

Strategy Research Project

Regionally Aligned Forces: Do They Provide Adequate Warfighting Function Protection

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Regionally Aligned Forces: Do They Provide Adequate Warfighting Function
Protection**

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Abstract

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Army leaders are considering a regional alignment of U.S. military forces to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders in their conduct of theater operations. This SRP assesses the viability of the Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno's new concept of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). It focuses on the single Warfighting of Protection, using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) problem solving construct as an analytical tool. It concludes with recommendations to ensure the RAF is employed with adequate Protection.

Regionally Aligned Forces: Do They Provide Adequate Warfighting Function Protection

Through regional alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement these skills with language, regional expertise, and cultural training.

– General Raymond Odierno¹

As the United States concludes the second of two major conflicts within the last twelve years, military leaders are reflecting on past lessons learned, looking inward, analyzing recent innovations, and reviewing strategy in order to enhance and codify the nation's war-fighting capabilities. They are preparing for future conflicts in a rapidly-changing global environment. They are scrutinizing equipment, doctrine, force structure, personnel, and other military systems.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Raymond Odierno, recently implemented the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Concept execution order (December 2012), which lays out the Army's strategy to support the joint force in the future operational environment. This concept provides combatant commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, responsive and consistently-available Army forces, to include Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to meet emerging global challenges.² Regionally aligned forces provide the CCDR available land forces to accomplish the variety of missions set forth in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to achieve the President's National Security Strategy (NSS).

RAF is a fairly new concept for providing available resources for the CCDR. But do RAFs provide CCDRs with the best means for executing 21st century U.S. strategy? Continued analysis, after-action reports, and further research might reveal a better solution or identify enhancements to the RAF concept. This SRP focuses on one of six

warfighting functions (WfFs), Protection, to determine if RAF has sufficient capability for this vital WfF. It identifies challenges and risks associated with Protection, using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and arriving at recommendations to address capability gaps. First, the paper describes the post-9/11 environment. It then shows how forces will be regionally aligned and elaborates on the WfF of Protection. It proceeds to analyze the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), corps, division, and brigade levels to identify any capability gaps in Protection. Finally, it uses the DOTMLPF analysis to provide recommendations for improving RAF Protection to provide CCDRs an optimal operational asset.

Background

The 21st century strategic environment poses an array of complicated challenges. These may include smaller conflicts, rather than large-state wars; engagements with nation states with smaller, high-technological militaries; encounters with more active non-state actors; and interventions into internal conflicts like civil wars. Global challenges include transnational and non-transnational boundaries, intensified inequality and economic instability, competition among rising economies, cyber warfare, the wealth gap, world health issues, and an increasingly multi-polar world. An applicable definition of 21st century war is a condition that exists when a state or a group, such as a non-state actor, employs lethal force against an opposing entity in order to achieve an objective.³ However, General Rupert Smith asserts that the days of war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs industrial warfare, no longer exists. But conflict, confrontation, and combat persist all around the world.⁴ The Department of Defense Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* defines

the strategic security environment as characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) expects that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate future regional and global events.⁵

This new environment is fraught with challenges for the United States; it presents national security threats from state and non-state actors; international alliances; it is replete with changing national societies and cultures, federal budget constraints, and a socially-networked public. Further complications include a bi-partisan federal government with no common strategic vision that cannot come to consensus on global or domestic issues. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can complicate global issues. Jessica Matthews wrote in *Foreign Affairs*: "Despite NGOs good intentions. For all their strengths, NGOs are special interests. The best of them ... often suffer from tunnel vision, judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest." Since NGOs do have to worry about policy trade-offs, the overall impact of their cause might bring more harm to a society.⁶ Within a CCDR's area of responsibility (AOR), NGOs are not aligned with national visions of stability and prosperity. NGOs efforts can inhibit progress and sometimes provide overlapping and redundant programs. Additionally, the United States is more than ever closely tied and rapidly interconnected to all world actors and events within this globalized world. Globalization and the information revolution are major catalysts for rapid change.⁷ T. Owen Jacobs sees the current external environment as filled with "volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity."⁸ Jacob's description aligns with Joint Pub 1, which describes the strategic environment succinctly with the acronym VUCA.

President Barack Obama states, from the national security strategy, a re-balance of our military capabilities to address the full range of military operations; also he is adjusting the nation's long term priorities and focusing attention and resources on a broader set of countries and challenges (Asia Pacific and the Middle East).

To execute this strategy, the Armed Forces looked at innovative concepts. The CJCS published the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. He proposes a "globally integrated operations" approach.⁹ The Navy and Air Force are considering the Air-Sea Battle Concept to address Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) issues. This document is globally focused, but prioritized towards the Asia Pacific and Middle East. The CSA, in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance and Army Posture Statement, supports the CJCS's vision for the Army through 2020 and beyond with "Prevent, Shape and Win". To fulfill the CCDR's demand signals and realize the intent of Prevent, Shape and Win approach, the Army of the future will be regionally aligned, and flexibly tailored for particular missions.¹⁰ The CSA's RAF concept seeks to achieve the Presidents strategic ends through the ways and means provided by the joint force and individual services.

The G3/5/7 defines RAF as:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. This includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.¹¹

There are areas of concern and challenges as the Army adopts the RAF concept. Some of the implications and challenges are vague. The Army has been doing steady state and shaping operations for decades. However, as we transition from major combat operations and increase steady state operations, the community must understand there will be some difficulties.

Protection

This SRP assesses RAF's viability in providing the WfF of Protection and considers how this WfF is carried out in the JIIM environment as well as considers the extent of this Protection. Can the preservation and survivability of RAF be assured throughout the CCDRs operational environment?

Overall there are six WfFs. Commanders and their staffs use the WfFs to help exercise command and control, throughout planning, preparing, executing and assessing operations. By definition, a WfF consists of a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose and used by commanders to accomplish missions and establish training objectives. All WfFs provide scalable capabilities to mass lethal and non-lethal effects.¹²

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* defines the Protection WfF as the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel, combatants and noncombatants, and physical assets of the United States and its multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The Protection WfF enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection is a continuing activity carried out through 14 sub-tasks: Employ Safety Techniques; Operational Security;

Provide Intelligence; Physical Security; Anti-Terrorism Measures; Law and Order; Survivability; Health Protection; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN); Explosive Ordnance Disposal; Air and Missile Defense; Personnel Recovery; Conduct Operational Security. Successful execution of these sub-tasks assures comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection.¹³ See Figure One.




Figure 1.¹⁴

The Army's WfFs nest closely with the joint functions. And just as the Army WfFs reinforce and complement one another, so do the joint functions. Joint Pub 3-0 defines the joint functions as a consolidation of related capabilities and activities to help Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) integrate synchronize and direct joint operations.¹⁵ The Joint function of Protection focuses on preserving the joint force's fighting potential in four primary areas—active defense measures, passive defense measures, use of technology to reduce fratricide, and emergency management and response to reduce

loss of personnel and equipment. The joint function protection consists of twelve sub-tasks. See Figure Two.¹⁶ Integration and synchronization of these tasks and systems can synergistically maximize operations.

Joint Function Protection Tasks

- **Provide Air and Missile Defense**
- **Protect U.S. Civilians**
- **Provide Physical Security for Forces and Means**
- **Conduct Defensive Countermeasures**
- **Provide CBRN Defense**
- **Conduct OPSEC**
- **Secure/Protect Forces, Bases, Joint Security Areas and LOCs**
- **Conduct Personnel Recovery**
- **WMD Consequence Management**
- **Establish Anti-Terrorism Programs**
- **Establish Measures to Prevent Fratricide**
- **Provide Emergency Management Response Capabilities and Services**

Figure 2.

Other WfFs, such as C2, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Sustainment, Intelligence are relatively easy to understand and apply; joint and Army doctrine codified these decades ago, which form the basis for all military operations. Protection is not as clear because it spans the other five WfFs.¹⁷ Both the Army's and Joint Forces Protection measures require coordination with the other WfFs. The Protection measures are integrated throughout all the other WfFs. For example, providing health protection requires coordination with sustainment assets, and conducting personnel recovery operations requires coordination with movement and maneuver as well as mission command.

Emphasis of Protection

The CDR is ultimately responsible for carrying out Protection WfF responsibilities and military joint security operations in his AOR—including assigned or attached forces and all assets. This responsibility is established in Joint Publications, and the President's Unified Command Plan. When planning and executing operations or developing campaign plans, both Joint and Army publications codify in doctrine Joint and Army responsibility to reinforce and complement one another. Army and Joint foundational doctrine is designed to prevent worst case scenarios. It applies to joint operations that are conducting combined arms maneuver (CAM) or wide area security (WAS)—operation plan phases one through five. This foundational doctrine does not highlight steady state or shaping operations. Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, addresses security and protection tasks for bases, base nodes, ports, and airfields. It also focuses on joint security areas designated to facilitate protection of bases.

Because most foundational doctrine is built around CAM, WAS and OPLANs, staffs planned and integrated all aspects of the WfFs—during operations in OIF and OEF. In these operations, Joint Staff and HQs incorporated robust staffs and abundant assets. If a command identified a need for a certain capability, whether it was to enhance protection with physical security barriers, the command submitted an operational needs statement (ONS) to get the requested assets. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds were available to resource those capability gaps.

As U.S. forces now decrease in size and capacity, and as operations focus on steady state through theater security cooperation (TSC) activities and contingency planning, reduced OCO and decreasing budgets, how can HQs and Staffs stay focused

on incorporating and synchronizing the Protection WfF tasks in order to preserve the force? Presumably, U.S. military forces will operate in and outside joint security areas; they will be required to do more with less force structure. In this environment, opportunistic adversaries may seek to exploit gaps among our allies and partners while U.S. leaders focus narrowly on U.S. interests. Without doubt, the U.S. military will be smaller; it will be shaped for expeditionary operations. So protection of our forces, civilians, and agencies will become more imperative in this operating environment.

To execute the RAF concept, U.S. landpower forces will use smaller dispersed unit footprints as they conduct TSC activities. Therefore Protection WfF requires more emphasis in order to preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Consider the example of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): Several nations within the AFRICOM AOR pose on-going threats U.S. interests. The AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez claims that the highest number of high-threats to our embassies is in Africa. He believes that African adversaries are learning from experiences in Afghanistan as they plan attacks on U.S. facilities.¹⁸ As staffs focus on coordinating and planning steady state operations to prevent and shape the environment through TSC activities, threats persist—requiring a variety of Protection WfF considerations. AFRICOM has a major responsibility to protect U.S. personnel and facilities across the region, whether in CJTF-HOA joint security area of operations, or the ASCC AOR not under CJTF-HOA. During steady state and shaping operations, the Protection WfF planning and tasks increase. Additionally, small unit teams across austere and large AOs require innovative means to ensure they are under a protection umbrella. Once an OPLAN or CONPLAN is executed and operational phases transition

from phase 1-4, the military effort increases, the emphasis on Protection WfF planning and tasks decreases as established HQs integrate Protection WfF tasks. Figure three depicts the relationship between the Protection WfF, steady state operations and OPLAN phases.




Figure 3.

RAF Missions

Doing more with less is the new normal for the Armed Forces. As the armed services compete for resources in a fiscally-constrained environment, the Army must find more efficient ways to effectively employ the force. RAF provides CCDRs landpower resources to meet emerging regional demands. The CCDRs are required by the Guidance of Employment of the Force (GEF) to prepare and review Theater Campaign Plans (TCP).¹⁹ The TCP is the CCDR's vehicle for operationalizing the theater strategy. The TCP provides a framework within which CCDRs conduct TSC activities with regional partners through cooperative security and development; this

informs the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). U.S. forces engage in TSC for many reasons, not just as a preventive measure, but also more frequently to help other countries' military forces become more professional, proficient, interoperable, and reliable in burden-sharing.²⁰

TSC activities through the TCP or Operation Plan (OPLAN) provide the CCDR the steady-state or phase 0 shaping operations to prevent emerging crisis and the attainment of strategic and military end states.²¹ CCDR's TCPs generate mission demands. For example, Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) CCDRs primarily conduct hundreds of TSC activities throughout their Area of Responsibility (AOR) to meet TCP objectives. In order to prevent and shape the AOR, CCDR missions include TSC, crisis response, and operational support. TSC activities consist of military engagement, multinational combined exercises, personnel exchanges, civil affairs support and similar security cooperation activities in order to facilitate partner capacity and building partnerships.²² Currently, 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (2/1 ABCT) provides a security force, response force, and numerous TSC activities—no less than 108 activities in first six months of employment. As elements of RAFs deploy to conduct TSC, RAFs can provide a standard security and response forces package, providing the CCDR options for an emergent crisis.

However, they also enable CCDRs to broaden the RAF mission to include tasks other than pure TSC. The CSA approves of flexibility, but it comes with some added risks—such as undertaking operational tasks and emerging missions not in the scope of the brigade. These expanded missions still require request for forces (RFF) for

SECDEF approval.²³ The completed TCP links CCDRs ends and ways to the national strategic guidance to “prevent, shape, security and peace”. The CCDR conducts security cooperation activities, employing a RAF Brigade to help shape the environment and prevent unstable situations from escalating into conflict.

Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations help the commander shape the security environment.²⁴ For example, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) leverages its strategic location as a critical power projection platform. CJTF-HOA works with African partner nations, coalition forces, and interagency/intergovernmental organizations to achieve a unified effort to deter and defeat transnational threats, to protect U.S. security interests, to prevent future conflicts, and to support humanitarian and disaster relief.²⁵

The United States Government (USG) agency with primary responsibility to foreign nations is the DOS. They are in the lead.²⁶ The CCDRs provide all military resources conducting TSC activities to the Department of State (DOS). CCDRs conduct many and varied missions: building partner capacity and capability through mil-to-mil exercises; military engagements; security assistance forces; foreign military sales; and building diplomatic relations. CCDRs must work with the Department of State (DOS) to coordinate and conduct security cooperation activities, land forces provide the means to shape the CCDR’s environment to achieve the TCP objectives. Some of these security cooperation activities require smaller teams and footprints to execute missions over numerous countries throughout a large area of operations. Therefore, typical RAF missions include military education, security assistance teams, civil affairs support, rotational military exercises and engagements, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief. General Carter Ham (previous AFRICOM Commander) stated that since March 2013, 2/1 ABCT supported U.S. AFRICOM in developing enduring relationships and cooperation with partner nations' land forces. RAF engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to support to major exercises.²⁷ As the United States draws down from two major conflicts and the Army shifts to the RAF concept, RAF Brigades deployed in support of TSC activities will be smaller and more dispersed in the foreseeable future conducting a variety of missions.

With smaller unit footprints across large CCDR's AORs, the biggest challenge will be to ensure that the RAFs that deploy for TSC activities have an overarching umbrella of Protection, especially when they support weak nation states. Nathan Freier, from the Center for Strategic Studies, believes that future ground forces will be vulnerable to numerous hazards in almost all operational conditions. These military forces, their hardware, and their secure communications and networked information sharing will all be vulnerable to lethal and non-lethal threats. Even operations in the most benign environments conducted for purely humanitarian purposes will encounter persistent threats from a variety of challenges.²⁸

The CCDR, sub-unified commanders, or JTF commanders are responsible to plan and coordinate Protection to ensure that the Soldiers, citizens, and partnered nations are adequately protected. The Army's theater-level HQs, the ASCC, also has the capability to coordinate overarching Protection WfF tasks, such as air and missile defense, CBRN, and physical security. But, for remote small teams dispersed throughout a large AOR, ASCC theater-level HQs and JTFs must ensure that Protection WfF tasks are incorporated into the plans and orders.

ASCC HQs and Brigade HQs should not assume Protection WfF measures are redundant. To provide adequate Protection, CCDRs and DOS should coordinate their plans and integrate their protective measures. There is a shared responsibility between the losing HQs (brigade combat teams), and gaining HQs (ASCC or JTF) to ensure there are seamless transitions of protective responsibilities, for the deploying teams. Monitoring systems and tools within the levels of command should be established, seamless and corroborated to ensure that working protection systems are in place. The ASCC HQs provides the military resources to achieve TSC activities; the DOS has a responsibility to ensure its internal systems account for these teams. Coordination and integration of capabilities throughout the Joint Inter-agency, Inter-governmental, Multinational (JIIM) environment bind these organizations together and can achieve maximum situational awareness and synchronization throughout the WfFs.

HQs Capabilities

Both Joint and Army doctrine codify ways to coordinate and integrate protection tasks. The primary difference between joint and Army doctrine is designation to the providers of protection assets and designation of personnel responsible for protection itself. The ASCC HQs coordinate and provide the resources for requesting subordinate HQs, such as theater Air and Missile Defense assets in a joint operational area for a JTF. Also, Army and Joint doctrine differ regarding the organizational level at which protection tasks are coordinated and integrated. ASCC HQs, Army corps HQs and division HQs have organic Protections cells in their HQs. Army BCTs do not have Protection cells. If a JTF is stood up in a CCDR's AOR, its Protection cell is typically an afterthought during Phase 0. Instead, these HQs stand up ad hoc cells and assign personnel to coordinate those functions as an additional duty. Additionally in the RAFs,

the BCT HQs normally do not deploy; rather, they remain at home station planning and coordinating subordinate units for RAF missions. For theater steady state operations the ASCCs are responsible for the Protection WfF. JTFs HQs, during Phase 0 in an operation or contingency plan take ownership responsibility for protection of the RAF troops on the ground. Also, ASCCs and JTFs must coordinate through the DOS country teams to coordinate Protection WfF tasks. A problem identified by 2/1 ABCT, resides in the lack of interoperability of hardware, communications, networks for ASCCs and JTFs with the small teams on the ground. For example, 2/1 ABCT small unit teams do not have satellite phones or computer reach back on secret computer servers (SIPR access).²⁹ TSC activities properly planned and resourced, with coordination across all HQ's functional cells, and staffs and the DOS country teams could identify these shortfalls and provide protection resources.

BCT Level

BCTs are the RAF's primary unit. The BCT HQs can integrate and coordinate Protection WfF tasks among staff members. But, they will be challenged to do this as they carry out all other assigned tasks. They can quickly be over tasked as they plan and execute home station training while they are deploying multiple subordinate units. For example, the 2/1 ABCT commander organized subordinate units and staff to plan, prepare, and execute missions directed by the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) while the Commander also maintained the capability to deploy a contingency expeditionary force (CEF).³⁰

When BCTs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the theaters were well established and mature at later stages, after two to three years. HQs were available at levels from brigade to theater, augmented with

service and joint staffs to plan, integrate, and execute the numerous Protection WfF tasks. Those HQs had functional systems in place incorporated the Protection WfF into the daily operations and plans. For example, in OIF the Central Command (CENTCOM) Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) designated the Commander, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), as the joint security coordinator for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This Commander recommended operational force protection priorities, led the joint security area force protection boards, and oversaw vulnerability assessments. So in OIF a single commander standardized, integrated, and coordinated force protections standards. The benefits of this structure prevented a single dimensional approach and ensured no gaps in the Protection WfF.³¹ Additionally, ASCC and Corps level HQs overlapped their Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assets within the BCTs' AOs to mass and mutually support these enablers.

However, RAFs conducting theater security cooperation activities, crisis response and mil-to-mil exercises tend to operate in immature austere theaters. So the OIF enablers and organizations are not available for RAF operations. Accordingly, ASCCs or newly established JTFs will be challenged to implement steady state or phase 0 operations. As the RAF concept matures, these challenges should be mitigated over time as BCTs acquire institutional knowledge of the region, build on established relationships, and incorporate interagency interoperability with the ASCC or a JTF HQs.

DOTMLPF Analysis

Doctrine

Doctrine provides the guidance around which military organizations worldwide organize, plan, train, and fight. Doctrine drives the organization's, training, material, and leadership. Doctrinal analysis reveals the way the military conducts its operations; this

analysis may reveal a better way to close a capability gap.³² An existing Joint and Service doctrinal basis addresses the application of Army WfF and Joint function protection and staff organization. Emphasis on Protection WfF has come a long way since 2001. The June 2001 FM 3-0 *Operations* did not cite Protection as a Battlefield Operating System (BOS)—which identifies the physical means needed to accomplish missions. However, FM 3-0 cites protection listed as an element of combat power—which commanders combined the elements of combat power to increase disparity friendly forces and adversaries.³³

Recently, the Army has issued Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-37, Protection as part of its revolutionary effort to update doctrine. ADP provides the fundamentals, and ADRP provides detailed elaboration of these the fundamentals. Army doctrine now identifies Protection as a WfF (previously designated BOS). So Army doctrine now acknowledges importance of incorporating this WfF into plans, training and execution in order to preserve the force and maximize operations effectiveness.³⁴ ADRP 3-37 nests with ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*; it describes protection as continuing activity and a WfF, and aligns this function with the joint definition.

The doctrine defines protection and its enablers; it lists the protective tasks, which ensure systems are synchronized and integrated throughout the operations process. This new Army doctrine provides overarching guidance and a conceptual framework that explains how the Army conducts protection to support commander's conduct of unified land operations. The doctrinal principles depict Protection WfF as a layered, comprehensive, redundant, integrated and enduring activity that must be

carefully planned and adequately resourced.³⁵ So ADRP 3-37 provides the details for incorporating the Protection WfF into operational planning. The ADRP provides a list of fourteen supporting protection tasks incorporated throughout the plans and orders to protect the force. So it provides the “how to” for Protection. For example, consider force health protection. ADRP 3-37 provides specific directions and a checklist of sub-tasks to ensure establishment of force health protection measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers.³⁶ Army doctrine also specifies the organization, duties, and responsibilities of Protection cells; it explains how to integrate Protection WfF into the operations process by conforming to Protection WfF principles that assure effective force protection.

Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* and 3-10 *Joint Security Operations in the Theater* provide doctrine overviews of overarching protection frameworks for the joint staff and HQs; including guidance of incorporating Protection into Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Both Joint publications and Army publications are aligned to complement each other. For example, both doctrines identify supporting Protection WfF tasks that align with each other; however, ADP 3-37: identifies two additional supporting tasks—provide intelligence support and provide internment and resettlement.³⁷

Additionally, Army doctrine has a more holistic view of the Protection WfF, compared with joint doctrine. Army doctrine provides a field manual for Theater Security Cooperation, FM 3-22; explaining operations in steady state and shaping environments. Joint doctrine does not have a manual to explain steady state operations. Current Joint

doctrine is focused to prevent worst case scenarios—phased operations and contingency plans.

Doctrine Recommendation

Develop a joint publication to address steady state operations or security cooperation, since the nature of the future will focus primarily on steady state and shaping operations. Review Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in the Theater*. It provides a good baseline for the joint environment; it specifies responsibilities, levels of threats, and techniques and procedures for managing joint security areas. But it is CAM, WAS, and decisive action OPLAN-centric. Although this joint publication does allow joint force commanders (JFC) to establish the operational framework while providing for flexibility, it does not address TSC activities within the joint security area.³⁸ It should provide guidance on the full range of military operations, to include steady state operations consisting of TSC activities and Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations.

Additionally, it should describe some of the State Partnership Program (SPP) National Guard Brigades' techniques and procedures as models. For twenty years, the 48th IBCT Georgia National Guard (NG) has partnered with the country of Georgia. It has developed good systems and procedures for working with United States Army Europe (USAREUR), with the Georgia Country Team (DOS), and with the National Guard Bureau. For example, the brigade rotates liaison officers (2 years at a time) attached to USAREUR. Its planners are embedded with the country team to plan, and coordinate upcoming military activities; it also addresses the force protection concerns for the small teams that deploy to Georgia.³⁹ Improving Joint doctrine helps address the

challenges and awareness of the current operational environment, and may reduce the capability gaps.

Organization

The organizational analysis examines how we are organizing to fight at all levels: theater, corps, divisions, and brigades, and other. It may reveal a better organizational structure or capability that can be developed to solve a capability gap.⁴⁰ Three concerns come to the fore: First, are corps, divisions, and BCTs HQs properly staffed to ensure Protection WfF capabilities are integrated into the operations? Currently, corps and division HQs are designed to operate as single JTF HQs, which currently have authorized personnel to manage the tasks—since they were built during the past twelve years of persistent conflict.

With the new round of force structure recommendations, corps, divisions, and BCT HQs are scheduled to reduce staffs and change structure. For example, a recommendation for Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) reorganizing the Protection cell resulted in eliminating or transferring positions to the RC. This 25 percent HQs personnel reduction, currently pre-decisional, eliminates the Protection cell and reduces the HQs staff capacity. The responsibility for Protection WfF is now assigned to Movement and Maneuver cell. With reduced Protection WfF expertise, HQs staff will depend on the Movement and Maneuver Cell to fully integrate and support Commanders' Protection WfF requirements. So engineer protection must support tasks to enable sustainment (i.e.: general engineering and counter-IED operations) and to preserve the force (i.e.: survivability, base camps, and urban search and rescue).⁴¹ If this is the case, then the HQ's staffs sections will not be organized optimally to carry out the numerous Protection WfF tasks they plan, integrate, and implement. Reductions in

key enablers, staff cells, and expertise reduces the unity of effort in the organization—which ensures the Protection WfFs are properly planned into the full range of military operations.

JTF HQs are built from a corps and division HQs organization. In standing JTF headquarters, the joint security cells are typically ad hoc cells, mission-set dependent, and heavily augmented for major combat operations; but not attended to in steady state or phase zero operations. The number of tasks, requirements, and oversight do not change with the type of mission—whether it is security cooperation activities or decisive action. Protection cells, joint security cells, even protection working groups continuously monitor and evaluate the ongoing functions. These are still requirements to incorporate the Protection WfF for RAF and SPP units across the CCDR's AOR. Any reorganization of the protection cells to include reduction in the HQs staff weakens the commander's overall capabilities and flexibility and capability.

A second concern: BCTs lose their military police (MP) platoons in 2014, leaving the BCTs with no MP platoon enablers. This loss reduces the BCTs' capability to conduct supporting Protection WfF tasks—such as law enforcement and internment. While this loss can be mitigated with the increase of the additional BCT maneuver battalion, this reliance on maneuver battalions detracts from their capability to conduct core maneuver tasks.

A third concern: The proponent for EOD is organized to support the Sustainment WfF. Recommend consideration to align EOD under the Protection WfF proponent in MSCoE. Most EOD core tasks support Protection WfF tasks; for example, providing explosive ordnance disposal support is a Protection WfF supporting task. Aligning the

EOD proponent under MSCoE ensures unity of effort and provides a direct line of communications, eliminating the need for complex coordination among multiple centers of excellence.

The elimination of HQs Protection Cells in corps and divisions, the loss of IBCT's MPs, and misaligned proponents pose considerable risk. These issues are weakening IBCT's capacity and complicating staff functions to integrate Protection WfFs into operations. Furthermore, division HQs have no brigade level organizations to draw from to compensate these losses; CBRN, MP, and engineer (EN) functional brigades are not associated or aligned with the divisions, unlike the sustainment and fires brigades.

Organization Recommendation

During this downsizing, the Army must make sure it is making the right choices bill-payers for future Army capabilities. Cutting MP, Air Defense, CBRN, Engineers, and Aviation personnel in headquarter staffs, thus eliminating Protection cells—all Protection enablers, could lead to gaps in planning and integrating those Protection WfF and systems to preserve the combat power on the ground.

First, the Army should align Reserve Component Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEBs) to CCDRs or Army divisions. MEBs can augment ASCC and JTFs HQs with those MP, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense (ADA) staff enablers for six-month rotations. MEB augmentees enhance these HQs capability to provide the proper emphasis on Protection WfF and compensate for reduced staff positions. MEBs could be aligned to a Division and provide this resource in the absence of the 25 percent reduction. The MEB is indispensable to the current force; it provides focused protection and assures mobility for the supported commander. Normally MEBs operate in support of divisions, but MEBs can support corps/theater/JTF/Multi-National. Reservists must

plan carefully to provide the MEBs with appropriate timelines and predictability to train, fund, and deploy this asset.

Second, the Army should deploy small corps and division Protection cells to the ASCC or JTF HQs for six month rotations, to augment these HQ's staffs. This augmentation cell would come from the corps/division HQs aligned with the CCCR, it would include MP, ADA, Aviation, CBRN personnel. Even the RAF BCT could augment some of the bde HQs personnel to support its organic unit down range. This provides a couple of advantages. First, it is cost effective since augmenting Protection WfF assets to assist the ASCC or JTF HQs, instead of providing additional HQs. Second, these augmentees are trained protection cell personnel from the organic RAF home station, so ad-hoc cells are not needed. These augmentees have a relationship and established ties with the RAF elements down range. This facilitates reach back to home station for any coordination. Additionally, they can serve as a liaison team for both the forward HQs and home station BCT.

Finally, the Army and MP proponent should conduct further analysis on the elimination of MPs from the BCTs. The MSCoE Protection proponent declares MP support to the BCT will be provided from the echelon above Brigades (EAB) force pool. Also, a revised doctrinal Rule of Allocation (ROA) that provides an MP Company to support each committed BCT in phases I-III, and one MP Co plus one MP PLT in phase IV.⁴² Under this concept, there is not enough AC MP units to support this proposal, and the MP proponent is looking for a RC solution.⁴³ This is a vital Protection WfF asset and enabler for BCTs throughout all phases of operations, and during steady state and shaping operations. Its elimination and recommendation should be re-evaluated.

Training

The training analysis examines how we prepare our forces to fight tactically from basic training, advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint exercises, and other ways to offset capability gaps. Units struggle to properly train their Soldiers who deploy to the regionally aligned areas. Detailed country clearance and deployment checklists, and training requirements are required for small units, and individual Soldiers. There is a large onus on the BCT HQs to ensure its Soldiers are thoroughly and diligently prepared for deployments. Sufficient time must be allocated to complete Force Protection checklists.

Training Recommendations

Lessons learned from 2/1 ABCT should be leveraged. For example, RAF units should leverage country teams for expertise to gain a situational understanding of country security. RAF units should coordinate early and often with country teams to determine alert procedures of deployed RAF teams when there are significant changes in the security environment.⁴⁴ Last, MSCoE should consider increasing Protection WfF educational opportunities at the schoolhouse or online classes that focus on Protection WfF tasks for RAF personnel. For example: MP courses may introduce students to a country's law and order. Likewise, survival training schools offered by the Special Warfare Center (SWC) can sharpen Soldiers' survivability skills.

Materiel

The materiel analysis examines all the necessary equipment and systems that our forces need to fight and operate effectively. If new systems are needed to fill a capability gap, they should be acquired. Likewise, inadequate or antiquated systems should be replaced.⁴⁵ 2/1 ABCT after action-report indicated that small unit teams had

limited communications and were unable to communicate with higher echelons. Additionally, the African theater lacks communications infrastructure in many of the areas where the brigade dispatched personnel and teams. Most RAF teams were dependent on civilian cell phones and hotel's internet. Force protection considerations, cyber threats, and large physical security factors strongly justify the Army's investment in appropriate communications capability.⁴⁶

Material Recommendation

AFRICOM is an austere environment, and the RAF BCT MTOEs do not support robust secure communications to support numerous small teams that deploy separately while operating within a large AOR. These units should have access to SOF type communications equipment. RAF missions should be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications either organic to regionally aligned BCTs or resourced to the small teams by the ASCC HQs.⁴⁷ Additionally look at some off the shelf commercial technology to enhance accountability, reporting, and communications with country teams or higher HQs.

Leadership and Education

The leadership and education analysis examines how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight from squad leader to four-star general/admiral, focusing on their overall professional development. The leadership and education of personnel is adequate to implement RAF concept and assure Protection WfF. A large part of educating Leaders and Soldiers involves learning the Culture, Regional Expertise and Language (CREL) to understand the RAF environment and area of operations. A great example is 2/1 ABCT's Dagger University. To further prepare for specific, assigned RAF missions, 2/1 ABCT created a brigade-level training program to fulfill a myriad of Army, Forces

Command (FORSCOM), and USARAF deployment and training requirements. This Dagger University program is offered monthly to prepare for upcoming training missions; it incorporates all pre-deployment tasks.⁴⁸ Dagger University enables Soldiers/students to understand the threat. The BCT can tailor the university to any regionally aligned AO. It enhances Protection WfF for the individual Soldier and small deploying units. Students receive Dagger University information about insurgencies in threat briefings tailored to the region. Additionally, information, briefings, and updates from ASCC HQs, JTF HQs and the Regional Security Officer (RSO) modified force protection measures to address differing conditions. 2/1 ABCT contacted the Department of State RSO to determine additional threat and force protection measures.⁴⁹

Leadership Recommendation:

RAF BCTs should establish their own version of Dagger University.

Personnel

The personnel analysis examines availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations to fill a capability gap by restructuring.⁵⁰ Proposals for personnel reductions are currently being staffed and recommended in corps, divisions and BCT HQs. Impending reductions will impact the HQs staff cells and enablers. Corps HQs' loss of 21 positions, division HQs' loss of 14 positions, and BCT HQs' loss of the MP platoon all add up to less capability to integrate Protection WfF tasks and systems into future operations. The proposed reductions would eliminate 40 percent in maneuver support and protection positions in the division HQs, which far exceeds the aggregate 25 percent goal across all HQs vice the 25 percent in corps HQs. The single most important component of Army organizations is personnel. Parts of

these reductions include a dual-hatted Provost Marshall; the protection cell chief in both corps and division HQs was eliminated; engineer positions were reduced and consolidated. The downsizing Army must find the right balance of personnel and capability.

Reducing the protection enablers could pose considerable risk, given many future steady state operations as the Army adopts the RAF concept. Organizations outside RAF units may be called upon to support RAF missions. Tasking and matching Protection WfF enablers from the RC and other functional brigades build ad hoc teams at the brigade-and-below level does not assure unity of effort.

Personnel recommendation

Align Reserve Component/National Guard Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEBs) with Regionally Aligned Divisions. MEB HQs have the sufficient staff assets and equipment to provide and integrate the Protection WfF. Aligned MEBs can augment ASCCs or JTF HQs with a robust joint security cell. This cell could be tailored and packaged to meet the needs of the augmented HQs. The MEB staff could rotate every six month and provide augmentees for as long as the JTF HQs. Or provide augmentation to the aligned regions ASCC HQs. Additionally, they could regionally align permanently with that CCDRs AOR, thereby providing continuity for the MEB.

Facilities

The facilities analysis examines military property, installations and industrial facilities that support our forces to determine whatever they can be used to fill in a capability gap.⁵¹ The facilities are adequate assure the viability of the RAF concept within the Protection WfF. Currently, through the Protection lens the RAF concept

primarily focuses on doctrine, organizations, material, and personnel gaps with Corps, Divisions, and BCTs HQs.

Conclusion

RAFs are viable from a Protection perspective. Many relevant systems are in place, and these systems will continue to improve, so that ASCC CDRs and JFCs will not overlook the Protection WfF. ASCC HQs have some overarching regional assets to ensure Protection (such as Air and Missile Defense and Cyber Cells).

One concern is the need to integrate and focus TSC activities and SPPs successes into the foundational doctrine. This can be done through analyzing 2/1 ABCT after-action reviews that address Protection. Also, small team units should have SOF-type communications packages. Further, BCTs should build appropriate education platforms, and leverage Army training opportunities that address Protection skills. MEBs should align with CCDRs and divisions to provide opportunities to deploy division and BCT staff Protection enablers to enhance ASCC and JTF HQs. This initiative will assure effective Protection for the landpower forces. If the preponderance of future missions are executed in steady state and shaping operations, they will mostly participate in theater security cooperation activities that are aligned with the CCDRs theater campaign plan. So RAFs must emphasize thorough planning, synchronization, and integration of Protection WfFs. The more HQ staffs are resourced, the better the staffs can focus on Protection WfFs at all levels for any type of operations. And they are better prepared to leverage resources in a timely manner to ensure safety and security within the area of responsibility. Carefully developed, integrated, synchronized Protection WfF plans for Joint operations within the JIIM environment help mitigate emerging crisis and preserve combat power.

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