


Where are the Artillery Generals? The Unintended Consequences of Modularity

by

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Abstract

Transition to a modular structure was a necessary process for the Army to best meet the needs of a modern fighting force, while accounting for the realities of a post-Cold War environment. However, modularity significantly changed the talent management system of the Army, by greatly empowering Brigade Combat Team commanders to assess talent across a large and branch-diverse population of officers. This paper looks at the impact of that empowerment and argues for a correlation between modularity and a reduction in the branch diversity of the General Officer population. It does so by examining primary-zone and below-the-zone promotion data for one of those branches, the Field Artillery, in comparison to another, the Infantry. The results have not been good for the Field Artillery and, from a development of senior leader perspective, might also not be good for the Army overall. The author presents an argument for a more diverse general officer population and makes recommendations to rectify this unintended consequence of the transition to a modular force.

Where are the Artillery Generals? The Unintended Consequences of Modularity

As a rite of passage, every Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic Course class takes its first steps through the corridors of Snow Hall.¹ Past the statues and paintings of Saint Barbara and Revolutionary and Civil War cannon, young Lieutenants find themselves facing an imposing wall.² It features the pictures of all the active duty General Officers who came from the Artillery. These Lieutenants are probably completely unaware of the significant decrease in the number of those pictures over the last ten years.

Today, there are seventeen General Officers from the Field Artillery and six from the Air Defense Artillery, out of three hundred and forty-three Generals, seventy-seven of which come from the Infantry alone.³ From 2000-2002, the Army selected seventeen General Officers from the Field Artillery, equaling the total today. A Lieutenant walking the corridors then would pass by almost forty pictures of General Officers.⁴ That was both inspirational and aspirational.

The reduction is more stark when one considers that before 2005, the wall only contained Field Artillery Generals.⁵ Field Artillery officers have historically served in critical senior positions in the Army. Three of the last nine Chiefs of Staff of the Army were Field Artillery.⁶ But as the Army promotes fewer Field Artillery officers to its senior ranks, will there be a large enough pool to serve at the highest levels in the future?

This paper will consider a correlation for this reduction in Field Artillery senior officers, discuss why this is not a positive development for the Army, and propose actions to reverse the trend. The root cause can be found in modularity, a significant structural and organizational change to the Army. The transformation to a modular force has unintentionally altered the landscape of the Army's pool of strategic leaders.

Modularity: The Army's Answer to a Changing Environment

In 2003, the Army initiated a force structure change designed to transition from an Army centered on the division to one centered on the brigade, more specifically the brigade combat team (BCT). This represented the culmination of a process to adapt and modernize that spanned ten years and encapsulated the visions of multiple Chiefs of Staff of the Army.⁷ What would become the modular BCT, began as just an idea.

The concept of modularity was first introduced in a training pamphlet.⁸ It was meant to be the solution to the problem of creating a force prepared for full-spectrum operations.⁹ This problem was earlier considered in the 1993 version of the Operations manual.¹⁰ Army Chief, General Gordon Sullivan, recognized that not only was the environment changing with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but that there was also political pressure to reduce the size of the force in response to the end of the Cold War.¹¹ The goal was more flexible, flatter, and less hierarchical organizations to fight and win across a diverse set of missions.

To achieve this goal, the modular force was conceived with five characteristics (one was modularity), which were designed to balance the two competing realities of the transformation.¹² First, the concept was supposed to be forward looking. It was an effort to consider what the nature of future conflict would be and to design a force to meet the requirements of that conflict. Secondly, the force concept had to be mindful of the constraints of a post-Cold War environment, the need for efficiency through a wider range of missions for the sake of budgets. Now that the future modular force was conceived and written into the doctrine, the Army Chiefs that followed focused on building, equipping, and training that force.

A significant component of the modular effort was technological. When General Reimer followed General Sullivan, he focused on the weapons systems that allowed the force to be flexible, mobile, and versatile.¹³ Through simulations, the Army identified a need for a medium force, more deployable than mechanized forces and more lethal than light units.¹⁴ As the Army looked to build a new type of maneuver force, which would ultimately become the Stryker Brigade, the construction of this organization informed large scale modularity.

After doctrine development and structural design, the final steps in transitioning to a modular force were to operationalize and validate the concept. General Eric Shinseki did this when he accelerated the restructuring of the Army.¹⁵ As the Chief on 9-11, he also linked rapid deployability and interoperability to the modular force.¹⁶ General Peter Schoomaker succeeded General Shinseki, and he emphasized the BCT as a combat-ready team.¹⁷ Assigning all the required combat capabilities to the BCT was a condemnation of division-centric warfare where brigades were task-organized for their missions.¹⁸ This led to the breakup of the Division Artillery (DIVARTY) and the Division Support Command (DISCOM), as well as the Division Signal Battalion and the Division Military Intelligence Battalion, permanently assigning their units to the BCTs. Lastly, in the wake of simultaneous Afghanistan and Iraq troop requirements, General Schoomaker grew the overall size of Army, predominantly by adding maneuver forces.¹⁹

The logic of the Army's march to modularity was sound. The Cold War had ended, which brought not just victory, but uncertainty. This led to deep thinking about the future force, which was further shaped by the realities of budget and force reduction. As a versatile force was conceived and equipped, a new threat materialized which

seemed to validate the already initiated movement towards the modular force. Structural changes were finalized with the sound of the bugles to war. Lastly, the force requirements for an enduring conflict grew the Army in a way that was consistent with the premises of modularity—building more BCTs. A decade later, the Army had established the BCT as its combat building block, provided it with the permanently assigned forces to fight, and sent it to war, repeatedly.

The Talent Management Problem

Lost in the transition, was that modularity supremely empowered BCT Commanders to manage the officer talent of the Army. They were specifically charged with building the team because of the addition of varied units to their formations.²⁰ The combat enablers, like Field Artillery and Forward Support Battalions, were assigned directly to the BCT to build a more effective team. It was meant to reduce the requirement to task organize for specific missions because the components would already belong to the unit. There is a critical connection between personnel and organizational performance, and it is enhanced in a permanent relationship.

As the team builder, the BCT commander also trains and assesses the leaders that comprise those teams. He is charged with developing, enhancing, and evaluating “human skills, knowledge, and abilities.”²¹ The BCT commander achieves this through counseling and evaluation. Specifically, he is the senior rater for all company, battery, and troop commanders, as well as for field grade officers in staff positions at the battalion and brigade level. He is also the rater of each of the battalion commanders.

Understanding the structure of a modular BCT is important.²² As an example, the Infantry BCT commander’s team now includes seven battalions; three Infantry battalions, a Reconnaissance battalion, a Cannon Artillery battalion, a Brigade Engineer

battalion, and a Brigade Support battalion. Each of those battalions has two Majors, in addition to the field grade officers on the brigade staff. The Infantry BCT commander could senior rate as many as thirty-nine company, troop, and battery commanders and twenty Majors.²³ Under modularity, the BCT commander now evaluates a population of Majors and Captains in many branches, with larger numbers in the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer, Military Intelligence, Signal, and Logistics branches.

This was a dramatic change in talent management, with the number of officers evaluated by the BCT commander increased by almost 50%. Not only did the numbers increase, but the variety of branches represented in the BCT commander's population also increased. Even before modularity there was diverse representation, but with the advent of the BCT, there were more of these officers and they were being evaluated in critical, key and developmental positions.

The BCT Commander was the primary evaluator for these branches and he was evaluating them against each other. He was assessing all the Captains and comparing them to each other, regardless of their unique responsibilities. This was the same with the Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. The BCT commander in the modular force is shaping the future Army by his assessment of officers across a wide array of branches, serving in positions deemed critical by the Army. It will be worthwhile to look at the potential and realized impact of that power.

Data Analysis – What the Promotion Data Tells Us about Modularity

The BCT commander is now empowered to influence the talent management of several branches outside of the Infantry. This portion of the paper will focus on an analysis of promotion data for one of those branches, the Field Artillery, which has been significantly impacted by modularity.²⁴ The Field Artillery was disproportionately

impacted because more of its active duty officers are assigned to BCTs than to Field Artillery Brigades.²⁵ Additionally, while Field Artillery officers can command BCTs, it is the exception and not the rule. As an example, on the Colonel Command Selection List that was released in March 2017, there were seventeen officers slated to command BCTs; twelve Infantry officers, four Armor officers, and one Field Artillery officer.²⁶ Over the last ten years, the number of Field Artillery officers selected annually to command BCTs is either one or zero. Since the advent of modularity, most Field Artillery officers are in a BCT and have been evaluated by mostly Infantry officers. This section will review the trends in how those Field Artillery officers have fared under modularity.

For the purposes of this analysis, the paper will provide an overview of a series of data charts for promotion to the ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel, all located in Appendix 1. All three charts are divided horizontally by promotion year and vertically by five promotion categories: Field Artillery, Infantry, Armor, "All Others", which represents all non-operations division branches, and the total Army. Each of these categories is further divided into the total population size for that year and the percentage of that population selected for promotion.

These two data points, population size and selection percentage, will be used in a comparison between the Field Artillery and Infantry Branches.²⁷ Selection percentage is a logical comparison point because it reflects how the talent in one branch compares to another. At a central selection board, all the files in the Operations Division are weighed against each other, so a difference in promotion percentages would indicate a relative strength of the files in the branch with the higher percentage. The analysis will show a difference in promotion percentage between the Field Artillery and the Infantry.

When comparing these two branches, population size might not seem relevant, but it is important for one reason. The common belief is that the Infantry branch is much larger than other branches, particularly the Field Artillery, partially accounting for their higher representation in the senior leader ranks. On the contrary, the data will show that at the field grade level the population sizes are surprisingly similar. The analysis below will look at both data points more closely.

The comparison between the Field Artillery and the Infantry begins with trends in the promotion to Major. The first critical data point is an analysis of population size. There is no argument that the Infantry population is larger than the Field Artillery at the company grade level. As an example, between 2008 and 2015, the Infantry population was on average about 45% larger (Appendix 1).²⁸ As the Army grew BCTs, the Infantry was growing nearly twice as fast as the Field Artillery, with two Infantry battalions in each new BCT and one Field Artillery battalion. With near identical promotion numbers, the result was an Infantry Captain population that was significantly larger than the Field Artillery population. This trend is erased by the time those Captains are considered for promotion to Major, which will be relevant when looking at selection rates.

From 2002 to 2016 (Appendix 1), the two branch populations under consideration for promotion to Major are similar. There is fluctuation from year to year, with three instances where the Field Artillery population is larger than the Infantry (2007, 2009, and 2010). There are also four years where the population size advantage for the Infantry officers is in the single digits (2002, 2006 April, 2008, and 2012) and one year (2013) when the populations are identical. The key point is that the differences in

population size that began as Second Lieutenants and continued to a lesser degree as Captains, are virtually eliminated by the time the officers are considered for Major.

Table 1. Major Promotion Rates²⁹

MAJ	Field Artillery		Infantry	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2006APR	185	98%	201	98%
2006SEP	125	98%	174	97%
2007	152	95%	114	96%
2008	100	87%	106	93%
2009	101	94%	97	92%
2010	106	91%	88	93%
2011	101	87%	115	93%

There are two final data points in the Major promotion figures that indicate a trend caused by modularity. The first is a trend in favor of Infantry officer promotion selection that begins in 2008 (Table 1), where 6% more Infantry officers are selected for promotion. This year is important because it represents a population of officers with more Captain evaluations, including those in command, under modularity. This trend continues through 2013, with 2009 representing the only year when the Field Artillery promotion rate is higher, by 2%. Secondly, this trend reverses itself beginning in 2014 (Table 2), when the promotion rate increases in favor of the Field Artillery over its Infantry counterparts for three consecutive years, by 4% in 2014, by 5% in 2015, and by 12% in 2016.

Table 2. Major Promotion Rates³⁰

MAJ	Field Artillery		Infantry	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2013	138	78%	138	84%
2014	135	71%	186	67%
2015	136	78%	192	73%
2016	132	77%	197	65%

These numbers, however, cannot be considered in isolation. Some point to this percentage advantage for the Field Artillery as a positive trend, but during these same three years, the comparative population size for the Infantry also increases significantly. It goes from 0% in 2013 to 28% larger in 2014, 29% in 2015, and 33% in 2016. Because of this, the Infantry promoted 89 more officers during this period, despite a higher selection percentage for Field Artillery.

The analysis between the Field Artillery and the Infantry for officer promotion to Lieutenant Colonel is relatively straightforward (Appendix 1). The ratio of population sizes fluctuates, but it is the highest and most greatly favors the Infantry from 2003 to 2007. The two populations are the closest in size in 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2013. The promotion rates also remain relatively close. Over ten years, from 2002 to 2011, the two branches were within three percentage points of each other eight times, with an even number of instances where one was ahead of the other. The two years that were outside of 3%, 2004 and 2007, were years in which the Infantry rate exceeded the Field Artillery by 9% and 8%. Additionally, in each of these years the Field Artillery promotion percentage exceeded or was within one percentage point of the Army promotion rate.

Table 3. Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Rates³¹

LTC	Field Artillery		Infantry		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2012	83	82%	108	88%	1405	83%
2013	104	66%	99	82%	1397	72%
2014	112	63%	85	63%	1406	63%
2015	73	62%	100	72%	1521	61%
2016	88	49%	95	77%	1529	60%

These trends begin to change in 2012 (Table 3). While the sample size is small, the data is nonetheless noteworthy. In two of those five years, the Field Artillery population size exceeds that of the Infantry, while in the other three years it does not. In one of those years, 2015, the Infantry population size is 27% larger. More importantly, in four of those five years the Infantry promotion rate is higher than that of the Field Artillery and the one time it is not they are even at 63% in 2014. In the other four years, the Infantry promotion rate exceeds the Field Artillery by 6%, 16%, 10%, and 28%. Those last three differences are higher than at any time in the previous fifteen years. In 2016, not only is the Field Artillery promotion rate 28% behind the Infantry, it is 11% behind the overall Army percentage.

Those three years of Field Artillery promotion to Lieutenant Colonel correspond with the promotion of those same officers to Major in 2006, 2008, and 2009, where there was no significant difference in promotion percentages between the Field Artillery and the Infantry (Table 1). In seven years, and one promotion board, this population of Field Artillery officers, which spent most of its Captain and Major years within the

construct of modularity, saw a severe decline in promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. This is a concerning trend.

For promotion to Colonel, the analysis is also straightforward, but with some clearly delineated trends (Appendix 1). First, in the fifteen years of data the Field Artillery population is generally smaller than the Infantry population. In most of the years, the Infantry population is considerably larger. This is interesting when considered in the context of retirement. Promotion to Colonel is the first time when officers can consider retiring instead of continuing to compete for promotion. In 2002, only seven more officers were considered for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in the Infantry than the Field Artillery, and their promotion rates were similar. Six years later, in 2008, 22 fewer Field Artillery officers chose to compete for promotion to Colonel than their Infantry counterparts.

There are many reasons why officers make the decision to retire, it is inherently personal. The Army was at the height of two wars, with previous and potential future deployments further influencing this decision. With the elimination of Division Artilleries, opportunities for command at the Colonel level were further limited for Field Artillery officers. These were also the first officers who lived through the transition to modularity as Battalion Commanders. It is possible that their experience did not make them confident about the opportunities for future service. The promotion rates that followed justified that concern.

Table 4. Colonel Promotion Rates³²

COL	Field Artillery		Infantry		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2010	52	60%	53	72%	878	47%
2011	56	45%	83	46%	1029	36%
2012	55	47%	75	59%	1032	37%
2013	69	36%	71	49%	1023	42%
2014	72	32%	87	64%	983	40%
2015	84	26%	95	57%	1182	40%
2016	58	33%	57	60%	908	42%

In terms of promotion percentage, the data set can be divided roughly in half in terms of trend analysis. Between 2002 and 2009 (Appendix 1), the Field Artillery promotion percentage is higher than the Infantry percentage six out of eight times. The two times that it is not, 2006 and 2007, coincide with BCT growth in the Army. Additionally, between those years, the Field Artillery promotion percentage is below the percentage for the overall Army average on only two occasions, again in 2006 and 2007. Conversely, between 2010 and 2016 (Table 4), the Infantry promotion percentage is higher than the Field Artillery percentage in all seven years, six times that number is in double digits. In the last three years, the Infantry percentage has been 32%, 31%, and 27% higher, respectively. Additionally, the Field Artillery percentage has been lower than the Army percentage in each of the last four years, by an average of 9%. In the last four years, the Infantry has promoted 90 more officers to the rank of Colonel. The

current trend in the promotion to Colonel statistics is consistent with the trend in the previous ranks, but it is more stark.

The first thing to understand about the officers under consideration for promotion to Colonel in 2016 is that they have spent nearly their entire Captain and field grade years within the construct of modularity. This does not mean that all Field Artillery officers served in BCTs, but most of them did. Those considered for Colonel in 2013, 2014, and 2015 have all their field grade time, along with a couple of years of Captain evaluations, under modularity. The variable that most significantly characterizes each of these data sets is the Army's transition to modularity, and the effect clearly appears to be cumulative. In other words, the more evaluations that Field Artillery officers have under modularity, the more they have been disadvantaged against their Infantry counterparts. When they reach consideration for Colonel, they are further disadvantaged against the rest of the Army.

Further Data Analysis – Where the Army Really Gets its General Officers

The above data was only a presentation of officers considered for promotion in the primary zone, due course promotions based on established timelines. This is an incomplete analysis. Most of the Army's General Officers have been promoted below-the-zone at least once in their careers, 72% of them.³³ That percentage is even higher when Judge Advocates, Chaplains, and Acquisition Corps officers, who are all considered separately for promotion, are excluded. In fact, only 17% of Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery General Officers, 21 out of 127, were not selected below-the-zone at least once.³⁴ More than half of all below-the-zone General Officers, 129, have been promoted below-the-zone two or three times.³⁵

As such, a complete analysis of the potential impacts of modularity on the selection of Army senior leaders requires a brief analysis of below-the-zone promotion data. This analysis will only include below-the-zone promotion percentages, because the population sizes would be the same as for the primary zone numbers, it would just be one year offset. The key point to understand is there are very few below-the-zone promotions, in some cases there are no officers selected for below-the-zone promotion in a branch category. The low percentages are part of the point. From this very small population of officers the Army selects most its General Officers.

The promotion data for selection below-the-zone to Major indicates a general lag for Field Artillery officers when compared to Infantry officers and to the overall Army selection percentage (Appendix 2). In thirteen of fourteen years, the Infantry percentage outpaces the Field Artillery, often by a wide margin. Only three times are the numbers within two percentage points.³⁶ In 2010, the Infantry selection rate was seven times that of the Field Artillery, with forty-eight officers selected for below-the-zone promotion compared to five for the Field Artillery. Also, only three times in fourteen years does the Field Artillery percentage exceed the overall Army selection rate.³⁷ As a snapshot of the initial identification of future talent, which is what the below-the-zone selection at the rank of Major represents, the data does not paint a positive picture for the Field Artillery. These promotion rates for the branch are below the Infantry and below the Army overall, often well below.

Table 5. Below-the-Zone Promotion Data to Major³⁸

MAJ	FA	Infantry	Army
2010	1.8%	12.6%	5.8%
2011	8.1%	14.6%	8.7%
2012	5.0%	13.5%	8.1%
2013	6.0%	14.8%	7.4%
2014	1.1%	5.7%	3.3%
2015	3.5%	3.4%	2.8%
2016	2.4%	4.0%	3.3%

In addition to a general lag in below-the-zone promotions, there is another negative trend that mirrors the primary zone data; the more evaluations that Field Artillery officers have under modularity the bleaker their promotion outlook. For the last three years (Table 5), only twelve total Field Artillery officers were selected for promotion below-the-zone, compared to thirty-six Infantry officers. While there will be two other opportunities for Field Artillery officers in these year groups to be considered for below-the-zone promotion—Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel—this initial cut is not a positive indicator for future success.

The trends are similar in the below-the-zone promotions to Lieutenant Colonel (Appendix 2). In fourteen years, the Field Artillery percentage is only above the Infantry in 2008, by 1.1%, and above the overall Army in 2007, by a miniscule 0.1%. In all the other years, the Infantry percentage is significantly higher; in three of the years it is seven times higher. Most recently, from 2013-2016 (Table 6), the Field Artillery selection percentages equated to three officers, compared to twenty-eight Infantry

officers. These Field Artillery officers held all their key and developmental positions during modularity. Very few of them were identified for early promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.

Table 6. Below-the-Zone Promotion Data to Lieutenant Colonel³⁹

LTC	FA	Infantry	Army
2013	0.8%	7.8%	5.3%
2014	1.3%	6.5%	2.8%
2015	1.1%	7.2%	3.0%
2016	0.0%	4.8%	3.5%

The trend for below-the-zone selection to Colonel is similar (Appendix 2). Only once in fifteen years is the Field Artillery percentage higher than the Infantry, in 2005, when it was also higher than the overall Army percentage. In 2005, most of the evaluations for those officers were before modularity. Additionally, there are two instances where no Field Artillery officers were selected below-the-zone, 2008 and 2014. As with the Major and Lieutenant Colonel data, there is a vast difference between the Infantry and Field Artillery percentages.

Table 7. Below-the-Zone Promotion Data to Colonel⁴⁰

COL	FA	Infantry	Army
2008	0.0%	12.9%	4.7%
2009	3.5%	12.9%	4.9%
2010	1.4%	5.9%	2.3%
2011	1.6%	2.3%	1.6%
2012	1.2%	3.9%	2.1%
2013	0.5%	1.9%	1.0%
2014	0.0%	2.7%	1.0%
2015	0.7%	2.2%	1.2%
2016	0.7%	2.6%	0.9%

Lastly, the current below-the-zone trend is more stark in the Colonel data set (Table 7). From 2008 to 2016, eleven Field Artillery officers were selected for below-the-zone promotion, less than one per year, compared to fifty-two Infantry officers. The challenge for the Field Artillery officers in this rank group is that not only were they subject to the identified talent management limitations of modularity, but for most of this period there also were no Division Artilleries for them to command or Division Artillery Commanders to provide Field Artillery mentorship.

Data Analysis Summary

After an analysis of Field Artillery primary and below-the-zone promotion rates from Major to Colonel, compared to the Infantry, I draw three observations. First, the Field Artillery population does not compare favorably with its Infantry counterpart. Over fifteen years of data, the Field Artillery selection rates are generally lower, even when

the populations are similarly sized. Secondly, that comparative trend has gotten worse. Across all three ranks the difference has generally widened in the last six years, especially in below-the-zone promotions. Lastly, the results are cumulative; Field Artillery officers compare least favorably to Infantry officers in the Colonel data sets, both primary-zone and below-the-zone. Again, the more evaluations that a Field Artillery officer has under modularity, the worse he compares to an Infantry officer.

Why It Matters

The more difficult question is whether the data identifies a significant problem. The BCT commander, normally an Infantryman, leads and observes these officers, assesses their performance and potential, and evaluates them in comparison to each other. If one branch is outperforming another, or all the others, then its promotion results should reflect that performance. But is this the case? Or, were the issues of branch bias exacerbated by the transformation to modularity?

I believe the problem is that a modern force also requires a modern concept of talent management. But, a modularity construct, wherein a single branch now predominates in the assessment of officers, is not beneficial to senior leader development. The challenges and threats facing the nation and the Army are both diverse and complex and the leadership that faces these challenges and meets these threats must be equally diverse and prepared to operate in complexity. The senior leaders of today and tomorrow must be masters of a uniquely 21st century complexity. If that is the requirement, the question becomes does the current process for identifying and selecting talent fall short.

There are three arguments in current leadership literature that support a different path for building senior leaders for the Army; differentiation, expert knowledge, and

diversity of thought and experiences. These concepts indicate a need to change the current processes that identify officers for service in the Army's senior leadership.

Differentiation is a talent management concept that is critical to organizations in a complex environment. The "interconnected, technical, specialized, and complex" nature of modern work requires differentiating the talent in an organization based on expertise, assigning that talent to leverage and develop that expertise, and grooming talent for senior leadership from all the different areas of expertise.⁴¹ Organizations are stronger when their senior leaders come from different specialty areas, complementing each other to lead the organization. This has even linked traditional counseling and mentorship to the establishment of "flexible development plans" to broaden officer talent at a young age in preparation for potential future use at senior levels.⁴² Modern corporations, like General Electric, are already practicing differentiation to "cultivate deep industry experts" across multiple disciplines to build stronger leadership teams today and in the future.⁴³

The Army does differentiate, but it is very limited. The Army's version is performance based: above-center-of-mass evaluation reports and below-the-zone promotion selections are two examples. The problem is this method does not place primacy on developing a wide array of specialties, and it also creates dissatisfaction among the population that is left behind. While force structure requirements strongly influence promotion rates, they should not be definitive. Additionally, there is an identified bias in the Army's version of differentiation because senior raters are known to be "heavily influenced by their own experiences" and regularly "seek to advance officers who resemble themselves."⁴⁴ This is one of the indicators from the above data of an

unintended consequence of modularity. Infantry BCT commanders have a greater appreciation for the work of Infantry officers because they have done those jobs themselves in the past. Therefore, that work is more readily recognized for its quality and rewarded during evaluations.

Fundamental to the idea of differentiation is the value placed on expert knowledge and its potential to contribute to the organization at all levels. The idea of expert knowledge is used across disciplines to define specialized information, processes, and understanding possessed by experts. These experts “have acquired extensive knowledge and experience that affects how they perceive systems and how they are able to organize and interpret information.”⁴⁵ Critical to expert knowledge is recognition that those in possession of it provide a twofold benefit to an organization. First, the knowledge that they possess is intrinsically valuable to the organization. Secondly, and arguably more importantly, the process of gaining expert knowledge makes the individuals valuable because of the logic and perspectives gained through the study and discipline of knowledge acquisition.

The current talent management system in the Army recognizes the first benefit of expert knowledge, but tends to devalue the second. There are career fields that leverage expert knowledge by educating and developing officers throughout their careers with skills to benefit the Army, up to the rank of Colonel. Public Affairs, Logistics, and Adjutant General, for human resource management, are some examples. However, at the strategic level of leadership, positions in these fields often go to combat arms officers.⁴⁶ The Army’s Chief of Public Affairs and Senior Personnel Officer are often maneuver General Officers and it is also common for the Deputy Commanding

General for Support in a Division to also be a maneuver officer.⁴⁷ More specifically, Infantry officers fill a wide variety of General Officer positions.⁴⁸

Field Artillery officers possess expert knowledge—joint targeting, fires synchronization, maneuver and fires integration—that is critically valuable to the Army, especially within the parameters of 21st century conflict. If more of these Field Artillery officers cannot make it through the gauntlet of successful service in a BCT, they will not compete and be selected for the rank of General Officer in sufficient numbers to contribute the needed diversity of expert knowledge.

The value of unique perspectives epitomizes the third argument in favor of more diverse representation in senior leadership; diversity of thought and experiences. Diversity of thought is associated with vibrant and thriving organizations. It “allows for differing perspectives on ideas and unique insights into problems” and provides a counterweight to the risks of ‘groupthink’.⁴⁹ Diversity of thought is critical when tackling the ambiguity of complex environments. Similarly, diversity of experiences widens the aperture of participants when addressing unfamiliar situations or challenges. When combined, and put into action, diversity of thought and diversity of experiences enhance the effectiveness of senior leadership and organizations by opening the collective intellect of a wide-ranging set of leaders.

For these three reasons—the importance of differentiation, the value of expert knowledge and those who possess it, and the utility of diverse thought and experiences among strategic leaders—the trending disparity between Field Artillery and Infantry officer promotion rates is cause for concern. It is an indicator of an antiquated model of

talent identification, development, and management, made worse by modularity, that is inadequately meeting the long-term needs of the Army.

Recommendations

The Army has a senior leadership diversity problem. The Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and a total of eight of eleven four-star Generals, are Infantry.⁵⁰ Two of the three Army Corps Commanders are Infantry and the other one is Armor.⁵¹ Five of eleven division commanders are Infantry, five are Armor, and one in Field Artillery.⁵² Leadership drives the engine of the Army. It is the lubricant that ensures the effective movement of the gears. The lack of branch diversity at the senior levels presents a leadership challenge, but it can be addressed, for the benefit of the Field Artillery and, more importantly, for the Army.

First, serious consideration should be given to the relationship between the Field Artillery officers in the BCTs and their corresponding Division Artillery Commander. In addition to responsibility for informal mentorship, the Division Artillery Commander should assume evaluation responsibilities for all battery commanders, along with the executive officer and the operations officer in the Artillery battalions.⁵³ This would require a cultural change in the Army, as these officers would remain assigned to the BCTs. However, this change is consistent with maintaining expert knowledge. The Division Artillery Commander is more qualified to mentor and assess Field Artillery talent. The Division Artillery Commander is also best positioned to identify potential future senior leaders among the Field Artillery population. This change has the added benefit of empowering the Division Artillery Commander, a position that still fights for relevance as a brigade-level commander without many assigned troops.

The second proposed change involves the current methodology for selecting brigade-level commanders. First, the Army should immediately stop considering Field Artillery officers for BCT command. Taking away potential brigade-level commands may seem counterintuitive in an environment where opportunities are limited for Field Artillery officers. The problem is that in all the years Field Artillery officers have competed in this category, very few of them have been selected. Instead, it has created a perception across the Army that selection for BCT command is more valuable than Field Artillery brigades or Division Artilleries for Field Artillery Officers. As such, BCT command is not truly a viable option for Field Artillery officers, yet because the opportunity exists at all it lessens the value of traditional Field Artillery commands.

Secondly, the Army should consider a more holistic change to how it fills brigade-level command positions. Competition for non-branch specific commands, like garrisons or training brigades, should be open to all branches, with an emphasis on identifying talented officers in low density, expert knowledge branches. Additionally, Infantry and Armor officers should not be eligible to compete for those commands. This year, in addition to the sixteen Infantry and Armor officers selected for BCT command, three were selected for maneuver training brigades, and twelve more were selected for branch immaterial positions.⁵⁴ The Infantry and Armor branches have already voted on their talent, through BCT command selection, and they have had the lion's share of opportunities. Garrison and other brigade-level commands would provide an opportunity to promote lesser known, but equal, talent for future senior leader service. Again, this would be a fundamental cultural change, but the time is right for it.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to identify a specific shortfall in effective senior leader development. It is a detailed analysis at how the Army, and BCT commanders specifically, are assessing and promoting Field Artillery talent under the Army's modular structure, as measured by promotion rates. A similar analysis could, and should, be done of other branches that were possibly deleteriously impacted by modularity. At a minimum, the Army must educate BCT Commanders on the implications of their talent management decisions. Those commanders are significantly impacting future senior talent across the force and they should held accountable for the consequences. Almost a generation of Field Artillery officers has been negatively impacted by this unintended consequence of modularity.

For the Field Artillery, modularity has widened the promotion gap with the Infantry and this does not serve the Army well. In the past, Field Artillery officers have contributed invaluable to the Army at the highest levels. For that to continue, the avenue to senior leadership must be reopened for the officers in the Field Artillery. Of the seventeen active duty Field Artillery General Officers, ten were commissioned in 1986 or earlier.⁵⁵ Modularity has almost shut the door, but there are steps that can be taken to reverse the trend.

More fundamentally, why does the path to senior leadership in the Army only pass through the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning? The 21st century battlefield requires officers with a diverse set of skills and abilities, and currently leadership selection is too limiting. Thus, the discussion ends where it began, in the corridors of Snow Hall. The next generation of Field Artillery officers is beginning its journey to expert knowledge, confident that the Army as an organization will continue to

adapt to best accomplish the mission, while also mindful of identifying and maximizing the potential of those young Lieutenants in the future.

Appendix 1 Primary Zone Promotion Rate Charts

Captain Promotion Rates⁵⁶

CPT	Field Artillery		Infantry		Armor		All Others		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2005	511	98%	756	97%	386	98%	2563	98%	4485	98%
2006										
2007	514	99%	686	98%	347	99%	2287	98%	4108	98%
2008	445	99%	759	98%	470	99%	2072	99%	4063	99%
2009	454	99%	799	99%	378	99%	2255	99%	4167	99%
2010	486	99%	890	99%	436	99%	2665	98%	4776	99%
2011	508	99%	880	99%	463	99%	2854	98%	4925	99%
2012	578	91%	760	90%	362	93%	3094	93%	5000	92%
2013	641	94%	851	93%	428	95%	2944	94%	5112	94%
2014	563	84%	1056	85%	449	80%	2645	89%	5035	86%
2015	486	90%	878	92%	412	87%	2296	88%	4355	89%
2016	573	91%	895	89%	384	90%	2214	93%	4342	92%

Major Promotion Rates⁵⁷

MAJ	Field Artillery		Infantry		Armor		All Others		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2002	131	88%	144	89%	87	86%	879	90%	1433	90%
2003										
2004	142	97%	183	94%	102	96%	932	97%	1589	97%
2005	129	98%	168	95%	113	98%	883	98%	1495	98%
2006APR	185	98%	201	98%	135	96%	945	97%	1679	97%
2006SEP	125	98%	174	97%	123	98%	932	98%	1554	98%
2007	152	95%	114	96%	68	94%	1187	95%	1741	95%
2008	100	87%	106	93%	70	96%	1225	92%	1698	92%
2009	101	94%	97	92%	68	94%	1305	94%	1785	94%
2010	106	91%	88	93%	57	95%	1279	91%	1743	92%
2011	101	87%	115	93%	68	94%	1551	93%	2057	93%
2012	118	84%	125	85%	81	94%	1567	88%	2157	89%
2013	138	78%	138	84%	90	83%	1650	83%	2280	84%
2014	135	71%	186	67%	112	73%	1647	64%	2388	65%
2015	136	78%	192	73%	99	80%	1470	68%	2206	70%
2016	132	77%	197	65%	113	73%	1731	70%	2467	71%

Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Rates⁵⁸

LTC	Field Artillery		Infantry		Armor		All Others		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2002	78	79%	85	82%	54	81%	968	72%	1307	75%
2003	80	83%	117	85%	62	85%	1108	77%	1510	79%
2004	68	76%	89	85%	53	79%	1022	75%	1358	77%
2005	65	96%	77	93%	38	84%	934	85%	1224	86%
2006	80	92%	97	90%	68	95%	1074	91%	1446	91%
2007	73	90%	85	98%	61	100%	967	89%	1326	91%
2008	80	97%	84	95%	54	94%	898	87%	1247	89%
2009	89	97%	99	100%	67	96%	859	85%	1235	89%
2010	97	99%	94	98%	67	99%	1048	85%	1469	88%
2011	77	95%	83	94%	48	92%	863	84%	1207	87%
2012	83	82%	108	88%	70	84%	1028	82%	1405	83%
2013	104	66%	99	82%	61	77%	1017	70%	1397	72%
2014	112	63%	85	63%	59	81%	1013	61%	1406	63%
2015	73	62%	100	72%	60	67%	1155	59%	1521	61%
2016	88	49%	95	77%	62	69%	1137	59%	1529	60%

Colonel Promotion Rates⁵⁹

COL	Field Artillery		Infantry		Armor		All Others		Army	
	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel	Pop.	% Sel
2002	45	60%	81	52%	38	42%	497	53%	747	52%
2003	51	61%	50	60%	26	50%	515	51%	713	52%
2004	43	63%	66	53%	30	67%	512	52%	734	52%
2005	42	67%	66	65%	36	50%	562	57%	794	59%
2006	58	50%	70	60%	29	76%	503	58%	727	59%
2007	50	56%	62	60%	36	69%	529	61%	743	62%
2008	49	71%	71	63%	35	42%	600	53%	847	55%
2009	33	61%	54	57%	32	56%	598	53%	803	54%
2010	52	60%	53	72%	28	43%	658	45%	878	47%
2011	56	45%	83	46%	47	55%	746	34%	1029	36%
2012	55	47%	75	59%	45	49%	745	33%	1032	37%
2013	69	36%	71	49%	51	57%	709	41%	1023	42%
2014	72	32%	87	64%	60	42%	655	38%	983	40%
2015	84	26%	95	57%	67	46%	805	38%	1182	40%
2016	58	33%	57	60%	35	46%	652	40%	908	42%

Appendix 2 Below-the-zone Promotion Rate Charts

Below-the-zone Promotion Data to Major⁶⁰

MAJ	FA	Infantry	Armor	Ops Div	Army
2002	9.1%	10.1%	11.1%	8.3%	6.6%
2003					
2004	7.5%	14.5%	14.4%	9.2%	8.0%
2005	7.7%	11.5%	7.0%	8.9%	6.8%
2006	7.4%	14.7%	5.8%	7.4%	7.6%
2007	6.1%	20.0%	14.3%	9.7%	9.3%
2008	3.7%	9.3%	6.6%	4.8%	5.5%
2009	4.5%	9.9%	7.2%	6.0%	6.0%
2010	1.8%	12.6%	5.8%	5.5%	5.8%
2011	8.1%	14.6%	16.8%	8.8%	8.7%
2012	5.0%	13.5%	7.1%	7.2%	8.1%
2013	6.0%	14.8%	6.2%	6.7%	7.4%
2014	1.1%	5.7%	5.0%	3.0%	3.3%
2015	3.5%	3.4%	4.5%	2.7%	2.8%
2016	2.4%	4.0%	4.2%	3.0%	3.3%

Below-the-zone Promotion Data to Lieutenant Colonel⁶¹

LTC	FA	Infantry	Armor	Ops Div	Army
2003	1.4%	10.9%	6.9%	7.4%	6.2%
2004	1.6%	4.8%	22.0%	7.6%	6.6%
2005	2.4%	10.0%	4.1%	6.9%	5.9%
2006	3.6%	13.4%	10.7%	7.9%	6.6%
2007	9.9%	15.1%	14.3%	10.4%	9.8%
2008	13.5%	12.4%	17.1%	13.9%	13.8%
2009	5.8%	12.7%	9.1%	8.7%	7.2%
2010	9.3%	15.2%	19.7%	11.1%	10.8%
2011	2.3%	3.4%	5.4%	3.7%	3.5%
2012	6.3%	9.9%	7.6%	8.3%	8.3%
2013	0.8%	7.8%	7.6%	5.5%	5.3%
2014	1.3%	6.5%	4.8%	3.2%	2.8%
2015	1.1%	7.2%	3.0%	2.8%	3.0%
2016	0.0%	4.8%	8.2%	3.2%	3.5%

Below-the-zone Promotion Data to Colonel⁶²

COL	FA	Infantry	Armor	Ops Div	Army
2002	5.2%	10.9%	13.5%	4.9%	3.5%
2003	1.8%	3.9%	12.5%	4.2%	3.2%
2004	1.8%	8.3%	12.8%	4.3%	3.2%
2005	4.6%	3.6%	2.7%	4.6%	4.2%
2006	1.6%	11.1%	2.2%	4.5%	3.9%
2007	3.4%	9.6%	8.2%	5.0%	4.7%
2008	0.0%	12.9%	10.0%	5.6%	4.7%
2009	3.5%	12.9%	3.2%	5.0%	4.9%
2010	1.4%	5.9%	0.0%	2.3%	2.3%
2011	1.6%	2.3%	3.4%	1.5%	1.6%
2012	1.2%	3.9%	2.3%	1.9%	2.1%
2013	0.5%	1.9%	2.8%	1.0%	1.0%
2014	0.0%	2.7%	0.8%	1.0%	1.0%
2015	0.7%	2.2%	2.9%	1.2%	1.2%
2016	0.7%	2.6%	0.9%	1.0%	0.9%

Endnotes

¹ Snow Hall at Fort Sill, Oklahoma is the current home to both the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School. *The Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence Home Page*, <http://sill-www.army.mil/> (accessed February 1, 2017).

² Saint Barbara is the patron saint of those at risk to accidents of explosion and is prominently featured throughout Snow Hall. The picture wall is directly across from the building's featured conference room, the Dennis J. Reimer Room, which is named after the 33rd Chief of Staff of the United States Army, an artilleryman.

³ There are also two Field Artillery Promotable Colonels and one Air Defense Artillery Promotable Colonel. For this and more information on the current and former General Officer population see *The General Officer Management Office Home Page*, <https://www.gomo.army.mil/> (accessed February 15, 2017).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Air Defense Artillery School moved to Fort Sill from Fort Bliss in 2005. *The 30th Air Defense Artillery Home Page*, <http://sill-www.army.mil/30ada/> (accessed February 1, 2017).

⁶ General Carl Vuono, from 1987-1991, General Dennis Reimer, from 1995 to 1999, and General Raymond Odierno, 2011-2015, all held the position in the last 30 years. During that same period, three Infantry officers, two Armor officers, and one Special Forces officer all held the position. *The U.S. Army Center of Military History Home Page*, <http://www.history.army.mil/faq/FAQ-CSA.htm> (accessed February 1, 2017).

⁷ The change was born out of a recognition that the collapse of the Soviet Union had fundamentally changed the global security environment. Stuart E. Johnson et al., *A Review of the Army's Modular Force Structure* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), iii.

⁸ TRADOC pamphlet, *Force XXI Operations*, conceptualized a new type of conflict, described what it could look like, and considered what types of forces it would require. In it, modularity is defined as "a force design methodology that establishes a means to provide interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable force elements." For background, see U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Force XXI Operations*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1, 1994), Glossary 5, www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA314276 (accessed February 15, 2017).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ This concept was preparing units for "a range of full-dimensional operations in war to operations other than war." For further development, see Field Manual 100-5. U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), 1-4, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll9/id/49> (accessed February 15, 2017).

¹¹ General Gordon R. Sullivan was an Infantry officer and the 32nd Chief of Staff of the Army from 1991-1995. His contributions to modularity are reviewed in, Johnson, *A Review of the Army's Modular Force Structure*, 7.

¹² These characteristics were doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and versatility to function in war and operations other than war. *Force XXI Operations*, 3-1.

¹³ Under General Reimer, the Army developed the Army after Next concept, which was an expansion of Force XXI that included a series of exercises to determine the right composition of the modular force. Johnson, *A Review of the Army's Modular Force Structure*, 9.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ General Eric Shinseki was an Armor officer and the Chief of Staff of the Army from 1999-2003, for more information, see Bobbie K. Sauer, "10 Things You Didn't Know About Gen. Eric Shinseki," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 18, 2008, <https://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2008/12/18/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-gen-eric-shinseki> (accessed February 16, 2017).

¹⁶ Johnson, *A Review of the Army's Modular Force Structure*, 9.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 11.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ It is spelled out very clearly in the BCT doctrine that one of the principle responsibilities of the BCT commander "is to develop teams." U.S. Department of the Army, *Brigade Combat Team*, Field Manual 3-96 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 8, 2015), 3-5, http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_96.pdf (accessed February 17, 2017).

²¹ Ibid., 3-15.

²² There are differences between the Infantry BCT, the Armor BCT, and the Stryker BCT, but the structural concept, and therefore number of rated officers, is very similar. "MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90 Force Structure Reference Data: Brigade Combat Teams," briefing slides, Fort Benning, GA, Maneuver Center of Excellence, September 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/other/msm3-90_2012.pdf (accessed March 27, 2017).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The Army's Human Resources Command organizes branches for management by the similarity of their missions. The Field Artillery is in the Operations Division, along with Infantry, Armor, the Corps of Engineers, Aviation, the Military Police, the Chemical Corps, and the Air Defense Artillery, for more see *The Human Resources Command Home Page*, <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Officer%20Personnel%20Management%20Directorate> (accessed March 24, 2017).

²⁵ "Active Duty Units," *The 2014 Field Artillery Red Book*, January-February 2015, <http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/2015/jan-feb/activefa.html> (accessed March 23, 2017).

²⁶ *The Human Resources Command Home Page.*

²⁷ The data from the other three categories, Armor, All Others, and Army, are provided in the appendix to enhance the comparison between the Field Artillery and the Infantry, as well as to provide context. Data provided by, Lieutenant Colonel Jason Tolbert, Human Resources Command Operations and Plans Branch Chief, email message to author, February 1, 2017.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Jason Tolbert, Human Resources Command Operations and Plans Branch Chief, email message to author, February 1, 2017. All of the chart data was provided by the Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA) technicians at Human Resources Command.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ 247 of the 343 active Army General Officers as of March 2017, have been promoted below-the-zone at least once. Complete General Officer promotion and branch data provided by, Matthew Gillespie, General Officer Management Office, email message to the author, March 8, 2017.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ This is 38% of the overall General Officer population. Ibid.

³⁶ Once, in 2015, the Field Artillery percentage is 0.1% above the Infantry figure, see promotion data, Lieutenant Colonel Jason Tolbert, Human Resources Command Operations and Plans Branch Chief, email message to author, February 1, 2017

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Michael J. Colarusso and David S. Lyle, *Managing Senior Officer Talent: Fostering Institutional Adaptability* (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2012), 25.

⁴² Michael J. Arnold, *The Future Security Environment: Why the U.S. Army Must Differentiate and Grow Millennial Officer Talent* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 10, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1279 (accessed March 15, 2017).

⁴³ "Consider that many senior officer positions requiring equally specialized expertise (in financial comptrollership, public affairs, force management, logistics, acquisitions, research and development, information technology, human resources, contracting, etc.) are today filled by

Maneuver, Fires, and Effects officers and will be for the foreseeable future,” from Colarusso, *Managing Senior Officer Talent*, 25.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁵ Marissa F. McBride and Mark A. Burgman, “What Is Expert Knowledge, How Is Such Knowledge Gathered, and How Do We Use It to Address Questions in Landscape Ecology?” in *Expert Knowledge and Its Application in Landscape Ecology*, eds. Ajith H. Perera, C. Ashton Drew, and Chris J. Johnson (New York: Springer, 2012), 13, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-1034-8_2#page-1 (accessed March 15, 2017).

⁴⁶ Colarusso, *Managing Senior Officer Talent*, 54.

⁴⁷ The current Chief of Public Affairs, MG Malcolm Frost, is an Infantry Officer and the current Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), LTG James McConville, is an Aviator. For additional, see *The General Officer Management Office Home Page*, <https://www.gomo.army.mil/> (accessed March 25, 2017).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Groupthink Definition: “When one or two people or personality styles dominate a group’s culture so completely that there is no room for those with other styles, perspectives, needs, or beliefs,” from Claudia Fernandez, “Creating Thought Diversity: The Antidote to Group Think,” *Journal of Public Health Management and Practice* 13, no. 6 (2007): 670-671, http://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Abstract/2007/11000/Creating_Thought_Diversity_The_Antidote_to_Group.21.aspx (accessed March 15, 2017).

⁵⁰ General Mark Milley and General Daniel Allyn, from *The General Officer Management Office Home Page*, <https://www.gomo.army.mil/> (accessed March 25, 2017).

⁵¹ Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, Lieutenant General Gary Volesky, and Lieutenant General Sean McFarland. Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ In some divisions this is already happening, but it is not codified across the Army.

⁵⁴ *The Human Resources Command Home Page*.

⁵⁵ Matthew Gillespie, General Officer Management Office, email message to the author, March 8, 2017.

⁵⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Jason Tolbert, Human Resources Command Operations and Plans Branch Chief, email message to author, February 1, 2017.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.