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Building Defense Training and Education Institutions in Africa

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Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Africa
Introduction

The following paper is an excerpt from a JPME paper on the topic of building defense training and education institutions in Africa. It relies heavily on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published on February 1, 2010 for research, guidance, and conclusions. The 2014 QDR was approved and signed by the Secretary of Defense on March 4, 2014. Therefore, the publication of the new 2014 QDR requires several additional comments in order to highlight the new defense guidance on Africa contained within the document.

Two primary strategic policy statements on African engagement are set forth within the 2014 QDR:

“The United States remains focused on maximizing our impact throughout Africa by actively working with key partners to foster stability and prosperity. Many African countries are undertaking efforts to address the wide range of challenges they face, by improving their governance institutions, strengthening rule of law, and protecting borders more effectively. The U.S. Armed Forces cooperate with counterparts on counterterrorism and counter-piracy efforts, partnership capacity building—especially for peacekeeping—and crisis and contingency response.” (2014 QDR, page 19)

“Africa. The Department will continue to maximize the impact of a relatively small U.S. presence in Africa by engaging in high-return training and exercise events; negotiating flexible agreements; working with interagency partners; investing in new, effective, and efficient small footprint locations; and developing innovative approaches to using host nation facilities or allied joint-basing.” (2014 QDR, page 36)

Key policy and engagement themes such as partnership capacity building for crisis response and peacekeeping, governance, rule of law, border protection, and working with our interagency partners remain consistent, however, the 2014 QDR provides a more focused strategic engagement policy list that includes one important addition most relevant to this paper — engaging in high-return training and exercise events.

This new strategic priority addition in the 2014 QDR validates the conclusions of this paper and provides significant direction for future U.S. Armed Forces engagement in Africa. The new policy provides emphasis and will improve African training and education institutions, strengthen African military professionalism, enhance African defense capability and capacity, and ultimately assist Africans defense institutions in taking a leading role in responding to crisis on the continent.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth stated in her 2014 testimony before Congress that changes in the strategic environment may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the African region. These military-to-military tailored programs and efforts play a key role in advancing U.S. strategic interests by enabling partner capacity. Under Secretary Wormuth said, “It is imperative that the Department sustains and improves military-to-military and defense civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of each of our relationships to ensure they are with U.S. values and advance U.S. vital national interests.”

USAFRICOM has implemented these policies by deploying its primary military instruments to accomplish the directed requirements. General Rodriguez stated in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee that, “In Fiscal Year 2013, we conducted 55 operations, 10 exercises, and 481 security cooperation activities, making Africa Command an extremely active geographic command.” These instruments include joint military-to-military engagements, joint training team activities, and joint exercises routinely executed with a temporary presence on the continent.

Current U.S. policies support a modified effort refocused towards enhancing African partners’ defense training and education institutions, strengthening professionalism, and improving African military capability and capacity. These policy adjustments clearly fall within the parameters of existing policy; thus, requiring only minor changes in USAFRICOM’s short, intermediate, and long term military objectives and staff planning efforts.

**Institutions to Train and Educate the African Defense Forces**

The critical priority tasks required to enhance African defense training and education institutions include better military-to-military engagement and increased sustainment. This strategic military objective modification through engagement and sustainment activities would achieve dramatically improved African defense institutions by strengthening relationships with African military partners. After working towards developing, building, and sustaining an enduring institutional training and education capacity, the U.S. joint force sets the conditions for our African partners to help solve security changes for themselves.

Currently, most African defense training and education institutions lack capability and capacity because of limited and anachronistic sustainment systems. The deficiencies are frequently extensive and include lesson materials, doctrine, technology, and facilities. When new systems are established, they often erode over time due to inadequate resourcing and usually fail to produce the required military skills. Military planners and operators must ensure that their efforts establish systems with long term success in mind. Dan Hampton concludes in his brief on creating peacekeeping forces that, “Both African states and their international partners must avoid training programs that do not create enduring indigenous capacity to sustain skills.”

A recent example of engagement and sustainment in building a training and education institution took place in Malawi. Senior non-commissioned officers from U.S. Army Africa supported the development and course execution of the Malawian Sergeant Major Academy. The ground-breaking initiative succeeded in training over 30 non-commissioned officer and warrant officer students in leadership skills, critical thinking, problem solving, computer skills, and gender integration. However, two shortfalls highlighted the need for long term institutional building efforts. One, the Malawi Defense Force lacked the important written policies and doctrine that help leaders maintain and communicate standards. Doctrinal tactics, techniques, procedures, and military traditions are maintained through formal policies and doctrine. Two, the Academy lacked sufficient funding to maintain facilities, internet services, and staff quarters in order to be viewed as a Regional Center of Excellence. Modern facilities instill confidence in donors or regional partners and contribute to positive learning atmospheres and achievement of envisioned military skills.

The two shortfalls presented in the Malawi vignette represent realistic and achievable military objectives within the context of future policy adjustments. An immediate shift towards better military-to-military engagement and increased institutional sustainment would communicate to our African partners an
increased commitment to building and enhancing African military training and education institutions. However, this shift ultimately requires a significant and fundamental re-programming of USAFRICOM’s limited resources, detailed military planning, and the senior leader decision-making to execute this resourcing.

Strengthen African Defense Forces Professionalism

Effective and well-performing military training and education institutions develop service members who reflect internationally accepted core values and military professionalism standards. Although many of our African military partners lack a formal, enduring, and professional military training and education system, most have an existing framework to improve upon. These improvements include technical and tactical competence, academic achievement, civil-military awareness, and gender integration. Advancing these improvements achieve better core values and higher standards of military professionalism.

Investing in African military professionalism often consists of providing technical equipment, logistical support, and training, but it also consists of educating future officers at various international military academies and defense universities. The U.S., France, and Belgium are leading nations that cooperate with African militaries in providing advanced education qualification. This education usually concentrates on technical and general military skills and significantly improves military professionalism. Receiving less attention is curriculum earmarked on intangible areas such as service to the nation, social responsibility, and military values. In many cases, this education is simply not required for career success. In his study on military professionalism in Africa, Emile Ouédraogo argues that, “One of the challenges many African militaries face is that these academic qualifications and combat training have not been considered necessary for advancement and promotion. This needs to change. Professional military education and training is crucial. South Africa’s SANDF, (South African National Defense Force), institutionalized a basic training program for all its soldiers and incorporated three levels of training for its officers.” As this South African example demonstrates, improved military professionalism begins with standardized military training augmented by formal academic education. The South African system has resulted in stable and effective military skills that easily produce internationally accepted core values and professionalism.
Low standards of professionalism often contribute to numerous civil-military challenges. Many African military leaders lack an awareness of emerging threats such as extremism, piracy, narcotics trafficking, and misunderstand civilian oversight and control. The 2010 QDR directs an emphasis in policy towards civil-military cooperation and states that “all such efforts to build partner capacity will pay special attention to the dynamics associated with civil military relations in host countries and will emphasize the principles of civilian control and respect for dignity, rule of law, and professionalism.”

Similarly, David Brown suggests in his analysis of USAFRICOM that by “providing training to include International Military Education and Training may help influence future [African Military] leaders to follow the rule of law better.”

One of the most important U.S. policy and military objectives on improving African military professionalism is gender integration. Numerous peacekeeping operations revealed that the effective integration of females into the international peacekeeping forces results in enhancing professionalism within African defense forces. When African military partners integrate females into the peacekeeping forces, they realize many positive mission impacts. Operational effectiveness improves, they meet their gender equality goals, operational situational awareness increases, and female civilians report more incidents of sexual violence and sexual exploitation. Also, female peacekeepers are invaluable in sensitive body searches, working in women’s prisons, and screening female combatants at reintegration sites.

To build on these successes, U.S. forces should continue to place female U.S. service members in critical leadership and training positions and recommend African military partners replicate in order to overtly underscore modern professionalism aims and policy goals.

Although many African military partners possess varying core values and professionalism standards, U.S. defense policy strategies must be adjusted to help them improve their values and professionalism. This objective can be accomplished by prioritizing technical and tactical competence, academic achievement, civil-military awareness, and gender integration.

Develop African Defense Forces Capability and Capacity.

In order to develop defense capability and capacity, several objectives must be prioritized. These include effective selection of partner nations, selection and vetting of peacekeepers, efficient theater security cooperation events, and robust joint training exercises. In his article, Eric Schmitt notes that, “In the past decade, the Bush and Obama administrations put a premium on training and equipping foreign troops…” Prioritizing these activities and training events with adjusted policies and military objectives will result in better African defense force capability and capacity; accordingly, helping African defense forces solve African security challenges.
Careful country selection during staff analysis promotes mission success. David Brown reasoned that, “While it will require patience and determination, the U.S. Government should try in the future-to the extent there are troop-contributing countries for a given mission-to give clearer priority to emerging democracies in Africa…in choosing future partner-nations for the training of African peacekeepers.”

The assessment and selection of trainee peacekeepers are critical prerequisites. During the development of defense capability and capacity, particular focus should address recruiting, selection, and the vetting of soldiers. Supporting this undertaking, Major General Patrick Donahue II, the former Commanding General for U.S. Army Africa, stated that, “You have to make sure of who you’re training…has this guy been a terrorist or some sort of criminal? But also, what are his allegiances? Is he true to the country, or is he still bound to his militia?”

Leveraging African Theater Security Cooperation activities and Foreign Military Sales programs develops and improves defense capability and capacity, but the activities and equipment provided must meet the desired effect and mission preparation requirements. David Brown recommends that African defense forces “deserve to be given more and better resources to fulfill the numerous tasks they are set. Specifically, resources are needed to ensure missions avoid overstretching their personnel, assets/capabilities, finances, and headquarters/command and control.”

Finally, building capacity requires exceptional flexibility and rapid agility. Development of military exercises, such as the USAFRICOM sponsored combined/joint ACCORD series of command post and field training exercises, assists in the transfer of military professional knowledge and expertise while building the tactical and operational capacity of participating nations. During these large scale exercises, partner nation expectations must be realistic, regional and civilian organizations must be incorporated, and collaboration among participants must be maintained throughout the event. This high profile cooperation among the participants is one more additional important factor in attaining improved African defense capability and capacity.

Adapting current strategy to a complex African Continent

Robust USAFRICOM military-to-military engagement has confirmed the effective implementation of U.S. policy. The Command maintains a unique ability to rapidly leverage flexible
and tailored joint capabilities with assigned or aligned forces including the Army’s regionally aligned units, the Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Special Operations Forces, Naval Forces, and numerous interagency partners. In addition to operational deployments, these force capabilities can be rapidly deployed to advise and assist African partner nations in developing, building, and sustaining defense training and education institutions. In his Senate testimony, General Rodriguez stated that, “Our priorities for military-to-military engagement are the African countries with the greatest potential, by virtue of their population, economy, and national power, to influence the continent positively in future decades. With countries already on positive trajectories as regional leaders and influencers, we can focus on strengthening military-to-military relationships to build capacity together.”

Understandably, USAFRICOM-led crisis response must be sustained, especially when U.S. facilities or citizens are at risk. Maintaining USAFRICOM’s rapid response forces capable of protecting U.S. national security interests is imperative and should not be degraded by any modification to policy towards increased African defense training and institutional engagement.

However, any future engagement with our African partners must transpire with a multi-faceted and tailored policy. This is a tremendous U.S. strategic policy challenge because every partner possesses a diverse geography and population, incongruent military capabilities and capacities, and multiple and dynamic trans-national threats. The current U.S. focus on contingency response fails to adequately address the underlying issue of building our African partners’ defenses. U.S. defense objectives for Africa must prioritize building the capability and capacity of African defense training and education institutions in order to assist Africans to solve and respond to problems on the African continent. This recommended defense policy adjustment will improve African training and education institutions, strengthen African defense forces credibility by enhancing emerging African professionalism, and ultimately increase the capability and capacity of African force contributions to the United Nations and African regional organization’s peacekeeping and contingency operations.

Notes:

2 U.S. Congress, Senate 2014, Wormuth, #52.

8 2010 QDR, 68.
9 David E. Brown, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command, August 2013, 80.
12 Brown, 80.
13 Schmitt, 27 May 2014.
14 Williams, 7.
13 November 2014

INTERAGENCY DAY

Transportation Commerce Labor
Agriculture Energy Justice Veterans Affairs
Education Homeland Security Treasury CIA
Health and Human services NASA Interior
State Defense International Development
DMSPO and PKSOI Collaborate to Bring First Ever “Interagency Day” to the United States Army War College (USAWC)
by Mike Marra, Rick Coplen, and Jim Embrey

“The complex problems we face are not single-issue, but are multifaceted and require the expertise and coordinated attention of multiple agencies, organizations, and military services for solutions to truly gain traction.”

– Paraphrasing a student during Interagency Day at the USAWC

The student’s assertion demonstrates clear understanding of the purpose of the first ever Interagency Day at the USAWC, conducted November 13, 2014 and co-created and facilitated by the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations (DMSPO) of the USAWC’s School of Strategic Landpower and PKSOI. Interagency Day, which included seminar classroom discussions with senior interagency practitioners, noontime lecture, senior academic leader discussion, and a lively senior panel discussion for the entire class and faculty, was designed to help U.S. and International students comprehend the challenges and benefits of achieving “Unified Action” – a doctrinal term describing the synchronization of “all the elements of national power.”

The learning objectives for the day, written by lesson authors Mike Marra (DMSPO) and Dr. Jim Embrey (PKSOI), addressed a variety of contemporary challenges on civil-military teaming. First, students were asked to understand the comprehensive approach in integrating all elements of national power to achieve policy and strategy success at the Chief of Mission/Country Team level. Second, they were also asked to comprehend the primary actors, processes and challenges that facilitate the synchronization and implementation of national strategy between the regional combatant commander and the Chief of Mission at the country team level. Finally, seminar members were challenged to comprehend the primary ways military efforts support and enable “Unified Action” under Chief of Mission authority at the country team level to achieve and maintain security and stability within a host nation during pre-conflict through post conflict periods.

A number of senior interagency practitioners joined the seminars in order to fully bring these learning objectives to life:

- Richard Neumann: Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; currently President of the American Academy of Diplomacy
- Leonard R. Hawley: Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Former DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, and Former Director for Multilateral Affairs of the National Security Council
- Joe Kinzer: Lieutenant General (R), Former Force Commander of United Nations Forces and Commander U.S. Forces in Haiti; Former Commanding General, 5th U.S. Army
- Carl B. Derrick: Former Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in El Salvador; currently Senior Advisor, U.S. Global Development Lab, USAID

All four senior practitioners rotated amongst classrooms during the morning seminar, enabling students to ask tough questions and receive candid feedback about how the military services helped or hindered the overall U.S. government efforts in steady-state or crisis scenarios. Len Hawley then presented the noontime lecture, “Senior Leader Perspectives and Approaches to Effective Civ-Mil Planning” focusing on interagency best practices for international crisis response, including a comprehensive explanation of the attributes of high performing interagency groups. Meanwhile the other three
senior practitioners met with senior USAWC academic officials to discuss what we should be doing to help our graduates more effectively interact with U.S. government interagency partners, especially in the context of a U.S. Embassy mission.

During the senior panel discussion, conducted in Bliss Hall after lunch, AMB Neumann, LTG (R) Kinzer, and Mr. Derrick each provided insights gained from their experiences and explained vignettes about the challenges of interagency coordination, cooperation and planning. While answering student questions they not only provided valuable insights on how to better facilitate key relationships between U.S. government agencies, but also provided International Fellows a unique perspective on how their key partner, the United States, conceptualizes and implements our national security strategy through “Unified Action” in their regions of the world.

From a student and faculty perspective, the first-ever “Interagency Day” at the USAWC was a tremendous learning experience, especially for the preponderance of students who arrive with primarily tactical, vice strategic, experience. Additionally, the students learned about the “friction points” that exist between major agencies, drawing from their studies of corporate and organizational cultures, especially with regard to planning and resourcing. Students learned the importance of integrating the “3-D Planning Methodology” into their mindset and skill set: Diplomacy – Development – Defense comprise the foundation of nearly all viable strategic solution sets.

Another key insight gained by students was their newfound understanding of the Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) being promulgated world-wide across the country teams within each U.S. Embassy. The ICS concept helps standardize how all key actors in country teams around the world focus their efforts and resources to support common goals and objectives to “act and speak with one voice” from the embassy to the host nation.

DMSPO and PKSOI both look forward to similar future collaborations in the context of the USAWC core curriculum and other venues!

Interagency panel composed of (L-R): Ambassador Richard Neumann, LTG (R) Joe Kinzer, and Carl Derrick.
Caitlin’s assertion captures the essence of the ongoing collaboration between PKSOI, Princeton University, and the U.S. Institute of Peace-sponsored Interagency Working Group on Economic Development and Stability. The Princeton Group, comprised of 11 graduate students in the Woodrow Wilson School (WWS) of Public and International Affairs and their Princeton professors Ethan Kapstein and Jacob Shapiro, traveled globally and researched extensively to deliver products that are contributing significantly to evolving doctrine and practice as discussed in the USIP Working Group and defined by PKSOI as DoD’s Joint Propo- nent for Peace and Stability Operations.
PKSOI, Princeton University, and the U.S. Institute of Peace Collaborate cont..

Specifically, the Princeton Group’s products are informing these ongoing PKSOI-led efforts:

✓ Rewrite of Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 (Stability Operations)
✓ Rewrite of the Joint Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization
✓ Updates to the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Management System (SOLLIMS), especially economic and infrastructure development lessons learned
✓ Peace and Stability Operations courses offered by PKSOI to global audiences

The Princeton Group’s work is informed by extensive global travel and research, funded by Princeton University, including the following:

✓ Stuttgart: Students Stephen Chaisson, Shannon Hiller, and Kevin McGinnis met with representatives of EUCOM and AFRICOM
✓ Manila: Students Gabriel Catapang, Joanna Hecht, John Houston, and Amanda Hsiao met with representatives of the Philippines Government, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Embassy, Multilateral Financial Institutions, and Civil Society
✓ Nairobi: Students Rebecca Gong and Elizabeth Schultz met with representatives of the British Peace Support Team (BPST) and the UN Somalia Team

L-R: Caitlin Tulloch, Megan McGuire, CJTF-HOA Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Alexander L. Krongard, Rebecca Gong, and Elizabeth Schultz at CJTF-HOA in Djibouti
PKSOI, Princeton University, and the U.S. Institute of Peace Collaborate cont..

"Working for PKSOI gave our team a chance to discuss key lessons learned over the last decade of US-led stabilization operations with a wide-range of practitioners, in the process giving us a more nuanced appreciation for the challenges of codifying these lessons in the doctrine."

—Shannon Hiller

The Princeton Group’s work is also informed by their WWS coursework for their Graduate Workshop: Peace-Building and Development, including guest speakers General (R) Stanley McChrystal, Kael Weston, and Joel Hellman. The Princeton Group also traveled to Carlisle Barracks in early December to discuss their evolving products and receive feedback from PKSOI subject matter experts, including Mike Esper, PKSOI’s lead author for the JP 3-07 re-write.

PKSOI and Princeton Professor Ethan Kapstein are currently exploring options for future collaborations, including a potential partnership with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Any such partnerships could leverage the ongoing Empirical Studies of Conflict Project sponsored by Princeton University: https://esoc.princeton.edu/. Participants include representatives from the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, RAND, and many others.

"The collaboration between PKSOI and WWS has been unusually productive and timely in bringing input from the field directly into the decision process regarding future doctrine. In some ways the WWS team served as a conduit to give folks from across the government who are working stability operations a voice in the doctrine. The students communicated the observations, concerns, and suggestions of people they met with in five countries to the rewrite team just as the authors were integrating comments from across the government."

—Professor Jacob Shapiro, Princeton Univ.

Joint Stability Operations Symposium at the Advanced Distributed Learning Co-Lab

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Joint Proponent for Stability Operations, sponsored the Joint SO Symposium at the Advanced Distributed Learning Co-Lab held in Alexandria, VA, 21-22 October 2014. Two workgroups (Unity of Effort and Transitional Public Security) met to gain consensus and craft a response or a way ahead for completion of several tasks outlined in Joint Review Oversight Council Memorandum (JRCOM) 172-13 on Stability Operations. The workgroups brought together senior DoD officials to collaborate and identify implications and taskings for each area of the DOTMLPF-P.

by Lt. Col Norihisa Urakami, PKSOI International Research Fellow
Introduction

The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of the pillars of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and a means of deploying military troops to engage in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. When fully operational by the end of 2015, the rapid deployment capacity of the ASF will be to deploy within 14 days at the earliest.1

The institution of APSA was designed with the United Nation’s collective security as a model. The 2015 deadline has been given for the five regions – East, West, Central, North and Southern Africa – to develop their own standby brigades with military, police and civilian components. The Constitutive Act gives the African Union (AU) the right to intervene with a member state which is in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The ASF is based on standby arrangements with Africa’s five sub-regions.2 Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) is one of these five sub-regional standby forces.3

The EASF consists of 10 member states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It is expected to have the primary mandate of enhancing peace and security in the region. The EASF is part of the APSA that seeks to be ready to be called upon from contributing countries on short notice to intervene in conflicts on the continent. The EASF deployed police officers in Somalia in 2011 where they worked under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for one year as part of a test mission.4

The plan of the EASF Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) had been to operationalize the force based on the AU Road Map. However, at the EASF Policy Organs Meeting held on April 20, 2014 in Kigali, Rwanda, peace and security leaders in the Eastern Africa Region agreed to operationalize the EASF, and establish the posture to deploy a 5,000 strong force by December 2014.5 Additionally, if the force was ready it would have been the one deployed to South Sudan and Somalia.6
Over the last decade, in parallel development to the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed to several peace operations, including to Burundi (AMIB), Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM). In 2012, the Government of Mali asked France to intervene in its crisis because the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were perceived not to be able to deploy their forces rapidly enough to deal decisively with the unfolding crisis in Mali. This showed the shortfall of capacity and capability to respond to a crisis by the AU and ECOWAS. The AU-backed ASF operationalization was planned for 2008, pushed to 2010, then 2013 and now to 2015. Therefore, some security experts doubt that the force will be operational by the end of this year.

As the EASFCOM started to accelerate an operational EASF one year earlier, the question is really whether these efforts are realistic. What is the key factor for developing the capability of the EASF? The purpose of this paper is to observe the current institutional and operational posture of the EASF in the APSA, and examine its effectiveness of employment of the EASF.

Outline of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The official establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was in December 2003 according to the Protocol which defines the PSC as “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC shall be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa”.

The objectives of the PSC are: 1) promote peace, security and stability in Africa; 2) where conflicts occurred, undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts; 3) promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to strengthen peace and prevent the resurgence of violence. In order to carry out these objectives, the PSC can ‘authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions,’ recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war, crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

In order to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, Article 13 defines the ASF to be ready for rapid deployment with civilian and military components in their countries of origin. This is due to the regional mechanism being part of the overall security architecture of the AU in the Protocol, and coordination for regional arrangement is implemented by the PSC and Chairperson of Commission.

The six mandates of the ASF are: 1) observation and monitoring mission; 2) other types of peace support missions; 3) intervention in a member state in case of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security; 4) preventive deployment; 5) peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; and 6) humanitarian assistance in conflict areas or natural disasters.

The PSC is a subsidiary body of the AU consisting of the Panel of Wise as an advisory organ, Continental Early Warning System, Peace Fund, and Military Staff Committee. The mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution of each sub-regional organization is organized by the APSA which is the body responsible for continental peace, security and stability.

Establishment and Development of Eastern African Standby Force (EASF)

The establishment of the EASF is based on the decision by the AU summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2004. The EASF was established as a regional mechanism to provide capability for rapidly deploying forces to implement preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support operation, stabilization operation, and peace enforcement missions. In order to ensure accomplish the mission, the EASF affairs are managed by Policy Organs, which are structured at three levels, the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, and the Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDs).

The Assembly is the supreme authority of the EASF. It consists of the Heads of State and Government of Member States. The Assembly formulates policy and directives, and controls the functioning of the EASF. It authorizes the deployment of the EASF according to the Constitutive Act of the AU and PSC Protocol. The Assembly meets once a year and at any time upon the request of any member state and upon the agreement of the majority of the member states.

The Council of Ministers was established 2007 and consists of Ministers of Defense and Security of the EASF member states that are signatory to the MOU. The Council of Ministers manages all aspects relating to the EASF. It appoints the Director and Heads of Department of the EASFCOM, the heads of the EASF structures as well as the EASF Commander based on recommendations from the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff for stand-alone missions within the Eastern Africa Region.
The Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) is made up of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of the EASF member states. The Committee serves as an advisory military committee to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. It oversees, directs and manages the EASF main structures and thereby oversees and directs EASFCOM in technical aspect.

The Structure and Employment of EASF

The EASF consists of four main structures including the EASFCOM, EASF Headquarters (HQ), Planning Element (PLAN-ELM), and LOGBASE. EASFCOM is located in Nairobi, Kenya, and is responsible to deal with policy, strategy and activities of EASF. The EASF HQ is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and it has command and control of forces when the EASF is deployed. The LOGBASE is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and has the function of logistics headquarters in peacetime. When the EASF deployed to a particular state, the LOGBASE advances to the receiving state with the EASF main body. PLANELM is located in Nairobi, Kenya, and functions as the multinational coordination organization. 13

The basic structure of the EASF is four infantry battalions with 750 personnel each, one engineer battalion, reconnaissance, signal, medical, aviation, military police, and logistic unit (Table 1). In addition to military, the EASF structure includes a Formed Police Unit (FPU) and a Civilian Unit.

The roster of standby forces of the EASF member states is in its finalizing steps. Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda announced in September 2014 in Kigali, Rwanda a list of troops. Even smaller military powers like Comoros, Djibouti, and Somalia announced their willingness to provide a range of fully equipped troops. Burundi pledged to contribute one light infantry battalion with 850 strength, 15 military observers, 140 polices and 36 civilians. Ethiopia stated it will contribute one motorized infantry battalion, an engineer unit, and signal unit, 15 military observers, a FPU with 120 personnel, and 40 civilians. Kenya provides 1 mechanized infantry battalion, aviation unit, and medical unit, 15 military observers, FPU with 100 strong, and 40 civilians. Rwanda pledged one motorized infantry battalion, medical staff, 15 military observers, one FPU, and 47 civilians. Ten member states pledged to contribute troops.

Table 1. Basic Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Number of Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade HQs and Support Unit</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ Company and Support Unit</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion x 4</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>70 x 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Unit</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Unit</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Company</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Unit</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4 helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Unit</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Unit</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 Medical Unit</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observer Group</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Support Group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

towards setting up the EASF which should be operational by December, under the auspices of the AU. Uganda contributes one motorized infantry battalion, 15 military observers, one FPU, and 40 civilians. Minister of Defense and Security of member states signed an agreement of troop contributions on September 22 in Kigali. Each state is responsible to deploy forces, and has a responsibility to bear the deployment expenses for at least the initial 90 days of the intervention operation.

The EASF operations are planned according to the six scenarios of AU. Depending on the scenario, the EASF will conduct missions in accordance with these mandates of the ASF granted by the PSC. The EASF will be operational within 30 days for Scenarios 1-4; and operational within 90 days including police and civilian components; the military component must be operational within 30 days for Scenario 5, and a robust military force must be operational within 14 days for Scenario 6.

The PLANELM mainly conducts the planning and operational management of EASF. In peacetime, it plans and manages Command Post Exercises (CPXs) and Field Training Exercises (FTXs), development of Standard Operational Procedures (SOP), and force generation of the EASF.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an Eastern Africa regional organization, which is responsible for political and diplomatic initiatives, and does not involve the command and control of the EASF military operation. The highest level decision making body for the EASF is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Based on the official request from the PSC, the EASF initiates the deployment of forces. IGAD does not make a decision on the deployment of the EASF, but it provides funding as an economic body.
Effectiveness of Readiness and Capability of EASF

Since the HQ and LOGBASE of the EASF are located in one country and PLANELM another, it is not efficient. It would seem desirable that these lead agencies are located in the same area for coherent command, control and information sharing. While the Force commander is in Addis Ababa, the organ which is responsible for planning, PLANELM, is not.

The EASF staff recognizes this less than optimal circumstance and is pouring in effort to avoid inefficiency. In response, the EASF conducts two kinds of exercises such as CPX and FTX every year since 2007 inviting member states’ force, police and civilian units to participate. They exercise the command and control of a multinational force during the CPX, and examine the deployment of forces during the FTX by applying the EASF SOP.17

The HQ, PLANELM, and the member states of the EASF have been focused to enhance the readiness of deployment and information sharing for establishing the effective capability of the force. Standby forces in each country are managed by the force generation roster during peacetime and pre-phase of intervention operations. For any mission of Scenarios 1-6, each country’s standby force is assigned to generate part of the EASF. In peacetime and prephase, standby forces are located and ready in each country. Training and preparation of forces are carried out by each member state.18

Once the deployment of the EASF is decided, command and control of the EASF are held by the EASF Force Commander (FC). When the AUSC made a decision of deployment of the EASF, the contingent commander of each country gather at HQ in Addis Ababa, and the EASF is officially mandated, and start the command and control of operation by the EASF FC. Initial deployment is carried out under the command of each contingent commander. After contingents deploy to an affected state, contingents fall under the command of the EASF FC. In order to rapidly deploy, information sharing is key. The focal point of the system is defined in the communication strategy of the ASF.19

In the peacetime and pre-phase, points of contact are assigned. Liaison officers (LOs) from each country are allocated to each other as point of contact. LOs from 10 member states are positioned at HQ and contingent operation cells. This is the basic framework of information sharing in pre-phase and mission phase.20

The AU conducted some peace support operations in Burundi, the Republic of Central Africa, Darfur, Mali and Somalia. In these operations, member states of the EASF namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda joined the operations in Darfur and Somalia. Through these intervention operations, these countries earned practical knowledge and experiences on peace support operations which enhanced their operational capability for sub-regional and states level.21 The PLANELM of the EASF learned and experienced the political decision making process, planning, force deployment, strategy and operation, and logistics through the AU mission in Darfur and Somalia. At the same time, the peacekeeping training center in each member state trained personnel and units to prepare for operations and review missions.22

Scenario 1. AU/Regional military advice to a political mission.

Scenario 2. AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission.


Scenario 4. AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building).

Scenario 5. AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.

Scenario 6. AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.
Experience in the AMISOM led to knowledge gained in respect to sustainability of operations. In AMISOM’s total strength of 21,000, Ethiopia contributes approximately 4,000 personnel, Uganda 6,000, and Kenya 4,000. The essential mandate of AMISOM is to maintain peace and security over Somalia, and ‘mop-up’ of Al-Shabaab. Throughout vast Somalia, sustainable logistics is the largest challenge. Al-Shabaab is dispersed, and fled to northern Somalia, where the group is hiding. In order to rid the country of Al-Shabaab, AMISOM had to deploy to a wider area and maintain a long logistic line. Water, food, fuel, ammunition and material have to be continuously supplied, however, infrastructure in Somalia is extremely poor so it was a challenge to sustain the transportation of material over unpaved ground routes making it difficult to fulfill the intervention operation.

On the other hand, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda experienced the limitations and difficulty of logistics management on the ground through AMISOM’s operation. These troop contributing countries found a possible effective employment of the EASF through practical experience earned in AMISOM’s operations. Since Somalia is a neighboring country, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are able to maintain intervention operations and logistics in this geographical area.

Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda also experienced command and control of the multinational force in AMISOM which is similar to the EASF. If these three leading countries in the EASF deliberately coordinate and collaborate, it is feasible to deploy the EASF and the experience in AMISOM can be applied to the EASF operations.

Furthermore, Uganda deployed military forces in South Sudan with about 4,000 personnel since December 2013 in order to maintain peace and security mainly in Juba and the eastern area in South Sudan according to the request from the Government of South Sudan and IGAD. The HQ of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and Uganda forces coordinated peace and security operations in South Sudan. De facto, it is possible to interpret a co-location of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) and peace support operations (PSO).

The member states of the EASF have been trained in effective command and control and through CPXs and FTXs. The command, control and readiness of the EASF was examined through those exercises in the past few years. Exercises have been conducted since 2007 in Kenya, 2014 in Uganda, in Sudan, and in Djibouti. Exercise participants total approximately 2,000 to 3,000 from 10 member states with the goal of reaching the full operation capability of the EASF.

Besides military exercises, the EASF continues their effort to resolve a resource issue, particularly financial shortfalls for sustainable military operations. The EASF holds donor conferences sometimes for fund raising to support the EASF’s deployment capability.

Conclusion

Readiness and Sustainability: Two Challenges Validate the Effectiveness

This paper examined the effectiveness of the EASF. The review focused on AMISOM’s operation, particularly the employment of military troops by Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Since the troop contributing countries of AMISOM have structures similar to that of the EASF, these key countries earned practical experience related to command and control, logistics, and coordination in multinational operations.

At present, the challenges for the EASF are the effectiveness of readiness (rapid deployment capability) and sustainability of operations (logistics). In order to effectively deploy the EASF, it is critical to prepare the standby force in peacetime (pre-phase). As discussed so far, the member states of the EASF, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, have become confident in their ability to deploy the EASF based on what they learned from AMISOM.

As for the human resource development, the shortfall of experts is a fundamental issue for the Africans. The capacity and capability of peacekeeping training organizations are still not enough. The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya is functional. It delivers various training courses for the military, police and civilians. The Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) is newly established and will take a few more years to become fully operational. Only one peacekeeping training center is available in the region today. Even though the logistics center of the EASF will be operationalized with the current financial and technical support by the United Kingdom, training logistics experts (supply, finance, and transport), administration, and mobilization of staffs are not sufficient.

As far as observing the actual results of past operations of member states in AMISOM, under the condition of neighboring countries, the EASF seems to be capable of conducting military intervention operations. Thus, if Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda lead the EASF, and these three countries have appropriate political coordination and collaboration at strategic and operational levels, the EASF will be able to effectively execute military operations in the region. In regard to the geographical scope of
the operation, the EASF will be able to operate in areas accessible by ground transportation without airlift or sealift where neighboring countries share the border on the ground. Effective logistics for deployed forces have to be supported by each troop contributing country for the time being. The EASF will be able to place advanced logistics bases in an affected state; each troop contributing country will have to deliver necessary supplies in order to sustain the peace support operation due to the shortfall in funding and the limited capability of the EASF LOGBASE and IGAD.

Notes:

2 Article 13, protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC)
3 Standby force of other four regions; Northern Standby Brigade (NARC), Western Africa Standby Brigade (ECOWAS), Central Africa Standby Brigade (ECCAS), and South Africa Standby Brigade (SADC)
5 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 Protocol, Article 17.
15 Interviewed Mr. Richard Barno, Director, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD, October 31, 2014.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
22 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184350
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Communique of the 9th Extra Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of the Eastern Africa Region, held in Kampala, Uganda, on 5th April, 2013, para.5

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Comments on SIGAR’s October 30, 2014, Observations on the Afghan Opium Economy

by Dr. Inge Fryklund

SIGAR
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

OCT 30 2014
The recent SIGAR report’s section on The Opium Economy decries the $7.8 billion spent since 2002 in Afghanistan—to no apparent effect—on U.S. Government counter narcotics efforts. SIGAR’s concern for the opium economy and its role in Afghanistan is predicated on two assumptions: 1) that reduction in Afghan poppy production is a worthwhile focus of USG policy, and 2) that reduction is realistically achievable if only more effective tactics were employed. Neither assumption survives examination.

Is it possible to eliminate Afghan poppy?

To address the practicalities first, consider the incentives at stake. Heroin production is immensely profitable—although relatively little of that profit remains in Afghanistan. Afghan poppy production is driven almost entirely by demand in the West, which has continued unabated despite all our efforts to attack the supply in Afghanistan. UNODC (the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) has estimated that the ultimate yearly worldwide street value of Afghan opium (2009 figures) is $68 billion. Yes, billion. With this much money at stake, trying to reduce Afghan poppy production is a fool’s errand.

It isn’t just the pointlessness of the drug war that matters. The collateral consequences have been terribly damaging to Afghanistan as well as to the rest of the world. Whenever a substance for which there is demand is declared illegal, crime and corruption necessarily result. When I was with the Marines in Helmand in 2012, they reported that a District Chief of Police position could be purchased for $150,000/year. No amount of training assistance to the Ministry of the Interior is going to overcome the incentives of the poppy trade. Remember Prohibition of Alcohol in the U.S. (1920-1933), with the rise of Al Capone and all the governmental corruption and the violence associated with gangs fighting over turf. The day Prohibition was repealed, the violence and corruption associated with the trade in alcohol essentially came to a halt; beer distributors took their disputes to court rather than relying on mafia enforcement services. It is our insistence upon the illegality of poppy that has fostered violence and governmental corruption in Afghanistan.

The history of Afghan poppy production sheds light on the scope of the worldwide drug trade. Prior to 1980, there was very little Afghan poppy production, mostly for local medicinal use. (Louis Dupree’s 1973 anthropological study of Afghanistan mentions poppy only in an Appendix.) Around 1980, we succeeded, through a combination of economic development and police action, in pushing poppy production out of the Golden Triangle (Burma and Thailand). Worldwide demand did not cease; production simply moved to more hospitable territory—Afghanistan, where the disorganization resulting from the 1979 Soviet invasion allowed poppy to be grown without governmental interference. Forced reduction in Afghan production might in the short run drive up the street price, but in the longer term production will simply shift to some more hospitable location (more remote areas of Afghanistan such as the dashi outside the Helmand Food Zone, or in other countries), continuing as before to supply demand. We are only pushing a bubble around a balloon. From the perspective of heroin usage around the world, it matters very little whether Afghanistan is or is not producing poppy. Someone somewhere would pick up any slack. Colombia illustrates a similar lesson. While the Calderon government remains stable, Colombia fluctuates with Burma as the world’s second or third largest heroin producer. Despite our assistance, we have only succeeded in pushing production from one location to another.

Our $7.8 billion expenditure has had no effect on either worldwide demand or the decisions of Afghan farmers. No amount of doubling down on our counter-narcotics efforts or altering our tactics is going to change this picture. As Einstein once defined insanity, it is “doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.”

Why is eliminating Afghan poppy a priority?

The more fundamental—and unstated—assumption is that eliminating Afghan poppy production is something we should strive to do. But why does it matter whether Afghans are or are not growing poppy?

The first argument is that poppy funds the insurgency. I have discussed this at length in another paper, but in brief, while the Taliban make use of any local resources and do indeed tax farmers (reportedly 10%), the insurgency is a low-budget operation. The highest figure I ever heard from Marine intel was $350 million/year—a very modest sum in comparison with U.S. military support, and a figure easily replaced by donations from Pakistan or the Gulf countries. The insurgency is driven far more by the incompetence and corruption (in large part drug-related) of the Karzai government than by the availability of poppy proceeds. We shall see whether the new Ghani-Abdullah government can change this dynamic. The existence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan (and active support for insurgents) is also driving the conflict, and the war on poppy may be distracting U.S. attention from that issue.

Aside from the minimal support that the Taliban receive from the drug trade, are there other reasons for wanting to disrupt poppy production? Heroin is clearly a problematic substance, without the recreational value of marijuana and with potentially
fatal consequences, but it does not follow that the response to a problem should be making the substance illegal. After all, we do not criminalize the production and use of cigarettes or high fructose corn syrup, both products with well-known and serious effects on mortality and morbidity, and large cost implications for our healthcare system. Regulation, management, and education are thus far not utilized in our war on drugs, which has relied almost exclusively on military and police force and the criminal law.

**A shift to harm reduction**

Worldwide thinking on drugs is now shifting from prohibition and enforcement to harm reduction. The Global Commission on Drug Policy (including such luminaries as Kofi Annan, Paul Volcker, George Shultz, and the former presidents of Poland, Chile, Switzerland, Colombia, Mexico and Portugal) in September 2014 issued “Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work,” arguing that the worldwide war on drugs has been a costly and damaging failure and should be replaced by a system of regulatory management.

As a species, we apparently have a propensity for seeking substances that alter our mood or consciousness. Looking back over the past 2000 years, if there is any substance that can be brewed, distilled, fermented, smoked or ingested to produce an effect, it has been tried. In order to have a Drug Free America (or a drug free world), we would have to eliminate from the planet all plants that could be so processed—not just marijuana, poppy and cocoa, but barley, corn, grain, rice, potatoes, grapes, juniper berries and fruit. Far better to take a realistic view of who we are, and focus our resources on sensible management, regulation and harm reduction. Something that is illegal cannot be managed. Legalization is required not because drugs are harmless or a good thing, but precisely because of the potential for harm. Legalization is a prerequisite for regulation.

**Does regulation work to control drug problems?**

In 1994, Switzerland decriminalized heroin—by which they meant that any self-described heroin addict could come to a government clinic and inject pharmaceutical grade heroin (not methadone). Treatment was offered, although not required. In the 20 years since, there has not been an overdose death at an injection center, HIV and hepatitis transmission rates have plummeted and crime is down, as addicts no longer steal to support their habit. Treatment rates are up, and of particular interest, young people are less likely to try heroin in the first place; there is nothing glamorous about a substance served up at a government clinic and “shooting galleries” as social sites for introducing new users have largely disappeared.

Portugal decriminalized all drugs in 2001. The country (then under prohibitionist policies) was overwhelmed with drug problems and the government convened a committee to study drug usage and recommend ways to get a grip on the problem. The committee concluded that the best solution was to legalize in order to allow regulatory control. This approach has been a resounding success.

**Conclusion**

Prohibition policies can only make matters worse—cementing in place a regime of crime, corruption and violence in both the producer countries such as Afghanistan and in the rest of the world, and preventing any control of potency and purity. If poppy were no longer illegal, it would simply become another commodity—supported, taxed or regulated as the country saw fit. Afghanistan could fund its own development and military out of legal exports of a product (including medicinal morphine) with worldwide demand. Corrupt Afghan officials would suddenly lose a major source of income, as bribes could no longer be demanded for moving and protecting the product. Police chiefs would have no reason to purchase positions, and their Police units might devote more time to protecting Afghan citizens.

While SIGAR is right to question the expenditure of $7.8 billion on a losing venture, the relevant question for the U.S. Government to ask is not “how can we better wage the drug war,” but “how can we shift our resources from enforcement to regulation and harm reduction and call a halt to the disastrous collateral consequences of the war on drugs?” It is time for some fundamental rethinking. SIGAR’s mandate focuses on “doing things right.” It is even more important for the U.S. Government to “do the right things.”

**Notes:**

1 Ms. Inge Fryklund, JD, PhD, has spent five years in Afghanistan (2004-2014), working at various times for USAID, UNDP, OSCE, contractors, and with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. In 2006, she served as a development adviser on the Nangarhar PRT, and in 2011-12, was with the Marine HQ in Helmand, source of 90% of the world’s opium poppy. She is a former Chicago prosecutor, and a current member of the Board of Directors for LEAP (Law Enforcement Against Prohibition), 150,000 current and former law enforcement and their supporters who have concluded that the war on drugs is a danger to public health and safety.

Reliable statistics are, of course, hard to come by. One group of researchers estimated “roughly $900 million in annual revenues for the farmers, $1.6 billion for traffickers from operations within Afghanistan, and another $1.5 billion for those who smuggle heroin out of the country.” Jonathan P. Caulkins, Jonathan D. Kulick, and Mark A.R. Kleiman, Think again: the Afghan drug trade. Why cracking down on Afghanistan’s opium business won’t help stop the Taliban -- or the United States’ own drug problems, FP, April 11, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/01/think_again_the_afghan_drug_trade.

UNODC 2012 World Drug Report at 60.


7 Inge Fryklund, Our Disastrous Afghan Drug War: Whatever Were We Thinking, PKSOI vol 4, issue 3, May 2014.


10 Witness the precipitous drop in cigarette smoking—from a high of about 4200 cigarettes smoked per capita just before the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report to 1100 by 2012. (CDC data.) Honest and accurate information can go a long way towards altering behavior.


12 Recent research indicates that our human ancestors had an enzyme to metabolize alcohol as far back as 10 million years ago. Matthew A. Carrigan et al., Hominids adapted to metabolize ethanol long before human-directed fermentation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) December 1, 2014.


15 25% less drug use, 52% fewer overdoses, 71% fewer HIV infections, and a 300% increase in treatment. Source: Glenn Greenwald, “Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies,” Cato Institute, 2009.

Author Dr. Inge Fryklund shown here on a tank in Bamiyan, see bio note #1.
Top Ten Lessons from the Afghanistan War
(All negative lessons in order of importance)

by PKSOI Dept. of State Rep. Dr. Mike Spangler
SECURITY

1. The Coalition relied on foreign troops to consolidate regime change. The provision of host-nation-led security (i.e., the training and equipping of Afghan security forces) should have been paramount after the Taliban roll-back in late 2001. The Coalition expanded Taliban recruitment beginning in 2005 partly due to harassing but largely ineffective efforts to identify and detain Taliban suspects in the South and East. The Coalition’s actions helped spur the Taliban resurgence.

2. The 2009-12 Coalition “surge” ramped up ANSF training – but expanded the Army too rapidly and neglected the ANP/ALP, sowing doubts about their sustainability. The literacy component of ANSF training was started too late (in 2009) although constituting a key incentive for ANSF retention and rebuilding civil society. The Coalition effort to foster a safe and secure environment was diluted by mission creep that pursued too many lines of effort including the provision of “essential government services,” a concept unfamiliar to and widely distrusted by the Afghan people. Development and Rule of law efforts were seriously compromised by the lack of security and local buy-in.

3. Village Stability Operations were questioned even before they were started in 2010, partly due to Afghan government objections that local defense forces could undermine it. The Coalition should have placed these forces under stronger Afghan Special Forces mentorship as Afghan Local Police (ALP) units, but personnel shortfalls, ALP human rights abuses and inter-service prejudices hampered this transition. The Coalition should have urged government officials to involve traditional local and tribal authorities more actively in government monitoring and decision-making. (See http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR936.pdf and http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf.)

4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs were inadequately funded. Funding shortfalls undermined the long-term credibility of the programs.

GOVERNANCE

5. The Coalition should have considered advocating a federal parliamentary system as opposed to a centralized chief executive-led system. The latter form of government facilitated corrupt practices, retarded the development of checks-and-balances, and set back the development of a more accountable government.

DEVELOPMENT

6. The Coalition should not have spent so much money so quickly. It contributed directly to waste and largely unsustainable projects while fueling corruption and setting up a serious economic contraction once the aid declined.

REGIONAL INITIATIVE

7. The Coalition should have conditioned aid to Pakistan on its dismantling of the Haqqani Network in 2010 when the U.S. learned the Times Square bomber was trained by the group. Over time, actions against the Quetta Shura should have been pursued with Pakistan.

PERSONNEL AND EVALUATION

8. Assessments of the progress and overall impact of stability programs were deficient. The Coalition should have codified simple, clear yardsticks for measuring impact rather than output.

9. The Coalition failed to implement coherent, institutionalized approaches to verify the use of our assistance. This should have involved overlapping, redundant and randomized systems of evaluation.

10. The Coalition should have instituted two-year tours for its officers, both military and civilian, in the field.

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