

Civil-Military Relations: George Washington, An Example for Today's Leaders

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Abstract

The United States Army has developed a Civil-Military relations model based on Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Written in 1957, Huntington's work is the fundamental theory used to develop the current military profession. The military profession needs to abandon this Civil-Military relations model as defined by Huntington. It must build a new Civil-Military relations model inspired by America's first and greatest strategic leader, General George Washington. The world of developing America's national security strategy is as much military as it is political. It is the realm of senior military officers as well as of civilian leaders. Learning to effectively operate inside the environment is necessary for a senior military officer's career, and critical for the future of the Nation. The challenge of providing military advice in the complex national security environment, informed by political considerations and relevant to the nation's civilian leadership requires a unique skill set. General George Washington thrived in this complex environment and his experience is an example for senior military leaders.

Civil-Military Relations: George Washington, An Example for Today's Leaders

First in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen...Pious, just, humane, temperate and sincere—uniform, dignified and commanding—his example was as edifying to all around him as were the effects of that example lasting.

—Henry Lee's¹

The United States Army has developed a Civil-Military relations model based on Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*.² Written in 1957, Huntington's work has become a fundamental theory in developing the current military profession. The military profession needs to abandon the Civil-Military relations model followed since 1957 as defined by Huntington. It must build a new Civil-Military relations model inspired by America's first and greatest strategic leader, General George Washington.

In his essay on Civil-Military relations, Major General William Rapp argues that Huntington's model calls for clear spheres of influence between military leadership and civilian leaders. This view offers that the civilian leaders of the United States have a responsibility to provide objectives and broad guidance to the military in the beginning. Then, the military makes that guidance happen with "minimal political oversight or 'meddling.'" MG Rapp counters that the clean world that Huntington's model is based on does not reflect the reality of the national security environment today.³ He concludes that the model ill prepares senior military leaders to operate effectively in the real national security environment.⁴

I would agree with MG Rapp's characterization of the national security environment and add that the environment Samuel Huntington envisioned in his 1957 work rarely, if ever, existed in the United States. The clean lines and distinct roles that Huntington based his model on are simply unrealistic. The senior military officer and the

American politician have struggled to understand each other's roles since the birth of the nation. Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster argues in his 1997 work, *Dereliction of Duty*, that the poor relationships between the nation's civilian leaders and their principle military advisors caused the United States to go to war without sound military advice.⁵ President Johnson's Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, said "what isn't taught is how to cope with the accommodation required in the political process. There must be clearer and more rigid standards for the man in uniform."⁶ General Johnson, an officer with experience in World War II and Korea, was unprepared to deal with the murkiness of the national security environment. General Johnson's statement implies that the political leadership should change to accommodate the military officer. These same complaints - officers not understanding the bigger picture and civilian leaders meddling in military matters - are reflected in relations between Presidents Lincoln and Bush and their senior military advisors.

The world of developing America's national security strategy is as much military as it is political. It is the realm of senior military officers as well as of civilian leaders. Learning to effectively operate inside both is necessary for a senior military officer's career and critical for the future of the Nation.

The U.S. Army must prepare its leaders to operate in this complex environment. The United States Army developed a professional officer model that prepares highly - effective tactical and operational leaders. The challenge of providing military advice in the complex national security environment, informed by political considerations, and relevant to the nation's civilian leadership requires a unique skill set.

The lessons of early leaders are thought of by many as historically interesting but not applicable in today's complex world. This paper will examine the complex national security environment of the American Revolution and what skills General George Washington used to thrive in it. It will show a need for certain experience and characteristics in leaders to operate in the real national security environment.

This paper is not intended to be a chronological history of the American Revolution. Instead it will use specific examples from across the eight and a half years of the war to examine what characteristics made George Washington successful. It will examine the interaction of these characteristics with the war's four critical stakeholders – people, government, economy, and foreign powers.

First the paper will provide an overview of the environment that Washington operated in as the Commander of the army. Then it will cover each of the stakeholders, starting with the people of America. The soldier, the citizen, and the press that influenced both make up this stakeholder group. Washington's courage and judgement will be the critical characteristics associated with his influence over the people. Next the paper will look at the government. This stakeholder group is made up of the national level congress and the state level governors and legislators. The impact of Washington's empathy and judgement will be examined relative to his influence over the government. The paper will then consider the economy by examining the industry that fueled it. Washington's empathy and judgement will once again be the critical characteristics associated with his influence over this area. The final stakeholders will be foreign powers supporting America during the Revolution. Courage, empathy and judgement each impact George Washington's success with these stakeholders.

General Washington and His Environment

George Washington lacked the formal training of today's military strategic leaders. Throughout his eight years as the Commander of the new nation's army, he faced daunting challenges across the civil-military spectrum. Creating and leading an army to victory against the mighty British Empire was no small feat, especially doing it with the American citizen soldier. Understanding and courting the citizens of America and the press that influenced them would make the people a major player in Washington's war.

Along with a new type of citizen and soldier, The United Colonies and The United States that followed would usher a new form of government on to the world stage, a representative democracy with strong state governments and a weak central Continental Congress. Washington received his commission from and would answer to the Continental Congress but would also need to gain the trust and support of the governors and their states.

The British Colonial system that America lived under did not provide the foundation for equipping an army. Under the system, the American colonies produced raw materials that were shipped only to trade companies in Great Britain. They also received the majority of their manufactured goods, regardless of where in the world they were made, through these British trade companies.⁷ This economic system did not prepare colonial industry to supply an army in a war against their British masters and would not provide economic independence for a new United States. Washington had to cultivate an industry that would supply his army, but would also serve as the foundation for economic independence in the new United States.⁸

To defeat the most powerful empire in the world, the American leaders knew that they needed the support of Great Britain's enemies in Europe. While colonial ambassadors like Franklin and Adams in Europe cultivated allies, the task of convincing those allies that the United States was a legitimate nation and that the army could defeat the British fell on Washington.

In the 43 years leading up to the American Revolution, George Washington had been a surveyor, colonial military officer, farmer, entrepreneur and state legislator. Over the next eight and a half years, he would shape a new nation's civil-military culture. Four major stakeholders - the people, American government, colonial industry and foreign allies - would occupy more of his time and energy than any military battles.

The People

In June of 1775, George Washington was appointed Commander and Chief of the Army of the United Colonies of North America, the early name for the continental Army.⁹ The Army that he commanded and the people that it fought for were as complex as any in world history. The soldiers of the army ranged from age ten to their late fifties.¹⁰ They came from all walks of life, most with little if any real military training or experience. Many could read, some had formal education, many were tradesmen, fisherman and farmers. They lacked in almost every way what their new commanding general would call military discipline and the skills needed to win the war. They represented a population that was as diverse as they were. Most historians' today estimate that only forty percent of the American population supported the Revolution, the remainder was either loyalists or neutral.¹¹ In 1776, the second year of the Revolution, there were forty-four newspapers in America and only about a third favored the war.¹² The American Revolution was fought for eight years. In that time the army

would constantly seek new recruits from the population. The Army was clothed, fed, housed and armed by the thirteen colonies through the Continental Congress. The people and their support was vital to the success of the war. Washington understood this, he knew that he needed the people if the war was going to succeed. He knew that the people must see him and the Army in a positive light.¹³

It was into this environment that Washington was cast in June of 1775 and where he would remain for eight years. Through the high and low points, Washington would rely on his courage and his judgment to build an army and inspire a people to establish the dream that is the United States.

Courage is a popular term when speaking of wars, military leaders and revolutions. Courage typically refers to is tactical or battlefield courage - a courage that impacts the specific action. Washington certainly exhibited courage on the battlefield time and time again. At the battle of Princeton in 1777, American troops began to retreat in the face of a British advance; Washington rallied the men to stand and fight. He then moved with them to hold the battle line and led the counter attack.¹⁴ At the battle of Monmouth in 1778, upon learning that General Lee's men were in retreat, he rode directly onto the battlefield, stemmed the retreat and rallied the army to fight.¹⁵ Each time, the courage that Washington displayed in the face of the enemy was a critical element of many of the army's battle field successes. The impact of his personal courage reached far beyond the battle field.

In the winter of 1777, the Army moved to winter quarters in Morristown, NJ. In early January, one of the worst smallpox epidemics in American history began to take the lives of Morristown's citizens. The epidemic was being reported across the country.

Washington feared the epidemic would devastate the army and he knew that he had to act. After consulting the Army's chief doctor, Washington ordered an experimental procedure. Typical inoculation for smallpox began with a dietary preparation period to prepare the patients of 10 days or more. Based on consultations with his doctor, Washington ordered the immediate inoculation of the entire army. He brought in local clergy and urged the civilian population in the area to volunteer for inoculation. While many residence refused treatment, the results among the army were incredible. Of the three thousand soldiers in the Morristown area, only a small number died. The same results were reported in the other states. Washington had acted without approval from Congress. He had acted in secret to ensure the British would not learn the condition of his army.¹⁶ He acted with great courage to not only save the army, but the people of the United States.

Washington's decision to inoculate the army was not just an act of courage, but it exemplified his amazing judgement. Time and again, Washington's judgement would play a role in the relationship between the army and the people. Washington knew that he had to keep the will of the people on his side. He also knew that the American press was crucial in shaping the will of the people. In December of 1776, Washington trusted his judgement of the civil-military environment above all else. The Christmas raid at Trenton, New Jersey was a supreme gamble. Washington conceived a plan that required his entire Army to cross the Delaware River, and march 12 miles to conduct a three-pronged attack on the Hessian Garrison Trenton. The crossing of the river took hours longer than planned and only Washington's portion of the Army made it. Yet his

judgement told him that he must continue, that the fate of the new nation needed this victory. His judgement told him that his soldiers were up to the task and he was right.¹⁷

The result was not just a tactical victory for Washington, but a major strategic victory for the nation. The raid on Trenton helped to galvanize the nation in support of the Revolution. After the raid almost all of the forty-four newspapers in America were supportive of the Revolution, urging American's to be proud of their army.¹⁸ The raid had the same impact across Europe. The risks were great, Washington gambled his entire army and the fate of the Nation in a nighttime raid, across a major river, during a blizzard against the premiere mercenary force in the world. Washington knew the risk was worth it. He knew he needed to galvanize the people to support the army and his judgement paid off.

Washington also exercised his judgement when interacting with and understanding the role of the media in America. George Washington understood early in the war that the patriotic press could be a powerful tool. He read any newspaper and journal that he could gather. Reading stories from across the colonies and Europe helped him understand public sentiment in America and across the Atlantic. Washington soon began to use the press to his advantage. He convinced editors across America to publish campaign stories from his headquarters. He urged Americans in Europe to write stories in foreign media supporting the American cause.¹⁹

Starting in 1777, Washington supported New Jersey Governor Livingston's paper, The New Jersey Gazette.²⁰ Governor Livingston envisioned the paper as a pro-army paper to help build public support in his state. In 1778, Washington took Livingston's idea to the next level. Washington convinced one of his own officers,

Shepard Kollock to resign his commission and start a publication for New Jersey and New York communities called The New Jersey Journal.

The Army would purchase all of the equipment needed for the paper. It would supply Kollock with all the paper it could find. Kollock would keep all the profits and would retain ownership of the journal when the war ended. In return, Kollock would publish stories and opinion columns that supported the Revolution.²¹ Washington promised to supply stories from the army and gave Kollock full access to his headquarters.²²

There was never a time during the American Revolution that Washington did not struggle for the funds needed to maintain the army. The fact that he would spend critical money needed for the army to fund a newspaper speaks volumes about his judgement. Washington understood the cause, he understood the people and his decision to embrace the press was vital to the success of the Revolution.

The same judgement that he needed to gain the support of the people would be needed to maneuver the unique political landscape of American politics.

The Government

In 1775, when Congress appointed George Washington to lead the army, the Continental Congress had no real power. The members of the Congress were representatives sent by their colonies to discuss, formulate and recommend back to each colony a way that they could collectively address their grievances with the King.²³ To support of the army Congress required money which the Congress did not have and relied on the states to voluntarily provide.²⁴ Once the new United States passed the original governing document, the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not force the states to provide taxes.²⁵ The Congress represented the government of the new

United States, but the power rested in the state governments, their elected governors, and state legislatures. The states had the power to influence their populations, collect taxes, and outfit the army.

By the time George Washington was appointed Commander of the Continental Army, he was already a seasoned legislator. Having served in the First and Second Continental Congress and in the Virginia House of Burgesses,²⁶ his experience would serve Washington well during the Revolution. His empathy and judgement would allow him to build an army and lead it to victory, thereby establishing a firm tradition of civilian supremacy over the American military.

The American tradition of civilian supremacy was born during the American Revolution. The tradition was nurtured by George Washington during the eight and half long years of the war. Throughout the American Revolution, Washington struggled to keep his army supplied. He constantly engaged the states and Congress for the support the army desperately needed.²⁷ Many believed that the answer to the Army's problems was for Washington to declare martial law, to take charge of the country, and to use his extreme popularity and position to get the Army what he needed to win the war.²⁸ Washington understood the problems of his Army, but he also empathized with the challenges that political leaders faced. Washington made many demands of politicians, but he always did so in the form of a request, acknowledging their supremacy over his command and the army.²⁹

Washington's political battles were not just fought with Congress. He also understood that power in America rested in the hands of the governors. Washington represented what many in the young nation feared - a large central army that did not

represent the people. Washington empathized with the struggle of congressional representatives and the fears of state leaders. To aid Congress and calm popular fears, Washington practiced a feverish letter-writing campaign with each state's leaders. He reported the state of the army and requested their help and support in maintaining it. He encouraged visits to the army and reported to them the proud actions of their troops.³⁰ In a letter to the New York Committee of Safety in 1776, Washington wrote that "when the civil and military powers co-operate, and afford mutual aid to each other, there can be little doubt of things going well."³¹ Understanding their position and showing that he shared their fears and beliefs aided Washington and the army many times throughout the war, often when the army needed government or civil-leader support the most.

Two of the greatest examples of George Washington's judgement with respect to Congress are the Conway Cabal and the winter at Valley Forge. In the winter of 1777, Generals Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, Thomas Conway and some members of Congress were involved in an effort to replace George Washington as the Commander of the Army. Using Gates' victory at the Battle of Saratoga as their starting point, the trio attempted to discredit Washington's judgement and capabilities through anonymous letters, political maneuvering and a gossip campaign.³² The empathy Washington showed to state and congressional leaders cultivated a relationship that would benefit Washington at this critical time. The leaders he made relationships with made fully aware of the efforts to replace him, Washington "maneuvered brilliantly" to expose the trio.³³ True to his character, Washington skillfully communicated with leaders in Congress and the army without directly attacking the trio. Washington's judgement proved its worth once again, in a time when others would have settled such an affair by

dueling.³⁴ Washington handled the situation with a grace and dignity that “silenced his hardest critics, leaving him in unquestionable command of the Continental Army.”³⁵

The selection of Valley Forge as the winter camp for the Continental Army in 1777 resulted from Congressional pressure on Washington.³⁶ As the winter progressed and the situation deteriorated for the Army. The communities around Valley Forge lacked the produce and livestock to feed the Army. The area did not have adequate buildings or medical facilities for the sick and the people were not happy the winter encampment was in their midst. The Soldiers starved, had little to wear and increasing numbers of them grew ill.³⁷ Washington grew desperate for help from Congress and the local governments.

Washington also knew what steps needed to be taken to correct the problems at this winter encampment. The people appointed by Congress to lead the commissary and quartermaster organizations of the army were corrupt and ineffective and needed to be replaced.³⁸ The centralized medical department Congress created was too slow to respond and did not allow doctors in each camp to treat their patients in the most effective method. On top of all the army's problems, Congress directed that Washington launch an expedition under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette to invade Canada. When Washington's letters to Congress were ignored, he changed his approach. Washington invited a delegation from Congress to assess the conditions at Valley Forge. He reasoned that if they could see the Army firsthand, he could convince them of the changes that needed to be made.

In late January of 1778, four representatives from Congress arrived at Valley Forge. The delegation was horrified by the situation and placed the blame on Congress

and the state governments. Each of Washington's recommendations was adopted by Congress. He was given the power to decentralize the control of the medical department and appoint the directors of the army's supply systems. Congress also canceled the invasion of Canada. The power of Washington's judgement was made clear to the delegation and they finally convinced Congress to give the army the power to run itself.³⁹ Washington's judgement of how to handle the situation prevailed.

In his engagements with Congress and state governors, Washington had an agenda; but, his motives were consistent and apparent to all. In each case, he was doing what he thought was essential to win the war and forge the nation. His empathetic approach was one of the main reasons that Washington constantly invited elected leaders at all levels to visit the army and why he sought their advice.⁴⁰ His empathy ensured that the leaders of America knew that this was their army and that they would come to its aid when Washington needed them. The link between his empathy and others understanding and trusting his judgement was critical. These same two traits would be important for Washington as he supplied and equipped the army.

Economy

George Washington believed that economic freedom and prosperity were essential to the future of America.⁴¹ The certainty of that future did not exist at the start of the American Revolution. The colonies produced great quantities of raw materials, but they had no foreign markets. British laws impacted who the colonies were allowed to trade with, and what they were allowed to produce.⁴² Industries like the colonial iron industry were only allowed to ship iron bars to England, greatly reducing the manufacturing capabilities of iron works.⁴³

The Second Continental Congress understood that encouraging manufacturing in America was important for the future of the colonies.⁴⁴ As in so many other areas, Washington's empathy and judgement would be critical to shape American industry to supply and equip the army. These two characteristics would also help Washington shape the economic future of the United States.

Washington's efforts were effective in building the national economy because he understood the people of America. Washington was a farmer and legislator and understood both perspectives. But more importantly, Washington deeply understood the grievances of the American people and the liberties they so deeply sought. This understanding informed his decisions and vision. Washington needed weapons and ammunition to fight the British, and America needed a strong economic future to fulfill its destiny. The army needed food to survive the long winters, and the locals needed to sell their crops to live. They also needed to believe that any sacrifice they were asked to make was for something greater than what they had under the British. Washington agreed and understood. By the spring of 1778 in Valley Forge, Washington built a community between the army and the local populations. Markets were established inside the army camp where locals sold their goods for a profit.⁴⁵

Washington's belief that a strong economy was necessary for the future of America often came into direct conflict with his need to supply and feed the army. He was ever mindful of the expense required to support the army and felt that careless spending by the Army would undermine the nation.⁴⁶ Washington was vigilant with merchants attempting to price gouge the Army and fought it constantly. During the most drastic winters at Valley Forge and Morristown, the Army was forced to take extreme

action to survive. At both Valley Forge and Morristown, Washington was authorized to declare martial law and take from the local populations what the army needed.⁴⁷ Both times Washington refused; he knew that such an action was against the foundational liberties of America.⁴⁸ Washington did send the army out to get the food they needed, but he paid for all of it, either by Continental Script or credit. Washington's judgement ensured that the army survive, along with the ideals the nation was built on. The locals learned to trust the army and that trust fostered prosperity.⁴⁹

Washington knew that a functioning economy was critical to a strong government once the fighting was done.⁵⁰ Nowhere was this more evident than in his cultivation of the American iron industry. At the time of the Revolution, the primary firearms made in America were for hunting and not made in quantities needed to supply an army. The only cannon that the Continental Army had were taken from Fort Ticonderoga after it was captured from the British. Understanding these constraints, Washington started communications with the iron foundry owners in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He worked with each of the local leaders to shift their iron production to weapons and munitions needed for the army. He knew that transforming these industries to support the army would not only provide him the tools he needed, it would also build a greater dedication to independence in the region. Washington worked with Governors and Congress to write laws that supported the iron works. He dedicated soldier work forces to ensure that some of the forges remained open and made considerable efforts to mediate the bitter infighting of the forge owners. Washington exercised both military and political power because he understood the long-term impact of the industry's success. By the end of his first winter working with the iron industry, the British army

communicated to London that there would be at least another year of fighting, in part because of the increase in American artillery.⁵¹ Washington's efforts with the iron works owners were also successful. By the end of the war, they had stopped their bitter feuding, and had started working together.⁵² Washington's cultivation of this industry, along with others like textiles, demonstrated his strategic vision for America, and exemplified his judgement. Washington knew where he had to spend his energy as the Commander of the Army.

Foreign Powers

When Great Britain and her American colonies went to war in 1775, the world watched closely. None more closely than France. Humiliated following the French and Indian war, France saw opportunity. Through the American colonies, they might be able to strike back at Great Britain and possibly gain strength back in Europe.⁵³ America knew that they needed the support of foreign powers. They needed markets to trade, they needed loans to help fund the war, and they needed trained army and naval forces to help them defeat the British Army, the best equipped and trained army in the world.⁵⁴ The problem for the young United States was convincing foreign powers that they stood a chance. France and other countries had to believe that the United States could win a war against the British.

While American ambassadors work the courts of Europe for support, the main responsibility for establishing credibility fell on Washington and his army. Washington had to produce battlefield victories, but that was not enough. He also had to show the Europeans that the United States was a unified nation.⁵⁵ Washington knew that the American Army must defeat the British for the legitimacy of the nation, but he was going

to need help. His judgement and transparency helped convince European nations to take the gamble on the United States.

In April 1778, Washington's judgement in two events cemented foreign support for the American Revolution. The French minister to America and a Spanish diplomat traveled to Washington's winter camp to determine if their countries would formally support the American war against the British. Washington knew that this diplomatic party must see an army worth supporting, one that was capable of defeating the British. Even though his army was suffering at Morristown and was on the verge of collapse, Washington orchestrated a visit that was worthy of any court in Europe. The delegation was escorted by the finest military honor guard. They attended military maneuvers, dinners, and balls with army and local leaders. Washington ensured that each aspect of the event received his personal attention. His plan worked; within days of the visit, the French reaffirmed their full commitment to the American cause.⁵⁶

During the visit, the Spanish diplomat, Don Juan de Miralles, became ill and died in a local hospital. Here again, Washington knew that how they buried a foreign official would judge them as a nation. Washington coordinated a state funeral worthy of any European court. An ornate coffin was carried by a uniformed honor guard. Officers and soldiers, members of Congress, and local leaders participated in a mile-long funeral procession. Miralles was buried in full honors greatly pleasing the Spanish officials, and further convincing European nations that America was a nation of its own.⁵⁷ Washington knew that in each case he could show foreign powers America had the will to be free; he showed them, through lens they understood, that America was *mature* enough to be free.

Washington's courage, judgement and empathy were noted during his engagements with the French. During a September 1779 meeting, Secretary to the French Minister to America, Francois Barbe'-Marbois, noted that, when dealing with his staff Washington, unlike most generals during a war, "always appeared even tempered, tranquil...serious in his conversations. He asks few questions, listens attentively and answers in a low tone with few words."⁵⁸ During Washington's first meeting with the French Army, General Rochambeau's staff was equally taken by Washington's clarity of self. General Rochambeau's quartermaster, Claude Blanchard, noted that Washington had "an easy and noble bearing, extensive and correct views and the art of making himself beloved."⁵⁹

What the French saw in these and other engagements was not a facade. They saw what made Washington beloved by his Army and the nation. Washington was who he was. With few exceptions, his interactions and actions reflected this transparent nature. The French Army staff claimed later that they were impatient to see "the hero of liberty."⁶⁰ When they finally met the hero, they were charmed. This and the many interactions that followed would build the trust between the two armies that would win the war.

Washington's Impact on Civil-Military Relations

The national strategic environment General George Washington faced was as complex as today's. In many ways the stakeholders that Washington dealt with are incredibly similar to the ones senior military officers find themselves working with today. The modern army constantly struggles to explain itself and connect with the American people, for recruits and support. Senior military officers must engage and advise the senior members of the executive branch, and with the state and local leaders who carry

influence and power in the legislative branch. Senior leaders have the responsibility to ensure that the United States Army remains the most lethal, capable, and technologically advanced army in the world. To accomplish this, they must work and interact with the industrial complex that has been created to support it. Their interactions must ensure a profitable relationship for industry that is conscience of the fiscal environment. Like Washington, senior military leaders must recognize that they will not fight alone. Alliances and partnership will almost certainly ensure that all future applications of American military power are done with close cooperation with other nations.⁶¹

General Washington approached his stakeholders with the battlefield courage expected of a military leader and the personal courage to do what needed to be done. He had the courage to not always have the answers and to listen to the advice of those around him. He had the courage to take great risk when the strategic environment needed a victory. As biographer Ron Chernow explains, Washington was “equipped with keen powers of judgement rather than originality.”⁶² This keen judgement allowed him to act on his courage and to make decisions that shaped not only the war but the future of America. When many leaders were accused of not being able to see past the tip of their nose, Washington seemed to be able to see into the distant future. He made decisions that would shaped the future. Washington’s courage and judgement would have meant little if not for the empathy that underpinned everything he did. His empathy deeply influenced and allowed others to trust his actions. Washington was able to make judgements based on his courageous vision of the future because he understood the people he was fighting for.

The modern senior military officer is taught to operate in the strategic environment of national security based largely on the Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* military as a profession model. The clean and clearly-defined roles of military and civilian leaders outlined by Huntington fail to account for the complex world facing senior military leaders now or when Huntington wrote about them. Huntington's theory creates in the military officer a fear of becoming political, thereby avoiding the need to understand political context necessary to providing relevant military advice. Huntington separates the responsibilities of the soldier and the statesmen under the belief that each must stay firmly planted on their side of national security. Huntington prepares military leaders to operate in a world that simply does not exist.

George Washington led the nation to independence in an incredibly murky, ill-defined national security environment. With courage, judgment, and empathy he negotiated his environment and exercised civil-military powers beyond any other officer in the nation's history. Yet when he resigned his commission to Congress, one-time critic and the President of Congress Thomas Mifflin remarked, Washington had "conducted the greatest military conflict with wisdom and fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil powers."⁶³

Endnotes

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¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 342-343.

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²⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 415.

²² *Ibid.*, 415-421.

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²⁶ Ellis, *His Excellency*, 36.

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- ²⁸ Lengel, *First Entrepreneur*, 101-103
- ²⁹ Chadwick, *George Washington's War*, 115.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 103
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 102-103.
- ³² Ellis, *His Excellency*, 106-107.
- ³³ Chadwick, *George Washington's War*, 263.
- ³⁴ Chernow, *Washington*, 320-322.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 321.
- ³⁶ Chadwick, *The First American Army*, 210.
- ³⁷ Ellis, *His Excellency*, 112-117.
- ³⁸ Chadwick, *George Washington's War*, 275-277.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 275-277.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 102-103.
- ⁴¹ Lengel, *First Entrepreneur*, 90-91.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 58-59.
- ⁴³ Chadwick, *George Washington's War*, 175.
- ⁴⁴ Arthur Meier Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution 1763-1776* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1957), 564.
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⁵⁴ Chernow, *Washington*, 207.

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