

# Strategy Research Project

## Strategic Religious Engagement and the Promotion of Religious Freedom Abroad

by

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Class of 2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188		
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2017		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strategic Religious Engagement and the Promotion of Religious Freedom Abroad			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Chaplain (Colonel) John D. Laing Texas Army National Guard			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Chaplain (Colonel) John L. Kallerson			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. To the best of my knowledge this SRP accurately depicts USG and/or DoD policy & contains no classified information or aggregation of information that poses an operations security risk. <b>Author:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Mentor:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 8668					
14. ABSTRACT The United States has an interest in promoting democracy and religious freedom abroad, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (2015) and the wording of HR 2431, The International Religious Freedom Act. Although the State Department has been given primary responsibility for that promotion, it has had difficulty doing so due to resource and personnel constraints, as well as to internal philosophical and ideological objections. By contrast, the Department of Defense has the resources, personnel, and the interest for promoting religious freedom and democracy and therefore, it can contribute to the effort as part of a whole-of-government approach to the issue. Military chaplaincy is uniquely suited for this task because of its history, function, and reach. It can do so through a two-pronged approach including strategic application/management of religious leader engagements and development of chaplaincy programs in foreign militaries. These efforts support one another, but will require significant coordination, planning, and resourcing.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Chaplaincy, International Religious Freedom Act, IRFA, Liberty, Peace Promotion					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 48	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

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(8668 words)

## Abstract

The United States has an interest in promoting democracy and religious freedom abroad, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (2015) and the wording of HR 2431, The International Religious Freedom Act. Although the State Department has been given primary responsibility for that promotion, it has had difficulty doing so due to resource and personnel constraints, as well as to internal philosophical and ideological objections. By contrast, the Department of Defense has the resources, personnel, and the interest for promoting religious freedom and democracy and therefore, it can contribute to the effort as part of a whole-of-government approach to the issue. Military chaplaincy is uniquely suited for this task because of its history, function, and reach. It can do so through a two-pronged approach including strategic application/management of religious leader engagements and development of chaplaincy programs in foreign militaries. These efforts support one another, but will require significant coordination, planning, and resourcing.

## **Strategic Religious Engagement and the Promotion of Religious Freedom Abroad**

The core values of the United States are grounded in the notions of freedom and individuality. As the U.S. seeks to promote those values around the world, the Department of Defense must offer options for its contribution to a whole-of-government effort. In this paper, I will argue that the military chaplaincy can aid the State Department in its mandated task of promoting religious freedom abroad through two means: strategic religious leader engagements, and development of chaplaincy programs in foreign militaries. In order to develop the argument, I will first offer an explanation of the core U.S. interest in religious freedom, its philosophical and legal basis, and the challenges its promotion poses. Next, I will examine the contribution religion makes to foreign policy and the capability chaplains offer to the Departments of Defense and State in this regard. Last, I will argue that a strategic application of those capabilities stands as a powerful and as yet untapped resource for democracy and religious freedom promotion.

### **Religious Freedom and U.S. Interests**

The United States has an interest in promoting democracy and freedom of religion abroad, despite minor concerns with how the relationship between the two could be inappropriately construed.<sup>1</sup> The so-called *democratic peace theory*—the belief that countries governed by democratic institutions are less likely to engage in armed conflict with one another—has attained the status of dogma among many international relations theorists and forms the basis for much U.S. foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> Put simply, the promotion of democracy abroad serves U.S. national security interests by creating nations that are more likely to enter into security, economic, and other strategic partnerships with the United States. Several scholars have offered philosophical arguments that also tie

religious freedom to the realization of our national interests, but the most important for purposes of this work is the connection between the establishment of democratic institutions and freedom of religion.<sup>3</sup>

While the Trump Administration has not yet published its National Security Strategy, there is good reason to think that it will continue or expand upon the initiatives in this area by the Obama Administration.<sup>4</sup> In the 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama addressed promotion of both democracy and religious freedom, though at times in broad terms. He begins by noting that many of the recent threats to U.S. security arose from authoritarian states' efforts to oppose democratic ideals and forces, and he ties promotion of democracy to the protection of fundamental human rights and ultimately, "every enduring national interest."<sup>5</sup> He therefore sees a U.S. obligation to promote human rights by supporting peaceful democratic movements and by insisting that other nations "uphold their human rights obligations."<sup>6</sup> His words on religious freedom are more vague and indirect and as a result, have been the target of criticism by some advocates, though they are still present.<sup>7</sup> For example, in the section addressing advancement of security, Obama specifically mentions freedom of worship alongside freedoms of speech and assembly as *universal values*, and he promises that the United States will "be a champion" for those who are subject to violence and abuse, specifically mentioning ethnic and religious minorities, among others.<sup>8</sup> He sees the acceptance of the ideal of freedom and the establishment of democratic institutions as key to the battle against violent extremism.<sup>9</sup>

His connection of these two core values (democracy and religious freedom) stands within a tradition of American political philosophy, and traces its roots to the very

founding of the United States. Perhaps more than anyone else, John Locke influenced the thought of the founding fathers on the ideal of freedom.<sup>10</sup> Although he argued for religious toleration on both religious and rational grounds, his appeal to logic and governance is of particular interest.<sup>11</sup> Locke offers several reasons why the government should refrain from enforcing religion, many of which are still influential in Establishment jurisprudence today, but the most important is one built upon the notion of the human as properly free and government as a voluntary agreement by persons to live in community.<sup>12</sup> That is, Locke argues that the nature of individual liberty precludes laws from establishing religion because persons have a right to be wrong.<sup>13</sup> Since democratic governance is based on the premise of individual choice, restrictions upon religious expression and belief are antithetical to its core. These notions form the basis for much of the modern discussion surrounding religious freedom as a right and a necessary constituent part of modern democracy.<sup>14</sup> Most importantly, the key United Nations document on religious freedom couches it in terms of universal human rights, and most member nations have indicated their agreement by signature.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to these philosophical arguments for promoting freedom of religion, there are also practical reasons for doing so. For example, Leiter argues that modern secular democracies should tolerate religion as a pragmatic matter, due to the popularity of religious devotion among the citizenry.<sup>16</sup> Others have argued that religious freedom leads to national peace and stability. Voltaire claimed that it prevents violence and persecution because a plurality of religions precludes one from gaining control and forcing its proscriptions on all: "If there were only one religion...there would be danger of despotism, if there were two, they would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty,

and they live in peace and happiness.”<sup>17</sup> In a similar way, Grim and Finke argue that governmental religious persecution breeds societal and civil unrest, especially violence among competing religious groups, while government toleration leads to decreased sectarian violence and increased societal stability.<sup>18</sup> They also correctly note that freedom of religion is closely tied to other essential freedoms like freedom of speech and freedom to assemble, as well as other societal goods such as higher income, better educational opportunities, better health of citizens, less armed conflict and greater opportunities for women and minorities.<sup>19</sup> As Grim puts it, “...the empirical data are clear[:] religious freedom is part of the ‘bundled commodity’ of human freedoms that energize participation in civil society by all religious groups, which is conducive to the consolidation of democracy and to socioeconomic progress.”<sup>20</sup> Each of these concerns speaks to the importance of religious freedom as a core U.S. interest and as an important component of U.S. foreign policy.

#### International Religious Freedom Act

These considerations led the United States Congress, in 1998, to pass HR 2431, The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), in order to express and project America’s commitment to freedom of religion and to make provision for foreign policy actions that support that effort.<sup>21</sup> In particular, it created the Office of International Religious Freedom with an Ambassador-at-Large within the Department of State and an independent Commission on International Religious Freedom with a special Advisor on International Religious Freedom within the National Security Council. Both have mandatory annual reporting requirements concerning religious freedom across the globe. The legislation links foreign assistance to religious freedom, and requires sanctions or other executive action by the President upon international violators

reported by the State Department office.<sup>22</sup> It also makes provision for funds to promote religious freedom abroad through a variety of means, including official U.S.

broadcasting efforts and political/cultural exchange programs.<sup>23</sup>

From the time of its passage, IRFA has proven to be somewhat controversial, both in principle and practice/enforcement. Critics have charged that it is imperialistic, vague, subject to abuse, and simply wrong-headed. For example, Sullivan charges that it is grounded in cultural imperialism, based on [Western] “Protestant and Enlightenment theories of the state and religion,” and Danchin has warned that it is vulnerable to politicization and abuse.<sup>24</sup> By contrast, its defenders have argued that it is culturally sensitive, universally applicable, concrete, and altruistic.<sup>25</sup> As Fore notes, IRFA is grounded in universal human rights, does not prohibit establishment of religion, and “is not attempting to have other countries adopt the First Amendment as their own.”<sup>26</sup> These debates are not merely academic, as they have made implementation of IRFA more difficult.

As noted, the State Department is the primary agency tasked with the promotion of religious freedom, but it has struggled to fulfill the mandates of the law beyond the reporting requirements. Thomas Farr, the first director of the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, has expressed frustration at its lack of success, and this, due in no part to a lack of effort by those in the office. He complains that at the heart of the problem is a failure by those in the most senior political positions to make religious freedom a real priority, despite words to the contrary: “Officials, including presidents and secretaries of state, have done almost nothing to integrate religious freedom into our democratic, economic, and counterterrorism strategies...foreign policy

speeches are empty words if they are not followed by strategic planning and policy action.”<sup>27</sup>

Farr suggests that this ineffectiveness reflects a deeper problem at the State Department, namely a rejection of religious freedom as the *first freedom* and a universal right to be encouraged among all peoples. As proof, he points to the inadequate training on religious freedom provided to Foreign Service officials at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute: it is voluntary, and the curriculum fails to make clear why Congress has mandated the promotion of religious freedom. He writes, “The stark reality is that fifteen years after IRFA’s passage, our diplomats are not being trained to know what religious freedom is and why it is important, let alone how to advance it. This deficiency reflects a deep-seated skepticism in our foreign policy establishment.”<sup>28</sup>

That skepticism represents key philosophical/moral concerns with promoting religious freedom abroad. Some within the State Department doubt the United States should seek to promote religious freedom for three principle reasons. First, some see it as an attempt by Christian lobbying groups to pave the way for missionary work.<sup>29</sup> Second, drawing upon the basic criticisms of IRFA, some see it as (culturally) imperialistic and thus, counter-productive to forging relationships of trust and mutuality that are so vital to effective diplomacy.<sup>30</sup> Third, some conservatives within the State Department do not want religious freedom for some groups because they fear that terrorist organizations will exploit it for their own purposes. Each of these concerns is important for understanding the cultural barriers to implementation of IRFA within the State Department and for a broader evaluation of any proposal for promoting religious freedom. The second and third concerns are especially important for considering how

promotion of religious freedom will be received and should be implemented (if at all) in Muslim-majority nations.

There is a sizeable body of literature concerning the advisability and feasibility, and the risks of promoting and implementing religious freedom in Muslim societies. Some Muslim scholars are wary of U.S. efforts in this regard because they “fear that the secular democracy we are selling them is anti-Islam,” and they confuse religious freedom with secularism.<sup>31</sup> Some Western scholars and diplomats have questioned whether Islam has the theological resources to truly allow a robust religious freedom, because they assume its exclusivist view of religious truth prevents tolerance of other faiths. Both of these beliefs contain some truth, but are largely erroneous and can lead to ill-advised strategies for democracy and religious freedom promotion, particularly in the Middle East.<sup>32</sup> While some American policy makers seem to see democracy and religion at odds, others do not. All conservative, exclusivist theologies make claims to ultimate truth, but it does not follow that they are incapable of valuing freedom of religion or conscience.<sup>33</sup> In fact, a growing number of Islamic scholars are drawing upon its concept of faith to argue for religious freedom.<sup>34</sup> Thus, a proper strategy for promotion of religious freedom should not seek to influence the theological commitments of local religious leaders, and should not target some groups for preferential treatment based on their presumed theological affinity for democracy.<sup>35</sup>

### Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy

Despite these debates about promotion of religious freedom abroad, an increasing number of foreign policy analysts and scholars have acknowledged the significant role of religion in international relations and conflict, and have called for increased attention to religious communities and concerns in foreign affairs work.<sup>36</sup> They

have argued that religious leaders often play a significant role in both their local communities and national cultures, and should therefore be considered when engaging in diplomatic negotiations. This suggests a need for religious expertise among American foreign diplomats. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it, “In the future, no American ambassador should be assigned to a country where religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of the faiths commonly practiced there. Ambassadors and their representatives, wherever they are assigned, should establish relationships with local religious leaders.”<sup>37</sup>

These considerations led Douglas Johnston to suggest that the U.S. State Department create the new position of *religion attaché* within the Foreign Service. Johnston’s proposal includes a religion attaché assigned to the diplomatic missions in those countries where religion “has a particular salience,” whose responsibilities would include developing relationships with local religious leaders and groups and advising the ambassador on religious issues of concern in the region.<sup>38</sup> As Johnston sees it, the religion attaché would be analogous to the cultural officer—perhaps working under the auspices of that office—but with sole responsibility for religious concerns. Johnston suggests a need for at least 30 such persons distributed across the globe at an initial cost of approximately \$10 million, and although he considers possible problems for the program, he quickly dismisses them as “not particularly worrisome.”<sup>39</sup> Unfortunately, Johnston’s proposal has failed to gain traction among senior Administration officials, and in light of the Trump Administration’s proposed cuts to the State Department’s budget, it seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. In addition, his calculations could be questioned as overly optimistic.<sup>40</sup>

Nevertheless, Johnston's ideas are of value, and while the State Department appears unable or unwilling to devote the necessary resources for implementing his proposal, its intent may be met through other means. In recent years, military chaplains have been involved in the very work he proposes for the religion attachés and a number of chaplains have recently argued that more cooperation between the State and Defense Departments would allow State to leverage that expertise, primarily for the promotion of international peace and stability. For example, Cook proposes that a military chaplain be placed on the country team for those countries where religion is "an integral part of life and government."<sup>41</sup> He sees this position as analogous to that of the military attaché already present in most U.S. embassies, and argues for it based on the need for a religion expert to advise the ambassador, on the limited resources of the State Department vis-à-vis the much larger budget and personnel pool of the Defense Department, and on the ability of a permanent position to capture gains from religious leader engagements. Cook's idea has some merit, but it seems that his concerns could be addressed in a manner that enables greater personnel stability within the military chaplaincy and retains the relationship of the chaplain to the military command.<sup>42</sup>

#### The Advisement Role

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States military (as well as partner nation militaries) has been in an almost continual cycle of deployment, redeployment, reconstitution, and deployment again. The global war on terror has required new strategies and techniques for waging war, as well as enhancements of older tactics. The chaplaincy has adapted as greater sensitivity to the religious aspects of war and conflict has come to the fore. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, chaplains began embracing an expanded role of religious advisement, to

include diplomatic-like functions. Patterson sums it up quite nicely: “Particularly in the past decade, Western military chaplains have been called upon to move beyond the pulpit to promote peace: by engaging with local religious leaders abroad, by advising combatant commanders and senior diplomats on the religious and cultural mores of their area, by serving local civilians in war-ravaged environments, and by being agents for peace in ways not conceived of by past generations of military chaplains.”<sup>43</sup>

Unfortunately, this innovative use of chaplains, particularly as liaisons with foreign leaders and in peace promotion has been, as Johnston laments, “ad hoc” in nature, and largely confined to the tactical level.<sup>44</sup> This is understandable for a number of reasons. The ad hoc nature of implementation is due to several factors, some unwitting and some considered. Five factors stand out. First, because this use of chaplains is relatively new, many commanders have simply failed to consider utilizing their chaplains in any way other than direct religious support to military service members and advisement on the ethical climate or morale within their commands. Second, some chaplains and their endorsers do not accept the liaison role as part of the chaplaincy ministry because they see it as more political than religious or ministerial. In addition, some chaplains are not well suited for this type of work due to their personal dispositions or due to theological commitments that preclude their ability to partner with those of other faiths. Third, some military leaders have resisted this shift in chaplaincy roles because they fear it will detract from the fundamental historical and legislative purpose of having chaplains in the military, namely providing religious support to military personnel downrange. Fourth, some military leaders, in particular the Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Chaplains, are concerned that liaison activities in hostile environments

could compromise the noncombatant status of the chaplains involved. Fifth, most chaplains have not been formally trained in religious leader engagement, as it has not been incorporated into the curricula at the military chaplain schools; the training some have received is typically pragmatically focused, region-specific and offered immediately prior to deployment (i.e., at the mobilization platform).

The focus on the tactical level can be attributed to at least four factors. First, it is easiest to implement at the lower echelons, where battalions on the ground have regular contact with the local populace, can easily make contact with local religious leaders, and can gain trust through regular interaction and familiarity. Second, the general lack of bureaucracy at the local level means that tangible results from the meetings can be more quickly realized and have a more immediate effect on operations, potentially saving U.S. service member lives. Third, the risks associated with failure, whether in terms of physical security or of political and diplomatic value, are minimized when confined to the regional level. Fourth, success at the local level can be used to argue for an expansion of the underlying concepts on a much larger scale by U.S. military leaders—especially those within the chaplaincy—and by indigenous religious and political leaders.

There is not space here to address each of these issues comprehensively, and while many of the concerns have some warrant, they do not present an insurmountable problem for the proposal, and will be discussed briefly later.<sup>45</sup> What is of interest is the fact that a good case can be made for an expansion of the chaplaincy liaison role to the strategic level for the promotion of both peace and religious freedom. As Johnston puts it, “Rather than confining the chaplain’s liaison role within rigidly circumscribed

boundaries, we would do well to provide greater latitude to those chaplains who are well-educated and seasoned practitioners in this arena.”<sup>46</sup>

### Chaplains and Promotion of Religious Freedom

There are several good reasons for using the military chaplaincy for promoting religious freedom as part of a whole of government approach to meeting the requirements of IRFA. First, the doctrinal and legal basis for military chaplaincy is grounded in the notion of protecting freedom of religion. It is the military commander’s responsibility to ensure that personnel under his/her command enjoy the free exercise of their religious beliefs, and military chaplains are the means to meeting that end. As the joint publication for religious affairs puts it, “US military chaplains represent specific religious organizations and work together within the pluralistic context of the military to ensure freedom of religion within the joint force.”<sup>47</sup> The idea is that, although chaplains are clergypersons who represent their particular faith groups/traditions, they can legally be supported with public funds because the U.S. government has an obligation to ensure that the men and women who serve in the armed forces—sometimes in remote locations not conducive to attendance at a local house of worship—have the ability and opportunity to practice their faith(s). While this was probably not the original basis for forming the military chaplaincy, it now stands as the legal justification for the continued existence of the armed forces chaplaincy programs; somewhat paradoxically, chaplains serve a *secular* purpose (i.e., protecting the First Amendment) by engaging in *religious* activities.<sup>48</sup> Thus, if the very existence of government chaplaincy is tied to the protection of religious freedom, then it stands to reason that chaplains have something to offer the U.S. effort to promote and protect religious freedom abroad.

Second, chaplains are a visible, tangible embodiment of the principles of religious freedom and America's commitment to them. Chaplains represent the American value of religious freedom abroad because of where they are, who they are, what they do, and how they do it. U.S. military chaplains are perhaps the most visible example of America's commitment to religious freedom because they can be found in almost every country due to the extensive American military presence abroad. At any given time, there is a significant number of U.S. military members serving in approximately 80 countries, not only engaging in warfighting efforts, but also in peacekeeping, stability, and humanitarian operations.<sup>49</sup> Wherever there is a significant presence of military personnel, there is almost certainly at least one chaplain assigned.

Chaplains are religious and spiritual leaders for their respective faith communities, and this status grants them credibility and access in many cultures where other U.S. military and governmental leaders may be treated with suspicion. As Nix explains, in many nations "religious leaders are highly regarded and possess significant moral authority as a result of their religious positions. They often hold public offices and political positions that play significant roles in daily community life. In these cultures, military chaplains, by nature of their religious position, may possess authority and legitimacy not enjoyed by other military and diplomatic personnel."<sup>50</sup> But access and credibility do not, in themselves, explain how U.S. military chaplains incarnate the core U.S. value of religious freedom. It is the way chaplains faithfully execute their duties that is most compelling. The combination of the pluralistic and cooperative nature of chaplaincy work, along with its official governmental status, speaks volumes to those from cultures unfamiliar with how religious freedom works in America. Chaplains

represent over 100 distinct faith groups, some from liberal and some from conservative traditions, yet they all work together in order to ensure that all U.S. service members have the opportunity to practice their faith(s). Chaplains perform religious services and rites for those personnel of like faith, and they provide support for those of other faiths in various forms, from ensuring access to worship spaces, to ordering appropriate religious supplies; from intervening with unsupportive leadership, to coordinating for a chaplain of that faith to come and perform needed religious services, among other things. This interventionist work, even for those with whom the chaplain disagrees on spiritual/religious matters, is driven by an underlying commitment to the ideal of freedom of religion.

Third, those chaplains who have engaged in liaison activities have typically enjoyed access to foreign personnel who can impact popular support for religious liberty because of those activities. That is, military chaplains may have access to networks of relationships that can prove valuable for influencing developing and recovering nations to move toward religious freedom. This is due to the fact that those chaplains have been regularly meeting with and developing friendly relationships with host nation religious leaders at both the local and national levels.

#### Expansion of Religious Leader Engagement to Strategic Level

There are several measures the chaplaincy can take to help the State Department in the promotion of religious freedom. First, it can do so by continuing to promote peace and stability through the work of senior chaplains intentionally meeting with senior-level political and religious leaders in areas of concern. In so doing, the senior chaplains will build and expand upon the religious leader engagements already taking place at the tactical level. This also implies a more intentional focus on religious

leader engagements at all levels, with appropriate training provided through the military schools. These national- and international-level engagements will need to be coordinated and synchronized with State Department activities and goals in the region.

There is some precedent for the kind of interagency cooperation proposed here. Of particular interest is a 2004 State Department initiative which arranged for a group of Iraqi religious leaders to travel to the United States for a Department of Defense hosted conference on religious pluralism. As Keller describes it, “State and Defense both hoped to expose these religious leaders to the religious pluralism found in the United States so that they could then lead their followers in Iraqi [sic] along a more peaceful route.”<sup>51</sup> The State Department action officer for the conference happened to ask the operations chaplain in the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains if he could possibly help, and he agreed. He assembled a panel of active and reserve Army chaplains of various faith groups to meet with the Iraqi leaders and answer questions. The Iraqis were interested in and impressed by the willingness of chaplains to care for those of other faiths. They were also impressed by the faith of the chaplains they met, in particular the Muslim chaplain. They initially had concerns about his training and fidelity to the faith, but after some questioning, they were satisfied.<sup>52</sup>

Unfortunately, this meeting and a few others like it were designed as something of a stopgap measure during a particularly critical time in the U.S. effort in Iraq, and were not part of a larger and continuing foreign policy strategy. Keller laments the fact that most of the Iraqis who participated in the meeting were killed as Iraq descended into sectarian violence, that these types of meetings “petered out” within 18 months, and that “there was never a systematic wide-scale effort to sustain future meetings.”<sup>53</sup>

This example is instructive for several reasons. First, it shows how the two largest U.S. government agencies with direct contact with foreign governments and populaces, and with the greatest stakes in peace processes and the development of democratic institutions abroad, can work together on religious issues. The State Department has funds to bring foreign nationals to the United States for training and education in support of our national security and strategic goals, and the Department of Defense has resources and personnel to provide training and develop relationships. Second, it demonstrates that while there may be concern that the U.S. commitment to religious freedom leads to a kind of pluralism that fails to respect theological distinctives and forces compromise on important tenets of the faith, education—particularly through personal interaction with those who work in that pluralistic environment and retain their conservative commitments—can assuage those fears. The Iraqi Muslim leaders wanted assurances that the Islamic American Army chaplain was able to practice his faith in accordance with the teachings of the Quran, and this seemed to be their greatest concern with the ideas to which they were being exposed.<sup>54</sup> Third, it suggests that there is real interest in the underlying notion of religious freedom exemplified (and protected) in the U.S. military chaplaincy's commitment to ministry in a pluralistic environment. While the goal of the conference was to ostensibly convince the Iraqi religious leaders to speak out against sectarian violence upon their return to the local communities, their interest in and admiration for how chaplains respect and care for the religious needs of those from differing faiths speaks to the appeal of the idea. Last, the failure of the initiative to continue beyond 2006 speaks to the need for some kind of formal position(s) and/or process to facilitate similar projects. That process will need to ensure proper

coordination and communication between the State Department and the Department of Defense.

A number of proposals have been made for how this kind of coordination can take place, but the most common suggestion, drawing upon historical precedent, has been to place a senior-ranking military chaplain at the State Department, most likely in the Office of Religion and Global Affairs.<sup>55</sup> In addition, if chaplaincy involvement in religious liaison work is to have a lasting impact, it needs some kind of formalization, as is currently being examined in the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>56</sup> Put differently, if U.S. military chaplains are to have a strategic impact on peace and stability operations in the promotion of religious freedom, then the roles and responsibilities of strategic-level chaplains must not only be agreed upon and written into doctrine, but they must also be embraced by senior military and political leaders.

Thus, there is a need to identify an individual who will be responsible for the overall planning, control, and assessment for these strategic religious engagements by military chaplains. As Ferry correctly notes, by proper authorization and authority, they fall within the operational responsibility of the Combatant Commander, and therefore, the key to success is to build religious leader engagements into the combatant command's theater security cooperation plans as part of the theater campaign plans, and to execute those plans in close cooperation with the State Department's country missions.<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, the Combatant Command Chaplain cannot adequately provide supervision and direction to the religious support chaplains and staff, advise the combatant commander, and engage senior religious leaders throughout the command area; someone who is mature, capable, and aware of the religious and political situation

within the area is needed to take responsibility for strategic liaison activities.<sup>58</sup> Thus, it seems advisable to create a new senior-level chaplain position at each of the geographic combatant commands, less United States Northern Command.<sup>59</sup>

The elevation of religious leader engagement activities to the strategic level will require acceptance at the national level, from the Secretaries of State and Defense to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and the Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs; from the Service Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the services' Chiefs of Chaplains. In principle, all parties should support the effort because the philosophical basis is sound and it supports U.S. national interests and strategic goals. However, agreement with a theoretical proposal does not always result in active and concrete support for its enactment especially when there are competing (and perhaps more pressing) issues. It is quite possible that, even if the secretaries agree in principle with the cooperative utilization of military chaplains in this type of diplomacy, there will be no significant resourcing available to move forward; both departments may authorize the collaboration necessary to develop the proposed program, but may not make it a top priority. In that case, it will be incumbent upon those responsible for the program's implementation within each department to develop a plan that makes full use of the resources and personnel already available, and that follows a bottom-up approach to organizational change. The longevity of the program and future resourcing will depend on proven success and upon formalizing it as an official program.<sup>60</sup>

A more significant challenge to support at the national level has to do with disagreement among the various services' Chiefs of Chaplains regarding the use of

chaplains in religious leader engagements downrange. The Air Force has mandated that its chaplains will not engage local religious leaders outside of U.S. garrison situations, and the Navy restricts its chaplain liaison activities overseas to humanitarian efforts. In both cases, the primary fear is that an expansion and formalization of these chaplaincy activities will compromise the chaplain's noncombatant status and detract from the primary mission of direct religious support.<sup>61</sup>

That these concerns are justified can be seen in the structure of the religion and culture team at the United States Central Command Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. The center was established in late 2009 in an effort to understand and engage the culture(s) of the two countries. Part of the effort included the establishment of a religion-culture team, since religion is such an important facet of those cultures. The team was led by an Army chaplain and included a sociologist, three human-terrain analysts, and an expert on each country. While it was groundbreaking work, it also had some liabilities, most importantly its structure within the command. The chaplain-led team fell under the supervision and direction of the J2, and although West notes that there was continuous coordination and communication with the Joint Chiefs staff chaplain and the three services' Offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains, it seems unwise to have it structured this way.<sup>62</sup> Since the team was not designed for intelligence collection, it probably should have fallen under the auspices of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Religious Support Office as part of the Combatant Commander's Religious Program. Information could be shared with other offices, as appropriate, but there would not be the same danger of drift into targeting as there could be under the direction of the Intelligence Group.

Given all these concerns and difficulties, it may be advisable to instead allow the Army to take responsibility for this function, at least in the short term, by creating a position within each of the affected Geographic Combatant Commands' Religious Support offices and supporting it with a Memorandum of Agreement between the services' Chiefs of Chaplains. Thus, the proposal requires the addition, creation, or reallocation of six senior-level chaplain positions within the Army. Since federal law establishes the number of Colonel positions, one avenue for adding these positions could be to request six additional slots from Congress. While it has been argued that this effort supports the National Security Strategy and that it ought to receive support from the Secretaries of Defense and State, it is doubtful that such an increase will be approved. The proposal will probably require reallocation of six Colonel positions from within the Army chaplaincy. It is recommended that those positions be gleaned from the over thirty garrison Chaplain positions. Six could be downgraded to Lieutenant Colonel billets, with the Assistant Chief of Chaplains taking the lead on the development of a decision/evaluation matrix.<sup>63</sup>

#### Development of Chaplaincy Programs

A second way the U.S. military chaplaincy can promote religious freedom abroad is by developing programs to help other nations stand up military chaplaincies grounded in the value and preservation of religious freedom. There is good reason to think that changes in societal attitudes, beliefs, and norms can be influenced by those same changes taking place within the nation's military. Sociologists have been most interested in how modernization of the military can drive public acceptance of modern ideals in developing societies. There are several theories of how this takes place. Some argue that in the countries examined, the military exercised widespread control within

the society, usually due to political upheaval followed by martial law used as a stabilizing measure.<sup>64</sup> Others, however, point to the prominence of the military within developing societies and to the ability of the military to attract the brightest and best-educated personnel, who then become societal shapers and transformers or political leaders.<sup>65</sup> Still others have argued that the military's acculturation process can be used to transform individuals into political citizens, that is, citizens of a state with a broader cultural identity.<sup>66</sup> While theorists vary on their understanding of how this takes place, they agree that the military can be a powerful vehicle for social change, even if somewhat limited.<sup>67</sup> Thus, if attitudes toward religious pluralism and acceptance can be changed within nations' militaries, attitudes within the societies toward religious freedom can be affected, moving toward general acceptance.<sup>68</sup>

This proposal is properly conceived as an expansion and development of the strategic religious leader engagement concept and of activities already taking place in some combatant commands.<sup>69</sup> There is a natural connection between the two, as evinced by Carver's efforts in Iraq while serving as the command chaplain for Combined Joint Task Force 7 (Iraq) in 2003. He participated in a number of senior level religious leader engagements, and at the request of Ambassador Bremer, represented the United States at the first Iraqi Inter-Religious Council for Peace. He also worked with Iraqi leaders on strategies for leveraging the religious communities in Iraq for development of a lasting peace. One of those efforts included the formation of a chaplain corps in the new Iraqi Army.<sup>70</sup> Carver correctly saw the formation of a chaplaincy within the reconstituted Army as a component of a larger strategic effort, with

promotion of religious tolerance designed to counter violent extremist sectarian rhetoric and ideology.

There is evidence that programs of this sort would be received with great interest and participation from many of the nations with which the United States is engaged and which have not had a tradition of religious freedom in public sentiment or national law. Consider, for example, the story of Chaplain Eric Eliason, who met a group of Afghan soldiers who expressed interest in having a chaplain of their own. They selected a fellow soldier named Massuallah (who had studied at a madrassa) to fulfill that role for them, and Eliason offered what training he could provide. In order to do so, he drew upon his Chaplain Officer Basic Course materials and suggested Massuallah contextualize the application of the ideas to the Afghan culture and military.<sup>71</sup> This is admittedly anecdotal, but it suggests that there are some leaders, even among third-world populations, that see the value of chaplaincy for the military, and desire training in order to implement similar programs in their forces.

While Chaplain Eliason surely helped the Afghan soldier to think about chaplaincy ministry, he was hardly equipped to take on the role of official trainer. There can be no doubt that Massuallah would have benefitted from a more formal training program operated under the auspices, for example, of the United States Army Chaplain Center and School. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that, if such a program were to exist, there would be many interested parties. Even if some chose to participate in order to confirm their own suspicions about nefarious American motives, (e.g., the U.S. wants to destroy Islam), they would be exposed to the ideals of religious freedom and cooperation, and they would see those ideals enacted in the lives and work of U.S.

military chaplains. They could then become ambassadors, not only of U.S. goodwill (as Massuella), but also of freedom.<sup>72</sup>

Similarly, while serving in United States Africa Command, Cutler helped develop a religious leader engagement program that had a primary goal of countering violent religious extremism. However, he expanded its mission as part of a larger Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa effort in military-to-military relations, and reached out to the senior Kenyan military chaplains. It became evident in these meetings that the Kenyan leadership desired more training for their junior-grade chaplains, so three were sent to train alongside U.S. Army chaplains for three-weeks each. Two important points can be drawn from this encounter. First, it is clear that there is a need and desire for training in military chaplaincy by the U.S., even among those foreign militaries that already have chaplaincy programs, and second, it is equally clear that these training opportunities will prove valuable to U.S. interests, both regionally and globally.<sup>73</sup>

Each of these cases illustrates a need and desire for chaplaincy training by foreign nationals, and they suggest that U.S. interests would be served in doing so. To be sure, U.S. chaplaincy leaders have already considered this, and the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School already offers slots to foreign nationals in its Chaplain Officer Basic Leadership Course and its Chaplain Captain Career Course.<sup>74</sup> However, this fails to address the larger issue of developing chaplaincy programs or introducing foreign national leaders to the concept of military chaplaincy and its underlying beliefs/values.

Some non-governmental organizations have sought to help foreign militaries in this way, with some success. Olive Branch International began work in this area in

Ukraine as it sought to train clergy to address psycho-spiritual problems associated with the current conflict (e.g., combat stress, battle fatigue, compassion fatigue, moral injury, etc.). The move to help establish a military chaplaincy corps was a natural outflow of this effort. Other organizations have had a more intentional focus on developing chaplaincies abroad. The International Association of Evangelical Chaplains (IAEC) offers “basic chaplaincy training” to foreign nationals who wish to minister to members in their home nation militaries.<sup>75</sup> It does not purport to qualify persons for appointment as chaplains, though the organization also offers some information about developing a chaplaincy program abroad, including a downloadable presentation/document providing rationale for military chaplaincy and a code of ethics for military chaplains. Similarly, the Association of Military Christian Fellowships, whose executive arm is the Association of Christian Conferences, Teaching and Service, is heavily involved in ministry to military personnel in foreign nations. While the primary focus of the organization is evangelistic and training in Bible study methods, it does engage in chaplaincy training, primarily through a program in cooperation with IAEC called a “Chaplains Interaction,” wherein internationals are brought to the United States for training and exposure to the U.S. Chaplaincy.<sup>76</sup> All three organizations are staffed by former and retired chaplains, most of whom have served at the senior level and volunteer their time.

One of the strongest arguments for a civilian-led effort is that they do not represent any national interests or political agendas. That is, their work is perceived as grounded in a genuine belief in the value and effectiveness of military chaplaincy for ministering to the spiritual needs of host nation service members. However, while they have had some success, they have also faced challenges.

First, some have had difficulty gaining access to those in the most influential political and military positions within host countries. Even though the organizations typically begin their work at the request of a host nation's leadership, they have still encountered difficulty gaining the necessary support from the leadership in order to effect lasting change or to establish enduring institutions.<sup>77</sup> Second, they have at times encountered ethical challenges related to that lack of access. For example, some have reported being pressured to pay what amount to bribes in order to receive the support needed to continue their work.<sup>78</sup> Requests of this sort serve as effective roadblocks to further work for these faith-based organizations. Third, they could be perceived as having interests of their own that are antithetical to those of the U.S. State Department (at least with respect to promotion of religious freedom) or are hostile to the religious sensibilities of some U.S. national partners. Most of the organizations working in this field are faith-based and therefore, ground their efforts in their religious mission. This could be construed as an unwelcome effort to covertly introduce missionaries into closed societies.<sup>79</sup> At a minimum, it could cause confusion, as the organizations appear to send mixed messages, advocating chaplaincy as an entrée to evangelistic activity on the one hand, and advancing chaplaincy as a pluralistic enterprise on the other hand.<sup>80</sup>

By contrast, the U.S. military chaplaincy will have much greater flexibility and access to strategic leaders of host nations. By working in close coordination with the State Department's Office of International Religious Freedom and Office of Religion and Global Affairs, along with the host nation country team and in concert with the geographic combatant command's Theater Security Plan, the Deputy Combatant Command Chaplain for Religious Engagement will have the support of the United

States' governmental leaders in the region, and will benefit from the leverage that can be brought to bear from all instruments of national power in order to make his initiatives a success. Although the U.S. military chaplaincy may also be perceived as serving interests of its own (i.e., U.S. national interests), there are measures that can be taken to mitigate the negative impacts of that perception. First, those interests can be clearly communicated in a manner consistent with the strategic message that the U.S. is concerned with promoting democratic institutions and ideals and in promoting universal human rights, both of which are served in the development of a chaplaincy program. Second, those interests can be nested within the similarly aligned interests of the host nation (i.e., to protect human rights, freedom, and the like). Finally, and most critically, the negative perceptions can be mitigated by the aggregate effect of positive religious leader engagements by chaplains at all levels within the operational environment. The most effective counter-measure to negative messaging is relationships built on trust. That is why an effectively managed, intentional religious engagement program that moves across all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic—is vital to the success of the chaplaincy development proposal.

The U.S. Army Chaplaincy seems ideal to help in this effort, but a number of measures will have to be taken to make it work. First, the Army Chief of Chaplains, in coordination with United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, would need to support the development of a new International Military Chaplaincy Development training program at the Army's Chaplain Center and School. Currently, the school offers a number of programs for chaplains, including basic, mid-level, and senior chaplaincy courses, and various technical and managerial courses necessary for the administration

of the chaplaincy programs, funds, and other resources. Consequently, it is unlikely that such an ambitious and extensive additional training program can be supported at this time; the school simply does not have the capacity or the capability in space and personnel to do so without additional resourcing.<sup>81</sup>

Second, a determination of nations in which to implement the program would need to be made. Criteria would need to be set forth, but as a starting point let me offer a few suggestions: nations that are friendly to, and want to maintain good relations with the United States, nations that are nevertheless cited as regular violators of religious freedom, and nations with which the United States already has relationships with religious leaders. There could be some difficulty in identifying participants, but it would seem that the newly-established Army Deputy Command Chaplains for Religious Engagement, in consultation with the Office of International Religious Freedom and the U.S. missions in the region, could be tasked with the decision. The key risk would be the perception of favoritism toward certain faith groups, as this would be fatal to the ideal.

### Recommendations

There are several things that will need to happen in order to develop religious leader engagement capabilities at the strategic level and to leverage those capabilities in the promotion of religious freedom and democracy through chaplaincy corps development programs. I will discuss five, though there are certainly other recommendations that could be made and other risks that could be noted.<sup>82</sup>

First, the Army Chief of Chaplains should engage the other services' Chiefs of Chaplains in order to examine and discuss the value, advisability, and risks associated with an intentional strategic religious leader engagement program. While the

development of such a program would involve some costs (e.g., training costs), if successful, it would provide the military with a new capability and would provide the services' chaplaincies with further justification for future resourcing. Still, the concerns, particularly over the non-combatant status of chaplains engaged in liaison activities, would need to be answered. Therefore, the Chiefs of Chaplains should commission a non-partisan study at the newly-created Chaplaincy Center of Excellence at Fort Jackson, S.C., to provide legal, doctrinal, and financial analysis and to offer concrete recommendations. The study group should consist of political scientists, senior chaplains from each of the services, jurists familiar with international and Constitutional law, and other experts in religion and diplomacy.

Second, if agreement can be reached across the services' chaplaincies, then changes will need to be made to both training and doctrine. Both joint and service doctrine and policy should be amended to more clearly incorporate religious leader engagement as a core competency of all military chaplains. This will ensure that service disagreements will not hamper efforts in this area in the future. As already noted, the acceptance of a strategic religious leader engagement program will require significant investment in training resources to ensure that all military chaplains are prepared to undertake this sensitive tasking.

Third, in coordination and by agreement with the Director of the Office of Religion and Global Affairs and the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (and ultimately the Secretary of State), create a senior-level (O-6) chaplain position at the State Department. This individual will be responsible for coordinating the global religious leader engagement efforts (managed by the Deputy Combatant Command

Chaplains for Religious Engagement, see next recommendation) with these State Department offices, and for communicating those efforts with the Joint Chaplain's office and the services' Chiefs of Chaplains Offices.<sup>83</sup>

Fourth, five new senior-level (O-6) chaplain positions should be established, one at each of the following geographic Combatant Commands: Southern Command, European Command, Africa Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. These Deputy Command Chaplains will be responsible for managing religious leader engagements within the commands' areas of responsibility, for engaging senior political, military, and religious leaders in the countries of their respective regions, and for coordinating these engagements with State Department missions of each affected country and the military chaplain at the State Department. Ideally, the proposed positions will be jointly filled, but if agreement cannot be reached among the services, they could be filled by the Army (as noted earlier), either through creation of new positions or by reallocation of some garrison chaplain positions.

Fifth, the Chiefs of Chaplains should commission a study to examine the facilities and personnel requirements needed to run an International Chaplaincy Development Program at the Army's Chaplain Center and School or jointly with the other services' Chaplain Schools. Since it appears that the three services' Chaplain schools will no longer be located together, a joint effort seems less advisable, though given the advent of internet education, it is still a viable option. Ironically, the transfer of the Air Force and Navy Chaplain Schools from Fort Jackson may provide the needed space for the Army Chaplain School to offer new courses of study, including the one proposed here. The commission should also examine the acceptability of partnering with non-governmental

organizations in that effort. In addition, it is recommended that the process for official recognition of the Development Program as a program of record be initiated.

Each of these recommendations—particularly those involving new initiatives—will require significant investment of time, personnel, and money. At a time of fiscal restraint, such recommendations may appear unrealistic; as the government continues to operate on continuing resolutions under the threat of sequestration, decisions regarding the appropriation of funds will certainly face a higher level of scrutiny. Nevertheless, there is some room for hope in the near term, at least for the Defense Department if the initial proposed budget from the Trump Administration is any indication of its support for military programs. The point to be made is that, if the arguments presented here prove persuasive, then despite fiscal constraints, a strategic use of military chaplains will be beneficial.

### Conclusion

The U.S. military chaplaincies, and the Army chaplaincy in particular, have over twenty years of experience engaging local religious leaders all over the globe. The relationships made have largely only affected the tactical level of operations because the engagement activities have suffered from a lack of strategic direction and coordination. This represents both a failure and an opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. The elevation of religious leader engagement activities to the strategic level will allow Combatant Commanders and State Department officials to leverage those relationships for peace and stability initiatives at the national and international levels. It will also provide an avenue through which religious freedom and democracy may be promoted by exposing senior foreign political, military and religious leaders to the ideals

undergirding the U.S. military chaplaincy and by helping partner nations to develop military chaplaincy programs of their own.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>For an interesting discussion of U.S. efforts at promotion of religious freedom and its relationship to promotion of democracy, see Anna Su, *Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2016). Some scholars have expressed concern that in certain societies, democracy can be used as a pretext for denying religious freedom, or religious sensibilities can be a barrier to truly democratic values. It is not uncommon for governments to restrict religion in an effort to control the population or to prevent conflict. The basis for this approach is a belief that religious disagreement serves as the basis for many conflicts. It is true that many conflicts have a religious dimension to them, but there are good reasons to think the policy wrongheaded. First, it is overly simplistic to think that religion is the source of all societal ills. Second, and somewhat related, it is mistaken to think that just because there is a religious dimension to a conflict, that religious disagreement is at its heart. Oftentimes, religion serves as a convenient excuse for persecution or as a tool to garner public support for other actions. Third, Grim and Finke have convincingly shown that there is an inverse relationship between restrictions on religion and religious violence: “The central irony we demonstrate throughout this book is that although governments typically view restricting religious freedoms as a necessity to maintain order and reduce potential violence, the fact is that fewer religious freedoms often results in more violent persecution [by religious groups as well as the state] and [societal] conflict.” Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012), 10. Kupchan has cautioned against an overzealous promotion of democracy in the Middle East, for fear it will have a destabilizing effect in the host countries. This is due in part to the general difficulty in quickly instituting democratic reforms where they were not previously known, and in part to particular regional factors that make democratization especially difficult. Possibly the greatest impediment to democracy in the Middle East is the way religion and politics are interwoven in the region; political Islam simply has too much power over governmental institutions. As Kupchan notes, “Absent the Western tradition of separating the sacred from the secular—which came about only after the bloody wars of the Protestant Reformation—pitched battles over the role of Islam in politics will bedevil aspiring Middle East democracies for generations to come.” Charles A. Kupchan, “Democracy in Egypt can wait,” *The New York Times Online*, August 16, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/opinion/democracy-in-egypt-can-wait.html> (accessed January 15, 2017). While Kupchan’s claim that secularization was a result of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries’ wars of religion is doubtful—it came more as a result of the Church’s confrontation with modernity and scientific advancement—his basic point that an ideological shift regarding the role of religion in politics must take place is sound. That is, democracy is grounded in something akin to the notion of separation of church and state, and that notion is grounded in freedom of religion.

<sup>2</sup>For discussion of the theory, along with analysis of various statistical data supporting it, see Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross Cultural Test of the ‘Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other’ Hypothesis,” *World Politics*

44, no. 4 (July 1992): 573-599; Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 653-673; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-638; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions* 17, no. 3 (1992): 245-267; Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "Do Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other?: Evidence from the Peloponnesian War," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992): 415-434.

<sup>3</sup>See for example, Thomas Farr, *World of Faith and Freedom: Why International Religious Freedom is Vital to American National Security* (New York: Oxford University, 2008).

<sup>4</sup>The strong influence of Evangelicals within the Trump campaign and Administration suggests that there will be at least as much concern, if not more, for the implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act in a Trump White House as there was under the Obama Administration. Since part of the impetus for IRFA was Evangelical concern over persecution of Christians abroad, it makes sense to suppose those concerns will continue to be a factor in U.S. foreign policy under President Trump. In addition, as Lucius notes, the last two administrations have both seen religion and religious freedom as fundamental in national security: "Both President G. W. Bush and President Obama use religion as an enduring American value of freedom: they both distinguish between those governments that support religious freedom and those that do not, they both emphasize a Western conceptualization of religious freedom, and they both believe that the United States has a moral imperative to act under certain circumstances." Casey Lucius, "Religion and the National Security Strategy," *Journal of Church and State* 55, no. 1 (2012): 50-70. Even with the Trump Administration's inward turn toward domestic concerns, it is hard to imagine that there will be a sharp departure from these principles, given the strongly religious tone of its rhetoric and the public support of these policies.

<sup>5</sup>Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, February 2015), 19.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas Farr has been particularly critical in numerous interviews and opinion pieces. For a broader defense of the Obama Administration's efforts in promoting religious freedom abroad, see Judd Birdsall, "Obama and the Drama over International Religious Freedom Policy: An Insider's Perspective," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10, no. 3 (2012): 33-41.

<sup>8</sup>Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 20.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>10</sup>James Madison, following Locke, argued that "religion...must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man" and that it is an "arrogant pretension" to think the governmental authorities are competent to judge the truth of religious claims. James Madison, *Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments* (1785), reprinted in Thomas C. Berg, John H. Garvey, and Michael W. McConnell, eds., *Religion and the Constitution* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Aspen, 2011), 51, 52.

<sup>11</sup>It is fashionable to claim that Locke's views on religious freedom are simply a reflection of the Enlightenment skepticism that was so prevalent at the time, but Loconte has convincingly argued that Locke's ideas were more strongly influenced by his own Christian faith, coupled with his distaste for the persecution he witnessed. Joseph Loconte, *God, Locke, and Liberty: The Struggle for Religious Freedom in the West* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014). Consider the following from Locke's treatise on religious toleration: "The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light." John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Charles L. Sherman, in *Great Books of the Western World*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. 33 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990), 2. Locke's religious arguments include an appeal to Christ, who (he thinks) was tolerant; an appeal to the Christian virtues of love and mercy, which are antithetical to violent persecution; an appeal to the theological notion of the Church as a voluntary community of faith; and an appeal to the nature of faith as necessarily uncoerced.

<sup>12</sup>First, he notes that the magistrate's power cannot extend to individual beliefs because it is limited to the (outward) physical realm, while belief is inward. Second, he argues that civil authorities are ill equipped to discover religious truth with the kind of certainty needed to enact just laws regulating belief. Since both individuals and churches disagree over theology—and they are arguably better positioned to know the truth—there can be little confidence that governmental leaders can resolve doctrinal controversies. Third, governments often have other interests at stake and thus, their impartiality can be questioned. Not only this, but if government is given the power to restrict false religion, it can use that power to restrict true religion as well (either intentionally or unintentionally).

<sup>13</sup>Locke does not put it in these terms. Rather, he draws an analogy between the responsibility of the individual for his own finances and health and for his eternal soul. He takes it as self-evident that the state bears no responsibility to ensure the health and wealth of its citizens (i.e., by forcing them to care for themselves), but only to protect them from external harm from others. Similarly, it is not the place of the state to protect religious dissenters from their presumably false beliefs, even if it means they are damned. He writes, "Will the magistrate provide by an express law that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves." Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, 8.

<sup>14</sup>For example, Soriano argues that Constitutional democracy rests upon the liberal foundation of freedom of the individual citizen and therefore, must allow freedom of religion. Anti-liberal viewpoints—those that emphasize the collective consensus—undermine individual freedom and thereby, also democracy and Western civilization. Aldir Guedes Soriano, "Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious Freedom," *Brigham Young University Law Review* 3 (2013): 581-603. See also Daniel Philpott, "Why Religious Freedom is Good Foreign Policy," May 6, 2015, <http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/foundation/news/why-religious-freedom-good-foreign-policy> (accessed January 15, 2017).

<sup>15</sup>Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." *United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights*, [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR\\_Translations/eng.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf) (accessed March 1,

2017). Garnett argues that religious freedom requires not only the right of practice, but also the right of choice. The right of choice is inherent in and foundational to proselytism. Thus, religious freedom should include the right to engage in missionary activity, the right to gather for worship, and the right to be free of coercion from other faiths, through fear or law. Richard W. Garnett, "Changing Minds: Proselytism, Freedom and the First Amendment," *University of St. Thomas Law Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 453-473. Although the United Nations Declaration offers a definition of universal rights, some complain that it does not adequately ground those rights and only asserts them. It therefore offers no compelling reasons for member nations to sign and adhere to its proscriptions. See, for example, Kevin J. Hasson, "Religious Liberty and Human Dignity: A Tale of Two Declarations," *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 27, no. 1 (2003): 81-92.

<sup>16</sup>Brian Leiter, *Why Tolerate Religion?* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2012). Leiter argues that the philosophical arguments for the value of religion and/or toleration are based on the false premise that religion is true. Since religion is false, it should not be tolerated in the modern secular state if it were not for the fact that many persons believe in it and most modern states are democratically constituted. Still, he argues that in some cases, state regulation or abolition of religion may be advisable. For a helpful and comprehensive review essay of Leiter's work, see Michael W. McConnell, "Why Protect Religious Freedom?" *Yale Law Journal* 123, no. 3 (December 2013): 770-810.

<sup>17</sup>Voltaire, *Letters on England*, trans. L. Tancock (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1980).

<sup>18</sup>See Grim and Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied*.

<sup>19</sup>Toft et al., demonstrate that statistically, religious communities played a significant role in the democratization of those societies that moved toward democracy in the last generation. Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).

<sup>20</sup>Brian Grim, "Religious Freedom and Social Wellbeing: A Critical Appraisal," *International Journal for Religious Freedom* 2, no. 1 (January 2009): 37-46. For more on the concept of freedoms as bundled commodities, see Amartya K. Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999); Amartya K. Sen, *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2002).

<sup>21</sup>It was updated in 2016 in order to address a number of perceived shortcomings in the original law. For example, it raises the stature of the Ambassador-at-Large within the State Department to report directly to the Secretary of State. It also moves beyond concern for states that violate religious rights to include organizations (like Islamic State) that violate those rights. It allows the president to grant waivers to countries guilty of violations, and it clarifies the extent of protections, noting that they apply to atheism, non-theistic faiths, and to those who choose to not profess or practice no religion. See *Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act*, H.R. 1150 (2016). See also "American Humanist Association Celebrates Historic Bill after Lobbying for Inclusion of the Non-Religious," *American Humanist*, December 15, 2016, <https://americanhumanist.org/press-releases/international-religious-freedom-bill-heads-president-includes-language-protect-humanists-nontheists/> (accessed January 25, 2017).

<sup>22</sup>The relevant portion states, "...in the provision of foreign assistance, the United States should make a priority of promoting and developing legal protections and cultural respect for religious freedom." *The International Religious Freedom Act (1998)*, H.R. 2431, Title V, Sec.

501 (a) (2), 25. While it is the State Department Office of International Religious Freedom that determines the level of the violation(s) and thereby sets the type of response required by the President, the independent commission report serves as a corroborating evaluation, primarily designed to prevent political pressure or competing U.S. interests from compromising the evaluation.

<sup>23</sup>For example, it amends the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 by adding that U.S. efforts will include actions in “promoting respect for and guarantees of religious freedom abroad by interchanges and visits between the United States and other nations of religious leaders, scholars, and religious and legal experts in the field of religious freedom.” *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, “Exporting Religion: Where the Religious Freedom Act Fails,” *Commonweal*, February 26, 1999, 10. Danchin expresses concern that the unilateral approach to human rights—in this case, religious freedom—is not only ineffective, but may be counterproductive, and that it leaves IRFA vulnerable to exploitation. Peter G. Danchin, “U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 41 (2003): 33-135. Smolin similarly warns against importing distinctively American conceptions of religious freedom into the analysis and judgment of other nations’ laws, and suggests focusing on clear examples of violations: “We cannot expect to export the peculiar manner in which we have chosen to implement that value [religious liberty]...Our efforts to influence the world must target the most egregious violations of the core principle of religious liberty, and must seek to export a form of religious liberty that can be culturally adaptable.” David M. Smolin, “Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International Religious Freedom Act,” *Cumberland Law Review* 31 (2000): 706. Smolin specifically warns against importing American notions of disestablishment into the notion of religious freedom. He notes that U.S. policymakers “must be willing to accept that other nations will evaluate religious speech, including evangelism/proselytism and changes in religious affiliation differently than is done within the United States” precisely because some nations have a national religion, the conversion from which can constitute a violation of law. *Ibid.*, 690. He goes on to address other similar concerns related to free speech about religion; in many other countries (even Western democracies) freedom from injury or hatred can take precedence over freedom of speech, and can lead to prosecution of those who use free speech to criticize other religions. This means that, as the U.S. seeks to implement IRFA, policymakers need to take care to avoid imposing American notions of the sanctity of free speech, to the detriment of other values related to personal safety and freedom from harassment. *Ibid.*, 698. Cleveland also expresses concern over the misuse and unequal application/enforcement of IRFA, due to political concerns: “Differential application of sanctions policies, far from being motivated by respect for international norms, simply reflect the whims and fads of U.S. domestic politics.” Sarah H. Cleveland, “Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions,” *Yale Journal of International Law* 26 (2001): 75. Still others have complained that IRFA elevates religious freedom above other human rights. Kristin N. Wuerffel, “Discriminating Among Rights?: A Nation’s Legislating a Hierarchy of Human Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Customary Law,” *Valparaiso University Law Review* 33, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 369-412.

<sup>25</sup>Relano Pastor argues that while IRFA has flaws, it is not beyond repair. She offers three recommendations to relieve tensions in IRFA. First, the U.S. must treat the issue as a truly international concern by enlisting the aid of the international community for policing and enforcement. Second, the U.S. should subject itself to the same scrutiny as it places upon other nations (in this regard). Last, the U.S. needs to be more consistent in its application of sanctions, so long as it does so with caution. Eugenia Relano Pastor, “The Flawed

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: A European Perspective,” *Brigham Young University Law Review* 3 (2005): 711-746.

<sup>26</sup>Matthew L. Fore, “Shall Weigh Your God and You: Assessing the Imperialistic Implications of the International Religious Freedom Act in Muslim Countries,” *Duke Law Journal* 52 (2002): 445. He continues, “Instead, IRFA seeks to foster a minimum level of religious tolerance.” *Ibid.* Little argues that freedom of conscience in religion has not only *historically* enjoyed a preferred status, but that it ought to do so because of its foundational nature to humanity. David Little, “Does the Human Right to Freedom of Conscience, Religion, and Belief Have Special Status?” *Brigham Young University Law Review* 2 (2001): 603-610.

<sup>27</sup>Thomas F. Farr, “Our Failed Religious Freedom Policy,” *First Things* 237 (November 2013): 36. Similarly, Rieffer-Flanagan complains that there is no clear U.S. strategy to promote religious freedom and offers some policy guidelines to promote it. Barb Rieffer-Flanagan, “Promoting the Fundamental Human Right of Religious Liberty in U.S. Foreign Policy,” *GSTF Journal of Law and Social Science* 4, no. 1 (December 2014): 45-51. Illustrative of this lack of commitment are the anemic responses by the presidential administrations to violations of religious freedom since the passage of IRFA. Although IRFA requires the president to take executive action in response to violations of religious freedom reported by the State Department office, in the first fifteen years (1998-2013) sanctions have only been imposed on one country, and they were largely ineffective. Several members of the commission have expressed concern over the inaction of the government or over the downplaying of violations by those nations in which we have a greater interest. See, for example, Adelaide Mena, “Critics: Global Religious Freedom Report Falls Short of Action Needed,” *Catholic News Agency*, July 29, 2014, <http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/global-religious-freedom-report-falls-short-of-action-needed-critics-say-14221/> (accessed January 30, 2017). In most cases, other national interests appear to have outweighed U.S. interest in condemning religious persecution.

<sup>28</sup>Farr, “Our Failed Religious Freedom Policy,” 38. Inboden agrees, and complains that religious freedom simply is not taken seriously as a national security threat, despite Presidential language to the contrary. William Inboden, “Religious Freedom and National Security,” *Policy Review* 175 (October/November 2012): 55-68.

<sup>29</sup>William Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy* 114 (Spring 1999): 66-80.

<sup>30</sup>Witte and Green note the difficulty of disentangling religion from culture and ethnicity in such a way as to promote the kind of religious freedom enjoyed in Western democracies without offending indigenous population sensibilities. John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green, “Religious Freedom, Democracy, and International Human Rights,” *Emory International Law Review* 23 (2009): 583-608. Hurd cautions that the State Department activity in religious engagement can actually have the opposite effect of that intended, namely that it can cause more religious and sectarian tensions by forcing groups to define themselves and their ideologies in religious terms and by forcing groups to choose sides in conflicts based on religious identification. Worse, she argues, such engagement can also grant some religions official status while relegating others to the position of cult or fringe group. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “What’s Wrong with Promoting Religious Freedom?” *Foreign Policy*, June 12, 2013, [www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/12/whats-wrong-with-promoting-religious-freedom](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/12/whats-wrong-with-promoting-religious-freedom) (accessed January 16, 2017). On the one hand, Hurd’s concerns regarding the United States’ government endorsement of some religious groups as valid and relegation of others as invalid by its choice to engage or not engage have some merit. However, the problem can be averted if the State Department emphasizes religious freedom,

even while it has to make hard decisions about which groups to engage, largely due to limited time and resources. On the other hand, her fear that groups will somehow develop a religious identity or that religion will become the overarching self-identity as a result of the U.S. State Department recognition or activities is far-fetched. Those groups that are prone to acting on religious belief or are prone to act violently toward other religions will not do so because of the State Department. Thus, her larger concerns seem unfounded.

<sup>31</sup>Thomas F. Farr, "Public Religion, Democracy Promotion, and U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 51.

<sup>32</sup>For a helpful analysis of religion in the Middle East, see Robert D. Lee, *Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Identity, Ideology, Institutions, and Attitudes* (Boulder: Westview, 2010).

<sup>33</sup>Conservative, exclusivist theologies, no matter what their particular faith, typically conceive of their religion as the sole locus of ultimate truth. This creates something of a paradoxical position for those who wish to support religious freedom. On the one hand, their desire for freedom of belief, worship and association drives them to support the political ideal of freedom of religion. On the other hand, their belief in the exclusive truth of their religion and its ultimate demands upon humanity can drive them to deny that freedom to others. At a minimum, the religious beliefs are in a position to negate the political beliefs if they clash. As Christiano writes, "So the basic problem with giving a political argument for religious toleration is that the interests that ground a political argument for religious toleration are always and necessarily outweighed by the transcendent interests invoked in religious belief and practice." Thomas Christiano, "Does Religious Toleration Make Any Sense?" in Lawrence Thomas, ed. *Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 180. Consider Islam: the problem with so-called "radical Islam" is not theological, but sociological (and perhaps hermeneutical). What distinguishes radical Islam from Fundamentalist Christianity (apart from the obvious base doctrinal disagreements between Islam and Christianity as religions) is not priority of faith in the lives of adherents, but the use of violence as an acceptable expression of faith.

<sup>34</sup>For a discussion of current trends in democratic development in Muslim-majority nations, along with practical solutions garnered from the history of democratic initiatives in the Muslim world, see Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Moslim Democracy'," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (April 2005): 13-27. Appleby argues that all religions have resources to justify what most would consider to be violations of human rights and to advocate for human rights. R. Scott Appleby, "Serving Two Masters? Affirming Religious Belief and Human Rights in a Pluralistic World," in John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens, eds., *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2003), 170-195. Woodberry and Shah argue that although Protestant notions of freedom and the sanctity of individual conscience set the stage for democratic governance, other religions are now fostering democracy-friendly social processes. Robert D. Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah, "Christianity and Democracy: The Pioneering Protestants," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 47-61.

<sup>35</sup>The goal should not be to strengthen or instill liberal Islamic theology, even though that position may prove agreeable to freedom of religion and democracy. This line of thinking has led some chaplains to suggest focusing engagement efforts on moderate Islam. See Scottie Lloyd, *Chaplain Contact with Local Religious Leaders: A Strategic Support*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 1; Ira G. Houk, III, *Strategic Religious*

*Engagement for Peacebuilding*, Senior Service College Fellowship Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 10. Such a move is likely to exacerbate the problem and strengthen the position of violent Islamists for three reasons: 1) it suggests American meddling, which exacerbates suspicions, 2) it runs counter to U.S. values enshrined in freedom of religion, and 3) it conflicts with U.S. strategic goals of promoting freedom and democracy.

<sup>36</sup>See, for example, Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds., *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford University, 2012). Several explanations exist for this newfound awareness of what many would take to be an obvious sociological consideration. Perhaps the most popular explanation is that religious factors were obscured by the Cold War with its primary emphases upon economic and political forces, and that the end of the Cold War gave rise to identity politics and increased the visibility of religious-based terror organizations. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Other explanations appeal to the distorting effect Enlightenment rationalism had on the importance of religion in political structures and they cite the failure of modernity as the catalyst for a renewed interest in religion and its central role. Edward Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University, 1994), 8-19. Still others have argued that the problem has been an overemphasis on the Constitutional principles of separation of church and state in American foreign policy.

<sup>37</sup>Madeleine Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).

<sup>38</sup>Douglas M. Johnston, "The Case for a Religion Attaché," *Foreign Service Journal* 79, no. 2 (February 2002): 34.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 37. Johnston cites challenges from the internal culture of the State Department, the tendency to focus on larger religions to the exclusion of minority groups, and the potential for host nations to view such a position as "an unwanted intrusion in their internal affairs" as the most pressing potential obstacles to his proposal. *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>The cost of Johnston's proposal is not prohibitive, as it represented approximately only a 0.5% increase of the State Department's overall budget and a 2% increase of its personnel costs for fiscal year 2002 (the year Johnston's article was published), but his proposed numbers seem low. While he is surely correct in his claim that "the benefits of creating the religion attaché position would outweigh the possible liabilities," and that increased interaction by American officials would provide the United States with valuable insight into the ideas and concerns of a much-neglected and important segment of the communities our foreign diplomats are seeking to understand, it is hard to imagine that 30 personnel would be sufficient. *Ibid.* For example, four religion attachés for all of sub-Saharan Africa seems far too few. Even though *something* is better than *nothing*, it would be ill advised to begin a program with too few resources to succeed.

<sup>41</sup>Stephen L. Cook, *U.S. Military Chaplains on the Ambassador's Country Team*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 1.

<sup>42</sup>Cook suggests that military chaplains serve on country teams for locales where religion is important, but he offers neither a method for determining which countries warrant such a position nor an estimate regarding how many chaplains will be needed. It is, of course,

infeasible to place a chaplain on every country team, and presumably single digits would be too few. Perhaps he has something akin to Douglas Johnston's proposal for the religion attachés, but that idea has already been shown to likely be less effective than using the resources already extant in the region(s). In addition, Cook does not address questions related to the requisite rank and experience of the chaplains he proposes, or to the feasibility of the services' providing these chaplains. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw with the proposal, depending upon the number of country team chaplains needed. Complicating matters is the lack of clarity regarding the personnel requirements for the long-term. If the country team chaplain positions are occasional in nature—and there is good reason to think that they would be at least somewhat dependent upon the changing religio-political situations in countries/regions throughout the world—then it will be exceedingly difficult for the personnel managers in the Offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains to anticipate increased or decreased need for these admittedly highly-trained and specialized chaplains with any degree of accuracy. Last, while it is not unheard of for military personnel to work with the State Department, it would seem that the country team chaplain could experience confusion concerning his/her chain of command and technical supervisory chain. Presumably, this would flow through the geographic combatant commands in some form, but it seems to make more sense for the chaplain to work within the combatant command structure to help State Department missions in the region, and to coordinate that effort through the military attachés.

<sup>43</sup>Eric Patterson, "The Modern Military Chaplaincy in the Era of Intervention and Terrorism," in Eric Patterson, ed. *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond: Advisement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 4.

<sup>44</sup>Douglas M. Johnston, "Military Chaplains: Bridging Church and State," in Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston, eds., *Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings* (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2012), 264.

<sup>45</sup>The problem of underutilization of chaplains by commanders is simply a matter of awareness and could easily be addressed by the unit chaplains themselves, by supervisory chaplains in their communication with subordinate unit commanders, or by military education avenues. The issue of negative perceptions of liaison activities by chaplains and/or endorsers is a matter of opinion, and serves as a principle reason that most advocates for this use of chaplains argue that it should be voluntary. Nevertheless, as Hoyt points out, there is a religious dimension to the work, what he refers to as a blending of professional competency and personal piety. He writes, "On a personal level this [religious liaison work in Iraq] required a daily deeply personal reliance on piety, theological integrity, submission, and patience. On the professional level it required strategic vision, intellectual consistency, adaptability, and honesty in a cycle of purpose/follow-through/feedback. In short, the entire process of working toward conflict resolution from a religious framework requires keeping it authentic as a religious act or function." Michael Hoyt, "The Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress and the Baghdad Accords," in Patterson, ed., *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*, 82. The fear that liaison activities will detract from direct ministry to members of the armed forces is a valid concern, and all acknowledge that the ministry function of chaplains is primary. Still, many chaplains who have engaged in this type of work have found the opportunity to add value to the overall mission and to their ministry to service members in their units. The coordination needed to move *outside the wire* and the visibility of the chaplain out where the service members are engaging the local populace can help endear the chaplain to his/her unit. The fear that liaison activities can cross the line between non-combatant and combatant functions is legitimate, and is discussed later. In brief, standardization, training, and care can mitigate the risks and protect against violations.

<sup>46</sup>Johnston, "Military Chaplains: Bridging Church and State," 270.

<sup>47</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2013), vii. The joint publication on military doctrine notes the responsibility of commanders for issues of religion within his/her purview: "All military commanders are responsible for religious affairs in their command [sic]...Religious support consists of the accommodation of the free exercise of religious beliefs through provision and facilitation of religious worship and pastoral care; advising the JFC on ethics, morals, morale, command climate, and the command religious program." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), IV-22.

<sup>48</sup>General George Washington seemed to have more religious and pragmatic concerns in mind. When Washington served in the Virginia militia during the French and Indian War, he repeatedly requested a chaplain because he felt the presence of the chaplain would curb the debauchery of the soldiers. Later, General Washington lobbied for higher pay for chaplains and for more chaplains (one per regiment), and encouraged his men to attend divine services. However, even as early as September 1775, Washington exhibited concern for respect of the religious beliefs of those who differ from the majority. See Israel Drazin and Cecil B. Currey, *For God and Country: The History of a Constitutional Challenge to the Army Chaplaincy* (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, 1995), 9-10. See *Lemon v Kurtzman*, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); *Katcoff v Marsh*, 755 F.2d.

<sup>49</sup>Military presence is exceedingly difficult to assess, partly because of the way the Department of Defense reports its numbers, and partly because of the need for secrecy in some cases. According to the recent Defense Department reports, the United States has bases in over 70 countries, but that number fails to account for temporary bases and shared (i.e., NATO) bases, which can take the number over 80. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report (Fiscal Year 2015)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense 2014), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY15.pdf> (accessed January 25, 2017). See also David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015).

<sup>50</sup>Dayne Nix, "Chaplains Advising Warfighters on Culture and Religion," in Patterson, ed., *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*, 47.

<sup>51</sup>Eric Keller, "Beginnings: Army Chaplaincy and the War on Terror, 2001-2005," in Patterson, ed., *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*, 70.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup>Suspicion of chaplaincy and the requirement to conform to a model of religion approved by the government is not confined to foreign religious leaders. Many Americans have expressed fear that the military chaplaincy requires an abandonment of one's sectarian commitments and/or exclusivist beliefs and practices. This belief, of course, is false. For a discussion of evangelical concerns with the U.S. military chaplaincy, see my *In Jesus' Name: Evangelicals and Military Chaplaincy* (Eugene, OR: Resource, 2010).

<sup>55</sup>Chaplain (COL-R) Herman Keizer, who was the second chaplain to serve as Special Advisor to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, argues that chaplains should also be assigned to each of the State Department regional Bureaus. Kenneth E. Duvall, "The Strategic Use of Chaplain Liaison in a Policy Projection Platform to Resolve Conflict and Promote Peace," Civilian Research Project (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2010), 25. Duvall argues that retired chaplains should be utilized for the State Department liaison activities, in order for the necessary longevity to make an impact. *Ibid.*, 27-29. See also John L. Kallerson, *National Strategy for Religious Leader Engagements: Interagency Challenges Supporting Combatant Commands*, Civilian Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2014), 30-31.

<sup>56</sup>Moore claims that the Canadian Army is at the forefront of the movement to operationalize chaplaincy liaison activities within the armed forces' and national strategic goals and operations. He notes, "Indicative of the relevancy of such engagement to strategic planning is the recent endorsement and continued advancement of RLE [in June, 2011] by the Canadian Forces Army as a new capability under development, e.g. the institutionalization of RLE as an operational construct." S. K. Moore, *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 2. There is some evidence that Moore has overstated the case and that the Canadian military is not currently pursuing this use of chaplains. Chaplain (COL) John L. Kallerson, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, March 15, 2017.

<sup>57</sup>Todd W. Ferry, *DOD Strategic Religious Engagement: A Luxury or a Necessity*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013), 24-26.

<sup>58</sup>Carver noted that he was somewhat overwhelmed during his tour as the Combined Joint Task Force 7 Command Chaplain, due to his efforts at providing supervision to the chaplains within the command and at engaging senior Iraqi religious leaders. Douglas Carver, email correspondence with Stephen L. Cook, February 25, 2005, reported in Cook, "U.S. Military Chaplains on the Ambassador's Country Team," 9.

<sup>59</sup>It may seem odd to refuse a comparable position at United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), but there are good reasons for its exclusion from the plan. First, NORTHCOM's primary focus, unlike the other geographic combatant commands, is upon stability of the homeland. While it is true that every command within the U.S. armed forces has protecting the land and territories of the United States as a first function, they primarily do so through actions outside the United States and its territories, whereas NORTHCOM often does so through actions and operations within the borders of U.S. territory. Second, NORTHCOM only has responsibility for two countries besides the U.S., so if it had a mission that required the type of chaplain support discussed here, the existing religious support team would be sufficient. Third, the two foreign countries in NORTHCOM's areas of responsibility have historically stable religious landscapes. Fourth, if additional religious support assets were needed for strategic religious engagement, NORTHCOM has assets more readily at its disposal, simply due to proximity. Last, it is likely that the O-6 position that would be needed at NORTHCOM for this function would be better used elsewhere.

<sup>60</sup>This was the approach taken by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) team assembled to address religious issues in the area when it engaged JUI-F leaders (several of whom were associated with the founding of the Taliban). Eventually, the team met with Ambassador Holbrooke, Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time, and received encouragement from the State Department to continue this sort of work in the future.

See David West, "Strategic Engagement and Advisement at the CENTCOM Center of Excellence," in Patterson, ed., *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*, esp.139-142. See my "Implementation Strategy for Chaplaincy Strategic Religious Leader Engagement," Army War College student paper (Carlisle, PA, 2017).

<sup>61</sup>These concerns have been echoed by Whitt, who argues that the chaplain's liaison role should remain both informal and voluntary in order to allow relationships to develop naturally and to avoid problems associated with targeting. She writes, "Thus, by explicitly and purposefully involving chaplains more directly in the official tactical, operational, and strategic military mission, the organization undermines the chaplain's somewhat ambiguous status, which has afforded him a wide and flexible range of roles and functions in peacetime and in war." Jacqueline E. Whitt, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Context and Consequences of Operationalizing Military Chaplains," *Military Review* (March-April 2012): 54.

<sup>62</sup>West, "Strategic Engagement and Advisement at the CENTCOM Center of Excellence," 131-135.

<sup>63</sup>The downgrading of the six garrison positions could be phased in over a three-year period in order to avoid any adverse effects on career progression for those currently holding the slots. The decision criteria would most likely need to consider religious support requirements, personnel allocation, and units headquartered at each post. By way of example, those posts with only one or two chapels may not require an O-6 garrison chaplain, while those with three or more would receive consideration for an O-6 billet; those posts with a large percentage of high-ranking personnel (e.g., Carlisle Barracks, where over 50% of the personnel are either O-5 or O-6) may warrant a higher ranking chaplain position; and those posts with Corps or higher headquarters would require an O-6 garrison chaplain, while those with a division or lower may not require a chaplain of that rank.

<sup>64</sup>Asaf Hussain, *Political Perspectives on the Muslim World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 35-43.

<sup>65</sup>Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1972), 7-68.

<sup>66</sup>Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, 69-90.

<sup>67</sup>Raymond A. Moore, "The Army as a Vehicle for Social Change in Pakistan," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 2, no. 1 (1967): 57-74. Moore notes that the military can encounter resistance if it tries to institute changes too quickly or tries to do so with brute force. It is more effective in this area when it allows the changes to make their way into the society as military members return to their homes after completing their service obligations. See also Claude Heller, ed., *The Military as an Agent of Social Change: XXX International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1981); Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework," *Armed Forces and Society* 3 (1977): 249-270.

<sup>68</sup>Many commentators have seen similar efforts at social change in the U.S. military's civil rights initiatives. The most common examples have been racial integration within military units, acceptance of openly homosexual service members, and the opening of combat positions to

female service members. The idea is that, as military policy changes to accommodate particular positions on controversial social issues, it will help move society as a whole toward acceptance of that position. Of course, things are more complex than this simple explanation suggests. There is disagreement about how progressive the military has been on these issues. Some argue that the military tends to be socially conservative, and resists efforts to implement change in these areas. On the military's battle against full integration of African Americans in military units, see Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1988). Others argue that military personnel policies lag behind societal norms and changes are made in order to make the military reflect the culture. See Scott Beauchamp, "Women in the Military Are Not a Social Experiment," *Al Jazeera America*, August 26, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/8/women-in-the-military-are-not-a-social-experiment.html> (accessed February 19, 2017). Others argue that the military is often ahead of society. For example, President Truman officially desegregated the military in 1948, while the civil rights legislation desegregating schools (*Brown v. Board of Education*) was in 1954. For an interesting examination of the effects of military desegregation upon communities close to military installations, see Polly J. Smith, *The Impact of Military Desegregation on Segregation Patterns in American Cities: A Case Study of Colorado Springs, New London, and Fayetteville* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2007).

<sup>69</sup>The United States European Command (EUCOM) Office of Religious Affairs has hosted an annual conference for senior level chaplains within its area of responsibility since 1990. The International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference is meant to foster communication and cooperation among chaplaincies within the EUCOM area of responsibility. Interestingly, the initiative has led to the EUCOM Command Chaplain's office receiving requests for help in developing military chaplaincy programs in some nations where they have never existed. See "Albania Looks to EUCOM for Chaplaincy Advice," *EUCOM blog*, June 23, 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/blogpost/22193/albania-looks-to-eucom-for-chaplaincy-advice> (accessed February 18, 2017). What the EUCOM Chaplain's office is doing as an informal extension of a successful religious leader engagement program, I am suggesting needs to be an intentional, formal program of all geographic combatant commands outside of North America. Currently, the only other combatant command that specifically addresses helping establish chaplaincies is United States Pacific Command, though the website has a rather passive approach to the issue: "When directed, [the PACOM Command Chaplain's Office] responds to host nation requests to develop models for their military chaplaincies." U.S. Pacific Command Chaplain Home Page, <http://www.pacom.mil/Contact/Directory/J0/HQ-Chaplain-J01C> (accessed February 19, 2017).

<sup>70</sup>Douglas Carver, email correspondence with Stephen L. Cook, February 25, 2005, reported in Cook, "U.S. Military Chaplains on the Ambassador's Country Team," 10.

<sup>71</sup>George Adams, "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Peaceworks* 56 (2006): 20.

<sup>72</sup>Massuallah purportedly returned to the site of his childhood madrassa to challenge the perception and teaching of his former mentors regarding the United States' efforts to destroy Islam. Massuallah helped them see that the United States is interested in promoting freedom across the globe, and that therefore supports the rights of Muslims in the U.S. and abroad. *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>73</sup>Throughout this paper, I have argued that this will help U.S. interests by promoting freedom of religion, a foundational ideal to democracy, and by developing relationships that can prove helpful in various stability/peace operations, particularly following armed conflict. Of course, these relationships can also prove valuable for coordination of humanitarian missions and in multinational/coalition force operations.

<sup>74</sup>Chaplain Sniffin, Commandant of the United States Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS), points out that USACHCS has provided this level of chaplaincy training to foreign nationals from United States Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command, and notes that their attendance in the classes is vetted through the Combatant Command and coordinated with the State Department. CH (COL) Pete Sniffin, emailed to author, February 28, 2017.

<sup>75</sup>International Association of Evangelical Chaplains, “About Our Training,” [http://www.iaechap.com/about\\_training.html](http://www.iaechap.com/about_training.html) (accessed February 23, 2017).

<sup>76</sup>AMCF’s website notes its evangelistic focus: “AMCF is a community of Christians which is composed of Military Christian Fellowships (MCFs) and individual military Christians in over 100 nations. These MCFs are self-governing and seek only the Lord’s wisdom as they share Christ within their nation. AMCF’s role is to encourage them as they follow Christ’s leading.” Association of Military Christian Fellowships homepage, <http://www.amcf-int.org/index.htm>, accessed February 23, 2017. AMCF began as a voluntary Christian fellowship organization in 1930 (though it traces its origins to 1851), but grew into an international consortium of fellowships and initiatives to equip Christians across the globe for evangelistic work. The organization’s handbook describes the nature and goal of the Chaplains Interaction. See *AMCF Reference Handbook* (Denver: AMCF, 2015), 54, available at <http://www.amcf-int.org/resources/AMCF-reference-manual/English/AMCFHandbook2015.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2017).

<sup>77</sup>Chaplain (COL-R) Arthur Pace, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, January 22, 2017. Chaplain Pace has worked with Olive Branch International in Ukraine, helping to develop chaplaincy programs and skills among local clergy.

<sup>78</sup>Colonel (Retired) William Barko, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, February 5, 2017.

<sup>79</sup>In some ways, the perception is not so far afield. All three organizations mentioned here are unabashedly Christian evangelical, and although they offer a number of pragmatic and utilitarian reasons for developing chaplaincy programs—preserving service member marriages, preventing service member suicides, mitigating the negative effects of war, meeting the religious needs of service members, etc.—they clearly note the evangelistic motives behind their work. See n. 76 above.

<sup>80</sup>One example of a potentially confusing set of messages is found in IAEC’s Covenant and Code of Ethics for Chaplaincy. The Covenant statement is clearly written in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It promises obedience to the “Commandments,” and references love of “the Lord our God” with all of one’s “heart, soul, mind, and strength,” and love of neighbor as oneself. The Code of Ethics, though, seems much more pluralistic. It speaks of respect of the beliefs of others, drawing upon common traditions when working with those of other faiths, and of working collegially with chaplains from other traditions. International Association of Evangelical Christians, “Covenant and Code of Ethics,”

<http://www.iaechap.com/documents/Rationale%20for%20a%20Chaplaincy-English.pdf>  
(accessed February 23, 2017).

<sup>81</sup>CH (COL) Pete Sniffin, emailed to author, February 28, 2017.

<sup>82</sup>There are surely other considerations related to these issues that are not discussed here, but have been addressed elsewhere. Perhaps most important among them is the lack of training in religious engagement among both State and Defense Department personnel. See Ferry, "DOD Strategic Religious Engagement," 32-33; and Kallerson, "National Strategy for Religious Leader Engagements," 28-39, 31. Another important issue related to strategic religious leader engagements is the difficulty that the National Guard State Partnership Program could pose due to the independence National Guard chaplains enjoy. See Duvall, "The Strategic Use of Chaplain Liaison," 29-31; Kallerson, "National Strategy for Religious Leader Engagements," 20, 32

<sup>83</sup>This assumes agreement from the Secretary of State with the effort and its contribution to the promotion of religious freedom globally.