocation of air units to other locations, and limitations on night flying operations.³¹ These land returns coupled with the approved restrictions on training and operations on Okinawa have reduced the USMC training readiness, which directly decreases the Alliance's operational capability and the U.S. ability to meet its treaty obligation of defending Japan. In addition, the SACO final report specifies the recommended MCAS Futenma replacement, a "Sea Based Facility (SBF)," will have a runway of 1500 meters. This represents another decrease in Alliance capability. The current MCAS Futenma runway is 2500 meters and serves as a dispersal location for fixed wing airframes. The replacement will leave Kadena Air Base as the only long runway on Okinawa capable of accommodating heavy fixed-wing aircraft. The SACO final report initiatives also decreased the U.S.–Japan Alliance capabilities with the reduction of training areas on Okinawa, which will later lead to training relocation to areas outside Okinawa.

Furthermore, these training area reductions and the return of MCAS Futenma did not satisfy the Okinawan people's demands for SOFA revision. The SOFA additions did not focus on discipline. The SOFA wasn't revised, but the U.S. and GOJ agreed to add accident reporting, greater visibility of the Joint Committee agreements, supplemental automobile insurance, and improvement of the claims process.³² The last SACO initiatives that impacted readiness and capability were noise reduction around Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma. The noise reductions measures include: construction of aircraft noise abatement countermeasures, relocation of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni on the Japanese mainland, relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base away from the perimeter fence to internal areas of the base, construction of noise baffles at Kadena Air Base, and limitation of night flight training operations at MCAS Futenma.³³ Moving support aircraft off Okinawa de-synchronizes III MEF combined arms training, and in order to conduct this critical combined arms training, both types of aircraft must fly back to Okinawa with additional expenditure of fuel.

The SACO initiatives fell short of the aggressive timelines dictated in the final report. As of 8 July, 2017 twenty of the twenty-seven initiatives had been completed.³⁴ During this extended SACO execution, the GOJ has repeatedly attempted to re-negotiate several of the conditional land returns in the original agreement. This paper highlights two. The conditions for return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area were the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and their supporting ground access roads from the area of return into the area U.S. forces will retain. The relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base is the other

initiative for which the GOJ requested renegotiation. The SACO final report directed the Kadena Air Base aircraft relocation be completed by 1996.³⁵ The GOJ's requested renegotiation of the Northern Training Area agreement sought the reduction of the conditions for land release. Reducing the GOJ agreed NTA land release conditions decreases the U.S. Forces' operational capability and readiness. As the Command Engineer from July 2015 to July 2017, the author came to understand a Joint Committee agreement was the start point for the next negotiation. The conditions for return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area were renegotiated in 2005. The Joint Committee approved the new agreement, reducing the number of HLZs from seven to six on 31 January 2006. The title of the agreement is, *Revision of Partial Release of the Northern Training Area*. Construction of the HLZs did not begin after the new agreement. In 2008 another agreement was locally negotiated to reduce the HLZ access roads to temporary construction roads in order to speed construction. Construction of two of the six HLZs began in 2009, with completion in 2013. Construction did not begin on the final four HLZs until July 2016. The main impediment to HLZ construction was protestor activities at all of the ground entry points to the HLZs and the GOJ's unwillingness to engage with the protestors in order to allow construction access. To get construction started, the GOJ again approached the United States with a proposal to reduce the conditions required to trigger the land return. The GOJ's proposal was to only construct the HLZs to trigger the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area. During negotiation at the Facilities Sub-Committee and Joint Committee, the GOJ promised to construct the access roads at a later date. An HLZ without supporting ground access can only be used in emergency situations due to

safety; therefore the HLZs could not be used for tilt rotor or rotary wing training. The GOJ completed the four remaining HLZs in December 2016, and the U.S. executed the land return on 20 December 2016. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Ambassador Caroline Kennedy co-hosted a ceremony in Tokyo to recognize this historic land return.³⁶ The HLZs will not be fully operational until the GOJ completes the non-permanent access roads are constructed.

Relocation of Navy aircraft from the north ramp of Kadena Air Base is a SACO noise reduction initiative. The Navy aircraft were primarily Lockheed P-3 Orions, which are being replaced by P-8 Poseidons. Both aircraft perform anti-submarine and maritime surveillance missions. These aircraft are critical to the alliance and the defense of Japan. The P-3 squadron has 17 aircraft. The relocation of the Navy P-3s could not be completed by 1996 due to the lack of existing ramp space on Kadena Air Base. The GOJ agreed to fund and construct new ramp space and a maintenance hangar across the runway from the north ramp butting up against Kadena's Munitions Storage Area in 2004. The first agreement was to construct ramp space and facilities to integrate the entire squadron. A follow on agreement reduced the size of the Navy's new ramp while maintaining some facilities on the north ramp in 2009. During a tour of the new facility in January 2017, the Squadron Commander told the USFJ Deputy Commanding General the extra P-3s are sent to Misawa Air Base at the northern end of mainland Japan. This is another example of reduced capability in the Japanese archipelago and is of great concern, especially since a Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy nuclear submarine sailed through the contiguous zone of the Senkaku

Islands on 11 January 2018, demonstrating the need for effective anti-submarine operations.³⁷

During the same visit to Kadena Air Base, the GOJ expressed their view that the north ramp would never be used again. There is an active taxi way that runs down the middle of the north ramp, so this area will continue to have aircraft traffic, visiting aircraft parking, and contingency use. During the meeting, the GOJ requested no aircraft be parked on the ramp and that aircraft using the taxi way shut down their engines and be towed. The 18th Wing Commander told GOJ representatives these requests place a great burden on Kadena operational flexibility and ability to address regional threats.

In 2006, the Bush Administration initiated the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The primary DPRI objectives were to realign the regional force structure for better training and quicker deployment. A secondary goal was to alleviate the tensions between U.S. forces and local communities in Japan.³⁸ On Okinawa, DPRI sought to move the majority of U.S. basing north of Kadena Air Base. DPRI also incorporated some of the SACO initiatives. SACO transferred the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the relocation of Naha Military Port, the relocation of KC-130s from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni, and the partial return of Makiminato Service Area to DPRI. DPRI also changed the MCAS Futenma replacement alternative from the Sea Based Facility identified in the SACO final report to Camp Schwab at the northern end of Okinawa. DPRI had significant impact on the rest of Japan as well. There are numerous initiatives arranged into six Alliance Transformation Ad Hoc Working Groups (ATAWG) under the ATOP.³⁹ There was an ATAWG for Okinawa, Atsugi / Iwakuni, Kanagawa,

Yokota, Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP), and Training Relocation. The DPRI Realignment Operational End-states are:

1. Japan Air Self Defense Force Air Defense Command (ADC) Headquarters (HQ) relocated to Yokota.
2. Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) established at HQ USFJ Yokota.
3. Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5) Fixed Wing relocated from Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.
4. Completed primary FCLP site in vicinity of MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Completed Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab - Henoko Bay
6. Approximately 9,000 Marines relocated off Okinawa
7. Completed U.S. military force reduction, relocations, consolidations, and land returns on Okinawa
8. VMGR-152 (KC-130s) relocated to MCAS Iwakuni
9. Transformed U.S. Army HQ / C2 in Japan at Zama
10. Japan Ground Self Defense Force Central Readiness Force (CRF) HQ established at Zama⁴⁰

The Okinawa ATAWG included the Guam Master Plan but this effort was led by a MARFORPAC and OSD Joint Program Office. USFJ has no visibility of or linkage to the Guam program. DPRI also sought to integrate U.S. Forces and Japan Self Defense Forces into joint shared use bases. MCAS Iwakuni, Camp Zama, Misawa Air Base, and Yokota Air Base are all joint use bases today. This initiative has been harder to execute

in Okinawa. Both Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab have Japan Self Defense Forces templated into the camp master plans, but joint basing in Okinawa has not yet been initiated. The U.S. and the GOJ signed the DPRI agreement without any prefectural input, outraging the Okinawan Prefectural Government at the lack of consultation on the new plans for U.S. bases on Okinawa.⁴¹

There is still an operational and readiness decrement to the United States and the Alliance with the switch of FRF from the Sea Based Facility to Camp Schwab. The FRF runway design increased to 1600 meters but it is still a 900 meter reduction from MCAS Futenma. Other U.S. and Alliance operational and readiness issues developed with the choosing of Camp Schwab as the FRF. The SACO housing consolidation on Camp Zukeran will significantly increase the number of U.S. Marines and Department of Navy Civilians commuting from Camp Zukeran to Camp Schwab on a daily basis. The commute time is about an hour on the main toll road, longer if commuters avoid the tolls. The biggest local political impact is the perception of Camp Schwab as a “new base,” which increased anti-base protests in Ginowan City and at the gates of Camp Schwab in Nago.⁴² Camp Schwab is not a new base but will look very different once the FRF is completed. The U.S.–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation clearly states, “This facility (FRF) ensures agreed operational capabilities ... and ... relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.”⁴³ Camp Schwab must grow in all directions in order to integrate all the required capabilities to make the FRF fully operational.

The GOJ’s trend of seeking short term local political gains at the expense of the U.S.–Japan Alliance’s operational capability is not isolated to the island of Okinawa.

The town of Iwakuni surrounds MCAS Iwakuni. In the early 1970's the town of Iwakuni requested the air station relocate its runway due to flight patterns going directly over the small town. Relocation construction began in 1997 and was completed in 2010. The relocation of the runway created 531 additional acres of space. This additional space made MCAS Iwakuni an ideal destination for DPRI, realigning capabilities and units, such as KC-130s from MCAS Futenma and CVW-5 from NAF Atsugi. During the runway relocation project, the Joint Committee approved a Joint Use Agreement to use a portion of the air station for Japanese commercial air travel. The commercial flights use the same runway and have a separate terminal outside the MCAS Iwakuni perimeter. The commercial terminal opened in 2012. As the ATAWG-Iwakuni co-chair, the GOJ asked this author to modify the Joint Use agreement in order to increase commercial flights from four to six daily.⁴⁴ The GOJ made the request a couple of months prior to the January 2016 Iwakuni mayoral election. BLC required the completion of the agreement before the end of the year, so that Mayor Yoshihiko Fukuda could announce the increase in flights prior to the mayoral election. In December 2015 the Joint Committee approved the new Joint Use agreement for six daily All Nippon Airways (ANA) flights. In June 2017, Mayor Fukuda announced his approval of the CVW-5's move to MCAS Iwakuni. Six daily commercial flights are possible for the air station's current air traffic but the addition of CVW-5 at the end of 2018 will nearly double the number of aircraft stationed at MCAS Iwakuni with subsequent degradation of training and operations.⁴⁵ Thus, the local political gain of Mayor Fukuda's re-election could have a drastic operational detriment to flight

operations out of MCAS Iwakuni and consequent reduction of Alliance Operational Capabilities.

The second example of mainland Japan local politics and local elections hindering Alliance readiness is in the small town of Fukuchiyama. Fukuchiyama is the home to a Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) Base. Missile Defense is one of the DPRI initiatives. The U.S.–Japan Alliance has agreed to position two X-band radar systems (AN/TPY-2) on the Japan mainland. These radars serve to protect Japan as well as the U.S. homeland. The Shariki Communications Site (SCS) was established in 2006.⁴⁶ The 2013 SSC Joint Statement confirmed the intention to establish a second AN/TPY-2 site at Kyogamisaki.⁴⁷ The GOJ recommended the specific site for the Kyogamisaki Communications Site (KCS) and the SSC approved it, establishing the site in 2015. Each of the radar sites has a small guard force to provide security for the equipment and personnel. The guards must qualify on their small arms weapons every six months. The SCS has a limited use agreement with the adjacent Japan Self Defense Base that satisfies the weapons qualification requirement. KCS is not co-located with any other U.S. or Japanese base. Every quarter, half the KCS guard force ground convoys nine hours, one way, to Camp Fuji to conduct weapons qualification. In order to improve operational readiness, security of the guard force, and the security of the radar site, United States Army Japan (USARJ) began coordinating with the local defense bureau to locate a closer small arms range to be used up to four times a year. A closer range would also reduce travel time, cost, and safety considerations associated with using Camp Fuji. In November 2015 the KCS leadership began local coordination with the JGSDF at Camp Fukuchiyama. Camp Fukuchiyama is two hours

from KCS by ground but is a location that historically has not had United States Forces training there before. In December 2015 USARJ submitted a draft limited use agreement to USFJ for U.S. use of Camp Fukuchiyama's small arms range. The same month, USFJ passed the request through the Facilities Subcommittee to BLC for internal GOJ coordination. After months of GOJ internal coordination this author met with the BLC Local Coordination Division (LCD) Director in an effort to energize the limited use agreement process. During the director-level meeting, the LCD director informed the United States that local coordination with Kyoto Prefecture and Fukuchiyama City would be deferred until after the June 2016 mayoral election.

Understanding the value of gaining support from local municipalities, the United States requested BLC initiate local coordination immediately following the election. BLC began formal local coordination with the new mayor in October 2016. The new Fukuchiyama City Mayor approved the U.S. request with the condition of U.S. discipline and safety. The Joint Committee approved the limited use agreement in November 2016. The first KCS weapons qualification at Camp Fukuchiyama was on 29 November 2016. During the thirteen months of coordination and negotiation for this limited use agreement, KCS conducted weapons training at Camp Fuji four times, exposing U.S. Forces to greater security risk and operations costs. It also impacted security forces' availability at the KCS. This was an easy solution complicated by local politics and elections that caused a prolonged reduction in operational readiness at one of the key ballistic missile defense nodes.

In 2013 the U.S. and the GOJ developed and publicly released the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (OCP). In order to achieve realignment, both

governments recognized the need for an overarching plan that synchronized the more than 400 construction projects at seven different bases in Okinawa before relocation and land returns could begin. The OCP, indirectly, addressed some of the National Governors Association's "Request for Base Measures" published on 31 July 2009. The first part of this document requests faster realignment, reduction, and early land returns.⁴⁸ Before the OCP, early land return requests and agreements were made outside the guidelines of DPRI or SACO. The OCP integrated all these separate requests and agreements into one synchronized and coordinated plan. Early land return requests were made in support of local road widening, establishing an historic park, or other community desires. The GOJ uses early land returns as a tool to gain local community or government support. The 2013 SSC Joint Statement praised progress already made on the partial early land returns incorporated into the OCP. The ministers viewed the early land returns as ahead of schedule, specifically mentioning the West Futenma Housing Area and a portion of the Facilities and Engineering Area at the northern end of Camp Foster along Highway 58.⁴⁹ Unscheduled early land returns are labor intensive and de-synchronize a construction program's actions and activities; which was the U.S. justification for insisting early land returns be included in the 2013 OCP. The U.S. and the GOJ agreed to review and update the OCP every three years. All new early land return requests should be considered during the triannual review.

Okinawa Consolidation (Major DPRI Relocations)




Figure 2 – Okinawa Consolidation Plan⁵⁰

During Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter’s visit to Japan in April 2014, Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Yoshihide Suga directly requested an unscheduled early return of the south-west corner of Camp Foster and a 15 meter strip of land running the entire eastern boundary of Camp Kinser. Both Camp Kinser and the Industrial Corridor of Camp Foster are scheduled for return in the OCP. The Industrial Corridor of Camp Foster runs the entire western boundary along Highway 58. Appendix A of the OCP lists Camp Kinser’s estimated return date as Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 2025 or later and the Camp Foster Industrial Corridor’s estimated return date as JFY 2024 or later. CCS Suga thus requested land returns that were not specified in the OCP.⁵¹ Secretary Carter responded to CCS Suga’s requests on 24 April 2015, in a letter that stated that

both Camp Kinser and the Camp Foster's Industrial Corridor fall under the 5 April 2013 bi-lateral OCP, which was scheduled to be updated by spring 2016. The letter further recommended that U.S. and GOJ representatives meet at the appropriate level to discuss steps each country must take under the 2013 OCP in order for the U.S. to return the land earlier than the plan states and that the GOJ should provide detailed rationale supporting the request. The letter concluded that the DOD looked forward to the OCP update.⁵²




Figure 3 – Camp Kinser⁵³



Figure 4 – Camp Foster, Southern Industrial Corridor⁵⁴

Director level negotiations began in July of 2015. As the USFJ Command Engineer, this author was the lead facilities and construction expert for the bi-lateral negotiations led by the USFJ J5 and the U.S. Embassy Minister for Political Affairs. In response to Secretary Carter’s letter, the GOJ provided the rationale for both land returns at the first director level meeting. The GOJ needed the strip of land along Camp Kinser to widen Highway 58 in support of traffic congestion reduction. The return of the southern end of Camp Foster’s Industrial Corridor was to support Ginowan City’s future construction of a medical complex on the just-returned West Futenma Housing Area. The GOJ also wanted the agreement made and announced by November 2015, so as to pre-date the Ginowan City mayoral election scheduled for 24 January 2016. CCS Suga’s requested early land returns negotiations took precedence over all other Alliance realignment business to include the initiation of the OCP review and update. On 4

December 2015, Ambassador Kennedy and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga announced the important U.S.–Japan agreement regarding the early return of land in Okinawa.⁵⁵ The final agreement was for some of what CCS Suga had requested. The U.S. would return the strip of land running the eastern boundary of Camp Kinser once the GOJ had constructed the new perimeter fences and gates for the camp by 2019. The U.S. could not agree to return any of the land in Camp Foster’s southern Industrial Corridor until the units in that area relocated to Camp Schwab, when operations of MCAS Futenma transferred to a fully operational FRF. The GOJ insisted that some visible action must be taken in the Camp Foster Industrial Corridor. The bi-lateral compromise for no early land returns in the southern Industrial Corridor was to permit the GOJ to construct an elevated roadway through the area over an existing storm drainage canal, connecting Highway 58 to the West Futenma Housing Area.

CCS Suga’s early land return request had many consequences. First, it significantly undercut the importance of the OCP as a comprehensive construction management tool for synchronizing a multi-billion dollar host nation construction program. Second, it diverted design and planning capabilities from other efforts to work new project concepts at Camp Kinser and Camp Foster. Lastly, it shifted all survey and construction capacity from other areas of the OCP to construct new unscheduled projects once the agreement was approved. These consequences will impact all the OCP construction timelines, which will then delay all the OCP Appendix A estimated return dates. The delays to Okinawa consolidation will continue to deteriorate U.S. operational readiness as the U.S. continues to operate from legacy facilities or splits operations among multiple bases.

Conclusion

This SRP has provided numerous examples of how the GOJ has historically and repeatedly made choices in favor of decreased U.S.–Japan Alliance operational readiness, capabilities, and posture for short term political gains that cater to sensitivities in communities hosting facilities and areas, which has led to a decrease in optimal effectiveness. The Special Action Committee for Okinawa (SACO), the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas on Okinawa (OCP), the combined and joint training, the shared use, and the GOJ requests for early land returns all show the GOJ’s prioritization of local political gain over national and alliance issues, especially in current realignment initiatives in Japan and Okinawa

Japan sees itself as a peace-loving nation, playing a major role in international politics and business, while seeking its own security and peace and security for the region. Japan’s three vital national interests are to: “Maintain Japan’s peace and Security, and ensure its survival; enhance Japan’s peace and security; and maintain and uphold international order based on universal values and rules.”⁵⁶ These national interests are currently dependent upon a strong U.S.–Japan Alliance with forces that are postured and positioned to enable Japan’s interests and support Japan’s strategic objective to, “improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce threats through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance.”⁵⁷ Hiroshi Nakanishi confirms the importance the Abe Administration places on the U.S.–Japan Alliance in his article “Reorienting Japan? Security Transformation Under the Second Abe Cabinet.”⁵⁸ The importance and emphasis on the U.S.–Japan Alliance

shows U.S. forces realignment is supportive of Japan's interests and strategic objectives. Balancing the tensions of strengthening the United States – Japan Alliance and the impacts of forward based U.S. Forces on Japanese local communities is extremely complex and presents the United States and the GOJ with interesting strategic challenges. The importance of local support is essential for the GOJ. Japan's strategy is a delicate balance between its national interests and maintaining the support of the population. The domestic influence is the primary driver of Japan's strategic development and implementation. The JMOD 2017 White paper dedicated an entire section to local considerations and cooperation. The Alliance management structure as well as JMOD's organization shows the importance the GOJ places on local communities. The Bureau of Local Cooperation within the Japanese Ministry of Defense is dedicated to coordinating and synchronizing local cooperation with alliance and national initiatives. This SRP has highlighted numerous examples of the GOJ negotiating agreements to appease local communities and support local elections to the detriment of U.S.–Japan Alliance operational capability, force posture, and readiness. Japan is essential to the United States' strategic access to the region and the support of our treaty and alliance obligations.

Maintaining strategic access and operational capability, force posture and readiness are in direct conflict with one another. The support of local Japanese communities is vital to maintaining a U.S. presence in Japan. The GOJ views the decreased operational capability in most cases as strengthening the United States' strategic access to Japan as well as the region, but at some point the continued forfeiture of U.S. operational capability and readiness will make strategic access

irrelevant. The United States should continue to aggressively negotiate Alliance realignment agreements that support its national defense and national interests laid out in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The United States should conduct a detailed capabilities analysis to identify U.S.-Japan Alliance requirements that will cause mission failure if decreased in order to appease local political demands and should share the results with the GOJ. Shared understanding of the mission critical capabilities will strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and enable the Alliance to maintain strategic access along with the required operational capabilities, force posture and readiness. The Japan Alliance is essential to the National Security Strategy's success.

Endnotes

¹ Victor Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security Online* Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2010): 184, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.158> (access January 12, 2018).

² *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan* (January 19, 1960), 1, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf (access January 12, 2018).

³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan* (January 19, 1960), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2018).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

⁸ Itsunori Onodera, *Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan 2017* (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense, 2017), 43, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2017.html (accessed January 17, 2018).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan*, 2.

¹¹ US Department of Defense, "Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee," (August 17, 2017): NR-293-17, 2, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1282045/joint-statement-of-the-security-consultative-committee/> (accessed January 12, 2018).

¹² Onodera, *Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan 2017*, 287.

¹³ Darren Moniot, "USFJ Overview Construction Programs in Japan," briefing slides, Yokota Air Base, Japan, U.S. Forces Japan Headquarters, July 6, 2017, 9.

¹⁴ Onodera, *Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan 2017*, 314.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 435.

¹⁶ Yuko Kawato, *Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 41.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁸ Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 65.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Kawato, *Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia*, 59.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

²² Kanagawa Prefectural Government - National Governors Association, *Request(s) Concerning Base Measures: Policy-System-Budget* (July 31, 2009), 1, <http://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/uploaded/attachment/22759.pdf> (accessed December 21, 2017), USFJ translated copy.

²³ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 67.

²⁴ "Americans Charged in Rape in Okinawa," *New York Times*, September 29, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/29/world/americans-charged-in-rape-in-okinawa.html> (accessed February 2, 2018).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 68.

²⁷ Michael A. Lev, "3 GIs Convicted In Okinawa Rape," *The Chicago Tribune*, March 07, 1996, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-07/news/9603070150_1_marine-pfc-okinawa-sentence (accessed February 5, 2018).

²⁸ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 69.

²⁹ The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee, *Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report*, (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee, 2 December 1996), 1, https://web.archive.org/web/19981202130639/http://www.state.gov:80/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-saco_final_961202.html (accessed January 12, 2018).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

³² *Ibid.*, 3-4.

³³ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁴ Moniot, "USFJ Overview Construction Programs in Japan," 4.

³⁵ The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee, *Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report*, 3.

³⁶ U.S. Mission Japan, "The United States Announces the Return of the Northern Training Area to Japan," December 21, 2016, linked from *U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Japan*, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-return-northern-training-area-japan/> (access February 24, 2018).

³⁷ "Chinese submarine near Senkakus ignored warnings, Japan says," *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 16, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Chinese-submarine-near-Senkakus-ignored-warnings-Japan-says> (accessed February 14, 2018).

³⁸ Dennis C. Blair and James R. Kendall, *U.S. Bases In Okinawa: What Must Be Done, and Quickly*, Sasakawa USA, 2015, 4, <https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/US-Bases-in-Okinawa.pdf> (accessed February 19, 2018).

³⁹ United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation*, (Washington, DC: United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, May 1, 2006), 1, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html> (accessed December 18, 2017).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 174.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴³ United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation*, 1.

⁴⁴ Makoto Fujishiro, e-mail message to author, November 03, 2015.

⁴⁵ Hana Kusumoto, "Iwakuni Mayor Announces Support For Relocating Navy Carrier Air Wing From Atsugi," *Stars and Stripes*, June 23, 2017.

⁴⁶ Jason B. Cutshaw, "Radar site celebrates 10 years in Japan," *Army.mil*, October 19, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/176980/radar_site_celebrates_10_years_in_japan (accessed February 18, 2018).

⁴⁷ United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), *Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities*, (Washington DC: United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 3 October 2013), 4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000016028.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2017).

⁴⁸ Kanagawa Prefectural Government - National Governors Association, *Request(s) Concerning Base Measures: Policy-System-Budget*, 1.

⁴⁹ United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), *Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities*, 8.

⁵⁰ Moniot, "USFJ Overview Construction Programs in Japan," 20.

⁵¹ *Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (OCP)*, April 2013, 27, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/pdfs/togo_20130405_en.pdf (accessed January 12, 2018).

⁵² Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, letter to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, 24 April 2015.

⁵³ Thomas Verell, "Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa, Working Draft," briefing sides, Yokota Air Base, Japan, U.S. Forces Japan Headquarters, September 12, 2016, 11.

⁵⁴ *Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (OCP)*, 12.

⁵⁵ Ambassador Carolyn Kennedy, "Consolidating Facilities & Areas in Okinawa," public speech, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, December 4, 2015, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/ambassador-kennedys-remarks-joint-press-statement-implementation-bilateral-plans-consolidating-facilities-areas-okinawa/> (accessed January 20, 2018).

⁵⁶ Onodera, *Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan 2017*, 218.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Reorienting Japan? Security Transformation under the Second Abe Cabinet," *Asian Perspective* 39, no. 3 (July-September 2015): 414-415.