


Strategy Research Project

Moving Toward a Cost Efficient and Effective Total Army Force

by

Lieutenant Colonel Barry K. Vincent
Army National Guard

Under the Direction of:
Professor Edward J. Filiberti



United States Army War College
Class of 2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188		
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2017		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Moving Toward a Cost Efficient and Effective Total Army Force			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Barry K. Vincent Army National Guard			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Edward J. Filiberti			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. To the best of my knowledge this CRP accurately depicts USG and/or DoD policy & contains no classified information or aggregation of information that poses an operations security risk. Author: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mentor: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 8,028					
14. ABSTRACT Maintaining a large standing Army is costly. Although historically our Nation has been loath to do so, the U.S.'s increasing global role and exigent threats to our National Security and World Order have compelled its being. The challenge for Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, and ultimately the American people, is to balance the need to deter antagonists in peace and, if required, prevail against adversaries in war, with the high cost of maintaining the large standing Army required to do so. One way to help reduce the high cost of a large army is through the expeditious reliance on the Reserve Component (RC). This paper explores the key factors that led to the creation of the RC (both the National Guard and federal reserve force), examines the current framework for how different types of forces are assigned to the three components (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard), and proposes subsuming the federal reserve forces within the National Guard and modifying the current force mix between the Regular Army and a consolidated National Guard/Reserve force for both a cost efficient and effective Total Force.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS 1993 Offsite Agreement, Merge Army Reserve Components, Force Structure					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

Moving Toward a Cost Efficient and Effective Total Army Force

(8,028 words)

Abstract

Maintaining a large standing Army is costly. Although historically our Nation has been loath to do so, the U.S.'s increasing global role and exigent threats to our National Security and World Order have compelled its being. The challenge for Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, and ultimately the American people, is to balance the need to deter antagonists in peace and, if required, prevail against adversaries in war, with the high cost of maintaining the large standing Army required to do so. One way to help reduce the high cost of a large army is through the expeditious reliance on the Reserve Component (RC). This paper explores the key factors that led to the creation of the RC (both the National Guard and federal reserve force), examines the current framework for how different types of forces are assigned to the three components (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard), and proposes subsuming the federal reserve forces within the National Guard and modifying the current force mix between the Regular Army and a consolidated National Guard/Reserve force for both a cost efficient and effective Total Force.

Moving Toward a Cost Efficient and Effective Total Army Force

Behind the regular Army must always stand the great reserve army consisting of the able-bodied men of the nation, so trained as to be promptly available for military service if needed, but following their normal occupations in time of peace.

—Major Gen. Leonard Wood¹

Maintaining a large standing Army is costly. Although historically our Nation has been loath to do so, the United States' (U.S.) increasing global role and exigent threats to our National Security and World Order, have compelled its being. Our existing standing Army and its continued maintenance and high cost is still not without controversy. There is a constant conflict of ideology between our responsible citizens. Realists see the world through the lens of continual war interrupted by brief moments of peace. Liberalists' world view opines that the United States could significantly decrease the size of the active Army because the world has become so interconnected that war is increasingly unlikely and unaffordable.² However, a large, lethal, expeditionary force has a tendency to deter and make more unlikely even improbable threats or at least, forces them towards coercive measures short of war.³ The challenge for Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, and ultimately the American people, is to balance the need to deter antagonists and, if required, prevail against adversaries in war, with the high cost of maintaining a large standing Army. One way to help reduce the high cost is through the expeditious reliance on the Reserve Component (RC).⁴ This paper explores the key factors that led to the creation of the RC (both the federal reserve force and the National Guard), examines the current framework for how different types of forces are assigned to the three components (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard), and proposes subsuming the federal reserve forces

within the National Guard and modifying the current total force mix between the Regular Army and a consolidated National Guard/Reserve force.

History of Reserve Component Force Structure

Major militia restructuring and RC reform began in 1875 with efforts made by Brevet Major General Emory Upton, a distinguished and innovative West Point graduate. Based upon the Prussian system, Upton sought to create an improved reserve system in the United States to prevent “the employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of military art” that he believed was the greatest weakness of the American military system.⁵ Importantly, his criticisms later influenced Secretary of War Elihu Root to take action. In 1903 U.S. Public Law 57-33, drafted by Root and authored by Ohio Congressman and National Guard Major General Charles W. Dick, reformed the militia and became commonly known as the *Dick Act*. The *Dick Act* provided the organized militia federal pay and standardized equipment from the federal government while still maintaining its historical state militia functions. It also “reaffirmed the principles of federal funding, federal inspections, and federal standards for training upon which today’s reserve components are built.”⁶ Later in 1908, Root’s ideas to create a “federal reserve” of volunteers, initially conceived as a way to address the shortfall of physicians during the Spanish-American War, was passed into law. The creation of this limited federal medical reserve force that was separate and distinct from the states’ militias was followed by other developments that led to its expansion.

In February 1912, Attorney General George W. Wickersham ruled that “the militia while in U.S. service might pursue an invading force beyond the U.S. boundary as part of repelling an invasion, but in general the militia cannot be employed outside of the

United States.” This opinion gave rise for Congress to create an Army Reserve under provisions of Section 2 of the *Army Appropriations Act* of August 24, 1912.

Correspondingly, the term of enlistment for a new Soldier was changed to seven years, with three or four years to be served on active duty and the balance served within the expanded Army Reserve.⁷

Thus, the original Reserve force that began as a means to surge ‘federal reserve’ *physicians* in support of the active Army in times of war expanded into a large and capable component prepared to augment the Regular Army for operations outside the National boundaries.⁸ From these humble beginnings, the Army Reserve has grown to be almost 20% of the Total Army and the USAF Reserve consists of nearly 14% of the Air Force. Additionally, the Army National Guard (ARNG) consists of another 33.7% and the Air National Guard (ANG) is 21.3% of the Total Force. Significantly, for the Army, the Regular Army constitutes 46.8% of the Total Army force. The Marine Corps and Navy do not have National Guard components, but do have federal reserve forces consisting of 15% with the US Marine Corps Reserve and 17% with US Navy Reserve of their total forces.⁹

The general restrictions of employing the National Guard outside the Nation, that mainly drove the alternative expansion of the Federal Reserve, continued to generate controversy. In 1986 the restriction was apparently lifted when Congressman Gillespie Montgomery (Democrat-Mississippi) proposed changes in the 1987 *Defense Authorization* bill that passed the full House on August 14, 1986. The amendment simply stated “that no governor could withhold a unit from deployment on account of

location, purpose, type or schedule of such deployment.”¹⁰ Not surprisingly, the amendment was soon challenged by the governors of Minnesota and Massachusetts.

The issue came to a head during the summer of 1988. As part of an engagement mission to U.S. Southern Command, West Virginia provided the leadership for a Task Force of approximately 6,000 guardsmen with the mission to construct 11.5 kilometers of new road through rugged mountainous terrain in Honduras. Hollywood turned the mission into a political issue as they produced two factually inaccurate movies negatively depicting Guardsmen in battle against revolutionaries that notionally resulted in Guardsmen casualties. A more egregious media depiction was the made-for-television movie entitled “Weekend War.” The much exaggerated and inflammatory film aired in February 1988. Coincidentally, the movie aired just one night before President Reagan addressed the nation where he announced additional U.S. aid to the contras. The two juxtaposed events generated a significant public outcry with predictable political fallout.

Consequently, a handful of governors and several active military leaders began to express concerns about the deployment of National Guard forces for similar training missions in Central America. The reaction of the senior military leadership was foreseeable. The military leaders felt that if they couldn’t use the National Guard forces where they were needed, then the force structure might need to shift to the USAR where there were no limitations in employment.¹¹ The controversy over the employment of the National Guard transitioned to the courts for adjudication and resolution.

The lower courts and the courts of appeal battled the issue back and forth until Governor Perpich (Democrat-Minnesota) appealed to the Supreme Court. The matter

was settled by the Supreme Court with an overwhelming nine-to-zero decision in favor of the U.S. Government on June 11, 1990.¹² The primacy of the exercise of authority by the federal government over the Army and Air National Guard forces across the full range of current and future military missions became indisputable.

Clearly, the extensive use of National Guard units from every state and territory over the past 16 years in Afghanistan and Iraq provides substantial evidence of both the primacy of federal control and the commitment by National Guard leaders to serve in support of federal authorities. It has also demonstrated the acceptance of the principle of federal control over the militia by the respective governors.

Since September 11, 2001, the Reserve Component has convincingly confirmed that it can also provide substantial operational capability – capability that effectively enhances the quality of life of DOD’s Active forces by reducing stress, by abrogating the need for conscription during periods when demands on Active forces are particularly high, and by providing a means to retain the national investment in trained personnel who chose to leave Active service.¹³

Notwithstanding the convergence of federal employment authorities over both the Reserve and the National Guard (referred to collectively in this paper as the Reserve Component (RC)) other issues have surfaced addressing the appropriate force mix between the two RC components and the Regular Army active force, their comparative resourcing, and whether there is no longer a compelling need for both. Some of the major decisions governing the RC were arbitrated during a broad-based conference termed “The 1993 Off-Site.”

1993 Off-Site Agreement

The 1993 off-site was primarily driven by the RC mobilization challenges that surfaced during the Gulf War and the continued post-Cold War military force reductions. The Army mobilized three ARNG combat brigades in 1990 for employment during the

Gulf War. However, Army leadership declined to validate their combat readiness and the war concluded before the three brigades could be deployed for the operation. The ARNG leadership felt the post mobilization period had been unnecessarily extended and the ARNG brigades treated unfairly as every Soldier and leader was forced to undergo the most basic skill training as if they had no training at all. Senior Guard officers and congressional supporters also suspected underlying political motivations and alleged “The Army never intended to deploy a Guard combat team because to do so would validate the cost savings associated with moving more combat structure to the National Guard.”¹⁴ The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan remarked in his oral history interview that,

The perception was not good. Unfortunately that flap overshadowed the good performance of the bulk of the Guardsmen or Reservists and, by the way, the good performance of those brigades that we were getting ready to go. But it became a real political football. We needed to bring everybody back to common grounds so I sent [VCSA, GEN] Binnie Peay, Jim Dubick and others into an offsite to come up with an agreed upon approach to taking the forces down and the creation of America’s Army, Active, Guard, and Reserve.¹⁵

The Army was faced with several challenges in 1993. The most challenging was the downsizing of the force based upon the congressionally authorized end strength of the Army’s reserve components being reduced from 702,300 in fiscal year (FY) 1993 to 575,000 by FY 1999.¹⁶ The next issue was the need to repair the mistrust between the Guard and Regular Army, and address the shortfalls in capabilities identified by the governors to support the mission needs of their states.¹⁷ The elimination of the Cold War threat made large portions of the force unnecessary according to the Bottom-Up Review.¹⁸ Also without the immediate ground operational threat posed by the previous disposition of Warsaw Pact forces, the Bottom-Up Review also implied a possible

increased reliance on the remaining ARNG and the USAR forces that were postulated to be able to mobilize and deploy in time to meet national military objectives.

General Sullivan's plan to assemble top leaders from all stakeholder organizations at locations away from the Pentagon to work through each of these challenges proved successful. One key to this success was the inclusion of each components' civilian association: The Association of the United States Army, The National Guard Association of the United States, and the Reserve Officers Association. While losses in end strength and force structure were not seen as equitable across the force, each component had to give up something and ultimately all parties signed the agreement.¹⁹

The 1993 Off-Site Agreement had three major components. These included: significant end strength reductions in both reserve components; a clarification of the role of the ARNG necessitating a shift of force structure to the ARNG; and finally, a clarification of the role of the USAR causing some force structure to shift to the USAR. All end strength reductions were to be achieved by FY 1999. The ARNG target end strength was reduced from 422,700 to 367,000; similarly the Reserves end strength target was reduced from 297,000 to 208,000.

The overall general force mix between the Reserve and Guard was also clarified. The ARNG would focus on wartime combat missions and the peacetime domestic emergency response mission. Correspondingly, the ARNG would gain artillery, aviation, mechanized infantry, armor and Special Forces from the Reserves. Third, the Reserves would focus on wartime combat support and service support missions giving up all combat force structure, excepting the historic 100/442nd Infantry Battalion in the Pacific

that would be retained in the Army Reserve. The Reserves would gain medical, signal, military police and transportation units from the ARNG. The ARNG and the Reserves each exchanged roughly 12,000 spaces of force structure to realign the force mix in accordance with the Off-site Agreement.

One aspect of particular importance to the states was the transfer of rotary wing aviation units from the USAR to the ARNG. Prior to this agreement 12 states were without any aviation assets. The agreement provided enough capability to allow every state, territory and the District of Columbia to home station at least some aviation assets. Despite the subsequent dramatic shifts in the operational and strategic environments, the 1993 Off-Site Agreement remains the only major re-structuring agreement brokered across all the Army components to date.²⁰

As always, the military and the Army must keep pace with a dynamic operational and strategic environment. Similar to the 1990s drawdown, services are currently undergoing major force reductions and restructuring measures dictated by a combination of sequestration-mandated resourcing constraints, phasing out of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, other changes in the threat environment, and the application of the perceived lessons gleaned from 16 years of combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These and many other issues have generated questions as to the continued relevancy of the 1993 Off-Site Agreement.

One question relates to whether the transformation of a previous division-based Army into the current complex modular brigade combat team-based structure makes it beyond the feasibility of an ARNG Brigade Combat Team to attain and sustain the

collective training proficiencies required to mobilize, conduct a short period of post-mobilization training, and deploy in time to meet contingency mission timelines.²¹ For the conduct of operations by the RC in OIF and OEF, a Congressional Research Service report states, "The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan included large-scale and continuing mobilizations of RC forces, and defense officials and other observers have generally expressed satisfaction with the operational performance of these units."²² So the major issue is not whether the RC was less effective than the Regular Army units, or even whether they routinely conducted less demanding operational missions during OIF and OEF, but rather whether the deployment context of those operations accurately reflect *future* contingency mission requirements.²³ Most likely the military will be forced to respond to a range of known forecasted demands, emergent missions and also be prepared to deploy on a time-phased planned contingency operation. At least for known demands that allow for deliberate preparation and for late deploying units for emergent and contingency operations, the reserve component is a very cost effective sourcing solution for strategic depth in meeting rotational demands and late deploying combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities.

The Reserve Component is well suited for use as a source of strategic depth as well as in a wide variety of operational roles, including: (1) rotating operational units deployed in response to Combatant Commander (CCDR) needs and Service requirements; (2) units and teams deployed in support of CCDR Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity activities around the globe...²⁴

Thus, the force structure mix relates more to how the various forces are distributed across the Regular Army, Reserve and National Guard according to *when* those capabilities are required for the mission and whether it is feasible for those forces to attain the required readiness levels in time to deploy and conduct those missions.

Notwithstanding, due to the seemingly narrow focus of the Regular Army on combat forces, numerous downsizing efforts have consistently eroded the Regular Army's combat support and service support force structure as it has incrementally assumed risk over the years in these functional areas.²⁵

Correspondingly, the recently completed National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), proposed as Recommendation 24 that "The Army should consider reducing up to two Regular Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to provide manpower spaces that could be used to decrease higher priority risks."²⁶ The shortfall creating higher risks identified by the NCFA is in combat support and combat service support structure that is missing in the active component, *not* a shortfall of combat maneuver structure.²⁷ The NCFA "found the Army's capability and capacity in [Infantry Brigade Combat Teams] IBCT's created less risk than many of the structure shortfalls identified above [listing support and sustainment capabilities]."²⁸ Importantly, the RC in general and the ARNG in particular also successfully filled thousands of individual augmentee positions across the force during the 16 years of sustained conflict. The ARNG effectively used an innovative program called "Tour of Duty" to advertise and solicit volunteers for rotational assignments that filled wartime individual requirements.²⁹

An important issue to examine now, with over 20 years and two major conflicts beyond the date of the Off-site Agreement, is whether there is compelling rationale for re-examining the basic structure and force mix of the RC. Clearly, the National Guard has successfully served as "the primary domestic response force for the governors" of each state, territory, and the District of Columbia supporting civil authorities and defending the homeland.³⁰ Through a wide range of domestic responses, the governors

have exercised their authority as the commander in chief of their state National Guard units when those units are not mobilized for federal missions. Over the span of those 23 years the ARNG has continued to evolve and improve organizations and processes in responding to civil disorder, disasters and other state emergencies. Currently, the ARNG is a vital part of the domestic landscape and has facilities located in more than 2,600 communities spread across the nation that are filled with Soldiers and leaders from the local area making them ideally postured to support the people of the United States.³¹

Conversely, the USAR centrally manages their full-time force and leadership positions at the captain and above levels across state lines. This practice has the effect of distancing the USAR units from the communities in which they are situated. Significantly, the Army Reserve combat support and combat service support force structure is ideally suited for potential dual role support of civil authorities for domestic disaster response and other missions. Unfortunately, “Loyalty to military units and to each component have risen to inject an emotional tone into the policy determination process.”³² Perhaps another ‘Offsite’ brokered by senior defense leadership could again objectively address the issues relating to the largely common roles and missions of the two reserve components and the appropriate force mix across a potential “unified RC’ and the Regular Army. It appears that at least some senior leaders within the USAR recognize the opportunities for component reform.

Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Commander of the Army Reserves, had this to say as he testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee about capabilities in the

USAR only available to support the people of the U.S. upon presidential disaster declaration:

In fact, key capabilities in high demand during a major disaster, such as an earthquake or hurricane, are prominent in the Army Reserve and nearly all Defense Support of Civil Authorities response missions could benefit from the Army Reserve's unique capabilities and core competencies. In addition to those already mentioned, Army Reserve capabilities also include aviation lift, search and rescue or extraction; quartermaster units (food, shelter, potable water, heated tents, etc.); protection of key infrastructure; supply; civil affairs; public affairs; public and civilian works; as well as a significant portion of full spectrum engineer capability - with some almost exclusively in the Army Reserve. Our Expeditionary Sustainment Commands deploy to locations devoid of infrastructure and quickly open seaports and airports, while our logistics and supply chain personnel are experts at moving supplies into affected areas. Army Reserve aviation units include medical evacuation helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft that can provide quick transportation in a disaster response area, and heavy lift helicopters that can rapidly move relief supplies, equipment and construction material into devastated areas. Our Engineer units include search and rescue teams, debris removal capabilities, horizontal and vertical construction and bridge construction capabilities. We even have a prime power company, headquartered in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, that provides commercial-level electrical power to affected areas. We also provide 100 percent of the Army's Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO's), and nearly 50 percent of the Department of Defense's EPLO's, who maintain communications between the Department of Defense, federal, State and local governments, and nongovernmental organizations to coordinate assistance between all parties during emergency response events. They serve as subject matter experts on specific capabilities, limitations and legal authorities and keep track of Army Reserve capabilities in their States and regions.³³

The U.S. system of federalism expects State and local government, with support from private industry and volunteer organizations, to provide the preponderance of disaster relief. Until 2012, all of the force structure and capabilities mentioned above were not readily available to the governors of the many States until a federal declaration of emergency was made by the President of the United States. The 1988 *Stafford Act* limited the federal government from getting involved in disaster response only when they are of "such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the

capabilities of the State and the affected local governments.”³⁴ The *National Defense Authorization Act* of 2012 allowed the Secretary of Defense to involuntarily order units and individuals of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to active duty for up to 120 days “when the governor requests federal assistance to respond to a natural disaster or emergency.”³⁵ Moreover, states have agreements to lend support to each other through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts that share State resources including military capabilities resident in their State National Guard.³⁶ This practice expands the available force structure to every State by their willingness to work together. But this practice does not allow immediate State access to those USAR capabilities that Lieutenant General Talley highlighted in his testimony.

There are other legal constraints on the use of federal forces in support of the States. The U.S. has a long-standing strong opposition to the use of federal troops to perform police functions. Congress passed the *Posse Comitatus Act*, 18 U.S. Code, Section 1385 and it was signed into law by President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1878. The law ended the practice of employing federal troops to enforce State elections in former Confederate States. The law states:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.³⁷

The law expressly prohibits the federal forces of the Army and the Air Force from conducting policing actions, but does not include the Navy and the Marines. However, U.S. Department of Defense policy has extended the same rules to both the forces of the Navy and the Marine Corps.³⁸ The Congress also extended law enforcement

functions to the Coast Guard so they are not subject to the restrictions and penalties of the Act.³⁹ Similarly, the National Guard operating under the State authority of Title 32 is exempt from the *Posse Comitatus Act*.⁴⁰ Thus, the governors of the many States are permitted to use National Guard forces in support of civil authorities to respond to natural or man-made disasters *and* to perform emergent and frequently related law enforcement functions. Just as every Soldier is expected to fight during combat operations, those reserve forces responding to disasters may face law enforcement challenges such as those that surfaced during the looting following Hurricane Katrina.⁴¹

The USAR units are federal forces that, even when serving in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities mission directed by the President, cannot perform law enforcement functions unless specifically authorized. Additionally, as was demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina, the political sensitivities associated with using federal troops for law enforcement activities delayed and discouraged their employment in that role.⁴² The restricted authorities imposed on federal forces by the *Posse Comitatus Act* provides additional justification to place state-applicable federal Reserve support forces into the National Guard for expeditious use by the governors. Moreover, RC combat units are also well-suited to support civil authorities in a law enforcement role under State control. Notwithstanding these advantages there are arguments for retaining forces under federal control in the Reserve.

The main arguments against transferring forces from the Army Reserve to the ARNG stem, in part, from the Reserve's day-to-day sole command and management by the Secretary of Defense and President, but mainly from the intense political resistance associated with nearly any reduction or changes of National Guard force structure. The

USAR is highly responsive to the federal needs of DOD and the Army. Both Reserve Components have become easily activated and mobilized as individuals, whole units, or derivative units. The Reserve individuals and units can also reinforce and be permanently assigned to Active Component organizations. While many of these Reserve assignments and task requirements can also be met with ARNG forces, generally it takes additional management actions, governor approval and/or other authorization measures that are sometimes accompanied by political resistance.⁴³

Differently, the National Guard maintains continuous and close relationships with both their State governors and directly with their Congressional representatives. As a dual-status force, it serves two sometimes competing masters. Perhaps no other aspect highlights this inherent dialectic than the controversy generated over proposed changes in National Guard force structure and stationing. As early as 1948 the DOD noted this dissonance by stating that the dual-status of this component “produces a constant turmoil of bickering, recrimination, factionalism and stalemate.”⁴⁴ Recent disputes over Regular Army force structure initiatives include opposing cuts and re-stationing efforts in the Air National Guard, opposing the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative, and many others.⁴⁵

While openly opposing many Regular Army restructuring efforts, the National Guard leaders, governors and Congressional advocates argue that they provide alternative perspectives which, through related study efforts and political compromises, result in a more balanced force able to meet domestic support needs while concurrently augmenting and complementing Regular Army forces to meet the full range of National security mission requirements. All this is provided at a much lower cost than the Regular

Army. Many resultant compromises on restructuring initiatives have subsequently proven to be advantageous for National Guard support in accomplishing both Regular Army and state domestic mission requirements.⁴⁶ Notwithstanding these arguments, should the DOD and Congress move to combine both RC components into the National Guard, the newly combined Guard will likely need to demonstrate less parochial resistance to service force structure proposals or possibly face restrictive legislative measures such as those contained in Congressman Montgomery's 1987 *Defense Authorization Bill*.

Force Size and Mix Planning

Army force planners wrestle with determining what is required to meet both current and future security threats. Within available resource levels, the Army needs to modernize its forces to be technologically superior than its opponents at the point of employment; have sufficient force capacity to overwhelm the adversary and, if required, sustain continuous operations with rotational forces; and have the appropriate mix of forces at the requisite readiness to respond to the full range of concurrent or near simultaneous contingencies.

Today, the Army faces a rapidly changing security environment that requires the Army to make difficult decisions in order to remain an effective instrument of the Nation's military power. The past three years of reduced funding coupled with the uncertainty of future funding, the Army risks going to war with insufficient readiness to win decisively.⁴⁷

Correspondingly, Army senior leaders are faced with tough decisions on a near daily basis as they attempt to balance the readiness of the force for likely missions in the near-term with the need to modernize and develop the force for future threats. The RC can play a critical role in reducing strategic risk by providing additional affordable

capacity to meet late deploying force requirements for projected contingencies. Feickert and Kapp wrote in their report for Congress that,

...concerns about federal spending, coupled with the constraints of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), have led many to look for ways to cut costs within the DOD. As a result, some policymakers have begun considering whether part-time RC forces might provide a more cost-effective alternative to some portion of the AC force structure, particularly for the Army, which has the largest reserve component of all the Services.⁴⁸

To examine force demands and force sourcing solutions, the Army uses a two-phase process known as Total Army Analysis (TAA). The first phase of TAA is to determine the capability demands. Scenarios provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and related military plans, computer modeling, rules-of-allocation (work load, span of control, etc.) and system and organization consumption factors, determine the demands for the types and quantity of operational units necessary to accomplish the Unified Land Operations mission with “minimum risk.” Phase I analyses and related required capabilities always exceeds authorized end strength levels due to the number and scope of the scenarios that span the spectrum of conflict.⁴⁹ The analysis examines the frequency and essentiality of force types across all the projected scenarios and plans and determines the optimum mix of units within authorized end strength levels.

Phase II of TAA is the “Resourcing and Approval Phase.” Since the list of units generated in Phase I greatly exceeds authorized end strength levels, the Army has to make a determination of the level of acceptable risk for each type of capability. The determination of how many units of each capability and in which component to station those units is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The inputs to the Phase II process are Army leadership directives, risk analysis, and the combatant commander’s operations requirements. The Army uses the TAA process to build the

operational force and enabler support force structure that specifies the Army Program Objective Memorandum force. The TAA is a proven and defensible process that results in a balanced and affordable force projected to accomplish the required strategic missions within acceptable risk.⁵⁰

As indicated, the Phase II of TAA injects the subjective judgments of the Senior Leadership of the Department of the Army in determining force mix. During periods of military force downsizing, where strategy-to-resource constraints become magnified, the Army leadership exhibits a bias towards retaining combat units because “reductions in enabler units is more acceptable than further reducing the Army’s combat units because combat unit shortfalls are more challenging to resolve than enabler unit capabilities or shortfalls.”⁵¹ Generally, the Army has been able to contract for enabler capabilities or can build those capabilities in approximately 9-months or less. This contrasts with the inability to contract for maneuver and fires combat capabilities and the excessive time required to build new multi-functional combat units (estimated as 32-months for an armor brigade combat team).⁵²

The NCFA was directed by Congress to study the size and force mix of the Regular Army, the ARNG, and the USAR and make recommendations on Total Army force structure. Importantly, TAA considers time-phased force requirements separately from Defense Planning Scenario (DPS)-informed readiness simulations. Differently, the NCFA used a modification of the TAA where the Center for Army Analysis simulation (MARATHON) substituted for the time-phased force requirements for the DPS requirements. By including time-phased operations plan (OPLAN) requirements, the Commission was able to assess overall force sufficiency and mix between components

using a single model. The NCFA method sought to answer two major issues: (1) it examined whether there was sufficient capacity (enough forces) to accomplish the missions; and (2), it analyzed the mix of forces appropriate for meeting OPLAN force requirement timelines. The NCFA's combined modeling method provided useful insights on force structure misalignment.⁵³ Overall there was a net surplus of active Army IBCTs, and a deficiency in active Army combat support and combat service support units. A partial list of those required support forces not currently resourced in the active Army force structure are addressed below. The NCFA finding was reinforced by a subsequent 2016 Government Accountability Office Report that found that:

The Army did not comprehensively assess mission risk (risk to the missions in DOD's defense planning guidance) associated with its planned force structure because it did not assess mission risk for its enabler units. As a result, the Army was not well positioned to develop and evaluate mitigation strategies for unit shortfalls.⁵⁴

The thorough NCFA study provides a more comprehensive framework for examining the appropriate force mix across the Army Components. Generally, the active Army should source every capability needed to initiate, conduct, and sustain combat during the first 30 days of a contingency. Both the Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker reiterated this force planning construct in the 2005 Army Posture Statement.⁵⁵ Notably, phased deployment timelines are also dependent on available U.S. Transportation Command's strategic lift resources, the home station proximity to air or ports of embarkation, Army mobilization throughput capacity, the location of the contingency and many other factors.⁵⁶ Notwithstanding, the expectation is for the *active* Army to maintain the highest state of personnel, training, and equipment readiness levels in order to meet the Army's near-term (at least for the first 30-days) mission requirements across combat

and enabler capability requirements. Differently, the reserve components require at least some additional post-mobilization/pre-deployment training to attain the readiness levels comparative to their active duty counterparts. The amount and duration of post-mobilization training required to attain the required readiness to deploy also depends on a host of situational factors and can vary the duration from an estimated 30 days to up to 120 days or more.⁵⁷ It is problematic to expect the RC to *sustain* high levels of readiness when they are resourced less than 15% of the training time of their Regular Army counterparts. Even with additional training time, the RC is challenged in sustaining readiness levels.⁵⁸

There are other factors that limit pre-mobilization training time. For instance, RC Soldiers have competing demands of their civilian employers. Generally, RC soldiers depend upon their civilian employment to buy their groceries, finance their children's education, and pay for their mortgages, medical costs, living expenses, etc. There are long-held assumptions that RC Soldiers can't perform more than one weekend per month and two weeks of annual training per year. General Milley challenged that assumption saying, "It might be 60. It might be 90. I don't know. I don't know what the answer is. But I don't know if 39 is right."⁵⁹ There may be feasible limits to RC pre-mobilization training requirements intended to reduce the duration of post-mobilization training. Large increases in drill periods and multiple two-week training periods may jeopardize the citizen Soldiers' advancement potential in their civilian jobs; notwithstanding federal safeguards. The force mix between the active Army and the RC must reasonably reflect this framework and at least assess the related risk and challenges associated with the over-reliance on RC enabler capabilities.

The end result is that current early-entry sustainment forces are not balanced within the active Army in sufficient quantities to support the committed force. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Lieutenant General Gustavo Perna proposed a stop-gap plan to meet the early-entry sustainment force requirements based on Total Army Analysis 2018-2022. His proposal requires selected reserve component units to maintain C-2 level readiness with the RC internally adjusting existing resources to focus on increasing those units' sustained readiness. The reserve components are expected to achieve the higher level readiness by prioritizing currently available resources toward those units. The proposal is for the forces listed below to sustain C2 level of readiness for possible contingency deployments:

Table 1. Reserve Early-Deploying Sustainment Units⁶⁰

Unit-type	Quantity
Light/Medium Truck Company	1
Medium Truck Company (POL, Line-Haul)	4
Inland Cargo Transfer Company	1
Palletized Load System (PLS) Truck Company	1
Movement Control Team	3
Field Service Company	3
Petroleum Pipeline/Terminal Company	1
Petroleum Support Battalion	1
Petroleum Company	1

This proposal is intended to be a short-term solution to fill existing capability gaps until such time as Total Force readiness objectives, and associated resourcing levels are developed for all unit types within the nascent Sustainable Readiness Model. The RC units in Table 1 are joined with the below listed RC units that the Regular Army does not currently have in sufficient quantities to meet the projected time-phased force requirement demands.

Table 2. Support Units Needed in Regular Army⁶¹

Unit-type	Units Deficient	Spaces per Unit	Spaces
CBRN Company (Maneuver Support)	5	95	475
Survey and Design Team	4	14	56
Horizontal Engineer Company	6	160	960
Engineer Support Company	10	116	1160
Mobility Augmentation Company	13	116	1508
Sapper Company	8	103	824
Multi-Role Bridge Company	5	183	915
Tactical Civil Affairs Battalion	6	203	1218
Ordnance Company Ammo	1	178	178
Quarter Master Company (POL)	12	202	2424
Transportation Medium Boat Detachment	2	71	142
Medium Truck Company Cargo Line Haul	15	170	2550
Petroleum Truck Company 5K Off-road	12	169	2028
Medium Truck Company (Palletized Load System)	6	165	990
Composite Truck Company Heavy	1	271	271
Transportation Terminal Battalion	2	48	96
Seaport Operations Company	1	207	207

The above listed RC enabler units equate to 16,002 personnel spaces of force structure.⁶² Within the context of the forecasted scenarios and related plans, the Army is assuming significant risk in both the AC and RC enabler force structure and the readiness expectations of the projected RC enabler units. With the inherent bias towards retaining combat maneuver capabilities in the active component, the Army is likely over-relying on the RC to sustain high readiness levels to allow for the relatively early deployment of RC enabler forces. In view of President Trump's proposed increase of the Regular Army end strength from its current size of 476,000 back up to 540,000, perhaps the Army should prioritize investment of the anticipated AC end strength

increases into the early-entry enabler capabilities *and* also increase enabler force structure in the RC.⁶³

Again, given the Army's predisposition for combat maneuver force structure, the Army may choose to re-invest in adding back Brigade Combat Teams, or worse, if it is forced to reduce end strength to 450,000, cut even more enablers. The NCFA recommendation to remove two IBCTs in order to re-invest the space savings in needed support structure challenges senior Army leadership decisions regarding the directed combat maneuver force levels.⁶⁴ However, General Mark Milley has voiced his desire to, "Improve our Army's *set the theater* capability and properly balance readiness investments, especially with the RC where much of the capacity resides."⁶⁵

Merge the Army's Reserve Components

This proposal is not new, but it is bold. An examination of the previous attempt from December 1964 when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced his plan at a press conference to merge the Army's reserve components is useful to inform a future effort. Remarkably, two of the three objectives of the 1964 proposed merger are still valid today. Those objectives were: to improve combat readiness of early-deployment capability; to eliminate reserve component structure that no longer met contingency war plans; and to streamline the management of the reserve components under a single management headquarters.⁶⁶ Secretary of Defense McNamara,

...proposed a plan in which all paid-drill units would be placed under the single management of the National Guard. Some units of both components for which there was no military requirement in contingency war plans would be discontinued, and the authorized paid-drill strength of the combined components would be reduced from 700,000 to 550,000. With the unit structure of the Guard and the Reserve merged under the management of the National Guard, the Army Reserve would consist entirely of individuals and provide personnel for units at summer camp or upon mobilization.⁶⁷

Three significant dynamics were at work to prevent the 1964 merger to proceed as announced by Secretary McNamara. The first was the timing of the announcement as it related to the war in Vietnam. Explicably, opposition grew toward the merger as the possibility of a reserve call-up for Vietnam loomed. Congress rightfully did not want the Army to reduce forces that might be needed in Vietnam.⁶⁸ The merger also sought to inactivate 751 Army Reserve units with a total reduction of 55,000 personnel.⁶⁹ Furthermore, due to the reconfiguration of the force mix, nearly all the remaining personnel and equipment in those units would have to be transferred to other units and most personnel would have to undergo re-training for their new positions. Second, many of the World War II veterans who stayed in the reserve components were nearing the point to qualify for retirement pay through their reserve service. Thus, there was fear that the reduced training opportunities for senior USAR officers might prevent them from attaining the twenty-years of service needed to qualify for retirement benefits. The question of motivation was also raised about those most stridently against the merger as to whether opposition was based upon weakening national security or their own personal self-interests.⁷⁰

Lastly, and perhaps the most significant, was the attitude of the Eighty-ninth Congress on defense matters.

Veteran law-makers in the armed services area sensed the challenge to Congressional authority. The new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers, may have felt it necessary when he first assumed his new position to assert his philosophy that he intended to see Congress fulfill its constitutional role in the determination of policy for the armed forces, including the reserve components.⁷¹

Adding to the backlash from Congress was the portion of the merger plan that directed the transfer from the Ready Reserve to the Standby Reserve of some 150,000

reservists who were employed by the three branches of the federal government. Eighty-three members of Congress were among them. The effect of the proposed transfer meant that those members of Congress would also not continue to earn credit towards retirement benefits.⁷² The apparent self-serving action taken is particularly disturbing since the purpose of the reserve components of the Army is to provide deployable depth and added capability for the nation and for National Guardsmen to be available to their governors. The governing principle should be that every person assigned to a unit be prepared for and willing to deploy. There should be no protected class of individuals exempted from Presidential call-up for overseas deployment or from state active duty to respond to emergencies at home.

Saving taxpayer dollars while increasing effectiveness constitutes compelling justification for the merger. Cost savings within the defense budget, while not one of Secretary McNamara's primary objectives in 1964, was discussed as a peripheral consideration in congressional hearings with "expected cost savings of approximately \$150 million per year."⁷³ Significantly, the Army reserve component merger option resurfaced in 1997 with an even greater estimated cost savings: "A 1997 Congressional Budget Office report on policy options for reducing government spending showed that the Army could save over \$500 million annually with a five year cumulative savings totaling more than \$2 billion."⁷⁴ Saving taxpayer funds while arguably improving RC effectiveness should constitute compelling rationale for almost any reform proposal.

The 1993 Off-Site Agreement provides a historical instance where units of like-type migrated between the Army's two reserve components successfully over time, but not in the most efficient manner. A Government Accountability Office report from March

1995 describes the effect of the transfer on Soldiers. The report indicates that individual Soldiers were left to find new units as the old unit inactivated in one component and activated in the other. In some cases, such as aviation and Special Operations units, Soldiers were able to transfer to the new unit with little difficulty. Other units seemed, “To discourage the transfer of personnel, even if a transfer would result in a more effective use of their skills. Senior and experienced officers and enlisted persons in inactivating units appear to have the most difficulty obtaining positions in other units.”⁷⁵ The Army’s programmatic method used to inactivate a unit in one component and then activate a different unit in the other component proved more turbulent to the force than was necessary as trained individuals were mainly left to find a new unit on their own. An alternative option for the proposed merger could be to identify whole units that would transfer intact from one component to the other while retaining all personnel and equipment associated with that unit. Even real property could transfer with the unit. A possible reason that the 1993 Off-Site Agreement implementation wasn’t able to follow this unit transfer methodology could be due to the sheer number of personnel spaces and units that were removed from the force. Transferring whole units intact would prevent unnecessary turbulence to the force.

People are the most valuable asset to the Army. This merger could occur with little to no negative effect to whole units as they move from the USAR into the ARNG. Additionally, units could maintain their lineage and honors. They could also continue to perform Inactive Duty for Training at the same facilities where they are currently located. Generally, only personnel in duplicative or unnecessary structure (headquarters rendered superfluous based upon reduced span of control, etc.) would face the

uncertainty of relocating due to reductions in authorizations or unit inactivation. An example of this would be the elimination of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) positions mentioned previously. The EPLO function is already performed by the National Guard in every State and coordinated with each Federal Emergency Management Agency region. This is not to say that every officer serving in an EPLO position within the Army Reserves would be involuntarily separated from service. This merger could be spread over time to allow officers and non-commissioned officers to transfer and integrate into the National Guard.

There are superb soldiers and leaders in both reserve components and the most capable personnel of each component should continue to serve. In some instances, USAR officers would replace or displace ARNG officers based upon their comparative higher level of qualifications. Headquarters, Department of the Army should take an active role in the board process to ensure transparency and eliminate any perception of partiality.

Conclusions

The impetus that drove the federal government to form the USAR no longer exists. Legal authorities are in place that now allow a merged reserve force, organized under the ARNG, to fully support the Regular Army as both work to achieve the national security objectives. The ARNG is a proven operational partner with the Regular Army and both have trained, deployed, fought, sweat, bled, and died together over the past 16 years. This close partnership should continue unabated into the future.

Concurrent with combining both reserve components into one National Guard, the Army should adopt the force mix proposed herein to structure the Army Total Force to include every capability necessary to prevail against likely adversaries. Importantly,

Regular Army forces should include capabilities required to open the theater, commence hostilities, and support the force during the first 30 days of the conflict. Units identified above as required early-entry support forces should be sourced by the AC and not by the RC.

The 1993 Off-Site Agreement was an effective collaborative effort to align capabilities into the ARNG making them readily available to the governors; but it did not go far enough. Congress should move to merge the USAR into the ARNG adding greater capability to the inventory. Expanded capabilities that are both readily available to the governors as they respond to emergencies in the States and local communities *and* as an accessible force for federal missions.

Finally, DOD has the responsibility to the American taxpayer to use the dollars they provide in the most efficient manner possible. Merging the Army's reserve components could save over two billion dollars over five years and improve both the availability and utility of the ARNG. Improvements in cost savings AND operational effectiveness constitute compelling rationale for change.

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