


# Strategy Research Project

## The USAR: A Dedicated Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

by

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United States Army



United States Army War College  
Class of 2014

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Form Approved--OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 15-04-2014		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> The USAR: A Dedicated Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Colonel William S. Schaper United States Army				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Colonel Roger J. McFadden United States Marine Corps, Senior Service Representative				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> Word Count: 5,854					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Throughout our nation's history, the U.S. military has been involved in conflicts that have required post-combat reconstruction and stability operations. In the vast majority of our 20th century conflicts, the success, or lack thereof, has been glaring. Historically, the U.S. military has been the single element to conduct the burden of planning, preparing and executing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, (Phases IV and V). In the present-day era of persistent conflict, it will be critical that the U.S. military prepares to successfully conduct these operations to achieve the desired end state and successfully conclude military operations. This paper will examine the establishment of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as a dedicated force tasked with leading S&R operations, whose sole mission focuses on "winning the peace."					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Iraq, Germany, Post-Combat Recovery, Reserve Component					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 32	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> UU	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UU	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UU			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)</b>



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## **Abstract**

Title: The USAR: A Dedicated Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Report Date: 15 April 2014

Page Count: 32

Word Count: 5,854

Key Terms: Iraq, Germany, Post-Combat Recovery, Reserve Component

Classification: Unclassified

Throughout our nation's history, the U.S. military has been involved in conflicts that have required post-combat reconstruction and stability operations. In the vast majority of our 20th century conflicts, the success, or lack thereof, has been glaring. Historically, the U.S. military has been the single element to conduct the burden of planning, preparing and executing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, (Phases IV and V). In the present-day era of persistent conflict, it will be critical that the U.S. military prepares to successfully conduct these operations to achieve the desired end state and successfully conclude military operations. This paper will examine the establishment of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as a dedicated force tasked with leading S&R operations, whose sole mission focuses on "winning the peace."



## **The USAR: A Dedicated Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations**

The object in war is to attain a better peace-even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz's definition of war as a 'continuation of policy by other means'- the prolongation of that policy through the war and into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind. A state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy and future.

—B.H. Liddell Hart<sup>1</sup>

Throughout our nation's history, the U.S. military has been involved in conflicts that have required post-combat reconstruction and stability operations. In the vast majority of our 20th century conflicts, the success, or lack thereof, has been glaring. Historically, the U.S. military has been the single element to conduct the burden of planning, preparing and executing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, (phases IV and V). In the present-day era of persistent conflict, it will be critical that the U.S. military prepares to successfully conduct these operations to achieve the desired end state and successfully conclude military operations. As B. H. Liddell Hart has noted, without a clear plan for post-combat peace, the end result is a future of unrest and exhaustive measures which falls short of the objective of war. This paper will examine the establishment of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as a dedicated force tasked with leading S&R operations, whose sole mission focuses on "winning the peace."

In the past, U.S. commanders often conducted detailed planning for phase IV while phase III (defined later) was ongoing, such as during World War II. But, with modern warfighting concepts like Rapid Decisive Operations and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries, such an approach is no longer wise or feasible.<sup>2</sup>

With this in mind, future conflicts will require the U.S. military, specifically the U.S. Army, to execute S&R operations with an established force that is trained, manned, and equipped to win the long-term peace.

### Defining the Phases of War

Today's military doctrine provides the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) with a "flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations."<sup>3</sup> While these phases are generally sequential, they also operate concurrently and often overlap each other. In some instances, combat operations may be occurring in one area while S&R operations occur in another. Forces must be flexible and able to rapidly transition from one phase to the next. The following defines the stages of war as identified by Joint Publication 3-0 (Joint Operations).

Phase 0: (Shape) Missions, task, and actions are those that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities.

Phase I: (Deter) To deter an adversary from undesirable actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them. Deter is generally weighted toward security activities that are characterized by preparatory actions to operation.

Phase II: (Seize Initiative) JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for defensive operations.

Phase III: (Dominate) Breaking the enemy's will to resist, or in noncombat situations, to control the operational environment. Success in the dominate phase depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at the critical time and place.

Phase IV: (Stabilize) Characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability operations. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential

government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Phase V: (Enable Civil Authority) Joint force support to legitimate civil governance. The commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority.

#### Figure 1. JP 3-0 Stages of Conflict<sup>4</sup>

With the phases of war clearly identified, the focus on S&R (phases IV-V) will complete the end state objective of winning the peace and ensuring long-term stable nations who become assets to the global community of nations.

#### S&R Breakdown

The initial question arises in S&R operations; who's in charge here? The critical mission of these operations requires a whole-of government approach. Joint Publication 3-07 states "the Department of the State (DoS) is charged with responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of USG departments and agencies, DoD and components services and agencies."<sup>5</sup> This all-inclusive effort ensures a unified approach to economic, political and human security. It is critical that all elements of government are engaged when the shooting stops and phase IV begins in order to ensure all facets of government are committed to and focused on a unified outcome.

As seen in the chart below outlining a notional operation plan, military effort during each phase of war is projected to change.




Figure 2. Operational Phases versus Level of Military Effort <sup>6</sup>

As represented in the above chart (see Figure 2) which doctrinally outlines levels of military effort in phases of operations, military responsibilities for S&R during phase IV and phase V should be rapidly diminishing. However, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has continued to place the burden of responsibility on the backs of the U.S. military. This approach has failed to synchronize a whole-of-government strategy for S&R operations, leaving the vast majority of effort in the hands of the DoD. This failure by the national command structure to coordinate a whole-of-government approach has resulted in a patchwork effort to lead, in what some would argue is the most critical phase of conflict.

The challenges to share in the burden of post-combat responsibilities were present even during U.S. conflicts deemed highly successful. "When Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock took command of the U.S. Third Army during Operation Desert Storm,

he could not get useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict problems such as hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees. He later complained he was handed a 'dripping bag of manure' no one else wanted to deal with."<sup>7</sup>

### Why S&R is Important

S&R is the transition from victory on the battlefield to a long-term victory which achieves our national strategic objectives. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has been successful in dominating the enemy on the battlefield. The challenge arises in ensuring that this success on the battlefield leads to the establishment of long-term peace. As Flavin notes, "Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict. U.S. doctrine holds that the goal of military operations is to set conditions that compel belligerents' decision makers to end hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies."<sup>8</sup>

Following the end of major combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. fully anticipated the rapid withdrawal of combat forces from the battlefield, only to find itself in the midst of a major insurgency. The failure to successfully transition to S&R, the phase which sets conditions for long-term peace, negatively affected Iraq. Security, political stability, and economic viability were threatened. As a result, the U.S. rapidly lost the trust of the Iraqi people. The DoD was charged with leading S&R operations and quickly found themselves unprepared, lacking both the expertise and forces required to execute this massive undertaking.

Recognizing the shortcomings of both doctrine and guidance, the DoD issued DoD Directive 3000.5. "[This directive identified] stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations".<sup>9</sup> This directive was followed by the 2009 Quadrennial

Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM), which clearly identifies support to stabilization security, transition, and reconstruction operations as one of DoD's core mission areas.<sup>10</sup>

Having been identified as equivalent to combat operations, S&R operations now exist as a core competency of the U.S. military and must be given the appropriate level of emphasis before during and after a conflict is initiated.

### History

A brief look at history will further establish the critical nature of S&R operations and how this phase of war can set conditions for a nation's long-term success or failure.

No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose, the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.<sup>11</sup>

Beginning with a success story, post WWII Germany clearly demonstrated the ability to "get it right" when conducting post-combat operations. The whole-of government approach and long-term planning exemplified the daunting task of rebuilding a postwar nation in ruin. However, much like in today's volatile political environment, not all players were initially in agreement on how to deal with postwar Germany.

American planning for the occupation of Germany divided the wartime Roosevelt administration as did few other issues. Secretary Morgenthau and the Treasury Department, often joined by Cordell Hull (State) and Harry Hopkins (personal advisor to the President), favored the harshest possible treatment for Germany. Secretary Stimson and the War Department, frequently joined by the career foreign service, favored a firm occupation and a swift rehabilitation.<sup>12</sup>

Despite these disagreements, the strategic leaders developed a vision which involved a whole-of-government approach and long-term planning to insure lasting stability in Germany and the European region.

One of the early strategic leaders to enact this vision was General Lucius D. Clay. General Clay was identified as one of America's inter-war period strategic thinkers. Upon arrival in Germany, General Clay faced the daunting task of rebuilding a nation in ruin. Housing was depleted by 20%, food production was down 49% and industrial output was one third that of pre-war production.<sup>13</sup> With a staff consisting of the remnants of a WWII organization, Clay anticipated the need to conduct S&R operations. He identified two areas which would be critical in the successful recovery of Germany. His strategic planning included economic and political reforms that would return power to Germans and avoid Germany becoming a long-term welfare state of the United States. Clay identified "the economic unification of the country and the establishment of a federal administration" <sup>14</sup> as the ultimate goals.

Politically, Clay recognized the Germans' post-war dependency on American power. "We cannot expect the Germans to take responsibility without giving it to them,"<sup>15</sup> he said. With the Soviets establishing a communist political structure in the Soviet zone, Clay pushed to start political party formation in the western zone. He initiated the licensing of political parties at the local level first, which later established a "grass roots" democratic foundation in Germany. Within one year of the war's termination, the people of western Germany held their first local elections, and within two years, the first state parliaments were elected. These early elections firmly cemented democratic principles in western Germany which continue today. Clay had

accomplished his initial goal of returning political power to western Germany by establishing a self-governing democratically elected government.

Economically, Clay's initial guidance came from the "Morgenthau Plan", which outlined a harsh war reparations payment plan for Germany. This plan would strip Germany of its industrial power and turn it into a divided agrarian society. However, General Clay realized this plan would wreak havoc on the German people. His day-to-day contact with the Germans gave him insight to their struggles unseen in Washington, D.C. In addition, Clay saw the potential for an economically strong and democratic Germany as a counter against Soviet power in eastern Europe.

Having identified the short-comings of the Morgenthau Plan, General Clay worked with Secretary of State George Marshall to influence the development of a European Recovery Program (ERP), which would later be identified as "The Marshall Plan." Clay fully supported the U.S. funding of Germany's post-war economic reconstruction. Clay's first step was to implement currency reform, remove regulatory pricing, eliminate rationing, and reduce taxes. These steps made an immediate impact on the German economy. Henry Wallich wrote, "The spirit of the country changed overnight. The gray, hungry, dead-looking figures wandering about the streets in their everlasting search for food came to life."<sup>16</sup> As the western German economy boomed, the Soviet satellite economies stagnated.

From a historical perspective, the question then arises; how did the U.S. succeed in S&R operations in post-war Germany? A critical component was the decision to develop S&R plans early in the conflict. This decision laid the groundwork for future victory. Long-term planning for post-combat Europe began as early as 1941 at the

Atlantic Conference which resulted in the Atlantic Charter. “[The Atlantic Charter established eight] common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they based their hopes for a better future for the world.”<sup>17</sup>

Specifically, principles six and eight became critical to shaping policy and planning for post-combat Germany. “[The sixth principle following destruction of Nazi tyranny] they hope to see established a peace which will afford all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurances that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.<sup>18</sup> The eighth principle would abandon the use of force.<sup>19</sup> The charter established a vision for post-combat peace and security in Germany.

The planning effort continued throughout the prosecution of the war, culminating in the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. This conference included the leadership of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The primary outcome was the establishment of the occupation plan of post-war Germany which included separate zones within Germany for the U.S., Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

Equipped with the outcome of these conferences and agreements, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was instrumental in translating strategic plans into military strategies at the operational and tactical level. “Operation Eclipse” had two phases: to rapidly secure important strategic areas deep inside Germany, and to solidify allied control of occupied areas and achieve objectives established for the operation. “[These objectives included] (1) primary disarmament and control of German forces; (2) enforcement of the terms of surrender or the will of SHAEF in the event there was no surrender; (3) establishment of law and order; (4) beginning of the total disarmament of

Germany; and (5) redistribution of Allied forces into their national zones.”<sup>20</sup> These strategic policies resulted in a firm framework for long-term peace in Europe and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO would be the cornerstone of America’s European security policy for the next 60 years and continues today to anchor European security strategy.

Today’s strategic leaders can learn many lessons from General Clay’s experience leading post-combat reconstruction in Germany. Our nation’s whole-of-government approach engaged powers outside the military, including, but not limited to, the State Department, Treasury Department, and national economic advisors. This approach encouraged an all-inclusive effort to establish a strategic plan for post-war Germany, avoiding Germany becoming a long-term U.S. dependent. The strategic plan to assist in Germany’s recovery resulted in a nation that has stood the test of the cold war and is now seen as the economic cornerstone of the European Union.

As we study our nations’ history to plan for modern day conflicts, it is crucial to note that the environment following WWII allowed for a whole of nation approach that was planned, coordinated, synchronized and executed across the diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) elements of national power. Time constraints were not an issue in this extended conflict, allowing years for deliberate planning. Today’s stability operations, however, require a lead agency with agile resources, both civilian and military, standing by, ready to execute in a moment’s notice.

When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice. When weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act. And even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future. Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a

clever operation that was prolonged. For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.<sup>21</sup>

Contrary to the success of West Germany's rebound from war, Iraq's recovery following the U.S. invasion in 2003 has been viewed by many as a failure. While a whole-of-government approach and long-term planning were attempted, the lack of a designated and concentrated force to deal with post-war chaos hindered the U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq and reach the national objective of regional stability.

"In early 2002 the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs launched the "Future of Iraq Project" to assess post-war requirements."<sup>22</sup> This initiative provided the early and deliberate attempt at defining post-war Iraq's reconstruction requirements as identified by the Department of State (DoS). Furthermore, additional planning strategies were launched to identify post-invasion requirements. This interagency initiative outlined the necessary cooperation of multiple agencies, each playing a key role in the planning for the future of Iraq. "The outline anticipated seventeen working groups, composed primarily of Iraqi exiles, that would evaluate post-invasion needs in areas ranging from rule of law and public finance to oil, energy, and anti-corruption."<sup>23</sup>

As Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. discusses in *Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, planning for postwar Iraq continued, but lacked a lead agency.

In the wake of the October 2002 decision to delay establishing a civilian office in the Department of Defense to coordinate interagency planning for postwar Iraq, the existing planning groups pressed on independently." The USAID created a detailed plan for humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations. A Department of Defense team prepared to restore Iraq's oil infrastructure, and a team at the Department of the Treasury planned to restore Iraq's financial infrastructure. An interagency humanitarian planning team, with representatives from agencies across the government, worked at CENTCOM headquarters. But the absence of a single coordinating office meant there was no management locus around which postwar planning could coalesce. "What was lacking," Under Secretary Douglas Feith would later say, "[was] the integration."<sup>24</sup>

This “stove pipe” planning, with vertical operations lacking interagency strategic coordination and communication, proved detrimental to the establishment of a whole-of-government approach to S&R efforts. Consequently, the responsibility for the reconstruction effort fell squarely on the DoD. President George W. Bush scrutinized postwar planning and questioned the chain of command in Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s civil administration office which was detailed to manage postwar Iraq. At Secretary Rumsfeld’s request, and with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s concurrence, the President placed the Defense Department in charge of all postwar activity. Concurring with the President and Rumsfeld, “‘State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles away from here,’ Secretary Powell explained.”<sup>25</sup>

The President formalized the decision on January 20, 2003, by issuing National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24), consolidating responsibility for managing postwar Iraq in a new organization, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), housed within the Defense Department. With a stroke of his pen, the President superseded the existing system for interagency postwar planning inside the NSC.<sup>26</sup>

Concurrently, General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Commander, requested a large ground force (500,000 troops) to insure military victory and maintenance of security following the U.S. invasion. Opposing his plan, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pushed for a much smaller and more agile force (160,000 troops). The coalition ground forces commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, “Really felt strongly about the inadequacy of the force.”<sup>27</sup> The idea of fewer troops similarly unsettled CENTCOM S&R planners, as Major Fisher explained:

The thing we kept going back to was we’ve only got so many people. Do you want them on the streets protecting people? Do you want them on the borders keeping WMD from getting away and keeping terrorists from getting in? Do you want them on the oil pipelines to keep the oil flow

flowing? Do you want them handing out food to people that need food? Do you want them securing bank vaults and things of that nature? Do you want them conducting [medical programs] to build good will?<sup>28</sup>

Despite serious concerns from both GEN Franks and LTG McKiernan, in the end the Secretary of Defense, having the President's ear, prevailed in his desire for a smaller force.

Pressing on, the ORHA planned a deployment of relief operations immediately following completion of combat operations. However, ORHA elements arrived late, after coalition ground forces had already pressed north to Bagdad in pursuit of toppling Saddam's regime. The late arrival of ORHA and insufficient coalition land forces prevented troops from securing rear areas which led to widespread chaos, looting, lawlessness, and insecurity. In short, the efforts of the DoS, DoD, CENTCOM, and ORHA to coordinate relief operations in postwar Iraq failed within the initial phase of the operation.

In both the German and Iraq conflicts, it is important to observe the amount of effort dedicated to planning for S&R operations. In the case of Iraq, the end result was exhaustive measures which fell short of the national strategic objective. It was evident that post-combat operations required a cooperative interagency strategy. However, the missing piece was an element with expertise in stability operations, able to synchronize the elements across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and military (JIIM) spectrum. This lack of an "expert" element resulted in the U.S. failure to win the peace in Iraq.

#### A Dedicated Force

When Iraq's reconstruction began, the U.S. government relied on—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld —“quickly assembled, ad hoc efforts” to coordinate the resources of departments

long used to working independently. The lead agencies —the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development —sometimes coordinated but rarely integrated their operations: ‘stovepiping’ is the apt descriptor.<sup>29</sup>

As seen in the examples of Iraq and Germany, the U.S. military has been called to lead the difficult S&R mission of post-combat reconstruction during phase IV and the transfer to civil authorities in phase V. As documented earlier, doctrine dictates that phase IV and phase V should be led by civilian organizations. Unfortunately, today’s civilian organizations do not have the capacity to undertake this difficult and specialized mission. With this in mind, there exists a significant capabilities gap between the transfer from conventional combat operations to stability and reconstruction operations. Based upon this continual challenge, it is imperative that the U.S. military establish a dedicated force to plan, lead and execute S&R operations.

In today’s resource constrained environment, the U.S. military and in particular the U.S. Army, will be required to make difficult choices on how to downsize the force while maintaining the critical warfighting elements required to execute the nation’s strategic objectives. “The global fiscal environment brings growing security challenges to our nation and our coalition partners, necessitating a balance between identifying efficiencies and the continued engagement of a ready, agile and adaptable force.”<sup>30</sup> With S&R operations identified as a core competency and critical to the execution of Strategic Landpower, the question becomes who will be the responsible party? The answer lies in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), a force whose experience over the past ten years of conflict, coupled with its civilian skill sets, make it the best suited force to fill the void of S&R operations.

## History of the USAR

During the Cold War years, the USAR was a strategic reserve to be utilized in the event of a national emergency. The USAR supported operations in Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East but with limited numbers of forces. The Cold War assumption was that the active component (AC) was large enough to sustain initial combat operations thus allowing the strategic reserve the time to train and deploy. The USAR was seen as a force to be used in case of the “big one”. The USAR mobilization process was based upon a train-alert-train-deploy model which was laborious, bureaucratic and required a lengthy build-up period. This model was time consuming and, in some cases, required months for the unit to prepare for the rigors of combat. The events of 9/11 would require significant changes in the USAR force generation capabilities to support the nation’s lengthy combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The transformation of the USAR to an operational reserve was necessary to support the significant number of land forces required to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) operations following the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategic reserve model fell short of deploying the required number of forces at the speed necessary to support the Combatant Commanders (CCDR). In response, the mobilization process was changed to a train-mobilize-deploy model, which transferred the burden of training to home station and allowed USAR units to rapidly deploy following arrival at the mobilization station. Additionally, the USAR adopted the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This model allowed the USAR to synchronize, coordinate and plan unit readiness to meet the CCDR’s force requirements. USAR units would now operate on a 1-5 ratio, deploying once every five years. This model also allowed the USAR to provide deployment predictability to its soldiers, families and

civilian employer partners. The old mindset that deployment would be a “once in a lifetime event” was history, and a new trained-ready-deployable operational reserve mindset was adopted.

### Filling the Void

The Army’s focus has been conventional warfighting and its branches into COIN and S&R have been regarded as a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces and other specialists, many of whom are in the Army reserves.<sup>31</sup>

With recent history serving as an example, the U.S. Army will be required to execute S&R operations during both peace and war. Historically, this mission has required one unit to conduct both combat and S&R operations. In retrospect, the mission has failed. “The requirement to master post-conflict operations, to provide stability, and lay the groundwork for reconstruction of a defeated country, calls for transforming how we organize, plan, and conduct S&R operations.”<sup>32</sup>

The U.S. Army now stands at a crossroads in history. With historical lessons learned, it has the unique opportunity to fill a strategic void by transferring S&R responsibilities to the operational Army Reserve, an organization uniquely qualified to conduct this critical mission. This would provide the CCDR with a force dedicated to the distinct requirements of post-combat planning and execution and capable of conducting S&R operations in unstable environments whether at peace or war. In preparation for this transition, the initial challenge will be to reorganize the force to conduct S&R operations.

The USAR is currently organized into 15 operational commands that could rapidly be transformed into regionally aligned S&R division level headquarters. Each S&R division would have an assigned modular downtrace capable of conducting S&R

operations. Because the USAR is comprised of combat support (CS) and combat service and support (CSS) units, the new S&R model would require minimal force structure changes. The primary elements would be comprised of civil affairs, military police, engineers, medical support, logistics, and training. In addition to the military organization of each S&R headquarters, civil interagency positions would be designated and manned during exercises, peace time missions and wartime deployments. The organizational chart below provides a framework for a modular “plug and play” structure capable of rapid deployment to conduct S&R operations.

S&R Division Headquarters with Modular Brigades




Figure 3. S&R Division Headquarters

Essential tasks for these units must also be defined. “[Based upon lessons learned over the past ten years, the Army has documented tasks] to support a country in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustainable security.”<sup>33</sup> These tasks have been identified as the post-conflict essential tasks matrix, (ETM) as illustrated in the below table.<sup>34</sup> The ETM is designed as a tool to identify gaps in capabilities, develop a common language, and used as the initial S&R division mission essential task list (METL). Additionally, the list provides a framework for three phases of operation transitioning from post-combat to long-term sustainability.<sup>35</sup>

POST-CONFLICT ESSENTIAL TASKS MATRIX<sup>36</sup>

<b>Technical Sector</b>	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
Security	Establish a safe and secure environment	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate indigenous capacity
Governance and Participation	Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being	Provide for emergency humanitarian	Establish foundation for development	Institutionalize long-term development
Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure	Respond to immediate needs	Establish foundation for development	Institutionalize long-term development Program
Justice and Reconciliation	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms

Figure 4. Post-Conflict Essential Task Matrix

Now that force structure and mission essential tasks are identified, the USAR will become a dedicated force specializing in S&R operations. The benefits of assigning S&R responsibilities to the USAR are numerous. Four of these benefits are identified in detail as follows.

Unity of Effort and Planning

S&R commands will establish unity of effort/unity of command for S&R operations. The S&R commands will be responsible for planning S&R operations in

coordination with the regional combatant commands, (CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM). Each S&R command will have an embedded forward cell located with each combatant command. These forward cells will participate in contingency planning and will be responsible for providing the CCDR with pertinent information regarding the availability and capability of S&R forces. In the event of a national emergency, the S&R division headquarters (HQTRS) and staff will deploy with the CCDR and will be responsible for the employment of S&R forces and insuring a continuous planning effort. In the end, the S&R division commander will be the principal advisor on S&R operations and forces and is primarily responsible for overall S&R operations in theater.

#### Whole-of government Approach

These commands will have built-in interagency positions that will allow the S&R divisional HQTRS to be rapidly augmented by interagency partners. This augmentation will link the military organization back to the civilian agencies to ensure a whole-of government approach to S&R operations. It will be crucial for the S&R commanders to establish early relationships with interagency partners to insure the progression of trusting, dependable relations before the commencement of collaboration.

#### Timely Access to Forces

“[The USAR single command structure] allows for immediate access to— and use of— Army Reserve Soldiers and units for missions at home or abroad.”<sup>37</sup> It will be essential that S&R units remain an operational force manned, trained and equipped to rapidly deploy in support of the CCDR. CCDRs must coordinate with USAR leaders, and S&R forces must be fully integrated into the CCDR’s Theater Campaign Plan. This

coordination insures that the civilian aspects of S&R are addressed prior to the commencement of mobilization.

#### Cost Effectiveness

The U.S. Army is facing unprecedented budgetary constraints which will prevent the expansion of forces to address the shortfalls in S&R capabilities. The USAR provides a clear, cost-effective option to address the void in S&R capabilities. Over the past 10 years, the USAR has provided 20% of the total force for only 6% of the budget. “In order to maintain our operational proficiency, it is vital to invest in the training and readiness of our Army Reserve force.”<sup>38</sup> If funding is not secured to maintain an Operational Reserve, the U.S. will risk not having trained and ready forces capable of providing rapid support to the CCDR. Reverting to the Cold War strategic reserve places at risk the gains experienced in 11 years of combat.

#### The Naysayers

One risk associated with transforming the USAR to an S&R force is the AC will lose a large portion of the CS and CSS forces it has depended on for long-term conflicts. In the past, USAR elements have been focused on CS and CSS operations while the National Guard has attempted to develop forces that mirrored AC formations. With the conversion of the USAR to an S&R force, the National Guard will be required to convert a portion of its maneuver-fires-effects (MFE) forces to provide the AC with CS and CSS elements. In addition to providing support to AC forces, the conversion of these forces in the National Guard, will allow for improved support to state governors for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). This allows the AC to maintain brigade combat team (BCT) centric formations, and remain focused on combat operations.

An additional argument is that the USAR S&R responsibilities would be too large and complex for the USAR to handle alone. In contrast, the USAR has demonstrated its ability to handle complex and ambiguous problems at strategic levels. LTG Jeff Talley (Chief, Army Reserve) explains, "Since 2001, an annual average of 24,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized and seamlessly integrated with the Total Force."<sup>39</sup> "By aligning Army Reserve Theater Commands with Army Corps, Army Service Component Commands and Combatant Commands as part of the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces, Army Reserve Soldiers and leaders are executing critical planning and implementation to ensure full support of the Department of Defense's global requirements."<sup>40</sup> In 10 years of conflict, Army Reserve soldiers and leaders have operated in strategic positions across the Army and have demonstrated their efficiency and effectiveness in handling complex problems under challenging conditions.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, throughout history the U.S. military has been the principle element to conduct the burden of planning, preparing and executing stability operations. These stability operations are known to set the conditions for a nations' long-term success or failure. These final phases of war, defined as S&R, have been further identified as the pivotal shift from victory on the battlefield to long-term peace. With the goal of long-term peace in mind, S&R has been identified as a phase of war requiring proficiency equivalent to combat operations. S&R now exists as a core competency of the U.S. military and must be given the appropriate level of emphasis before, during, and after conflict.

As in Germany, these stages of war require a focus on early planning and a whole-of-government approach which must commence long before engagement on the

battlefield. An early successful focus on S&R in WWII resulted in long-term peace in Europe and the establishment of NATO. America's European security policy succeeded in achieving its aims for decades. The battle for peace, both on and off the field of battle, was won.

On the other hand, exhaustive measures in Iraq focused on the development of an interagency initiative which failed to produce a coordinating office to oversee the necessary reconstruction efforts. What it did produce was stove pipe plan with vertical operations, which proved unable to achieve the goals of reconstruction following successful major combat operations. These efforts failed to establish an agency with expertise in stability operations, capable of synchronizing elements across the JIIM. The absence of an "expert" agency resulted in the U.S. failure to win the peace in the Iraq. With the military led ORHA approach, the DoD once again shouldered the burden of post-combat operations, failing to meet the national strategic objectives.

With historical lessons learned, the U.S. Army has the unique opportunity to fill a strategic void by transferring S&R responsibilities to the operational Army Reserve, an organization uniquely qualified to conduct this critical mission. The implementation of this restructuring would facilitate a unity of effort in both planning and execution of a whole-of-government approach, timely access to troops, and a cost effective approach to modern day war. The current era of persistent conflict requires the establishment of a dedicated force whose expertise focuses on winning the peace.

## Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won," *Military Review* Special Edition, May-June 2005, 11.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), V-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, V-8-9.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 2011), I-1-2.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, V-6.

<sup>7</sup> Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," 11.

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<sup>12</sup> Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay, An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 223.

<sup>13</sup> David R. Henderson, "German Economic Miracle", *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, 2008, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/germanEconomicMiracle.html> (accessed October 24, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> John H. Backer, *Winds of History, The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983), 81.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>16</sup> Henderson, "German Economic Miracle."

<sup>17</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, "Atlantic Charter," August 14, 1941, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp> (accessed February 8, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army and Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 163.

<sup>21</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (London: Oxford university Press, 1963), 73.

<sup>22</sup> Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., *Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 2009), 7.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 33-34.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., *Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction, Learning from Iraq* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, March 2013), 37.

<sup>30</sup> Jeffrey W. Talley, *America's Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force For the Nation*, Posture Statement presented to the 113th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013), iii.

<sup>31</sup> Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 6 (November-December 2005): 8.

<sup>32</sup> Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 54.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations, Doctrinal and Interagency Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 16.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 17-18.

<sup>36</sup> For background on the development and purpose of the Essential Tasks Matrix refer to pages 16 -18, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations, Doctrinal and Interagency Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007).

<sup>37</sup> Talley, *America's Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation*, ii.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., iii.