

Strategy Research Project

Army Operational Effectiveness Requires Changes to its Civil Affairs Capability

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Abstract

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Army Operational Effectiveness Requires Changes to its Civil Affairs Capability

If Army forces do not address the requirements of noncombatants in the joint operational area before, during, and after battle, then the tactical victories achieved by our firepower only lead to strategic failure and world condemnation.

—Army Doctrine Publication 1¹

Since its creation on June 14, 1775, the U.S. Army has been in a constant state of adaptation in terms of its operational concepts and capabilities for fighting and achieving the Nation's security objectives.² Today's global environment remains as complex as ever, and it will undoubtedly only grow more complex and challenging in the future. The Army must be prepared to prevail along the entire spectrum of conflict ranging from high intensity, peer-to peer conventional battle to irregular warfare or a hybrid of the two. Conflict will take place amidst civilian populations and under the ever present eye of personal cell phones and social and news media that immediately capture and report the U.S. military's effect on civilians.³ Operational and strategic success will require translating military gains into sustainable political outcomes.⁴ Ensuring the U.S. Army has the right doctrine and capability is difficult, but paramount. The following pages will explore the Army's evolution of thought on engaging civilian populations and non-military partners and its Civil Affairs (CA) capability. This paper focuses on defining Army CA, reviewing the adaptation of Army doctrine and CA capability, examining CA capability gaps, and recommending changes the Army should implement to improve its CA capability and, thus, better prepare itself to conduct unified land operations.

Defining Civil Affairs

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.13, dated March 11, 2014, established policy and assigned responsibility for the Department of Defense (DoD) on CA. The directive mandates that DoD maintain “a capability to conduct a broad range of CA operations necessary to support DoD missions . . . and meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in the operational environment across the range of military operations.”⁵ The directive provides a foundation for the DoD and all respective services’ understanding and employment of CA. It states that CA operations are not limited to, but at minimum consist of the following:

- (1) Coordinate military activities with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and non-governmental organizations.
- (2) Support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
- (3) Provide assistance outside the range of military operations, when directed, to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
- (4) Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DoD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- (5) Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.⁶

DoDD 2000.13 provides further clarity on what CA capability brings to Army and joint forces commanders: “support unified action by interacting and consulting with other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, host nations, foreign nations, and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful civil-military operations.”⁷

This statement makes CA forces a military commander's dedicated interlocutor between his effort and non-military entities and civil populations. As land power forces, the Army and Marine Corps are the only two services with CA, and the Army possesses 91 percent of the total DoD capability.⁸ Army CA doctrine provides additional granularity on CA capabilities.

Army Field Manual 3-57, *CA Operations*, is the Army's primary doctrine for CA. Its purpose is to educate commanders on how to utilize and integrate CA in support of unified land operations.⁹ The Army CA force's primary role is to conduct face to face engagement with, develop understanding of, and ultimately, influence civil populations and non-military entities in order to facilitate the achievement of a commander's objective(s). No other Army branch or capability is specifically designed for or formally designated with this responsibility.¹⁰ The manual's introduction specifies the uniqueness of Army CA:

The United States Army CA forces are the Department of Defense's primary force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations. These forces, and the operations they conduct, are the commander's asset to purposefully [*sic*] engage nonmilitary organizations, institutions, and populations.¹¹

The Army's specified mission of Army CA forces is:

To mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of CAO [Civil Affairs Operations], or to enable CMO [Civil Military Operations], to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations.¹²

The phrase "to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society" is ambiguous. It is best understood as understanding and addressing issues and dynamics within the civil

environment of a commander's area of operation that disrupt societal welfare and stability.

Understanding CA in the context of civil-military operations is important to comprehending CA's role. Army and joint doctrine define civil-military operations (CMO) as:

Activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between [*sic*] military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.¹³

Thus, while other military forces contribute to CMO, CA forces have a responsibility for enabling these operations that extend beyond the normal scope of direct combatant versus combatant engagement. Performing responsibilities normally conducted by civil governments or "military government" is a specific military activity and responsibility conducted in accordance with international law.¹⁴ Military Government is defined as, "The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, or enemy territory therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government."¹⁵

The current Field Manual 3-57, *CA Operations*, fails to define specific differences between the two distinct types of Army CA personnel, CA generalists and military government (or functional) specialists. By examining these two related but different capabilities in the context of the manual, it can be discerned that CA generalists are trained and focused on engaging, assessing, understanding, and influencing the civil component of a commander's operational environment. The activities and competencies of CA generalists allow the commander to understand and visualize the how civilian

components of the operational environment affect their operations (e.g. understand local leader or populace grievances or concerns that undermine stability in an area). CA generalists are central to enabling commanders to plan and execute operations specifically designed to shape the civil component of the environment and achieve overall operational or strategic objectives.¹⁶ CA military government or functional specialists are intended to provide a commander with in-depth expertise and resident capability in the specific areas of governance, rule of law, infrastructure, economic stability, public health and welfare, and public education and information. The application of the specialists' skills empowers commanders to assume responsibility for and then reestablish these sectors within their areas of responsibility. DoDD 2000.13 highlights the importance of military government specialist capabilities: that is, the DoD must be prepared to "establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored."¹⁷

Evolution of Army CA

The U.S. Army has grappled for over 200 years with how to care for and establish control over noncombatants and set political conditions for desired long term U.S. objectives. However, for much of its history the Army has done so reluctantly. Commanders preferred to focus solely on defeating enemy forces, and regarded tasks associated with noncombatants and establishing governance as anathema.¹⁸ Post-World War I experiences during the occupation of the Rhineland (December 1918 to January 1920) prompted the U.S. War Department to prepare for military government during World War II.¹⁹ This effort resulted in the 1940 publication of Army-Navy Field Manual 27-5, *Military Government*, and institutional training, via the School of Military Government (SOMG) and Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS). The SOMG and CATS

created Army CA and military governance capability to assist commanders in planning for and stabilizing their areas of operation through deliberate interaction with indigenous populations and the re-establishment of governance.²⁰ The Army's creation and application of CA and military government doctrine and capability in World War II was a key component in the U.S. government's overall and lasting success of the war. However, when the United States became involved in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, it foresaw little need for CA.²¹

The Army's post World War II handling of CA "led to the contraction of training, resources, and infrastructure, leaving only a CA shell with its capabilities predominately in the reserves."²² The Army disbanded the SOMG and CATS by the end of War World II. The Army maintained a semblance of the capability, and in 1955, made CA and Military Government a branch in the U.S. Army Reserve. On 2 October 1959, Military Governance was dropped from the branch's name.²³ For a while following World War II, the Army maintained representation of the CA capability in U.S. Army Headquarters. The title designators of the entities responsible for CA changed frequently. In 1949, the CA Division in the Army Staff was abolished and shifted to the Office of Occupied Areas within the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army. In 1952, the Office of Occupied Areas was eliminated and its responsibilities moved to the Office of the Chief of CA and Military Government in the Army Staff. In 1959, this office was renamed the Office of Chief of CA, but was ultimately abolished in 1962 and its duties were subsumed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations on the Army Staff.²⁴ This abolishment represents the end of CA having direct Army Staff level representation and

the loss of Army Staff level advocacy and expertise. Similar to CA representation within U.S. Headquarters, the CA institutional training base changed location multiple times.

After years of neglect, the Army opened the CA and Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Georgia in 1955, and then renamed it the U.S. Army CA School in 1968. In 1971, the U.S Army CA School was assigned to the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance and relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 1983, the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance was combined with the U.S. John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare making the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, which has remained the residence of CA proponentcy and institutional training.²⁵ Consistent with continually shifting responsibility for the CA capability, in 1987 the Department of Defense and U.S. Army assigned all CA forces to the United States Special Operations Command.²⁶ The Army's lack of emphasis on maintaining CA and military government institutional training, doctrine, and capacity resulted in poor employment of and limited output from the capability.

The U.S. Army's use of CA from 1945 to 2001 was continuous, but restricted in scope and effect. The Korean War consisted primarily of working with the Korean Government, which stayed intact during the war. Thus, the effort was less intensive with respect to required military governance capabilities. Coming so quickly on the heels of World War II, the Korean War was important to solidifying and maintaining some CA and military governance capability in the Army.²⁷ However, the U.S. Army was quick to put the Korean War experience behind it and return to its focus of defending Europe. U.S. Government and Army stability focused operations were hindered during the Vietnam War due to a severely limited CA capability. At the height of the war, the U.S.

Army had only three one hundred-man active duty CA companies rotating through Vietnam. The quagmire of the Vietnam conflict convinced the Army to avoid such conflicts in the future and hence, eliminate CA capabilities geared for such conflicts. Thus, the Army began deactivating the three active component companies in 1970.²⁸ According to authors of a 2003 Land Power Institute Paper, post-Vietnam Army thought consisted of “Enlightenment focused on achieving victory. Securing the victory was taken for granted. There was no thought given to what must be done after the shooting stopped. CA slid into the backwaters of the Army’s priorities - that is, until the U.S. intervention into Panama [JUST CAUSE in 1989].”²⁹

When asked how the U.S. would reestablish governance in Panama after deposing Panamanian Dictator Manuel Noriega, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that CA units were ready to achieve that aim. However, with almost all CA capability in the U.S. Army Reserves and political sensitivities deterring the presidential administration from involuntarily calling up reserve forces, there were limited CA personnel involved in the planning and execution of the operation. The positive end result of the effort can be attributed more to luck than skill, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Colin Powell assessed the operation as poorly planned for reintroducing civil government.³⁰

The use of CA in Desert Shield/Desert Storm presented different challenges. Given the long build-up period prior to the war’s start, coupled with the short duration and limited objective (simply ejecting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and not replacing him as the head of Iraq) of the actual conflict, use of reserve CA in Desert Storm was substantial and yielded some positive results. Despite the pre-war preparatory time,

post-war analysis found that many of the CA reserve personnel were not psychologically or physically prepared to go war. The review highlighted that CA efforts were degraded because reserve CA forces did not deploy with their assigned units, nor had they previously trained with or been integrated into them.³¹ Army CA personnel did overcome other U.S. military planners' protests and worked with the Kuwait Government in exile to set conditions for its successful resumption of power. Subsequently, Army experiences in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo were overall positive, but efforts were relatively small in scale, only requiring a limited amount of reserve CA forces in the theaters at any one time. In all three contingencies, application of CA capability was degraded due to insufficient active duty personnel, late mobilization of reserve CA, and legal restrictions preventing reservists from serving more than 270 days.³²

Post-9/11 U.S. Army action in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed fully and quickly that it had maintained just enough investment in CA so as to prevent it from losing its capability completely and/or returning to a pre-World War II status. With only one battalion of active duty CA, made up of functional area officers and Special Forces NCOs, the Army rapidly exhausted its reserve capability. By 2005, the Army had to rely on internal cross-leveling of personnel and using individual ready reserve (IRR) personnel, some of which were from the Navy and Air Force to fill CA positions.³³ Providing four weeks of CA training to personnel from other Army military specialty occupations or the IRR and then sending them into combat is not an optimal way to create a capability. The situation undoubtedly placed these new "CA personnel" in dangerous and difficult situations for which they were underprepared. The resultant

underperformance of CA activities convinced tactical commanders that CA was of little value for stability operations.

The Army's decision to make CA an active duty branch in 2006 and expand its active component forces from one battalion to one brigade was a positive outcome of the dilemma.³⁴ The importance of these two steps is noteworthy. By making CA an active duty branch and increasing the number of active duty personnel, the Army created a pool of officers and non-commissioned officers more readily available to support active Army commanders and solely dedicated to learning and further developing the capability. However, creating an active duty branch takes time, and this act alone could not fix all problems with the Civil Affairs capability.

New Army Operational Approach Amplifies Requirement for Civil Affairs

Since 2001, the U.S. Army has made rapid and substantial progress in evolving its doctrine. The long period between World War II and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 can be characterized as the Army being focused on conventional maneuver operations. Army doctrine of the past 16 years reflects the reality that physically defeating an enemy force alone does not equate to a sustained desired outcome, thereby specifying and implying a requirement for effective Civil Affairs capability.

On June 14, 2001, the Army revised FM 3-0, *Operations*, introducing the concept of full spectrum operations, consisting of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to be executed in combinations and simultaneously in order to achieve strategic objectives.³⁵ The revised doctrine recognized that stability was integral to military operations, both during conflict and in its aftermath. Challenges in achieving strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq led to the 15 December, 2006 joint Army-

Marine Corps publication of Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. The manual makes clear that counterinsurgency campaigns require the Army to execute both combat and civilian orientated tasks in order to help reestablish security and civil infrastructure. It also highlights that such operations entail extensive interaction and coordination with indigenous populations, as well as intergovernmental, host-nation, and interagency entities.³⁶

The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which elevated stability operations to be on a par with direct combat operations, prompted the Army's creation of Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* in 2008.³⁷ The new manual reinforced stability operations as an integral part of "the Army's approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict."³⁸ The Army emphasized that the new publication "represents a milestone in Army doctrine. It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership"³⁹ This doctrine specified the requirement to integrate and support the activities of other U.S. government agencies and intergovernmental, multinational, and host nation partners to set conditions for achieving lasting success, and framed how the U.S. Army would accomplish it. FM 3-07 designated CA as "the commander's conduit for civil-military integration."⁴⁰ Also in 2008, the Army released an update to FM 3-0 assimilating the primary lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴¹ This new overarching operational doctrine acknowledged that "noncombatants are frequently part of the terrain and their support is a principal determinant of success in future conflicts."⁴²

The rapid evolution of doctrine continued with Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, being supplemented and updated by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land*

Operations. Published on October 10, 2011, ADP 3-0 furthered the idea of Army forces working across the range of military operations as an integrated part of a team of joint, interagency, and multinational partners all working as part of a greater effort. The Army described its progression of doctrinal thought as follows:

Unified Land Operations is a natural intellectual outgrowth of past capstone doctrine. AirLand battle recognized the three-dimensional nature of modern warfare, while full spectrum operations recognized the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. This publication builds on both these ideas, adding that success requires fully integrating Army operations with the efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners.⁴³

This evolution in doctrinal thought led to the current ADP 3-0, *Operations*, released on November 11, 2016, which states that Army forces are “uniquely suited to shape operational environments through their forward presence and sustained engagement with unified action partners and local civilian populations.”⁴⁴ Correspondingly, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations*, recognizes that unified land operations are “more than combat between armed opponents:”

Army forces conduct operations amid populations. This requires Army forces to defeat the enemy and simultaneously shape civil conditions. Offensive and defensive tasks defeat enemy forces, whereas stability tasks shape conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but that alone may not be the most significant task. Shaping civil conditions (in concert with civilian organizations, civil authorities, and multinational forces) often proves just as important to campaign success. In many joint operations, stability or defense support of civil authorities task often prove more important than offensive or defensive tasks.⁴⁵

The Army now defines unified land operations as “simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities [*sic*] tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action.”⁴⁶ This definition brings forth the key concepts of consolidation of gains and unified action. A new doctrinal term,

consolidation of gains is “the activities to make permanent any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a sustainable stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate civil authorities.”⁴⁷ The new doctrine defines unified action as, “actions of Army, joint, and multinational forces synchronized or coordinated with activities of other government agencies, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector.”⁴⁸ The concepts of shaping the civil environment, a sustainable stable environment, unified action, and transfer of control to civil authorities imply substantial interaction with civilian populations and civilian entities and, thus, a significant requirement for CA capability.

Civil Affairs Capability Gaps

The insufficiency and inadequacy of CA capability in Afghanistan and Iraq came to the attention of senior military leaders. As a result, from 2008 to 2011, several studies on CA capabilities within the Army and the DoD were conducted.⁴⁹ The studies provided insights into the evolution and current status of CA and military governance capability, and they identified significant capability gaps.

The Center for the Strategic and International Studies concluded that the Army lacked sufficient active component CA personnel and authorizations required to enable integration of CA capabilities across all echelons of the military. The study viewed the Army’s 2006 decision to create an active component CA branch as an important step in reducing CA capability gaps, and noted that the Army must ensure active component Civil Branch career path viability in order to attract and retain top quality officers and non-commissioned officers needed to further the capability.⁵⁰ Lack of full-time, active component CA representation in units and staffs creates an uncomfortable dilemma for combat arms commanders: they know CA is essential to mission success, but they are

unfamiliar with the full range of capabilities CA can provide. Lastly, the study highlighted the fact that the U.S. Army CA reserve forces completely lacked qualified military governance/functional specialist personnel to provide specific expertise in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education.⁵¹

During the same time period, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities provided a report on the status of the CA to the Congressional House Armed Services. The report denoted the importance of CA capability to both stability operations and irregular warfare. It stated that addressing short and long term CA capability gaps were a DoD priority.⁵² The report emphasized that CA military governance/functional specialist capability was nonexistent. It also deemed the Army's post-Vietnam War decision to maintain nearly all of CA capability in the reserves as the cause for repeated instances in which CA capability was required but unavailable when needed.⁵³ The DoD cited the Army's plan to change CA force structure as the way to address persistent gaps in CA capabilities. The plan consisted of increasing active component CA from one active component special operations battalion to one special operations CA brigade and the addition of a second CA brigade (with five battalions and 30 companies) dedicated to general purpose forces. It also included an increase in reserve CA.⁵⁴ The change in CA force structure would result in a healthier balance of Army active and reserve component CA forces (26 to 74 percent ratio, respectively).

A 2009 RAND Arroyo Center study concluded the Army's CA force was its "most important enabler" in working with the interagency and that it required a "properly

trained and organized” CA force.⁵⁵ The study found that reliance on reserve personnel as strategic planners limited the Army and Joint Force’s ability to rely on CA for strategic planning support, due to the CA planners’ unavailability or late participation in the planning process. It also noted that the lack of active component CA planners prevented CA from establishing and maintaining critical relationships with other capabilities and agencies central to stability planning.⁵⁶ Additionally, RAND found that, due to a lack of training, neither active nor reserve CA planners had the ability to plan strategic and operational-level CA.⁵⁷ In order for the Army to be successful at planning and executing stability operations, the authors concluded, “Fixing Army CA is an issue that needs high level attention and quick action.”⁵⁸

Rebecca Patterson at the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation corroborates many of the findings from the three aforementioned reviews on Army CA capability. Based on nearly every past U.S. military campaign, Patterson concluded that some form of stability operations are required to transition from conflict to peace.⁵⁹ The report determined that the Army should return to lessons it had learned decades before and follow the World War II model. First, create an institutional training organization, like the School of Military Government, to ensure that the Army has the cadre of professional CA and military governance experts required to achieve success. Second, provide all CA personnel with a basic level of expertise in the areas of law, economics and entrepreneurship, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Of significance, her report specified that military governance specialists must have both in-depth expertise in the these areas from the civilian sector, as well as institutional military training that enables them to apply their specific

knowledge in the context of a foreign country and combat zone. Third, a new School of Military Governance could serve as a repository of lessons learned and provide subject matter expertise to CA generalists and commanders in the field.⁶⁰ Lastly, Patterson concluded that investing in an effective school that produces the requisite CA, military government, and general stability capability may provide less expensive and more effective ways of approaching current and future challenges abroad.⁶¹

As evidenced by the historical experience and the aforementioned reports on CA, an imbalance in the ratio of active to reserve CA units adversely affects CA capabilities and Army operations. In light of this reality, the Army consciously rebalanced the ratio of active to reserve component forces by adding active component capability. It also made CA an active duty branch in 2006. Both steps enabled greater access to and integration of the CA capability into the Joint Force and active component Army units and headquarters staffs. The logical result of which is improved understanding, trust, and integration of the capability during mission planning and execution. To be used effectively and fully incorporated in to the Army, every branch or capability requires a reasonable level of active component forces.

However, due to subsequent fiscal constraints, the Army decided to reduce the size of active component CA significantly - a step backwards. The in-progress reduction will ultimately eliminate the active component general purpose force CA brigade headquarters and four of five battalions that were dedicated to providing support to conventional Army and Joint Force commanders. Also noteworthy when considering active component CA branch viability, the Special Operations CA Brigade was reduced by approximately a battalions worth of capability.⁶² As a result of the reductions, unless

decisions are reversed, the Army Fiscal Year 2018 general purpose CA force component balance of tactical capability will be one battalion with six companies in the active component to nine brigades and 33 battalions with 132 companies in the reserve component.⁶³ Thus, only one active component CA battalion will be readily available to support the entire active component Army. The reduction means the Army is returning to nearly the same CA active to reserve component balance or level of investment in the capability that has proven insufficient in the past.

Another noted Army deficiency lies in CA staff planning. Insufficient availability and quantities of CA planners within headquarters staffs hinders Army efforts to develop operational plans that effectively address the civil component of military operations. In addition, lack of CA training and doctrine on operational and strategic level planning further degrades Army and Joint force overall planning capability. CA still has no advanced institutional training to prepare field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers to conduct operational and strategic level CA planning.⁶⁴ The April 2014, Army Techniques Publications (ATP) 3-57.60, *CA Planning*, was the first Army doctrinal manual dedicated solely to CA planning.⁶⁵ The ATP sought to address CA planning deficiencies. However, it is insufficient in details on how to conduct CA planning from the tactical to the strategic level.

The dearth of military government or functional specialists leaves the DoD unprepared to fulfill its requirement to establish military government in conflict zones. And, it has degraded the Army's ability to conduct complex stability operations as part of decisive combat action and to consolidate gains. Perhaps more problematic, despite U.S. government efforts in the previous decade to create interagency capacity to meet

the requirement of establishing governance in a foreign country, the interagency capacity has never come to fruition.⁶⁶ Thus, the U.S. Army, as the largest and principle land power service, will undoubtedly bear the greatest burden for this responsibility in the foreseeable future.

In 2013, the Army made a step forward in addressing its CA military government or functional specialist shortfalls. First, it established the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), under the Special Operations Center of Excellence, which serves as the Proponent for Army CA. Second, it created the reserve military occupational specialty (MOS) 38G military governance specialty.⁶⁷ 38G personnel are drawn from the civilian sector in order to capitalize on extensive civilian professional experience which cannot be gained through military service alone. The IMSG is intended to revitalize military governance capabilities by setting 38G credentialing standards, informing Military governance doctrine, training, and policy, and coordinating the resourcing of military government capability.⁶⁸

However, nearly four years since its inception there has been little discernable change in the status of U.S. Army military governance capability and capacity. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Fiscal Year 2017 Academic Handbook indicates that there is no specific doctrine or institutional training course for 38G military governance specialists. The current status calls into question how capability can be developed and prepared for employment without any doctrine or form of institutional training.⁶⁹

Conclusion

In view of the stated purpose of CA, the historical use of CA, current U.S. Army doctrine, and known CA capability gaps, this paper recommends the following:

- Establish and maintain a healthy active to reserve CA component balance. The Army should maintain the general purpose active component CA brigade headquarters and five subordinate battalions in order to ensure viability of and access to CA capability for operational planning, training integration, and steady state, contingency, and initial phase III-dominate operations.
- Develop adequate CA staff sections and planning doctrine and training. The Army should ensure that all levels of headquarters staffs have the CA manpower necessary to integrate the capability and coordinate with other agencies, non-military partners, and Army capabilities critical to a commander's stability and military government operations (e.g. military police, engineers, staff judge advocates, and medical). Also, the Army should develop separate CA planning doctrine across the range of military operations. Lastly, CA branch should develop advanced institutional training to prepare field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers to conduct operational and strategic level CA planning.
- Establish military government capability. The Army should develop military government doctrine and implement a military government training program that produces a sufficient number of 38G personnel, who are prepared to work in foreign countries, under conflict conditions, and as part of a broader U.S. government effort.

CA capability is critical to effective application of land power, which is population centric. CA forces enable the Army to directly engage, understand, and influence civilian populations and non-military entities. CA provides the Army and DoD with the ability to

shape the civil component of an operational area, apply combat force effectively, achieve unified action with non-military partners, establish sustainable stable environments, and, if necessary, conduct military governance. Thus, ineffective CA undermines the Army's ability to conduct unified land operations across the range of military operations. It also undermines the U.S. government's ability to work by, with, and through civilian partners who can take responsibility for solutions and share the burden of costs. The Army has recognized the need for CA and placed it in doctrine, but it has not taken the steps necessary to develop this capability fully. To make CA effective, the Army must correct the active to reserve CA component imbalance, develop adequate CA staff planning sections, doctrine, and training, and create military governance doctrine and institutional training. Failure to implement these recommendations will leave the Army and Joint force ill-prepared for the future and likely to repeat disappointing experiences of the past.

Endnotes

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