

Strategy Research Project

Career Intermission Program: Talent Management for the Army Total Force

by

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Abstract

This paper argues that the Army Career Intermission Program should be revised to better address the persistent decline in company grade officer retention rates. The departure of mid-career officers represents a strategic risk to the U.S. Code Title 10 responsibility to provide trained and ready land forces. The Career Intermission Program is intended to address the decline in retention rates by allowing select officers to take a sabbatical from active military service to earn a degree, learn a new skill or start a family. The Career Intermission Program represents an opportunity to preserve and protect the Army's human capital investment from mid-career flight. Providing options in intermission status service would signal a departure from the "military bureaucracy" and more firmly establish the social compact between service member and organization. A revised Career Intermission Exchange Program creates the opportunity to simultaneously enhance its investment in all three components of the Total Force through cross acculturation between the Army National Guard, the Army Reserves and the Regular Army. Historical environment, organizational and individual culture, and the principles of human capital management are elements of the analysis. A comparison of the current Career Intermission Program with the revised Career Intermission Exchange Program completes the presentation of the proposal.

Career Intermission Program: Talent Management for the Army Total Force

Since the late 1980s, the Army has experienced a persistent decline in company grade officer retention rates. Even more problematic, this exodus from the Officer's Corps includes a disproportionate share of high-performing officers, many of them developed via fully-funded undergraduate education either through the United States (U.S.) Military Academy (USMA) or full, 4 year Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships.¹ The departure of mid-career officers represents a strategic risk to the U.S. Code Title 10 - Armed Force's responsibility to provide trained and ready land forces to meet threats to national security. Over the past thirty years, the Army has repeatedly identified the symptoms of this flight without adequately identifying the causes underlying the problem.

Most recently, former-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced several Force of the Future initiatives on November 18, 2015. While these initiatives are designed "to attract [and retain] the best people America has to offer," one of them, the Career Intermission Program, misses the mark.² Congress authorized the Career Intermission Pilot Program in 2009 to provide greater flexibility in career paths for well qualified, high potential service members in an effort to enhance their retention. The Career Intermission Program allows service members to take a sabbatical from their military service, ostensibly to earn a degree, learn a new skill or start a family.

The armed services began implementing the Career Intermission Pilot Program as early as 2013. The *2015 National Defense Authorization Act* extended the program, allowing for service members to start sabbaticals through December 31, 2019, returning to active duty no later than December 31, 2022. While the Marine Corps has formally adopted the program last year, the Army continues to evaluate whether its pilot program

will provide “an effective means of enhancing retention through greater career flexibility,” but it appears that new Secretary of Defense James Mattis may soon announce its permanent adoption.³ For the Army, participation in the program requires the soldier to sign a “binding contract,” wherein the soldier agrees to enter the Individual Ready Reserve for a period of one to three years and then return to active federal service and accept an additional service obligation of two months for every month spent on this sabbatical.⁴

In order to understand how the Army Career Intermission Program has strategically erred, one must both understand the causes of the problem and appreciate that human resources management is, in essence, management of a capital asset. In this context, I argue that human resource management is more appropriately defined as human capital management. Within this framework, we can apply the principles of human capital management to better understand how existing programs like the Army Career Intermission Program can be refined to address causation rather than symptoms.

The Problem and the Causal Factors

Attrition in the armed forces is expected, even intended as necessary to maintain rank structure ratios. In a healthy system, the rate of attrition will be higher at lower ranks but still approximate the rate of accession of new personnel. Since the inception of the Army as an all-volunteer force, accession and attrition rates are subject to a myriad of factors such as state of the domestic economy, social biases towards the military and U.S. foreign policy, and employment rates. Thus, the ability to manage attrition rates has risen in importance to equal that of accession rates.

Officer Corps accession is regulated by three primary commissioning sources, the USMA at West Point, the ROTC established at hundreds of colleges and universities across the nation, and Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning. While officers commissioned through OCS must have already obtained a four-year baccalaureate degree prior to commissioning, both the USMA and ROTC commissioning programs are administered contemporaneously with a prospective officer's four-year, college education. While attendance at the USMA is by congressional nomination and provides a full educational and military experience at no expense to the individual, ROTC programs offer four, three, and two year academic scholarships as well as the opportunity for commissioning without scholarship in limited circumstances.

At the end of the Cold War era, a disturbing trend began to appear. Increasingly, the military services found that higher educated personnel reported less satisfaction with military life and actually planned to spend shorter periods of time in service.⁵ This issue was significantly more prevalent in the Army than the other services.⁶ In the Army, USMA graduates and four and three year ROTC scholarship recipients were nearly twice as likely to depart military service prior to reaching eight years of active federal service than those commissioned through OCS.⁷ By 2000, high junior officer attrition rates were such that the army could fill only 56 percent of positions requiring experienced captains.⁸ Congress, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army conducted numerous studies and surveys in an attempt to identify the problem.

Several studies over the past three decades reflect that among officers the desire to serve the nation is the single biggest reason for entering military service.⁹ Of mid-career officers (captains and majors), 39 percent cited this motivation. In contrast, the next two most frequently cited reasons were education benefits (25 percent) and challenging or interesting work (23 percent).¹⁰ Once in the military, pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and the Army values continue to strongly influence the decisions of officers and their spouses to make the Army a career.¹¹ Despite these encouraging findings, these same studies found that perceptions of a lack of commitment from the Army, limitations on spouse employment, imbalance between Army expectations and the family, the lack of work predictability, and only limited control over assignments were significant factors contributing to mid-career officer decisions to leave the Army.

The same survey pool which cited the desire for national service as the biggest motivation for joining also cited the amount of personal and family time as the most important reason for separating or considering separation from the military; more so than cited pay and benefits, job satisfaction or quality of leadership.¹² As a result of these studies, the Army focused its retention efforts primarily on new financial incentives and increased secondary benefits such as the Basic Allowance for Housing and Basic Allowance for Subsistence.¹³

Senior Army leadership has failed to understand that the cultural identity of those attracted to military service represents a significant element of the problem. Rather, retention efforts such as mid-career retention bonuses and the Career Intermission Program have focused on the well identified symptoms of mid-career exodus. Edgar

Schein presents a compelling explanation of cultural identity, suggesting that culture manifests at three distinct levels.¹⁴ At the foundation of organizational culture lie the assumptions, developed over time through the process of trial and error. Assumptions inform the next level which consists of norms and values, those rules and priorities of the organization which guide its long-term operation. Norms and values are exhibited through artifacts, the most superficial level of organizational culture. Schein's basic premises apply to individuals as well since organizations are merely collections of individuals with a common purpose.

Thus, the relationship between a desire for national service (based on a combination of cultural assumptions and norms and values) and expressed discontent with the amount of personal and family time (artifacts showing that those assumptions, norms and values are not being satisfied) is a significant element of the problem. Many of these departing officers would prefer to remain in the Army, but for their frustration with military bureaucracy.¹⁵ Many of those who have already left, if given the chance, would still return. The challenge in crafting any effective retention program is the ability to link the incentive with the norms and values of the target audience in order to either reinforce or modify their cultural assumptions.

The Principles of Human Capital Management

What is Human Capital?

What comprises "human capital" in an individual? The nature of human capital is essentially both personal and situational.¹⁶ The character of human capital is defined by a person's skill, knowledge, personality, relationships, and even culture that coalesce to produce economic value.¹⁷ Human capital is distinguishable from other forms of capital assets because of two critical factors, complexity and instability.

The UH-1 “Huey” helicopter was a very complex machine for its time. It incorporated several different systems, from avionics to hydraulics to the combustion engine, to achieve its function of flight. Yet, the introduction of the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter did not affect the flight abilities of the Huey. Machines do not change their performance parameters in response to the introduction of newer or competing technologies or even obsolescence. People are even more complex than these machines because they are emotional, sentient beings and, thus, susceptible to both the context of their employment and the presence of competition.

Both the Huey and the Blackhawk helicopters required regular maintenance in order to perform their functions, just as people require periodic exercise, training, health and dental care to remain “functional.” Yet, the functionality and performance of the helicopter would remain stable, even if they were employed at less than their best and highest use. The same cannot be said for people and there can be significant risks associated with misuse or neglect.

Three Phases of Human Capital Management

In the civilian business world, successful human capital management depends on understanding the characteristics of the relationship between the organization and the worker. There are three distinct phases of human capital management: first, acquisition which involves the identification of compatible human capital (the employee) and the valuation of its cost; investment, which involves the indoctrination and training of the employee with the values of the organization and knowledge of processes necessary to fulfill the employee’s purpose; finally, maintenance, which involves preserving investment against degradation of functional knowledge or skills and protecting the investment through retention of the employee.

The maintenance phase of human capital management presents the greatest risk to an organization's ability to fully realize its return on investment. This risk management in the human capital context is informed by the recognition that human capital is inherently complex and potentially instable. With this appreciation, risk to human capital can be assessed based on the degree to which human capital is inseparable from the employee and the increase in opportunity cost which investment may provide the employee.

Assessing Value and Risk in Human Capital

Knowledge and skills are essential parts of human capital. The value of investment in human capital to the employer can be described in terms of both the increase in overall organizational productivity and the degree to which that productivity can be separated from the knowledge and skill of the individual employee.¹⁸ While organizational productivity can be measured in terms of volume of manufactured goods or customer satisfaction in services, measuring the risk associated with an investment in an individual's knowledge and skill can be difficult. The degree of risk associated with human capital depends, in part, on the degree to which the characteristics of that capital can be separated from the individual. To better illuminate the concept of risk in human capital maintenance, the question becomes to what degree is education and training provided to the employee by the employer valuable to another organization?

Structural human capital is created when the return on investment can be realized and enjoyed by the organization only. Structural human capital is most often created indirectly through organizational investment in mechanisms supporting, the processes used by, and the culture inculcated in the employee. In the military context, a soldier's training in marksmanship with a 120 mm main gun on the M1-A1 Abrams tank

produces a skill that translates neither to any other industry nor even to a different military service and is an example of structural human capital. In the civilian context, the detailed, yet simple, process of making burgers and fries utilized by McDonald's is another example of structural human capital. Structural human capital presents the lowest degree of risk within human capital management.

Individual human capital is created when an organization's investment in education or training has immediate value to another organization, meaning that the employee could leave one employer and start working for another employer with little or no additional training or educational requirement. In the civilian world, there are few, clear-cut examples of individual human capital investments. A business' investment in AutoCAD training and certification for an employee or in an employee's Masters in Business Administration in order to improve his general managerial skills provide a few examples. The AutoCAD is used across a wide range of industries, by architects, engineers, graphic designers, and many other professionals. While each industry may have a different or specialized use for computer assisted design software, the basic knowledge and skills necessary to employ the software can easily translate across industries and an AutoCAD certification is unique to the individual employee. Likewise, general managerial skills are useful in a broad variety of work environments and, thus, are highly desirable from an employee's perspective. Not surprisingly, the degree of risk inherent in managing this form of human capital increases soon after initial investment.

Finally, dependent human capital is created when organizational investment matures within the individual, i.e., the value of the human capital investment can only be enjoyed in the particular organization-employee pairing. Some of the knowledge and

skills acquired by the soldier is so unique in its application to the business of warfighting, i.e., close quarter combatives, establishing a company or battalion defensive perimeter, or developing a theater campaign plan, that the value of the Army's investment in developing these skills is effectively dependent on the soldier remaining in the Army.¹⁹ In the civilian market, interpersonal relationships between a regional sales representative and his or his corporate clientele represents dependent human capital. Ironically, a general overview of research indicates that the greatest risk lies in managing this form of human capital.

Risk is also created in the employee-employer relationship when one or both sides fails to understand the opportunity cost involved in breaking the employee-employer relationship. In economic decision theory, the concept of opportunity cost simply means that people choose the option they believe will provide the highest satisfaction. In our context, opportunity cost represents the crux of how individual officers make the decision to stay or to leave.²⁰

Opportunity cost represents a uniquely individualized assessment of a variety of factors, such as employment and compensation potential, spousal employment potential, work-family balance, and alignment of core values and beliefs. Some of these factors are independent of the soldier and the Army, such as civilian unemployment and compensation rates or spousal employment opportunities. Other factors are inextricably linked to the soldier *and* the Army through the nexus cultural assumptions, norms, and values.

Not surprisingly, USMA and four and three year ROTC scholarship graduates have the highest opportunity costs, meaning they have the most to gain by leaving the

Army. The same intellectual aptitude and moral integrity which made them attractive scholarship candidates for the Army is also highly attractive in the civilian sector. The Army can decrease the opportunity cost for these officers by ensuring that retention policies such as the Career Intermission Program align with the officers' norms and values.

Army Human Capital Acquisition and Investment

The Army recently announced its intention to spend \$300 million in order to recruit 6,000 new soldiers to meet an increased authorization in active Army endstrength.²¹ Thus, the acquisition cost to the Army for an individual soldier appears to be approximately \$50,000 per recruit. However, the Army invests much more to meet its Title 10 responsibility of providing trained and ready forces to the combatant commands.

The Army invests in building a soldier's human capital through basic and advanced individual training, enlisted and officer occupational career schools, specialty training such as airborne or desert warfare, etc.; all of which are designed to train the soldier to, in effect, manage himself, others and/or equipment with minimal direct intervention. Estimates of the Army's investment costs for a fully trained and productive soldier of range from \$97,000 for a junior enlisted Infantry soldier to \$370,000 for a newly commissioned officer from West Point to upwards of \$500,000 for a newly minted combat aviator regardless of commissioning source.²² While acquisition and investment are essential to building human capital within an organization, the organization cannot realize and maximize its return on investment without maintaining the human capital. Some of the more obvious ways the Army seeks to preserve the human capital

represented in soldiers is through repetitive training exercises, periodic education and evaluation, and many “benefits” such as medical and dental care.

The dilemma which faces the Army in protecting its human capital is the ability to discern risk inherent in these efforts, i.e., how much of its investment is indeed separable from the individual. Logic should dictate that for those investments which produced perfectly dependent or structural human capital, there should be little to no incentive for the Army to invest further in maintenance of the human capital in the form of retention. Conversely, the Army should aggressively seek to maintain and protect that human capital which is uniquely individualized in the service member or perfectly dependent on the soldier-service relationship. In practice, much of the Army’s human capital investments fall somewhere between the three extremes of individual, structural, and dependent human capital. As the managerial, critical thinking and leadership skills in which the Army heavily invests in its commissioned and non-commissioned officers’ corps are arguably the most individualized and dependent forms of human capital in its investment portfolio, management of these two communities is where the greatest risk lies.

The Career Incentive Program’s failure to link the incentive with norms and values of mid-career officers increases the risk associated with opportunity cost when weighed against cultural assumptions. Armed with an appreciation of the cultural causation underlying this exodus and employing the principles of human capital management, we can refine the Army’s remedial efforts to better address risk.

Applying Human Capital Management Principles to the Problem

The Army Career Intermission Program is a laudable concept, which could serve to retain many mid-career commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers who

would otherwise leave the services for the more stable and often lucrative economic environment of civilian life, if implemented in a thoughtful, culturally sensitive manner. However, in its current form, the Career Intermission Program fails to both *preserve* and *protect* the nation's investment in what is arguably the Army's most valuable capital asset, its human capital. The current Army Program fails to preserve its investment by providing eligible candidates with only the option to enter the Individual Ready Reserve during their sabbatical. Equally significant, the Program fails to protect its investment by limiting the window of opportunity and duration of the sabbatical to an insignificant number of potential candidates.

Preserving Human Capital in the Career Intermission Program

The current Army Career Intermission Pilot Program provides soldiers with only the option to enter the Individual Ready Reserve. In this respect, the Program fails to preserve the predominantly dependent form of human capital in which the Army has invested. Certain knowledge and skills are uniquely military in nature, such as marksmanship, tactical maneuver and operational design methodology. Likewise, the Army exhibits its own unique organizational culture. These characteristics of military human capital are perishable, with the degree of degradation depending entirely on the individual and his or her experiences while on sabbatical. The decision to limit intermission placement to only the Individual Ready Reserve ignores the possibilities presented in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

This is particularly troubling in light of the recent report from the National Commission on the Future of the Army, which noted that "Department of Defense and Army policy directs the Army to organize, man, train, and equip the Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve as an integrated, operational Total Force."²³ This

Commission also found that “[w]hile the Army is intended to operate as one force—integrating the efforts of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—gaps and seams exist in the implementation of the Total Force Policy.”²⁴ The Army Career Intermission Pilot Program is one example of a gap which should be closed in order to improve the Army as a Total Force.

As Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley noted, “Over half of the total Army is in the Guard and Reserve.” With his Initial Message to the Army, General Milley stated that readiness of the Army is the first priority, and “there is no other #1.”²⁵ “Readiness” is the ability of “the Army as an institution to provide sufficient, capable units to support the national military strategy (NMS).”²⁶ If readiness of the whole Army is General Milley’s top priority, the Army Career Intermission Program represents an strategic opportunity to address readiness across the Army as a Total Force, specifically through providing an avenue to exchange personnel between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard and Reserve.

While the Army Career Intermission Program was originally conceived as a human capital maintenance (retention) tool, the program foregoes a critical opportunity to be both a tool for investment as well as maintenance through its expansion into a cross-component exchange program. A revised “Career Intermission Exchange Program” would afford a soldier in “intermission” the opportunity to preserve perishable military skills, as well as physical fitness through regular, accountable drilling requirements. In addition, such an exchange program would serve to improve interoperability and acculturation between the active component and the reserve components as urged by the National Commission on the Future of the Army. If the

service member had the ability to enter the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard, those perishable skills could not only be better maintained, but the reserve units which enjoyed the Regular Army service member's presence could also benefit from acculturation.

Protecting Human Capital in the Career Intermission Program

Perhaps most importantly, a revised "Career Intermission Exchange Program" would directly address the relationship between the service member's desire to continue serving the nation, while pursuing higher personal priorities with greater flexibility. In its current form, the Program fails to link its primary objective of retaining officers with the desire for continued military service. This linkage can be found in the explicit acknowledgement of the organization of the value of these officers. In this respect, the current Program actually impedes such a strategic message by failing to offer eligible candidates options other than placement in the Individual Ready Reserve and a two-for-one additional service obligation.

Those potential officers with the highest intellectual aptitude and moral integrity receive appointment to the USMA or three or four year ROTC scholarships. These same characteristics generally imbue these officers with greater critical thinking skills and appreciation of their opportunity cost. The Career Intermission Program would become a more powerful retention tool if it empowered these officers to choose how he or she would honor the obligation incurred with the active service sabbatical. Options could include a one for one additional service obligation for those choosing to enter the Army Reserve or Army National Guard, or no additional service obligation for sabbatical periods of no more than twelve months for the purpose of obtaining a masters degree

directly related to their military occupational specialty or of eighteen months or less for the purpose of having a child.

Only slightly less significant is the cap placed on the number career intermission slots available in any given fiscal year. The current pilot program limits officer cohort participation to twenty people per year.²⁷ To put this into perspective, the Army has historically accessed new officers into the Army at a rate of approximately 7,200 per year. Of these newly minted officers, 16.7 percent, or roughly 1,200, are commissioned each year from the USMA. The ROTC scholarship program produces an additional 39.3 percent, or roughly 2,800, new lieutenants for active service alone.

As shown above, the Army invested significantly in the college education and preliminary military training of these 4,000 new officers. Yet, 60 percent, or roughly 2,400, of these officers leave the military upon completion of their initial active duty service obligation. The current cap permits less than two percent of the target population of 2,400 officers to participate in this sabbatical program. Thus, twenty officer participants in the current program appears too few to establish create momentum to permit a shift in the cultural identity of both the Army as an organization and individual officers.²⁸

Implementing Revisions to the Career Intermission Program

Ironically, the Army has already developed several of the key tools necessary to quickly and efficiently administer a revised “Career Intermission Exchange Program.” The Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A), the Army’s highly touted, web-based human capital management solution, is one of those tools.²⁹ One of the capabilities IPPS-A is designed to provide Army leadership is the ability to track talent inside the force, across all three components of the Army. As noted by Lieutenant

General James C. McConville, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, the Army has an array of skills and talents in the reserve components.³⁰ The IPPS-A can be used to track the skills and talents and capabilities that individual reserve component soldiers might have, and which are derived outside of their formal Army occupation.

The Army has already created a Talent Management Task Force, headed by Major General Wilson A. Shoffner to document those civilian derived skills and talents for exploitation by the active component where needed. The IPPS-A can likewise be used to catalog the individual talents and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) skills of active component soldiers, including civilian education obtained outside of formal Army channels, which can be borrowed and exploited by the civilian sector in collaboration with the Army. According to MG Shoffner, the Army should have an automated talent management capability established by the beginning of FY2018.³¹

Another tool which the Army has already fielded is the Army's Credentialing Opportunities On-Line (COOL). The COOL bills itself as an Army service which helps soldiers find information on certifications and licenses related to their MOS. This service is found within the Army Knowledge Online suite of self-help services and correlates enlisted and warrant officer occupational skills with civilian sector credentialing opportunities.

But how can the Army marry those active component and reserve component soldiers who are interested in such an exchange program based on compatibility of skills, talents, locations and employers? The Army can best achieve this marriage using a LinkedIn-style application to match active component soldiers with reserve component soldiers with willing employers. The best way to think of it is an open market place for

allowing units to compete for talent, and to allow individuals to tell the Army and each other what they want, and to be able to see both the civilian and Army jobs that are available.

While larger U.S. employers prize former military members as potential lower and middle management employees, the available research is inconclusive as to whether larger employers are also less likely to perceive a continuing tie with the military, such as that contemplated under the current Career Intermission Pilot Program, as a favorable characteristic of a potential employee. Both the Army Reserves and the National Guard actively seek to maintain positive civilian employer-military service relations, through programs such as the Employer Support to Guard and Reserve and the U.S. Army Reserve's Employer Partnership of the Armed Services. As such, the Army Reserve and National Guard could represent a significant resource of ready, pro-military employers for active component soldiers participating in the Career Intermission Pilot Program.

A 2013 study conducted by the Rand Corporation found that a majority of reserve component members employed in both the private and public sectors work for employers with 500 or more employees.³² The Rand study included data collected by the Department of Defense in 2011 through the National Survey of Employers. All employers surveyed were asked which of a series of hypothetical measures would be most helpful for their businesses in addressing military-related absences of reserve component employees. Twenty-five percent of survey respondents said that providing replacement assistance for job vacancies would be most useful. In addition, assistance with replacement workers was specifically mentioned by 167 employers in open-ended

survey responses. In these responses, employers repeatedly raised the challenges of temporarily replacing key employees' (e.g., those in management positions) as an issue of particular concern for them. These survey results indicate a specific interest in the civilian business community to support the military service of their current employees in the least disruptive manner possible. More importantly, employer willingness to accept replacement employees from the Department of Defense represents an opportunity to improve civilian-military relations and provide a meaningful mechanism to implement Secretary Carter's initiatives for the Force of Future.

Conclusion

The Army has long identified the loss of mid-career soldiers as a problem of retention, an issue falling squarely in the maintenance phase of human capital management.³³ As shown above, several studies have identified the cultural symptoms of the mid-career exodus, which can be summarized as frustration with military bureaucracy. However, past and current retention programs fail to acknowledge the cultural compact sought by those in the officer corps and its potential value to the Army. This failure impairs the Army's return on its total investment in human capital across the force, not just within the cohort of well-educated, high potential officers.

The Army benefits from human capital investment through thoughtful, iterative preservation and protection programs in the maintenance phase of human capital management. The Army already has engaged in a similar effort to retain its investment in human capital with its Soldier For Life program. However, the Career Intermission Program represents an opportunity to preserve and protect the Army's human capital investment from mid-career flight. Providing options in intermission status service would signal a departure from the "military bureaucracy" and more firmly establish the social

compact between service member and organization. A revised Career Intermission Exchange Program creates the opportunity to simultaneously enhance its investment in all three components of the Total Force through cross acculturation between the Army National Guard, the Army Reserves and the Regular Army. Additional study should be directed to determining the optimal number of participants required to achieve critical mass in achieving programmatic success.

Endnotes

¹ Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso, *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Retaining Talent* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010).

² Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, "Building the First Link to the Force of the Future," Transcript of Remarks, George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, Washington, DC, November 18, 2015.

³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Career Intermission Pilot Program (CIPP) Calendar Year (CY) 2016*, MILPER Message Number 16-2280 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 12, 2016).

⁴ The term soldier encompasses commissioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. Regular Army enlisted soldiers below the rank of E-5 are not eligible to participate.

⁵ Daniel M. Aldridge and Tracy T. Sturdivant, *The Military as a Career: Results from the 1992 DOD Surveys of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and Military Spouses*, Defense Manpower Data Center Report No. 97-006 (Arlington, VA: Defense Manpower Data Center, April 1997), 19, 27.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷ Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso, *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused Upon Talent* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

⁸ Mark R. Lewis, "Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus," *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 63-93.

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