FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lesson Report, and (4) links to additional references, reports, and articles that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.
If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [http://pksoi.army.mil] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

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Za’atari Refugee Camp / Mafraq, Jordan (7 December 2012)

“An aerial view of Za’atri refugee camp, host to tens of thousands of Syrians displaced by conflict, near Mafraq, Jordan. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the camp as part of a two-leg trip to Jordan and Turkey to assess the Syrian refugee situation in those countries.”

(Photo Credit: UN Photo / Mark Garten)
INTRODUCTION


This Sampler comes at an important moment as global displacement has reached an all-time high, surpassing levels post-World War II. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), over 65 million people are currently forcibly displaced due to violent conflict, persecution, and human rights abuses – not to mention those displaced from poverty and climate change. The majority are displaced within their own countries as IDPs, while over 21 million have fled beyond borders to seek international protection as refugees, 54% from three main countries of origin: Syria (4.9m), Afghanistan (2.7m), and Somalia (1.1m).

The primary legal framework obligating nations to assist refugees is the 1951 Convention & 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. This treaty gives refugees the right to seek international protection as well as the right to not be returned to a country where they may be persecuted (the principle of non-refoulement).

For the United States Government (USG)’s response to displacement, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is responsible for assisting IDPs through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in coordination with UNHCR and national governments, while the U.S. Department of State (DOS) oversees the USG’s refugee response via the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) may also be involved at times as refugees and displaced persons often result from armed conflict, as noted in Stability Doctrine (JP 3-07), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Doctrine (JP 3-29), and the Commander’s Guide to Supporting Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.

While there are many cases of displacement worldwide, this particular Sampler examines lessons specifically from the current refugee crisis in Syria, spreading beyond to Europe. It also highlights lessons from prior situations of protracted displacement (in areas with UN peacekeeping missions) which can offer perspectives for how to deal with ongoing crises today. Along with this selection of relevant lessons, this Sampler provides a list of resources that can serve as a “toolkit” for leaders, planners, and practitioners (see page 52). Pertinent themes and recommendations are summarized following the lessons on pages 50-51.
# Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

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“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)
Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

A. Thousands of people are dying in dangerous migration routes across the Mediterranean Sea in the wake of Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis. While the European Union remains in political discussion about reducing ‘pull’ factors towards the continent, building fences, and focusing on border control over rescue operations, people continue to die at sea… [Read More ...]

B. While political discussion in the wake of Europe’s 2015-2016 refugee crisis within the European Union centers on border control and the distribution of asylum-seekers, locals in southern Italy have taken it into their own hands to welcome refugees into small and otherwise dying towns… [Read More ...]

C. Over 5 million people have fled Syria in the five years since the beginnings of its 2011 civil war in what has become the largest humanitarian crisis in our time. The majority of these refugees are now hosted by neighboring countries who have become overwhelmed by the influx, exacerbating tensions in a region already rife with years of displacement… [Read More ...]

D. As the Syrian Civil War continues into its fifth year since 2011, the youth who compose over half of all Syrian refugees are in danger of becoming a lost generation. The risk for such youth to radicalize increases when opportunities for education, employment, and addressing injustice are limited… [Read More ...]

E. As 100,000s of people flee to Europe during the European refugee crisis, European nations face a huge challenge in integrating these refugees, many of whom have differing cultural norms of gender and sexuality. Addressing host nation concerns is essential for sustainable integration, yet public tensions about gender issues have increased… [Read More ...]

F. Post-conflict countries need well-planned and predictable assistance to promote sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty, and build institutions/capacity for providing essential services to citizens… [Read More ...]

G. Not handling Internally Displaced Person (IDP) / refugee resettlement appropriately at first may subsequently perpetuate additional conflict, as was the case in Timor-Leste when displaced people from the conflict in 1999 did not return to their place of origin but instead occupied land that did not belong to them… [Read More ...]

H. Security Sector Reform (SSR) under the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) contributed to durable solutions for displaced people in Kosovo by increasing trust/legitimacy in police in the security sector… [Read More ...]

I. The presence of large numbers of Displaced Persons (DPs), including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), are often the result of conflict, whether conventional military operations or counterinsurgency operations. The costs associated with their presence in large numbers can be burdensome… [Read More ...]
SUBJECT: Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

1. GENERAL

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) often result from war and violent conflict. If the needs of both displaced people and host communities are not understood and met, however, displacement itself can produce further instability.

This lesson report examines challenges and opportunities surrounding the ongoing displacement crisis in Syria and its spillover into neighboring countries in the Middle East and in Europe, as Syria is currently the largest source country of refugees in the world. It also considers lessons from prior situations of protracted displacement in other contexts including Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, which give insight for the current crisis into how to prepare now for future refugee return and reconstruction. Issues discussed include the impact of refugees on the surrounding region, the integration of refugees into host communities, the provision of opportunities for displaced / host nation youth, various humanitarian assistance efforts such as search & rescue at sea, and economic / security challenges of integration, resettlement, and return. Continue reading to consider lessons learned regarding Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

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Za'atari Refugee Camp, Jordan (7 December 2012)
“A woman and child at Za’atri refugee camp, host to tens of thousands of Syrians displaced by conflict, near Mafraq, Jordan. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the camp as part of a two-leg trip to Jordan and Turkey to assess the Syrian refugee situation in those countries.” (Photo Credit: UN Photo / Mark Garten)
2. **LESSONS**

   **A. TOPIC. Refugee Search & Rescue Operations Assisted by Independent Agencies in the Mediterranean Sea (2463)**

**Observation.**

Thousands of people are dying in dangerous migration routes across the Mediterranean Sea in the wake of Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis. While the European Union remains in political discussion about reducing ‘pull’ factors towards the continent, building fences, and focusing on border control over rescue operations, people continue to die at sea. One NGO, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station, has stepped in to fill the gap in Europe’s maritime response.

**Discussion.**

With the current turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, a flood of refugees is pouring into Europe, seeking refuge or asylum. The majority of these asylum-seekers are from countries with violent conflict such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, while others flee from abuse and poverty in Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran, and Ukraine. These refugees are taking routes by land and sea to arrive in Europe, most attempting the dangerous voyage across the Mediterranean from Northern Africa to Italy or from Turkey to Greece. In 2015, International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates indicate that over 1,011,700 migrants journeyed to Europe by sea (34,900 by land).

The high influx of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers attempting to reach Europe by sea comes as Europe’s land borders are being closed. According to a November 2015 report by Amnesty International, EU member states have already built over 235 km of fences on the EU’s external border (costing over 175 million Euros), including 175 km along the Hungary-Serbia border, 30 km along Bulgaria-Turkey border, 18.7 km along Spanish enclaves, and 10.5 km along Greece-Turkey border; however, “Instead of stopping people from coming, these fences have only redirected refugee flows to other land routes or more dangerous sea routes.” Vice News recounts how after Greece fenced its border with Turkey in 2012, migration routes shifts to Bulgaria; after a 21-mile fence was completed along the Bulgaria-Turkey border in July 2014, refugees then began to take the passage from Turkey into Greece across the Aegean Sea, swiftly increasing the number crossing to Europe by sea.

This high number of migrants on sea voyages has been accompanied by excessive death tolls from the crossings. BBC News reports that, “According to the IOM, more than 3,770 migrants were reported to have died trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2015,” primarily on the passage from northern African to Italy,
but also in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece. These deaths arise due to various conditions; according to Human Rights Watch, “Smugglers routinely overload unseaworthy boats; provide insufficient food, water, and fuel for the journey; and lock women, men and children below deck, putting their lives at grave risk in the event of a shipwreck,” (p. 6). Across the Aegean, migrants often use “flimsy rubber dinghies or small wooden boats,” (BBC News). As such, a number of significant tragedies have occurred on these waters, including the 2011 disaster when a Libyan dinghy’s distress signals were not responded with a rescue attempt (leading to the slow starvation of 61 passengers), the 2013 shipwreck off of Lampedusa in which over 360 people drowned, and the April 2015 capsizing of a boat with 800 people off of Libya, due to overcrowded conditions.

After the tragedy of Lampedusa, Italy responded by launching Mare Nostrum, an extensive rescue mission, saving over 150,000 lives in less than a year. However, by October 2014, the operation had ended despite the continuation of tragedies at sea. This was due in part to the great costs associated with the operation – upwards of 9 million euros ($10.2m) each month. In addition, many EU politicians criticized this rescue operation as creating a “pull factor” for people to attempt the crossing to the European continent, since it promised potential saving at sea. EU Frontex border control turned instead to Operation Triton which had a significantly smaller budget than Mare Nostrum and focused primarily on border protection. However, from 2014-2015, the death toll in the Mediterranean increased almost tenfold, according to the IOM. In March 2015, the Joint Operational Team MARE was launched, yet another European effort focused on intelligence aimed at fighting maritime people-smuggling instead of rescuing people in distress at sea. The European Union also decided to keep EU ships closer to shore in 2015 to discourage migrants, but to no avail. On 22 June 2015, the EU launched EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, aimed at countering migrant smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.

According to an article by Doctors Without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “The measures put in place to stop the boats ignore the most basic point of the so-called ‘migration crisis’: people in need of protection have no choice but to flee.” Debate in Europe has centered around whether ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors are more prevalent in drawing people to the continent; however, “[g]iven the continuing arrivals by sea, regardless of weather or pushbacks, Europe is forced to accept that rescue at sea is not what is pulling people toward the continent,” (Pelton). Many migrants are coming from war-torn countries, in desperate need of protection, and willing to gamble their lives on dangerous voyages in order to leave more dangerous situations in their countries of origin. As such, most refugees flee due to push factors. However, Europe’s response continues to focus on reducing pull factors rather than addressing the current need for ongoing rescue operations at sea as well as safe, legal options for refugees to
arrive in Europe that would reduce the number of dangerous boat crossings and subsequent tragic maritime deaths.

In the wake of Europe’s struggle to respond to the refugee crisis on the seas, one NGO has taken it into its own hands to fill the gap. An American/Italian couple in 2013 founded the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS); after witnessing evidence of drowned migrants during a cruise in the Mediterranean, the couple used their own money to purchase a fishing vessel and convert it into a rescue vessel with unmanned drones for spotting vessels in distress, with the motto “No One Deserves To Die At Sea.” These drones either alert the main MOAS ship to respond, or the Italian Coast Guard is called, providing an opportunity for many lives to be saved amid the dangerous crossing. The MOAS operation has grown as donations poured in from people across the world, especially after the media reproduction in September 2015 of the image of three-year-old Alan Kurdi who washed up dead on the Turkish coast. The efforts of MOAS have additionally inspired other NGOs such as MSF to also launch search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Even if the European Union still struggles to respond to the refugee crisis, those attempting the dangerous voyage have not been entirely forgotten.

**Recommendation.**

Human Rights Watch Recommendations include (p. 2):

“Specifically the EU and member states should:

- Save lives at sea through sustained search and rescue operations along the main migration routes in the Mediterranean.

- Ensure that passengers on all vessels interdicted at sea that are suspected of being used for human trafficking or smuggling are disembarked at a safe location in EU territory. Vessels should not be diverted or returned to a place where passengers might be exposed to the risk of persecution, torture, or inhuman and degrading treatment, to the risk of harm from indiscriminate violence, or to the risk of chain refoulement.

- Ensure that action against smugglers and traffickers who endanger lives respects human rights, guarantees the ability of asylum seekers to seek international protection in other countries, and does not itself put passengers’ lives in danger.

- Ensure that EU anti-smuggling efforts in the Mediterranean do not leave asylum seekers in Libya with no access to protection.
• Increase safe and legal channels into the EU to reduce demand for smuggling and dangerous journeys, specifically through:
  o Increased refugee resettlement;
  o Expanded family reunification;
  o Reform of the EU Visa Code with a view to creating a Schengen humanitarian visa"

Amnesty International Recommendations include:

“Amnesty International is calling on the EU and its member states to:

• open up safe and legal routes, including through increasing resettlement, family reunification, and humanitarian admissions and visas;

• ensure that refugees have access to territory and asylum at the EU’s external land borders;

• end push-backs and other human rights violations at the borders, particularly through effective investigations into allegations of abuse at the national level, and the initiation of infringement proceedings by the EU Commission, where EU law is breached;

• significantly increase reception capacity and short-term humanitarian assistance in Europe’s front-line countries; and

• accelerate and extend the implementation of its relocation scheme for asylum seekers”

Implications.

If there are no additional European search and rescue operations, refugees will continue to die at sea. Refugees will continue to cross the Mediterranean Sea whether or not there are rescue operations, because the push factors are strong from their countries of origin. If Europe does not find a way to help them reach land safely and apply for asylum, it is more likely that refugees would have additional grievances. Prioritizing human rights for refugees, in part through sustained search and rescue operations, will, on the other hand, enhance human security in Europe.

According to Human Rights Watch, “The provision of more safe and legal channels into the EU – ways for migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to reach EU territory without having to risk their lives or resort to criminal networks – could reduce the use of dangerous migration avenues. The development of such channels need not amount to an open door policy: those arriving can be screened, have their protection needs assessed, and their entitlement to remain
in the European Union determined based on their international protection needs and any human rights imperatives,” (p. 8).

**Event Description.**

This lesson is primarily based on these articles:

- “Refugees Endangered and Dying Due to EU Reliance on Fences and Gatekeepers,” Amnesty International (17 November 2015).
- “The Building Blocks of Fortress Europe: How EU Policy is Failing Record Numbers of Migrants,” Milene Larsson at VICE News (6 March 2015).
- “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts,” BBC News (as of 4 March 2016).
- “Words of concern, walls of deterrence: refugees pushed out to sea // How European indifference pushed MSF to take ‘controversial’ action,” Aurelie Ponthieu, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (17 April 2015).
- “No One Deserves To Die At Sea,” Robert Pelton, NewsDeeply (16 March 2016).
- “Lifesaving Drones: ‘No One Deserves to Die at Sea,’” Sarah Stanley (10 March 2015).

**Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.**

For more information on the 2011 tragedy off of Libya where the dinghy’s distress signals were not answered, see this lessons learned report written by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1872 (2012): “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?”

**Lesson Author:** Ms. Katrina Gehman

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**Lesbos Island, Greece (18 June 2016)**

Scene from Lesbos, Greece, on the day of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s visit to the Kara Tepe refugee camp on the island, where many refugees and migrants land after journeying by sea. Mr. Ban’s visit came just ahead of World Refugee Day on 20 June.

(Photograph Credit: UN Photo / Rick Bajornas)
B. TOPIC. Refugees Repopulate ‘Dying’ Towns and Rejuvenate Local Economy in Europe’s Refugee Crisis (2462)

Observation.

While political discussion in the wake of Europe’s 2015-2016 refugee crisis within the European Union centers on border control and the distribution of asylum-seekers, locals in southern Italy have taken it into their own hands to welcome refugees into small and otherwise dying towns – a model which may prove both socially and economically viable across Europe in light of the ongoing influx of people fleeing to find refuge in the continent.

Discussion.

Europe is experiencing a refugee crisis. As of March 2016, over 135,700 people have already reached Europe by sea since the beginning of 2016, according to United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). This follows International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates of over 1, 011,700 arrivals by sea and 34,900 by land in 2015, up from 280,000 total land/sea for 2014. The majority of refugees seeking asylum in the EU in 2015 came from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, along with other countries in the region experiencing violent conflict, turmoil, and poverty. With the majority of these refugees arriving by sea, Italy and Greece have become de facto initial receptors, as primary routes across the Mediterranean include the voyage from North Africa to Italy as well as from Turkey to Greece.

This large influx of refugees is overwhelming the European Union (EU)’s capacity to respond. The majority of countries in the European Union (26 states in total) participate in a passport-free zone known as the Schengen Area, free from internal border controls. In conjunction with Schengen, the EU’s Dublin Regulation places primary responsibility for asylum applications on the country where asylum seekers first enter the EU. As such, according to Human Rights Watch, “[This regulation] has imposed an unfair burden on countries on the EU’s external borders” (p. 16 of "Europe's Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action," December 2015). Italy and Greece, particularly, in the current crisis, have faced a disproportionately high level of migrant arrivals.

Due in part to this uneven distribution, the European Commission Agenda on Migration established a resettlement agreement in which 160,000 asylum-seekers will be moved from Italy and Greece to other EU countries. The first group of refugees to be transferred under this agreement was flown from Italy to Sweden in October 2015. However, “[b]y mid-November, over four months after EU countries agreed to a first tranche of 40,000 relocations, only 147 Eritreans, Iraqis, and Syrians had been relocated. Only a handful of countries had made concrete offers to accept relocations in the near future,” and implementation of this plan has been quite slow (Human Rights Watch, p. 16). Furthermore, this
A resettlement plan is only modest in size compared to the continuing high numbers of arrivals. As such, there still persists a dilemma for how to handle the many refugees and asylum-seekers who remain in EU border countries such as Italy and Greece.

One model for how to constructively deal with this crisis has emerged throughout southern Italy. As many as 6,000 ghost towns exist in Italy that have been partially or entirely abandoned over the years due to reasons as varied as pirate sacks, war bombings, harsh conditions, natural disasters, and emigration. Many other small towns on the peninsula are shrinking due to high levels of youth unemployment as the younger generation relocates to the cities, leaving behind an aging population. In these towns, there are too few workers and too many retirees to fill the labor gap for jobs most Italians are unwilling to do, such as manual labor of picking olives and oranges.

As an alternative to relegating refugees and asylum-seekers into refugee camps, some small towns across southern Italy have decided to host them instead, rejuvenating their dying towns and filling this labor gap in the process. For example, the small, impoverished town of Satriano in the Calabria region of Italy has shrunk by 75% over the past 50 years (from its prior population of 4,000 in the 1960s) as people have emigrated elsewhere for work. Since 2014, however, it has hosted 21 migrants from Pakistan, Somalia, and Mali. The 1,500-inhabitant town of Sutera in central Sicily has taken hosting refugees one step further. After the Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013 in which 366 migrants died off the coast of an Italian island in a shipwreck, the mayor of Sutera opened the town to refugees, now hosting 34 from the Middle East and Africa. However, “unlike in other Italian towns and cities where migrants are placed in vacant buildings on the edge of town and left to fend for themselves, in Sutera each refugee is entrusted to a local family charged with helping them to integrate,” (Browne). Sutera’s refugees are also taught Italian lessons, and the town celebrates a “festival of hospitality” to showcase the refugees’ cultures.

Across southern Italy, small, often poor, and isolated Italian towns are thus showing remarkable generosity to recent refugees and making them feel welcome, remembering times past when Italians have had to emigrate and have found welcome across the world as migrants themselves. Satriano and other Italian villages now form part of SPRAR – the Protection System of Refugees and Asylum Seekers – a national network created by the Italian government and composed of 382 municipalities working together to resettle people and rejuvenate towns. SPRAR hopes to offer a potential model to be used across Europe as many EU countries continue to face the challenge of swiftly increasing migrant populations.
Recommendation.

1. Continue to integrate refugees into small and dying towns across Italy and utilize this model across Europe as appropriate to provide a welcome refuge for migrants while rejuvenating dying towns and filling in a labor gap in the economy. As possible, integrate refugees in the social and economic life of these villages.

2. Concerning the EU’s current asylum system, Human Rights Watch recommends (p. 17):

   • “Replace the Dublin Regulation with a permanent relocation mechanism based on rational criteria including states’ capacities and asylum seekers’ family and social ties and, to the extent possible, the wishes of the applicant. In the meantime, all member states should make generous use of provisions in the Dublin Regulation allowing them to take responsibility for asylum seekers already present in their territory, especially those with family and social ties or with special vulnerabilities.

   • Ensure that the emergency relocation plan to benefit 160,000 asylum seekers is implemented swiftly and in a way that takes into account individual circumstances of asylum seekers, including their qualifications, language skills, and family, cultural, and social ties. Competent authorities should ensure that priority is given to particularly vulnerable asylum seekers, including persons with disabilities, victims or those at risk of torture or sexual violence or gender-based violence, women heads of household, and unaccompanied children. This prioritization could take place regardless of nationality.”

Implications.

Many of the refugees flocking to Europe are fleeing war-torn regions and have experienced trauma from violent conflict and poverty. If these refugees are not welcomed and socially and economically integrated and resettled into communities once they reach Europe, they may struggle to find stability and healing, which may in turn negatively impact or exacerbate the potential for conflict within Europe. Furthermore, if small and dying Italian and/or European towns do not welcome refugees, these towns may continue to experience population and economic decline. However, if refugees are integrated into these small towns, not only do these people have a chance at a new and more secure life, but dying towns also receive rejuvenation and a boosted economy.
If the Dublin Regulation is not revised or replaced and if the emergency relocation plan for 160,000 asylum seekers is not implemented, then the first countries of entry for migrants into the EU will continue to be overwhelmed by the ongoing influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. If these countries continue to be overwhelmed, people may not receive the resettlement services that they need in order to establish a new life, and this may affect domestic European political unrest.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was primarily based on these articles:

- “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts,” BBC News (as of 4 March 2016).
- “How this tiny Italian town opened its homes to refugees,” Patrick Browne, the Local, (12 Feb. 2016).

**Additional Comments by the Lesson Author.**

For more information on various other small Italian villages hosting refugees, see these articles:

- “Refugees revive fading Italian villages,” Thomas Bruckner, (2 May 2016) – in Riace, Italy.
- “Refugees are Rejuvenating Dying Italian Towns,” Justin Salhani, ThinkProgress, (2 May 2016).
- “6,000 ghost towns: Italy’s answer to migrant crisis?” Silvia Marchetti, (26 May 2015).

**Lesson Author:** Ms. Katrina Gehman

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**Lampedusa, Italy (5 March 2010)**

“Tunisians recently migrated from their home country board an early-morning bus in Lampedusa, Italy, bound for a detention centre. It took the group four days of travel at sea to reach the Italian island.”

(Photo Credit: UN Photo / UNHCR / Phil Behan).
C. **TOPIC.** Regional Constraints & Resettlement for the Syrian Refugee Crisis (2481)

**Observation.**

Over 5 million people have fled Syria in the five years since the beginnings of its 2011 civil war in what has become the largest humanitarian crisis in our time. The majority of these refugees are now hosted by neighboring countries who have become overwhelmed by the influx, exacerbating tensions in a region already rife with years of displacement. While the UN works to implement the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP), it is underfunded, and neighboring countries remain disproportionately burdened as other nations of the world resist any major increase in refugee resettlement.

**Discussion.**

Since violent conflict erupted in Syria in 2011, half of Syria’s pre-war population has been displaced – 6.6 million internally within Syria itself (with almost 1 million besieged, including those in Aleppo city) and over 4.5 million in the surrounding region. The majority of Syrian refugees are currently hosted by five neighboring countries: Turkey (the world’s top host of refugees with over 2.5 million), Lebanon (1.1 million – over one-fifth of its population), Jordan (635,000), Iraq (245,000, compounding the 3.9 million IDPs already within the country), and Egypt (118,000) – (Amnesty International, February 2016). These Syrian refugees primarily live outside of refugee camps; in Lebanon, most Syrian refugees live in unofficial tented settlements or rented accommodation, in Turkey, many seek work and live in urban communities, while major Syrian refugee camps such as Za’atari (opened July 2012) and Azraq (opened April 2014) have grown in Jordan.

These Syrian refugees join several pre-existing refugee populations in the region from prior conflicts. Following U.S. stability operations in Iraq and subsequent intensifying violence, an Iraqi refugee crisis emerged in 2006-2008 – the largest displacement crisis in the Middle East since 1948, until surpassed by the current Syrian refugee crisis. Prior to U.S. operations, half a million Iraqi refugees from prior conflicts in the region had fled to neighboring countries of Jordan (300,000), Iran (200,000), Syria (40,000), and Saudi Arabia (5,000), with an additional million displaced internally. This displacement across the region has been further complicated by the more recent rise of the Islamic State (IS), which displaced approximately 1.7 million Iraqis in 2014, according to estimates from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

The influx of Syrian refugees on a region already saturated with displacement is concerning, as “[t]he increasing number of Syrian refugees is widely recognized throughout the literature as having the potential to destabilize and polarize Lebanon, as have past refugee influxes in Lebanon,” (GSDRC, p. 5). Lebanon in particular already hosts Palestinian refugees (from 1948, 1967, and the 1990s)
who comprised 10% of the population (as of 2013) and have experienced marginalization and limited rights, since Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention that obligates nations to assist refugees.

When millions of Syrian refugees began pouring across their borders, Jordan and Lebanon were initially extraordinarily generous. However, as the war has progressed, tensions have become strained as the influx has had a major impact on the region – hospitals are overflowing with Syrians, schools are doing double-shifts to accommodate refugee children, there is a massive water shortage (especially in Jordan), and competition for housing and jobs has raised rent and lowered wages. Some 170,000 Lebanese have fallen into poverty because of the strain the refugee crisis has had on the economy, according to a World Bank/UN assessment. Furthermore, support for refugees in neighboring countries can inadvertently breed resentment and violence if the local population is not allowed to use the services allocated to refugees. During the Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan in 2008, attention and funding increased for Iraqi refugees, even though Jordanians in the vicinity also had very limited resources; this created a backlash against Iraqi children.

As neighboring countries became overwhelmed by Syrian refugees, by mid-2014, Lebanon and Jordan began to restrict their borders, as well as Turkey. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), many Syrians in urban areas have been forced to deplete their savings as the war has dragged on, and they are now obliged to live in substandard housing and send their children to work in informal or dangerous jobs. As neighboring countries have become crowded and the war has continued, with infrastructure and basic delivery strained from the demand to accommodate the high influx of refugees in addition to their own populations, refugees have sought refuge elsewhere - many risking the dangerous journey by land or by sea into Europe despite the risk of pushbacks as happen with alarming frequency at the borders between Turkey and Greece. In 2015, half of all migrants/refugees who attempted the Mediterranean route were Syrians – over half a million people.

There are three main options for responding to such a refugee situation: “[1.] resolving the original conflict in the country of origin and returning refugees to their homes, [2.] permanently settling the refugees in the host country, perhaps with an option for citizenship, [and 3.] resettling them in a third country,” (RAND, p. 15). Refugees may wish to remain in neighboring host countries due to similar linguistic and cultural affinities and since closer proximity provides a better judge of when/if they can return to their country of origin. However, this does not always work out well in the case of protracted displacement. A RAND study notes that as displacement continues – such as with Palestinian refugees – “the longer a crisis goes on, the more receiving countries tend to limit refugees’ other options, such as precluding citizenship, higher education, or employment. Other governments and international donors succumb over time to budgetary pressures by cutting food handouts to camps or social programs in urban settings,” (p. 15).
The Syrian refugee situation shows no signs of abating anytime soon, promising to become a protracted refugee crisis. As such, in February 2016, Germany, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations co-hosted the London Conference (“Supporting Syria and the Region”) to raise funds for the billions of dollars of international aid necessary to meet both short-term and longer-term needs for the refugee crisis. This aid is fed into the 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, a coordinated regional framework of over 200 partners which addresses humanitarian relief and stabilization in the five neighboring countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis – Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. According to the 3RP Mid-year Report (2016), over USD 11.22 billion was pledged at the London Conference for the crisis – which included multi-year funding from 2016-2020. These pledges would fulfill 76% of the appeal by the UN and NGOs for the response. So far, however, the disbursement has been slow, only USD 1.38 billion received by 31 May 2016, which is 30% of the revised interagency 2016 appeal for $4.54 billion. This comes after the 2015 UN humanitarian appeal for the Syrian crisis was only 61% funded at the year’s end. This underfunding is negatively impacting 3RP programs, compromising child protection, food security, education, health & nutrition, basic needs, shelter, water systems & hygiene, and livelihoods for refugees in the neighboring host countries.

In addition to supporting host nations with money and resources, resettlement is a real and necessary option in the case of protracted displacement, especially when a conflict such as the Syrian civil war shows no signs of abating. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), at least 450,000 people (10%) from these neighboring host countries needed resettlement (as of February 2016). Yet, nations around the world have been hesitant to allocate resettlement slots for Syrian refugees on a large scale. “In total, [only] 162,151 resettlement places have been offered globally since the start of the Syria crisis, which equates to a mere 3.6% of the total population of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey,” (Amnesty International, February 2016). Many Gulf countries are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus had not offered official UN resettlement slots to Syrian refugees, nor had various higher income countries such as Russia, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea, according to Amnesty International. A notable exception is Germany, who (as of February 2016), had pledged 39,987 slots for Syrian refugees, which comprised 54% of the European Union’s total effort. The remaining EU countries (excluding Sweden / Germany), had only pledged a total of 30,903 slots – a mere 0.7% of the population of refugees in neighboring host countries. By December 2015, only a total of 2,200 Syrians had been resettled to the United States since the war began in 2011.

European countries and the U.S. have been hesitant to let refugees enter due in part to security concerns. Europe has suffered several terror attacks over the past two years. Several of the attacks were in fact carried out by European citizens, not refugees or asylum-seekers – such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks (January 7, 2015 – Paris, France). Although a Syrian passport was found at the
site of the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks – later determined to be utilized by ISIS operatives who were only pretending to be Syrian refugees in order to gain access to Europe - the passport at the scene of the attack nonetheless heightened xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiment across Europe. Similar backlash also happened in the U.S. as 31 state governors called for entirely banning Syrian refugee resettlement to the U.S. following the Paris attacks. The U.S. actually already has very strict policies – security vetting and refugee resettlement are not mutually exclusive. Refugees may enter through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which has a robust screening process that can take up to two years. Of those settled in the states since 9-11 through USRAP, only 3 refugees of a total of 784,000 have been arrested and convicted on charges related to terrorism. Yet the Obama administration announced that of the 100,000 refugees slotted for resettlement in the US in FY2017, only 10,000 would be reserved for Syrian refugees.

According to a 2015 RAND study on “Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization” based on nine historical cases of refugees fleeing violence in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, “poverty and physical deprivation have less impact on the degree of radicalization than actions or omissions on the part of the receiving country and the international community,” (p. 3). This RAND study determined that six groups of factors may contribute to the risk for refugees to radicalize, including: host country’s administrative/legal policies, political and militant organizing, security, shelter, local economic conditions and resilience, and conditions for youth; limiting refugee opportunities in multiple ways simultaneously increases the risk. However, “[R]adicalization – meaning the process of committing to political or religious ideologies that espouse change through violence – and related armed militancy are not inevitable. Rather, the risk can be mitigated if the main stakeholders adopt comprehensive policies that extend beyond immediate life-saving needs and address such issues as refugees’ impact on the countries that host them,” (p. 1).

As such, the international community can play a part in welcoming refugees, and in that way actually reduce the risk for more radicalization toward extremism. A massive welcome of refugees has been achieved successfully by the international community in the past, such as in the late 1970s after the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam. Three million people (one million of whom were boat people) fled regimes in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in the two decades after the war. A broad coalition of nations led by the U.S. resettled 450,000 Indochinese refugees initially, with one million eventually settling in the U.S. by the 1990s. In the case of the Indochinese refugee crisis, neighboring host nations also bore the brunt of the burden before media attention on the tragedies and political backlash prompted other governments to open their doors. But when the international community did commit to hosting refugees, resettling such a large number of refugees proved possible – as it could again, for the Syrian refugee crisis.
**Recommendation.**

In order to contribute to a solution for the Syrian refugee crisis, the international community should:

1. Urgently prioritize the resettling of non-Syrian refugees from prior conflicts in the Middle East who have already been vetted and who are awaiting placement. This will reduce the burden on neighboring countries as Syrian refugees continue to pour into the surrounding communities. This will also ensure that prior refugees from protracted displacement are not forgotten as the Syrian crisis takes center stage.

2. Increase quotas for Syrian refugee resettlement and integration into new host nations while maintaining appropriate security vetting procedures. Utilize strategic messaging with national constituencies to decrease xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiment and rhetoric, educating the public about vetting processes to decrease security concerns.

3. Support neighboring countries in the region with money and resources so that they will have the capacity both to continue to host Syrian refugees and to provide services to their own people with less strain to their economy and to their social delivery services.

4. Promptly fulfill pledges made for financial and other support at the 2016 London conference so that 3RP can continue to deliver urgent regional services. Advocate/encourage host nations not to isolate refugees or restrict their access to employment or education.

**Implications.**

If non-Syrian refugees are not expedited for resettlement, they may become lost in the overwhelming sea of the refugee crisis and not receive the care that they need; if they stay in a protracted refugee situation, it is likely that they would continue to exist with few opportunities; if they are resettled quickly, however, they will be able to build a new life for themselves elsewhere while the region will be less strained in order to continue to host Syrian refugees.

If potential host nation constituencies are able to understand the potential value of refugees as well as the dire situation of their plight through strategic messaging, they may be more willing to host them in their countries. If refugees are resettled and integrated into welcoming communities, the risk of radicalization will lessen. If western nations increase their quotas for refugee resettlement, this may counteract the narrative IS and other violent extremist groups use to say that the West does not care about the Middle East; furthermore, with increased refugee resettlement, other nations will have more political clout to advocate for solutions in the region.
If the international community does not continue to support the region with augmented financial and resource support in addition to increased refugee resettlement quotas, surrounding countries will continue to be overwhelmed and the region may collapse into further conflict. If the 3RP remains underfunded, services of health & nutrition, education, child protection, food security, basic needs, shelter, water systems & hygiene, and livelihoods will be compromised, and increasing numbers of refugees and host nationals in the region will be forced to live below the poverty line.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was based primarily on information from the following sources:

- “35 years of forced displacement in Iraq: Contextualising the ISIS threat, unpacking the movements,” by: Cameron Thibos, Migration Policy Centre, EUI (October 2014).
- 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan

**Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.**

“Whether in the United States or Europe, the refugee issue must be thought of as an integration crisis, not a border security challenge. These refugees are not likely to go home soon: the Syrian civil war shows no signs of ending, and the level of destruction is so great that, even if it did, many refugees have no homes to which they can return. We do not want these refugees to come to Europe and America and then, through discrimination and mistreatment, become hostile to their new host countries. Counterterrorism, then, means ensuring that the refugees have access to services, are educated, and over time, become citizens of their host countries who respect its law and traditions and are respected in turn.” (Daniel Byman, “Rethinking Refugees,” Brookings, (17 May 2016))
“I note with grave concern that xenophobic and racist responses to refugees and migrants seem to be reaching new levels of stridency, frequency and public acceptance. The tenor of policy and public discourse on migrants and refugees must be shifted from one of threat to one of international solidarity, protection of dignity and recognition of positive contributions. Such efforts need to take address the fears and concerns of host communities and they must be based on facts rather than assumptions and misinformation. Given the overwhelming evidence that personal contact significantly reduces prejudice, more creative ways of fostering contacts between host communities on the one hand and refugees and migrants, on the other, are urgently needed.” (“In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants,” UN, (21 April 2016))

“We can dispense with the notion that Arab refugees themselves are vectors for violence; refugees are the victims of conflict, not its cause. Yet the arrival of so many migrants within a short window of time places immense pressure on the capacities of regional governments already struggling to provide basic goods to their populations. […] A vast majority of refugees worldwide—many of them victims of conflicts begat by the United States and other first-world nations—reside in neighboring states of first asylum, placing a disproportionate burden of refugee-hosting on poor, weak, and conflict-prone governments. An appeal to security interests based not on vague fears of refugee terrorism, but rather on concern for the well-being of citizens in refugee-hosting states and the stability of their governments, may prove an effective frame for refugee advocates moving forward.” (Chantal E. Berman, Brookings, (24 September 2015))

Lesson Author: Ms. Katrina Gehman

Syria Donors Conference 2016 / London, United Kingdom (4 February 2016)
“Helen Clark (top right), Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), addresses the Syria Donors Conference 2016 in London. Also pictured (on dais, from left): Sabah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait; Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Stephen O’Brien, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.” (Photo Credit: UN Photo / Eskinder Debebe)
D. **TOPIC.** No Lost Generation: Education & Opportunities Decrease Radicalization Risk for Refugee Youth *(2480)*

**Observation.**

As the Syrian Civil War continues into its fifth year since 2011, the youth who compose over half of all Syrian refugees are in danger of becoming a lost generation. The risk for such youth to radicalize increases when opportunities for education, employment, and addressing injustice are limited, according to studies by the RAND Corporation and Mercy Corps. The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) is heading the No Lost Generation Initiative to fill this gap and encourage the resilience of Syrian youth who long to rebuild their country.

**Discussion.**

Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, over half of Syria’s population has been displaced – 6.6 million internally and some 4.5 million in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. The UN estimates that over half of Syrian refugees (some 2.4 million refugee children), are less than 18 years old. A 2012 study from the Migration Policy Centre about Syrian refugees in the Duhok Domiz camp in the Kurdistan region of Iraq provides a glimpse into why refugee youth fled towards the beginning of the Syrian civil war: “The respondents [93% of which were youth] gave varying reasons for their flight from Syria. Reasons included the fear of physical violence (25%); the fear of being used as a human shield (25%); the fear of rape (24%); the fear of forced military service (22%); and other reasons in different proportions,” (p. 9). Youth – especially young Syrian Kurdish men – were under increasing pressure from both the Syrian government and the Free Syrian Army to bear arms in the fighting or to be used as human shields. These youth fled precisely because they did not want to participate in the violence and militancy.

Prior to the start of the war, Syrian youth were invested in building their future. Over 70% of Syrian youth attended secondary schools, and Syria had a 95% literacy rate. However, according to the 2015 RAND study “Education of Syrian Refugee Children: Managing the Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan,” as of November 2015, at least 700,000 Syrian refugee children were not attending formal education in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. Reasons for this are myriad and include: school and transportation expenses, security concerns, documentation, shortages on school space, and language/curriculum challenges. Child marriages have become more common for Syrian refugee girls, as lack of educational and employment opportunities lead families to marry off their girls to ease the burden. Child labor is also rising, as youth are forced to work to support their families, often in informal and dangerous jobs.
Though Syrian youth initially fled to avoid militancy, these limited opportunities in a protracted refugee situation may put them at more risk of eventual radicalization. Conditions for youth was named as one of six factors by the 2015 RAND study “Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization” as potentially contributing to an increased risk of refugee radicalization. RAND’s study of historical cases of refugees fleeing armed conflict/violence focused on Rohingya Muslim refugees in Bangladesh from Burma (1975-1978; 1989-1992), Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran (1978-1988; 1990s), Somali refugees in Kenya (1990s-2000s), Rwandan refugees in DRC (19902-2000s), Palestinian refugees in the Middle East (especially Lebanon) (1967-1993), Eritrean refugees in Sudan (1974-1991), and Iraqi refugees in Jordan/Syria (2000s). Youth (ages 15-24 years old, and potentially even younger) in these contexts were at risk of recruitment by militant groups as they became more politically aware.

“The risk [of radicalization] increases if young people have few opportunities for education beyond the primary level or for employment in more than “make work” jobs, if they perceive discrimination, or where radicalized groups provide the training,” according to the RAND study (p. 5, 8). Studies of non-refugee youth point to personal factors and peer influence, not solely economic deprivation, as driving factors to radicalization. However, refugee youth in particular experience a narrowing of opportunities that may increase risk, including a lack of access to higher education, employment, traditional ‘coming of age’ transition milestones, and personal experiences of trauma that may be harrowing. Furthermore, the programs that exist for refugee youth often focus on keeping them out of trouble as opposed to teaching livelihood and vocational skills that are appropriate for both local industry and for reconstruction in their country of origin. In the void of formal education, crime and militant groups may fill the gaps – such as in Somali camps in Kenya in the 1990s-2000s when youth crime rose after secondary education was cut due to budget restrictions, and when Islamist groups educated Afghan refugee youth in the 1990s after donor funding stopped. Joining armed factions at times allows youth opportunities they may not have otherwise, such as learning how to write and read, which happened for refugees in camps run by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s.

The risk of youth radicalization is not only tied to employment and education opportunities, however; the non-governmental organization (NGO) Mercy Corps found in a 2015 study that experience of injustice was a prominent driver as to whether youth would turn to political violence. “Refugees have experienced trauma in escaping their country of origin and often face abuse, humiliation, and powerlessness in their place of refuge. This arena is where militant groups are likely to step in and try to radicalize vulnerable populations with narratives, often aimed at youth, of empowerment through violence,” (RAND, “Radicalization,” p. 16). This is especially relevant to the Syrian refugee youth because of the level of trauma and powerlessness that many have experienced. According to a 2015 study by the Migration Policy Institute of Syrian refugee children’s mental health in southeast Turkey, approximately half of the children had post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) symptoms, 79% experienced a death in the family, and 60% personally witnessed attacks on other people, with 44% suffering from depression.

It is by no means inevitable that refugee youth would resort to violence or radicalization, despite the trauma many have experienced. The challenges facing Syrian refugee youth are not new and have been overcome before. Before the Syrian refugee crisis dominated the world stage following the outbreak of civil war in 2011, the region was already rife with years of displacement. Most notably, U.S. stability operations in Iraq and subsequent exchange of violence in the insurgency precipitated a large movement of Iraqis between 2006-2008, with a half a million Iraqis fleeing to neighboring countries of Jordan (300,000), Iran (200,000), Syria (40,000), and Saudi Arabia (5,000). During the 2008 Iraqi refugee influx into Jordan, delivering education as early as possible provided an important means of both providing essential services and establishing normalcy for traumatized children who benefit from participating in routine behaviors like attending school. These Iraqi refugees lived in urban areas amongst the Jordanian population instead of being housed in camps; as such, schools additionally became locations for delivery of services to refugee children, such as health screenings, school feeding programs, and psychosocial support.

This lesson from the Iraqi refugee crisis is important now for the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis. Launched in 2013, the No Lost Generation initiative, headed by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) but involving multiple partners, is a strategic framework to respond to such children and youth affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, on three pillars: 1) Education, 2) Child Protection, and 3) Adolescent/Youth Engagement. The initiative goes hand-in-hand with the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2016-2017 which focuses on the education, livelihood, and social cohesion sectors, prioritizing school access, vocational training, and livelihood opportunities for both refugees and under-employed nationals. Through the No Lost Generation Initiative, programs through partners such as Mercy Corps are providing vocational training and safe spaces for youth to learn non-violent ways of dealing with the psychosocial stress they have experienced as refugees. The most effective programs consult with Syrian youth on program design and encourage Syrian youth to participate in decision-making in their own contexts. For Syrian refugee children who currently live in refugee camps such as Za’atari in Jordan, their daily lives are now very different; educational services can establish a new normal and provide service opportunities for both children and their parents.

At the 3RP fundraising London Conference in February 2016, several neighboring host country governments, including Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, committed to opening up more legal opportunities for refugees to access education and livelihoods. This opens a whole new world of possibility for Syrian youth coming into the work force. These youth have not given up their dreams to study and work hard in order to return and contribute to rebuilding their country.
someday. Though obtaining adequate funding and continuing to open legal barriers to such opportunities for refugee youth can be challenging, the international community is determined that Syria will not lose a generation of its children and youth, but will in fact empower them to be agents of positive change for building a better future.

**Recommendation.**

1. **The international community must prioritize long-term educational planning (for primary, secondary, and post-secondary education) from the very beginning of a refugee situation such as the Syrian refugee crisis, not just humanitarian aid.** Support initiatives such as the UN’s Lost Generation Initiative and 3RP which is prioritizing education and livelihood opportunities for youth, as well as governments in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, whose schools systems are accommodating Syrian refugee children. Develop funding strategies to support educational initiatives over the “long-term,” should the crisis be protracted over space and time.

2. **Improve access to formal education for out-of-school children by first analyzing barriers to access (such as lack of documentation) and then developing plans to address them.** It is important to coordinate certification exams and curriculum standards across the region for Syrian children who may either return to Syria or integrate fully into the host countries.

3. **Tie educational opportunities into livelihood paths that are viable both in order to work in the host community and in order to rebuild Syria one day if that becomes an option.** According to Mercy Corps, “Investment in non-formal education can reach the hundreds of thousands of youth who have dropped out of school and won’t be going back. Through these models, Syrians and other marginalized youth can get the critical skills that are in demand on the labor market […] and for industries that will be vital for post-war reconstruction in Syria, including construction and technology.”

4. **Include both refugee youth and host nation youth in youth programming so that one population or the other is not marginalized.** Focus on the educational needs of both refugees and host country nationals, creating a deliberative strategy to address both. Emphasize the social connection between refugee and non-refugee youth so as to decrease potential tensions within the host nation.

5. **Consult with, involve, and work alongside youth so that their voices are heard in the design of programs meant to benefit them.** In this way, youth will be empowered to shape real decisions in a non-violent way as real partners of change. Provide psychosocial support and teach skills for nonviolent conflict interaction; this will acknowledge injustice experienced by the refugee youth and give them an outlet to express themselves without turning to violent extremism.

**Note:** Additional recommendations on how to improve refugee access to education and support Syria’s youth are available in the 2015 RAND study, “Education of Syrian Refugee Children: Managing the Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan,” and in Mercy Corp’s 2016 “Unlocking a future for Syria’s Youth.”
Implications.

If the international community does not support regional nations who are hosting Syrian refugee children in their school systems or initiatives such as No Lost Generation, then underfunding will force programs to be cut back, and less youth will have educational or vocational opportunities. If youth programs do not incorporate youth perspectives, address their psychosocial needs, and build cohesion between both refugee youth and host national youth, then refugee youth may begin to feel marginalized and may be at greater risk for radicalization should the refugee situation remain protracted. If Syrian youth are provided opportunities for education, vocation, and engagement, however, they will be supported to build themselves a better future, less likely to resort to radicalization and violent extremism. Syrian youth need not be a lost generation.

Event Description.

This lesson was based on information found in these sources:

- “Unlocking a future for Syria’s youth” Scott Latta, MercyCorps, (1 March 2016).
- “No Lost Generation Update: January – June 2016” UNICEF.

Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.

Resources:
- Mercy Corps Quick Facts about the Syrian Refugee Crisis (as of 16 June 2016)
- 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
- No Lost Generation
- Supporting Syria & the Region (London Conference 2016)

Lesson Author: Ms. Katrina Gehman
E. **TOPIC.** Integrating Refugees with Differing Norms of Gender & Sexuality (2499)

**Observation.**

As 100,000s of people flee to Europe during the European refugee crisis, European nations face a huge challenge in integrating these refugees, many of whom have differing cultural norms of gender and sexuality. Addressing host nation concerns is essential for sustainable integration, yet public tensions about gender issues have increased due to a series of sexual assaults in Norway (2013) and Germany (January 2016), some of which were perpetrated by asylum-seekers. In response, Norway and other European countries have begun hosting discussion classes to educate refugees and migrants on European social norms in the hopes of preventing various forms of violence and helping refugees to avoid misunderstandings as they navigate their new host cultures.

**Discussion.**

By the end of 2015, 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide due to conflict, persecution, human rights violations, and violence - of whom 40.8 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs), 21.3 million refugees, and 3.2 million asylum-seekers (according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)). The majority (54%) of refugees worldwide come from three main countries: Somalia (1.1 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Syria (4.9 million), all three (Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria) affected by years of continuous fighting involving multiple internal/external parties and stabilization forces. By the end of 2015, more than half of all refugees were residing in Europe or sub-Saharan Africa. The majority (84%) of arrivals in Europe are from the world’s 10 top refugee-producing countries, including Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, Morocco, and Sudan. Other refugees have fled to Europe from regions in Africa where conflict has continued for years in spite of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, such as the Central African Republic (Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA)), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’ONU pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO)), and South Sudan (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)).

While refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing such conflicts have distinct needs as they seek refuge, welcoming communities in host nations also have needs and concerns that must be addressed for sustainable refugee resettlement and integration. Studies have shown that the risk of refugees radicalizing or turning to violent extremism lessens if they are integrated into welcoming communities (see SOLLIMS Lesson #2481). Yet, it is also important to address the concerns of the receiving communities so as not to produce further instability. A 2015 RAND study affirms that “the risk [of radicalization] can be mitigated if the main stakeholders adopt comprehensive policies that extend beyond immediate life-saving needs and address such issues as the refugees’ impact on the countries that host them,” (p. 1).
Europe is deeply split politically about whether or not to open borders for refugees. One of the most contentious cultural issues for refugee integration in Europe is gender norms about how men and women relate with each other. Some – not all – of the refugees come from countries with religious or cultural norms that are more conservative in nature than those in contemporary Europe where gender equality is prized. Refugees from these societies may be accustomed to a higher degree of segregation between men and women and to codes/norms in which women do not show flesh nor public affection and typically wear some form of covering. For these refugees, interactions between men and women in open European society may be a shock. Some may misunderstand social cues and assume that smiling or drinking alcohol with someone constitutes an expression of further interest. They may also have fundamentally different beliefs and values about what it means to be a man or a woman, in direct contradiction to European gender values. It is very important to note that this does not apply to all refugees – but that an element of the European refugee crisis has been the difference in cultural norms and values, especially concerning gender and sexuality.

This tension in values and norms surrounding gender is further complicated by the demographics of refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe. Increasingly, the majority of those seeking refuge in Europe are men, since so many men have fled Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to avoid participating in fighting groups. For the year 2015, over 66% of adults registered for asylum through Greece and Italy were male, according to the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Furthermore, the IOM estimates a shocking 90% of unaccompanied minors traveling to Europe to be male. This high percentage of young men has begun to affect a gender imbalance in certain age groups in European countries such as Sweden, in which Politico Magazine suggests that by the end of 2015, there were 123 16-17 year old boys for every 100 girls. These statistics are causing some to worry as various studies have indicated a correlation between an imbalance in a populations’ sex ratio and higher rates of crime and sexual harassment.

A series of alleged sexual assaults on New Year’s Eve 2016 – primarily in Cologne, but also in other major German cities such as Hamburg – exacerbated significant public concern in Europe on this issue. Some estimates indicated that over 1,200 women were separated and surrounded by groups of men (as many as 2,000 perpetrators) who harassed them, performing theft and sexual assault. Reports have differed concerning how many of the perpetrators were refugees, although many were initially described as of ‘North African or Arab descent’ and a public prosecutor claimed that the majority of suspects fell into the general category of refugees "[with] various legal statuses, including illegal entry, asylum-seekers and asylum applicants [which] covers the overwhelming majority of suspects," (Huffington Post). Police have been accused of hiding the exact numbers of suspected refugees due to political concerns of increasing anti-immigration sentiment, since the Angela Merkel government had opened Germany’s borders to receive 441,900 claims for asylum in 2015.
Only two months before this series of sexual assaults, the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation had released a November 2015 report with findings from January – September 2015 that the crime rate for refugees was the same as that for the native German population. “The study concluded that the majority of crimes by refugees (67 percent) consisted of theft, robbery and fraud. Sex crimes made for less than 1 percent of all crimes committed by refugees, while homicide registered the smallest fraction at 0.1 percent,” (Deutsche Welle). However, another 2015 study concerning immigration in western Europe and corresponding crime rates found that even if the crime rate had not increased due to immigration flows, the fear of crime had increased and spread with anti-immigrant sentiment. This fear has exponentially increased following the alleged Cologne sex attacks; the title of an article written following the rapes captures the extent of public concern about this issue: “Europe’s Rape Epidemic: Western Women Will Be Sacrificed At the Altar of Mass Migration.”

In response, Norway, followed by other European countries, has begun hosting coaching classes for refugees about social codes, gender/sexual norms, and host nation laws in the hopes of both preventing sexual violence and assisting refugees with navigating new host nation cultures. Norway originally started hosting these courses following a series of rapes occurring between 2009-2011 in the city of Stavanger, primarily committed by foreign immigrants (3/20 by native Norwegians). In 2013, the Norwegian immigration department mandated nationwide offering of programs for refugees on sexual and other violence. The nonprofit Alternative to Violence and the private company "Hero Norge" were both hired to train refugee center workers and run asylum center discussions. Other European nations have followed suit. Denmark is considering incorporating sex education into mandatory language classes for refugees; Germany is experimenting with similar classes at shelters for teenage migrants; and in January 2016, Belgium announced plans to introduce compulsory “respect for women” classes for non-European migrants and refugees.

Classes hosted at Norwegian reception centers for refugees are discussion-based and use role-playing scenarios in order to help those seeking asylum to avoid mistakes in their discovery of Norwegian culture. These courses consist of voluntary weekly group discussions about rape and other violence. They do not focus on religion per se, but on educating new arrivals on the laws of Norway that must be obeyed regardless of religion. For example, the course manual instructs in the rule that forcing someone to have sex is not permitted in Norway regardless of whether you are married to that person. It also addresses perceptions of honor and how violence understood to be honorable in some cultures is illegal in Norway. These classes provide space for refugees to open up about their own views about relations between men and women. The aim is to assist refugees in understanding different cultural signals. Typical interactions between native Norwegian men and women such as being friends, drinking, smiling, and flirting are explained so that refugees from different cultures will
learn not to assume that these behaviors automatically mean an expression of further sexual interest.

This type of coaching program has been controversial because of what message it might send as labeling migrants, to what degree it might play into anti-immigration politics as such, and if it is in fact racist or discriminatory by offering the courses specifically for non-European migrants. In light of these concerns, some courses have studiously avoided stereotyping migrants as criminals; the Hero Norge teaching material, for example, instead uses fictional scenarios with fictional characters; the native Norwegian in this curriculum is portrayed as a sexual predator with the immigrant as an honest man, in order to underline that sexual violence is a problem in all cultures, and that the behavior is the problem, no matter the identity of the perpetrator.

So far, attendees of these courses have affirmed their usefulness. One Muslim asylum-seeker from Eritrea who was interviewed in the New York Times about his voluntary participation expressed how he was initially shocked and confused by European society. He was not accustomed to the open consumption of alcohol, public displays of affection, or less conservative apparel worn by women, who, in his home context, would be considered prostitutes. As such, this asylum-seeker decided to attend a weekly discussion class in Stavanger. Now, he is less confused about the social signals in his new environment and is less likely to misread them. Other men interviewed by the BBC for a June 2016 article did not feel patronized or stigmatized by the classes but instead found them helpful for forming relationships in their new culture.

The purpose of these courses has not been to make false generalizations about refugees, label refugees as ‘rapists,’ or fuel anti-immigrant sentiment. The purpose instead has been to address the very real cultural differences in social norms between many refugees and the European societies where they have sought asylum/refuge. By promoting discussions about the laws and social codes of the host country, these courses attempt to protect both host nation constituents and refugees/asylum-seekers from misunderstandings which could lead to potentially dangerous situations.

“[I]ntegration policies that require people to shed fundamental aspects of their identity are unlikely to succeed. Sustainable integration should aim at giving migrants a real stake in their new home, encouraging participation rather than exclusion, while requiring full adherence to laws and respect for the rights of others.” (Human Rights Watch, p. 3).

Recommendation.

1. Host nations (in Europe, but applicable elsewhere) should continue to provide educational coaching opportunities and discussion classes for refugees coming from differing cultural backgrounds in order to assist them in navigating their new host nation culture, especially in terms of gender relations and host nation laws. Provide these opportunities not only for migrant/refugee men but also for migrant/refugee women.
2. Assure that these courses are not offered based on racist or discriminatory policies. Do not generalize all refugees into one category or assume that just because some may have committed crimes that therefore all have. Courses should convey that all crimes of sexual assault, whether perpetrated by native host nationals or by migrants and refugees, should be brought to justice under the host nation’s legal system.

3. It is important for refugee advocates not to ignore or downplay the tensions that do arise from time to time when refugees come from cultures with differing norms and values, especially concerning gender and sexuality. Space must be opened for conversation about real challenges arising in the process, so that host nation communities feel that their concerns and needs are being addressed during the refugee integration process. For example, reports written following the Cologne rapes reveal that some European women felt that their safety was the price for increased immigration. This is a concern that needs to be addressed during the process of refugee integration.

**Implications.**

If discussion courses are hosted for refugees to identify and speak about their own views of gender and learn about those in their new host community, then there may be increased understanding. If there is increased understanding about European norms concerning gender relations, then gender relations involving refugees may improve and host nation constituents (especially women) may feel safer. If host nation concerns are addressed during refugee integration, integration will be more sustainable and less likely to breed instability in the host nation. Educational classes about gender and culture may enable refugees not to misread gender signals so that they may be less likely to break laws of the host nation. Hopefully, this will work towards preventing sexual violence and keeping host communities safe.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was based on information found in the following sources:

- “Refugees to be given lessons in ‘Western sexual norms’ in Norway, ” by: Jake Alden-Falconer, Independent, (9 January 2016).
- “For Europe, Integrating Refugees Is the Next Big Challenge,” by: Judith Sunderland, Human Rights Watch (Published in World Politics Review), (13 January 2016).
For information on refugee statistics, see:

- For refugee facts, see UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) “Figures at a Glance”

For crime rate and radicalization statistics, see:

- “Report: refugees have not increased crime rate in Germany”
- “Immigration and crime: evidenced from victimization data”
- “Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization”

For information on the alleged Cologne incidents, see:

- “Leaked document says 2,000 men allegedly assaulted 1,200 German women on New Year’s Eve”
- “Cologne Sex Attacks: Only Three out of 58 Men Arrested Are Refugees, Prosecutor Reveals”

Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.

Additional Resources:

1) While this lesson focuses more on integrating male refugees to European culture, it is also important to be mindful of the needs of refugee women entering the continent. The following report expounds on this inclusive approach.


2) Providing coaching on gender issues for refugees entering a new culture is important. However, it can also be important to provide gender coaching in refugees’ contexts of origin when peacekeepers of a different culture are sent there on UN missions. The following is a report which provides an overview of gender training necessary for UN peacekeepers.


3) Issues of refugees and immigration can quickly become quite polarized, making it difficult for European constituents from the far left or the far right to find a productive path forward. Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek recently released a book - Refugees, Terror, and other Troubles with the Neighbors - encouraging Europeans to confront the actual cultural differences between their values and those of many refugees from Africa and the Middle East. Zizek’s book is...
discussed in “Love Thy Neighbor: Marxist philosopher Slavoj Zizek explains why we shouldn’t pity or romanticize refugees,” by: Annalisa Merelli – Quartz, (9 September 2016).

“In opposing the right’s racism, we must be able to countenance that a group of refugees could be responsible for the assaults and that these individuals should not be defended. We engage in our own subtle racism if, in defending the rights of refugees in general, we collapse them all into a homogeneous category, because all racism is predicated on treated an entire group of people as an undifferentiated mass. The key is to take these assaults seriously on their own terms and as part of a generalized scourge of sexual harassment and assault, which is not fought by picking out specific ethnic groups. What’s more, we should be suspicious of any people so keen to point out the links between Islamic culture and misogyny if they are not equally concerned with the prevailing violent misogynies in the cultural West. [...] It is, prima facie, preferable to educate in an effort toward integration, as opposed to scapegoating and rejecting. It would be far better still if these anti-rape, respect for women classes were standardized across Europe, offered not just to new and feared brown-skinned arrivals. Men everywhere are in desperate need of such lessons.”

- “Germany’s bad answer to the Cologne attacks: Europe should steer clear of anti-refugee sentiment and take sexual assault seriously,” by: Natasha Lennard – Al Jazeera, (9 January 2016).

Lesson Author: Ms. Katrina Gehman
F. **TOPIC.** Cash Transfers as a Tool for Post-Conflict Transition and Poverty Reduction (688)

**Observation.**

Post-conflict countries need well-planned and predictable assistance to promote sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty, and build institutions/capacity for providing essential services to citizens. Recent study indicates that "cash transfers" can help the immediate needs of poor households in a post-conflict country for meeting basic living necessities. However, there is little evidence that cash transfers can contribute to poverty reduction or to the government's ability to assume and sustain provision of services.

**Discussion.**

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) - an independent think-tank in Britain which focuses on international development and humanitarian issues – conducted a 3-year study (funded by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, 2006-2009) on the topic of "cash transfers" in post-conflict countries and fragile states. Part of this study included casework in Sierra Leone and Nepal - two countries that were recovering from 10-year civil conflicts. For these two countries, the main goals of the research & analysis were: (1) to assess receptiveness for using cash transfers as a tool for "social protection" (with the aim of empowering vulnerable populations, such as women, war widows, orphans / street children, sick, elderly, and veterans), (2) to determine to what extent cash transfers (greater cash transfers) could contribute to poverty reduction, and (3) to examine the role of cash transfer programming in the context of new state development and social cohesion within a fragile peace process.

With regard to the first goal of the study - determining receptiveness for using cash transfers for "social protection" - it was found, in Sierra Leone, that there was reluctance on the part of both donors and the government to put much emphasis on implementing further cash transfers. Donors and government officials were both concerned about whether markets would function well enough for economic program objectives to be achieved if cash, rather than in-kind transfers (food aid, agricultural assistance, basic necessities, etc.) were given to various target population groups. They believed that the government's limited institutional capacity would be a major barrier to effective delivery of additional cash transfers. They also felt that cash would be more prone to corruption than other forms of assistance. Additionally, they had the concern that cash, in particular, would create expectations of long-term support among beneficiaries.

The receptiveness in Nepal, on the other hand, was much more positive. In this country, cash transfers had been provided by the national government to the elderly, the disabled, and the widowed for an almost 15-year period. Both donors
and the government of Nepal favored not only continuance of cash transfers, but also an expansion of the program. Arguments they cited: Cash could boost economic growth in the local economy, recipients of cash would be empowered by giving them choice over expenditure, and cash would be more effective than in-kind transfers.

With regard to the second goal of the study - determining to what extent greater cash transfers can contribute to poverty reduction - it was found that in Nepal, although donors and government were very positive about this assistance tool, the likelihood of actually reducing poverty through an expansion of cash transfers was estimated to be low. Cash transfer values contributed to only 15% of household basic needs expenditures of the recipient families - nowhere near enough to pull them out of poverty. The cash transfers were not linked to any other programs or services for improving their livelihood / income. In some areas of the country, insurgency and armed conflict continued to pose problems for delivery of additional cash transfers. Local government institutional capacity for cash transfer delivery was minimal to non-existent; the Village Development Committees responsible for delivering cash transfers had still not become fully operational since their inception in 2002. Hence, it was assessed that expanded cash transfers would be an unlikely means for poverty reduction.

In Sierra Leone, the likelihood of cash transfers contributing to poverty was also assessed to be low. The government of Sierra Leone had piloted a Social Safety Net (SSN) program in 2007, targeting the elderly and certain other vulnerable population groups. The households in receipt of SSN cash transfers (16,000 total households) were receiving only $62 every six months. A second program was the cash-for-work program implemented by the Ministry of Youth and Sports; it targeted unemployed youth, ex-combatants, and former refugees. Recipients were provided $2 per day. However, this cash transfer / cash-for-work program was not linked to any employment agency / organization nor linked to any skills / training program. Long-term employment was not being promoted. For both these cash transfer programs, the government had no plans to increase national spending. Hence, it was assessed that expanded cash transfers would not serve long-term poverty reduction.

With regard to the third goal of the study - examining the role of cash transfer programming for state development and social cohesion - it was assessed that in Nepal, in theory, cash transfers could support the building of state-citizen relationships by targeting vulnerable / excluded population groups and linking those cash transfers to other services (e.g., civil documentation services, legal services, employment services). However, in practice, Nepal lacked the institutional capacity to execute comprehensive cash transfer programs. The Village Development Committees (newly responsible at the local level for social assistance deliveries) were not yet operational / capable of administering and delivering top-down cash transfers, and Nepal's social security budget did not include provision for improving their capacity. Hence, although the study
recognized some potential for state-building and social cohesion, that potential was not likely to be realized due to capacity and resource constraints.

In Sierra Leone, as well, the outlook for cash transfers as a contributor to state-building and social cohesion was rather poor. The government of Sierra Leone had made a conscious effort to target specific groups with cash transfers – namely, the unemployed youth and ex-combatants - and this specific targeting was seen as a means to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict. However, the government of Sierra Leone had excluded many other poorer households, and this exclusion was viewed as being detrimental to peace and stability, as tensions could likely arise between those who received assistance and those who did not - according to this particular study.

Of note, a third country - Mozambique - is only briefly mentioned in the study, but its experiences are noteworthy. Mozambique had implemented a rather successful cash transfer program in the 1990s. Its program was called the Cash Payments to War-displaced Urban Destitute Households Programme (GAPVU). GAPVU targeted families who were displaced by the war and who wound up destitute on the fringes of cities. GAPVU provided small cash transfers to over 70,000 households. This program was credited as having worked well for five years, contributing to household food security and household income, promoting family trading activities, and supporting home gardens. However, when there was pressure / stimulus to expand the program in 1997, expansion was soon overcome by fraud and corruption, and the program was then suspended.

Recommendation.

- If the government of a post-conflict country is considering the use of cash transfers as a tool/program for poverty reduction and state-building, it should first examine the experiences of other countries - both peaceful and conflict-affected - to confirm/decide whether or not to actually implement such a program, and, if going forward, how best to design and implement it. Key to program design would be the identification/inclusion of recipient groups. It is important to target as many vulnerable groups as possible in any delivery area - to preclude community divisions/tensions over who receives the aid and who does not.

- If the government of a post-conflict country is considering the use of cash transfers, it should first ensure that adequate government institutional capacity is in place to administer/deliver the transfers, reliable government systems are set-up for program monitoring to deter corruption, and adequate security is established in the delivery areas.

- If the government of a post-conflict country is considering the use of cash transfers, it should link the cash transfers to other programs - such as employment-oriented programs or education/training programs – to
facilitate the ability of vulnerable/poor people to earn incomes on their own, to preclude long-term dependency on cash hand-outs, and to help them become participants in economic development.

**Implications.**

If only select groups are targeted to be the recipients of cash transfers, and if other vulnerable groups within the same community are excluded, then this decision/implementation would pose the risk of community division, tension, and conflict.

Note: Cash transfers do **not** need to be utilized at all in a post-conflict country. Although cash transfers can help the immediate needs of poor, vulnerable households, there is little evidence that they actually contribute to poverty reduction or to building effective governance.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "Cash Transfers in Post-Conflict Contexts," by Rebecca Holmes, Overseas Development Institute, Project Briefing No. 32, November 2009.

**Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.**

A related article is "The Role of Cash Transfers in Post-Conflict Nepal," by Rebecca Holmes and Shizu Uphadya, Overseas Development Institute paper, August 2009. This paper examines the role of cash transfers in addressing poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion in Nepal's post-conflict environment.

A second related article is "Cash Transfers in Sierra Leone: Are They Appropriate, Affordable or Feasible," by Rebecca Holmes and Adam Jackson, Overseas Development Institute, Project Briefing No. 8, January 2008. This study discusses whether cash transfers are an appropriate, feasible, and affordable tool to assist Sierra Leone’s post-conflict transition and to reduce poverty.

**Lesson Author:** Mr. Dave Mosinski

**Note:** For information about cash transfer as related to Syria, see this study also posted in SOLLIMS’ Syria & Refugees COP: “Cash Transfer Programming for Syrian Refugees: Lessons Learned on Vulnerability, Targeting, and Protection from the Danish Refugee Council’s E-Voucher Intervention in Southern Turkey”
G. **TOPIC.** Solving Displacement in Timor-Leste: Dialogue Processes & Property Disputes (2477)

**Observation.**

Not handling Internally Displaced Person (IDP)/refugee resettlement appropriately at first may subsequently perpetuate additional conflict, as was the case in Timor-Leste when displaced people from the conflict in 1999 did not return to their place of origin but instead occupied land that did not belong to them. This contributed to social and economic breakdown precipitating another displacement crisis in 2006. Many displaced people were able to resolve property disputes and return safely, however, due to local reconciliation processes and dialogue teams coordinated by various UN missions, according to a 2014-2015 study on internal displacement by the Brookings Institute.

**Discussion.**

After the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia in a UN-supervised referendum in 1999, widespread violence broke out, causing approximately 450,000 people to flee (210,000 internally and 240,000 as refugees in West Timor). Most of these displaced people returned between 1999 and 2002 under the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). When IDPs resettle, there are three choices to achieve durable solutions: “by reintegration at the place of origin; by local integration at place of refuge; or by integration in another part of the country,” (Derks-Normandin, p. 7). In Timor-Leste, most displaced people did not return to their place of origin but instead settled in Dili (the capital city). However, most land where they settled did not belong to them. This was complicated by a high degree of informality regarding property ownership, with few people possessing official property titles, and many official documents either being destroyed during the conflict or issued differently from Portuguese colonial administration to Indonesian occupying authority.

Though it was assumed that durable solutions to displacement had been found by the closing of UNHCR operations in 2002, internal tensions increased within Timor-Leste, even without an external aggressor. After the 1999 returns, competing property claims and uneven access to property and land in the capital city of Dili fueled latent tensions between westerners and easterners (some dating back to Portuguese colonization). This was exacerbated by rapid urbanization which the government system, 70% of whose infrastructure had been demolished by the 1999 violence, was unequipped to handle. In 2006, there was a break-down in law and order as tensions erupted between the military and the police over discriminatory practices against westerners. The utilization of arson as a protest weapon destroyed myriad homes. By June 2006, 150,000 people had fled from Dili and approximately 100,000 remained displaced by the beginning of 2008.

After the initial crisis, UNTAET established a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in 2002 to investigate crimes, primarily focusing on return / reconciliation from the 1999 violence. Although CAVR as a whole did not ultimately achieve accountability for crimes, CAVR spurred an initiative called the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) which did become a success. The CRP used restorative justice through a traditional process called “nahe biti bo’ot,” which means “spreading of the large mat” in which customary authorities and elders would sit together on a mat to resolve and mediate conflicts; the process had local ownership of an all-Timorese Commission, and over 1,400 CRP were supported by CAVR. In combination with the peacekeeping missions providing security, these processes played a large role in allowing displaced people to return. People who were pro-militia and pro-independence could now live beside each other without fear of reprisal, which let them focus on rebuilding their communities. Unfortunately, the CRPs were not used for many of the new arrivals in Dili, which increased tensions amidst land and resource competition. Furthermore, while many useful recommendations were formulated through the CAVR process, such as the need for ongoing mechanisms for community-level conflict resolution, these recommendations were not implemented within security sector reform or by the national government. This failure to incorporate the peacebuilding lessons and approaches within the security sector contributed to the eruption of conflict in 2006. Actors were focused on separate siloes and did not coordinate simultaneously across the spectrum of activities.

After the 2nd crisis, the government developed a National Recovery Strategy (NRS) in 2008 to resolve displacement based on consultations with IDPs which had shown the primary barriers to return to be land disputes, damaged homes, and fear. The government offered cash settlement of various amounts based on the extent of damage to IDP homes, and the majority of IDPs who accepted this
recovery package returned to their origins. To address the fear factor, dialogue teams were created by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP). These teams prepared both recipient communities and IDPs for their return, hosting multiple meetings and mediation processes. “Given the complex and often contradictory process of land titling, the government decided not to hold the IDPs hostage to the protracted land and property challenges but rather to encourage IDPs to return even though they did not have valid legal titles to land. […] Instead of verifying legal title, the dialogue teams accompanying the return process sought confirmation from community leaders on whether or not the returning IDP families had lived in a particular house. Contrary to initial fears, returning IDPs faced little to no tensions and almost no re-displacement,” (Wassel, p. 16). Overall, this return process was quite successful. Although underlying land title reform concerns were not all legally resolved, these local-level accommodations made resettlement more durable the second time around.

**Recommendation.**

1. Local-level reconciliation and dialogue processes should be used to facilitate refugee and IDP return. These processes should have local ownership and utilize traditional and customary processes as much as possible.

2. Lessons from peacebuilding efforts such as dialogue and reconciliation processes should be shared with the security sector and national government. Various actors (international/UN, humanitarian, security sector reform, and government) need to coordinate instead of compartmentalize.

3. “If the UN is involved in the building of new institutions, these should be developed in a way to work immediately on potential root causes to conflict rather than simply applying standardized solutions that create hollow institutions that are unable to effectively deal with complex issues,” (Wassel, p. 20). This is especially true in terms of land reform.

4. Utilize creativity in addressing property reform in a situation in which there are competing land claims, legal precedents, and yet a political and humanitarian need for swift resettlement. This can be accomplished, for example, through local dialogue teams who can verify property ownership even without legal titles.

**Implications.**

If local-level processes of dialogue and reconciliation are not utilized to facilitate refugee return, underlying tensions between various groups of people may remain unresolved, which may erupt into further conflict. If these processes are used, however, especially with local ownership and traditional processes, they can re-build trust in communities. If peacebuilding efforts and lessons from processes of reconciliation are not incorporated into planning at the
governmental level and in the security sector, then ongoing tensions may not be addressed, which may precipitate additional crisis, like what happened in Timor-Leste in 2006. If UN missions do not focus on root causes and long-term challenges (such as land reform) initially, then this may be a set-up for additional tensions to build. If the underlying root causes are not addressed, then additional conflict (especially with land) is likely.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based primarily on the case study found in these articles:


Additional information on displacement (in the context of a case study of Kosovo) can also be found here:


**Lesson Author:** Ms. Katrina Gehman
H. **TOPIC.** Security Sector Reform & Durable Solutions for Displaced People in Kosovo *(2476)*

**Observation.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) under the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) contributed to durable solutions for displaced people in Kosovo by increasing trust/legitimacy in police in the security sector. According to a study on internal displacement by the Brookings Institute, a decade and a half after violent conflict forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee from Kosovo in 1999, most displaced have returned, thanks in part to these measures.

**Discussion.**

War broke out in Kosovo in the late 1990s, after President Milosevic and Serbians began to repress Kosovo Albanians, destroying property and driving hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. To prevent further atrocities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened, bombing Serbia until it withdrew forces from Kosovo in June 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999) then put Kosovo under the international administration of UNMIK to promote conditions for self-government, with NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide security. After failed negotiations, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, inviting the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) to stay alongside UNMIK, with a mandate (currently extended until 14 June 2018) to monitor, mentor, and advise rule of law institutions such as the Kosovo police. By 2013, Serbia and Kosovo had begun the process of normalizing relations. There are still occasional clashes, but overall the security situation has improved.

Several waves of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees followed the initial eruption of conflict in Kosovo. Between March-June 1999, 590,000 Kosovo Albanian IDPs and 863,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees fled from violence by Serbian troops and Milosevic’s security forces. “Overall, during the conflict an estimated 90 percent of Kosovo Albanians [1.9 million people] were forced to leave their homes, some of which were damaged or destroyed, others of which were occupied by Kosovo Serb families, but many were simply left vacant,” (Derks-Normandin, p. 3; See "Event" below). By June 2000, one year after Serbia’s withdrawal following NATO’s international intervention, the majority of those displaced had returned and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) had shut down its operations as part of UNMIK. At that point, however, a new wave of displacement emerged, this time composed of 245,000 Kosovo Serbs and Roma, Egyptians, and Ashkali (RAE) fleeing threats of reprisals from Kosovo Albanians. Riots in March 2004 caused another 4,200 Kosovo Serbs and RAE to become displaced, also slowing down the return rate of those displaced in the reprisals four years earlier. By 2014, a decade and a
half later, 17,300 Kosovars were still displaced within Kosovo, with 220,000 displaced in Montenegro and Serbia.

One factor affecting the return of these displaced people was the security situation: “most of those who said they wished to stay in Serbia cited fear for their safety after return, their property being destroyed and a worry that their freedom of movement would be restricted as reasons for not wanting to return,” (Derks-Normandin, p. 8). After the initial conflict, two different police initiatives emerged to address such security concerns in Kosovo: 1) UNMIK instituted 4500 CIVPOL police troops, and 2) UNMIK built up the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in order to hand security tasks over to the local police as soon as possible. Additionally, a “lightly armed civilian force with an emergency response and a humanitarian mandate” was created, called the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), (Derks-Normandin, p. i). The KPC was formed mostly in order to appease the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which had been composed of Kosovo Albanians resisting Milosevic’s Serbians during the 1999 conflict.

One way in which Security Sector Reform in Kosovo contributed to durable solutions for the return of IDPs and refugees was through vetting security sector personnel in these institutions. The vetting of security personnel builds trust both by holding perpetrators accountable and by making it less likely that such acts will occur again in the future. From the beginning, the KPS instituted a rigorous vetting process to verify physical and psychological fitness for potential candidates as well as background checks on past behavior. It was agreed that 50% of the Kosovo’s police (the KPS) would be formed from the KLA; however, these ex-combatants had to go through the same application process as all other candidates to join the police. This made the KPS more legitimate, preventing criminal, corrupt, and abusive elements from entering the police, which boosted consistently high levels of trust reported. The KPC, on the other hand, had less success with trust-building. It was largely not trusted by Kosovo Serbs, since it was composed almost entirely of former KLA (which had had a reputation of allegations of human rights abuses). Years later, there was an additional vetting process which enabled some of the older former KLA to retire with dignity and make room for additional Kosovars to serve in what became the Kosovar Security Forces (KSF) – however, this institution was still treated with some suspicion, since it wasn’t as broadly representative from its beginnings.

In addition to vetting, inclusive representation in the security sector increases durable solutions for the return of conflict-displaced populations. In the creation of the Kosovo Police (originally the Kosovo Police Service), UNMIK placed high importance on including a broad representation of social groups within Kosovar society. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was thus tasked to recruit and train (with the assistance of CIVPOL) a broadly inclusive police force. OSCE recruited actively, filling quotas of 15% minority and 20% female candidates. Ethnic representation as such is an important first step in building a legitimate security sector, but in a situation of protracted ethnic
tensions, this does not automatically lead to even-handed responsiveness by the security forces. It takes time to create a system “where ethnic background no longer plays a factor determining whose needs will be addressed and who will receive service” (Derks-Normandin, p. 20). Most Kosovar officers in the Kosovo Police ended up working within their own ethnic communities, due in part to difficulties that arose for Kosovo Serbian officers to work in Kosovo Albanian neighborhoods and vice versa. For example, in at least one case, Serbian Kosovo police officers refused to intervene when Kosovo Albanian IDP properties were damaged and occupants harassed.

In 2006, there was an Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) led by the international community which included community input to promote Kosovar institutions as multi-ethnic, representative of various groups in Kosovar society. “If the security sector is to be perceived as effective and legitimate, it needs to be aligned with the security and justice needs of the population” (Derks-Normandin, p. 14). The input from the ISSR affected reforms that were implemented over the next six years. This was especially successful in terms of the Kosovar Police. The process itself was designed for inclusivity, managed by a broad committee of Kosovar authorities, political leaders and those in the international community, seeking out perspectives of minorities and vulnerable groups (which would include IDPs) through focus groups, hotlines, and a traveling “Have-Your-Say” bus. Unfortunately, the review that followed the original ISSR was much less effective; in 2012, the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR) took place, but it lost its inclusivity and transparency in the process. The initial process and reforms under the ISSR in 2006, however, were enough to build trust/legitimacy in police and the security sector for many of the returning IDPs.

“When displaced people trust that the security and justice institutions guarantee their safety and access to justice, these institutions contribute to durable solutions for their displacement. [...T]hey are more likely to return to their original communities or to integrate into the communities in which they have settled when they feel confident not only that they will be safe but that there are effective institutions that guarantee their safety. Therefore, to the extent that SSR contributes to the creation of trust in and legitimacy of the security and justice sectors among the entire population, including IDPs, it can also be considered as a contribution to durable solutions to situations of displacement. Such trust and legitimacy derives from justice and security institutions’ effectiveness and efficiency in maintaining public safety, addressing crime and resolving disputes, as well as from their inclusivity, responsiveness to all societal groups and accountability (for future as well as past wrongs),” (Derks-Normandin, p. 17).

**Recommendation.**

For Security Sector Reform (SSR) to contribute to durable solutions needed to resettle IDPs, it is recommended to:
1. Vet security sector personnel starting from the initial creation of security sector institutions, holding ex-combatants to the same physical and psychological standards as all potential candidates.

2. Include and represent minorities and vulnerable groups (including IDPs) and women within the security sector; this can be achieved through quotas and active recruiting of multi-ethnic representation.

3. Incorporate IDPs as a disaggregated category in SSR assessments to track IDP-specific needs.

4. Investigate and discipline cases when police officers do not protect specific ethnic groups, in order to contribute to trust by preventing future occurrences and building responsiveness.

5. Review security sector concerns with the population, as transparently and inclusively as possible, with such processes as an Internal Security Sector Review.

6. Do not focus solely on humanitarian requirements for solutions for IDPs while ignoring longer-term security and justice issues which will enable durable solutions for displacement.

Implications.

If security sector personnel are not vetted, then the security sector may be filled with former combatants who had committed war crimes during the conflict; if so, then those who had to flee the violence may not feel safe to return if they know that the new security forces may perpetuate violence on them again. If the security sector is not inclusive of minorities, then minorities and vulnerable groups such as IDPs may not feel that their security needs are being met, and they will be less likely to return and resettle. If IDPs are not incorporated as disaggregated categories in SSR assessments, then their specific needs will not be tracked, and opportunities will be missed to integrate and resettle them based on SSR. If cases when police officers do not protect specific ethnic groups are not investigated and disciplined, then trust in the police as an institution will be eroded for minorities and vulnerable groups such as IDPs. If the needs of the population are not included in processes such as an internal security sector review, then the security sector may not be aligned with the needs of the population and it may not be as effective or legitimate. If international humanitarian actors only focus on humanitarian requirements for IDP solutions, security and justice issues may not be addressed which may prevent IDPs from returning or resettling in durable solutions.
“an ineffective security sector frequently drives displacement – either by failing to protect people or in some cases by actively undermining the security of citizens including those internally displaced – and therefore, security sector reform can make an important contribution to creating durable solutions for displacement,” (Derks-Normandin, p. 1).

Event Description.

This lesson is primarily based on the case study found in these articles:


Lesson Author: Ms. Katrina Gehman
I. TOPIC. Economic Development and Displaced Persons (456)

Observation.

The presence of large numbers of Displaced Persons (DPs), including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), are often the result of conflict, whether conventional military operations or counterinsurgency operations. The costs associated with their presence in large numbers can be burdensome on the local economy, the host government, NGOs and international donors, military commanders, etc. Their absence from the workforce and traditional economies results in their presence being a burden to economic recovery and development and keeps them in a state of poverty, thus retarding overall economic growth and lessening aggregate economic well-being. It also provides a ready source of unemployed and underemployed people who may harbor numerous grievances who then become potential recruits for insurgent groups.

Discussion.

DPs typically require food, water, sanitation, and medical care, along with a secure environment. If displacement is prolonged, schools will also be needed in addition to assistance with earning money. Military leaders at the operational and tactical level may be required to help humanitarian aid workers involved in these efforts directly or indirectly by providing security or, in some cases, transportation or other logistical support.

In cases where displaced people are not living in camps or other temporary shelters, such assistance can be provided as part of development assistance to the broader community. In those cases, it is important to make sure that the needs of the displaced are neither ignored nor appear to take precedence over the needs of the longer-term population. The displaced can also be employed in short-term jobs in construction, clinics and schools for their own communities.

In situations in which DPs cannot return home quickly, it is usually better to try and integrate them into the surrounding community, in lieu of housing them in temporary camps. This is because those living in camps are not only cut off from the local economy and society, but also because DP Camps often become recruiting grounds for insurgents, who may take over the camp and monopolize its resources. The presence of DPs, particularly in areas of ethnic rivalry or conflict, creates situations in which ethnically related mass atrocities are made possible by concentrating ethnically homogeneous groups among or near rival ethnicities.
**Recommendation.**

- Donors, international organizations, and the host government must design their programs and facilities to assist refugees and the internally displaced to minimize the likelihood that that conflict will resume.

- Donors and the host government should design programs to help the displaced return home or find new permanent homes. Measures that promote return or resettlement include cash grants or vouchers to pay for travel, seeds, and tools to help people resume their livelihoods.

- Donors and the host government should ensure that the displaced have access to schools, medical care, and other needs once returned or resettled. They also need to work with local governments and leaders to integrate the displaced into new communities, especially if not fully welcoming.

**Event Description.**

This is an extract from the RAND publication "Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations," 2009, prepared for the U.S. Army.

**Lesson Author:** COL Allen Irish
3. **CONCLUSION**

Consider for a moment if you were forced to flee from your home – What would you carry with you? Your loved ones? Your culture? A few prized belongings? Your own unique talents? Grief and disappointment? … Would you carry Hope?

This lesson report has examined various efforts at responding to forcible displacement, some of which have been successful, although challenges such as lack of political will and underfunding remain. Independent citizens have stepped in to fill the gaps in national responses to the current global refugee crisis – from NGOs performing search and rescue at sea to tiny Italian villages opening their doors to welcome refugees. Broader regional partnerships have coordinated alongside the United Nations to supply humanitarian assistance for host nations as well as to support educational initiatives for displaced / host youth. And, in prior situations of displacement, dialogue teams in Timor-Leste and inclusive Security Sector Reform processes in Kosovo have made displaced people feel safe enough to risk return.

Recommendations from lessons in this report highlight several themes:

1. **It is imperative to respect the safety and dignity of displaced persons and to include them in response efforts.**
   Just as all levels of society from individual citizens to international organizations have a part to play in refugee response, the inclusion of displaced people/youth in designing programs meant to benefit them is essential – as is ending human rights violations of refugees on their journeys to seek protection. As emphasized by the UN Secretary-General, “[P]ublic discourse on migrants and refugees must be shifted from one of threat to one of international solidarity, the protection of dignity and a recognition of positive contributions.”

2. **Short-term humanitarian assistance must be connected with long-term efforts that prepare for eventual return and reconstruction.**
   While rescuing lives at sea is essential, it is also necessary to address the political realities which have driven asylum-seekers to those routes – not to mention the realities of ongoing conflicts and root causes that contribute to why people are fleeing in the first place. Long-term educational planning must be prioritized from the very beginning of a refugee situation and connected to livelihoods path that will be viable if and when future generations return. Efforts such as short-term cash transfers may be more useful if linked to employment-oriented programming. Preparation for reconstruction starts NOW.
3. Sharing the responsibility across the international community is essential in order to reduce regional strain.
   In the wake of the Vietnam War, an international coalition led by the US initially resettled 450,000 Indochinese refugees. This type of coordinated international effort is necessary – and possible – for the current global refugee crisis. Addressing the crisis in Syria, particularly, requires sharing the burden of the surrounding region by increasing global refugee resettlement options and providing funding/resources to nations/agencies bearing the brunt of the influx.

4. Integration efforts need to address concerns of both displaced people and host communities.
   Integration is only sustainable if real concerns of host communities are addressed, such as infrastructure strain, security, or cultural differences. One way to address these concerns is through education of the public about refugees and education of refugees about host nation laws and culture (such as Norway’s gender classes). Providing places for refugees to belong with an economic niche to fill can go a long way towards successful integration, as in villages across Italy.

5. Refugee crisis response provides an opportunity for conflict prevention.
   Addressing root causes and ceasing ongoing violence is imperative to prevent further displacement. If not handled appropriately, displacement will likely set the stage for additional conflict, as when displaced persons settled land that did not belong to them in Timor-Leste. Integrating refugees into welcome communities, however, not only may lessen the likelihood of further instability but may also reduce risk of radicalization. For refugees hoping to return, addressing security/justice concerns is vital, such as by vetting security sector personnel in Kosovo.

As the current global movement of refugees continues, dilemmas of how to deal with trade-offs in migration have politically split communities here in the US and abroad. In this divisive climate, one final recommendation is for you – the reader – whomever you may be, and whether the current global refugee crisis has touched you personally (yet) or not: Don’t stop here. Become more informed. Learn about other current displacement – Burundians fleeing political violence, Central American children running from gang violence, the persecution of Yazidi and Rohingya peoples, and erupting displacement in Yemen. In a time when many people suffer worldwide due to forcible displacement, it is paramount that we share and apply lessons learned and best practices to improve response to these crises – and to forge hope that together, we can build a solution.

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- - - - - - - - - - Publication approved by:  COL Greg Dewitt, Director - - - - - - - - - -
Refugees & IDPs: Related RESOURCES & REFERENCES

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access some of these items.]

FACT SHEETS

- UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR): Figures at a Glance
- BBC News: Migrant Crisis
- Amnesty International: Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers
- Mercy Corps: Quick Facts

ORGANIZATIONS

- U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID):
  Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
  Refugee Processing Center
  The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
- ReliefWeb
- Amnesty International
- Human Rights Watch
- Migration Policy Centre
- MercyCorps
- International Organization for Migration

INITIATIVES

- No Lost Generation
- London Conference 2016 / Supporting Syria & the Region
- Leaders’ Summit on Refugees (September 2016)

Reports / Studies

- UNHCR: Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015
- Human Rights Watch: Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action
- Amnesty International: Fear and Fences: Europe’s Approach to Keeping Refugees at Bay
- VICE News: The Building Blocks of Fortress Europe: How EU Policy is Failing Record Numbers of Migrants
- Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

United Nations Guidance:

- In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants
  (UN Report of the Secretary General, 21 April 2016)

U.S. Military Doctrine/Guides

- Stability Doctrine – JP 3-07
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Doctrine - JP 3-29
- Protection of Civilians Doctrine - ATP 3-07.6
Annex A. Syria & Refugees SOLLIMS Community of Practice (COP)

For additional resources pertaining specifically to the refugee situation in Syria, visit the “Syria & Refugees” Community of Practice (COP) on SOLLIMS!

Syria & Refugees COP

This COP was established to monitor the conflict situation in Syria and the associated refugee crisis. It includes a LIBRARY of useful resources dating back to 2013, LINKS to other organizations involved with the crisis, a list of NEWS sources, and relevant LESSONS (many of which are published in this Sampler). Some of the useful documents in the LIBRARY include:

- Reports of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on Syria
- UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Progress Reports
- Vulnerability Assessments of Syrian Refugees
- Regional Studies by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

SOLLIMS members are encouraged to contributed articles and commentary to this COP for the benefit of the community. If you have an article or document that you would like to post to the Syria & Refugees COP, email the COP Manager – David Mosinski – (david.a.mosinski.civ@mail.mil) as explained in the “Announcements” block of the COP.

Sign up for SOLLIMS and subscribe to updates for this COP!

United Nations, New York
(19 September 2016)
Yusra Mardini, a young Syrian refugee living in Berlin, Germany, and one of 10 refugee Olympic athletes who took part in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, participated in a high-level civil society event of the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. In August 2015, Yusra and her sister fled war-torn Syria; when their boat sprung a leak on their way to Greece, Yusra, her sister, and two other migrants swam it to safety. (Photo Credit: UN Photo / Rick Bajornas)
Annex B. PKSOI’s CDR King Visits USS Carney

CDR Danny King – who is currently supporting PKSOI as the Senior Navy Advisor – met with crew members of the USS Carney, the U.S. Naval destroyer who aided in the rescue of 97 migrants in July 2016. CDR King was at the United States Naval Support Activity Souda Bay Crete in October 2016 to conduct the Navy’s annual Captain Edward F. Ney Food Service Inspection onboard an afloat unit moored in Souda Bay. There, he had the opportunity to connect with the USS Carney and discuss lessons learned from their recent migrant rescue. The framework created by the USS Carney Supply Officer LT James Conklin and LTJG Eva LaFiura for future such encounters can be accessed via SOLLIMS (to the right). The USS Carney came across this migrant boat in distress and provided aid for the migrants until an independent European humanitarian association focusing on sea rescue – the SOS Méditerranée – arrived to take the migrants to safety.

Framework Created by USS Carney:

Instructions for Alien Migration Interdiction Operations Bill

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS for access]

Related News Articles:


Souda Bay, Crete (October 2016)
U.S. Navy CDR Danny King is pictured (center) with the USS Carney Supply Officer LT James Conklin (left) and ENS Shepherd Sherwin of the Fleet Logistics Center Souda Bay (right), in front of the USS Carney.

Mediterranean Sea (29 July 2016)
Left: “Sailors assigned to USS Carney (DDG 64) provide security while members of the SOS Méditerranée ship MS Aquarius rescue migrants on a small craft.” Right: “A Visit, Board, Search and Seizure team from the guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) approaches a migrant vessel in the Mediterranean.”

(Photo Credit: Navy Media Content Services)
Annex C. Maps/Graphs of the Current Global Refugee Crisis

Global forcible displacement is currently at an all-time high, as evident on the above graph (UNHCR). However, not all nations are signatories to the 1951 Convention & 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which obligates nations to assist refugees, as shown in red on the map below.
Given the strain on the region due to this influx and the limited global access for refugees needing resettlement, Europe has become a primary destination for asylum-seekers. However, many European nations have responded by building extensive fences to secure their borders. This has redirected the flow of refugees to deadly journeys across the Mediterranean (as depicted in the following page). Asylum claims in Europe increased dramatically in 2015, and 2016 recently surpassed 2015 as the year with the most migrant deaths on the Mediterranean.

While Syria is currently the world’s top producer of refugees, people across the globe are being displaced from many other ongoing conflicts which also merit attention by the international community.
Annex D. Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers
(Available in SOLLIMS Library)

2016
Strategic Communication / Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations
Stabilization and Transition
Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations
Building Stable Governance
Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

2015
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief]
Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations
Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
Security Sector Reform

2014
Reconstruction and Development
Women, Peace and Security
Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”
Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces

2013
Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations
Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students
Multinational Operations
Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People
Protection of Civilians

2012
Medical Assistance / Health Services
Reconciliation
Civ-Mil Cooperation
Building Capacity

2011
Ministerial Advising
Fighting Corruption
Economic Stabilization

2010
Transition to Local Governance
Rule of Law and Legitimacy
Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping
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