RUSSIAN MILITARY POLITICS AND RUSSIA’S 2010 DEFENSE DOCTRINE

Stephen J. Blank
Editor
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CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................v

Introduction .............................................................vii

1. Russia’s Military Doctrine Development
   (2000-10) .................................................................. 1
   Marcel de Haas

2. Russian Military Doctrine: Past, Present,
   and Future ............................................................63
   Jacob W. Kipp

3. Russian Defense Doctrine .............................153
   Alexander G. Savelyev

About the Contributors ......................................181
FOREWORD

This monograph is the third in the series of monographs stemming from the Strategic Studies Institute-U.S. State Department conference on Russia in January 2010. It is devoted to a consideration of Russia’s military doctrine. Russia had long before the conference announced the impending release of a new defense or military doctrine, but its release date was always being delayed, signifying a sharp political struggle over its contents. Although the doctrine ultimately was released on February 5, 2010, after the conference, the papers were nonetheless able to some degree to use the new text in their analysis. As a result, these three chapters provide an extremely revealing examination of the struggles over defining the threats facing Russia and the responses that the government should take to meet them. These struggles, as delineated here, provide deep insight into the nature of Russian security and military politics and the evolving views of key military and governmental institutions. No understanding of contemporary Russian defense and overall security policy is truly complete without taking into account the “backstage” politics described here. Neither is the doctrine entirely comprehensible without the kind of analysis that is offered.

For these reasons we offer this monograph to our readers so that they can benefit from the expert insights of the authors.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
INTRODUCTION

On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) organized a conference entitled, “Contemporary Issues in International Security,” at the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second in what we hope will be annual conferences bringing together U.S., European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss such issues in an open forum. The importance of such regular dialogues among experts is well known, and the benefits of these discussions are considerable. Just as we published the papers of the 2008 conference in 2009, (Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for US-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), we are doing so now. However, in this case, we are publishing the papers on a panel by panel basis.

This monograph on Russia’s defense or military doctrine represents the third of the five monographs that we will be publishing. It consists of three deeply probing essays into the genesis of the doctrine, the political struggle behind it, and the actual content of the doctrine. They reveal a highly politicized minefield of struggle comprising leading actors in the Russian military, government, and security policy circles as a whole. They duly illuminate the ongoing struggles between and among these sets of military and civilian elites and therefore cast a shining light on critical aspects of Russian policy that all too often are left in the darkness.

In this context, it is fair to say that it would be impossible to grasp fully the nature and direction of current Russian security policies without such an examination of the struggle to formulate it and present it
to the public. The question of what direction Russian policy is following is of the utmost importance, given Russia’s importance in world politics and the new Russian policy of the Obama administration. Therefore, the clarification of otherwise murky and obscure trends that are of great significance to the United States will be of great value to our readers and audience.

STEPHEN J. BLANK
Editor
CHAPTER 1
RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT (2000-10)
Marcel de Haas

In assessing Russia’s security policy, the analysis of military doctrine plays an important role. Military doctrine forms a part of the national security policy and is a reflection of past and possibly future political-military policy. Therefore, to gain a good insight into Russian security policy, a thorough analysis of the development of Russian military doctrine is essential. This chapter concentrates on Russian doctrinal thinking during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev since 2000. Furthermore, this doctrinal review is generally limited to elements on external security, with the exception of the use of military force against internal threats, e.g., the conflicts in and around Chechnya. The introduction describes the theoretical setting of military doctrine within Russian security thinking and will also provide a brief overview of doctrinal developments in the 1990s. Next, Putin’s first and only Military Doctrine of 2000 will be explained. Subsequently, the paper of 2003, which I depict as a “defense white paper,” was the following major security document on doctrinal thinking. After 2003, no documents related to military doctrine have been released. However, the security elite—politicians, military, and academics—regularly made statements on doctrinal thinking. As of December 2008, reports on a forthcoming new military doctrine—replacing the one of 2000—became stronger, accompanied with
excerpts of this upcoming security document. Finally, on February 5, 2010, the new military doctrine was released. This chapter ends with conclusions on Russia’s doctrinal development since 2000.

INTRODUCTION

Military Doctrine as a Major Element of National Security Policy.

The fact that a state lays down the safeguarding of its continuation in a national security policy is a broadly accepted principle. The objective of this policy is to ensure independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, welfare, and stability by taking political, economic, social-cultural, and military measures. Each state has specific interests. The use of armed forces is especially determined by the perception to which degree these interests are threatened. The conversion of interests into objectives takes place at the highest decisionmaking level, the political or grand strategy. Russia’s political strategy—formerly National Security Concept and now National Security Strategy—explains that the Russian Federation (RF) has military, diplomatic, international-legal, information, economic, and other means at its disposal to meet its objectives. The political strategy enlightens Russia’s interests and the measures to deal with threats that could prevent meeting its objectives. From the political strategy, as the principal security document, doctrines and concepts are drawn. The most important documents for clarifying Russia’s security policy are the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC). At the military strategic level, security policy is converted into the use of military power by guidelines laid down in a military...
doctrine. Military doctrines can be divided into three categories. The most detailed are service doctrines, e.g., those of army, air force, and navy. On a national level we find the joint armed forces or military doctrine, which includes all services. Finally, we can establish multinational or alliance doctrines, e.g., that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This chapter describes only the military doctrine at the national, Russian-state level.

Russia’s military doctrine is more abstract and has more politics in it than is the case with doctrines of Western states, which usually concentrate on guidelines for military action. As a result, the Russian doctrine is closely associated with the political-strategic level. Russian military doctrine usually defines itself as a set of officially approved state views concerning war and its prevention, force generation, preparation of the country and the armed forces for suppression of aggression, and methods of warfare to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹ The doctrine provides guidelines in two directions. First, it deals with the needs of the armed forces in the field of organization, personnel, and equipment. Second, the doctrine provides guidelines for waging wars/armed conflicts. Russia’s military doctrine provides political guidelines for the direction of all armed forces and troops, i.e., the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as the other troops of the so-called power ministries, such as the troops of the security service (FSB) and those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990S

After the break up of the Soviet Union, the Russian military leadership was initially convinced that the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would develop towards an organization similar to that of the former Soviet Union, naturally under Russian rule. This would allow the CIS to have combined armed forces at its disposal. However, it did not take long before a number of CIS states decided differently. They created their own armed forces, independent of Moscow’s desires. Subsequently, Russia was forced to form separate RF Armed Forces. This also created the need for a RF military doctrine, which was published in May 1992. This draft *Military Doctrine* seemed to be the start of a movement towards a more assertive confrontational Russian security policy, different from the defensive and peaceful tone of the last Soviet doctrine. In the 1990s, doctrinal development brought forward this assertive policy direction in doctrinal entries on adopting a leading role for the RF in conflict solution and military cooperation within the CIS; granting itself the right to protect Russian minorities in other CIS states, if necessary by using force; lowering of the nuclear threshold by abandoning “no-first-use” statements; the return of terms such as “opponents/enemies”; (forward) deployment of RF Armed Forces and Other Troops outside Russian territory; and a fierce anti-Western threat perception. (See Table 1-1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2, 1993</td>
<td><em>Military Doctrine</em> ratified by Presidential decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29, 1999</td>
<td>Draft <em>Military Doctrine</em> endorsed by the Collegium of the RF MoD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2000</td>
<td><em>Military Doctrine</em> ratified by Presidential decree.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1-1. Chronology of doctrinal documents in the 1990s.
More specifically, doctrinal development in the 1990s included the following adjustments: A deteriorating relationship with the West was reflected in doctrinal entries on interference in internal Russian affairs, expansion of military blocs and alliances, attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems, and language that reflects the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. Another illustration of the deteriorated relations was expressed in the development of the doctrinal views on international military cooperation. Cooperation with NATO has gradually disappeared from the doctrines. As a residue of Soviet thinking that threats only came from abroad, internal threats were not recognized at first. However, since 1993 experiences such as Boris Yeltsin’s clash with the Duma, armed conflicts within CIS states and, later, the conflicts in Chechnya, have caused internal threats to be included in the doctrines. The growing importance of internal threats generated entries in other areas as well; for instance, regarding the type of conflicts. During the 1990s, the order of conflicts changed, with local and internal armed conflicts, rather than global and nuclear wars, being listed as the most important conflicts. The threat of a global war had diminished. The Russian military-political leadership realized that the security apparatus would be increasingly faced with domestic and regional armed conflicts. This shift from external to internal conflicts was also reflected in changes in the perception of the use of military force. The emphasis changed from external large-scale warfare to operations within the CIS and joint operations of RF Armed Forces and Other Troops in internal conflicts. Another consequence of this change of warfare was expressed
in doctrinal entries stating that the RF Armed Forces (of the MoD) could also be employed for internal operations, and that cooperation between them and the Other Troops (of the power ministries) was essential.

The leadership of the security apparatus, as laid down in the command and control chain of the doctrine, became gradually concentrated in the hands of the following institutions: the President, the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), the MoD, and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. Clearly, the consecutive doctrines gave evidence of a power play by the military. Since drafting the doctrines was mainly left to the General Staff, the military leadership was to a great extent responsible for the assertive tone of the doctrines, as reflected in entries on the desire of controlling former Soviet territory of the CIS and with regard to a fierce threat perception with a corresponding framework of tasks for the military. This forceful attitude was probably an attempt by the military to regain their strong and influential position, which had been diminished under Mikhail Gorbachev. Another example of their aspirations for power and influence was the fact that the SCRF, probably at the instigation of the military, was left out of the command and control chain in the doctrine of 2000.² Other entries aimed at diminishing the status and influence of the Other Troops. However, in doing so, the military found Putin in their way. Since the Constitution of 1993, the President had had a dominating position in doctrinal development and the Legislature no longer played a role in drafting or passing the doctrine. In the course of 2000, by removing the responsibility for military reforms from the General Staff to the SCRF, Putin made it clear that he intended to strengthen the position of the SCRF at the expense of the MoD and the General Staff.

In 2000 Putin started his first term in office as President by signing new editions of Russia’s major security documents. Shortly after the publication of a new National Security Concept (NSC) in January 2000, the subordinate major security documents, i.e., the Military Doctrine and the FPC, were also revisited. The order of publication and the generally similar points of view of the different concepts gave proof of a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach to the foreign and security policies. The new military doctrine was signed by President Putin in April 2000. This paragraph proceeds with the contents of this doctrine (SCRF 2000). Since the NSC (as of 2009 renamed National Security Strategy) has been the principal document in Russian security thinking since the 1990s, for reasons of unity and clarity the main entries of the Military Doctrine 2000 and of subsequent doctrinal documents and statements are offered in the format of the NSC, i.e., subsequently Russia in the world community, Russia’s national interests, threats to Russia’s security, and ensuring Russia’s security.

RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY

The doctrine mentioned a number of destabilizing factors: Extremist national-ethnic and religious separatism and terrorism; weakening of existing mechanisms of international security; and unlawful application of military force under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention.”

There was remarkably increased attention upon internal conflicts, irregular warfare, and joint op-
erations by MoD and other forces, which were the experiences of the Chechen conflicts (1994-96 and 1999-2010). These conflicts were examples of internal destabilizing factors listed as “extremist national-ethnic and religious separatism and terrorism.” A striking feature of external destabilizing factors was the prominence of negative tendencies with reference to Western security policy. NATO’s use of force in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a particularly clear example of its policy of ignoring Russia, which claimed a decisive role in Europe, as well as of disregarding the United Nations (UN) and the standards of international law. Other concerns were NATO’s new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and its enlargement with new member states in the East, adjacent to Russia’s borders. The doctrine rejected a leading role for other institutions in international politics other than the UN Security Council (UNSC). This provision was related to the objective of strengthening Russia’s international position. In the UNSC, the RF possessed the right of veto and was thus able to block undesirable resolutions. Therefore, the objective of reinforcing Russia’s international status could be promoted within the constellation of the UN. However, if NATO dominated international politics, the situation was different. In such an arrangement of the international system, the RF, without a veto right, would be more or less “dependent” on NATO’s policies. This explained the prominence of the UN and the UNSC in the doctrinal entries. The doctrine unmistakably expressed that both internal (the Chechens) and external (the West) “aggressors” had to realize that Russia was not be trifled with anymore.
Russia’s National Interests.

The national interests stated in the doctrine reflect the military-political instrument that the state has at its disposal to achieve the objectives of its grand strategy: Military cooperation through the CIS Collective Security Treaty, creating a unified defense space and ensuring collective military security; and creating a common security and military policy with Belarus as an element of the union between both states.

The Military Doctrine dealt exclusively with the international military-diplomatic dimensions of national interests. Apparently, the military did not desire to mingle in or simply ignored the social-economic security interests of the state. This was a short-sighted approach. Russian forces participated in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) in which social-economic aspects were of great importance in reaching a long-lasting settlement of the conflict. Clearly, the Russian military leadership must have been well posted on the concept of “broad security,” which nowadays is an accepted model in international (security) politics. Since the top level of the General Staff was raised in the ideological background of the Cold War, it might very well be possible that hawkish generals stubbornly stuck to the outdated and limited views of the military-diplomatic dimension of security. Furthermore, domestically, the first Chechen conflict should have made clear to the RF authorities that threats were not confined to the military dimension but also have their roots in political, social, and economic dimensions. However, if the RF authorities had taken this interdependence between internal and external national interests seriously, this should have brought them to the conclusion that the
Chechen type of conflicts could not be solved by military means. Consequently, in the interest of preserving and strengthening the RF’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as of eliminating the causes of extremism and ethno-separatism, not only military and diplomatic means, but also social (human rights), economic (development projects, building and maintenance of houses, schools and medical facilities), and political (reform of the bureaucratic apparatus) activities are essential. However, these essential aspects were not identified in the doctrine as consequences of national interests. Furthermore, as a result of the Union Treaty of December 1999, Russia and Belarus had intensified their cooperation. The military aspects of the deepened relations were stated in the doctrine.

**Threats to Russian Security.**

The doctrine saw the fulfilment of the political-strategic objectives as well as Russian internal and external security threatened by a number of causes related to the aforementioned destabilizing factors. These included: interference in RF internal affairs; attempts to ignore RF interests in resolving international security problems; attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on a global level; the expansion of military blocs and alliances; the introduction of foreign troops (without UNSC sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF; and the suppression of the rights of RF citizens abroad.

Protecting Russians abroad is a recurring theme in the doctrines. In the consecutive military doctrines of the 1990s, a provision on the protection of Russians abroad was included under the heading “External threats.” In previous doctrines describing “abroad,” the same expression was used as in the other two se-
curity documents: za rubezhym. However, in the 2000 issue of the Military Doctrine, this term was changed into inostrannya. Inostrannya means out of the country in general, it has a neutral, dispassionate implication. Based upon the changed connotation of the term for abroad in the Military Doctrine of 2000, the assumption could be made that the General Staff/MoD had become less willing to use force if necessary for the protection of Russian minorities in a foreign country.

Ensuring Russia’s Security.

This part of the doctrine portrayed standpoints on military deterrence, security, and the use of force, as well as the deployment of forces and troops abroad, for achieving objectives of foreign and security policies of Russia’s grand strategy. As main policy elements for ensuring Russia’s security, the doctrine listed: Suppression of aggression towards the RF and (or) its allies; Retaining nuclear power status for deterring aggression against the RF and (or) its allies; Maintaining the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and in response to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for the RF; and Possible deployment of limited contingents of RF Armed Forces and other troops in regions of strategic importance outside RF territory.

The Military Doctrine of 2000 permitted the use of nuclear weapons to counter aggression. It allowed for the use of nuclear arms to repel a conventional attack as well, under certain, not specified, critical circumstances for national security. This attitude was not unexpected, since the on-going decline in conventional strength apparently had to be compensated with em-
phasis on the nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, stress on (the use of) nuclear weapons was also an instrument to counter attempts to decrease Russia’s influence in the international arena. The doctrine allotted a special role to the Russian Navy in ensuring security. Since previous doctrines did not reveal a specific role for naval forces, this provision was possibly a new course in security policy. The increased contribution of the RF Navy to the implementation of the political strategy was possibly related to a purposive campaign of the top level of this service to strengthen its position. In 2000 President Putin had endorsed a document on naval policy until 2010, which was further elaborated into a maritime doctrine, published in 2001. In view of the fact that Putin gave his backing to both documents, he apparently was convinced of an essential role for sea power in achieving political-strategic objectives.4

HIERARCHY OF SECURITY ORGANS

The doctrine presented a hierarchy of the institutions responsible for national security. The President directs the agencies and forces that ensure RF national security, is the supreme commander of the RF Armed Forces, and, as the head of state, represents the RF in international relations. The Government coordinates the work of federal executive agencies and executive agencies of RF constituent entities concerning national security, provides the equipment of the RF Armed Forces and Other Troops, and directs the preparation of the RF for its defense. The MoD, the General Staff, and staffs of the services and the arms of the armed forces complete the hierarchy chain. According to the Constitution, only the President had the power to sanction the doctrine.5 Taking into account Putin’s policy of centralization of power, it was not surprising
that the position of the RF President in the chain of command of security policy was strengthened in this doctrinal edition. However, the chain of command listed in the doctrine revealed a number of deficiencies in relation to the control of the Executive and the Legislative over military policy. Parliament and SCRF were missing in the doctrinal enumeration of security organs. Unmistakably, Parliament was set aside. This was probably because the SCRF, theoretically the primary security organ according to the chain of command list in the doctrine, was not involved in controlling the military apparatus and so leaving it out of the chain of command was most likely a purposive policy of the military to reinforce their own power and influence in this policy dimension. The military regarded the SCRF as a competitor, and it was probably for that reason that it was left out of the chain of command. However, in the course of 2000, Putin would make it clear that he intended to strengthen the position of the Security Council at the expense of the MoD and the General Staff (IISS 2000: 109).


On October 2, 2003, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov published The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, by its format not only a doctrine explaining military operations, but also describing military capabilities—and therefore here referred to as a defense white paper (DWP 2003) (Minoborony 2003).
Russia in the World Community.

With regard to the West, the DWP 2003 showed ambivalence. In dealing with the West in general and NATO especially, the 2003 DWP posed a vision of two minds. On the one hand, entries showed concern over the enlargement of the alliance and the possible deployment of NATO forces on the territory of new NATO members. But it also mentioned that the NATO-Russia partnership would be further deepened in spite of these major differences. Furthermore, it stated that nuclear and large-scale wars with NATO or other U.S.-led coalitions were no longer probable armed conflicts and that Russia expected cooperation with the United States and other industrialized countries to grow with consequent increased stability.

Analysis of the characteristics of current warfare from the 1970s until 2003 led the Russian MoD to a number of conclusions: a significant part of all conflict has an asymmetrical nature; the outcome of a conflict is more and more determined in its initial phase; the party that takes the initiative has the advantage; not only military forces but also political and military command and control systems (economic) infrastructure, as well as the population, have become primary targets; information and electronic warfare today have a great impact on conflicts; the use of airborne, air mobile, and special forces has increased; unified command and control, joint warfare, and a thorough cooperation between ground and air forces in particular, have become essential; a prominent role in modern warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002), and Iraq (2003), is taken by long-range precision-guided munitions in combination with airpower, after air superiority has been established; and massive use of tanks and
infantry has to a large extent been replaced by long-range guided weapon systems and massive air raids (Minoborony 2003: 34-38). With standpoints stressing the importance of information and electronic warfare, unified command and control and joint warfare, and asymmetric warfare, the 2003 DWP demonstrated a realistic view of modern warfare. Correctly, the DWP focused on asymmetric conflicts as being at the contemporary forefront, instead of large-scale conventional wars.

**Russia’s National Interests.**

In addition to commonly used national interests—such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity—the DWP 2003 emphasized the following interests of Russia: weakening of the UNSC and unilateral use of force as a threat to RF political and military-political interests; legitimate interests of RF citizens abroad; growth of the role of military power in ensuring RF political and economic interests; and the possibility of preemptive use of military force if the interests of Russia or its allied obligations require it.

The document clearly listed national interests especially in relation to the military-political dimension. Entries mentioned under “Ensuring Russia’s security” demonstrate that the DWP 2003 attached great value to the armed forces in ensuring RF interests. This was regarding political issues such as on the UN and on protecting RF citizens, but also on economic issues, which could even demand the preemptive use of force. Since the DWP was a product of the MoD, it is not surprising that the military is given such an essential position to the exclusion of other instruments for ensuring national interests, such as those in the fields
of economics (sanctions or boycotts) and diplomacy (pressure or coalition).

**Threats to Russia’s Security.**

The DWP 2003 identified these as major external threats: deployment of foreign troops in the territory of new NATO members and countries that aspire to join the bloc; armed force used by ad hoc coalitions; persistence of Cold War stereotypes that aggravate the international situation; reducing the role of the UNSC is a dangerous tendency; demonstration of military power close to the borders of Russia; expansion of military blocs; and Infringement on the rights and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states.

The document demonstrated ambivalence towards the West because, in addition to a positive attitude as mentioned under “Russia in the world community,” the DWP 2003 also expressed an antagonistic approach, underlining that Russia expected the anti-Russian entries to be removed from NATO’s military planning and political declarations. Even stronger, as listed under “Ensuring Russia’s security,” the document stated that if NATO was preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes would be undertaken in Russia’s military planning and development of the Russian Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy. At the time of publication of the 2003 DWP, these entries caused considerable concern in circles within NATO. The ambivalent character of the document clearly gave evidence that it was written by multiple authors.
Ensuring Russia’s Security.

The DWP 2003 stressed the importance of modern and strong armed forces as an essential instrument for ensuring the security of the state: preservation of a strategic nuclear deterrent to prevent power politics or aggression against Russia and its allies; and strong RF Armed Forces with geopolitical significance for conducting operations in regions of vital economic and political interest of Russia.

Apparently, study of recent Western-led conflicts and of their own experiences in Chechnya convinced the Russian military-political leadership to concentrate on irregular warfare. Nonetheless, carrying out this realistic approach towards modern warfare was a concern. The observations that modern, specifically irregular, warfare could only be fought with sophisticated weapon systems, as well as by improving the training level of personnel, required financial means. The Russian Armed Forces, massive in form, were still aimed at conventional large-scale warfare and demanded a vast amount of money for upkeep. So far, military reform plans had not offered a solution for this dilemma. Unless the military-political leadership decided to radically change the structure of the armed forces towards one capable of conducting asymmetric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of the Russian army was expected to be hampered.

DOCTRINAL THINKING BETWEEN 2003 AND 2008

In the aftermath of the “Nord Ost” terror attack (hostage taking) in a theater in Moscow, Russia, in October 2002, President Putin ordered a revision of the
National Security Concept (NSC) and subsequently of the military doctrine and other security documents subordinated to the NSC. Likewise, after a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, RF, was taken hostage in September 2004, the Kremlin reiterated in its statements the necessity of new editions of the major security documents, which dated from the year 2000. However, in the following years no new developments in military doctrine could be discerned. Not earlier than 2005, Putin ordered a review of Russia’s military doctrine (Solovyev 2007). In August 2006, reports appeared in the Russian press on the draft of a new doctrine to be completed in 2007 (Kirshin 2006). These reports, however, were immediately denied by Minister of Defense Ivanov (“And denies” 2006). In the course of 2007, with the announcement of the draft-in-process of a new doctrine, it seemed that the news reports were correct after all (Myasnikov 2006). On January 20, 2007, a conference of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences took place in Moscow. At the conference, the academy’s president, Army General Makhmut Gar-eyev, and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, presented elements of a new military doctrine. The revised doctrine—to be published at the end of summer 2007—was to replace the one that was ratified by President Vladimir Putin in 2000. At the Moscow conference, it was stated that the doctrine then in force, of 2000—i.e., before the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terror attacks in the United States—needed revision because of the deterioration of the international security situation since then. Subsequently, in March 2007 the SCRF declared that in developing a new military doctrine, the growing role of force in the foreign policy of “leading states” would have to be taken into account (“Russia to revise” 2007).
After the terror attacks of 2002 and 2004, Putin had already ordered a revision of the NSC. However, after a report of Secretary SCRF Igor Ivanov in February 2005 on the draft contents of the revised NSC, nothing was heard on the subject of that draft document. At the conference of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences of January 20, 2007, Gareyev explained that the review of the NSC had been delayed and that the adjustment of the military doctrine would be accomplished first. The development of the new military doctrine, its sequence with the NSC, and the provisional contents of the doctrine clearly showed an attempt by the military to increase their influence among Russia’s security elite and thus on decisionmaking in this field. Theoretically speaking, a country should first draft a political strategy before a military doctrine, which should be in line with and derived from this grand strategy. Traditionally, Russia’s military had a fundamental influence on the state’s security policy. To remain in the forefront of security policy, the military in 1999 managed to avoid the SCRF and to bring out a draft of the revised military doctrine before the draft of the modified NSC was made public. After taking over from President Boris Yeltsin, President Putin in 2000 returned order in the security documents by first ratifying the final edition of the NSC and then that of the military doctrine. In 2007 the development of security documents seemed like a repetition of 1999. For unknown reasons, the revised political strategy was delayed but instead of waiting for this, the military were well underway in releasing a new doctrine, which — according to the statements of Baluyevsky and Gareyev — was likely to include nonmilitary threats and measures as well, which actually belonged to the NSC. Obviously, just as in 1999, the military leadership was eager to strengthen its position.
On May 7, 2007, CGS Baluyevsky formally announced that a new military doctrine was being drafted. Coordination of the doctrinal drafting in general was in the hands of the SCRF and the technical structure was done by the MoD (“Minoborony razrabotalo” 2007). However, after Baluyevsky’s statement, further news on a forthcoming doctrine was not released until December 2008 (“Voyennaya doktrina ozhila” 2008). In spite of the statements of Gareyev and Baluyevsky in January and May 2007 respectively, neither a new issue of the military doctrine, nor of the other major security documents, was released before the end of Putin’s presidency in May 2008. During the remainder of Putin’s second term as President, no further significant terrorist attacks took place, which might explain the absence of revised security documents. Other reasons might have been division among the different actors — such as the SCRF and the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs — in security policy decision-making or perhaps a lack of genuine interest on the part of Putin. As with the aforementioned doctrinal documents, the main entries of the doctrinal development from 2003 to 2008 are presented in the format of the NSC, i.e., subsequently, Russia in the world community, national interests, threats, and ensuring security.

**Russia in the World Community.**

In the editions of the military doctrine of 1993 and 2000, military threats and measures were separated from other dimensions, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and other nonviolent means to prevent wars and conflicts. These other spheres of security traditionally belonged in the domain of the NSC, Russia’s political strategy. The development of the international security situation demonstrated that this
division among threats and corresponding measures was disappearing. This led to the conclusion that either all related dimensions—i.e., all military and non-military security threats—were to be included in the military doctrine, or that the doctrine and the national security concept should be combined into one document, perhaps a so-called defense or security doctrine (Gareyev 2007; Solovyev 2007). The recognition that distinctions could no longer be made between internal and external security and between military and nonmilitary threats and corresponding responses was a noteworthy feature. As Western doctrinal experts had done previously, their Russian counterparts now also acknowledged that security is comprehensive and comprises all dimensions. In line with this was the call to strengthen the status of the SCRF, the organ to provide an all-inclusive and interdepartmental response to internal and external security challenges. These entries revealed that Russia’s military had an open eye for international security developments and for recognizing the value of related analyses of others.

**Russia’s National Interests.**

The statements on doctrinal changes focused mainly on (capabilities of) ensuring security. Only on the sideline were interests mentioned, such as guaranteeing the sovereignty of the state, protecting energy resources and infrastructure, and maintaining a balance of forces near the borders of Russia.

**Threats to Russia’s Security.**

Russia’s defense white paper (DWP) of October 2003 discussed characteristics of current wars and armed conflicts. Rightly, the DWP focused on asym-
metric conflicts as being at the forefront, instead of large-scale conventional wars. On January 25, 2006, CGS General Yuri Baluyevsky in the MoD’s Red Star newspaper mentioned as modern day threats organized crime, drugs and arms trafficking, illegal immigration, extremism, separatism, and terrorism (Baluyevsky 2006). However, at the same time he repeated the traditional “Cold War vestiges” of threat perception such as: the expansion of military blocs; military presence in traditional regions of Russian interest; ignoring Russia in international security politics; and attempts against the strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers in the world. Hence, although recognized as the primary warfare to prepare for, asymmetric threats were not emphasized as the most essential ones. This ambiguity in Russia’s threat perception—emphasis on large-scale conventional and/or nuclear warfare and, conversely, on irregular conflicts—has been a constant factor in military thinking.

Russia’s military observed that security cooperation with the West had not brought a diminished number of military threats. At the conference of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences of January 2007, Baluyevsky stated that the existing threats came from Washington: the course of America was toward global leadership and a desire to get a foothold in regions where Russia traditionally was present (Solovyev 2007). The next threat was the enlargement of the NATO “bloc” to the east and the fact that this alliance was involved in local conflicts near Russia’s borders. Another threat was the increasing spread of hostile information on Russia’s policies. Terrorism and separatism were only mentioned further down on his and Gareyev’s list of threats. Gareyev’s priority threats were those of specific international forces
and leading states aiming to affect the sovereignty of Russia, to damage Russia’s economic and other interests, as well as to execute political and information pressure and undermining activities (Gareyev 2007). The threat to energy security was also considered a vital threat, since leading circles within NATO now considered price changes of energy resources as a form of aggression. The second threat on Gareyev’s list was that of nuclear weapons—among others resulting from the construction of anti-missile defense systems—and the proliferation of WMD (“Russia to revise” 2007). According to Gareyev, in the end, nearly all holders of nuclear arms had them aimed at Russia. Third, he mentioned the start of armed conflicts and even large-scale wars as an existing threat. This threat derived from the motivations of great powers to reach military superiority and the presence of large military contingents near the borders of Russia, resulting in a change of the military balance. Finally, the fact that NATO had broadened its sphere of activities and was striving to act on a global level was also regarded as a threat by Russia. The entries on threats—mainly referring to the West in general, and the United States and NATO in particular—corresponded with the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. Yet, the anti-Western entries were not new and, therefore, not alarming. Similar phrases were used in the military doctrine of 2000.

HIERARCHY OF SECURITY ORGANS

According to Baluyevsky and Gareyev, in addition to advancing the strength of the armed forces, the position of the Minister of Defense was also to be reinforced (Gareyev 2007; Solovyev 2007). The draft doc-
trine suggested enhancing the status of the Minister of Defense by promoting him to deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Considering that Russia’s President is the commander-in-chief, this proposal included granting the Minister of Defense de-facto the position of Vice President. Furthermore, the draft stated that the SCRF should be the all-comprising security organ of the Russian state, which had not been the case in preceding years. To raise its standard to this level, the SCRF was to be under administrative command of the Vice President (Gareyev 2007; Solovyev 2007). The call to make the Minister of Defense deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as (de-facto) Vice President looked like another effort to increase the leverage of the military in security-related decisionmaking. With supervision not only over the military, but also over the troops of the other so-called power ministries—such as the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs—the extension of the position of the Minister of Defense with that of the newly to-be-established deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and consequently that of Vice President, would mean a heavy concentration of power in the hands of one person, possibly giving preference to military power at the expense of other security organs.

Military Cooperation.

Gareyev called for a comparison with military doctrines of other key players in international security—such as China, the United States, and NATO—in order to include entries of their common threats, for instance on terrorism, into Russia’s revised military doctrine. Moreover, to counter threats, Gareyev pleaded for a “division of labor” among East and West, by deter-
mining areas of responsibility between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led CIS military alliance (Gareyev 2007). The demand for a comparison of threat perceptions with doctrines of other important actors—China, the United States, and NATO—demonstrated Russia’s willingness to learn from others and not to consider itself in an isolated position. Related to this was the proposal to construct a division in areas of responsibility between NATO and the CSTO. Although this was to be unacceptable to the Western alliance, which, according to its 1999 Strategic Concept, regarded itself responsible for the unspecified Euro-Atlantic region, the fact that Russia encouraged cooperation between both military partnerships could possibly be valuable in the near future but, more importantly, also showed that Russia wished to continue security teamwork with the West in spite of the differences, as emphasized in entries on threats from the West.

**Priority Dilemma between Conventional or Nuclear Forces.**

Although President Putin, Minister of Defense Ivanov, parliamentarians, and academics regularly stated that radical modernization of the armed forces was necessary to cope with modern day warfare and contemporary threats, corresponding measures could hardly be traced. The status of material and personnel, as well as plans for the future, did not coincide with the perceived interest in acquiring capabilities for modern warfare. A large part of Russia’s weaponry was becoming obsolete. However, the level of investments made for buying new hardware was too low. The number of arms and equipment becoming out-
dated grew faster than the number of arms and equipment meant to replace them. Around 2006 the share of modern military hardware was only some 20 percent of the total, whereas the weaponry of the armed forces of NATO countries was more than 70 percent modern (“Russian forces” 2006). To counter the threats, according to the excerpts of the draft doctrine of 2007, Russia’s military organization was to be strengthened, both financially and politically. The size of the armed forces—more than one million—demanded a lot of money, not only for (low level) salaries, but also for other facilities to keep the forces going, thus preventing modernization of arms. Furthermore, a large share of the actual investment was not going to conventional but to nuclear forces, which became a vital reason for lack of investment in conventional forces. However, the provisional entries of the doctrine also emphasized the reinforcement of Russia’s nuclear capabilities (Yasmann 2007). The political and military elite recognized the necessity of introducing modern arms to replace the majority of obsolete ones. However, the aforementioned ambiguity between nuclear and conventional arms was also visible in the State Programme of Armaments, Gosudarstvennaya Programma razvitiya Vooruzheniy (GPV). The GPV is a classified document covering domestic arms procurement, military related research and development (R&D), and the repair and modernization of arms and other military equipment, describing a 10-year period, of which the first 5 years are described in detail (IISS 2009: 214-215). A central point in the GPV-2015 was emphasis on the nuclear deterrent (FTsP 2008). Russia’s strategic deterrent had shrunk from 1,398 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 1991 to 430 missiles in 2008 (IISS 2009: 214). According to the GPV-2015, by 2020 Russia
was to be equipped with a modern nuclear force by acquiring Topol-M land-based and Bulava submarine-launched ICBMs, as well as a number of new strategic bombers and (nuclear) submarines equipped with the Bulava. Conventional procurement would entail weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, fighter aircraft, helicopters, and air defense missile systems. Apparently, the political leadership could or would not decide in which way military reforms were to go, either towards smaller, conventional, professional, high-tech, expeditionary forces—the direction Western armed forces moved to—or to continue with large but old-fashioned conventional forces together with modernized nuclear strategic-deterrent forces, to emphasize Russia’s vital status in the international arena.

Large-Scale Static Conscript Forces versus Professional Expeditionary Forces.

In the DWP 2003, Russia rightly focused on modern high-tech warfare and on asymmetric conflicts instead of large-scale conventional wars. However, the traditional large-scale structure of the armed forces was not changed, which obstructed the adaptation of the armed forces to modern warfare. There were no indications that Russia was moving towards a model of Western-style modern forces. According to future plans, a large military force largely composed of conscripts was to be maintained. Russian military reforms were limited to reduction of manpower and an organizational change from a five-services (including strategic missile and air defense forces) into a three-services structure (air, ground, and naval forces). Military exercises—such as the (mainly) Russian-Sino
military manoeuvres of 2005 and 2007—demonstrated that Russia was capable of handling conventional warfare (Haas 2005; 2007). However, this applied to a large extent to deploying forces in a traditional way. Moreover, there were no indications that the armed forces were trained and equipped for wide-ranging, complex military operations abroad, as had become the core business of Western armed forces in that decade. During Putin’s presidency, Russia refrained from radically changing the structure of the armed forces towards one that was capable of addressing the challenges of modern warfare and current threats. Russia’s global ambitions, resulting from its endeavors to restore its superpower status, demanded the capability of power projection by highly skilled, modern equipped, expeditionary military forces that could be deployed at short notice anywhere in the world. However, instead of conventional modernization, the nuclear deterrent received priority. At the same time, protracted conflicts in the North Caucasus—Russia’s Achilles heel—demanded armed forces capable of conducting asymmetric warfare against an irregular opponent. During Putin’s presidency, neither the status of Russia’s armed forces, nor future plans lived up to these two demands on the military.

Reorganization of the Military Administrative Structure.

Since the end of 2005, more and more details were made public on a change of thinking towards the organization of the armed forces. Traditionally, Russia’s military had been administratively organized in military districts, for instance those of Moscow, North Caucasus, and the Far East. New Russian military

The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 was part of a consistent assertive stance in Moscow’s foreign and security policy, of which military power is
one of the major instruments. Around the military campaign in Georgia, President Medvedev launched new policy concepts, emphasizing Russia’s return to a position of strength. However, this assertive stance in external security policy was not matched with a military apparatus capable of executing these political ambitions. Although a victory for the Kremlin, the Georgian conflict clearly demonstrated shortcomings in the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. A large part of Russia’s weaponry was obsolete, and the operations were conducted in a traditional way of massive artillery barrages, counter to the high-tech warfare of the West. After the conflict, the Kremlin concluded that the military should be brought in line with Russia’s (regained) status as an important power in the international arena. Thus, ambitious procurement and military reform plans were announced.

Enhancing Rearmament While Continuing Focus on Nuclear Deterrence.

Under Putin’s presidency, the State Programme of Armaments GPV-2015 covering the period 2007-15 was developed. After the Georgia conflict, President Medvedev ordered an acceleration of the modernization plans for the armed forces. Although this was already well known, the conflict once again confirmed that a large part of the weaponry of the Russian Armed Forces was obsolete, which hampered successful conduct of operations. According to the GPV-2015, as of 2011-12 the military would receive new weapon systems on a large scale. The Georgia conflict revealed that the level of the existing arms was even worse than previously assumed. This convinced the political and military elite that the pace of modernization should
be enhanced, i.e., new weapon systems were soon to be introduced. As underlined in the statements on the GPV under Putin, after the Georgia conflict—in spite of its purely conventional warfare nature—remarkably, emphasis was again laid on the nuclear forces as the guarantee for Russia’s national security. Prioritization of the nuclear deterrence was clarified by the assumption that no state would dare to attack a nuclear power. In October 2008, the Kremlin intended to allocate extra financial means for the enhanced modernization of the military (Denisov 2008). This line of policy was still formally valid in March 2009, stressing that the GPV-2015 would not be affected by the financial crisis. Again, priority for procurement of nuclear weapons—amounting to 25 percent of the expenditures on armament—was stressed.

**Reorganization of Units and Structures.**

Soon after the Georgian conflict, in September 2008 President Medvedev made a first statement on the necessity of modernizing the weapon systems of the armed forces, as well as their organizational structures and personnel. After this first announcement, a number of detailed military reform plans were to follow at a rapid pace, provided not only by President Medvedev, but also by First Vice-Premier Sergei Ivanov, Defense Minister Serdyukov, and Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov. The DWP 2003 had been the first Russian security document to express the need for restructuring the armed forces into Western-type expeditionary forces, comprising well-equipped and well-trained troops with strategic air and sea lift capacities, which could be deployed in irregular operations rapidly and far away from the
motherland. However, under Putin no structural modernization plans were undertaken, except for preparing for the large-scale introduction of modern weapons. The military reform plans of Medvedev provided a realistic attitude toward the present problems of the armed forces, sound measures to solve them, and ambitious plans to develop a modern military apparatus. The main objectives of the reorganization plans were the following. The combat readiness of the armed forces would be improved by deleting the unit levels of division and regiment and by creating permanent combat ready brigades. With regard to the structure of the military, in 2008 only 20 percent of the military units were in permanent readiness status. According to the reform plans, most largely unfilled framework units would be dissolved in favor of establishing permanent ready units. The restructuring measures dictated that in 2011 all (remaining) units should be permanently ready for deployment. Related to this was that the number of military units would be reduced from 1,890 in 2008 to 172 units in 2012. The total of 172 units would consist of 80 brigades, all permanently ready. These self-contained modular brigades would be capable of conducting operations independent of other units. The reorganization to a brigade-based structure was executed at a fast pace; in June 2009 50 brigades were already formed, and in December 2009 the establishment of the full number of some 80 brigades was to be accomplished (“Brigadnomu” 2009). Furthermore, if Moscow was to apply power projection more successfully than in the Georgian conflict, rapid reaction forces capable of conducting operations at short notice would be required. For this purpose, airborne brigades would be formed in each military district. Also, the number of available troops would be
raised by reducing the number of senior officers and increasing the number of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). This was intended to end the discrepancy of the overload of officers compared to soldiers (until now officers filled between a third and half of the armed forces) and to organize a professional NCO corps. This would not only enhance the number of troops but also strengthen the combat readiness of the armed forces.

**Assessment on Modernization and Reorganization Plans for the Military.**

Fewer staff levels and reduced burden of command and control, more troops available for combat action, as well as the concentration on modern-equipped permanent ready and rapid reaction units would improve decisionmaking and usability of the military and provide the Kremlin with power projection capabilities in support of its foreign security policy. This must have been President Medvedev’s objective for getting actively involved in modernizing Russia’s military power. However, for a number of reasons, it is uncertain whether these plans will be fully carried out and successful in enhancing the capabilities of the military. For many years, the armed forces have been faced with military reforms that were not carried out because of obstruction by the military leadership and a lack of will on the part of the security elite. Furthermore, although Russia’s defense budget had risen rapidly under Putin, there was no considerable improvement visible in the combat readiness of the forces. Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, a former tax official, was appointed to this post by former President Putin especially to counter corruption
and obstruction by the military leadership. He faced a lot of opposition from the military leadership against his reform plans due to the intended deep cuts in the officer corps and central staff. Next, Russia was suffering heavily from the international financial crises to the extent that the financial reserves built up by oil and natural gas revenues were fading away rapidly, with consequences for rearment.

Around December 2008, the reform plans still called for raising the number of modern weapons and equipment to 80-100 percent of the total by 2020. However, in March 2009, the modernization aim was lowered to 70 percent advanced weapons in 2020 (“Russia to downsize” 2008; Naumov 2008; “Russian military to be fully rearmed” 2008; Kremlin 2008a/b, 2009; “Russia announces” 2009). In addition, although aiming to reform its military into Western-style expeditionary forces, Russia’s security elite continued to consider combat readiness and modernization of nuclear arms as its first priority, which was not consistent with the overall reform plans and could prove to be counterproductive to conventional arms reforms. Moreover, due to the inefficiency of the military industrial complex (MIC) and its contracts for arms export—meaning crucial revenues for the upkeep of the MIC—the output capability of the military industries was likely to be insufficient to deliver the requested amount of modern weapons for the RF Armed Forces. Hence, due to a number of developments, it was uncertain that Moscow was going to acquire fully modernized armed forces, skilled for power projection, to accomplish the political-strategic objectives of the foreign security policy of the Kremlin. However, what would be the use of a revised military doctrine without correspondingly updated armed forces?
Preparation of a New Military Doctrine.

After many years of discussion on a revised military doctrine and reiterated announcements on the publication of such a document, at the end of 2008 signals became stronger that this time the process of launching a new military doctrine had to be taken seriously. Probably the proceeding military reforms and the aftermath of the Georgian conflict had convinced Russia’s security elite that an updated military doctrine was now inevitable. In December 2008, the Kremlin announced plans for a new military doctrine. At the SCRF, an interdepartmental working group was formed, consisting of delegates of federal state organs, the Duma, the Federation Council, the regional presidential representatives, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Military Sciences, as well of scientific and civil organizations (Borisov 2009). The working group drafting the new doctrine under the auspices of the SCRF was led by Deputy Secretary of the SCRF Baluyevsky. Deputy CGS General Anatoly Nogovitsyn was head of the working group on the development of military doctrine of the MoD (“Voyennaya doktrina ozhila” 2008; “Genshtab” 2009; Litovkin 2009). General Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences and member of the scientific council of the SCRF, was also involved in drafting the new doctrine (Nikolskiy 2009). On October 8, 2009, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the SCRF and former Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), announced that Russia would soon adopt a new military doctrine. The upcoming doctrine was expected to be presented to President Medvedev before the end of 2009 (“Russia may revise” 2009). In spite of the restated pro-
nouncements that a new military doctrine would be approved by President Medvedev before the end of 2009, this was not the case. Not until February 5, 2010, did Medvedev release the new doctrine in a session of the SCRF. The timing of publication was probably related to the publication of the U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the annual security conference in Munich, Germany (Giles 2010).

**Statements on the Assumed Contents.**

Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Makarov stated in December 2008 that in the new doctrine some provisions of the old one would be more precise. Former CGS and current Deputy Secretary of the SCRF Army General Yuri Baluyevsky pointed out that statements on the use of nuclear weapons would be adjusted (“V Rossii” 2009). However, also in December 2008, Deputy CGS Anatoly Nogovitsyn, declared that the part of the document regulating the use of nuclear weapons would not be released (Krainova 2009; “Doktrinal’naya” 2009). In August 2009, it was announced that the new doctrine would consist of two parts, a public part on military-political aspects, and a secret part on the application of the armed forces, including nuclear weapons (Litovkin 2009). Nonetheless, SCRF Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated that the new doctrine would be a public document. In interviews for *Izvestiya* (October 14) and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (November 20), Patrushev further elaborated on the contents of the forthcoming military doctrine. In spite of the alleged secret part on the use of nuclear arms as stated by Nogovitsyn, Patrushev also revealed planned doctrinal changes on the use of nuclear weapons (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009).
the Izvestiya interview of October 14, 2009, Patrushev, with regard to doctrinal entries on guaranteeing security, stressed that in the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons would remain the most important priority. The doctrine would list adjustments in the conditions of using nuclear weapons in repelling aggression with conventional arms, not only in large-scale, but also in regional and even in local wars. Furthermore, doctrinal entries were to provide a variance of options for using nuclear weapons, depending on the situation and the intentions of the adversary. Patrushev also remarked that in situations critical to national security, the use of nuclear arms, including preemptive (preventive) nuclear strikes against the aggressor, would be possible (Mamontov 2009).

Because of the uproar, especially in the West, due to Patrushev’s statements on the use of nuclear arms, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov was swift in underlining that these entries of the new doctrine were not meant as a threat, only to warn actors intending to attack Russia ("Russia moves to ease concerns over new doctrine" 2009). Regarding Russia’s threat perception, in spite of the rapprochement of the United States and NATO towards Russia, in September 2009 Patrushev explained that traditional threats coming from NATO and America were still valid and thus to be mentioned in the doctrine. Newly listed as a doctrinal threat would be the escalating struggle for energy and other raw materials, increasing the potential for conflict at Russia’s borders, including the Arctic region (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009). Another serious threat would be at stake when a more developed neighbor, not a member of a NATO-type military alliance, would use force against Russia to settle a territorial dispute. Theoretically, such a conflict would
be possible with Japan concerning the Kuril Islands (Kramnik 2009; Borisov 2009). According to Patrushev, the final chapter of the doctrine would discuss military-economic and military-technical conditions of defense, prioritizing improvement of the military-industrial complex. Sound functioning of enterprises and organizations of the defense industry and organizations would not only solve military challenges, but also entail an important social function by raising the living standards of the people (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009).

Assessment of the Drafting Process of the New Military Doctrine.

Formally, Patrushev’s SCRF was in command of drafting the new doctrine. However, it seemed that the contents were also highly influenced by the military, considering the involvement of principal “doctrinal” generals, such as former CGS Baluyevsky, Deputy CGS Nogovitsyn, and president of the Academy of Military Sciences Gareyev. Nevertheless, the battle between the MoD and the SCRF on primacy over the major security documents seemed to have been won by the latter. After an earlier attempt in 1999-2000 by the MoD to overrule the SCRF, Putin restored order by considering the SCRF as the principal supervisor of security documents and by approving the National Security Concept to which the subsequent Military Doctrine of 2000 was subjected. Another effort by the military to bypass the SCRF occurred in 2007, when the delay of a new political strategy apparently was considered by the military as an opportunity to launch a new doctrine before the political strategy was published. In the end, neither of these security documents
was released. This time, in 2009, by revealing details of the forthcoming doctrine, Patrushev probably wanted to make it clear that the SCRF—and not the MoD—was responsible for supervision of the new military doctrine.

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 2010

The text of the new doctrine, published on February 5, 2010, was divided into four chapters: general provisions; military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation; military policy of the Russian Federation; and military-economic support for defense (SCRF 2010). The first chapter on general provisions merely unfolded the doctrine’s relationship with other primary security documents and explained military-technical terms used in the text. The second chapter on military dangers and military threats also contained characteristics of modern warfare. The third chapter on military policy explained the objectives of Moscow’s course of action and its instruments, the use of the RF Armed Forces in particular. The fourth and final chapter, on military-economic support for defense, elaborated on the importance of the economic situation and military industries as guarantors for adequate armed forces. Additionally, this chapter dealt with international military cooperation. The following analysis of the 2010 Military Doctrine will be conducted not according to the aforementioned chapters of this text, but—in light of the previously discussed security documents and statements—in line with the format of the National Security Concept/Strategy (see Table 1-2).
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<tr>
<th>Military Doctrine</th>
<th>February 2010</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Destabilizing factors for the military-political situation</td>
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<td>• External national, religious, ethnic, and terrorist movements, organizations and structures</td>
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<td>• Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing international security mechanisms such as OSCE and UN</td>
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<td>• Other spheres of international security (economic, demographic, political, etc.)</td>
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<td>• Distinction between internal and external security has also diminished</td>
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<td>• Security is comprehensive and comprises all dimensions</td>
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<td><strong>RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS</strong></td>
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<td>• Basic national interests: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, socio-political stability, constitutional regime, energy security, etc.</td>
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<td>• Protection of the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state against external military threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>• To protect interests of Russia and its citizens and maintain international peace and security, formations of the RF Armed Forces may be used operationally outside Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Utilization of political, diplomatic, legal, economic, environmental, informational, military, and other instruments to protect national interests</td>
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<td>• The RF attaches priority importance to the development of military cooperation with states of the CIS Collective Security Treaty</td>
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<td>• RF executes a common defense policy with Belarus in the field of military organization and development of armed forces of the Union states</td>
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Sources: SCRF (2000); Minoboron (2003); Baltievsky (2006); Gareyev (2007); Solovyev (2007); SCRF (2010).
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<td><strong>THREATS TO RUSSIA’S SECURITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main external military dangers:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Interference in RF internal affairs.</td>
<td>• Reducing the role of the UNSC is seen as a dangerous tendency.</td>
<td>• Expansion of military blocs.</td>
<td>• Desire to endow NATO’s force potential with global functions and to move its military infrastructure closer to RF borders, expanding the bloc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems.</td>
<td>• Unilateral use of military power without UNSC mandate encourages greater demand for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).</td>
<td>• Military presence in traditional regions of Russian interest.</td>
<td>• Attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states/regions and to undermine strategic stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on a global level.</td>
<td>• Deployment of foreign troops in the territory of new NATO members and countries that aspire to join the bloc.</td>
<td>• Ignoring Russia in international security politics.</td>
<td>• Build-up of foreign troops on territories of states contiguous with Russia and its allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The expansion of military blocs and alliances.</td>
<td>• Cold war stereotypes continue to exist, aggravating the international situation.</td>
<td>• Attempts against the strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers in the world.</td>
<td>• Deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The introduction of foreign troops (without UNSC sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF.</td>
<td>• Proliferation of mass destruction weapons.</td>
<td>• Course of the USA towards global leadership and a desire to get a foothold in Russia’s sphere of influence.</td>
<td>• Territorial claims against Russia and its allies and interference in internal affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Suppression of the rights of RF citizens abroad.</td>
<td>• Armed force is increasingly used for protecting economic interests, which enlarges foreign policy requirements for using violence.</td>
<td>• NATO enlargement to the east and its involvement in conflicts near Russia’s borders.</td>
<td>• Proliferation of WMD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Interference in internal RF affairs.</td>
<td>• NATO’s broadened actions strive to act on a global level</td>
<td>• Non-compliance with previously concluded international treaties in arms limitation and reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Demonstration of military power close to RF borders.</td>
<td>• International forces and leading states aiming to affect the sovereignty of Russia and to damage Russia’s economic and other interests.</td>
<td>• Use of military force on territories of states contiguous with Russia in violation of the UN Charter / international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expansion of military blocs.</td>
<td>• The West considering price changes of energy resources as a form of aggression.</td>
<td>• Presence of armed conflict on territories of states contiguous with Russia and its allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strengthening of Islamic extremism close to RF borders.</td>
<td>• The construction of anti-missile defense systems.</td>
<td>• Ensuring Russia’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Infringement on the rights and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states.</td>
<td>• Proliferation of WMD.</td>
<td>• Limited contingents of RF Armed Forces and Other Troops may be deployed in regions of strategic importance outside RF territory as combined or national task forces and bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Desire of great powers to reach military superiority.</td>
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</table>
Russia in the World Community.

In this doctrine, Russian security thinking on global developments provided a mixed view; on the one hand, reduced political and military threats, but on the other, pointing at the use of military force to solve conflicts and the intensification of military dangers in some areas. The second chapter on dangers and threats started with the remark that the existing architecture of global security did not ensure the equal security of all nations. This seemed to correspond with President Medvedev’s stance for a new European security architecture in which the “Cold War vestiges” of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would be replaced by an all-European security treaty and conference, preventing the use of force by individual states or organizations.

Russia’s National Interests.

With respect to national interests, three aspects in particular came to the fore. First, the desire to expand the circle of partner states on the basis of common interests in strengthening international security. This was probably especially related to Belarus and the member states of the CSTO and of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), cooperation with whom was explained later in the doctrine. Secondly, the provision that for the protection of the interests of Russia and its citizens and maintaining international peace and security, formations of the RF Armed Forces might be used operationally outside Russia. The protection of Russians abroad was mentioned three
times in the doctrine. Consequently, as laid down in the Law on Defense after the 2008 Georgian conflict, Moscow entitled itself to use military force abroad. The third aspect comprised the creation and training of special formations of armed forces and other troops for use in the interests of Russia’s economy. This was probably related to protecting energy infrastructure and possibly also with an outlook on future resources, such as those in the Arctic region.

**Threats to Russia’s Security.**

Previous doctrines only mentioned threats. This time the doctrine also referred to dangers. Actually, the threats seemed to be of less importance. They only appeared after the dangers. Furthermore, only the dangers were concrete, the (external) threats were of a very general nature: the drastic deterioration in the military-political situation (interstate relations); the impeding of the operation of systems of state and military command and control; the show of military force with provocative objectives on territories of states contiguous with Russia or its allies; and the stepping up of the activity of the armies of states involving partial or complete mobilization. The listed dangers were specific and referred to a great extent to the West. First of all, the doctrine stated the danger of NATO globalization of its endeavors, attempting to expand its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders, and expanding by adding new members. Clearly, this referred to the intended enlargement of NATO by including Georgia and—until the 2010 Presidential elections—Ukraine. The next doctrinal danger abroad was the deployment (or expansion) of foreign military contingents on territories neighboring Russia or its allies. This probably pointed at the American military contingents.
deployed in Romania and Bulgaria. Another listed foreign danger was the development and deployment of missile defense systems. Although not specifically mentioned, this provision presumably meant the global U.S. missile defense network of which the annulled one in Poland and the Czech Republic was a part. Next, territorial claims against Russia and its allies were mentioned. In earlier public statements on the forthcoming doctrine, reference was made to Japan concerning the Kuril Islands. Finally, the doctrine pronounced the danger of the use of military force on territories neighboring Russia in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law. This entry possibly addressed NATO’s attack on Serbia in the Kosovo conflict in 1999, but even more, Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August 2008.

This chapter in the doctrine not only discussed dangers and threats but also characteristics of modern warfare, such as integrated use of military force and nonmilitary means; the use of highly effective conventional arms; increased military use of airspace and outer space; intensification of the role of information warfare; reduced preparation time to conduct military operations; increase in high-tech, networked command and control; and continuity of military operations. Moreover, the doctrine set forth the features of contemporary military conflicts: unpredictability of outbreak; a broad range of military-political, economic, strategic, and other objectives; increased role of modern highly effective weapons systems; speed; selectivity; a high level of target destruction; rapid maneuvering; firepower; mobility; initiative; the preservation of sustainable state and military command and control; supremacy on land, at sea, in the air, and in outer space; increasing significance of precision, electromagnetic, laser, and infrasound weap-
onry; computer-controlled systems and drones; and nuclear weapons remaining an important factor for preventing the outbreak of military conflicts.

Ensuring Russia’s Security.

In response to dangers and threats, the doctrine explained that Russia retained the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a WMD attack against itself or against its allies and also against an attack with conventional weapons when the very existence of the state was under threat. Furthermore, Moscow would ensure the protection of Russian citizens abroad. Other provisions to ensure RF security related to the strengthening of collective security within the framework of the CSTO, CIS, OSCE, and SCO; as well as to develop relations in this field with the European Union (EU) and NATO. Next, the main priorities of military-political cooperation were with Belarus, CSTO, CIS, SCO, and the UN. More specifically, on international security cooperation, an armed attack on a (Russia-Belarus) Union State member or a member state of the CSTO would be regarded as an act of aggression causing retaliatory measures. In addition to the aforementioned (CSTO Treaty) military assistance article, the doctrine also underlined Moscow’s willingness to assign troop contingents to CSTO peacekeeping forces. Moreover, Russia would assign forces to the CSTO Collective Rapid-Response forces for the purpose of responding promptly to military threats.

Assessment.

The contents of the doctrine did not quite live up to the earlier statements related to it, nor to the realities of the RF Armed Forces. For instance, the expect-
ed emphasis on energy security was completely left out. The only reference to energy was in relation to the threat of disruption of the functioning of nuclear energy facilities. Furthermore, the repeatedly announced provision on preventive/preemptive nuclear strikes was also missing in the published text of the 2010 Military Doctrine. Moreover, the on-going deep reforms of the RF Armed Forces and the intended huge influx of modern weapons before 2020 were also absent from the doctrine.

Concerning Russia in the world community, the doctrine stated a plea for a new European security architecture, preventing the use of force by individual states or organizations. However, would the proposed European security treaty and conference also imply the type of force Russia used against Georgia in 2008? And if Russia prioritized international law and institutions, why did it veto the prolongation of the UN and OSCE missions in the Georgian separatist regions, and not allow EU observers to enter these regions? If Russia demanded a different security architecture, this would only come closer if Moscow itself would be the role model of adherence to international law. The facts showed a different picture.

Pertaining to Russia’s national interests, the doctrine mentioned that the Kremlin could send troops abroad to protect its national interests or its citizens. The use of military force to protect Russian minorities—also by first creating such a minority as was the case in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by submitting Russian passports—was applied in the 2008 Georgian conflict. Countries with Russian minorities, such as the Baltic States, were worried, since they might be the next victim of this provision. This damaged international stability.
Regarding threats to Russian security, the 2010 Military Doctrine considered NATO as a danger. However, if international law was of crucial importance for Moscow as repeatedly stated in the doctrine, why did it not also recognize the right of self-determination of states to align themselves with international organizations as they like? Russia’s frequently declared privileged interests in the former Soviet Union area did not entitle the Kremlin to decide what the countries in this region were allowed to do. With regard to foreign troops deployed close to Russian borders, U.S. military contingents deployed in Romania and Bulgaria were in other security documents mixed up with those of NATO. However, if U.S. and NATO policy were the same, Georgia and Ukraine would already have been NATO members. Considering the West as the primary adversary was a disappointing continuation of old thinking. However, by listing the West under “dangers” instead of “threats,” damage to the relationship with NATO and the United States was less than otherwise. In that respect, the term “dangers” may have been introduced in order to not complicate the on-going negotiations with America for a new START Treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Nevertheless, the thinking in terms of opponents was counterproductive to the course of rapprochement as initiated in autumn 2009 by U.S. President Barack Obama by annulling the European missile defense shield, and by NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen focusing his first major speech on improvement of relations with Russia. However, to a certain extent the West itself was also to blame for the prolongation of antagonistic views by the Kremlin, for example, by recognizing the independence of Kosovo—thus encouraging Russia to recognize the
Georgian separatist regions—and NATO extending air defense to the Baltic States, hence fulfilling Moscow’s claim that NATO deploys its forces at Russia’s borders.

With regard to ensuring Russia’s security, in autumn 2009 it was mentioned that the new doctrine would entitle Russia to also use nuclear weapons in preventive (preemptive) strikes. At the time, this remark caused a lot of turmoil and criticism in the West. Perhaps because of that, this provision was absent in the doctrinal text of 2010. It is doubtful that this provision was totally deleted. On February 5, 2010, together with the Military Doctrine, President Medvedev announced his approval of the “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020” (Kremlin 2010). During the process of drafting the doctrine, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Nogovitsyn had already remarked that the doctrinal part on the use of nuclear arms would not be made public. On February 5, only the doctrine was published on the websites of the Kremlin and of the SCRF. It is not unlikely that the not-publicly-released document, “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020,” would contain this secret nuclear part of the doctrine, including provisions on preventive (preemptive) nuclear strikes.

Another striking feature of ensuring security was the choice of “friends” for enhancing collective security and military-political cooperation. Considering the enumeration of the CSTO, the main actors to cooperate with were found to be Belarus and SCO. The mentioning of a military assistance entry—derived from the CSTO Treaty—together with doctrinal provisions on Russian troop assignments to CSTO peacekeeping as well as rapid reaction forces, unmistakably marked the CSTO as the primary security partner for Moscow.
The Union Treaty of Russia with Belarus was silenced for many years but now returned, just like the CSTO, in the format of a military assistance article. This was remarkable in light of the frequent problems between Russia and Belarus, i.e., on the further development of the CSTO. The SCO, the other international organization in which Moscow played a leading role, was also given a priority status of cooperation. However, different from other recent security documents, the special relationship with China and India was not listed in the doctrine. Perhaps by keeping silent about China, the Russian military thus avoided this taboo and made it clear that China could develop into a threat to Russia. Finally, the EU and NATO were mentioned in the sphere of collective security, as evidenced by RF military contingents participating in operations of both Western organizations. However, they were excluded from the list of military-political cooperation, underlining that these actors did not belong to the category of favored military partners.

CONCLUSIONS ON RUSSIA’S DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 2000

A comparison of Moscow’s documents dealing with military doctrine between 2000 and 2010 leads to the following conclusions (see Table 1-2).

Perception of Security.

During Putin’s first term as President—one of economic weakness and subsequent more dependence on the West—the Kremlin in its DWP 2003 noticed a shift in security challenges from military to other socio-economic problems. Gradually, in concurrence with
Western military thinking, Russia’s security elite also recognized that broad security had become the general concept, i.e., considering all dimensions of security and accepting that internal and external security are connected. However, this attitude changed in Putin’s second term when excerpts of the forthcoming new military doctrine underlined an alleged global tendency of solving political problems by military force. Incidentally, Russia itself had also become more active in the military field, e.g., by boosting its efforts in the Russian-led CSTO military alliance and the Russo-Chinese-led SCO by frequently conducting large-scale exercises with China and by resuming strategic bomber flights close to Western countries. The revenues from the increased prices of energy resources, strengthening Russia’s economic and political power, and its decreasing dependence on the West allowed for an assertive stance that was also expressed in the doctrinal documents.

**Energy: The New Vital Factor?**

In Putin’s second term, energy was introduced as a doctrinal factor in statements made in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, the alleged excerpts of the upcoming doctrine mentioned energy even more strongly. In his November 2009 interview, Patrushev mentioned energy (security) three times as an issue in the new military doctrine: the struggle for acquiring energy as a factor for armed conflict near Russia (e.g., the Arctic); the quest for energy as a military danger causing the use of armed forces; and energy as a grounds for escalation towards a large-scale conflict (Borisov 2009). In line with other security documents of recent years of Putin and Medvedev, e.g., Medvedev’s National Se-
curity Strategy (NSS) of May 2009, energy security for the first time would now enter the military doctrine. Given the importance that the Kremlin attached to its energy resources as witnessed by the release of an Arctic Strategy in September 2008, and by openly admitting in the 2009 NSS the use of energy as an instrument of power, energy (security) was expected to be part of Moscow’s doctrinal threat perception. However, in spite of strong expectations, energy security was missing completely in the 2010 Military Doctrine. The only indirect references to energy were the following:
• To ensure the security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation on the high seas;
• To create and train special formations intended for transfer to the RF Armed Forces and Other Troops . . . for use . . . in the interests of the economy of the Russian Federation.

The first entry could be related to the transport of oil and gas, the second one possibly for the protection of domestic energy facilities, perhaps also of future energy sites in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, the indirect mentioning, if at all, of energy meant a deviation from the tendency of growing attention for energy (instruments of power, security, and interests) in each security document since 2007. The question was if this breach had to be considered as an exception to the rule or as an indication that Russia’s security elite had changed its mind on the importance of energy. The former would be more self-evident.

**Constant Threats from the West.**

In all the doctrinal documents since 2000, NATO and the United States have continuously been considered as threats to Russia’s national security. The
Alliance was mainly condemned for its increasing range and breadth of activities and members, U.S. global dominance, nuclear deterrence, and missile defense plans and capabilities, all of which annoyed the Kremlin. This line of policy did not cease when these two Western actors started a policy of rapprochement towards Moscow in September 2009. A reset of the Western attitude would not automatically lead to a similar reply from the Kremlin. Possibly, Moscow needed such an adversary perception to justify aspects of its foreign and security policy. Therefore, this threat perception was to be prolonged.

**Forceful Protection of Russians Abroad.**

The interests and rights of Russian citizens abroad, or rather in the former Soviet Union area—Russia’s so-called “near abroad”—has been another recurring factor in doctrinal thinking of this decade, as mentioned in the documents reviewed. In the Georgian conflict of August 2008, this doctrinal provision was brought into practice for the first time. After including this entry in the Law on Defense, it has become likely that military operations abroad allegedly aimed at protecting (the interests of) Russian minorities might be conducted more often. Related to this is the provision of using the Russian Armed Forces abroad in areas of strategic importance. Both doctrinal entries are probably connected to the common thinking of the Russian security elite that the region of the former Soviet Union is still Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence. Conversely, and related to this thinking, NATO’s expansion to the east and encouragement to former Soviet republics—Georgia and Ukraine—to join the Alliance, has been relentlessly rejected in the different doctrinal documents.
Nuclear Weapons.

By extending the types of conflict that could result in a nuclear response, including local wars, in interviews prior to the release of the 2010 Military Doctrine, Patrushev indicated a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Considering the nuclear paragraph of Russia’s doctrinal documents since 1993, this would not be a watershed in security thinking but a continuation of thought. Gradually, new doctrines have moved away from a “no-first use” statement towards the possibility of using nuclear arms in smaller sized conflicts, including conventional ones. Most likely this development has occurred as a result of increasing weakness of Russia’s conventional military power (Fenenko 2009). The 2000 Military Doctrine included the first-use of nuclear arms also in response to wide-scale aggression against Russia with conventional weapons (“Doktrinal”naya” 2009). In that respect, the alleged provisions on nuclear arms in the forthcoming military doctrine were—with the exception of the introduction of a provision on the preemptive use of nuclear weapons—not very different from the 2000 version, as was acknowledged by Gareyev (Nikolskiy 2009; Fenenko 2009).

Patrushev’s statements in October 2009, during on-going military reforms, possibly reflected the feelings of the Kremlin that it needed to rely on nuclear deterrence even more in a time of military transition. Another reason for the expected emphasis on nuclear deterrence in the new doctrine was that only major powers possess such weapons. In other words, by demonstrating its nuclear force, the Kremlin demanded to be recognized as a great power. Such a status
was time after time claimed in recent major security
documents and in public statements, even though this
nuclear component carried the sound of Cold War
during a time of endeavors of rapprochement by the
United States and NATO towards Russia. The doctrinal emphasis on nuclear deterrence was also in line
with statements of Medvedev and others of the security elite in autumn 2008 declaring the modernization
of the nuclear force as a priority of the then started military reforms. However, in the actual text of the
2010 Military Doctrine, the stress on nuclear arms was
much less than expected from Patrushev’s statements.
Probably because of the on-going U.S.-Russian negotia-
tions on an agreement for a new bilateral pact cutting
stocks of strategic nuclear weapons (START), as well
as because of the strong condemnation of the West of
the alleged provisions on preventive nuclear strikes,
the latter statements were withdrawn and the overall emphasis on nuclear arms was strongly reduced in
the published text of the doctrine. However, since the
more harsh statements on the use of nuclear weapons
could have been laid down in the nonreleased docu-
ment, “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy
to 2020,” it is unlikely that the policy tendency of in-
creasing attention for nuclear arms has been broken.

**No Modern Doctrinal Concept of Warfare.**

In none of the reviewed doctrinal documents and
statements could a concept of modern warfare be
discerned. No reference is made to a concept of se-
curity thought, nor of political-strategic objectives of
using modernized forces in conflicts of contemporary
warfare, such as the West is conducting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The 2010 Military Doctrine completely
ignored the on-going far-reaching restructuring of the RF Armed Forces. Furthermore, this new doctrine repeatedly referred to mobilization, whereas the current structural reforms envisaged a nonmobilization permanent-ready type of forces. Consequently, the 2010 doctrine also refrained from stating what use the new “Western-type” brigade-structured and modern equipped troops would have. And this is perhaps more than anything else the reason for which a military doctrine is written. The policy of acquiring (French) helicopter carriers in relation to the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 gave the impression that traditional warfare “around the corner” in Russia’s near abroad would continue to be the main stream of Russian military thinking (Kipp 2009). The 2010 Military Doctrine demonstrated ambiguity in military thinking. On the one hand, it stated characteristics of modern warfare, but on the other stressed mobilization capabilities, thus leaning on old-style large-scale warfare of the NATO-Warsaw Pact type. Similarly, it pointed at the necessity of acquiring modern conventional arms, but at the same time underlined the importance of an up-to-date nuclear deterrent force. Hence, the doctrinal development of the last decade demonstrated uncertainty in the direction of the security elite. The 2003 DWP gave the first recognition of modern warfare, of which the military reforms since 2008 have been the application. But the next step—establishing objectives for modernized armed forces—has apparently as yet not been reached: in the meantime Moscow is likely to stick to military adventures in its near abroad.
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“Genshtab: zakrytaya chast’ novoy voyennoy doktriny RF opredelit proavoprimeneniye armii i flota” (2009), August 11, available from Interfax.ru.


“Rossiya nachala razrabotku novoy voyennoy doktriny” (2009), October 15, available from Lenta.ru.

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“Russia moves to ease concerns over new doctrine” (2009), RIA Novosti, October 23.

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“Voyennaya doktrina ozhila” (2008), Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, December 12.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. For definitions of the doctrine, see ‘Osnovy voyennyoy doktriny Rossii (Proyekt)’, Voyennaya Mysl’, spetsial’nyy vypusk, May 19, 1992, p. 3; V. D. Zabolotin, Slovar’ voyennykh terminov Moscow, Russia: Kosmo, 2000, p. 53.

2. The SCRF is the highest Russian state organ for internal and external security affairs. According to the 1992 Law on Security (Zakon RF o Bezopasnosti), the SCRF was charged with preparing presidential decisions on security affairs. Next, the SCRF analyzed aspects of internal and external security, as well as strategic problems concerning economic, social, military, information, ecological, and other forms of security. In June 1992, a presidential decree further defined the set of tasks for supporting the President in establishing domestic, foreign, and military policy and ensuring state sovereignty and social-economic stability. Thus, the set of tasks of the SCRF covered all aspects of Russia’s grand strategy. Apart from the Law on Security, the foundations of the SCRF were also rooted in the Constitution of 1993. See M. Khodarenok, ‘Vremya sobirat’ kamni’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 19, 2001, p. 1; ‘Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii o Bezopasnosti’, article 13; ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, article 83, paragraph G.)


5. Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 25, 1993; article 83, paragraph H.

7. The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. The grouping of related entries as used here is for the purpose of clarity and does not necessarily correspond with the original documents. Since the National Security Concept (NSC) was the principal Russian security document until publication of the National Security Strategy in May 2009, for reasons of unity and clarity the main entries of the documents are offered in the format of the NSC, i.e., subsequently Russia in the world community, Russia’s national interests, threats to Russia’s security, and ensuring Russia’s security.
CHAPTER 2

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Jacob W. Kipp

On February 5, 2010, President Dmitri Medvedev signed Russia’s long-awaited new military doctrine, which is supposed to guide defense policy over the next decade. In the presence of the senior civilian leadership of the government and legislative branches, President Medvedev announced that he had signed both the “Military Doctrine” and “The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020.”

The new Military Doctrine describes the threat environment facing Russia as complex and dynamic, but not dominated by the imminent threat of war:

In the new Military Doctrine, world development today is characterized by the weakening of ideological confrontation; the reduction in the level of economic, political, and military influence of certain individual states and alliances; and the rising influence of other states that seek all-embracing domination; multipolarity; and globalization of various process.

Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The tendencies toward violent solutions of these conflicts, including those bordering the Russian Federation, remains. The existing structure (system) of international security, including international legal mechanisms does not provide for the equal security of all states.

However, in spite of the lowering of the probability of the unleashing against the Russian Federation of large
scale warfare with the employment of conventional means and nuclear weapons, in a number of directions military dangers to the Russian Federation have increased.²

The document lists both internal and external dangers, with primary emphasis on those posed by actions of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the periphery of Russia. But the doctrine also recognizes a sliding scale of military conflicts that Russia might face. It also addresses the characteristic feature of contemporary military conflicts, relating to what Russian authors have called the sixth generation of warfare and an extension of what Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov labeled “the revolution in military affairs [RMA], involving precision-strike systems” and “the mass employment of weapons systems and weapons technology, based upon new physical principles and approaching in effectiveness that of nuclear weapons.”³ On the issue of the role of nuclear weapons in Russian strategy, the Military Doctrine speaks of the use of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence against nuclear and conventional attacks upon Russia and its allies, but does not explicitly proclaim a doctrine of preemptive attack, which had been part of much of the debate on the draft military doctrine. The Military Doctrine states: “The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation.”⁴

Given the content of press reporting on the draft military doctrine, which had promised presidential approval many months ago and included the concept of “preemptive or defensive nuclear strike,” one can assume that there was some struggle within Russia’s national security elite over the final content of the doc-
trine. As late as February 5, 2010, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council, had once again announced that the military doctrine would be signed shortly. He clarified this statement by saying that the Security Council had already met and approved the doctrine and sent it on to the President. The same article stressed the point that the doctrine would focus on the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of Russia. The article did not, however, repeat reports on the inclusion of preemptive nuclear strike in the doctrine.\(^5\)

This announcement of the new Military Doctrine has come at a time when the strategic situation before Russia has begun to clarify. Both Washington and Moscow are talking about significant progress on the START 2 agreement, with commentators speaking of a signing of the treaty during an April 2010 summit. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued its congressionally-mandated *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) to the public. Russian commentators have been quick to focus on the fact that this QDR does not focus on Russia as a threat to the United States and seems more focused upon the current conflicts and the global struggle against terrorism than upon preparing to fight major regional wars by conventional means. Russian commentators judged this to be a potential development of significance for Russia’s security interests. In conjunction with the newly published budget proposal for FY 2011, Russian observers see the Pentagon focused on maintaining the high quality of military personnel and on improving benefits for veterans. Comments on weapons acquisitions, especially missile defense capabilities, did not identify these developments as an explicit threat to Russia. The authors noted, however, that the United States will seek to retain the capacity to intervene in
all regions of the globe in defense of U.S. interests. Another article on the QDR put the shift in U.S. military posture as a more profound change: “The new doctrine has changed the strategy which has guided the American Army since the moment of the collapse of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] and the end of the Cold War.” The new QDR profoundly shifted the primary threat to the United States: “the main threat is insurgents.” In the context of these press reports, the content of Russia’s new military doctrine underscored the basic asymmetry between U.S. and Russian doctrine as they seem to be evolving. Russia still sees the United States and NATO as the source of the primary dangers confronting Russia, but not as imminent threats to Russia. Both the United States and Russia now openly share a recognition of terrorism, proliferation, and local insurgencies as sources of international instability, even as the powers cooperate to deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan.

This shift did not come about without a political struggle. Until recently, the comments from members of the Security Council all put first priority on the inclusion of Russia’s articulation of a posture of “preemptive nuclear first strike” to protect Russian interests, allies, and the survival of Russian statehood at the core of the new military doctrine. Patrushev explained the emphasis on preemptive strike as based upon U.S. and NATO actions: “Continuation of NATO’s expansion, military activization of the Alliance, intensive exercises of the American strategic forces involving strategic arms deployment drills cannot help disturbing Russia.” Patrushev later went on to list more general trends in the international situation contributing to “destabilization” and affecting the formulation of Russian military doctrine. These included:
“the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and germ warfare technologies, continuing production of weapons of mass destruction, battles for energy and other resources.” Another article on the same theme of the expected signature of the new doctrine by the President cited earlier comments by General Iurii Baluevsky, Russian Army (Retired) on the imminent threat from the United States. Baluevsky, who served as Chief of the General Staff from 2004-08 and now serves as the Assistant Secretary of the Security Council, pointed to the U.S. articulation of a doctrine of “instant global strike,” which would include both conventional precision strike and nuclear weapons as a justification for Russia’s adopting a doctrine of preemptive nuclear first-strike. An article from Trud on the same day suggested a political struggle within the walls of the Kremlin with outside experts defending and attacking the concept of preemptive nuclear strike. In this regard, the comments of Colonel-General Viktor Esin, Russian Army (Retired), deserve note. Esin, the former chief of staff of Strategic Rocket Forces and now a leading analyst of strategic issues, stated that the concept was ill-formulated: “It is impossible to forecast the moment when it is high time to be the first to attack a weapon with nuclear weapons in response just to a threat of aggression accurately.” He went on to say that he doubted that President Medvedev would accept the doctrinal formulation of preemptive nuclear first-strike.

One notable silence in all these discussions of doctrine was the absence of comments from General Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of the General Staff. Given the emphasis he has placed upon the modernization and transformation of Russian conventional forces, one might understand why he would favor a policy of
nuclear deterrence over nuclear preemption. Makarov has acted more as the agent of his civilian boss, Minister Serduikov, than as an autonomous actor representing the views of the Russian military elite. He and Serduikov have over the last 3 years been involved in fundamental changes in Russia’s conventional military toward a more flexible brigade-based ground force capable of conducting network-centric operations. While the Kremlin has published the new military doctrine, no copy of “The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020” have appeared in the press. Its content would reveal what Russian policymakers understand nuclear deterrence to mean in the second decade of the 21st century. In the absence of access to this document, one is left to speculate on just why the published Military Doctrine does not contain any reference to Russia’s right to a “preemptive strike” with “nuclear weapons” and why the published doctrine treats the deterrent function of nuclear weapons in the fashion that it does.

MILITARY DOCTRINE IN RUSSIA’S PAST

In this context, past military doctrine, both Soviet and Russian, takes on special importance. The legal basis for the publication of Russia’s military doctrine can be found in the Yeltsin Constitution, which was ratified by popular vote in December 1993. Chapter IV, Article 83 enumerates the duties of the President and, regarding the role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, states that the President shall: “form and head the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which is determined by the federal law; h. approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.” This constitutional provision does not
explain the origins of the requirement for a published military doctrine. Indeed, more than 1 month prior to the ratification of constitution, President Boris Yeltsin had presented a draft military doctrine to the Federal Assembly of Russia and received its endorsement for “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” which he signed on November 2, 1993. In the difficult political situation confronting Yeltsin that fall as he battled with the opposition in the Supreme Soviet, the President had relied upon the Security Council to plan his course of action in case the governmental crisis required the use of force. To secure the loyalty of senior commanders, about which Yeltsin and his allies were concerned, he pushed certain actions that were designed to win the loyalty of the officer corps and undercut efforts by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi to get support within the military and prevent the political crisis from becoming a civil war. In this context, post-Soviet Russia received its first published military doctrine, not as a result of open debate but through a concealed power struggle between the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), in which Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev got what he wanted as a result of his support for his president during the assault on the White House on October 4, 2010. The actual content of the military doctrine of 1993 reflected the Yeltsin administration’s hopes for a strategic partnership with the West and presented a relatively benign picture of the external security environment confronting Russia. The doctrine stated:

At the contemporary stage of development of the international situation—when confrontation generated by ideological antagonism is being overcome, part-
nership and all-around cooperation are expanding, confidence in the military sphere is strengthening, and nuclear and conventional armaments are being reduced—political-diplomatic, international legal, economic, and other nonmilitary methods and collective actions by the world community regarding threats to peace, violations of peace, and acts of aggression assume paramount importance in preventing wars and armed conflicts.¹⁷

Outside observers had little reason to express concern over the provisions of the doctrine that addressed nuclear weapons: “The aim of the Russian Federation’s policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.”¹⁸ The document did contain an explicit statement on “no first use,” but in this case, it applied to nonnuclear signatory states to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Regarding other nuclear powers the doctrine was silent. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev emphasized this silence and then declined any further comment on the topic. Western observers had never taken the Soviet proclamation of no-first-use by Brezhnev in 1982 as anything more than a propaganda statement without any strategic or operational consequences. Russia was no longer an enemy; its government was committed to reducing its arsenal of nuclear weapons; and its armed forces were in a state of chaos and decline and being drawn into civil unrest and ethnic clashes within Russia and on its periphery.¹⁹
THE ROAD TO RUSSIA’S FIRST MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Ministry of Defense promoted the articulation of a military doctrine for Russia for a number of sound reasons. The events of 1991 had brought about the end of the Soviet Union, and Russia found itself in the process of taking over and making its own the military instrument it inherited from the USSR. This was a period when the other successor states were creating their own national militaries, and the expectation in Moscow was that the Russian military would be the model and the mentor to the other emerging armed forces among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Internal reforms, especially the dismantling of the command economy, required significant reductions in defense spending and the number of men under arms. Moreover, the era of glasnost had inaugurated a wave of criticism of the Army as an institution with disclosures of abuse of recruits and dedovshchina (hazing) undermining the military’s own self-image as defender of the rodnina (motherland). At the same time, the professional military wanted guidance from the new state with regard to the role of the armed forces. Such agitation had begun almost as soon as the decision was taken in March 1992, when Yeltsin himself assumed the post of acting defense minister to create a Russian MoD. The appointment of General Grachev as Minister on May 18 accelerated the process. The MoD published a special issue of Voennaia mysl’ devoted to the topic of military doctrine. On May 27-30, the General Staff Academy hosted a scientific conference devoted to the topic. General Grachev provided the opening remarks to the assembled “comrades.” Noting the many tasks...
that Russia’s MoD and government faced in the areas of defense and security policy, Grachev emphasized the importance of a new military doctrine for the Russian Federation. “The development of Russia’s military doctrine is especially urgent in this connection. A concept of a Russian Federation Armed Forces force generation must be formed and practical measures for upgrading them must be carried out on its basis.”

Just how the professional military viewed military doctrine is quite important if we are to understand the content of the document issued in November 1993. Mastery of the art and science of war was the most sacred charge of the General Staff, and its officers firmly believed in military doctrine as the critical foundation of the state’s approach to preparations for and conduct of war. Through all the instability of late 1991 and early 1992, the desire for a new military doctrine runs like a red thread through discussions about the fate of the Soviet Armed Forces. General Vladimir Lobov, who became Minister of Defense after the August Putsch, struggled to maintain the unity of the armed forces as the separate republics moved to leave the union. In October 1991, he published an article on a new force structure. Lobov, who had been a friend and ally of Larionov and Kokoshin, spoke of a new military doctrine as a key aspect of transforming the military to fit a democratic state and “destatified” economy.

The victory by democratic forces in the country accelerated society’s political, economic and legal reform processes, which also affected the sphere of defense, necessitating a fundamental revision of the principles of military force generation and a change in military doctrine with retention of its defensive character. An entire set of fundamentally new factors, conditions, and trends arose which cannot fail to be considered.
Lobov noted the need for the Armed Forces to address interethnic tensions and to escape from the ideological control that the Communist Party had imposed upon the military. His struggle to maintain the unity of the Armed Forces led to his dismissal in December 1991, when President Yeltsin engineered the official break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of the CIS. Yeltsin had ridden Russian nationalism to secure the end of the Soviet state. Now he had to accept the logic of the forces he had unleashed as other states sought to leave the Union. For Yeltsin, the Commonwealth was supposed to be the substitute for the Union; other leaders, notably those in the Baltic States, wanted no part of the commonwealth. Ukraine’s leaders viewed the Commonwealth as the path towards complete independence. The end of the Soviet Union created further chaos in the military and raised serious questions as to who would inherit the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.

In the early months of 1992, the discussion of military doctrine took place in the context of the Commonwealth. Colonel Anatolii Klimenko of the General Staff discussed the content of such a doctrine. Repeating much of what Lobov had said but now speaking in the context of the Commonwealth, he looked to a consultative doctrine based on compromises among the member republics with the General Staff maintaining its coordinating function. Within 2 months, it was apparent that there would not be an MoD or General Staff for the Commonwealth, and talk turned to the development of a Russian military doctrine. Opinion among officers polled might support the maintenance of both a unified armed forces and a unified military doctrine, but political developments were pushing
towards the creation of a Russian military doctrine and Armed Forces. An important voice for Russian military doctrine came from General of the Army Makhmut Gareev. He asked the simple question of whether Russia had its own national interests, and he answered in the affirmative. Gareev saw little prospect in the maintenance of a unified military for the Commonwealth and pointed toward the need for Russia to articulate its own military doctrine reflecting its national interests and capabilities. Military strategy would be at the very heart of this new doctrine. Gareev did not see the need for a single document that would express the major tenets of military strategy. Gareev’s article set off a response among readers of Krasnaia zvezda. The editors noted the number of letters the article produced and also noted that many readers expressed the opinion that a democratic Russia should, indeed, have a single legislative document reflecting the state’s official views on the most important issue of military-political strategy and military-technical policy. Without such a document, reform of the armed forces would lack the basic orientation to guide the process. In April the Russian government created a commission under the chairmanship of Dmitri Volkogonov with the task of creating an MoD and of working out a military doctrine. Colonel-General V. Miruk, a member of the State Commission on the Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of the Russian Federation, addressed the methodological issues involved in articulating a military doctrine. Miruk emphasized the need for input from all the state agencies involved in defense and security issues and called for the doctrine’s approval to be by legislative action. Recognizing the new security environment that had emerged from the end of the Cold War,
Miruk named no specific threat facing Russia but he identified dangers that military doctrine should address:

It is well known that potential danger as a category exists objectively. Because of:
— the peacetime deployment of groupings of armed forces with high mobilization capabilities of a state continue to exist;
— territorial disputes between states, as well as ethno-national, economic, religious, and ideological contradictions exist, and can be sources of wars and regional conflicts;
— the pretensions of individual states for a dominant position on a global and regional scale remain;
— the change of leadership, internal political [and] economic crises can exercise real influence on the foreign policy of individual states.\(^{27}\)

The security focus was not, however, global security problems but instability in what Russian commentators were now calling “the near abroad.” By May, it was clear that tensions between Russia and Ukraine were pushing the Yeltsin government towards the creation of a Russian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces.\(^{28}\)

In June 1992, shortly after the establishment of the Russian MoD, Colonel Anatoli Klimenko, the Head of the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the General Staff argued for the articulation of a military doctrine for the Russian Federation as a statement of “the main military-political goal of the Russian state.”\(^{29}\) In this, Russian military culture was distinctly different from its Western counterparts, the military of which used the term “doctrine” loosely and without rigor, and avoided any reference to the political dimension of strategy, which was to be left to elected
officials.\textsuperscript{30} At the May conference, General Igor Rodionov, the Chief of the General Staff Academy, made it clear that the MoD had the leading role in developing military doctrine: “One task of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is to develop the fundamentals of a Russian military doctrine, to determine its overall direction and to substantiate the ways, means and mechanisms for protecting the homeland’s vitally important interests.” He went on to say that such doctrine when approved by the President would: “serve as it were as the aims of supreme political and military authority on national defense questions.”\textsuperscript{31}

Between the seminar in May 1992 and the signing of the Military Doctrine in November 1993, it appeared for a time that Russia’s military doctrine would be subordinated to a conception of national security that was to be formulated first by the Security Council, which had been created in April 1992. But this institution, which was to coordinate the activities of all the ministries involved in all matters of external and internal security, proved too weak to provide leadership. In the absence of that leadership, President Yeltsin might declare that Russia had a national security concept, but there was no document that expressed that concept.\textsuperscript{32} But the Minister of Defense gave content to Russia’s “new military policy,” speaking to various foreign governments and institutions about its content and the relationship between that policy with military doctrine and reform of the armed forces. In London, Grachev spoke at the Royal United Service institute (RUSI), declaring the primary point of the new policy was the prevention of wars and cooperation with other states to achieve peace.\textsuperscript{33} In October Grachev spoke to the Spanish General Staff about Russian military reform and military doctrine.
He called for a smaller, more mobile armed force, and laid out the stages of military reform for the rest of the decade. On military doctrine, Grachev stated: “As a result of the realization of the provisions of [its] military doctrine, Russia will have an armed forces, numerically smaller force but sufficient for the reliable defense of the country without creating a military threat to neighboring states.” Minister Grachev left the impression at home and abroad that military doctrine was a matter within the competence of the MoD, which was working towards its formulation at deliberate speed.

By December 1992, it was quite clear what place military doctrine would have in Russian national security policy. According to one of the leading experts, Major General Viktor Riabchuk, a senior professor in the Department of Operational Art at the Frunze Combined Arms Academy, Russia would have foreign and military policy set by the national leadership in each of these areas. They would provide the basis for Russia’s military doctrine, which was to be infused with the insights from military science. This view was not shared by civilian experts on international security. They warned that the approach taken in the past in the Soviet Union had, in fact, militarized national security. Yuri Gaidukov argued that international practice in this area demanded the articulation of a national security concept, followed by a national security strategy, and only then by a military doctrine. The soldiers were putting the cart before the horse. Gaidukov suggested that a good point of departure for contemporary Russian specialists, soldiers, and civilians was to read with care Aleksandr Svechin’s classic *Strategy*, which had just appeared in English translation. Svechin had called strategy the collective
responsibility of the political, military and economic leadership of the state. Svechin had, however, been repressed by the Soviet regime, and his book was only available to selected readers who had permission to access closed collections. No Russian edition had been published since 1927. Grachev and the other senior Russian generals were not embracing Svechin’s concept of the “integral commander composed of the political, military and economic leadership of the state,” but were harking back to a distinctly military vision of military doctrine, which had emerged in the early 20th century in conjunction with Russia’s wars and revolutions. That concept had led to the enthronement of operational art once a strategy of annihilation had been selected. Svechin had warned that such a choice reduced the political content of strategy and gave pre-eminence to planning for short, decisive campaigns.

Influence of the Tsarist and Soviet Past on Russian Doctrine.

The term military doctrine was not a new one among Russian soldiers. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Russian military reformers were concerned that the Russian Army meet and master the challenges of “modern war,” which is what they thought they had seen on the plains of Manchuria. Because of the increasing complexity of warfare and the need to shape a common understanding of modern war among military leaders, these reformers within the Russian General Staff advocated the articulation of an official understanding of what was involved in preparing for and conducting war, which went well beyond the existing field regulations with their tactical focus. It spoke to the problems of both strategic vision
and effective operational command and control. Tsar Nicholas II put an end to such discussions by claiming that he as autocrat was the one source of doctrine. In the aftermath of war and revolution, tsarist officers in Soviet military service, known under the new regime as voenspetsy (military specialists), to reflect both their professional competence and their questionable class origins, brought the issue of military doctrine into the debates of the Red Army. Mikhail Frunze, a Bolshevnik who had proven an effective field commander and went on to lead the Red Army as Narkomob (People’s Commissar of Defense), embraced the idea and called for the articulation of a “unified military doctrine” for the Soviet state. Here the political and military content were explicitly expressed in ideological terms befitting a revolutionary regime surrounded by a hostile capitalist world plotting its destruction. The Red Army was to be the trusted arm of the Bolshevik state and the defender of the proletariat’s revolution.38 General Makhmut Gareev, the Chief of the Directorate of Military Science of the Soviet General Staff, in his intellectual biography of Frunze, expressed the opinion that Frunze’s conceptualization of a unified military doctrine was a major contribution to military theory since he embraced the idea that doctrine would, by its nature, be incomplete and always subject to the dialectical tension between theory and praxis. It would always be subject to change, depending on developments in the environment.39 In these terms, military doctrine expressed the official views of the state on preparation for and conduct of war, but it was not to be considered a final statement since life demanded that such views evolve in response to changing internal and external conditions. Gareev, like Frunze, saw military doctrine as the domain where the Party and
state leadership called upon the professional military serving the Soviet state to address the technical aspects of military doctrine. In a review of Gareev’s book, Colonel-General Adrian A. Danilevich credited him with the first systemic exposition of Frunze’s contribution to military theory, called attention to the relationship between military forecasting (prognozirovanie) and the articulation of military doctrine, and emphasized their contemporary relevance.40

In the first decade following the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, there was a wide-ranging debate within the Soviet military elite over all aspects of military doctrine. The disputes led to repression against those who were seen as insufficiently rooted in Bolshevik ideology. In the end, however, a new autocrat imposed his own standard on military doctrine and became its sole repository, having purged the Red Army of much of its intellectual leadership. The General Staff might claim to be the brain of the army, but it was subject to the power of vodzh (boss) and Stalin kept that monopoly in his hands throughout the Great Patriotic War and into the Cold War. Stalin did not publish a military doctrine but did provide guidance concerning the changing Soviet view of the outside world. His election speech in early 1946, with its proclamation of capitalism’s continued hostility toward the Soviet Union, provided the basis for George Kennan’s Long Telegram devoted to the sources of Soviet conduct. Stalin’s own military writing hardly went beyond explaining the sources of Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War as a result of the Party and Soviet state mastering the “five permanently operating factors” (the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizing ability of the command
personnel) as the keys to success and by which he cast into the shadows the initial defeats of the Red Army.41

Under Stalin’s regime, there was no published military doctrine. Indeed, secrecy shrouded everything connected to defense and security. Even field regulations were classified documents. Not until after the dictator’s death did any overarching need appear for such a document, even with the onset of Cold War. The post-Stalin leadership engaged in its effort to reshape the Soviet military in keeping with the advent of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet General Staff articulated a military strategy for the nuclear age and published it in three editions in the 1960s under the general editorship of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky. The third edition of this book appeared as part of the Officer’s Library and gave expression to the military-political content of strategy, including operational art and tactics.42 The three editions in 6 years reflected major changes in the military balance during the period in question. Marshal Sokolovsky, who served as Chief of the General Staff from 1952 to 1960, had nominally overseen the authors’ collective that had actually written the volume. In the 1960s, the USSR went from a position of distinct inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons and delivery system in comparison with the United States to one of rough parity.43 At the same time, the Soviet Armed Forces maintained massive conventional forces deployed in Europe against NATO, and by the end of the decade, in the Far East against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The maintenance of both nuclear forces and conventional forces imposed upon the USSR an overwhelming burden beyond the capacity of the Soviet economy to maintain, especially in the context of a renewed arms race in the 1980s, when in-
novations in advanced technologies were creating an RMA.

By the late 1950s under the leadership of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union embarked upon the Military-Technical Revolution in which nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were seen as the new definition of national power. Since the Soviet Union was undergoing a demographic crisis because of the low birth rate during the war, this revolution was supposed to provide security while the ground, air, and naval forces were cut. The strategic concept for such a military posture was laid out in the three editions of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky’s *Military Strategy* between 1962 and 1968 and focused upon nuclear warfighting as the dominant characteristic of modern war.\(^44\) The second edition of *Voennaia strategiia*, which appeared after the Cuban Missile Crisis, contained a chilling explanation of this exposition by then Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Ia. Malinovsky:

\[\ldots\text{we are not supporters of the well-known aphorism — the best defense is attack. It does not fit socialist states, which are peace-loving by their very nature. We are motivated by another [aphorism]: the best method of defense is to warn the enemy of our strength and readiness to smash him at his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression.}\(^45\)

During this period, operational art made its reappearance as a relevant part of military art during the initial period of war. However, it was still nuclear-armed missile forces that fundamentally shaped the nature of future war and expanded the effects that could be achieved. The deployment of forces under the conditions of the possible employment of nuclear weapons demanded greater mobility and protective
systems against radiation for armor combat systems. The forces developed for this operational environment were designed to conduct operations for which there was no practical experience. Troops could exercise the doctrine and operations research professionals might find ways to simulate the conduct of operations, but there was no way to estimate the actual impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of operations. Modeling a NATO-World Trade Organization (WTO) conflict including the prospect of linkage of conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic forces posed a profoundly difficult problem.

In the 1970s Soviet military specialists, led by Colonel-General Andrian Danilevich, Senior Special Assistant to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, began to examine the possibility of an extended conventional phase of a NATO-WTO war. This was undertaken in the context of strategic nuclear parity and modernized theater nuclear arsenals, particularly the solid-fuel SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). By the end of the decade, instead of estimating that 5-6 days would pass before the conflict became nuclear, the Soviets assumed that conventional operations would last long enough to carry their forces all the way to France. They believed that the use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic and operationally counterproductive. They used as their model the Manchurian Strategic Offensive of 1945. In other words, in case of a NATO-WTO war, a theater-strategic offensive would be based upon a modernized concept of deep operations aimed at encircling and annihilating large portions of NATO forces and advancing to the Rhine. Crossing the river, the Soviets believed, would trigger NATO tactical nuclear use.
In 1977, the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* carried a long article on military doctrine, stressing its class nature, the guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist ideology in its formulation, and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist worlds. The article defined military doctrine as “a system of views regarding the goals and nature of possible war,” adopted by a government at a particular time.\(^{49}\) The article went on to address the differences between Soviet military doctrine and that of the states composing the capitalist world, which were depicted as bent upon promoting imperialist wars. From 1979 onward, the General Staff also began to examine the possibility of escalation control after nuclear use and addressed the idea of intrawar termination of nuclear use. To be decisive, the Soviet conventional strategic operation depended upon quantitative advantages in men and material. As Danilevich admitted, “the Soviets did not win the Great Patriotic War because Soviet generalship and fighting skills were superior to those of the Germans. The Soviet Armed Forces simply overwhelmed the Germans with superior numbers of airplanes, men, tanks, and artillery.”\(^{50}\) In a general conventional offensive, Soviet forces might commit 40,000 tanks in multiple echelons and end the war with just 5,000 left. In this context, strategy had been reduced to annihilation of the opposing force, leaving little room for the political dimension of conflict.

By the early 1980s, the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) was aware of qualitative improvements in U.S. theater-nuclear forces (ground launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] and Pershing IIs). It also recognized emerging enhanced conventional capabilities associated with better command and control and precision strike, by which the United States was seeking
to counter Soviet quantity with qualitatively superior conventional weapons systems. What was reemerging was the necessity for reflection (razmyshlenie) upon strategic choices based on an assessment of the probable war confronting the state and the economic means available to prepare for and conduct such a war. Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov cast an unblinking look at the future evolution of warfare. He began to call attention to an emerging RMA that affected conventional forces through automated command and control, informationization, precision, and weapons based on new physical principles. He championed the professionalization of the military, greater control by the General Staff over weapons development, and force structure changes, including the abolition of National Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany). All of this took place at a time when the Soviet Union found itself fighting a war of attrition in Afghanistan against mujahadeen insurgents enjoying external support from the United States and other states through Pakistan. The Soviet national economy could not sustain the military effort demanded by a new round of cold war tensions.

To counter NATO’s emerging theater-nuclear and conventional capabilities, Ogarkov embraced a new organizational concept proposed by Colonel-General Gareev. It focused on the Operational Maneuver Group as a countermeasure to NATO’s emerging capabilities. Specially designed, highly maneuverable, brigades would permit penetration and raiding on an operational scale, making enemy counterstrikes more difficult. Soviet military literature began to discuss the impact of reconnaissance strike and reconnaissance fire complexes upon the conduct of operations in the initial period of war.
These trends posed a profound challenge to the dominant concept regarding the desirability and even necessity of seizing the strategic initiative and mounting offensive operations early in the war. Orgakov’s call for an RMA that would lead to a profound transformation of the Soviet military because of the appearance of new weapon systems based on automated command and control, electronic warfare, and “weapons based on new physical principles, which were reshaping conventional warfare” was not favorably received by the Dimitry Ustinov as minister of defense and representative of the arms industry. In the end, it was Ustinov who, as a member of the Politburo, won the struggle; Orgakov was fired, and the dominance of strategy over operational art, which Orgakov had sought to endow with some degree of independence, was reaffirmed.

At this time, Soviet analysts, including those in the GRU, were trying to assess the implications of a profound shift in the articulated strategy of the United States. The Reagan administration had begun to speak of an “early victory in a protracted conventional war.” This was to be achieved by a shift away from the mass production of conventional weapon systems, i.e., artillery and tanks, toward “precision-strike systems.” Masses of precision-strike weapons might destroy forward-deployed conventional forces and disrupt their operations in the initial period of war. They thus called into question the mobilization for mass industrial war, which the Soviet Union built in the 1930s, perfected during the Great Patriotic War, and sustained throughout the Cold War, even when nuclear weapons had become the core of both nations’ strategic postures.  

54
Perestroika, Glasnost, and Military Doctrine.

With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the articulation of perestroika and glasnost, the content of the strategic debate underwent profound changes in both form and content. The new leadership began a process of strategic disengagement and domestic reform and made the issues of military strategy and doctrine topics of open debate for a far broader portion of the Soviet elite. Disengagement was supposed to lead to breathing space for internal reform and embraced not only the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, but sweeping approaches to disarmament and even military disengagement in Eastern Europe. One of the first indicators of this change came in May 1987 with the adoption by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of new “defensive military doctrine,” which was intended to promote “the development dialogue between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and confidence building in Europe.” Dialogue in this case became more complex than Minister of Defense Dmitri Yazov expected, since it soon took on an internal character over military strategy and the possibility of a posture based upon defensive sufficiency.

As part of that debate, General-Major V. V. Larionov and A. A. Kokoshin championed a doctrine of sufficient defense. They used the Battle of Kursk to support the possibility of an asymmetric response to the threat of an opponent’s offensive operations. At Kursk, the Soviet Stavka had made a conscious choice to stand on the defense to meet and defeat the German summer offensive against the Kursk bulge in order to drain German mechanized forces, set conditions for a Soviet offensive towards Belgorod-Kharkov, and pre-
pare for the liberation of the Ukraine to the Dnieper River.\textsuperscript{56}

Meanwhile, within the Soviet Union, glasnost was making it possible to address the “blank pages” of Soviet history in a more systemic fashion. This included discussing the costs of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and calling into question the rationality of offensive warfighting based upon mass industrial war in the context of nuclear parity and the emerging revolution in conventional capabilities. Such criticism undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet Armed Forces by putting into question the ideology, the institutions, and the values of the Soviet system. In 1990, in the aftermath of the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe, Kokoshin and Larionov published an article directly addressing the need to transform Soviet military doctrine into one based on defensive sufficiency and the abandonment of military strategy based upon offensive operations. The article called for the end of the ideological content of doctrine.\textsuperscript{57} Within a year of its publication, the internal crisis with the Soviet Union had called into question the very existence of the Soviet state. In the aftermath of the August putsch, during which the military refused to support the plotters, the state itself collapsed and the successor republics set about the creation of their own militaries.\textsuperscript{58} This was the context that gave birth to the search for a military doctrine for the Russian state. The disconnect between the Soviet past, the era of perestroika, and the new situation facing the Russian state with the break-up of the Soviet Union could not have been greater. The military sought to resist change by clinging to the past and in this fashion gave prominence to military doctrine that it should not have had. Russia needed a national security concept and a national security strategy, but none was forthcoming.
In August 1993, Sergei Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist and the Chair of the Committee on Defense and Security of the Supreme Soviet, had stated the need for a national security concept and then had outlined a number of reasons connected with the unstable political process that had made its legislation impossible. In the face of the charges and countercharges flung about over the security situation, Stepashin stated that no concept could be approved at that time. He painted a picture of a country in crisis—economic collapse, grinding poverty, political instability, ethnic challenges to central government authority, and soldiers who distrusted politicians. The struggle between the President and parliament had assumed the character of a confrontation that could only be answered by constitutional reform. In the meantime, people and parties were taking up sides. For Stepashin, the core concern was the survival of the Russian state and the revival of Russia’s past power. In the absence of a published security concept, the Ministry of Defense moved ahead with its military doctrine, which Yeltsin approved on November 2, 1993. The Security Council took no leading role in its formulation because it lacked any apparatus to support such oversight. On November 1, 1993, a day before the approval of the military doctrine, Yeltsin issued Decree No. 1807, which created “the Scientific Council” to support the operations of the Security Council. The head of the Scientific Council was retired Rear Admiral V. S. Pirumov, who over the next 5 years would transform the support apparatus of the Security Council into a functioning entity capable of supporting the articulation of national security policy.

The Military Doctrine signed by President Yeltsin in November 1993 was the high point of General Grachev’s tenure as Minister of Defense. Grachev had supported Yeltsin during the October crisis, and for that support the military received the doctrine that it said it needed. Unfortunately, the crisis revealed the true nature of the security environment facing the Russian state. Internal instability and separatism were much more immediate threats than external foes. President Yeltsin saw in the events of October 1993 a vacillation among some of the leadership of the armed forces and began to put his trust in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the command of General Anatoly Kulikov, who shortly went from commander of those forces to Minister of Internal Affairs. Just a year after the crisis between the president and parliament, the Yeltsin administration plunged Russia into a civil war, seeking to bring about the subjugation of Chechnya to Moscow’s rule. Grachev had predicted an easy victory, but none was forthcoming. Initial military defeats in the Battle of Grozny undermined the prestige of the Ministry of Defense. Command of Russian forces in Chechnya was given to General Anatoly Kulikov. In July 1995 Kulikov became Minister of Internal Affairs. The disaster in Chechnya stirred calls for a new military doctrine. Critics attacked Grachev as a political actor without military qualifications, questioned the role of the General Staff in planning operations for the war and focused on the fact that while the doctrine focused on the internal use of the armed forces, it had not prepared them to deal with the conflict they then faced and was less than worth-
less. “An army like the one we have today is incapable of operating successfully in present-day wars.”

During the same year, General Makhmut Gareev published a book on the changing character of armed conflict. Gareev began by assessing the geopolitical dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War world. He did not see any great prospect of nuclear war and considered the risk of general war between major powers as quite reduced, but he did see the likelihood of local conflicts and regional wars that would draw in other powers. The greatest risk with nuclear weapons was not their use by states against other states but “unsanctioned use or their employment as terrorist provocations. . . . At present, and in the long term, local wars and conflicts capable of growing into large-scale military confrontations are becoming more widespread and dangerous.” Considering the instability in the near abroad, Gareev spoke of the risks of Russia being drawn into a conflict as a result of U.S. and NATO intervention in the region. He was particularly concerned about the possibility of subversion and ideological struggle as aspects of such intervention. Moreover, he did not see it as practical for Russia to join the NATO alliance, given Russia’s size, nuclear arsenal, and Eurasian dimensions. It was in Russia’s interests to avoid conflict with NATO, but he warned that the Alliance’s expansion to the east would bring its own complications and contradictions, weakening the Alliance over time while increasing risk of conflict with Russia. Gareev addressed the changing nature of conventional war brought about by precision-strike systems that have made possible the destruction of large formations throughout their depth of deployment, but the same means in the hands of the opponent could impose similar losses and demand rapid
resupply to sustain what would become a protracted conflict. This volume was the first publication of the newly organized Academy of Military Sciences, a private organization composed of retired senior officers and civilian specialists, of whom Gareev was the President.

By March 1996, calls for the revision of Russia’s military doctrine were coming from more than those dissatisfied with the military’s performance in Chechnya. General-Lieutenant Reznichenko, Russian Army (Retired) pointed to two key weaknesses in the existing document in light of current developments: the absence of attention to the problem of general war and the failure to identify a probable opponent. Reznichenko pointed to U.S. defense spending, opposition to a Russian sphere of influence in the near abroad, and U.S. support for expansion of NATO to the east as signs that the United States was that probable opponent.

The article’s appearance in Voennaia mysl’, the chief organ of the General Staff, gives credence to the idea that such views had a significant following among senior military intellectuals. Given the continuing crisis in Chechnya, calls for reform of military doctrine did not receive much support by President Yeltsin as he sought re-election on the basis of his partnership with the West.

Grachev survived as Minister of Defense until the summer of 1996, when retired General Aleksandr Lebed demanded his replacement as part of a deal to support Yeltsin’s re-election in the run-off election. On June 18, 1996, he was removed as Minister of Defense. Yeltsin appointed Lebed as Secretary of the Security Council and a month later on Lebed’s recommendation named General Igor Rodionov, the Director of the Academy of the General Staff, as Minister
of Defense. By refusing to reinforce Russian troops in Grozny when that city was under Chechen attack, the Lebed-Rodionov team set the stage for the armistice that ended the first Chechen War and set in motion a political struggle between Lebed and Kulikov, which ended with the removal of Lebed from the post of Secretary of the Security Council that autumn. Lebed’s fall came as a result of his attempt to transform the Security Council from a consultative arm of executive authority into another power ministry, with the creation of its own crime-fighting legion under his command. The context of that attempt was the sharp decline in Yeltsin’ health between the first and runoff presidential elections in the summer of 1996 and the ensuing power struggle, during which Lebed was perceived as a dangerous outsider.

Rodionov survived longer in office, but found his efforts at military reform hamstrung. He was removed as Minister of Defense in May 1997. For the Yeltsin administration, first priority was reducing the cost of the military to the Russian state and it used military reform as a justification to reduce defense spending. To counterbalance Lebed in the Security Council, Yeltsin had created the Defense Council and appointed Yuri Baturin, a civilian, as secretary. Charged with the coordination of the activities of the Army, Internal Troops, and Border Guards, the Defense Council became a major force in defining Russian military reform. With Lebed’s removal, Rodionov found himself in a struggle with the Defense Council. Rodionov has described his own frustrations as Minister of Defense when he sought to reform the armed forces and carry out their modernization. Yeltsin found the civilian leadership willing to fund the troops under other ministries while soldiers, sailors, and airmen went without pay.
for months and were reduce to begging on the streets. The position of the General Staff was reduced from being the General Staff of the Armed Forces to that of the General Staff of the Army and Navy. His opponents accused Rodionov of trying to keep the Russian armed forces Soviet, while he saw in his civilian opponents the desire to wreck everything Soviet without paying any attention to the need for working out any concept of reform beyond reductions in numbers and costs. During this period of struggle over military reform, Baturin came forward with a proposal for a “provisional military doctrine” in response to increasing external instability and internal problems associated with the Caucasus and Central Asia. He cited the growing likelihood of NATO’s expansion to the east. In defending his proposal, Baturin gave a third reason for a new military doctrine:

... the socio-economic situation deteriorated, forcing us to change the structure of our power ministries and review their qualitative parameters. We had to reinforce interior forces, the border guards and the forces of the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Combat readiness and ability of the Armed Force dwindled owing to insufficient financing.

Baturin made reference to both the political and military-technical dimensions of the proposed doctrine but did not mention any role for the General Staff in its formulations. In this circumstance, Rodionov doubted that without the leadership of the General Staff to work out and approve concepts any sort of military doctrine could be articulated or military reform undertaken at the state level. Rodionov left no doubt that the primary problem here was Yeltsin as commander-in-chief because he set policy goals with-
out reference to expert advice and seemed unconcerned with finding the means to achieve them and at what cost. As an example, Rodionov cites Yeltsin’s decree to have the Army based completely on contract service by the year 2000. No provisional military doctrine was forthcoming during Rodionov’s tenure. When one was forthcoming, the Defense Council no longer existed and the new doctrine was the product of the Security Council, then under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

By 1997 Yeltsin’s Russia appeared to be moving toward stability. The national economy finally appeared to have stopped shrinking. The Caucasus were in a state of uneasy peace, and Russia seemed to have worked out an understanding with NATO via the NATO-Russia Charter. In the spring of 1997, Yeltsin charged the Security Council with overseeing the drafting of a national security concept for Russia. Ivan Rybkin, the Secretary of the Security Council, described this document as the ideological foundation of state construction and policy, which would provide guidance to state policy in the areas of the military, economy, ecology, technology, energy, and finance.

In late December 1997, President Yeltsin approved the Russian National Security Concept. This Concept, when published, stressed economic instability as the primary threat to Russia and spoke of international issues primarily in terms of Russia’s place in a multipolar world. Internal sources of instability, i.e., ethnic and religious contradictions, were seen as threats that could lead to challenges to Russia’s territorial integrity, but no state or alliance was depicted as a probable opponent. This benign view of the international environment did not endure.
The economic crisis of August 1998 undermined Russia’s economic position in the world and brought new hardships to a population that had endured a decade of promises without results. The push for a new military doctrine came in 1999 with the crisis of Russian foreign policy when NATO moved against Yugoslavia because of its repression in Kosovo. Yeltsin and his Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev, the former commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, had assumed that Russia’s nuclear arsenal would give Russia sufficient political leverage to obtain a hearing for its interests in the Balkans. NATO embarked on air operations on the assumption that a few days of bombing would lead Yugoslavia into negotiations, much like the process that had ended the conflict in Bosnia, but this time President Milosevic did not cave in, and the bombing went on. The impact on Russian relations with NATO was catastrophic. In Russia, President Yeltsin faced an unsuccessful attempt at impeachment by the State Duma, the government of Evgeny Primakov fell, and public opinion turned against NATO. In April, NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary by announcing the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. By the spring of 1999, Moscow was full of rumors about a new conflict over Chechnya, and some wondered whether NATO would seek to intervene there to secure Chechnya’s independence. This was the context in which the discussion of a new military doctrine began—with the march of 200 Russian paratroopers from their deployment as part of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia to Pristina, Kosovo—as a symbolic act to ensure Russia was treated as one of the occupying powers in postwar Kosovo. Politically, the move also expressed Moscow’s continuing support for the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It came as NATO forces were about to begin their deployment into Kosovo behind the retreating Yugoslav Army on June 12.

The General Staff planned the contingency operation in secret and only presented the plan to Yeltsin for his approval as it was to be executed. Senior leaders in the Government, Ministry of Defense, and Foreign Ministry were simply not informed until after the plan was approved by Yeltsin. General Anatoly Kvashnin, who had assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff after General Viktor Samsonov was fired along with Minister Rodionov, presented the plan to Yeltsin for his approval. The planning was conducted by the Main Operations Director of the General Staff led by Colonel-General Yuri Baluevsky. The driver in the plan had been the failure of talks between Strobe Talbot, President Clinton’s intermediary, and Vladimir Putin as Secretary of the Security Council over the Russian zone of operations as part of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The June 11 meeting failed to lead to an agreement, which put the Pristina demarche into action. When rumors swept Moscow and other capitals about a military coup against Yeltsin, it was Vladimir Putin who spoke to the public about the President’s role in approving the operation. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief knew about everything that was planned and approved, let’s say, the strategic plan of the developments...” While critics accused the military planners of improvisation and failure to take into account the political and military moves that would follow the deployment, public response to the action was overwhelmingly positive. It was labeled “‘the first appearance for many years of Russia’s political will.’” Putin had assumed a leading
role in Russian defense and foreign policy, advising
President Yeltsin on the crisis in Kosovo following
the unilateral deployment of Russian paratroopers
and the dispute with NATO over the Russian zone of
peacekeeping operations there.⁷⁶

A second such demonstration of military-political
will came only 10 days later. On June 21, the Ministry
of Defense announced Russia’s first, large-scale, post-
Cold War exercise, Zapad 99. The scenario for that
exercise involved an attack on Belarus from the West,
Russian military intervention to protect its ally, and a
failure of conventional forces to stop the aggression,
leading to the use of nuclear weapons to “de-escalate”
the conflict. At the conclusion of the exercise, Marshall
Sergeev put the exercise in the context of events in Yu-
goslavia, saying that Russian forces were only there as
peacekeepers and that Russia’s objective was to secure
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Speaking about
Zapad 99, he invoked the deterrent function of the
Russian Armed Forces.

I would like to address those who wear officer’s insig-
nia today, those who wore them yesterday, and those
will wear them tomorrow. Today the army and navy
occupy one of the most important places in the fate of
Russia. And in a changing world we need to have a
strong and combat-ready Armed Forces, which do not
frighten our neighbors, but serve as a warning to hot
heads. Those who seek to decide matters by taking up
arms against our country will lose.⁷⁷

Over the next 8 months, Russia’s political and
strategic environment underwent significant changes,
which would profoundly affect Russia’s military doc-
trine. Vladimir Putin, the former KGB officer of the
external service from Leningrad, went from Chief
of the FSB in July 1998 and Secretary of the Security Council in March 1999, to Prime Minister, and then President. Yeltsin’s trust in Putin was already evident when in the midst of a growing political crisis, the President appointed him to two positions combining administrative supervision of Russian security policy with control of a power ministry, the FSB. In these two positions, Putin assumed a leading role in both foreign and domestic policy during the political crisis of May 1999, when Yeltsin faced the prospect of impeachment. Putin became the spokesman within the Yeltsin administration for calls to respond forcefully to NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia, which he labeled not only a tragedy but also an explicit attempt to overturn the postwar order in Europe, which demanded an adequate reaction from Russia, including the reformulation of its national security concept.

With the increasing tensions in the Caucasus in the summer of 1999, discussions of issues relating to military doctrine became more active. The NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia had raised military-technical issues about the role of air power and precision strikes. Even as NATO began the air campaign in late March 1999, Russian experts were analyzing the conduct of the air war as a new example of what Vladimir Slipchenko had labeled “wars of the 6th generation,” by which he meant wars involving precision strike systems, electronic warfare, and information warfare as forms of applied coercion. Slipchenko stated that the application of these new means would bring decisive results without the deployment of large ground forces in combat. He stated that these new means had made conventional forces from the industrial age into target sets if they sought to mass. This “no-contact war” was at the heart of U.S. military development. He also
declared that nuclear weapons could deter the use of nuclear weapons but not win a modern war. Russia had to seek to answer these advanced conventional capabilities or find itself militarily vulnerable. Over the next decade, Slipchenko’s concept of 6th-generation warfare would be an integral part of all discussions of future war and would have an impact upon other Russian theorists of future war. In 2003, Admiral Ivan M. Kapitanets used it to discuss naval developments in the 21st century. A former Deputy Commander of the Soviet Navy, Kapitanets in retirement joined the Academy of Military Sciences.

Without advanced precision weapons systems, and faced with the prospect of conflict within its own borders and in the near abroad, Russia’s national security elite sought to bring nuclear weapons into the equation of such local wars to ensure that no intervening power could achieve strategic outcomes in a local war against Russia. With the outbreak of the Second Chechen War, Putin emerged as the most prominent figure in the government, replacing Sergei Stepashin as Prime Minister in August. At that time Yeltsin also announced that he wished to see Putin as his successor to the Presidency. Under his direction, Russian policy moved from trying to contain the conflict to the repression of all Chechen demands for independence. This policy won him support from the nation’s military leadership, many of whom had been humiliated by the outcome of the First Chechen War, which they viewed as a defeat imposed upon the military by weak civilian leaders. In October 1999, Putin chaired the meeting of the Security Council, which addressed changes in the National Security Doctrine to reflect the military developments in the Caucasus. Voicing his support for the newly-organized Unity Party,
Putin watched its triumph in December’s elections to the Duma. Later in December, Yeltsin resigned as President and appointed Putin as Acting President, the post Putin held until elected President in March 2000. In the meantime, Putin had overseen the articulation of a new National Security Concept, which he approved. The new National Security Concept, which reflected the ongoing war in Chechnya, was to serve as the basis for both military transformation and the articulation of a new military doctrine in the immediate future. The new National Security Concept did speak of external threats and placed NATO expansion among them. On nuclear weapons, it spoke of their deterrence function but defined it as the capability “to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies” by imposing upon the aggressor “the desired extent of damage.”


A new military doctrine followed shortly thereafter. It appeared that under Putin the Security Council, which he had led, would assume a more active role in coordinating the formulation of Russia’s national security concept and its military doctrine. In November 1999, as Prime Minister, Putin had secured the appointment of Sergei Ivanov as Secretary of the Security Council. Ivanov, another KGB operative from Leningrad, had served as Putin’s deputy at the FSB. Ivanov’s relationship with Putin was close and enhanced the role of the Security Council during his tenure in 1999 to 2001, when Putin appointed him Defense Minister. The new military doctrine was signed by President Putin on April 21. The document reflected the general principles contained in the recently published nation-
al security concept, but described it as a “document of the transition period, a period of the development of democratic statehood and a multiform economy, a period of the reform of the military organization of the state and a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations.”

However, in its discussion of the military-political environment, the military doctrine gave much greater attention to the threat posed by states having the capacity to engage in rapid, decisive no-contact operations, and states having as a goal the development of political and military means to counter such threats.

The possibility of achieving military-political goals through indirect, non-close-quarter operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed conflicts for peoples and states and for preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent them and to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and development.

The new military doctrine addressed both external and internal threats and called attention to the interconnections of the two. At a time of renewed conflict in Chechnya, Russian leaders were concerned about the extent to which internal instability would invite external intervention and struggled with a formulation that would pay due attention to indirect means of subversion. It stressed the importance of nuclear deterrence to Russian national security and reformulated Russia’s stance on the use of nuclear weapons to include the use of nuclear weapons in response to “large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation.”
The document reflected the maturation of Russia’s national security apparatus, including the cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the Security Council in its formulation. The continuing stress upon nuclear forces was clearly a product of the leadership exerted by Marshall Sergeev as Minister of Defense. Commenting on the formulation of the new military Doctrine, General-Major Vladimir Dvorkin, one of the authors of the section dealing with nuclear weapons, underscored the importance of Marshal Sergeev’s input and leadership: “One can hardly overstate the role Defense Minister Igor Sergeev played in elaboration of the principal items of the new military doctrine.” Dvorkin credited him with guiding the interagency commission that had worked out the statement on nuclear policy. At the same time, the growing role of veterans of the security services within Putin’s emerging administration could be seen in shaping Russian policy. One of major themes of the dawning Putin era would be the assertion of the need to recentralize state power in Russia to ensure domestic stability and national security. The new military doctrine directly addressed this by calling for “a combination of a strict centralized command of the military organization of the state with civilian control of its operation.” The disruptive competition among Russia’s varied security services would no longer be tolerated. The Security Council with Putin’s support would serve as the agency of administrative coordination for a strong presidency. A year later, Aleksei Baier could assert that Putin had put his stamp on Russian foreign and security policy by putting an end to the “era of the Prince and Pauper,” which had framed late Soviet and Russian policy towards the United States. Russia was and would be a great power with its own interests and
allies, even if Washington disagreed. This was the very heart of the Putin Doctrine. Following its publication, General-Major A. F. Klimenko once again provided the lead article on the new military doctrine for \textit{Voen-naia mysł}’. His task was to explain the significance of the new doctrine to the Russian senior military leadership and to discuss what impact it would have on Russian defense and security policy. His first point was to stress the continuity involved in the new doctrine since it addressed the basic questions associated with the military aspects of national security: interests and threats. The chief difference in the document was that it was designed to deal with a transition period involving the evolution of Russia as an actor within a changing international security system moving from unipolarity toward multipolarity, an internal situation that included a shaky economy, weak national government facing on-going ethnic strife, separatism, and terrorism. Klimenko still pictured the global security situation dominated by the reductions in both nuclear and conventional arms that came with the end of the Cold War. The Putin administration was only just beginning the process of reasserting Russia’s sovereignty within and without the country. Klimenko defined Russia’s national interests as associated with those goals and included in the list of vital national interests those things that would ensure a climate favorable for development by maintaining Russia’s:

\ldots sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the Russian Federation; a peaceful environment for a stable political, economic, and intellectual and spiritual development of the country and society; peace and stability in regions bordering Russia; freedom of operation in the world’s oceans and in space
and free access to international economic zones and communications that are critical to Russia; stability of the constitutional system, legality, law and order, and public security; protection of Russian citizens in zones of armed conflicts and their protection in other situations arising from armed violence, posing a threat to their lives.91

The challenge was to find a military doctrine in a transition period when the threat environment proved particularly dynamic. Klimenko listed four functions of military doctrine: organizational to guide the development of military theory and practice; normative as guidance for defense officials in making policy, informational for domestic and international audiences, and reflexive as a form of warning to and influence upon those considering the use of violence against Russia.92

The 1990s had demonstrated that reflexive control was no longer a matter of just nuclear arsenals. Changes in conventional forces associated with command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and precision-strike capabilities had brought about the “informationization” of warfare. Klimenko specifically addressed the challenge posed by the information age for military research and development.

Present day conditions are such that the capabilities of even the most sophisticated, state of the art weapon systems can be fully tapped only when they are integrated into combat systems with highly developed functional characteristics: intellect, organization, observation and surveillance, controllability, and concealment in the process of combat employment.93
It remained to be seen if Russian defense industry and military institutions had the capacity to meet the challenge posed by such system of systems warfare.

Although a document of the transition period, the military doctrine of 2000 officially survived Putin’s tenure as President and was not subject to revision until 2009. This was a remarkable achievement, given the tectonic shifts in the international system over the ensuing decade. Indeed, it could be argued that it survived for so long precisely because the Russian elite could not decide when the dominant trends in the international system were emerging or what threats or promises the emerging system had for Russia. On the one hand, renewed international concern over the threat posed by global terrorism after September 11, 2001 (9/11) temporarily held out the hope that Russia might be able to join a de facto coalition of major powers committed to a common struggle and receive international legitimacy while still enjoying sufficient autonomy to define its own terrorist threats and courses of action. That hope, which was part of the initial response to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, quickly vanished when the Bush administration pushed armed intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq on the grounds of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and in the absence of a UN Security Council vote specifically authorizing an ad hoc coalition’s armed intervention. That Germany and France did not support the intervention was taken as further proof of the trend toward multipolarity, even as the willingness to act in Washington was seen as one of the proofs of unipolarity. In all of this, the United States appeared to be the chief architect of a global security system in crisis. If Russia’s economic recovery fueled by higher energy prices was seen as
confirmation of Russia’s great power status, then the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, which brought to power popular figures following anti-Russian policies and seeking rapid membership in NATO, led Moscow to the conclusion that its own periphery in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia was in play. Here, the United States would be following a particularly anti-Russian policy. There were repeated discussions of rewriting Russia’s military doctrine during the period. They coincided with internal and external events that forced a re-examination of the international security environment. It is safe to say that not until August 2008 was Russia sure that the basic trend lines were not leading to a possible confrontation with a U.S.-led NATO.

The De Facto Doctrine of 2003.

Over the next decade, there was no official pronouncement of a new military doctrine. However, there was at least one official document that embraced all the elements that General-Major Klimenko had enumerated as the functions of military doctrine. In the early fall of 2003, President Putin issued an order to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff regarding certain questions that were to be addressed relating to the “current tasks before the Armed Forces.”94 Ivanov responded to the order by drafting a general statement that addressed a number of issues associated with military doctrine but in the context of a pronouncement from the Ministry on “Current Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” which was presented on October 2, 2003.95 The response in its published form was de facto military doctrine without the label. Indeed, in a criti-
cal assessment of its content, Aleskandr Kramchikhin labeled it a “pre-election doctrine” for the upcoming presidential elections in 2004. At the same time, the document was also an interim assessment of the impact of the U.S. Iraq campaign of March-April 2003 on the further development of military art and its impact upon the tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces. In reviewing the document, President Putin saw it as the basis for reasserting the General Staff’s leadership role in military transformation.

The document proclaimed that Russia found itself in a new era of its own historic development. It described the international security environment as “shaped by the sharpest socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions.” The clarity of the bipolar era of the Cold War had given way to a much more complex environment where “political, financial-economic, ethno-national, demographic, and other questions” impacted strategic stability. The document further spoke in terms of geopolitical constants set by Russia’s engagement with the Euro-Atlantic world to its west, the Islamic world to its south, and the Asia-Pacific world to its east. In this context, Russia’s Armed Forces must have sufficient power to deal with the challenges posed on each of these axes.

To this end, the report addressed the current situation confronting the armed forces. The Minister of Defense declared that those forces had entered a new era of development marked by the end of military reform, which had been completed. These reforms included: establishment of a legal basis for the armed forces that established civilian control over them; creation of a more open budget process; establishment of the basic service structure of the forces to oversee the reduction in the size of the force; the carrying out of the
adaptation of Russia’s military policy to new global realities; the instituting of a mixed system of contract and conscript manning of the force; establishment of the preconditions for the deployment of a modern system of social support for service members; formation of a new system of cooperation with other force structures of Russia in which the armed forces of the Russian Federation is the central part of the military organization of Russia; construction of a new system of military-political obligations of Russia with its allies on the basis of international law; and the setting up of partnership relations with the United States and NATO at the military level. Critics were quick to question this optimistic portrayal of Russian military reform. Aleksandr Golts, the well-known defense correspondent, published his own scathing analysis of military reform as a failure because it had failed to break the hold of Soviet experience and attitudes on the Armed Forces. Golts spoke of 11 lost years.

The success of military reform aside, Ivanov’s report laid out a comprehensive vision of the future transformation of the armed forces. The report addressed Russia in the system of military-political relations in the world, which examined (1) Russia’s relations with the UN and the UN Security Council, (2) the CIS and the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security States, (3) NATO and the EU, (4) the strategic partnership of Russia and the United States, and (5) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and analyzed those relations as they would impact the Armed Forces.

The document then addressed the assessment of the threat to Russia, which it saw as mitigated to some degree by the transparency evident in the foreign policy and defense planning of the major states. For Rus-
sia, the primary security focus was upon the situation in the CIS and among those states bordering the CIS. The document addressed the possibilities of technical advances creating a new generation of nuclear weapons that would optimize their specific effects while reducing their overall destruction. The Russian experts pointed to the increase in local wars and the interest of regional powers on relying upon nuclear weapons for “guaranteed deterrence” against regional opponents. “This lowering of the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons will demand the restructure of its system of command and control of troops and its approaches to deterrence of threats of various levels.”

Nuclear weapons alone will not deter the attack of a power armed with advanced conventional weapons. In that case, deterrence “will prove effective ONLY when the deterring power will possess well-armed, combat ready, conventional forces.”

Looking at the trends affecting the evolution of combat in the late 20th century and the early 21st century, i.e., from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the paper drew a set of conclusions regarding the further evolution of warfare over the next 3 decades of the 21st century or to 2030. That era had witnessed the end of industrial and mechanized warfare and the dawning of information warfare. This will include the further development of weapons based on artificial intelligence and the appearance of more smart weapons, with a shift from maneuvering fires to maneuvering effects and greater depth of precision fires and strikes. Information attack and defense will dominate combat. Logistics will have to be more flexible and be focused on the demands of combat units. Success in military operations will go to the side that wins the struggle for the strategic initia-
tive. Precision strikes will not be confined to just military objects and troops but will include “the country’s economy, its entire infrastructure, civilian population, and territory.” The paper stressed the informationization of warfare as profoundly shaping future conflicts with greater emphasis upon aero-space support to deep precision strikes; command, control, communications, and reconnaissance; and target identification. Of primary importance will be the development of redundant means of command and control and the creation of a network of well-protected fusion centers for the collection and analysis of intelligence from all branches and services.

On the basis of contemporary conflicts, the paper stressed the political ends in defining the means of conducting war. Operations and tactical combat will be enablers to achieve the political end without the complete annihilation of the opposing force. A decisive form of warfare to achieve limited political objectives without the annihilation of the opposing military was described. The paper did not exclude the possibility that initial operations would not lead to decision and spoke of the need to maintain a capacity to mobilize combat-ready reserves.

The authors stressed nine major changes in operational art that would define future conflicts. These included:

1. Transformation of the concept of massing forces and means to attain effects;

2. Changes in the correlation of strategy, operational art, and tactics, where each factor retained its importance in achieving the defeat of the enemy;

3. The basic tasks for the destruction and defeat of the enemy will be achieved not by the struggle of massed infantry and tanks, but by long-range fire destruction;
4. The drawing closer of the concepts of offense and defense with the offensive in these conflicts involving the grouping of fire and radio-electronic strikes;

5. Tactical combat will be dominated by deep strikes of precision systems, with emphasis upon defensive protection from such strikes;

6. Taking out enemy command and control of the economy and infrastructure, including communication and electronic warfare systems, will be the highest priority;

7. The decisive role of deception in air defense systems against cruise missiles and stealth aircraft with air defense organized as strategic, point defense, and air defense of ground forces;

8. Enemy preparing to attack will engage in an integrated set of measures to conceal his preparations and intentions; and,

9. The reality of precision strikes and the struggle for command of the air will be dominant features of combat, but there will still be a role for ground forces with no-contact warfare as a model for future evolution and beyond current capabilities—advanced states may chose to use the ground forces of allies while providing deep strike and electronic warfare capabilities.\textsuperscript{106}

On the basis of these developments, the paper presented an expanded list of current tasks for the Russian Armed Forces organized around four basic functions: (1) deterrence of military and military political threats to Russia’s security or interests; (2) protecting the economic and political interests of Russia; (3) conducting military operations in peacetime; and (4) the conduct of combat operations. The paper examined a wide range of tasks supporting these functions in
the context of armed conflicts, local wars, regional wars, and general war. It paid special attention to the development of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and addressed the development of conventional forces; weapons research and development; troop training; officer education; force manning, including the contract system and the development of force structure; improvement in military morale by providing service personnel with adequate housing; and the organization of military-patriotic education among the civilian population. The discussion was both comprehensive and detailed. Ivanov later described the paper as “a concept for the further development of the national armed forces.” The impression that the paper left on the reader was one of Russia’s being involved in a race to transform its military before the pace of change simply doomed the Russian Armed Forces to a qualitative inferiority. The tasks were ambitious, and it remained to be seen whether the military and the military-industrial complex could fulfill them.

Public responses to the de facto military doctrine were immediate and varied. With 2 days of the appearance of the report, Vitaly Denisov invoked President Putin’s words, which called the report a matter of “all-national tasks” of importance not just to military specialists, but to the entire nation. Taken together, the tasks embraced the military modernization of the Russian Armed Forces, which was the foundation of Russia’s national security. Improved fiscal conditions were making possible greater investment in defense. N. Petrov followed this line, stating that the new doctrine was the “foundation of security” and repeating President Putin’s claim that military reform was over and that an era of military transformation had begun. Petrov noted the lack of attention to the struggle against
terrorism but put this to the fact that counterterrorism was the primary business of the special services and not the Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{110} Aleksandr Khramchkin was much more skeptical about the doctrine. He saw no real successes in military reform, which had left Russia with a smaller and under-funded version of the Soviet Army. The document was to him both “strange” and “ambivalent,” and reflected more the desires of President Putin than reality. The doctrine posited an end of military reform and a speedy transformation to an armed force that would reflect the ambitions of a superpower. “So it appears that all is now normal and we can with a confident step march to a bright military future . . . when the Russian Armed Forces can without any problems fight two local wars, simultaneously defeat an aero-space attack, and even launch preventive strikes against any point on the globe.”\textsuperscript{111} This bright picture had more in common with the electoral manifesto of a mediocre politician, which proclaims that we are for everything good and against anything bad. False assumptions about current conditions were a poor basis for good doctrine. Oleg Odnokolenko saw the document as an attempt by the Ministry of Defense to short circuit the national security process by getting a military doctrine out before there was any official statement of a new national security concept or foreign policy concept. Odnokolenko took the central point of Ivanov’s report to be the emphasis upon preventive strikes against threats to Russian national security. Asking Andrei Koko- shin, the former First Deputy Minister of Defense, to comment on the naked declaration of the right to preventive strikes without reference to international sanctions for such strikes, Odnokolenko drew out this comment: “From that point of view . . . this is a very
strange document.” Kokoshin complained about the over-emphasis upon the role of the armed forces in national security policy, but found much of the discussion of the trends affecting military art to be of value. He characterized the document not as military doctrine, but a set of statements by the Ministry of Defense and General Staff that would be the subject of further debate. This position led Odnokolenko to see the document as an exercise in bureaucratic first-strike in order to make certain that the final variant of military doctrine would reflect those values and judgments. He characterized the document as “the science of the strike (nauka udariat’), and a play on words attributed to Marshal Aleksandr Suvorov: “the science of victory” (nauka pobezhdat’). In this case, however, the first strike seems to have preempted any further official discussion of military doctrine for the rest of President Putin’s tenure.

Over the next 6 years, there were discussions about the need for new military doctrine, but no final draft doctrine appeared until after the 2008 presidential election. External events raised new anxieties in Moscow’s official circles. The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia brought to power regimes that were openly anti-Russian and pushing hard to join NATO. The United States, as part of its effort to counter the possible threats posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states, was moving forward with the development of a missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe. Relations between Washington and Moscow became increasingly hostile as Russia’s concerns over a permanent U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan raised concerns over Russian interests in Central Asia. All of these issues contributed to calls for a new military doctrine. Military specialists might
affirm the importance of military doctrine as the “path to victory,” critique the “Ivanov Doctrine” as a good report and bad doctrine, call for a new doctrine reflecting a system of priorities based on the theory and praxis of “military security,” and even provide a model doctrine as worked out by the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. There were public debates about the nature of future war highlighting the continuing dispute over the nature of 6th generation warfare and the applicability of no-contact warfare at this stage of the revolution in military affairs. Specialists continued to discuss what a new military doctrine should contain on the basis of military-political and military technical changes in the world.

Baluevsky and the Ghost-Writing of the Putin Doctrine.

In 2004, President Putin removed Chief of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin after the general had clashed openly and frequently with Minister of Defense Ivanov. He was replaced by Colonel-General Yuri Baluevsky, the former Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Over the next 2 years, Baluevsky established himself as a powerful advocate for the position of the General Staff in making Russian defense and security policy. In June 2005, he assumed the post of Chief of Staff for the Collective Security Organization, thus re-establishing a Soviet tradition of the Chief of the General Staff also serving as chief of staff in alliance organizations. That same month at a session of the Security Council, President Putin ordered work to begin on formulating a new draft military doctrine. The General Staff and the Academy of Military Sciences assigned working groups to
develop parts of the proposed document. In September 2006, the press reported that secret work was underway in the Ministry of Defense on a new military doctrine, which would be forwarded to the President for his consideration by early October. One article reported that the secret draft included key provisions that would authorize Russian military intervention in conflicts with neighboring states, close its eyes to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and identify as probable enemies “the US, NATO, and terrorists.” The Ministry of Defense quickly denied that any such work was under way, and Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov denied that he had received any such order to work on a new military doctrine. Press speculation focused on a presidential directive to the General Staff that had by-passed his official boss, the Minister of Defense. Public commentary by civilian defense experts on the possibility of a new military doctrine was interesting because it universally asserted that there had been no revision of doctrine since 2000, thereby ignoring the de facto doctrine of 2003. No draft military doctrine appeared in October.

Three months later, well-known defense analyst and commentator Viktor Miasnikov called attention to a conference being organized by the Academy of Military Sciences and the Ministry of Defense for mid-January 2007 on the topic, “The Structure and Content of the new Military Doctrine.” Miasnikov recalled the Defense Ministry’s denials of press reports that work was going forward on a new military doctrine. Four months later, the MOD was cosponsoring a conference on just that topic. Miasnikov reported that one of the major reports would be delivered by a senor GRU officer of the General Staff on the topic, “Doctrinal Views of NATO on the Nature of Wars and the Main-
tenance of Security.” From this, he concluded that as in the past, so in the future, NATO and the United States were assumed to be the primary potential enemies. Miasnikov identified the General Staff as the primary driver in the working out of the new military doctrine and identified Colonel-General Aleksandr Rushkin, the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, as the party tasked with addressing Russian force structure and the employment of the Armed Forces. The meeting would also include a report on the “Role and Place of Strategic Nuclear forces in Military Doctrine,” confirming the continued importance of these forces as not only the primary instrument of deterrence but also the very foundation of Russian military power. Reviewing the other major topics, Miasnikov found terrorism, a serious national concern after the massacre at Beslan, given lower priority than economic security, which he took to mean Russia’s energy diplomacy as practiced by President Putin. He concluded that, once again, the military was driving policy when logically policy should dictate defense posture, and he characterized the anticipated discussion as bringing old concepts to new doctrine as if nothing had changed in the past 30 years.119

On the eve of the January conference, General Gareev, the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, made the case for a new military doctrine based on changes in the international and domestic situation.

The necessity to formulate a new edition of Russia’s military doctrine arose because after the adoption of the current doctrine, which was in 2000, there occurred significant changes in the geopolitical and military-political situation, and in the nature of the threats to the defensive security of the state. . . . There have been changes in the system of state management and
the level of economic development of the country and in its demographic potential.120

Gareev spoke specifically of changes in the international system adversely affecting Russia and calling into question the territorial integrity of that nation: “. . . the Baltic states have already become members of NATO and Ukraine and Georgia have been invited to join. . . . This is hardly a loyal approach, and after the adoption of the new doctrine it will certainly stir up sharp debates in Russia and beyond its borders.”121

The conference itself took place as planned on January 20, with attendance by senior government officials, military officers, and members of the Duma and the Federal Assembly. General Gareev delivered the opening remarks, which outlined the major parts of the draft doctrine and outlined the case for the need for a new version. Chief of the General Staff General Yurii Baluevsky delivered the keynote address in which he defended the success of military reform to date and set the charge for a new doctrine as “a powerful Army means a powerful Russia.”122 Following the conference, the press was full of reports on the content of the draft doctrine and on speculation about its imminent adoption. General Gareev was particularly prominent in pushing the case for adoption. He emphasized that new conditions dictated a new doctrine.123 But none was forthcoming. Not noted in the immediate press accounts of the conference was the conspicuous absence of Minister of Defense Ivanov from the proceedings. Ivanov had not attended and had not commented publicly on the event. At the end of the month, Anatoly Tsyganok, the Director of the Center for Military Forecasting and a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences, cast a
cloud over the enthusiasm for the likely progress of a new draft military doctrine when he noted that Minister Ivanov had not even attended the conference. The preliminary program had listed him as the keynote speaker. Tyganok speculated about tensions between Ivanov and the General Staff as the reason for his absence. Ivanov had played a leading role in the drafting of the 2000 military doctrine and in the *de facto* doctrine of 2003, but he had also had serious conflict with former Chief of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin, which contributed to the latter’s dismissal by President Putin in 2004.\textsuperscript{124} Within 2 weeks, President Putin dismissed his Minister of Defense and replaced him with Anatoly Serdyukov, a businessman and official with ties to Leningrad-St. Petersburg. While he had served in the Soviet Army in the 1980s, he was considered more of an expert on tax policy than defense policy. Speculation about the causes of Ivanov’s removal focused on the burning question of Putin’s successor as President and the fact that Ivanov had become too prominent a candidate for those in the presidential administration.\textsuperscript{125}

At the same time, President Putin put his own stamp on the actual content of Russian national security policy and thereby radically reshaped the debate about the new military doctrine. When speaking to the leaders of the Euro-Atlantic community at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, President Putin put a chill on Russia’s relations with the West, saying that Russia viewed the United States and NATO as engaged in policies threatening Russian national interests and creating a global security environment that increased conflicts and showed no way to resolve them.\textsuperscript{126} He particularly called attention to NATO’s expansion and warned that the deployment of a U.S. an-
tiballistic missile (ABM) system into Eastern Europe would be a precipitous step towards a new arms race. Putin informed Western leaders that they had two choices: continue on the path toward confrontation, or seek to revive a partnership with Russia. While the Western press spoke of a new cold war, the Russian press generally applauded “Putin’s doctrine.” Viktor Lennik wrote that Russia had spoken its piece in Munich, Germany, in a language that had not been heard for years, a language that clearly expressed Russian interests.

Following Putin’s speech, the momentum towards military reform seemed to decline. Gareev’s and Baluevsky’s presentations to the January conference were published by Voennaia mysl’. But the entire bureaucratic context for doctrinal reform changed after February 15, when Putin appointed as Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, an official who had made his reputation in the furniture business and for his work as Tax Minister in the second Putin administration, where he had successfully reorganized the tax service. Serdyukov in his first press conference announced his intention to continue Ivanov’s course on military reform but did not mention a new military doctrine. As to the logic of appointing a civilian minister of defense, experts speculated that Putin was most concerned about getting control of the expenditure of defense funds. Krasnaia zvezda reported on March 15 that the preparation of a new military doctrine had been placed in the hands of the Security Council and that it was busy with getting the opinions of various departments and experts on the content of the doctrine. The invitation for public discussions brought forth some sharp criticism of the draft military doctrine as presented at the January conference.
Georgii Kolyvanov, a retired colonel, took the opportunity to critique the proposed military doctrine beyond criticism of the draft to state that a new military doctrine was not needed. What Russia needed was a clear statement of its national interests, and this was a question beyond the competence of military specialists and a matter for the whole of government, political parties, and society. A new military doctrine in the absence of a new national security concept was a case of putting the horse before the cart. A week later, Kolyvanov criticized the views on the employment expressed by Colonel-General Aleksandr’ Rushkin, the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, at the January conference for being obscure, confused, and downright banal. Kolyvanov found one capital weakness in Rushkin’s presentation: it did not name the main threat to Russia or what sort of conflict the Armed Forces should expect to fight. “There is no answer to the main questions: with what enemy and in what means should the Russian Army prepare to fight today (in the extreme case, tomorrow, and not in the “foreseeable future”)? Shortly after the appearance of Kolyvanov’s two-part criticism of the draft military doctrine, the same publication that had carried his articles invited foreign specialists to comment on the draft military doctrine so that Russian readers might find out what these foreign experts might know about the presentations of the Russian military leaders involved in the debate.

Colonel Marcel de Haas of the Dutch Army made the first and quite informed contribution. A student of Russian military affairs, de Haas viewed the debate on military doctrine as a case of bureaucratic politics with the military under the leadership of the General Staff seeking to shape the entire debate on security
policy by a preemptive strike in formulating a new military doctrine. He stated that the future of doctrine and Russian military policy in general would depend on the success of this effort.\textsuperscript{135} The Security Council did not approve any new military doctrine in 2007 or in early 2008. The future of military doctrine would depend on the next presidential administration, which would emerge after the 2008 presidential elections. What did happen was a change of leadership in the Security Council. In mid-July 2007 Igor Ivanov resigned from his post as Secretary of the Security Council and was replaced by Valentin Sobolev.\textsuperscript{136} While the Security Council had enjoyed increased influence during the tenures of Putin and Sergei Ivanov as Secretary, its influence had declined under Ivanov’s successors. Vladimir Rushailo, a former Minister of Internal Affairs, had been badly hurt in an automobile accident while visiting Kamchatka. His successor, Igor Ivanov, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not dominate the interagency process. Neither did members of Putin’s inner circle of St. Petersburg apparatchiks. Sobolev, a former Deputy Head of the FSB and former deputy secretary of the Security Council, brought the Security Council into the competent hands of a former KGB officer.\textsuperscript{137} Sobolev remained Secretary of the Security Council until after the 2008 presidential election. He would be replaced by another veteran of the security services.

\textbf{The Medvedev-Putin Tandem and Military Doctrine.}

As Putin approached the end of his second consecutive term as president, the issue of succession began to dominate the rumor mill in Moscow, across
Russia, and in other world capitals. Putin repeatedly announced that he would finish his term in office, and speculation about his successor turned first to Sergei Ivanov, who had close ties to Putin from service in the KGB and was part of the cadres from St. Petersburg who made up much of Putin’s inner circle. Instead, Putin selected another Leningrader but of a younger generation, Dmitri Medvedev. Medvedev, like Putin, was a graduate of the law school at St. Petersburg University, and received his doctorate in law from the same institution in 1990. As a former student of Anatoly Sobchak, he was recruited into the Leningrad municipal government when Sobchak was mayor. He worked in the International Relations Committee of the city government, which at that time was headed by Vladimir Putin. When Putin became Prime Minister in November 1999, he brought Medvedev from St. Petersburg to Moscow, where he became chief of staff to the president and then Putin’s campaign manager during the 2000 elections. After the election, Putin appointed Medvedev Chairman of Gazprom and charged him with ensuring that the company paid its taxes. He seems to have played no role in Putin’s campaign against hostile oligarchs, which culminated in the break-up of the Yukos oil corporation and the arrest and imprisonment of its president, Vladimir Khodorkovsky. In 2003, Putin brought Medvedev back into his presidential administration as chief of staff and in 2005 appointed him First Deputy Prime Minister. In the fall of 2007, Putin stage managed Medvedev’s candidacy for president and then announced his support in December, all but ensuring Medvedev’s election in 2008. In his first campaign speech as an official candidate, Medvedev announced that his first official act, if elected, would be to appoint Putin as Prime Minister.
Medvedev was sworn in as President of the Russian Federation on May 7, 2008. On May 8, Putin moved from the presidential offices on Staryi Ploshchad’ to the office of the Prime Minister in the Belyi Dom (White House), confirming the legal foundation of what political commentators called the Medvedev-Putin Tandem.

Medvedev arrived in the presidency with extensive experience in the presidential administration but almost none in the area of national security policy. How the Medvedev-Putin tandem would approach international relations and national security and function in a crisis became apparent over the summer of 2008. Some observers expected Putin to play the role of Sophia Alekseevna, the daughter of Tsar Aleksei, and power behind the throne during the minority of the Tsarevichi Ivan Aleksevich and Petr Aleksevich, with the competent organs playing the role of the streltsy to ensure Sophia’s hand on power. However, Medvedev was not a family rival but part of the network of operatives that supported Putin in power. The capital issue was not the hand behind the throne but the functioning of a governmental tandem, or Tandemokatiia, given the President’s role as head of state and commander-in-chief.

Changes in national security leadership followed the presidential election of 2008. Putin joined the meetings of the Security Council as Prime Minister. Nikolai Patrushev retired from his post as head of the FSB to become Secretary of the Security Council. Patrushev had served as head of the FSB from August 1999 and had directed counterterrorist operations during the Second Chechen War. Patrushev’s ties to Putin extended back to service in the KGB, and his long tenure as head of the FSB made him an evident Putin
loyalist. His first days as head of the FSB in August-September 1999 coincided with the outbreak of the Second Chechen War. Patrushev had the responsibility for investigating a series of bombings across Russia in early September. The blasts in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk killed 293 persons and left another 651 wounded, turning the Second Chechen War from a contest for control of Dagestan and Chechnya into a threat to all of Russian society. On September 22, 1999, a fourth major bomb plot was discovered in Ryazan. However, a day later, Patrushev informed the Russian public that there had been no bomb plot, only an anti-terrorist training exercise. The murky events at Ryazan and the regime’s use of the bombings to rally national support for the Second Chechen War by creating mass psychosis among the population fueled rumors of the FSB being agent-provocateurs who staged the bombing to forge national support. Such accusations have been at the basis for depicting the Putin administration as a criminal enterprise willing to use any means to gain and hold power. The issue of the influence of the intelligence services in Putin’s Russia, which had been a concern to champions of a civil society, got renewed attention with the Putin-Medvedev tandem.

Those concerns received a major boost in early June when there was more talk about strengthening the position of the Security Council as an agency of the government with its own budget. The Security Council had evolved as an instrument for interagency cooperation. Now it appeared to be taking a policy formulation role. One sign of the possible new role for the Security Council was the departure of General Yuri Baluevsky from the post of Chief of the General Staff to that of Deputy Secretary of the Security Council,
with the responsibility for military-political forecasting. The press speculated about conflict between Baluevsky and Minister of Defense Serdiukov. It is worth noting that Baluevsky had been appointed a member of the Security Council on May 25, resigning from the post of Chief of the General Staff on June 4, after he was appointed to the staff of the Security Council.143 The new Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, had worked closely with Minister Serdyukov as Chief of Armaments for the Russian Armed Forces. Baluevsky had been the chief senior military booster of a new military doctrine, and as a member of the staff of the Security Council for military-political forecasting, he was in a very strong position to influence the articulation of a new military doctrine.144

However, the first security document coming from the Medvedev-Putin Tandem was not devoted to military doctrine but instead addressed the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, a matter that was considered to be primarily a document formulated under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry. On June 4, Medvedev visited his first Western capital, Berlin, Germany, as President. His tone seemed to raise expectations of change in Russian foreign policy even as his content reflected continuity with Putin’s policies. Bilateral cooperation with Germany was stressed in the area of energy policy, at the same time he warned against the negative consequences of NATO expansion and the deployment of ABM system components in Poland and the Czech Republic. Medvedev offered a vision of a united European civilization at the same time he warned against efforts to isolate Russia.145 Shortly after his return to Moscow, Medvedev signed the foreign policy concept on July 12 and then announced its approval at a conference of senior offi-
cials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document contained no surprises. The document began by outlining the place of Russia in the international system and articulated various objectives of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century. The concept then described the “modern world” and discussed Russia’s role in that world as a great power. The document addressed Russia’s relations with various international organizations from the UN, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the CIS, the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community, and the SCO. Taking a global overview of Russia’s relations, the concept focused first upon relations with the Euro-Atlantic world and then the Asian Pacific. The harshest criticisms were directed at the United States and NATO. The concept followed the foreign policy line set by Putin. It did discuss the existing threat environment, where it pointed to the lowered risks of nuclear and general war, and addressed the emerging transnational problems of international terrorism, narco-trafficking, organized crime, and the proliferation of WMD. The concept also stipulated the process by which official challenges and threats would be assessed within the Russian state:

The Security Council of the Russian Federation assesses the challenges and threats to the national interests and security of Russia in the international sphere, submits proposals to the President of the Russian Federation for his decision as the Head of State on issues of foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the field of national security, as well as on coordination of activities of federal executive bodies and executive bodies of the Subjects of the Russian Federation in the process of the implementation of the decisions taken.
in the area of ensuring national security, and evaluates the efficiency of those decisions.\textsuperscript{147}

The inclusion of this announcement was a clear reflection of the dominant position that the reformed Security Council was expected to play in articulating, not just coordinating, national security policy.\textsuperscript{148}

Some commentators found the document traditional in content and form. Sergei Karaganov, the head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, labeled it as a statement of the Russian foreign policy establishment and criticized it for being too long and too nuanced. It reflected too much hope for the role of the UN and put too much emphasis upon the CIS, when the real actors of importance were China, India, Europe, or the United States.\textsuperscript{149} Others questioned the basic assumption in the concept and speculated on its timing and purpose. Aleksandr’ Konovalov, the President of the think-tank, Institute of Strategic Assessments, provided an in-depth critique of the document, noting serious disconnects between what the document articulated as policy and what was the current reality of Russian foreign policy. He was particularly critical of the concept’s emphasis on multipolarity as a source of stability in the international system and pointed to numerous international security objectives, including the struggle with terrorism that depended upon cooperation with the West. Finally, he asked two basic questions: why had this document appeared now, and what was the subtext of the document? He concluded that either policy would shift to fit the new document, or the document would be forgotten. Since the President had both signed the concept and given it public attention, Konovalov concluded that the concept was an attempt by the President to put his own
stamp on Russian foreign policy. Another observer noted that the concept contained another change in keeping with the Medvedev-Putin tandem. The document granted the Prime Minister powers in the conduct of foreign relations, a matter that had been the exclusive province of Russia’s presidents.  

Shortly after the appearance of the foreign policy concept, another document began to circulate in the Russian mass media, *New Look of the Armed Forces: Being a Concept of the development of Military Force Structure to 2030*. If the first document had been clearly an official state policy associated with the Foreign Ministry and approved by the President, the second was leaked by unidentified sources in the Ministry of Defense in order to develop a public debate about it and get support outside the Ministry of Defense. Critics generally applauded its content for being forward-looking and acknowledged the need for such a document. But they were critical of the fact that it had been drafted by the Ministry of Defense alone. The document touched on political matters that were the province of the military. Critics admitted that the draft could have been the work of either unnamed generals, civilian specialists working for the Ministry, or a combination of both. But the issue of civilian control was not just a matter of appointing a civilian to the post of minister, it also involved subordination of the military establishment to the civil power. Here critics pointed to a capital problem, the concept took on the task of defining the threat to which the new military would respond. The political leadership had the responsibility of defining such threats. The concept of the “New Look” could be seen as a not too subtle attempt to lobby the government itself. On the emerging military threat to Russia, the concept stressed technological progress in the
West and declining capacity of the Russian military-industrial complex to provide the advanced weapons systems needed to support an “Army of Innovation.” The primary source of the threat from military backwardness allegedly came from the United States over the period in question because it would be struggling to retain its dominance of the international system against emerging regional powers, to continue its global deployments and would seek that, in part, by military-technological innovation. Critics questioned both these assumptions, some pointing to the growing power of China, while others were not so sure about the United States retaining its global basing over the period in question. The public debate of the concept came at a particularly critical moment for Russian national security policy.

The Foreign Policy Concept and the Ministry of Defense concept of the New Look can be seen as indications of just how the Medvedev-Putin tandem would function in the articulation of national security policy. Medvedev might leave his mark on foreign policy, but would share responsibility with his Prime Minister. The serious business of defining threats would be in the hands of the Security Council. Other powerful bureaucratic actors could be busy shaping public opinion before there was any official state policy outside the institution promoting new policy. But such analysis applied to a conventional policy process and not a crisis situation. Crises have their dynamics and often affect the character of conventional policy formulation in their aftermath.

By early August Russia found itself in just such a crisis situation in the Caucasus as the military confrontation on the border between Georgia and the breakaway province of South Ossetia escalated. Rus-
sia not only had peacekeepers deployed in South Ossetia but was also overtly committed to the protection of the South Ossetian population, many of whom had dual citizenship in Russia. The Georgian government under President Mikheil Saakashvili had promised a democratic Georgia that would reunite all its territories lost in the civil conflicts of the early 1990s, and move to the West through membership in NATO. The United States had supported Saakashvili’s efforts and had lobbied hard for a membership action plan for Georgia’s admission without immediate success. Speculation that Russia provoked a crisis over the summer followed the onset of armed conflict between Georgian and Russian forces. Such speculation viewed the Georgian-Russian conflict as the beginning of a new cold war with Russia willing to use military power to impose changes on the boundaries of states within Europe. Such critics linked together the Russian objections to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence without a UN mandate and subsequent recognition of that independence by the United States and most EU member states in the winter of 2008. International lawyers might argue over whether such an event set a precedent for other territories seeking independence from other national governments, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Ronald Asmus, the head of the German Marshall Fund, has provided the most cogent exposition of this case in his recent book.154

Others were not so sure that Russia had engineered the entire crisis. They pointed to the failure to get approval of the membership action plan at the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008 as raising anxiety in Tbilisi. This anxiety increased as the American presidential election campaign moved into full swing.
The Bush administration had shown its commitment to Georgian interests, even as it counseled restraint towards the summer crisis. Saakashvilli faced the prospect of the election bringing to power an administration that would not be so committed to Georgia’s cause. On that basis, he gambled on the use of force for a military-political coup de main that would put Georgian forces in control of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. The military operation did not achieve its objective before Russian re-enforcements reached the area. In 5 days, the Georgian military faced the prospect of total defeat and a Russian occupation of large areas of the country. No foreign military support for Tbilisi was forthcoming outside of the redeployment of one Georgian brigade from Iraq, where it had been supporting coalition operations. After that, Russia followed a strategy of talk and fight while it imposed a military defeat upon the Georgian Armed Forces and advanced into part of Georgia. Russia avoided threatening the existence of the Georgian state, even as its forces defeated the Georgian Armed Forces and humiliated its government. Moreover, Russia used the conflict to recognize the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, even as France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy, on behalf of the EU, negotiated a cease fire between the sides. Russia did not find many other states that would recognize the independence of the two break-away states, but Russian media treated the Georgian-Russian War as a just war and great victory in which Russia imposed peace. The events in Georgia did impact the U.S. presidential election, pushing Republican candidate John McCain towards advocating stronger support for Georgia in the face of Russian aggression. The United States and Poland also signed the agreement covering the deployment
of ABM interceptors in Poland in the aftermath of the Georgia War. Barrack Obama, the Democratic nominee, seemed at first reluctant to comment on the crisis beyond supporting Sarkozy’s peace efforts. As Stephen Blank observed in the immediate aftermath of the war, Russia had won on the ground and lost internationally, increasing Moscow’s isolation. Not even the members of the SCO would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹⁵⁶

Moscow’s response was to stress its willingness to protect its own vital national interests by force if necessary. On September 1, President Medvedev articulated five foreign policy principles: (1) the supremacy of international law in relations among nations; (2) preference for a multipolar world order over a unipolar one dominated by the United States; (3) commitment not to seek confrontation with any state and desire to avoid isolation; (4) defense of Russian citizens wherever they may be as a high national security priority; and (5) Russia’s support to friendly states in regions considered to be of special interest.¹⁵⁷ In late September and October, the Russian Armed Forces conducted a large-scale strategic command and staff exercise, “Stability-2008,” which was designed to test interagency responses to an emerging crisis, the liquidation of any resulting armed conflicts, and the reestablishment of strategic stability.¹⁵⁸

In the fall of 2008, economic events were not only reshaping American politics but also the international system. International security concerns took second place to seeking to stop a crisis in capital markets that spread from the United States across the globe. This not only ensured the election of Barrack Obama, but it also made it clear that the United States would have to engage in strategic disengagement from its two
foreign wars, even as it sought to create stability to manage both states and regions as it withdrew. On coming into office, the Obama administration quickly adopted a policy of “Reset” in U.S.-Russian relations, seeking to set a new atmosphere of cooperation without addressing key areas of conflict until Russia had made its own position clear on such prospects. Russia as a market economy suffered from the global economic crisis, and its next major national security document reflected both a response to the economic crisis and to the possibility of improved relations with the United States.

Having been tasked with formulating a new national security strategy in the summer of 2008, the Security Council had used its research staff to formulate a draft document and then arranged a series of conferences for discussions of its main features. The largest of these conferences took place in March 2009, and the Security Council used the inputs from it to refine the document and had a draft for presentation to the members of the Security Council in April. The document was signed by President Medvedev on May 12. The document’s chief point of departure was to play down military security and emphasize economic aspects of security in a time of global crisis. Energy diplomacy, a major component of Putin’s foreign policy, was addressed as a major strength and received priority attention. National security would be enhanced by improving Russia’s position in the global economy. The document lays out goals to be achieved in stages over the next decade.

At the time of the signing, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary to the Council, confirmed that the underlying principle of Russian security policy would be pragmatism. This meant that Russia would seek to establish an
equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States on the basis of mutual interests. In the measures leading to such a full partnership, Patrushev listed: arms control and disarmament negotiations, confidence-building measures and counterproliferation efforts to stop the spread of WMD, counterterrorism, and the resolution of regional conflicts. At the same time, he asserted that Russia would maintain its strategic nuclear deterrence in the face of U.S. efforts to field a global missile defense system and to develop global strike systems capable of attacking with nuclear and precision-guided conventional means. Russia would remain opposed to ABM deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland, would oppose NATO expansion into former Soviet space, and express its concern over the deployment of NATO infrastructure up to Russia’s borders. He expressed concern about NATO’s out-of-area interventions in the absence of approval by the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{162}

Russia’s National Security Strategy published in May 2009 set the stage for the Security Council to address Russia’s Military Doctrine. That process moved forward through 2009 and was completed in early 2010. And so we return to the initial point of departure of this chapter. Russia’s military doctrine has deep historical roots, it has compelling importance to the Russian military and the General Staff, and it reflects post-Cold War assumptions about the primary challenges and threats as coming from the West, even as it recognizes the need for cooperation with the West to deal with a whole range of security challenges that have emerged since the Cold War and are a part of very different global dynamics. As we have noted above, the final draft approved by President Medvedev contained some major changes from the proposi-
tions discussed by members of the Security Council in the fall of 2009. That final approved doctrine did not contain proposals on nuclear first use that had been mentioned by both Patrushev and General Bal-uevsky, but it did continue to treat NATO expansion as a primary challenge to Russia’s national security. This gives us some hope that military doctrine is not only not a matter for the Armed Forces to define, but that the interagency process can lead to modifications reflecting new international circumstances and opportunities. The Medvedev-Putin Tandem has not collapsed or degenerated into open conflict, but the policy process, if we judge by the new Military Doctrine, has become more regular, transparent, and dependable, which will serve Russian interests and global security. The new military doctrine was remarkably silent on the “new look” for the Russian Armed forces, which the Ministry of Defense Serdiukov and the new Chief of the General Staff, General Makarov, had been pushing forward since the summer of 2008. \(^\text{163}\) It is as if the RMA, which had been a great focus for the Soviet General Staff in the early 1980s had suddenly ceased to be an element of military doctrine just as the Ministry of defense was devoting every effort to make the Russian Armed Forces competitive in what has become a high-tech Sino-U.S. arms race driven by the informationization of warfare, shaped by C4ISR, employing multi-mission unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robotic systems, and embracing network-centric warfare. \(^\text{164}\)

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.


47. Ibid., p. 23.


63. Ibid.


85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.


91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.


98. Ibid., p. 2.


101. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

102. Ibid., p. 23.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., p. 24.

105. Ibid., p. 25.

106. Ibid., pp. 25-27.


113. Ibid.


115. Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko, Budushchaja voina, Moscow, Russia: Polit.Ru O. G. I., 2005. This work was an
extension of the debate over no-contact war and the lessons to be drawn from the insurgency that had developed in Iraq after the U.S.-led military intervention and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.


121. Ibid.


128. M. A. Gareev, “Struktura i osnovoe soderzhanie no-
voi voennoi doktriny Rossii,” *Voennaia mysl’,* No. pp. 2-13; and
Lu. N. Baluevskii, “Teoreticheskie i motodologicheskie osnovy
formirovания voennoi doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” *Voennaia

129. Ekatrina Grigor’eva, “Glavnokomanduiushchii Vladimir
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2007.

130. Dmitri Steshin, “Serdiukov pobeshal idti ‘kursom Iva-

131. Viktor Miasnikov, “Ministr bez mundira,” *Nezavisimoe
voennoe obozrenie,* March 2, 2007.

132. “Voennaia doktrina: Suzhdenia i mneniia,” *Krasnaia

133. Georgii Kolyvanov, “Voennaia doktrina ne nuzhna,” *Ne-

134. Georgii Kolyvanov, “Derzhat’sia prostykh i iasnykh
myslei,” *Nezavisimoe voennaia obozrenie,* April 6, 2007. On Rush-
kin’s actual presentation, see A. S. Rukshin, “Doktrinal’nye vzgli-
ady po voprosam premeneiia i stroitel’stva vooružennykh sil

135. Marcel de Haas, “Bovaia voennaia doktrina: Kakoi ona
budit?” *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,* April 13, 2007.

136. Andrei Baranov, “Igor’ Ivanov vse zhe ushel,”

137. Anna Nikolaeva, “Bezopasnyi kandidat,” *Vedomosti,* July

138. “Ukaz Prezidenta RF 749. O Sekretare Soveta Bezopas-

139. Aleksandr Kasatov, “Spetsluzhby poimeli Riazantsev,”


148. This dominant position did not exclude other ministries from offering their own working definitions of threats to Russia. Thus, on July 3, sources within the Ministry of Defense announced progress on a working draft of significant changes in army force structure leading to an “army of innovation” on the basis of the threat posed by technology change in other leading states. See Nikolai Poroskov, “Innovatsionnaia armiia,” *Vremia novostei*, July 3, 2008.


CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN DEFENSE DOCTRINE

Alexander G. Savelyev

After President Vladimir Putin of Russian Federation (RF) approved the Military Doctrine in April 2000, experts and observers started to propose improvements to this document since they considered it as only a “transitional” and a “temporary” vision of the role of armed forces in promoting the security of the state. In 2002, official representatives of the Security Council and the Defense Ministry of the RF first informed the government that the new draft of the Doctrine would soon be presented for the President’s approval. Similar information about the preparatory work on a new Military Doctrine was also distributed in 2006 and in 2007. The latest “news” on this issue came from the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2009. It promised that the document would be ready by September 2009 and approved by the end of the same year. However, the doctrine was only approved on February 5, 2010 (after presentation of this paper—Editor).

THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

According to the official definition, Military Doctrine is the combination of official views (directives) that defines the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic bases for promoting of the military security of the RF. The 2000 Military Doctrine (Doctrine-2000) is defined as “a document of the transitional period” and as “defensive.”
The document itself consists of several parts: One part titled, “Military-Political Basis,” including sub-chapters on the military-political situation with the description of possible wars and military conflicts; main provisions of promotion of military security; military organization of the state; and the state’s governance of the military organization. Another, “Military-economic basis,” gives the priorities of military-industrial preparations, mobilization, military cooperation, and some other provisions.

The legal nature of the Doctrine is not quite clear. It is not a law, which is obligatory for the implementation for any state body, because the document is not subject to approval by the Russian Parliament. At the same time, it is not a pure declaration, since the document is approved by a Presidential Decree. The document states that its success will be achieved by the state governance of the military and by implementation of a complex of political, diplomatic, economic, social, informational legal, military, and other measures aimed at promoting the military security of the RF and its allies.

In any case, the military and political leadership of Russia, as well as the majority of experts, consider the Military Doctrine to be a very important document. Therefore, such state structures as the Security Council, Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and some other state bodies, as well as the Russian Academy of Sciences, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) and groups of experts were busy for a long time with drafting this document and proposing their views on the issues it raises.
THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW DRAFT OF THE DOCTRINE

Before starting the analysis of the main provisions of a new draft of the Military Doctrine, it is important to pay attention to several points. Thus, according to the not-very-clearly-explainable Russian “tradition,” the draft of the Doctrine was developed by the Security Council, not by the Defense Ministry or by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF. It was not an initiative of the above-mentioned agencies, but the direct order of the President. One can consider this fact not to be very important, but under the present situation, it would be a mistake to completely ignore it.

The problem is that military reform, which is now in progress in Russia, produced strong dissatisfaction among many high-ranking generals, including former Chief of the General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky. Much evidence shows that this dissatisfaction was one of the main reasons for his retirement. General Baluyevsky now occupies the position of the Under Secretary of the Security Council, and led the group that is responsible for drafting a new Military Doctrine. Of course, it does not mean that the draft presented by the Security Council could completely reject the military reform, but it is difficult to imagine that it would reflect all the new beginnings in military modernization, which must be implemented into the armed forces of the RF according to the reform. (In fact, it did not even mention the reform—Editor.)

This problem is not the only one that accompanies the development of a new Military Doctrine. It only opens the list of relatively “strange” points in this sphere. Thus, the very fact that the President ordered
the Security Council and not the Defense Ministry to
draft the Doctrine does not mean that it was his initial
decision. It was the Ministry and the General Staff
who proposed to put this responsibility on this presi-
dential agency. Ironically, when General Baluyevsky
occupied the position of the Chief of the General Staff,
he also proposed that the Military Doctrine had to be
drafted by the Security Council. There is no clear an-
swer to the question of why the acting military does
not want to work out a document that must be num-
ber one from the point of their responsibility and day-
to-day life and activities. One of the answers is that
they do not consider the Military Doctrine to be a very
important document at all.

It is difficult to imagine that Military Doctrine
could be directly presented to the President of Russia
without preliminary approval of this document by the
Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.
But in open statements of the representatives of the
Security Council, there is nothing about such a very
natural mechanism of decisionmaking. In this connec-
tion, one can come to a conclusion that the present de-
lay in accepting the Doctrine can also be explained by
the need to achieve an agreement between the reform-
ers (Defense Ministry) and the conservatives (Security
Council). At the same time, according to the state-
ment of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Armed Forces General Nikolai Makarov, the process
of discussions and achieving of an agreement between
different agencies was underway by February 2009,
and might even have been started earlier.¹

One of the aspects of the existing disagreements
became public in autumn 2009. Thus, on October 8,
2009, during a press-conference, Secretary of the Se-
curity Council of the RF Nikolai Patrushev said that
his Council wanted “to make this Military Doctrine open in order that everybody here and abroad knew what we had developed and how we wanted to work. We will put forward certain aims and define the ways how to achieve them.”

But in August before that conference, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Anatoly Nogovyttsin stated that the new Military Doctrine would consist of two parts—an open one with the military political aspects, and a closed one that would contain strategic aspects, including the conditions and possible ways of use of nuclear weapons.

The “closed” method of working-out the Doctrine, as well as the idea to have a “secret” part of it, produced strong dissatisfaction within the expert community of Russia. The Security Council declared that it was open to any proposals and ideas concerning all the aspects of a new draft of this document. It is quite well known that the Academy of Sciences of Russia and the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF, as well as many other organizations, tried to make their proposals in this connection. But they could hardly find any trace of their ideas in the preliminary draft of the Doctrine during the process of discussions organized by the Security Council.

As for the “secret” part of the Doctrine, President of the Academy of Military Science General Makhmut Gareyev made a straightforward statement against the very idea to have it. He said that Military Doctrine was an open declaration about the policy of the state in the field of defense. This statement is to be made openly to its own people as well as to the all the world. Some of the aspects of this policy are presented directly and others, indirectly. But the Doctrine must not contain any closed parts. This point of view is shared by many Russian experts.
Another “strange” question is why it took so long to draft a new version of a military doctrine. As mentioned above, it was already 2002 when Russian authorities started to speak about the necessity to adjust the acting military doctrine to new realities. After September 11, 2001, these realities became absolutely clear to all the states and political and military leaders of the world, including Russian authorities. But for whatever reasons, for about 7 years they failed to reflect it in such documents as the Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.6

WHAT IS NEW IN THE DOCTRINE

In spite of the “closed” character of the development of the new Military Doctrine of the RF, some details of the new draft of this document became known through the press, mostly with reference to the “unidentified sources.” As usual, these sources explain that the document under development should not be considered as a completely new one. All the main provisions of the acting doctrine will remain the same. But some details and positions of it will be corrected according to a new strategic situation. At the same time, they state that unlike the previous (acting) doctrine, the new one is designed as a document that will “work” for a relatively long time (probably until 2020). The doctrine approved in 2000 is called a “temporary” or “transitional” document. Nevertheless, there are no specific details that prove the difference between these two doctrines from this point of view, and it is not clear why the document, which remained in force for 10 years (2000-10), is a “temporary” one, and the document that will “work” for the following 10 years (2010-20) is not.
The doctrine will remain as a defensive doctrine, but it will contain a new provision which calls for the use of force to protect the interests of Russian citizens abroad in case their lives are in danger. The experts unanimously link this new point with the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008. They also see the influence of this conflict in another new provision of the 2010 Doctrine that justifies the use of Russian Armed Forces in border conflicts along the perimeter of Russia in case of “violations of the principles of international law which could be defined as an aggression.”\textsuperscript{7} The third difference between the two doctrines is contained in the chapter, “Promotion of Military Security.” It provides a joint military policy not only together with Belarus as it is defined in the 2000 doctrine, but together with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\textsuperscript{8}

Finally, in the “nuclear” part of the Doctrine, there will be a new provision about the possibility of a delivery of preemptive strikes against the aggressor. The list of potential or probable enemies of Russia remains the same. They are international terrorism, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States. Many experts think that the United States and NATO were included in this list automatically, following the traditions of the Cold War and Soviet-type thinking. As for the most probable and important threats to Russian national security—the primary one is called interference of foreign states into Russian internal affairs—whether direct or indirect, through the structures that have their support. Another threat is described as anti-constitutional violence in the post-Soviet states, which could lead to instability at the Russian borders.\textsuperscript{9} The new doctrine also proclaims the principle of civilian control over the armed forces.
But it gives no details about such control or its mechanism.

THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As we mentioned above, some important details of the new draft of the Military Doctrine were openly presented to the public. The most sensational one was a new provision of the document that defines the spectrum of options for the first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. According to the statements of Secretary of the Security Council of Russia N. Patrushev, this spectrum would include, alongside the others, a preemptive strike option. It is quite obvious that this “leakage” was specially made to check the publics’ and experts’ reactions to such an innovation.

One should remember that in 1993 Russia for the first time abandoned Leonid Brezhnev’s proclaimed principle of no first use of nuclear weapons. This was done after it became clear that NATO would remain in force, that a number of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) allies would join this military-political organization and, most importantly, that the conditions of heavy economic crisis and the continued weakening of the capabilities of the general purpose forces of Russia and Russian conventional potential would restrict Russian military capabilities. It was a long-standing tradition for the Soviet Union to pay major attention to a military buildup, very often at the expense of the level of the welfare of the population of the country. The military always enjoyed a privileged position in the society, which is true at least for high-ranking officers. This situation started to change during the Mikhail Gorbachev period and accelerated during Boris Yeltsin’s rule. But the priority to promote
security of the country remained in place. And for the new leadership of Russia, it was simply impossible to ignore the growing dissatisfaction of the military and the “concerned” part of the public with the level of capabilities of the armed forces. So, a first use option became a sort of a compromise to prove to the skeptics that the security of Russia, in any case, would be promoted whether by conventional or by nuclear forces.

In the 2000 military doctrine, Russia preserved the right to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation and in case of the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it and its allies, as well in case of a “critical situation” for its national security that occurred as the result of a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons. Now it is proposed to preserve the right to start nuclear war not as retaliation, but in case of suspicions of possible attack against Russia. It is interesting to mention that such an “idea” was openly declared not by acting or retired military representatives, but by the Secretary of the Security Council of the RF and an ex-Federal Security Service (FSB) chief. The military tried to avoid the comments on nuclear issues of the new doctrine and the proposal to have a “closed” part of this document can probably be explained by their unwillingness to openly present their views on this very sensitive subject.

But at the same time, if the main goal of the state is to avoid war in general and nuclear war in particular, it must follow the strategy of deterrence. One of the most important postulates of this strategy was formulated 2,500 years ago by the great Chinese military authority, Sun Tzu. It states that if you want to prevent an attack of your enemy, you must show him all the disadvantages of such a decision. The key words here
are “to show.” So, the idea to “hide” this most important element of deterrence strategy would be unlikely to contribute to the general security of Russia. One should also take into account the fact that, while presenting general provisions of Russian nuclear strategy openly, there is no need to go deeply into the details if these details are considered to be very sensitive and classified. For the purpose of the military doctrine, it would be quite enough to make general statements, leaving the classified information for the war plans to be developed by the General Staff.

But in any case, the statement that Russia under certain conditions will be ready to deliver a first nuclear strike sounds extremely provocative, and it is very unlikely that this provision of the military doctrine could contribute to the security of the RF or to the security of any other state. That point of view was expressed by many experts, mostly retired military. Probably, the strongest dissatisfaction with the idea of preemptive use of force (not only nuclear, but also conventional) was presented by retired General Yuli Kirshin. Making a reference to the statement of General Baluyevsky of January 2008 that the Russian Federation could use its forces preemptively, he completely disagreed with it. Moreover, he put the blame on General Baluyevsky by saying that he was going “to completely break the content” of the doctrine and was going to transfer it “from peaceful and defensive” into “adventures, illegal and aggressive.” Of course, not all the experts share such a radical point of view. As usual, the spectrum of positions is very wide. And as soon as the new draft of Military Doctrine is approved by the President of the RF, one can expect a new wave of publications, statements, etc., on the subject.
MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION AND OPENNESS

In one of the preliminary drafts of the military doctrine, there was a provision that this document must implement an informational function along with the others. But much evidence shows that the new doctrine, as well as all the previous variations of this document, can hardly be described as informative. Russian military doctrine never contained such information as the number of military districts and the number of the fleets and the flotillas. The reader of the document will never find information about the branches of the armed forces and the overall numbers of military and civilian staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Strategic Rocket, and other forces. There is nothing about the numbers of the main weapon systems, etc. This information is not classified and is available in many, including official, open documents. But for whatever reasons, the authors of the doctrine decided not to “weigh down” the document with this data.

If the interested reader cannot “fill the gap” in the information concerning the aforementioned positions, it is quite difficult to understand other very important provisions of the document. One such provision is the question about the general method of warfare. More concretely, in case of war are we going to attack the enemy from the very beginning of the conflict, or will our general preparations be for defense and, probably, for counterattack?

Back in the 1930s, after very intensive discussions, Soviet military and political leaders came to a decision that the Red Army must have become the most offensive army in the world. They rejected defense as one of the important methods of warfare and put forward
a slogan “to destroy the enemy at its territory by small blood” (i.e., few casualties—Editor). It was a quite clear and straightforward strategy that was worked out in open discussions. It is another story that this offensive strategy became the cause for a terrible tragedy of the Red Army after German troops attacked Soviet forces who were not prepared for or trained for defense.

After World War II and until the Gorbachev period, there were no open debates on the offence and defense problem. The USSR’s military strategy then was obviously and clearly offensive. But in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the debates on this issue started again. Military leaders tried to defend their offensive position by putting forward the standard statement that it was impossible to achieve victory without decisive offensive operations and strategy in general. But the opponents did not accept this argument, arguing that the new character of contemporary war meant that there is no need to completely destroy the enemy. Moreover, in case of a conflict with a strong and nuclear enemy, Russia must seek an early termination of the conflict and not let it become nuclear and global. In other words, they proposed a strategy of de-escalation.

The political leadership of the USSR tried to avoid direct statements on the problem, but it obviously preferred a non-offensive option, or more correctly, a nonmilitary option. Gorbachev’s famous statement that security was a political matter and could only be solved by political means disappointed the military and their supporters, which resulted in termination of the dispute since the offenders preferred to keep silent. Of course, it does not mean that the military accepted their defeat. But further on, they simply tried to avoid
making direct statements on this problem and tried (not without success) to shift the attention of the political leadership of Russia (starting from Yeltsin and finishing with Dmitry Medvedev) to the questions of strategic stability.

Maybe the aforementioned debates on offense and defense became the turning point after which military and pro-military officials in their open presentations and documents, like the military doctrine, try to avoid straightforward statements so as to give as little information as possible. For example, in one of the drafts of the new Military Doctrine there were a number of such expressions as “increase in the effectiveness,” “improvements,” “neutralization of the aggressor,” and “bringing in accordance with the tasks.” But there is nothing about the methods of “neutralization of the aggressor,” i.e., by offensive or defensive operation, or by a combination of these two methods. Moreover, in speaking about “bringing in accordance with the tasks,” the authors of the document do not call anything tasks. So again, we have another unresolved issue. Taking this into consideration, one can conclude that new Military Doctrine failed to implement the “informative task” that was declared by its authors.

MILITARY REFORM AND THE REDUCTION AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE OFFICERS’ CORPS

The most contradictory problem in contemporary Russian military life is military reform, implemented by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov with a relatively small group of his supporters, including Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov. Serdyukov obviously enjoys support from the Kremlin, but, at the
same time, his attempts to make general improvements in the Army meet growing dissatisfaction among top level military officials (many of whom were retired during the period of reform—i.e., since 2008), as well as within military experts’ groups and from individuals.

One should remember that in October 2008 Serdyukov announced the main provisions of military reform. They concerned practically all the spheres of military activities of Russia—from the quantity of soldiers and officers, to the quality of military units, including the installation of a new system of military command and control. Thus, it was decided to reduce the overall number of the armed forces from 1.13 million in 2008 to 1 million troops by 2012. Originally it was decided to have 1 million troops in the armed forces by 2016, but Serdyukov proposed to implement this plan ahead of schedule.

The most painful reductions concern the officer corps. The number of officers’ positions will be reduced from 355,000 to 150,000, which means the actual retirement of 117,500 officers within 3 years. Part of this number of military positions will not be reduced, but substituted with civilian positions—physicians, journalists, lawyers, and others. Another part will be substituted with sergeants. The ratio between senior and junior officers’ positions will also be changed. The armed forces will have many fewer colonels and many more lieutenants.

Very serious reductions will affect the central apparatus of the armed forces. It will be reduced from 22,000 to 8,500 positions. It also concerns the General Staff, the number of whose departments must be reduced by half. More details of the planned reductions of military personnel are presented in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. The Planned Reductions of Military Personnel of the Russian Armed Forces.

Of course, the reductions of officers and generals (it is planned to reduce the number of generals’ positions in the armed forces from about 1,100 to less than 900—see Table 3-1) resulted in the most serious dissatisfaction and produced the strongest critiques of the reform in general and of Serdyukov in particular. Some of the critiques do it quite openly. Among them, one can mention the Chairman of the Communist Party of RF Gennady Zyuganov and retired generals Leonid Ivashov, Aleksandr’ Vladimirov, and others. Another group of those who oppose the reform prefer to express their views mostly through the internet and without mentioning their names. However, tak-
ing into account their level of knowledge, it is possible to conclude that some of these “incognitos” are high-ranking and, probably still active military.

For example, one of these sources gives the information that the number of staff members of the Main Department of Operations (Glavnoye Operativnoye Upravleniye [GOU]) of the General Staff was reduced from 550 to 260 persons during 1 year, and subsequently to 150 persons. But the tasks for these personnel remained the same, which forced the department to establish a working time from 8 a.m. until 8 p.m., in violation of acting Russian legislation. This source also states that the Department of Military Communications was reduced by more than three times and the department responsible for command centers by four times.

These critiques compare the scale of the present reform with the repressions of the late 1930s. They say that the majority of high ranking military were dismissed from their positions or given mandatory retirement. This concerns the Chief of the General Staff and all the chiefs of its main departments. All three of the commanders in chief of the military branches were dismissed, as well as all three of the commanders in chief of different troop branches. Also, all six commanders of military districts were dismissed. They present other figures to support their position.

Other very serious changes are expected at the lower levels of military command. It is planned to have (within 2-3 years) a completely new, “professional” sergeants’ corps which must substitute for the existing “semi-professional” staff of the armed forces. This idea of Defense Minister Serdyukov attracts far less criticism than the reductions of officers, but the skeptics cannot believe that this goal can be achieved
in such a short period of time. In this connection, they predict not less than 10-15 years for its implementation, during which transitional period they expect very serious weaknesses to appear in this lower level of command.

As for the doctrine, it is quite obvious that such big changes in the numbers and the structure of the armed forces of Russia, including dramatic changes in the officers’ and sergeants’ corps, must find at least some (if not very serious) reflection in this document, since the corresponding decisions have been already taken. Moreover, concrete actions in this field have been undertaken by the leadership of the armed forces. But there is some evidence that in the intermediate variants of the draft of the Doctrine, the Security Council and General Baluyevsky managed to avoid both the concrete figures as well as even mentioning the reductions and the restructuring of military personal of the Russian Army (and even in the final version published in February 2010, we find no mention of the reform—Editor).

**Changes of the Structure.**

Other changes as the result of the reform that obviously must find their reflection in the military doctrine are the structural changes in the armed forces and in the command system. The last time the structure of the Russian Army remained the same as during the Soviet time. The main unit was the division—motorized and tank—consisting of four regiments—three motorized and one tank for the motorized division and three tank regiments and one motorized for a tank division. Usually, three or four divisions constituted an army, which was under the command of
the military district authorities. Only in 1990 were a number of “reduced” (due to economic reasons) divisions transformed into brigades. But generally, the command system remained the same: military district—army—division—regiment.

Now the idea is to have a reduced, three-stage, command system: military district—operational command—brigade. The level of division will be abandoned, as will the divisions themselves. According to Serdyukov, this system will improve operational efficiency in military command. The transformation from divisions to brigades also presents a subject of critique on the part of Russian experts. Those who oppose the reform try to prove that this transition will dramatically weaken the armed forces and will make it impossible to wage a large-scale war against a strong enemy. As a result, the Russian Army will be able to fight and probably win only in limited military conflicts, like the conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008. Moreover, say the critics, in the long term the consequences of such a transformation will result in the dramatic weakness of the level of military professionalism and experience of Russian generals, because such a very important position as commander of division will be absent. According to such critics, only after having the experience as a division commander can a general obtain real operational and strategic skill.

Another innovation in the armed forces of Russia is the practically complete elimination of noncombat ready units. The most serious changes will take place in the Army, but all the rest of the services will also become subject to planned restructuring. The planned reductions in the number of military units are presented in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2. The Number of Military Units in Russian Armed Forces (Planned Reductions and Changes).

Chief of the General Staff Makarov stated that, as a result of modernization of the armed forces, including the restructuring and delivery of new weapon systems, all the combat ready units will be 100 percent equipped with new systems and other units by not less than 70 percent by the year 2020. The skeptics say that these new systems cannot be called “new” from the point of view of their characteristics. They are “new” only in comparison with the existing weapons, which are mostly obsolete. At the same time, there is no information on the cost of the modernization declared by the General Staff. But it is clear that Russia will pay very serious attention to these modernization issues, which will result in quite reasonable re-arming of the armed forces.

There is no official information about the future structure of the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, in November 2008 General Makarov signed a directive
that prohibited the military from openly presenting any information about the state of the reform of the armed forces, as well as about the problems occurring due to the reform.\textsuperscript{20} But according to some estimates, by the year 2015 the Russian Army may have about 60 combat-ready brigades with the total number of tanks (due to different estimates) from 2000 to 3000 (instead of 23,000 for today).

Once again, one should mention that the Russian Security Council, responsible for drafting the military doctrine, for whatever reasons does not want to reflect these dramatic changes in this document. It is impossible to imagine that any Russian officials—whether military or civilian—can consider these reforms as a not so important event that does not deserve the right to find its reflection in the Military Doctrine. At the same time, if they chose a variant with the “secret” part of this document, it is also difficult to imagine what kind of “secrets” concerning the military reform can be presented there, since practically all the information is available through open sources, including mass media.

**Mobilization Issues.**

Traditionally, the Russian military doctrine contains a rather big and important military—economic section that calls for preparations and improvements in the activities of the country’s military-industrial complex. It also contains general demands for the readiness of the economy of the state (both military and civilian) for mobilization efforts in case mobilization is declared by the supreme command (the President). As usual, his part of the Doctrine does not attract the general attention of the commentators on this
document, including critics as well as the supporters.

The necessity of military mobilization was almost never a subject of questions and serious discussions in Russia as well as in the Soviet Union. All the Soviet and Russian experience demanded a very strong potential for mobilization of the Army and industry in order to supply the huge armed forces in case of war. The very notion of war was unanimously viewed as signifying a massive and more or less prolonged one. The one exception was a nuclear war, which may have a relatively shorter period than a war using only conventional weapons.

Soviet and Russian military thought never rejected the participation of the country in local conflicts and limited wars (like the Afghan war) that do not demand massive mobilization. But general preparations of the country always had in mind the possibility of a central war with a military and economically strong enemy that will demand the concentration of all efforts to achieve a victory. The influence of the experience of the country in World War II, or the Great Patriotic War as it is usually called in Russia, is very strong even now, although it is nearly 65 years after its end. The book, *The Recollections and the Thoughts* by Marshal Georgy Zhukov is still very popular. It remains the most recommended book for young Russian officers.

But the very problem is not in the book, of course. It is much more serious. One can find the sources of this problem back in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Soviet Union started the so-called “Stalin’s industrialization.” The goal (and the result) of this industrialization was the creation of a Soviet economic system that was generally based on heavy and military industry. During World War II, this industry was partially
destroyed, partially relocated (to the Urals), and partially newly built. This allowed the state to increase dramatically the production of the entire spectrum of weapons during the war, which created a basis for victory.

After World War II, military construction in the Soviet Union continued at an even larger scale than before. Huge army and military reserves demanded unprecedented efforts in military production at the expense of the living standards of the population. Military demands were never cut by the USSR political leadership, since the majority of the leaders of the country had high military ranks and war experience. During the Gorbachev period, several attempts to transform the military economy into a civilian one were undertaken, but all failed. As a result, Russia inherited a rather weakened (due to practical termination of the arms race), but still enormous industry, which may be called mostly military. For example, practically all Soviet-made technical consumer goods (radio and TV sets, refrigerators, tape and video recorders, kitchen equipment, etc.) were produced by military enterprises, which received special orders defining the percentage of civilian goods to be produced by this or that military branch of the industry. During the period when there were practically no competitive foreign goods in the markets, these products of the Soviet military industrial complex had their consumers. But it is not surprising that civil production of technical consumer goods practically stopped or the volume of production was drastically reduced when the country became open to the world.

A huge military industrial complex is not the only problem for Russia. Another part is the civilian branches of Soviet economy, which were viewed by
the leadership as a sort of reserve that can contribute to military production in case of mobilization. The majority of civilian enterprises had special programs for such a transformation, including the reserves of special equipment, raw materials, etc. The Soviet Union had substantial experience in transferring civilian to military production, but there was practically no experience for how to do the opposite—to convert the military economy into a civilian one.

The nature and the scale of the Soviet, and now Russian, military economy is a special problem, which deserves separate research. But from the perspective of military doctrine, it is obvious that this issue must play a very important role in justifying the existence of such a monstrous part of the country’s economy. The necessity to keep mobilization capacity is one of the most important arguments for it, which always found its reflection in the Doctrine.

Now the problem is that military reform and planned transformation of the armed forces of Russia obviously contradict the standard demand to keep tremendous reserves and military-industrial potential. The mobilization issue is becoming more and more obsolete from the perspective of the reform. Some of the critics managed to detect this contradiction. Thus General (Ret.) Vladimirov states that the idea to start and to finish war without reserves is nonsense from the point of strategy and theory of war. According to this expert (and to the standard Soviet military thinking), the main task of the Army of a peaceful period is to fight during the initial period of war to give time for the state to undertake mobilization procedures. He also states, that “as usual” this “initial” Army perishes, and the victorious results of the war can be achieved only by the Army of the “war period” — the Army that
is built up as the result of mobilization. His conclusion is as follows: since the reform practically destroys the mobilization potential, the country is preparing “not to wage but to lose the war.”

As for the official point of view on this problem, at present it still remains at the periphery of the attention of the military leadership, which is busy with the transformation of the Army. As a result, it would not be very surprising if the new military doctrine would contain a section on the necessity to make preparations for military and industrial mobilization, which is absolutely contradictory to the essence of the reform (and this is exactly what happened—Editor).

CONCLUSION

The analysis of Russian military doctrine shows that this document is quite controversial on many points. Thus, there is not even a joint position on the question of whether or not this document is important for the security of Russia. The nature of Military Doctrine is also questionable. While declaring its “defensive character,” it calls for preemptive military actions (including a preemptive use of nuclear weapons), as well as mostly offensive military strategy. The doctrine will probably state that its provisions are obligatory for the implementation by all the state bodies. At the same time, the document does not contain any straightforward directives that can be treated as direct orders for this or that action. Moreover, if the doctrine by its nature is a complex of official views on the role of military instruments in preserving the security of the country, it is not clear how the views can be implemented by the state bodies.

There also are a number of other not very clear and explainable positions in the document. But what
is most important, the present variant of military doctrine does not reflect the overwhelming military reform under way in Russia. One can say more: the doctrine, due to a number of its positions, contradicts the reform. Leaving aside the absence of information about planned changes in the armed forces, the document has a number of positions (like the demands for preparations for a large-scale mobilization of the Army, as well as the military and civilian industry) that can be considered as being inconsistent with the reform.

If there were no such deep contradictions between the reformers and opponents of such rapid and deep transformation in the Russian Armed Forces, a compromise could be achieved in the military doctrine. But now this document has become a focal point of the struggle between the two parties. More correctly, the anti-reformist group obviously tries to use the doctrine as the proof of the rightness of their position. And if the President, for whatever reasons, approves the doctrine in the wording proposed by the Security Council, one can expect further difficulties in the implementation of the reforms of the armed forces as they were initially designed.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3


6. The New Security Strategy of the Russian Federation was approved only in 2009.


8. Ibid.


11. This official declaration was made by Brezhnev in 1976 in Bucharest, Hungary.

12. The Federal Security Service (FSB) is the successor of KGB. N. Patrushev has a military rank of army general (4-star general), but he never served in the Army, only in the KGB and FSB.


15. In this case, of course, the parties of the dispute spoke about “central” war—the war between the USSR (Russia) and NATO.

16. According to Serdyukov, in 2008, 40,000 of the officers’ positions were vacant, and 26,700 of the acting officers reached the age limit. In 2009, 9,100 officers would also reach this limit, plus 7,500 of the officers with 2-year contracts (after graduating civilian institutes) will also be retired. It means that actual reductions that will really affect the officers’ corps would constitute 117,500. “The Nature of Military Reforms—Serdyukov’s Plan,” August 12, 2008, available from army.lv/.


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