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A Stable Solution for South Asia:
Security Sector Reform in Jammu and Kashmir

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Introduction

South Asia is one of the poorest and most conflict prone nations in the world. Most South Asian countries have suffered from poor governance, lack of rule of law, corruption, lack of accountability, and human rights violations. In addition, the region of South Asia as a whole has yet to fully engage itself with issues pertaining to security sector reform. The broader notion of a full-fledged security agenda has not become an integral element of the ongoing security discourse, which remains essentially state-centric. In the case of India’s Jammu and Kashmir state (IJK), the efforts to pursue Security Sector Reform (SSR) have remained mostly sparse and fragmented. It is only now, in the post-9/11 security environment that issues pertaining to SSR have begun to have greater resonance in India’s national and state governments. Historically, conventional threats such as the Pakistan-India rivalry, the nuclear dimension, and contested land borders with China dominated India’s security focus. However, the new security situation since 9/11 and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks have lent greater urgency to the problematic issues of rising Islamic militancy and violence germinating in IJK.

This article seeks to assess India’s current security situation in IJK. The article posits that India can effectively enforce the rule of law in IJK through modern policing methods rather than relying on strict authoritarian measures. It will highlight how despite the non-enabling environment, opportunities to support SSR activities do exist and can be implemented effectively.

First, a brief account of the modern history and evolution of the international India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute and the separate, but interrelated internal clash between Kashmiri Muslims and the Indian government is necessary to understanding the complexity inherent in the Kashmir region. Second, this article sets out to identify the challenges and lessons in the implementation of SSR activities in the region. Lastly, this article ends by developing a set of recommendations aimed at improving India’s policing and rule of law activities. To this end, the proposals contained in this article will attempt to provide an operational framework for the Indian and IJK governments. Further, the recommendations will assist IJK policymakers to develop a holistic approach to building an effective and professional security apparatus that can successfully gain the trust of the local popu-
The Evolution of the IJK Conflict: A Security Dilemma

The conflict over Kashmir is a highly complex, internationalized dispute involving India and Pakistan that can be traced back to the design and movement of the partition of British colonial India in 1947. Kashmir occupies a strategic location in the northernmost part of India, surrounded by Pakistan on one side and China on the other. One-third of the state, known as Azad Kashmir, is governed by Pakistan and two-thirds of the state known as Indian Jammu and Kashmir, is governed by India. The cease-fire line that divides the state came into being in 1949 after the first Indo-Pakistan War. The 1972 Simla Agreement, which was signed by India and Pakistan after the 1971 war, officially formalized the cease-fire line, known as the Line of Control (LOC). This line also demarcates the de-facto border between India and Pakistan.

Since 1989, IJK has become engrossed in a mass-based nationalist movement, which was accompanied by a wide-scale political insurgency. This conflict within India finds its immediate origins in what has become known as the Kashmiri Intifada. The constant violence in IJK has stifled economic investment and development efforts in the region. Additionally, the violence has escalated at times to the level of civil war as a multitude of various militant separatist groups and Islamist terrorists with differing motives and often with cross-border support emanating from Pakistan continue to challenge Indian military and border security forces.

In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and, in 1999, the Kargil crisis signaled a possibility of nuclear confrontation in South Asia, thus necessitating a process of dialogue with pressure from the international community.

In October 2003, India proposed a number of confidence building measures for improving cross border human contacts and communications by road, rail, and sea between the two countries. A formal cease-fire agreement between the two countries came into effect on November 26, 2003 along the India-Pakistan international border, the LOC, and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). This truce accord proved historic because it indicated that the new “mood” was now for building peace in the Kashmir region and cross-border firing stopped almost completely for the first time.

In recent months, tensions have increased, resulting in cross-border incursions and artillery exchanges, jeopardizing new efforts to normalize relations between India and Pakistan. Past military conflicts between the two countries brought global concern about the violent and escalating nature of the Kashmir dispute. The conflict is synonymous with international concerns about a possible nuclear war in South Asia as both India and Pakistan have well-developed capacities for mutual annihilation. Although, escalation of the current situation is not imminent, the recent episodes highlight reminders of the risks involved in any tension between India and Pakistan.

“Kashmir has now evolved into a twenty-first century conflict, with characteristics of a regional conflict formation, with a distinct and dangerous nuclear dimension, and with militancy evidencing growing links to global terror networks; and a potentially rising state, coupled with a state at risk.” Additionally, there are strong indicators that the NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is contributing to increased Islamic militancy, violence, and insecurity in IJK.

Historically, the Pakistan Military and the intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the approval of the Pakistan central government, is known to support extremist militants and separatist movements in the Kashmir region. Moreover, it is widely known that Pakistan uses these domestic militant groups as a proxy force to advance the country’s core foreign policy interests in the Kashmir Valley and other parts of South Asia. These organizations include, but are not limited to: the IJK Liberation Front (JKLF), Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jamaat-e-Islami IJK (JIIK).

Of particular concern is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a well-organized militant group based in Pakistan's Punjab province. The network has both sectarian and Kashmir-oriented aims. The group is widely believed to have carried out the deadly 2008 attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai and is believed to have historical ties to the ISI.

The current LeT leader, Haifez Saeed regards Kashmir as the group’s core mission and has been vocal about an intention to rejuvenate jihad in Kashmir. According to Stephen Tankel, an Assistant Professor at American University and who has recently written the book, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, states, “LeT is a big enough, strong enough, and elastic enough organization that it won’t shift away from Afghanistan. Rather, we can expect them to remain active there and to put additional efforts into Kashmir.” Early indications suggest this is underway, including an uptick in high profile attacks in Kashmir in which LeT is believed to be involved.
Indian officials are apprehensive that the impending NATO-ISAF departure from Afghanistan will raise the costs of managing the militant problem in the Kashmir Valley. Additionally, U.S. officials and experts acknowledge there are valid concerns, though the U.S. government has not discussed such a risk publicly. Admiral Samuel Locklear, the United States Pacific Command Commander (USPACOM), is increasingly discussing the shifting terrorist movements with countries in the region. He stated, “We are thinking about it more and more each day, and this includes dialogue with our partners in India and Pakistan.” While most anti-Indian sentiment is now expressed in street protests, graffiti has started to appear on the streets of Srinagar, inviting foreign fighters with greetings of “Welcome Taliban.”

In the post-endgame Afghanistan withdrawal scenario, there is a likelihood of Punjab militants, who had moved their base of operations to the western Afghanistan-Pakistan border during the Afghan jihad against foreign troops, returning to the eastern front and refocusing their efforts on IJK. Furthermore, Pashtun militants, too, appear interested in prioritizing IJK higher as reflected in recent statements by top Pakistani Taliban Leaders: in January 2013, Tehriki-i-Taliban Pakistan leader Wali-ur Rahman vowed to send fighters to IJK and implement Sharia law. More recently, in September 2013, a senior Kashmiri independence fighter with the nom de guerre Mohammad Abdullah stated that the Afghan mujahedeen owed Kashmiris “a debt” that should be paid on “Kashmiri terms” after the NATO-ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Lastly, in October 2014, senior Indian military officers reported that potential Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters are operating in the Kashmir valley after Indian security forces observed ISIS flags flying after Eid prayers in Srinagar. In short, this renewed focus by militant separatist groups and Islamic terrorists to incite violence in the Kashmir Valley certainly has the ability to create massive instability in the region and is cause for concern. Thus, it is of utmost importance and in India’s vital strategic interest to promote peace and strive to bring pragmatic, long-term police and rule of law reforms to the IJK state.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) Challenges andLessons in IJK

SSR in IJK has faced a number of challenges. Foremost, SSR is hampered by the political and security context. Moreover, the security apparatus in IJK has been historically highly politicized and fragmented that this dysfunction has kept the Indian Security Forces in an extremely fragile and uneven institution with no real sense of national identity. This is further compounded by the fact that the Indian security forces remain isolated from large scale regional or Western assistance and resources that are required to rehabilitate and professionalize the national security sector.

Faced with the problem of continued violence and militancy in IJK, India’s response has been consistent and driven by a “support to civil authority” doctrine. The Indian national government has rationalized its Kashmir policies under the rubric of “political development.” This approach stems from its history as British colonial India. Insurgency therefore remains operationally, first and foremost, an issue of law and order, and thus is to be met by reinforcing the normal mechanisms of the state, most especially its local security forces (e.g. the IJK state police). Hence, India attempts to seek legitimacy through the concept of “traditional authority” and use force as a means to achieve its desired endstate – a peaceful and subordinate Kashmir state that accepts New Delhi as its legitimate ruling authority. As a result, the Indian military was interjected into the counterinsurgent dynamic in the early 1990s and is clearly the dominant force in terms of sheer power; military primacy is the template within which all force dispositions currently take place.

Since the beginning of a series of Kashmiri Muslim separatist uprisings in the Indian state of IJK in the late 1980s, the Kashmir valley has been governed as a police state operating under emergency powers since July 5, 1990. The organization of the Indian security apparatus reflects the nations’ centralized federalist structure. It is federal in that the security forces are organized by the states and is constitutionally responsible for law and order.

There are three main categories of Indian security forces in Kashmir: the local (state) police, paramilitary forces, and the Indian Army. These forces operate under a number of statutes formed from the Kashmir emergency powers act. The Terrorist and Disruptive Act (TADA), is a federal enactment and makes it a crime to commit certain actions defined as terrorist. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), grants Indian military personnel substantial immunity from prosecution, and the Public Safety Act (PSA) has created a military dominated regime that resembles martial law and which vests extraordinary powers in the Indian security forces. Combined with layer upon layer of security detachments, screening precautions, and fortified guard posts, these measures seek to maintain public order in IJK.

Because of these actions, human rights violations in the form of judicial and extrajudicial punishments meted out by Indian
security forces are the greatest amount of controversy. They include revenge killings, summary executions and assassinations, sexual molestation and rape, torture, and the deliberate torching of homes, markets, and mosques. The Indian government acknowledges the occurrence of most of these acts. However, “debated is the frequency and allocation of principal responsibility for them among the Indian security forces, earnestness of Indian government efforts to stop them, and how to account for these criminal acts.” Thus, the distrust of the Kashmiri people for the Indian security forces seems nearly complete; and the Indian security forces unquestionably reciprocate these feelings, creating a vicious cycle of violence and instability.

As a result, access to justice remains elusive in Kashmir. Access to justice is limited by lack of confidence in the IJK judicial system due to its inefficiency and corruption as well as the strict adherence to the enactment of “emergency legislation” to control militancy and separatist activities in the region. Additionally, there is a massive backlog of writs of habeas corpus pending in the IJK court system. Furthermore, laws on freedom of assembly, speech, and religion are non-existent. Laws against domestic violence are treated with similar indifference because the focus of the Indian national government and security forces is on maintaining security and control in the region and deterring Pakistan aggression along the LOC.

IJK Security Sector Reform Policy Recommendations

In the long term, stability and a rule of law depend on viable police, security forces, and justice structures. Hence, the recommendations listed below focus on the key components of implementing an effective SSR program in the IJK.

Increase Support to the Local IJK Governance Component. SSR is far more explicitly political than many of the other activities traditionally supported by the Indian national government and the international community and requires stronger political engagement on the ground to be effective. Local IJK security sector governance issues need to be supported from the outset, as they are crucial to SSR initiatives. Long-term security priorities should not be marginalized but placed at the forefront of the national governance framework. Target issues should include financial and social auditing of the security sector; the development of a human resource management system within the IJK security sector capable of supporting a regional consensus; and efforts to professionalize, oversee, and manage IJK security sector personnel.

Encourage Local Ownership and Community Engagement in IJK SSR Activities. In conjunction with bolstering the IJK governance component, efforts should be made to develop and support community safety structures (e.g. district or community safety councils, local security forums, or citizen councils) to engage the Kashmiri community so that they can collaborate and make decisions about their own security. Aside from the national and state security institutions, the community must be at the core of any SSR efforts. Actively engaging Kashmiri civil society and people at the community level will provide buy-in for national and state sponsored security sector reforms and afford an opportunity for Kashmiri people within different demographic groups to articulate their interests, needs, and concerns regarding IJK security. Additionally, active local engagement in SSR can alleviate some of the concerns regarding the destabilizing influence of spoilers (e.g. extremist militants and violent separatist movements) if local ownership is broadened beyond the national and state level security and policy institutions. Finally, in order for a community safety structure to be effective, it must be integrated and appropriately prioritized throughout all the stages (planning, design, and implementation) of the SSR process.

Eliminate Emergency Power Legislation and Establish Police Priority. As the security situation in IJK becomes more stable, the Indian government in concert with the Kashmir state assembly should roll back its emergency power legislation. In particular, the Indian government should urgently act on the recommendations of several commissions and repeal the AFSPA, which provides effective immunity for Indian military personnel implicated in human rights violations. The AFSPA prohibits prosecutions of military personnel in civilian courts without government approval. Thus, AFSPA promulgates a culture of impunity by allowing the Indian government and its agencies to shield officers and soldiers from being tried for serious offenses. In addition, the Indian government and IJK local authorities should strive to reduce their reliance on the Indian military to support the state police in their performance of daily law enforcement activities in IJK. Ideally, the Indian military in IJK should act as a quick response force and respond only to serious incidents (e.g. insurgent attacks, large-scale rioting, disturbances, etc.) which overwhelm IJK state police capabilities and capacities. Further, the Indian government should leverage and grow the IJK state police so that the Indian military can withdraw the preponderance of their forces out of the populated areas of IJK and focus on external threats such as securing the LOC and India’s other contested border areas. Stationing military forces in the border areas is acceptable, but the Indian Army’s sustained and heavy presence in places like “Srinagar seems to further the cause of war and internal conflict rather than that of peace.” Also, this arrangement would reduce the occurrence of human rights abuses caused by the Indian military
and national police forces. Since the IJK local authorities manage the state police, they will be held accountable more readily than Indian national security forces. Therefore, further reductions in military personnel has the potential to improve the political situation, stimulate the Kashmir economy, and show the people of Kashmir that the Indian national and local IJK governments trust the people and is serious about implementing SSR in the region.

A UN or NATO-sponsored Police Operational and Liaison Mentor Team (POLMT) would bolster the credibility of the Indian national government and demonstrate that they are serious in reforming the security forces in the Kashmir region. Dealing with unarmed civilians requires restraints of force and conciliatory measures based on dialogue, mediation, and building partnerships with the local population. Thus, the POLMT would assist in teaching, mentoring, and supporting the development of a professional, sufficient, and self-sustaining IJK state police organization. Finally, the POMLT would aid in incorporating human rights and gender-based sensitivity training into the IJK police curriculum. This will inculcate an ethos of legality and of compliance with international human rights standards, within the IJK law enforcement agencies.

Place a High Priority on Human Rights Protection. Respect for human rights must exist equally among the Kashmiri population as well as members of the IJK security forces. Thus, New Delhi should show willingness to acknowledge the problem of human rights abuses against the Kashmiri people. This is a very real and justifiable grievance. Human rights abuses, while not precisely chronicled, have occurred on a massive scale in IJK. Therefore, India should implement measures to improve the human rights situation in the Kashmir Valley. Pledging to investigate abuses of past crimes committed by Indian security forces and compensation packages for abused victims and their families would go a long way in restoring the confidence of the Kashmiri people with the Indian security forces operating in IJK.

Implement IJK State Judicial Reforms. An independent, impartial, and effective judiciary is the very foundation for justice, individual rights, and security. Thus, the incorporation of judicial reforms in IJK would strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the state and Indian national government. Acknowledging and quickly processing the massive amounts of pending writs of habeas corpus’ would be an excellent initial confidence building measure for the Kashmiri people.

Additionally, the creation of a mobile court system with trained judges and staff that is responsive, efficient, and impartial would provide an immediate positive impact in the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmir Valley is a rugged and mountainous area-making travel difficult and restricting the government’s ability to mediate disputes and enforce the rule of law. A mobile court system would allow the IJK judiciary to penetrate into the rural areas dispensing efficient and quick justice to large segments of the rural Kashmir population. Furthermore, the IJK judiciary must be prepared and provided the authority to try high-visibility cases of Indian security forces accused of human rights abuses. This in turn would reinforce to the Kashmir populace that the state judiciary/government are competent, able to enforce the law, and it is the predominant mechanism for dispute resolution and mediation.

Finally, one of the core responsibilities of the judiciary is oversight of the security sector’s activities. To that end, in order to make it more transparent and effective in curbing corruption, the judiciary “should publish annual reports of its activities and spending, and provide the public with reliable information about its governance and organization.”

Provide Stronger Civilian Oversight and Accountability of the IJK Security Sector. There is an increased recognition that the security sector, like any other part of the public sector, must be subject to the principles of civil oversight, accountability, and transparency. The creation of a State Security Commission to oversee police and security performance would provide an oversight mechanism to ensure accountability and adherence to proper procedures. The commission would ensure that the IJK state and local governments does not exercise “unwarranted influence or pressure on the State police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country.” Such a commission would also give a forum to IJK police and security supervisors, “enabling them to bring forward complaints of any illegal orders in the conduct of their duties.”

Conclusion

IJK desperately needs a shared responsibility to improve the security sector and a cooperative security mechanism, which emphasizes non-military solutions to confront the current internal security dilemma. Thus, achieving SSR will require significant political will and the allocation of meaningful resources by the Indian national government, IJK local government, and the international community. Most importantly, what is critically required is to have broad reforms that are uniformly applied to all IJK security institutions in a transparent manner. Institutions, whether civil or military need to be held accountable for any excesses. Lastly, sustained sub-national, national, and regional
level engagement will be critical in realizing these objectives. The challenge, of course, remains in achieving a consensus and operationalizing these approaches.

Notes:

3 Ibid.
4 Throughout this article, “IJK” refers to the Indian-administered part of Jammu and Kashmir. “Kashmir” is an abbreviated way of saying “Jammu and Kashmir,” and also focuses attention on the area where much of the fighting has taken place. Lastly, “AJK” (Azad Jammu and Kashmir) refers to the part of Kashmir under Pakistani administration.
5 For the purposes of this article, the term Security Sector is used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel, responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances also included (UN Nations Definition, http://unssr.unlb.org/SSR/Definitions.aspx).
6 Kashmir Intifada includes the secessionist groups such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front and The All-Parties Hurriyat Conference/Alliance who try to garner local support for the cause of Azadi (independence), because ethnic Kashmiris regard themselves as culturally different from the rest of the Indian sub-continent; Timothy D. Sisk, International mediation in civil wars: Bargaining with bullets, (London: Routledge, 2009), 168.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 The Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) refers to the current position that divides Indian and Pakistani troops in the Siachen Glacier region. The line extends from the northernmost point of the LOC to the Indira Col mountain pass.
11 Sisk International mediation, 168.
13 Sisk International mediation, 167.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Qandeel Siddique, “Is the endgame in Afghanistan likely to rekindle the Kashmir insurgency?” Center for International and Strategic Analysis. (Oslo: SISA Report no. 08-2013), 5.
23 Ibid.
25 The Times of India, “ISIS flag in Kashmir valley worries Army.”
28 Ibid.
31 It is important to note that a variety of national and state emergency ordinances have been implemented in IJK and the most prominent have been the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987, or TADA, and later the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, or POTO, later the Act of 2002 (POTA).
32 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir dispute, 160.
34 Ibid., 158.
Patrick Howell
American Univ.
Project: "How is Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) addressed in U.S. military doctrine and what is the state of FHA within Stability Operations?"

Katrina M. Gehman
Eastern Menonite Univ.
Project: "AMISOM Analysis" Prepare a thorough annotated bibliography of reports, studies, AU documents, books, etc. on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Allen Church
Dickinson College
Project: Support Dr. Robert Ellis’ USAWC Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) research and publications on Latin American security and defense issues

Daniel Lupacchino
Norwich University
Project: Create a country listing detailing their respective justice system. Incorporate those countries laws related to Transnational Organized Crime

Isaac Schlotterbeck
Dickinson College
Project: Research efforts to support the updating of syllabi for USAWC spring 2015 electives "Introduction to International Development" and Emerging Global Challenges and Development Trends

Nicholas Paparella
Dickinson College
Project: "Peace Operations Running Estimate" Design, develop a plan for, and initiate an information management system to provide current assessments of UN Peace Operations.

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Abigal Glascott
Dickinson College
Project: "Peace Operations Running Estimate" Design, develop a plan for, and initiate an information management system to provide current assessments of UN Peace Operations.
Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations
See full report

Launch and High-Level Seminar

"Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations"

27 January 2015

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

For PKSOI Assistant Director Professor Bill Flavin's remarks
THE DEMAND for UN peace operations is greater than ever before. The security environments in which they operate are becoming increasingly more complex and challenging. The resources and tools available are insufficient to meet the needs.

IN RESPONSE to the changing nature of conflict, there is a need to rethink and transform the approaches to UN peace operations, not only operationally and tactically, but also strategically and doctrinally, in order to ensure best possible effect on the ground.

TWO YEARS IN THE MAKING, the report Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations is a truly collaborative and global effort by the Challenges Forum Partner Organizations to address the current needs and challenges of international peace operations. Drawing upon the expertise of both practitioners, policy-makers and academicians, 24 target-ed recommendations are presented, which you can find in this brief.

THE REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS also represents a contribution to ongoing United Nations review efforts, in particular the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations appointed by the UN Secretary-General. The Challenges Forum Partnership will continue to provide suggestions and input to this process as it unfolds, on how to enhance the policies and practice, as well as effective implementation, of UN peace operations.
Preparing Leaders to Thrive in a Complex World

Peace & Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop

2015

April 14-16
National Defense University
Washington, DC

See workgroup articles in the July edition
In March 2015, the PKSOI Director COL Dan Pinnell hosted the NATO TEPSO meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Supported by a small team, one week representatives of 17 NATO and Partnership of Peace Programme members developed training modules on tasks for NATO military support to Peace Support Operations.

COL Pinnell took the opportunity to update the participants on PKSOI mid-and long-term projects, the U.S. Army Doctrine 2015, current updates on Stability Operations and U.S. doctrine efforts on Peace Operations. He also introduced the Regionally Aligned Forces Concept and discussed the U.S. way ahead on training and education in the aftermath of Afghanistan. Col Mark Haseman and Col Jurgen Prandtner briefed on the draft of the NATO “Protection of Civilians (POC) framework”; it serves as the conceptual foundation for the training modules on POC.
Increasing Use of Sustainable Energy Technologies in Micro-grids in UN PKO From U.S. Army Trained Less Developed Country Peacekeepers

by Andrew Mayer, MPA
Introduction

Increasing United States export of Sustainable Energy Technologies in Micro-grids (SETM)* in United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), and perhaps other Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are probable given global security’s interdependency with energy security. What is the current use of SETM in UN PKO given UN Millennium Development Goal #7 (MDG#7), ensuring environmental sustainability? How can the U.S. Army directly participate in the increase in use of SETM in UN PKO within LDCs to use them? How will opportunities for U.S. SETM exports to UN DPKO by training less developed countries1 (LDCs) to use them? How will opportunities for SETM use in UN PKO given UN Millennium Development Goal #7 (MDG#7), ensuring environmental sustainability? What is the current use of SETM in UN PKO when the U.S. Army directly participate in the increase in SETM use in UN PKO given UN DPKO/UNEP efforts battling climate change and resulting conflicts?

Leaders of science, sociology, and anthropology profess evolving opportunities humans have to avoid conflicts attributed to man-made, industrial, fossil fuel-created climate change. Climate change droughts, floods, and storms limit the availability of scarce resources, resulting in conflict. However, with inventions, innovations, and reforms of existing ideas, technologies, and governance methods of the world’s people and resources, there are plenty of opportunities to repair, and in some cases, reverse the climate damage to the environment, and help eliminate the scourge of war. There are battles fought and UN PKO conducted in the name of deterring aggression, maintaining treaties, and resolving armistices in the war resulting from climate change disasters/conflicts.

What are the metaphoric weapons brought to these battles to deter the scourge of man-made climate change war? The weapons are SETM. SETM are reliable electricity micro-grids that use renewable energy like solar and wind power, to name a couple, to provide power to stand alone and grid tied electrical infrastructures. Some examples of such systems are, in part, located at Sandia National Laboratory, called Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy, Reliability, and Security (SPIDERS).2 There are several U.S. national laboratory, non-profit, and academic research projects developing SETM at levels to address UN PKO power needs.

Although many countries have national SETM research programs, the U.S., also the leading UN financial contributor to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) (28%), and the UN DPKO (28%) itself, has been working tirelessly on SETM since before the 2000 West Coast blackouts, and the ensuing Northeast black and brown outs. The scale and complexity identified during these U.S. SETM trials lends well to SETM applications in UN PKO. The Galvin Center is another example of how SETM is used at the university campus-sized level.

Galvin’s SETM trial models are comparable to the sizes of UN PKO communities, especially within the refugee camp-sized operations settled within UN PKO.

UN DPKO /UNEP efforts battling climate change and resulting conflicts

Ninety-eight percent of international academic and industrial studies show all nations must act now to significantly reduce CO₂ emissions. The U.S. Global Change Research Program stated, “Global warming is unequivocal and primarily human-induced...” indicating a human war on Earth’s ecosystems. The world has arguably seven distinct ecosystems that suffer as the seasons change. Regardless of why humans are conducting this war on these ecosystems, the fact that the global temperature has increased over the past 50 years is not up for debate. The research group further states, “This observed increase is due primarily to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping gases [CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels].” As LDCs reach new levels of economic industrial prosperity and with increased levels of climate change, efforts required to include SETM in UN PKO within LDCs becomes more critical and emergent. Moreover, Justin Guay supports LDCs building their economies with SETM, with World Bank participation in his article.

Answering the call to implement World Bank recommended global energy policy is in part the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in partnership with the UN DPKO. A recent joint research and publication project was released by the UN focusing on UN DPKO and UNEP missions. The report addressed a component of SETM, solar energy. The UNEP publication Greening the Blue Helmets states, “Several missions use photovoltaic solar units on a limited scale, including UNI-
FIL, UNMIT, MINUSTAH, and MONUSCO.”

This indicates much more work to be done to meet the aims of increasing their use.

The difference in overall sustainability and public health between the use of fossil fuels and SETM in reconstruction was also noted in the 2005 UNEP Assessment of the Environment in Iraq; wherein, it was discovered the use of fossil fuels during conflict and disaster reconstruction leads to exacerbated environmental problems that exponentially delay recovery, prolong development, and exacerbate fossil fuel production related health problems. Additionally, an energy specialist for the UN Office of Field Support working with the UNEP noted in an email interview, “it [solar added to a traditional fossil fuel burning generator set] took five years to be embraced by the technical personnel of the UN DPKO Field Missions.” Five years is a very long time and not an operational timeframe to realize the overall paradigm change which might otherwise take place. Moreover, after an author 2013 survey of all active UN PKO, only one response related to SETM was discovered. These results also clearly show there are significant opportunities to increase the use of SETM, replacing traditional energy resources.

Fossil fuel competition in LDCs is burgeoning and resulting in significant economic activity; however, those activities are not without associated conflicts, which evolve into further conflicts amongst their neighbors and regions. It is with a pervasive sense of responsibility, the U.S. and LDCs respond to LDCs fossil fuel related conflicts through the UN DPKO. University of California, Los Angeles Professor Michael Ross captures and lists a "who's who" of fossil fuel conflict ridden nations across the globe,

...oil-producing states make up a growing fraction of the world’s conflict-ridden countries. They now host about a third of the world’s civil wars, both large and small, up from one-fifth in 1992.” He further states, “Most of the new energy-rich states are in Africa (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Namibia, and São Tomé and Príncipe), the Caspian basin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), or Southeast Asia (Cambodia, East Timor, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Although LDCs with readily accessible short supply fossil fuels may sell them in their plight for quick economic development to other LDCs with outdated infrastructures, paradoxically,
they have the temporary cash flow and opportunity to serve as ideal examples of the efficient use of energy by becoming masters of energy markets by using SETM instead. A recent report by a group of economists in the Journal of Economic Perspectives stated the scenario as follows:

Over the next 25-30 years, nearly all of the growth in energy demand, fossil fuel use, associated local pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions, is forecast to come from the developing [LDC] world. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that energy consumption in OECD and non-OECD countries was roughly equal in 2007, but from 2007 to 2035, it forecasts that energy consumption in OECD countries will grow by 14 percent, while energy consumption in non-OECD countries will grow by 84 percent.13

Should LDC countries run the energy high road by receiving SETM training from U.S. Army, they can transfer those skills to UN PKO host nations, building those important in roads, and introducing a way forward for their own national exports of SETM.

SETM and the state of the technology market

Although SETM could be best applied in UN PKO at the neighborhood and refugee camp level, microgrids are constructed and may be applied to as small an area as a city block. Linking houses together on small electric substations, SETM can also be applied to satisfy the needs of densely populated and large geographic areas by linking individual smaller SETM substations, supported energy islands, to larger existing power grids. SETM are readily available and primed for use in real-world and testing applications.14 There are thousands of international research institutes and startup companies leading the SETM market in its development, however a few companies stand out. The Zero Base *(TZB)* is a leader in this field with annual exhibitions in the courtyard of the United States Department of Defense’s Headquarters, Pentagon. TZB Board of Advisors include U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield and Mr. Terry Tamminen.15 Ambassador Bloomfield stated, Ambassador Bloomfield was the U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for the Political and Military Bureau, the Ambassador at Large for the eradication of shoulder fired rockets and mines, and the Department of Defense Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Currently, he serves on the board of the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C. think tank which regularly moves issues successfully through the beltway gridlock. Also of note at TZB, Mr. Tamminen was a special advisor to California Governor (R) Arnold Schwarzenegger for energy and environment as well as being a special advisor to current California Governor (D) Jerry Brown for the same fields. He also works with the UN as the head of the UN-supported R20 (Regions of Climate Action) initiative.

Another U.S. SETM industry leading company is SunPower®.17 SunPower® works with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)18 and recently with the Chilean government to create two of the world’s largest solar power installations.19 SunPower’s® majority investor is French oil giant Total®. SunPower® markets a 24 percent efficient solar photovoltaic cell that is/can be used within microgrids.20 Total® investment in SunPower® is coupled with associated investments by U.S. Berkshire Hathaway®.21 The U.S. and France are currently working together on UN PKO, notably within conflicts in Africa, among others. Because French and American investors are co-owners of this solar power giant, SunPower® is well positioned to be integrated into the UN DPKO procurement process with U.S. Army training support and UN logistics. Also of note, Total® was recently acquitted for its alleged involvement in the UN Oil for Food Program corruption.22 Ethical and sound public/private partnerships are of the utmost concern and that acquittal and resulting clearance for Total® to do business with the UN was critical.

The recent development between Total® and the UN was a critical one given UNPD requirements for vendors to survive the rigorous vetting process. Such vetting requirements are seen in an excerpt from a sample document from the UNPD involving current UN PKO contracting in Somalia which includes: Prerequisites for Eligibility

In order to be eligible for UN registration [as a Vendor], you must declare that:

A. Your company (as well as any parent, subsidiary or affiliate companies) is not listed in, or associated with a company or individual listed in:


II. the IIC Oil for Food [OFF] List website or, if listed on
either, this has been disclosed to the United Nations Procurement Division in writing.\textsuperscript{23}

Finally, although the U.S. shows the greatest political and financial potential to move SETM in UN PKO forward, two other top ten contributors, France and Germany, have recently developed-through a public private partnership-a solar cell almost twice as efficient as the SunPower’s\textsuperscript{\textregistered} 24 percent efficient cell on the market. The French company Soitech\textsuperscript{\textregistered} and the German research institute Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft created a prototype for a solar cell with a world record 46 percent efficiency,\textsuperscript{25} thereby almost doubling its efficiency rating of the SunPower\textsuperscript{\textregistered} solar cell. For now, much doubt remains about whether the 46 percent efficient cell is ready for deployment, but the scale of the SunPower\textsuperscript{\textregistered} cell, which is on the market, shows its availability as deployable.

Major UN financial and troop contributors’ motivations and influence on world decisions about SETM application through UN PKO start with the UN Committee on Contributions.\textsuperscript{26} That pay to play system very clearly establishes egalitarian standards for monetary influence on decisions made in the UN. No individual member nation can assert more influence on the outcome of any joint decision than another based on amounts contributed, which are a proportionate amount in comparison with each country’s gross national product.

UN DPKO is under the immediate control of the Secretary General to ensure most direct adherence to the UN mandate. Because the leading UN PKO troop contributors have been from LDCs since the original UN PKO in 1948, many leaders, under guidance of the UN DPKO, practice reducing tensions as an intuitive part of their geo-political positions. The U.S. Army is in a great position to train those LDCs’ militaries how to use U.S. SETM as a means to prepare them to bid for command positions in UN PKOs. Geopolitically, this is a great plan for the U.S. Army because it will not be over-exerting itself in proportion to its large financial contributions or its comparatively large population. Also placated would be those LDCs’ citizenry, who often place blame for many of the world’s conflicts squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. for a perceived lack of sharing resources or providing the means by which acquisition of those resources may take place by LDCs.

UN acquisition policy for positioning SETM in UN PKO

UN DPKO acquisition framework is the Contingency Owned Equipment (COE) policy.\textsuperscript{27} UN COE policy was recently reviewed by the UN Office of Internal Oversights’ Internal Audit Division’s, Audit Report 2013/030 that rated COE program implementation as Partially Satisfactory.\textsuperscript{28} Referencing the report’s findings could be an astute window of opportunity to incorporate new policy language taking SETM into con-
sideration. According to the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly,29 rates for reimbursement are flexible and always under development. This flexibility is important as up-front costs for SETM will initially be more expensive than outdated traditional and unsustainable energy resources. However, in the long run, the systems pay for themselves many times over. The UNEP’s Greening the Blue Helmets shows a traditional energy system supplemented by renewable energy.30 Although that system is admirable, its energy efficiency and savings would be dwarfed in comparison to SETM systems.

UN COE is a very detailed process considering line items when evaluating the reimbursement rates and costs for items. Specifically, electrical items are categorized into major and minor item status. Major system wet/dry lease reimbursements are arranged for equipment use and transportation of that equipment by troop/police contributing nations. Major electrical items (ie. potential SETM) that are above 20kVA (ie.16kW), and cost more than $1000 fit into the Special Case language of UN DPKO COE policy,31 and can be reimbursed when its self-sustainment use is applied to force level as well as unit level PKO. In the case of SETM, the most efficient use would be at the force level, and would surely be a major item instead of a unit level minor item. The power from SETM at the force level would be used by all units at the defined ‘unit’ level at a particular location; thereby cutting costs for redundancy of systems and “wet stacking”32 of back up generation at the unit level, should there be a critical immediate need.

This is not to say that ‘minor’ electrical/engineering items (ie. <16kW) should not also be used in daily operations as those items will significantly cut back on unit electrical expenses as well. U.S. Marine Colonel James Caley strongly emphasized the savings of using SETM in military operations at the annual Defense Energy Summit in Austin, Texas, U.S.A.33 The operations he described in his speech are the same sizes and require the same electricity demands of UN PKO. These relatively minor electrical/engineering expenses for power are reimbursable based on the operational Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and the troop/police contributing country.34 The reimbursements also account for items transferred or procured from bilateral troop/police contributing country operations. In these cases, it is appropriate an amendment be written to the original MOU, as is also the case with
reimbursements for moving units in mid-operation. If such mid-operation movements are required, SETM is well suited with temporarily rented industrial moving equipment and trucks.

Overall, the UN PKO COE operational policy requirements for procuring the amount of essential electrical generation needed per manned unit is conducive to accepting, and does not prevent the integration of, SETM; as long as the SETM, with operational capability and sufficient backup capacity to main camps and medical facilities around the clock, is provided. As is often the case with the use of SETM in field environments, the SETM battery storage by default, serves as the back up to the system. If the batteries no longer hold a charge, smaller, and more fuel efficient than traditional, generators are used to recharge those SETM batteries. For example, at night if the batteries are depleted late into the evening after the sun charged them during the day, then a more efficient generator can charge the batteries.

**Financing and Procurement/Logistics**

Although UN members’ financial contributions are equal as they are proportionate, internal UN political capital is considered via a more laissez faire system. When comparing the regular UN budget to the UN Peacekeeping budget, the UN DPKO manages more funds (est. USD7.5B) than the UNSG manages (est. USD2.6B). Financing for UN PKO is via established funds for reimbursements to nations providing peacekeeping logistical and sustainment aspects. UN programs administering UN PKO equipment, services, and training are funded in the form of the Contingency Owned Equipment (COE) system, the UN Procurement Division (UNPD), and its United Nations Global Marketplace (UNGM) online vendor registration system. The UNPD website describes COE and UNPD, as follows:

> The UNPD conducts procurement for the UN Headquarters in New York, Peacekeeping/Political Missions, Tribunals and Commissions. Selected offices away from Headquarters do have delegated procurement authority to carry out their own procurement up to established financial limits. The UNPD generally conducts purchases beyond these limits and for global acquisition projects.

The details of the finance and procurement processes are located online wherein the UNPD system is made more transparent for LDCs. Moreover, the UNPD might seize the opportunity to work with the UNSG to establish a SETM procurement and distribution fund as a project, which is language used in UNPD policy on its website.

After financing is approved, sustaining procurement and logistics for SETM in UN PKO is more easily done with traditional sea/air/ground shipments of containers. SETM shipments are of chemically stable and inert materiel; or more simply stated, sand-based plastics, steel, and batteries. The costs of SETM shipments are minimal and a fraction in comparison to regularly repeating fossil fuel shipments. Should there be UN project engineering questions; an example of how procurement and installation might take place can be seen in the U.S. DoD’s Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) procurement concept, recently reported by the *Wall Street Journal*. “RIF provides a collaborative vehicle for small businesses to provide the department with innovative technologies that can be rapidly inserted into acquisition programs that meet specific defense needs.” The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was the group awarded RIF so UN planners could specifically look to them for program guidance.

Moreover, the UN can be sure the U.S. Department of Defense has been considering SETM use in the operational setting.
April 2014, DoD Energy policy was updated from the previous 1991 version. Included was an emphasis both on the increased use of renewable energy [SETM] and mechanisms to assess and evaluate those operations using it.\textsuperscript{31} The offices called to expand energy resources including renewable sources [SETM] include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands. Those offices will focus on operational energy policy with interagency partners that support UN PKO. Further evidence U.S. DoD is moving incrementally towards the use of SETM in PKO is found in the new DoD Energy policy including Security Cooperation into its policy as it applies to a wide range of activities across the Department, including the direction to, "Incorporate guidance and analyses in Combatant Command planning to address energy risks and opportunities across the full range of military operations, from engagement and security cooperation to major operations and campaigns." Peacekeeping operations are within the terms of that DoD Directive, number 4180.01.\textsuperscript{42}

Conclusion

Less developed member nations of the UN system seek UN PKO intervention to help maintain their human rights and uphold international laws of armed conflict. Those who seek UN support to rebuild after climate change caused natural disasters and man-made conflicts are in positions of extreme need, often with their short and long term lives in peril. Some LDCs are aware of the state of SETM technology and seek only to rebuild their electrical infrastructures with today’s modernity. Some LDCs have never had electrical infrastructure and have limited access to learn about such technology. In both cases, whether the limitations are financial and/or technology based, taking advantage of those in need by providing them analogue and outdated generations of electrical power supplying technology at low cost is not in keeping with the intent of Millenium Development Goal (MDG #7). LDCs would appreciate the SETM and the jobs they create. According to the Center for American Progress, “Clean-energy investments create 16.7 jobs for every USD$1 million in spending. Spending on fossil fuels, by contrast, generates 5.3 jobs per USD$1 million in spending.”\textsuperscript{43} All member nations benefit, as nations whose economies are based on their natural fossil fuel resources are themselves converting to SETM.\textsuperscript{44} Peacekeepers lead the way and would lead better with SETM.

The UN DPKO works within its COE policy to provide feasible materiel and logistics policy for the delivery of goods and services to UN PKO. The COE processes can be improved according to UN auditing offices. How UN PKOs are financed and budgeted is already well established. New policy revisions need only be made to include SETM categorized contributions.

Finally, the benefits of both SETM and UN PKO are evident when considering the vast majority of LDCs that ascribe to the UN MDGs are also individually benefitting from both. The discussion of the use of SETM in LDC UN PKO is largely a political one. With all political discussions, the political gains and losses in democracies are found in their citizens’ votes and willingness to accept, implement, and practice the policies promulgated by their elected officials’ actions. If SETM implementation in U.S. Army trained UN PKO is to successfully be implemented, it is essential implementation takes place as a result of supporting the member countries citizens’ will to participate. That will to participate and assist in the development of those societies into nations achieving the UN MDGs is strengthened by the use of SETM in UN PKO.

Notes:


Andrew attended the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, obtaining his Master’s Degree in Public Administration, Management, and Policy focused on international solar policy; a full program, in-residency, 65 graduate-credit degree. Andrew also holds a Bachelor of Arts, Social Sciences, and a Bachelor of Arts, Journalism and Communications, both from the University of Oregon.


Mushumbusi, Bennie M, Energy Specialist, UN Office of Field Support, email interview with author, mushumbusi@un.org, October 21, 2013.


32 Author’s note: “Wet stacking is a method by which generators are connected and ran at less than optimal levels to avoid letting a generator reach life cycle before another. Synchronized wearing out of the generator is the goal to allow for procurement on the same schedule for replacements. This is a non-sustainable practice that wastes the life of the generator and the life of the fuel through the underperformance of the half capacity operation.”

33 Jim Caley, Colonel, Director, Expeditionary Energy Office, United States Marine Corps Headquarters, Defense Energy Summit, author’s notes from speech to Defense Energy Summit, Austin, TX, November 11, 2013.

34 Ibid, Annex B.


36 Table #2.


40 Ibid.


CAOCL and the RAF; A Training Program for Effective Regionally Aligned Forces

by Jim Cooney, PKSOI
The Army’s Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept is a way to align Army General Purpose Forces to better support Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) in theater engagement, crisis response, and major operations. Regionally Aligned Forces, through persistent engagement, provide a GCC with units that have developed situational understanding and context of a given region, have built relationships and developed interoperability with allied partners, and have established assured access to ports of entry and support bases. RAF units, conceptually, are augmented with cultural and language training in order to make them more effective within the region they will habitually operate. This article will focus on improving cultural and language training of Regionally Aligned Forces.

As the Army’s RAF concept matures, soldiers assigned to particular regions need a structured program that exposes them to cultural and linguistic aspects of their operational area. The objectives of this training is not to mirror the unique skills of a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), but provides soldiers with the tools to be better attuned to their operational environment. This training should be developed and supported by an institution that can facilitate both distance and face-to-face educational interactions. The training institute should maintain readily available cultural and linguistic familiarization material for any region in which General Purpose Force (GPF) forces may be deployed in a crisis situation. The Marine Corps University’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and CAOCL’s Regional, Culture and Language Familiarization (RCLF) program provide excellent training and education methodologies, as well as the Army’s TRADOC Culture Center and the Defense language Institute, which has a multitude of basic language familiarization material.

The 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2nd ABCT), after being assigned as U.S. Africa Commands RAF, became the first Army brigade to attempt structured regional specific culture and language awareness training. The 2nd ABCT’s culture and language awareness training manifested itself in what is known as “Dagger University”. While Dagger University proved useful in preparing teams to execute security cooperation missions with African partner nations, it could be improved. Dagger University, named after the brigade’s nom de guerre “Dagger Brigade”, relied on organic expertise from native African soldiers, now serving in the U.S. Army, as well as voluntary contributions from Kansas State University’s African Studies Department. There are several potential drawbacks to this approach. First, the curriculum relied on pro bono work from civilian academics. There is no guarantee that such coincidental and beneficial partnering will occur with brigades stationed in other parts of the country, or aligned with other regions of the world. Second, the program heavily leveraged resident expertise. While organic regional experts may have a wealth of knowledge, they are not necessarily best equipped to translate their personal experiences into effective periods of instruction in an academic or training environment. Once again, this opportune availability of regional experts will not necessarily be true in other RAF units. Third, the program focuses on the brigade construct, which is not necessarily applicable to staffs functioning above the brigade level. Dagger University is not agile enough to support enabling commands, such as logistics, engineering, or medical brigades, whose responsibility may be spread across multiple regions. Finally, the program is not formalized within an academic or training institution. As a result, the aspects of Dagger...
University which should be retained or may need improvement are not systematically incorporated into best practices, leading to the evolution of future training materials. Given the coincidental partnering, Dagger University’s unique advantages are not easily exportable to other brigades outside of Fort Riley that may be assigned to the same region as the 2ABCT.

The Marine Corps’ Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) capability development initiative for the General Purpose Force, which is based out of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) is one such program designed to provide linguistic and cultural training material across the spectrum of operational locations. One of CAOCL’s most wide reaching curriculums, the Regional, Culture and Language Familiarization (RCLF) program, is an excellent example of integrating regional cultural awareness with language starter programs in one structured curriculum, as opposed to utilizing the cultural training from the Army’s TRADOC Culture Center and nesting that with the Defense Language Institute’s linguistic introductory material.

The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) is the institutional foundation of the Marine Corps culture and language familiarization training. CAOCL addresses many of the shortcomings of the Army’s efforts like Dagger University. Along with being a resource for operational culture and communication skills to units prior to deployment, CAOCL conducts research to support broad Marine Corps missions and requirements and serves as the central Marine Corps agency for operational culture and language familiarization training programs. In addition to administering the RCLF program, CAOCL’s regional desk officers train Marine units through personal instruction, and training and education reference material. CAOCL provide instructors to support and contribute to curriculum development at other Marine Corps formal schools. CAOCL participates in exercise design and assessment, and contributes to doctrine and policy development. Some examples of CAOCL products include “The al-Anbar Awakening: Comparative Assessment of Strategies and Tactics Used to Instigate the Awakening Movement”, “Culture and Language Survey: Importance of Culture vs. Language”, and most recently, quick reference guides and pamphlets concerning the epidemic in West Africa, such as “Cultural Considerations for Ebola Impacted Countries”. It is, in Army vernacular, a “Center of Excellence” for LREC capability development.

One of the most wide reaching programs directed by CAOCL is the Regional, Culture and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program. The RCLF program was established for the active component of the Marine Corps in 2012, and was expanded to the reserve component in 2014 and serves as part of a career long professional military education program for Marine Corps Sergeants (E5) through Lieutenant Colonel (O5). The RCLF Program grew out of the recognized need for a more robust, intentional effort to instill a foundation of core cultural skills and concepts, regional understanding, and language skills across the GPF. Lessons from DoD missions over the last decade highlighted the need for the services to place more emphasis on developing LREC knowledge and skills within their forces to maximize operational effectiveness. Like the proposal at the beginning of this article, RCLF is not designed to replace country or region specific subject matter experts, or designated language professionals. RCLF is a familiarization program that lays the foundation to produce Marine units that are “globally prepared so that they are effective at navigating and influencing the culturally complex 21st century operating environment.”
The reasons RCLF should be attractive to the RAF are many. First, it specifically targets General Purpose Forces, which is where the RAF is drawn from. Second, the delivery mechanism, via distance education, is designed to allow the tailoring of curricula to individual ranks or groups of ranks, in a format today's Soldiers are accustomed to interacting with, at a relatively low cost. Third, RCLF is mandatory training for all Marines in pay grades E5 through O5. As such, the program builds on concepts and skills at each level and is designed to be relevant to a given rank and level of responsibility. This training and education model could be used to complement the RAF concept of aligning units to specific regions for extended periods of time. Finally, the program not only provides cultural and language familiarization specific to a particular region, it also exposes Marines to general culture concepts that are useful when interacting with, or planning operations in, any cultural environment. One of the key benefits to this type of familiarization training is that Marines attain an appreciation for the importance of cultural differences, and can attempt to account for that when planning or conducting operations, i.e. being familiar enough to know what you don't know. This makes many of the skills developed through the training readily transferrable to other regions.

An Army institute similar to CAOCL (an Army Culture and Operational Language Institute, perhaps), could be established to support an Army specific Language and Culture program. It could provide the Army with a center that not only manages the curriculum of an RCLF-like program, but also fosters an environment where the field of Cultural and Language familiarization and learning can be advanced. Once again, this institute would not be designed to duplicate specialized training conducted at centers like SOCOMs John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or the Defense Language Institute. In fact, the level of training this institute develops would require a specialization all its own, it needs to understand the training audience and the objectives Culture and Language training delivered to General Purpose Forces (GPF) is trying to achieve. For example, simply pulling out elements of Foreign Area Officer or Civil Affairs training and making the familiarization curriculum an “FAO-lite” course would not take into account the objectives of familiarization vice specialization and the fact that Culture and Language training must fit into the larger training and education program that makes up the professional GPF Soldiers skill set. Therefore, one of the key aspects to an Army institute would be its ability to walk the line between the demands to maintain Soldiers core competencies while at the same time inserting Culture and Language familiarization training at appropriate levels, formats, and times, that enables and enhances the core skills of a Soldier and his or her unit when set in a RAF organizing principle.

There are other advantages to the Army establishing an institute like CAOCL. Part of the institute’s mission would be to advance aspects of education and training in culture and language fields that are of utility to the General Purpose Force. Instead of inventing separate Dagger Universities from brigade to brigade, the institute would leverage lessons learned and best practices that promote the evolution of a standard, and effective, familiarization program. It would also retain sufficient expertise to generate products rapidly in response to contingencies in particular countries or regions. It could also manage the level of familiarization across the Army. For instance, rather than allowing Service Retained Forces not directly affiliated with the RAF being allowed to choose a particular region du jour based upon the headlines of the day; an institute that properly manages the program could ensure the Army is appropriately balancing cultural awareness across all regions or emphasizes one region over another as strategic direction dictates.

Naturally, any of this requires resources, but not allocating the relatively minor costs associated with a program that employs a small staff of experts, relies heavily on virtual education to propagate knowledge and skills across the bulk of the Army, and enables the RAF construct to better achieve its objectives, is effectively approaching the future global operating environment with only one eye open. At the very least an analysis of the Marine Corps CAOCL and RLCF models is worth the Army’s time, and if a separate institution is not feasible in the current fiscal environment, partnering with and leveraging the unique capabilities within CAOCL could yield great dividends for the Army.

Commander Jim Cooney is a retired naval supply officer who had multiple tours overseas including U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart Germany; Naval Forces Europe and Africa, Naples Italy; and 1st Marine Air Wing, Okinawa, Japan. He is a 2005 Graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He is currently an independent contractor working as the PKSOI Maritime Stability Operations Advisor.
Top Ten Positive Outcomes from the Afghanistan War

by Lieutenant Colonel Steven P. Basilici
Strategic:

1. **Toppling the Taliban** in 2001, which headed the Afghan government, denied al Qaeda a safe haven and support in Afghanistan.

2. The subsequent dismantling of Al Qaeda training camps and the death of their iconic leader Osama Bin Laden in 2010 greatly diminished the influence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

3. A stable Afghan Government was established through a democratic election process. The 2014 election of Ashraf Ghani, the second President of Afghanistan, unfolded in a contested, year-long process and proved to be a peaceful transition of power.

4. The ANSF is now a reliable partner in the worldwide fight against terrorism. The strong and enduring relationship between the GIROA, the ANSF (formerly the ANSF, Afghan National Security Forces) and the U.S. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) community has afforded the United States and its allies strategic access and placement in Central Asia.

5. U.S. and allied access and placement is a stabilizing influence on U.S. Central Asian allies: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. While tensions will continue to exist between Pakistan and India, the ability of the U.S. to operate out of Afghanistan together with a close alliance to the GIROA, introduces a stabilizing regional influence. Our presence in Afghanistan will help to stabilize the region and afford Afghanistan the leverage to develop relationships with her neighbors while alleviating undue pressure from them.

Operational and Tactical:

6. **The Afghanistan war validated U.S. Unconventional Warfare (UW) doctrine and the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) organizational construct.** The 12 man A-Team was strongly validated as a military option in a complex and austere environment. Through Advanced Special Operations (ASO), SF A-Teams provided more than 70 percent of the overall data processed and provided back to the operational force as actionable intelligence. Interestingly, the parallel successes of U.S. Army Special Forces in both Vietnam and Afghanistan are striking. In both locations SF A-Teams successfully operated out of base camps in isolated, hard to reach areas. In both locations there occurred an evolutionary development of the battle space resulting in a model that reflected the organic emergence of extremely effective grass roots programs that were focused on enabling villagers to defend their homes. In Vietnam it was called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and in Afghanistan it is called the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. The adaptability of SF units has now become a focal point for the development of Army doctrine as the Department of Defense (DOD) grapples with the future threat environment through persistent engagement and the Regionally Aligned Forces model.

7. The war facilitated the development, testing and fielding of tactical and intermediate range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), in both conventional and SOF units. In 2001 before deploying to Afghanistan, a U.S. Army Warrant Officer took the initiative to acquire a hand held prototype UAV from a company in the Washington, DC area. Once in theater, the A-Team employed the tactical UAV during operations, which immediately caught the attention of other organizations that were monitoring the operational air space. The utility of the tactical level UAV was immediately understood, which launched a massive Research, Development, Testing and Equipping (RDT&E) process resulting in the eventual fielding of the hand-launched version of the UAV for all SF A-Teams and the addition of a UAV Platoon to each of the SF Groups. These UAVs enabled tactical level commanders to gain situational awareness of their immediate battle space in a way that has greatly enabled battlefield awareness and dominance.

8. The war permitted the development, testing and fielding of Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) technologies. These items enabled units to conduct SSE on the objective during execution of operations and enabled the gathering of biometrics data on individuals and the exploitation of both cell phones and computer systems. This equipment was fielded to both
U.S., ISAF and Afghan special operations and conventional units enabling them to quickly collect data and send it back to intelligence fusion cells for processing. Reach back capability enabled units to exploit information and move to follow on targets on a much condensed timeline. More importantly, those units working with the Afghan National Police (ANP) trained their counterparts on the equipment, which enabled the ANP to collect and establish a chain of custody for evidence that could later be used in the Afghan judicial process so crucial to a Counter Insurgency (COIN) environment.

9. The war greatly enhanced the capability and capacity of more than thirteen NATO SOF organizations including Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romanian and Poland, to deploy and operate Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) in Afghanistan as a part of ISAF.

10. The war provided ISAF SOF unique enabling capabilities through secure communications network and an Intelligence Fusion Cell resulting in unprecedented intelligence sharing. U.S. efforts to build capability and capacity in allied and partner nation SOF units has established a baseline for mutually supporting networked operations that will enable future joint and combined operations globally. The NATO Headquarters at SHAPE is the single point of coordination for seventeen NATO nations that possess SOF capability. The employment of NATO SOF in Afghanistan has produced a watershed at an unprecedented level of networked, mutually supporting SOF operations.

Notes:


Civil Affairs Association and PKSOI Launch First of Issue Papers on “The Future of Civil Affairs”

by Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired), U.S. Army Civil Affairs

2014 - 2015 CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS:
THE FUTURE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Edited by
Christopher Holshek
John C. Church, Jr.
The Civil Affairs Association and the Peacekeeping & Stabilization Operations Institute are working together to promote an informed discussion on the future of Civil Affairs, and educate the wider Peace & Stability Operations community on key issues shaping this critical national strategic capability to end and prevent wars.

At the Civil Affairs Roundtable held at West Point, NY on 6 March, PKSOI, the Association, and their partners at the Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations at West Point and the Foreign Area Officers Association, released the first series of Civil Affairs Issue Papers. “The Future of Civil Affairs” was also the topic for the Roundtable and the Civil Affairs Symposium the preceding fall at Valley Forge, PA.

The intent is to provide a platform for the broader Civil Affairs community to discuss and communicate to important opinion leaders in the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as key military commands and institutions, what it thinks the way ahead should be for CA. Rather than the usual “think-tank” approach, the Issue Papers will draw insights from the most experienced force of Civil Affairs operators in generations, as well as key partners. For the foreseeable future, the Association and PKSOI will run a crowdsourcing cycle, starting with issue papers presented and selected every fall at the annual Symposium and the publication and the discussion of the resulting Issue Papers volume every spring at the annual Roundtable. At that time, those present will nominate the topic of the next Issue Papers, Symposium, and Roundtable.

“We encourage professional dialog and the exchange of ideas on all aspects of Civil Affairs between our members, the military branches, and interested civilian organizations,” explained Association President Joe Kirlin, a retired Civil Affairs colonel. “Our goal is to encourage research and publications that advance Civil Affairs thought and scholarship.”

For centuries, Civil Affairs (or, more originally, “Military Government”) specialists have been called upon to facilitate stable and secure transitions from military to civilian control and from conflict to peace. In the aftermath of World War II, they performed numerous functions of public administration and essential services in Europe and Asia, including the protection and preservation of cultural artifacts portrayed in the film, The Monuments Men.

More recently, it is helping to bring together whole-of-nation elements to engage partners and mitigate conflict under “Phase 0” (Shape and Influence) security assistance missions, including “building partner capacity” in civil-military operations of peacekeeping troop contributing countries. This national strategic capability, along with Military Information Support (formerly Psychological Operations) and Foreign Area Officers, comprises the only part of the Joint Force specifically suited for Peace & Stability Operations as well as Engagement under the new Army Functional Concept.

However, the future of Civil Affairs is once again in question, given shifts in U.S. foreign, national security, and defense policies and another military drawdown under budgetary constraints. The U.S. Navy has eliminated its Maritime Civil Affairs command. U.S. Army Civil Affairs is engaged in intense discussions regarding both Active and Reserve components, while the Marine Corps has doubled its Civil Affairs Groups, but – as with all of Civil Affairs – struggles under increased demand.

Meantime, because CA has been focused almost entirely on tactical level missions during the “Decade of War,” its operational and strategic capabilities – resident almost exclusively in the Army Reserves – have gone fallow. Looking more closely at this “functional specialty” capacity is the Institute for Military Support to Governance at Ft. Bragg, NC.

The Issue Papers, in turn, are looking at a host of matters impacting the future of the force, among them: mission, doctrine, and operations; executive and legal authorities; Joint/Service proponent; force design, structure, and management; force mix and integration of Active and Reserve Components; recruitment, career management, and education and training; and, inter-organizational partnering.

This year’s issue papers, ranked by the Association’s Issue Papers Committee under retired Brigadier General Bruce Bingham, include:

2. “Redefining Civil Affairs” – Colonel Dennis J. Cahill (ret).

The major insights on Civil Affairs, coming from both the papers and the panel discussions at the Symposium, as explained in the executive summary, are:

2. “Redefining Civil Affairs” – Colonel Dennis J. Cahill (ret).
First, Civil Affairs is a national strategic capability that must be preserved. CA is the major capability the nation has to transition to peace and bring together whole-of-nation elements to help mitigate conflict, to end and prevent wars. It is the most expedient and cost-effective means to execute U.S. political-military strategy and secure peace and stability on the ground. The low-tech solution to the low-tech problem, it engages and collaborates with partners from all walks of life to prevent or mitigate large-scale deployments of general purpose forces for low or high intensity combat operations. This unique strategic economy-of-force capability helps preserve combat forces for their core missions. In that regard, Civil Affairs is an essential instrument of America’s “strategic landpower.”

“As I look to the future and think about the nature of future operations and the character of the environment in which we send the women and men of our Nation,” retired General Carter F. Ham, keynote at the Civil Affairs Roundtable, told an audience of Active, Reserve, and retired military, civilians, and cadets, “it becomes clearer to me the essential role of Civil Affairs.”

Second, Civil Affairs like all major strategic capabilities, requires appropriate authorization, organization, and resourcing. Given the growing and not diminishing need of the Joint Force to deal with complex peace and security environments and security cooperation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding in coordination with an even greater array of civilian partners, Civil Affairs must evolve and adapt to these emerging imperatives which will require the CA force to work more collaboratively, multilaterally, with and through country teams. Citing his own experiences with Civil Affairs in the Balkans, Iraq, and Africa, General Ham noted how each time small numbers of Civil Affairs professionals had a “disproportionate effect” on leveraging “positive outcomes with relatively minor investment.”

A rebalancing and overhaul of all of Civil Affairs along “DOT-MLPF-P” (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, and policy) lines is no doubt in the offing. Army Reserve CA in particular has been far from ideally structured under DOTMLPF-P and is not integrated strategically and operationally with active component CA and interagency partners.

Third, other than issues relating to the martial principle of unity of command, the most urgent areas of focus for Civil Affairs are Active/Reserve and Special Operations/General Purpose Forces integration. While DoD may or may not soon broach the overarching subjects of executive authority, propenent office, and so on, the consensus was that, for the meantime, the CA community should look more at issues of force balance and integration. Ringing loud and clear from all the discussions at the Symposium was how “deliberative methodical civil affairs planning at all levels and phases of military operations was a key to success,” as one paper put it.

In his remarks at the Roundtable, retired General Ham explained that, because “war and conflict are inherently human endeavors,” the mindset and people skills trademark of Civil Affairs, along with their civilian acquired proficiencies, and cross-cultural and regional understanding, “describes the forces needed well into the future.”

Reserve Civil Affairs, in particular, embodies this in the longstanding national treasure of the citizen-soldier. It comprises 85% of Army Civil Affairs and an even higher percentage among Marines. In addition to the civilian attributes General Ham mentioned, these forces also bring the ability to access as well as influence whole-of-society actors and activities involved in conflict prevention, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding.

The unique capabilities and potential of Civil Affairs is well known among those who have worked in or with it, but not many others. For that reason, General Ham warned, there was much work to do to explain the unique national strategic capabilities of Civil Affairs to many military and foreign and national security leaders as well as congressional audiences that know little about it. “Unlike some other military capabilities, you can’t build proficient CA leaders quickly or on the cheap.”

Upon General Ham’s advice, the Roundtable group, in an open discussion, concurred that the topic of the next Civil Affairs Symposium and Issue Papers, should look more closely and comprehensively at current and emerging Civil Affairs capabilities, particularly with respect to balance and integration for “engagement” missions. A call-for-papers will come out by the end of April.

Copies of the 2014-15 Issue Papers, Roundtable agenda, biographies, presentations, and General Ham’s remarks are available at the Civil Affairs Association website: http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/
Please provide your comments / remarks / thoughts / articles / proposals to help us improve the value of the PKSOI Journal!

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