Strategy Research Project

Refinement and Refocus: How Landpower can Promote Stability in West Africa

by

Commander Shannon Andrew Corey
United States Navy

Under the Direction of:
Dr. William Flavin

United States Army War College
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Abstract

Promoting stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least developed Sub-region in the world, presents significant challenges for the U.S. military. Historically, it was not colonial armies, but rather naval supremacy and sea-borne trade routes that have had more of an impact on Africa through the ages. Therefore, it is noteworthy to investigate what landpower capabilities are most useful to a "whole of government" effort to promote stability in Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decade. This paper analyzes the strategy and policy directives guiding U.S. interests in West Africa, compares and contrast the components of defense, diplomacy, and development that comprise the U.S. strategy, and explores what landpower recommendations are most useful. This analysis reveals that a refinement of military crisis response capabilities, a refinement of military support DoS and USAID activities, and a DoD organizational refocus landpower will be most effective to contribute to a whole of government approach to stability in the coming decade.

Refinement and Refocus: How Landpower can Promote Stability in West Africa

> Relatively small but wise investments in African security institutions today offer disproportionate benefits … creating mutual opportunities and reducing the risks of destabilization, radicalization, and persistent conflict.
>
> —General David M. Rodriguez[1]

Africa is vast. The African continent has 54 countries, more than 800 ethnic groups, over 1,000 languages, and a land mass as large as China, India, the United States and most of Europe put together.[2] Because of its size and diversity, Africa – particularly the areas of the continent south of the Sahara – presents challenges to access, development, and logistics. Promoting stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least developed Sub-region in the world presents four significant challenges for the U.S. military. First, there are limited resources available for U.S forces to use on the continent. Second, the large distances required to cover and traverse make it difficult to cover with an economy of force. Third, the U.S. has less developed staging locations to base its operations from. Fourth, the minimal U.S. military presence on the continent limit options available to promote stability in the region.

Historically, it was not colonial armies, but rather naval supremacy and sea-borne trade routes that have had more of an impact on Africa through the ages.[3] Therefore, it is noteworthy to investigate what landpower capabilities are most useful to a "whole of government" effort to promote stability in Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decade. Landpower is the ability to impose the will of the U.S. to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any environment. Broadly, it is the capacity to establish and maintain a stable environment to facilitate political and economic development and address the consequences of natural or man-made catastrophic events. Due to the relatively limited U.S. military presence on the continent, Africa is a location where the Department of

Defense (DoD) may benefit being in a supporting, as opposed to leading, role. Because of the diversity and size of the continent, I intend to frame the problem set regionally. This paper will focus on landpower solutions that complement the whole of government approach to promoting stability in West Africa. If the U.S. is capable developing stability in West Africa, it will be able to transfer some techniques to the rest of the continent.

Military solutions alone are not sufficient to guarantee stability in Africa. A multi-faceted approach, taking into account all aspects of national power, is necessary to properly address security and stability concerns in Africa. Out of necessity, the DoD needs to look to the other USG agencies, African partners, and allies, to collaborate and "pool" their capabilities to confront common problems. The small but wise investments that GEN Rodriguez referred to in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, articulate the need to find where best to invest U.S resources and reflect a "whole of government" approach to enhancing stability and security in Africa.

To analyze what landpower capability is most beneficial to a "whole of government" approach to stability, I will first review the strategy and policy directives guiding U.S. interests in West Africa. Then, I will compare and contrast the components of defense, diplomacy, and development that comprise the U.S. strategy. Finally, I will explore what landpower recommendations are most useful in the coming decade.

Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance on promoting security in West Africa comes from a variety of sources. The National Security Strategy, Presidential addresses and speeches, as well as policy statements all guide the national security enterprise in their mission. Africa is an expansive and diverse continent. Although large in size, it does not have the same

priority as other security concerns facing the United States. Economic interests, competition with near peer nation states, or ongoing conflicts have primary focus in the U.S. National Security Strategy. This prioritization of interests coupled with finite resources has resulted in the security strategy that exists today towards Africa. Although current events can shade each variant of the NSS, the United States' strategy towards Africa has been steady since 2002 and focuses on poverty reduction, free trade and economic development, partnership to promote democratic governance, and elimination of violent extremist organizations. Of which, only elimination of violent extremist organizations has an active role for landpower.

President Obama's 2015 National Security Strategy built on his 2010 strategy as well as President Bush's 2002 and 2006 NSS. When written in 2015, the U.S. economy was rebounding; the administration was looking beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, had declared a pivot to Asia, a deepening investment in Africa, and continuing the U.S. strategy of working collaboratively vice unilaterally. In his introduction, President Obama outlined how the U.S. was increasing its investment in Africa through access to energy, health, and food security.[4]

As with previous National Security Strategies, violent extremists in North Africa were of primary concern due to their debilitating effect on the region.[5] The theme of working with partners to maintain global security and prosperity endured as well as the need to strengthen regional institutions like the African Union and African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership.[6] The 2015 NSS, emphasized trade through tools such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, but other development initiatives including

Power Africa, Trade Africa, Feed the Future, and the Open Government Partnership were also brought into prominence.[7]

The greatest difference between the 2015 NSS and previous iterations was the outlook on Africa's future. This NSS specifically called attention to the fact that Africa is rising,[8] and the U.S. will continue to support "companies to deepen investment in what can be the world's next major center of global growth."[9] Africa is rising, but continued support and work still need to be done to confront famine, disease, and poverty as the continent modernizes and grows.

The U.S. strategy in Africa was based on the four major focus areas of the 2015 NSS: security, prosperity, values, and international order.[10] These focus areas of the NSS were designed to promote U.S. interests, enhance security worldwide, and provide the stability for growth. Africa is no different from the rest of the world. Growth in Africa depends on stability. When looking to promote stability and growth from the DoD perspective, it is natural to default to military solutions. A more circumspect analysis featuring a balanced focus on poverty reduction, free trade and economic development, elimination of violent extremist organizations, and partnership to promote democratic governance will however, provide the greatest opportunity for success. This balanced multi-faceted methodology is most often called "whole of government." In this approach, the U.S. will "engage nations, institutions, and peoples around the world on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect."[11]

President Obama released three Presidential Policy Directives that govern how the United States will approach building stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Released in 2010, the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD-6) outlined

integration of defense, diplomacy, and development for a comprehensive approach to national security.[12] The second document that guides building stability in Sub-Saharan Africa is the Presidential Policy Directive for Sub-Saharan Africa (PPD-16). Written in 2012, it outlined four strategic policy objectives for the region. These objectives are: 1) strengthen democratic institutions, improve governance, and protect human rights; 2) spur economic growth, trade and investment; 3) advance peace and security; and 4) promote opportunity and development.[13] Finally, the Presidential Policy Directive for Security Sector Assistance (PPD-23) affects stability in Africa due to its aim to enable allies and partner nations to build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law.[14]

Diplomacy and Development Strategy in West Africa

To analyze where landpower can best contribute to stability in West Africa in the future, it is imperative to understand how the Department of State (DoS) and USAID promote stability. The NSS lays out the four greatest barriers to stability in Sub-Saharan Africa as: Violent Extremist Organizations, poverty reduction, free trade and economic development, and good governance. The DoS addresses these barriers through its programs and policy. One example of these programs is Security Sector Assistance. Through Security Sector Assistance, the DoS seeks to develop a sustainable capacity to address security challenges, promote support for U.S. interests, promote universal values such as good governance, and strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations.[15] Security Sector Assistance includes Peacekeeping Operations such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

GPOI is a Security Assistance Program to fund UN and regional peace support operations that train and maintain peacekeeping forces. GPOI now includes the pre-existing program of Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). The ACOTA program is funded and managed by the DoS Bureau of African Affairs for implementing GPOI efforts of training and equipping African militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance.[16] In addition to contributing to peacekeeping operations, African militaries now have trained and ready forces that can positively contribute to the stability of their nation and the region.

USAID, whose mission is to end extreme poverty, promote resilient democratic societies while advancing U.S. security and prosperity,[17] addresses these barriers to stability through Obama Administration initiatives such as Feed the Future, the Global Health Initiative, and Power Africa. Feed the Future employs American leadership to help some of the world's poorest countries harness the power of agriculture to jumpstart their economies and create new opportunities for people at every level of their societies.[18] Through the Global Health Initiative, the U.S. Government uses seven core principles derived from the principles outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to guide how it engages in global health.[19] Through Power Africa, technical and legal experts, the private sector, and governments from around the world work in partnership to increase the number of people with access to power. The goal of Power Africa is to add 30,000 megawatts (MW) of cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity and 60 million new home and business connections.[20] With access to food, power, and health initiatives, West Africa stability increases. The resident population has their basic needs tended to, and as a result, Violent Extremist

6

Organizations are less capable of recruiting followers. In addition to these Obama Administration initiatives, USAID has robust democracy and conflict mitigation programs. Through partnerships with DOS, USAID builds the capacity of government institutions, improves elections, bolsters civil society, protects human rights, promotes peacebuilding activities that aim to mitigate local conflicts, help rehabilitate ex-combatants, and strengthens the rule of law and administration of justice.[21]

The Department of State and USAID's Joint Regional Strategy for Africa is based upon the NSS, PPD-16, and PPD-23; however, it requires a regional synchronizer to ensure the coordination of defense, development, and diplomacy. Neither agency is staffed to accomplish the regional synchronization requirement for all three entities, but it is important to note that the DoS has experience, placement, and tools for advancing U.S. Security interests and is best manned to work with partner nations in the region to coordinate their respective foreign assistance programs.

<div align="center">Military Strategy for West Africa</div>

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) was established in 2007. As the ten year anniversary of USAFRICOM approaches, it is timely to review its current methodology when employing landpower solutions and determine the benefit of these solutions in future endeavors. Since USAFRICOM's inception, Africa has increased in relevance, and its security needs have outpaced allocated resources. As a result, USAFRICOM must develop ways to mitigate capability gaps, to include complementing the capabilities of multinational and interagency partners.

The military strategy to promote stability in Africa supports the National Security Strategy priorities of poverty reduction, free trade and economic development, and good governance, but primarily focuses on the elimination of Violent Extremist Organizations.

The USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan outlines ten key tasks to accomplish its strategic goals.[22]

1. Counter VEOs and the networks that support them.

2. Protect U.S. persons and facilities in Africa.

3. Assure U.S. access and freedom of movement in Africa.

4. Counter illicit flows of drugs, weapons, money, and people.

5. Support defense institutional building through Security Force Assistance.

6. Strengthen maritime security.

7. Support peace operations.

8. Support humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

9. Set the theater by securing required agreements, locations, intelligence, logistics support, and command and control networks.

10. Set the force by ensuring that we have the right capabilities, posture, and presence to project, sustain, and protect the force.

These ten tasks illustrate how USAFRICOM contributes to stability in West Africa. However, there is more that the Geographic Combatant Command provides to the whole of government effort to promote stability.

USAFRICOM is the regional synchronizer for all DoD activities on the continent of Africa. Engaging with nations, institutions, and peoples is a priority for USAFRICOM. One of USAFRICOM's core missions is to assist African states and regional

organizations to strengthen their defense capabilities.[23] Strengthened defense

capabilities enable Africans to respond to a crisis, deter transnational threats, reduces

threats to U.S. interests, and provides stability required for growth.[24] Today,

USAFRICOM concentrates its efforts on contributing to the development of capable and

professional militaries that respect human right and adhere to the rule of law.[25]

The first area where the Geographic Combatant Command benefits U.S.

strategic goals is its ability to take a regional look at issues. Due to resources, capacity

and capabilities, USAFRICOM is best equipped to act as a regional synchronizer for

defense, development, and diplomacy, since DoS and USAID lack the capacity to

manage and synchronize transnational strategic efforts. Although USAFRICOM has

more capacity than the DoS or USAID, few durable foreign policy outcomes are

achieved by military actions alone. The DoS has regional bureaus, but they are not

staffed or funded to the extent of the GCC. Since the DoS does not have the same

number of personnel available to provide regional analysis, the GCC's regional focus is

a valuable addition to strategy and planning. Second, the Geographic Combatant

Command acts as a regional facilitator and provides manpower, equipment, and

capabilities. The GCC hosts strategic dialogues for countries in its Area of

Responsibility (AOR), Ambassador meetings to synchronize efforts between DoD and

DoS, and military commander meetings with partner nations.[26] The GCC provides

Liaison Officers and force protection as well as access to military equipment for foreign

militaries, and equipment for U.S. personnel to use in theater. Capabilities wise, a GCC

provides strategic lift, intelligence capabilities, and communications infrastructure as

well as planning resources and facilities to its Joint Intergovernmental Interagency and Multinational (JIIM) counterparts.

As the Department of State and USAID personnel are not military, they are most effective enacting change in a permissive environment with a baseline level of stability. DoS and USAID programs in non-permissive environments tend to be more costly, less effective, and less sustainable. Additionally, many programs are joint in nature and require coordination between defense, development, and diplomacy, however, the coordination of these strategies occurs at the country team. A regional facilitator would be most helpful to coordinate the 3Ds and ensure that defense was in alignment with development and diplomacy.

Finally, the Geographic Combatant Command can influence its region to promote strategic goals. Exercises, joint military and interagency instruction, and capacity building all influence the AOR positively. Military construction projects and security force assistance advance development and stability objectives across the region. Through these engagements, the GCC exerts its influence and builds political leverage with governments, militaries, as well as local actors in the region.

<div align="center">Solutions for Stability in West Africa</div>

After analyzing the defense, diplomacy, and development strategies in West Africa, I recommend three distinct landpower solutions to enhance stability. These landpower solutions are: 1) Refine military crisis response capabilities, 2) Refine military support DoS and USAID activities, and 3) DoD organizational refocus to better posture landpower capabilities to enhance stability.

Refinement of Military Crisis Response Capabilities

Refining of the military crisis response capabilities will encompass three distinct missions. The first mission is the requirement to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. The responsibility for this mission primarily rests on the DoD and its crisis response forces. USAFRICOM must ensure that it maintains the ability to proactively protect, and in the event of a crisis, reach all high-risk embassies. In the wake of the 2012 Benghazi attack, USAFRICOM conducted a thorough review of its posture, forces, and abilities to respond to rapidly forming crises in Africa.[27] As a result, USAFRICOM determined that it must maintain its intelligence network for advanced threat warning, its theater basing, as well as forces that are ready to reinforce embassies and respond to the crisis. USAFRICOM revised its response forces plans and continues to revise its ability to share intelligence with partner nations. Cooperative security locations provide access for U.S. response forces or partner nation forces as well as mobility and medical support. Posture must be continually evaluated and refined to ensure that it supports the partner nation, meets operational needs and protection of U.S. personnel and facilities.

The second military crisis response mission is Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations. During this specific crisis, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is the lead federal agency for HA/DR, and the DoS will be the lead federal agency in any refugee crisis that may arise. USAFRICOM respond to a HA/DR crisis in a supporting role to DoS and USAID. Similarly to the protection of U.S. personnel and facilities, HA/DR requires theater posture locations to be successful. USAFRICOM must continually refine its theater basing and agreements to ensure it is

prepared to provide assistance during a humanitarian or naturally occurring disaster since access to a country or region is rarely developed during the time of crisis. Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA) is an example of why developed theater posture locations are useful for promoting stability. Relationships forged with Senegal and its military allowed the U.S. to stage and launch its Ebola response mission to Liberia.[28] USAFRICOM was able to sustain its ground forces with both airfield and seaport support enabling a robust and rapid response.[29] The rapid and robust response helped turn the tide against the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and return the region back to its pre-crisis status.

The third crisis response mission that USAFRICOM must refine are its abilities to counter violent extremism. Countering violent extremism is more than a military problem. It requires a coordinated approach that includes diplomacy, development, information operations, as well as cyber operations. A military force reversing territorial gains is rarely the reason why violent extremism comes to an end.[30] As such, a whole of government solution is required to counter violent extremism in Africa. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is an example of a joint effort by the DoS, USAID, and DoD to assist partners in West and North Africa to increase their immediate and long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism.[31] For the military to properly integrate with the rest of the interagency, enhanced interagency and intergovernmental presence is required from the theater level down to the tactical level. USAFRICOM should support the TSCTP and seek out similar programs that synchronize efforts of defense, diplomacy, and development in promoting stability in West Africa. Additionally, USAFRICOM must

ensure that operations targeting violent extremists which are not part of the TSCTP will support and benefit these joint programs as well as our partner nations.

<u>Refinement of Support to Interagency and Intergovernmental Counterparts</u>

The second landpower solution to enhance stability in West Africa is the refinement of USAFRICOM's support to the DoS and USAID to promote diplomacy and development in the theater. USAFRICOM regularly provides manpower, equipment, and capabilities to its interagency and intergovernmental counterparts. However, USAFRICOM must refine its support, ensuring that its landpower capabilities enhance the four strategic policy objectives for the region. These objectives are: 1) strengthen democratic institutions, improve governance, and protect human rights; 2) spur economic growth, trade, and investment; 3) advance peace and security; and 4) promote opportunity and development.[32]

Through its application of landpower, USAFRICOM has the capability and capacity to strengthen democratic institutions, improve governance, and protect human rights. Through landpower, the U.S. can model its beliefs and values. In addition to providing training or advisory support, landpower should model civilian control of military and adherence to rules and laws of the country. In a developing country, a scandal featuring corruption in the military would undermine the security of a country. Secondly, the Rule of Law (RoL) should be enforced and incorporated into all aspects of defense institution building. A strong focus on the governance of the military and enforcement of laws are a critical component. Exercises, training, and mentorship should include training on and commitment to RoL.[33] For example, Africa Partnership Station and

African Maritime Law Enforcement Program build maritime professionals[34] and assist partner nations in enforcing their national laws.[35]

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing are two additional jointly run programs to enhance security and stability. Both are directed by the DoS and administered by the DoD. IMET is a DoS managed program designed to train future leaders, establish a rapport between the U.S. military and the country's military to build alliances for the future and enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations.[36] An example of IMET would be the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). Designed to train and develop a global network for Combating Terrorism (CbT), the program provides a flexible and proactive program to respond to emerging CbT requirements and counter ideological support to terrorism.[37]

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allows the United States to finance procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international organizations and is managed by the DoS and executed by the DoD. FMF expands relationships with partner nations and enables interoperability for security cooperation and contingency operations.[38] Although it is a global program, FMF can be used to outfit West African partner nations who contribute to U.N peacekeeping missions in Africa. Military training and building partnership capacity should be linked as an incentive for partner nations to enact political reforms or improvements in human rights.[39] This is broadly accomplished through Leahy vetting, but in an era of limited resources, priority should be given countries that best align with U.S. beliefs and values. To that extent, FMF can be used as a carrot or stick to motivate partner nations to perform improvements or political

reform which will enhance the overall stability of their country. For example, since 1987 the U.S. has granted the troop contributing country of Ghana over $10.7 million dollars for purchasing military equipment, services, and training.[40] In addition to using the equipment for peacekeeping, Ghana is able to train and improve the technical and tactical capability of its forces which in turn enhances the overall stability in the country of Ghana as well as areas where the Ghanaian troops support UN peacekeeping missions.

Landpower enhances economic growth, trade, and investment. A baseline level of stability and peace is required for economic growth. If the local populace is concerned about violence and political unrest, there is less desire to develop and mature the economy. Landpower and its stabilizing effect enables the economic transformation and development of a nation. The DoD can contribute to stability and economic development and growth through its efforts to counter illicit trafficking. Landpower's ability to patrol and control illicit trade routes enhances legitimate trade and development and ultimately a more productive economy. Finally, landpower partnerships with host nation forces can lead to infrastructure investment and capacity building. Combined exercises can bring exercise-related construction to the partner nation. Exercise-related construction is minor military construction projects coordinated or directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for construction outside of the continental United States (OCONUS).[41] These projects are used for the exercise and then can be used by the partner nation thereafter. In addition, to exercise-related construction, cooperative security locations near airports and seaports provide versatile training locations as well as basing locations in time of crisis. Civil Affairs teams

conducting projects such as well drilling and school building improve the quality of life for our partners.[42] With more capable infrastructure the host nation benefits from increased economic capacity and throughput. This infrastructure capacity increases profits and investment in the local economy which has a re-enforcing stabilization attribute.

Landpower is a key partner in advancing peace and security of West Africa. Conventional Forces, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard representatives from the State Partnership Program all provide benefits to West Africa. Through exercises, joint military and interagency instruction, and capacity building U.S. forces advance the capabilities and capacity of partner nations. Three solutions are recommended for landpower to further enhance its ability to advance peace and security. The first is to review and monitor security assistance provided to foreign partners to determine whether it is preventing or contributing to violent extremism.[43] Secondly, landpower should strengthen counterterrorism capabilities through partnerships and training of partner nation forces.[44] Finally, landpower must build rapid response teams to protect civilian populations and important sites of religious, cultural, historical significance.[45] Landpower brings opportunity, stability, and development to West Africa. With increased stability, partner nations have freedom to pursue other goals that will further develop West Africa. A population that is protected will be able to develop at a faster rate.[46]

Refinement of crisis response capabilities and support to the Department of State and USAID counterparts will enhance stability in West Africa over the coming decade.

However, for landpower to make the greatest impact in the next ten years, organizational reform is required.

<u>Organizational Refocus to Enhance Stability</u>

Carrying out the National Security Strategy in Africa is not exclusively a military problem, nor is it solely a diplomatic problem. A comprehensive approach to strategy incorporating defense, diplomacy, and development presents the best way to understand the region and accomplish the National Security Strategy. Although effective in crisis management using military forces only, the current structure of USAFRICOM is not fully integrated with its counterparts in DoS or USAID. In fact, the most important landpower capability that USAFRICOM can bring to bear over the coming decade would be its ability to seamlessly integrate with its counterparts in the DoS and USAID.

The DoS has a heavy presence in Washington D.C as well as at the country team in the field. However it lacks the capacity to coordinate strategies across a region. Instead, the DoS coordinates the whole of government approach at each U.S. Embassy individually. As a result, strategies for defense, diplomacy and development often are built independently of each other with final coordination occurring between the GCC commander and Ambassador. Coordination and collaboration for stability operations would improve with a facilitator taking a regional look at these strategies vice a country centric view. Through an organizational refocus at USAFRICOM, additional emphasis can be placed on Ambassador coordination conferences, Chief of Defense Symposiums, and regional development forums. USAFRICOM routinely hosts these events to synchronize military activities. However, there is opportunity to use these events as coordination venues for development and diplomacy as well, resulting in a

more rounded strategy for the region as well as military operations aligned with DoS and USAID priorities.

Looking at the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan, organizational change at USAFRICOM will better posture landpower capabilities for future needs. Published in 2015, The USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan outlines the strategy for the near term (5 years) and long-term (5-50 years). Both statements express the need to work with partners, however, the focus is different. USAFRICOM's five-year Campaign Mission Statement focuses on the neutralization of transnational threats to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.[47] USAFRICOM's Strategic Mission Statement for 5-50 years, however, prioritizes building partnership capacity while maintaining the ability to respond to crises and transnational threats.[48]

With the different focus for the command in the short and long term and the need to synchronize defense, diplomacy, and development regionally, a reorganization of the command structure postures the command for future success. Although organizational change is required to address the shift in mission focus of USAFRICOM, changes should not be made just for the sake of change. Rather, the proposed changes should reduce friction outlined by Davidson[49] that exists between military planners and civilian decision makers. These friction points can be grouped into three areas. The first is the differing expectations between civilian and military planners regarding guidance for planning.[50] The second is friction between military planning systems and presidential decision making characterized by planning timelines and selection of courses of action.[51] Finally, the third friction point can be described as balancing the military desire to reduce risk to forces with actions that can be seen as escalatory in nature.[52]

I recommend two methods to reorganize the command structure of USAFRICOM and address Davidson's concerns while meeting the strategic needs of the future. The prioritized reorganizations of the command structure are: reorganizing the GCC to act as the regional synchronizer for defense, diplomacy, and development and restructuring of the subordinate staffs with additional interagency personnel.

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) provide capabilities that are essential for advancing U.S. interests across the globe. Combatant Commanders have the rank, experience, and relationships with regional military leaders. This creates an outsize influence on the countries in their area of responsibility which can overshadow diplomatic ties to a region. As a result, foreign policy issues that arise in their theater are often seen solely as military challenges. The logical conclusion for a combatant command when faced with these issues is to use respond to these challenges with military capabilities.

Although it is resourced better than its DoS counterparts, the DoD is best suited for a supporting role in the realm of diplomacy and development as the DoS has experience, placement, and tools for advancing U.S. Security interests. To combat this tendency, the interagency transformation of the GCCs should focus on ensuring DoS and USAID advisory capacity in three areas: 1) Executive decision-making support at the GCC commander level, 2) action officer coordination and planning support at the operational planning and joint planning team level, and 3) a small advisory committee comprised of liaison officers from DoS and USAID that looks regionally to align military operations with diplomatic and developmental initiatives. To ensure that Service Component Commands have the ability to properly nest their plans with USAFRICOM,

subordinate command interagency and intergovernmental manning should be increased. This enhances civilian control of the military at the theater level and will promote use of diplomatic, informational, and economic responses to foreign policy issues bringing all elements of national power back into balance. These initiatives when implemented have the potential to reduce friction between civilian and military planners, the presidential decision-making process, and allow the military to coordinate more effectively with its counterparts when discussing military risk to forces.

As the Goldwater-Nichols Act approaches its 30 year anniversary, pundits argue the relevance of Geographic Combatant Commands that were designed during the Cold War to manage major multi-domain conflicts against a peer.[53] National Security can be described as the combination of Defense Policy and Foreign Policy working together. With an increased interagency and intergovernmental focus, Geographic Combatant Commands can enhance their ability to complement foreign policy while maintaining their defense policy capabilities. The result is synchronized strategy and programs, developed GCC posture and structure for future requirements, and reduced militarization of foreign policy.

Although the U.S. military is quite familiar with a traditional command and control, it has less experience working in support of a lead federal agency such as the Department of State. The GCC does have experience working with a lead federal agency in disaster response such as the West Africa Ebola response. As such, lessons learned performing these operations can translate to other missions. The proposed interagency focus of the GCC will facilitate better relationships with DoS and USAID and will signal a change in the way the U.S. views foreign policy. Currently, when working as

part of a multinational coalition with interagency and intergovernmental agencies, the CCDR must work to synchronize the military element of power with the rest of the national elements of power. Failure to do so results in excessive redundancy between the military and the interagency, or in the worst case, military operations in direct opposition of interagency goals. With enhanced interagency and intergovernmental agency presence, the linkages of defense, diplomacy, and development outlined in the 2015 National Security Strategy will be operationalized.[54] The presence of DoS and USAID representatives in key capacities as advisors to the GCC commander, planning team support, and assisting in the alignment of military operations with the whole of government facilitates the operationalization at all levels in the GCC. USAFRICOM can seamlessly integrate with its counterparts at the Department of State regional bureaus as well as at USAID. The GCC retains the ability to conduct military operations as it has in the past but now is better postured to complement DoS in the pursuit of U.S. strategic goals. Resourcing of the Combatant Commands will be more closely linked to National Security and will complement the DoS, and USAID in their strategy to advance peace and security.[55] Programs to counter transnational threats of terrorism, transnational crime, economic and political drivers of violent extremism as well as preventing, mitigating, and resolving armed conflict will be synchronized at the theater level.

Increasing the interagency and intergovernmental manning of the GCCs will better posture them for future requirements and opportunities. For example, Africa will continue to see infrastructure and population growth. Africa's population is growing at the fastest rate worldwide and will have a larger workforce than China by 2035.[56] Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by five percent annually over the

last decade and was not slowed substantially by the financial crisis.[57] The large

economic and population growth will lead to infrastructure development and investment

opportunities as the continent modernizes.[58] Because of the modernization and

population growth, manufacturing may shift from Asia to Africa to take advantage of the

labor market. If AFRICOM's interagency manning includes the Department of

Commerce, Labor, Transportation, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services

representatives, as well as more robust DoS and USAID composition, it can be

proactive in its policies and programs. Opportunities to spur economic growth, trade,

and investments, advance peace and security, and promote opportunity and

development can be synchronized across the national security enterprise. As a result,

the enhanced Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational representation at

the GCC expand U.S. influence in the region positively.

Conclusion

Landpower capabilities are integral to a "whole of government" effort to promote

stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, for the DoD to achieve the greatest impact in

the coming decade, a reformation and refocus of landpower capabilities is required. A

measured reform of landpower crisis response capabilities, as well as its support

capabilities to interagency and intergovernmental counterparts, will enhance the

alignment as well as the cumulative effects of defense, diplomacy, and development.

Additionally, a refocus of the Geographic Combatant Commands with greater

interagency and intergovernmental presence reduces militarization of foreign policy,

postures commands for future requirements, and synchronizes strategy and programs

across the National Security enterprise. As USAFRICOM approaches its ten year

anniversary, it is noteworthy to assess progress made to date in the command and build

landpower capabilities for the next ten years.

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23

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