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Right-Sizing
Afghan National Security Forces

by Dr. Mike Spangler and Daniel Glickstein, PKSOI
INTRODUCTION

Some scholars warn that the 2010-12 Coalition “surge” in Afghanistan fell well short of the positive, albeit short-term results of the 2007-08 surge in Iraq. Since the Taliban threat remains high, its capabilities lethal, and its ideology resilient, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF— including both the Army and Police) continue to face a major challenge in countering this insurgency while protecting the civilian population, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan.

Against the backdrop of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s initial successes against the Iraqi Army, the jury is out on the effectiveness of the ANSF. The ANSF remains deficient in intelligence, logistics, and sustainment capabilities, with a shortfall of non-commissioned officers and a limited air force; and a relative dearth of Pashtun recruits from the south and east of Afghanistan. This article recommends adopting a slightly larger target for the ANSF’s overall size than that announced at the NATO Summit in May 2012 by bolstering the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to compensate for high Afghan Army attrition and low Pashtun recruitment in Afghanistan’s restive south and east. These adjustments would hold the total cost to NATO’s previously agreed upon $4.1 billion per year beginning in 2018.

Key Challenges

The approach outlined here is designed to address three developmental challenges facing the ANSF. First, the ANSF suffers from roughly 30-percent attrition, 10-percent absenteeism, and inflated recruitment rolls, all of which impede its operational effectiveness and retention of expertise. Soldiers and police are often recruited from other areas to serve in urban outposts and contested localities, providing space for insurgents to exploit indigenous populations. Secondly, the standing ANSF appears to be falling into an “unsustainability” trap, undermining its long-term viability. The relatively high cost of the ANSF, if not reduced, might not be underwritten by international donors beyond another five years. Thirdly, the top-down, corrupt practices of the national government could continue under the new “national unity” government, eroding its legitimacy and the ANSF’s will to fight. If new Afghan leaders fail to show flexibility in incorporating their country’s ethnically and tribally diverse populace into national security architecture, Afghanistan may devolve into a political mosaic of different armed groups controlling separatist-like territories over time.

This article therefore advocates that new Afghan leaders consider standing up a more resilient, inclusive, and localized security structure to deter and respond to terrorist and other criminal attacks, while keeping conventional forces focused on countering larger insurgent concentrations. Like politics, all security is local. Drawing on the personal commitments of ALP recruits to protect their family, community, and tribal ties, the ALP can improve security in both rural and urban areas.

The ALP approach also calls for the Afghan government’s greater engagement with effective local partners to help recruit and monitor ALP forces. The inclusion of these partners should make the national government more inclusive and accountable to the extent that it recognizes the need for stronger grassroots support throughout the country. During this process, international donors should anticipate that Afghan progress towards more inclusive democracy will be as slow, fitful, and inconsistent, as it was in their own countries.

Three main ANSF-sizing positions and their strategic justifications are reviewed in Part One, a mid-sizing option relying on ALP development is laid out in Part Two, and two major objections to the new option are considered in Part Three.

PART ONE: ANSF-SIZING

The U.S.-led NATO Coalition in Afghanistan has long regarded the ANSF as a necessary condition for the war-torn country’s long-term peace and stability. The ANSF remains, to date, the most studied aspect of Afghan government power, the largest Afghan investment made by the U.S. government, and the linchpin of the Coalition’s exit strategy. What is shaping current thinking on the ANSF’s size and structure?

The Zero Option: Setting the Stage for the ANSF after 2014

All of Afghanistan’s international donors have increasingly focused on ANSF planning since President Barack Obama unveiled the U.S. “zero option” decision in May 2014. President Obama announced:

America’s combat mission will be over by the end of this year [2014]. Starting next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their country. At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we have done in Iraq.
In light of the ANSF’s takeover of the lead security role throughout Afghanistan in June 2013, President Obama decided to draw down U.S. advisors, trainers, and counter-terrorism forces by 2017. This Presidential decision reflects a prior U.S. (and NATO) political commitment to transition out of Afghanistan while expressing confidence in Afghan-led security efforts after 13 years of overall support encompassing almost $750 billion in total U.S. assistance and the lives of over 3,500 Coalition soldiers.8

Three Different Camps on Future ANSF Sizing

Camp 1: Reduce the ANSF size to a more financially sustainable level by the end of 2017

This camp is shaped by official Coalition policy announced at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. The Summit called for reducing the ANSF force from the currently planned level of 382,000 to 258,500 by the end of 2017.9 The main reason for this decision appears to be long-term financial sustainability: Coalition nations decided the ANSF budget should be reduced from the current $11 billion to $4.1 billion per year by the end of 2017. The United States would contribute $2.3 billion, remaining Coalition nations $1.3 billion, and the Afghan government $500 million per year through 2024.10

The Summit communiqué emphasized that ANSF size would be regularly assessed in light of the evolving security environment. As the NATO communiqué states:

The pace and the size of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in consultation with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.11

To date, NATO’s preliminary ANSF sizing target for the end of 2017 has not been formally revised.

The smaller ANSF size proposed at the NATO summit was apparently based on the need to set more politically acceptable levels of international financial support up to 2024. Since 2012, the ANSF has performed well, holding its own against the Taliban while suffering substantial casualties. Yet, the ANSF still relies heavily on NATO financial and military aid in roles such as air support, logistics, and reconnaissance. Charting a near-term path to wean the ANSF off the current level of international assistance seems to be a key objective of the NATO community.

Many critics contend the May 2012 NATO decision raises serious questions about the staying power of international donor funding (amounting to billions of dollars per year up to 2024 even if the ANSF budget shrinks as planned). Some of these critics claim that the Summit decision was also irresponsible in recommending a smaller ANSF in light of potential security threats that could mount into 2017.12 Since the ANSF remains largely “a creation of the United States, which has advocated for and endorsed its current size and cost,” they argue that the U.S. should not have embraced a trajectory towards a smaller ANSF size, especially in the absence of meaningful progress in political negotiations with the Taliban.13 These critics therefore assert that continued robust support for the ANSF is critical to keep the pressure on the Taliban to come to the bargaining table.

Anticipating these criticisms, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen indicated in a February 22, 2013 press conference that ANSF force levels might be held at 382,000 for a longer period. He emphasized that NATO allies had not yet “taken any decision as regards the future size and for how long we will keep that size of the Afghan Security Forces.”14

Camp 2: Maintain the current ANSF size through 2018 to deal with serious security threats

The chief representative of this camp is the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) selected by the Department of Defense to make “an independent assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the ANSF capable of providing security.”15 Its January 2014 report argues that Afghanistan’s security efforts through 2018 will require a slight decrease in the current ANSF force structure from the currently planned level of 382,000 to 373,400 personnel.16 CNA estimates that the annual cost of sustaining their force number would be about $5-6 billion per year at a time of budget constraints for Afghanistan’s international donors, including the U.S.

The CNA’s ANSF estimate is predicated on the assumption that the Taliban insurgency will grow beyond 2014. In 2015-2016, the Taliban are likely to keep pressure on the ANSF in rural areas, expand their control and influence in areas vacated by Coalition forces, encircle key cities, conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other urban areas, and gain leverage for future political negotiations. In 2016-2018, once the insurgency has had time to recover from the past decade-and-a-half of fighting, the CNA assumes a much larger and more intense Taliban insurgency effort.17
In addition, the CNA report asserts that if NATO significantly cuts its commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, tensions between the two nations are likely to worsen. The CNA also believes a rapid decline in international financial support could lead to another civil war in Afghanistan. The CNA team therefore implies that the NATO policy decision of May 2012 was not only risky but premature since the Taliban insurgency, a potential civil war, and worsening Afghan-Pakistani relations loom as existential threats to the Afghan government. The CNA camp contends that large-scale spending is required until these threats have been significantly diminished. In short, this camp appears to rely on a worst-case scenario to justify a large ANSF size through 2018 and presumably beyond.\(^{18}\)

The financial cost of the ANSF is of particular concern moving forward. If the Afghan government proceeds with an ANSF-sizing trajectory in line with CNA’s assessment, international donations will remain vital for ANSF support. As history has shown, however, international aid donations decline over time in concert with troop withdrawals. If the Afghan force-structure is not revised before this aid pipeline dries up, the Afghan government may be forced to cut back security efforts in rural areas. In such a scenario, a large standing Afghan National Army (ANA) force may well be preserved, and dispersed Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces the first cut. This outcome is likely to present the Taliban and other criminal groups with a major opportunity to mount an existential challenge against the Afghan national government (as argued by Camp Three below).

**Camp 3: Adopt a smaller military footprint that relies on Afghan special operations forces to mentor and work with local defense groups**

One of the prominent advocates of this group is Scott Mann, a retired U.S. Army Special Operations Force (SOF) colonel, who helped design the Village Stability Program in Afghanistan and stood up the first Village Stability Coordination Center in southern Afghanistan.\(^{19}\) Mann argues that the ANSF continues to face a serious insurgency whose center of gravity lies in rural community support. He writes, “Farmers are still killing earthworms, cousins kill cousins over water disputes, and the Taliban are resolving conflicts when tribal elders should be. Our absence from the rural areas is contributing to rapid extremist expansion and tightening the noose around the key urban centers.”\(^{20}\)

This camp argues for partnering ANSF SOF forces with Afghan Local Police (ALP) units (including irregular local militia) in remote areas to ensure that training and equipment are adequate, local defense capabilities are effective, and the villagers themselves have confidence and buy-in to resist Taliban insurgents. This camp taps Special Operations Forces for this train-and-assist task because of past U.S. history in working with Afghan defense groups, going back to the retaking of Afghanistan from the Taliban in late 2001. In addition, Mann believes that local ALP unit commanders should be made accountable to their village elders and tribal leaders as well as national government (or ANSF) leadership, the latter often perceived to be divorced from local interests and subject to graft and corruption.\(^{21}\)

Mann points out that the ALP has significant potential to stand up as Pashtun tribal defense forces (arbakai) if the ALP members “are truly local, treat the people well, and if the community to which they are accountable accepts them as part of their social structure.”\(^{22}\) Afghan Deputy Minister Tariq Ismati of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development points out, “If the arbakai are put in situations where they are not trusted by the whole population, they will be seen as militias rather than arbakai.”\(^{23}\)

The military doctrine of foreign internal defense (FID) appears to form the main conceptual underpinning for this camp. FID is defined here as a counter-insurgency or anti-subversion approach relying on host-nation forces and drawing on U.S. SOF military advisors to partner with both the host-nation government and ANSF SOF in a support and training role.\(^{24}\) This camp draws, inter alia, on the concepts of the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, the Combined Action Platoon approach of the Vietnam War, and counter-insurgency doctrine refined in 2006-08 in Iraq.

While attuned to Pashtun cultural issues, this camp has not proposed a specific number of ANSF Special Operations (SO) commando battalions or ALP forces needed to secure Afghanistan, especially its restive south and east where most of the country’s poor, illiterate, and religiously conservative Pashtuns reside. In addition, this camp has not addressed training issues surrounding the merging of the ALP into the ANSF command structure.

**PART TWO: A NEW SIZING OPTION AT THE SAME NATO-AGREED COST**

**Down-size the ANA and Boost the ALP through 2017**

This article proposes a new sizing option that blends key elements of the three options reviewed in Part One. This new option (1) embraces a slightly larger target for the ANSF’s over-
all size compared to the 2012 NATO Summit target while (2) incorporating ALP elements and (3) adjusting internal ANSF component numbers to hold the total cost to NATO’s previously agreed upon $4.1 billion per year by the end of 2017. The table above compares the key ANSF numbers proposed in the current Plan of Record, CNA report, NATO Summit, and this article, while breaking down the ANSF’s total size in terms of its major force components.

As the table above shows, the approach advocated here doubles the size of the ANA/SOF and Afghan Local Police (ALP) by the end of 2017 to implement an ALP approach and to help absorb the relatively high attrition of Afghan Army soldiers.30 Overall, the budgetary cost of this new security architecture should approximate the $4.1 billion price tag that NATO allies and the Afghan government believe they can sustain up to 2024 when Afghanistan becomes financially self-reliant. The SOF and ALP personnel hikes as well as improved salaries can be covered by reducing full-time ANA personnel. This proposal is thus designed to support a strong, consistent narrative on the financial sustainability of the ANSF. Such a narrative is critical to demonstrate to the Taliban insurgency that Afghanistan’s national security and public protection forces are permanent. The financial sustainability of the counter-insurgency force is as much a part of effective strategy as the use and reliability of the force itself.

**The “Unsustainability” Trap**

The ALP approach advocated here rejects the common interpretation of counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy as simply ‘winning hearts and minds,’ ‘living with and protecting the locals,’ ‘surging 20 counter-insurgents for every 1,000 people,’ and ‘building schools and hospitals in exchange for the support of the population.’ These dogmas fell into the “unsustainability” trap, undermining long-term success in Iraq and Afghanistan. The main failure lay in the Coalition’s (and ultimately host government’s) inability to empower and incorporate an ethnically and religiously diverse populace into national security architecture. Soldiers and police were largely recruited from other areas and stationed in urban outposts and contested localities, which still provided space for insurgents to exploit the civilian population or encouraged insurgents to outwait the counter-insurgency.31

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**Afghan National Security Forces**

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<th></th>
<th>ANA</th>
<th>(SOF)</th>
<th>ANP</th>
<th>ALP</th>
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<td>139,200</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td>382,000</td>
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<td>(11,900)</td>
<td>134,500</td>
<td>29,100</td>
<td>34,300²⁷</td>
<td>373,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>258,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>(22,000²⁹</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>280,000</td>
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**PLAN** = current ANSF Plan of Record quoted in the CNA study  
**CNA** = Center for Naval Analyses  
**NATO** = Summit Decision of May 2012  
**NEW** = This article  
**ANA** = Afghan National Army  
**SOF** = Afghan Army Special Operations Forces  
**ANP** = Afghan National Police  
**ALP** = Afghan Local Police

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²⁵= Afghan National Security Forces

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²⁶²⁷²⁸²⁹
Many informed critics argue that returning the number of active-duty ANA forces to mid-2009 levels, as proposed here, will eventually allow the Taliban free rein to contend again for national power. They call for a 350,000-plus ANSF to repulse inevitable Taliban offensives up to 2018 and beyond. Unfortunately, this number did not prevent the Taliban from finding pockets of significant rural support when the Coalition fielded more than 150,000 foreign soldiers with about 200,000 ANSF personnel in 2009-10. Since it takes a minimal Taliban force to garner and extort the tacit support of Afghans, it is critical for the ANSF to demonstrate their paramount commitment to protect their citizenry. Time and again, when local villagers knew the location of a weapons cache, rocket launching point, or IED, they still refused to inform Coalition (including Afghan) troops in the area. They were terrified of retaliation by the Taliban.

Several analysts cling to a ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000 residents to plan for the ANSF mass required. Case studies indicate security in relatively hostile situations requires a force ratio that large or larger. To maintain stability in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, the British deployed a security force (army and police) at a ratio of 23 per 1,000 inhabitants. In its initial entry into Bosnia in 1995, NATO brought in multinational forces corresponding to 23 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. Assuming Afghanistan’s population is about 31 million, the “20” ratio calls for a 620-thousand strong ANSF, almost double its current strength of about 335 thousand. This large force size is simply too expensive and unsustainable for Afghanistan.

The Right Ratio?

Taking another tack, current estimates put the total number of Taliban fighters around 25,000. If this is true, the sizing proposal presented here means that one insurgent faces three ANA/six other ANSF personnel. This ratio glosses over a number of important questions including what is the right tooth-to-tail ratio for the ANA (historical U.S. military averages would put 15 percent of the ANA force in headquarters and 35 percent in logistics), the complementary counter-terrorism roles of the ANA and ANP/ALP, and the degree to which the new ANSF can respond rapidly to a wide spectrum of enemy actions. Nonetheless, the ratio has proven sufficient to counter Taliban strikes that have, up to now, mostly consisted of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, hit-and-run raids, insider attacks, and remote ambushes. To the extent that Taliban forces consolidate for more conventional operations, ANA Special Operation Forces and ANP Civil Order Police (totaling 26,500 and geared to rapid response) should be sufficient to take point and give the advantage to ANA infantry battalions with their superior weaponry and tactics.

Why Down-Size the ANA?

The ANSF force structure outlined here calls for reducing the ANA, while strengthening the ANA SOF, ANP and ALP to serve as the front-line against terrorist attacks by the Taliban and related groups. This sizing proposal is designed to address long-standing strategic challenges including the need for more effective counter-terrorism, reduced civilian casualties, a lower ANSF attrition rate, and a solid path toward Afghan self-sustainability. Failure to make progress on these strategic challenges by 2017 may well set up Afghanistan more clearly for failure than do potential security threats posed by the Taliban and other groups.

Growing Casualties

The ANA’s smaller footprint but larger SOF element is critical to reduce civilian casualties while countering Taliban terrorist tactics in the future. At present, civilian casualties in Afghanistan are on a significant upswing, particularly in and around Kabul, and in seven provinces in east and south Afghanistan. ANSF positions have sustained small, largely harassing terrorist attacks that nevertheless take a heavy toll in civilian casualties. A recent United Nation report indicates that civilian deaths and
injuries surged 24 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013.\textsuperscript{38} This sharp spike in casualties mostly stemmed from escalating ground engagements between Taliban-associated groups and the ANA. Indeed, civilian deaths from mortars, rockets, and grenades more than doubled from the same six-month period in 2013.

It is counter-intuitive to argue that fewer ANA soldiers on the ground will translate into greater public security. In practice, however, the ANA SOF is more capable of taking the lead in conducting counter-terrorist operations and raids against Taliban leadership and other high-value targets while restraining civilian casualties. Conventional ANA forces should be dedicated largely to respond to conventional direct and complex Taliban offensives if the insurgents concentrate against population centers and other targets. Over time, shrinking the number of ANA bases may also funnel Taliban terrorist attacks to them, further limiting prospects for collateral damage. Reducing civilian casualties, if realized, will help establish a virtuous cycle in which the ANSF receives stronger public support for its security efforts.

**High Attrition**

The ANA currently suffers from a high attrition rate.\textsuperscript{39} Recent statistics indicate that almost a third of ANA’s trained personnel move on after their first year of service.\textsuperscript{40} More must be done to try to retain the expertise of these departing ANA soldiers; hence the need for an expanded ALP as well as ANA pay incentives. Assuming the current attrition rate remains constant, the ANA size will shrink to this article’s target of 95,000 by 2017. While many observers believe that most of these departing soldiers return to peaceful lives in their home provinces, it is reasonable to expect that a portion join other armed groups including the Taliban, local warlords, and drug-trafficking chiefs. If this is true, it would suggest that the ANA could actually be training and, to some extent, equipping internal Afghan power brokers. Down-sizing the ANA (and encouraging retention through pay incentives) will reduce future attrition flows to the ANSF’s adversaries, even if the attrition rate itself does not fall.

**Spoilers and Insider Attacks**

In addition to reducing ANA attrition outflows to adversaries, downsizing the ANA may help further reduce insider or spoiler attacks. The spread of insider attacks has largely been seen as a NATO Coalition threat in which Afghan military personnel fire on their NATO counterparts. Insider attacks gained visibility in 2007 and surged over the next few years before dropping sharply from 44 attacks in 2012 to 13 in 2013. By June of 2014, a grand total of 87 insider attacks had killed 142 NATO soldiers and wounded another 165.\textsuperscript{41} The decline in attacks appears to be mainly due to the continuing drawdown of Coalition personnel, reduced interactions with Afghan forces, and the adoption of heightened security measures in exchanges between Coalition and Afghan forces.

It is reasonable to assume, however, that the Taliban insurgency remains focused on infiltrating and identifying spoilers in the ANA and ANP. The Taliban recruitment rate for spoilers seems to be constant in the absence of NATO-related exogenous factors such as Quran burnings or other publicly perceived insults. If this is the case, a smaller ANA corps would provide fewer opportunities for infiltration efforts, while a better-paid, longer-serving ANSf in general would further impede spoiler attempts by reducing attrition churn and instilling corps loyalty and improved operational security.

**Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**

Unlike other tactics, IEDs are generally implanted with the knowledge of local Afghans who are coerced into acquiescent if not direct collusion with Taliban actors. A larger number of Afghans appear to be fence-sitters who do not choose sides since it might endanger them. To survive, they wait to see who will emerge as the victor. An Afghan may therefore wish to support the ANSF but is frequently forced into assisting the Taliban.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Defeating the Taliban’ in these cases can be more effectively addressed by localized ALP units reporting to ANA SOF mentors, village headmen and district chiefs, as Mann points out above, and drawing on additional ANSF units as needed.

**Civil Strife and Border Security Challenges**

Some analysts believe a larger ANA is needed to counter additional threats including regional war-lords operating on ethnic or tribal lines, a Taliban surge swelled by terrorists flooding in from northwest Pakistan, and possibly even Pakistani Army units that challenge Afghan border control.\textsuperscript{43} Most of these potential threats are likely to emerge in eastern Afghanistan (the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Pakhtia, and Paktika), and in the south (Helmand and Kandahar). At present, these provinces receive the brunt of the attacks by Taliban groups (including the Haqqani Network), and conflict zones are situated along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, strategic transit routes, and river valleys. Conventional ANA units can be efficiently cross-loaded to these regions while operating with a reduced standing force. In addition, the NATO Coalition will need to continue improve the ANA’s rapid-response time by providing additional air support assistance.
The current ANSF Plan of Record – similar to the CNA assessment – calls for only 7,800 air force staff out of a total of 382,000 positions. Air capability must be significantly strengthened to protect remote ANP posts adequately over time. Each functional aircraft acts as a force-multiplier in support of the proposed decentralized, local security force structure. It is therefore critically necessary for the Coalition to review regularly its support to the Afghan National Air Force much, as it has done for the Iraqi Army.

Why a Larger ALP?

Adopting a localized ALP approach to absorb naturally retiring ANA soldiers calls for doubling the current ALP size from 30 to 60 thousand by the end of 2017. The ALP component is defined here as an ANP reserve that serves in different localities under active-duty ANP and ANA SOF mentors. Such an ALP force serves as a sponge to soak up retired ANA soldiers who wish to return to their homes and continue to serve their communities. Just as importantly, this ALP component constitutes the main channel through which to recruit security officers for under-served regions, notably the south and east of Afghanistan. To the extent that these ALP recruits can be located around ANP posts in population centers to monitor terrorist activities, the more secure the ANP posts should be. On the other hand, establishing ANP/ALP units in remote rural areas is equally essential to fill a security vacuum, although such posts will remain difficult to staff and defend.

While committed to deterring crime, the ANP and ALP will continue to be the swiftest first responders to Taliban terrorist attacks in concert with ANA SOF forces. The Afghan Uniformed and Anti-Crime Police (AUP), numbering about 98 thousand of the 150 thousand-strong ANP, constitutes the main crime-fighting force of the ANP. Since AUP and ALP units confront both criminal and terrorist organizations, they will continue, in concert with the ANA SOF and ANP’s Counter Terrorism Police, to be trained to handle both threats. By contrast, the ANA is dedicated to holding bases around urban areas and roads (so-called Tier One and Two areas mainly in the south and east of Afghanistan) where the majority of rocket launches, complex attacks, and hit-and-run raids occur. These ANA formations would continue to respond to major attacks on ANP and ALP forces.

To staff the ALP, ANA SOF officers should offer ALP mentor/advisor status to qualified retired ANA soldiers while also recruiting new ALP units to help protect under-manned areas. In this way, villages will have well-rounded guidance from army and police experts to counter militants and diminish exploitable soft targets. The critical need lies in building interoperability among Afghan army and police units at local and national levels while promoting more constructive information sharing, logistical support, and overall cohesion in the ANSF structure.

Out-of-work Soldiers

Alternative employment in the ALP should be offered to as many down-sized ANA soldiers as possible. Recruiting ANA personnel into the ALP in their home districts would provide the ANSF with badly needed reserves to counter any concentrations of Taliban fighters while giving the ANSF local ‘eyes and ears’ on community concerns. The ANA number proposed here also includes 10,500 ANA reservists to absorb additional retired ANA soldiers.

It is important to note that ALP recruits are compensated on the basis of time served. To the extent that tasks related to public security are insufficient to maintain an acceptable income, the ALP could, in certain areas, serve as a civil service organization. Public works projects such as repairing roads, building cold-storage facilities, and constructing more effective irrigation infrastructure might be considered as a way to aug-

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These graduates recently completed a three-week course which covered basic marksmanship, patrolling, improvised explosive device recognition and security techniques. The ALP program allows Afghans to provide security for their home villages and districts.
ment the ALP size in concert with the World Bank’s National Solidarity Program and falls in line with community policing methods.47

PART THREE: TWO MAJOR OBJECTIONS

This restructuring proposal is controversial. Two key objections to this approach stem from the second- and third-order effects of restructuring the ANSF. On balance, these risks can be managed with a carefully designed implementation plan.

Objection One: ALP Units Would Challenge National Sovereignty.

There is an inherent knee-jerk reaction among critics to label local security forces as independent militias that could threaten the integrity of the Afghan state. In fact, locally originated village defense groups have been consistently rejected by Afghan national leaders over the past decade – and by NATO Coalition officials who generally regard them as a potential challenge to civilian control of the military and to the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Case Study in Nangarhar

A case in point is the Coalition’s experience in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan in 2009. One hundred and sixty of the most influential Shinwari tribal elders agreed among themselves to denounce the Taliban in public. They sought help from the Coalition and the Afghan government to remove corrupt local officials and to have a say in who served in the local security forces in their tribal area. Both requests still appear to be valid: corrupt leaders remain a major source of instability, and the ANP needs tribal support to be successful. In response, the Coalition provided funds to the tribe’s traditional consultative council for development projects. This funding fell under U.S. and other allied control, and Coalition officials retained a project veto. To maintain ties with the national government, the assistance was channeled through the local branch of the national government once the tribe’s concerns about transparency and accountability were addressed.48

Over the next several months, insurgents lost their freedom of movement in Shinwari areas of Nangarhar, whereas the ANP could operate freely. The so-called Shinwari pact – an agreement among the Shinwari themselves and not with the NATO coalition – provided badly needed mutual support for their dispersed villages, as required in a counterinsurgency campaign. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hailed the pact as an example of “classic counterinsurgency.”49 And the Coalition’s military leadership in Afghanistan viewed the Pact as an opportunity to improve subnational governance by drawing in traditional tribal structures.

The U.S. embassy, however, opposed the pact after Afghan President Hamid Karzai denounced it in late January 2010 as “meddling in Afghan affairs.” Subsequently, conflicting civilian and military guidance led to confusion among both Afghan and Coalition officials. The U.S. embassy in Kabul forbade U.S. diplomats from meeting with tribal leaders to discuss tribal “pacts,” ruling out on-the-ground contact with local defense groups concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.50 By addressing Shinwari grievances, the NATO Coalition had the opportunity to diminish Taliban influence. This opportunity was lost, chiefly out of concern that local defense groups might spur inter-tribal conflict and eventually oppose the national government.

Overarching Control

This case underscores the importance of bringing local defense initiatives under overarching ANA/ANP control. First, ALP and ANP reservists should be equipped with a limited load-out of ammunition and weapons (AK-47s and RPGs, and perhaps 1-2 machine guns). In the event of a significant firefight, active ANA units from the district or provincial levels can provide additional ammunition as well as their own heavy machine guns, mortars, and limited air support. This step would ensure that the ALP/ANA reserve forces do not have the opportunity to amass weapons and ammunition to either expand their numbers or challenge higher authorities. A close partnership with the ANA is key to prevent these local security forces from being overrun by insurgents.

Second, active ANA SOF forces can establish links with these local forces by taking charge of their training in public and post protection. An active platoon could rotate through various villages in their area of operations and equip, train, and mentor the reservists. This gives the ANA an opportunity to recuperate from front-line operations and facilitates local-national cooperation. The key caveat here is that the ANA must ensure that supplies and training are delivered to the local forces. Any disruption in this flow would damage intra-ANSF morale and fuel chronic fears in the rural areas that the national government does not care about them.

Objection Two: The ANP and ALP are corrupt, inadequately trained, and poorly supervised.
A Corrupt ANP

The ANP and ALP are not positively viewed by Afghans: they are widely seen as corrupt, incompetent, and closely tied to local power brokers. Why would this article suggest that the ANP/ALP structure has any utility as a front-line responder? In fact, the training of Afghan police officers has been inadequate up to now, complicated by limited training budgets and the need for the ANP/ALP to conduct both counter-terrorism and crime-fighting roles. Just as importantly, ANP/ALP corruption appears to be much higher in the south and east of Afghanistan where the Taliban are centered. The ANP is susceptible to bribery by Taliban and other criminal groups operating lucrative drug-trafficking operations. These corruption issues constitute serious threats to the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s national government and call into question any proposal that would identify the ANP as part of the solution to Afghanistan’s current instability.

In addition, regional power brokers (many of whose families rose to hegemony during the Soviet resistance in the 1980’s) reportedly collude with ANP officers in carrying out drug-trafficking and other criminal activities. Concomitantly, the national government has not shown the political will to put in place a justice system independent from the executive branch, resistant to bribery, and accessible to rural areas. These weaknesses in the Afghan governmental system drive many Afghans to the Taliban for dispute resolution. The deficiency of the national justice system, in turn, casts public doubt on the intent and mission of ANP and ALP forces to safeguard public security.

Overlapping Chains of Reporting

Faced with these obstacles, the ANP and ALP have done much more effective work in areas where they have had Coalition and ANA Special Forces partners – even though they remain susceptible to local feuds, power brokers, and their own exploitation of the local population. Since Afghanistan’s regional and ethnic divisions have the potential to shift ANP and ALP forces into dominant factions, the proposal outlined here recommends a highly redundant, overlapping system of chains of reporting for ANP and ALP units. This means that ANP and ALP units should be visited frequently by ANA Special Operations officers, senior ANP officers, village headmen and district chiefs to whom they report. These cross-checking visits and overlapping authorities may be confusing to ANP/ALP officers to the extent they receive conflicting guidance, hence the need for a clear chain of command throughout this reporting process. Such a reporting system will better inform senior authorities about how well ANP and ALP units perform and should, in turn, make their actions more transparent and effective over time. If an ANSF general officer or political leader attempts to suborn ALP units, the overlapping system of authorities should expose the problem and lead to resolution.

Assessment visits tapping into multiple sources and local opinion should make clear to the ANP and ALP that their pay is tied to their progress in guaranteeing public security. Assessing ANP units will permit better funding for those who perform their missions and more training and other corrective actions for those that do not. It is counter-productive to provide additional training for ANP and ALP units without first identifying their shortcomings and making them more accountable through multiple-channel assessments.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the Afghan national government may determine if the ANSF stands or falls to the Taliban. To the extent that the national government does not become more democratically inclusive at lower levels and fails to break with corrupt practices of the past, it will inevitably become weaker. Indeed, many critics believe international donors saddled Afghanistan with too centralized a system in 2001-03. Structuring the Afghan state under an extremely powerful chief executive appears to have retarded the development of checks-and-balances and facilitated corrupt practices. Moving away from this top-down system has the potential to foster more positive democratic trends including the election of local-level representative bodies and a more responsive justice system.
Regardless of whether more democratic reforms can be instituted over the long term, however, the time appears right for the new Afghan leadership to try to boost ANSF forces in areas heavily influenced and contested by the Taliban. Indeed, the Taliban have already adopted their own version of the ALP approach outlined here and continue to forge it into a conventional force. Faced with this adversary (and the success of this method), Afghan leaders must reach out to tribal elders to help protect their home lands. Such tribal decisions will require courage, backed up by a more inclusive, inter-connected ANSF. In other words, Afghanistan’s future rests on difficult choices made by its own people and not by its allies.

Notes:


2. See Cordesman, A.H., loc. cit.


5. This was the case in most of Afghanistan and Iraq except for the latter’s Sunni triangle and Kurdish region. See Ricks, T.E., The Gamble: David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-08, London: Penguin, 2009, pp. 219-20. Ricks argues that the U.S.-led Coalition began working more effectively with Iraq’s tribal and ethnic structure in those areas during 2007, under the leadership of Petraeus and then Marine Brigadier General John Allen. Other observers argue the Sunni Awakening was embraced earlier. Notwithstanding chronology, General Petraeus made similar efforts to draw ethnic forces into the overall Iraqi defense effort in Mosul in 2004. In all cases, sustainability of these forces – both financial and political -- became a glaring problem over time since they were mainly seen as potential challenges to the government rather than localized approaches to be incorporated into the government.

6. Because of funding uncertainty, many critics believe a universal draft is the long-term answer to bringing down the cost of the ANSF. Compulsory service was proposed by President Karzai in early 2010 but most scholars have ruled it out mainly because of its potential to alienate local populaces in the very areas where the insurgency is strongest. See Meyerle, J. et al., Conscription in the Afghan Army, Center for Naval Analyses, April 2011. (http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/cna%20conscription%20in%20the%20afghan%20army%202012--%202013.pdf)


10. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

of its ANSF target size announced at the May 2012 Summit.

29 Included in the ANA number.
30 This article supports Colonel (retired) Mann’s view that the ALP is needed to secure rural areas. However, all three camps reviewed in Part One have not devoted much attention to ALP sizing.

31 This was the case in most of Afghanistan and Iraq except for the latter’s Sunni triangle and Kurdish region. See Ricks, T.E., The Gamble: David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-08, London: Penguin, 2009, pp. 219-20. Ricks argues that the U.S.-led Coalition began working more effectively with Iraq’s tribal and ethnic structure in those areas during 2007, under the leadership of Petraeus and then Marine Brigadier General John Allen. Other observers argue the Sunni Awakening was embraced earlier. Notwithstanding chronology, General Petraeus made similar efforts to draw ethnic forces into the overall Iraqi defense effort in Mosul in 2004. In all cases, sustainability of these forces – both financial and political -- became a glaring problem over time since they were mainly seen as potential challenges to the government rather than localized approaches to be incorporated into the government.

33 These analysts argue that this counter-insurgency dictum was not implemented in Afghanistan because Coalition forces and the ANSF only reached a ratio of 10/1,000.


37 Anti-government elements including the Taliban accounted for 74 percent of the civilian casualties in the first half of 2014, while the ANSF caused 8 percent, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s Midyear Report 2014. (http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m_XyrUQDkZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&lan-

The massive 8.1 million voter turnout for Presidential elections in April 2014 appears to indicate strong public support for elected leadership over the Taliban, although a portion of these ballots remain under audit for fraud.

This threat array was derived from the CNA study, Summary of Independent Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces, January 2014. (Website: https://www.cna.org/research/2014/summary-independent-assessment-afghan-national)


The ALP approach drawing on arbakai appears better suited for this region where tribal defense traditions persist. See M.O. Tariq, op.cit.

The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniform Police, responsible for general police duties, and four specialized police organizations: the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, including a counter-narcotics, a counter-terrorism, and a criminal investigations department.


Ibid.


One of President Karzai’s brothers, Ahmed Wali Karzai, was identified as such a criminal actor, according to press reports. See Tisdall, S., “Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Corrupt and Lawless Face of Modern Afghanistan,” Guardian, July 12, 2011. A.W. Karzai was killed by his bodyguard on July 9, 2011.


Taliban justice is swift, based on Islamic precepts, and less subject to bribery than the formal system.


See Mojumdar, A., “Afghanistan: Rethinking the Constitutional Balance of Power,” Eurasianet.org, October 1, 2009. (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/ea-v100209a.shtml). Power in Afghanistan is highly concentrated in the President’s office. Governors of provinces are appointed by the president. Provincial councils – whose elections are held concurrently with the presidential vote – have no powers and barely any role in the management of local affairs. District council elections have yet to be held.

Following a six-day battle between the ANSF and Taliban killing over 100 civilians in the Ghazni district of Ajestan in September 2014, Pashtun villagers hanged four Taliban fighters turned over by the ANSF. Their action demonstrated a strong resolve to resist the Taliban and protect their homeland. See Reuters, “Afghan villagers hang Taliban fighters as battle for district rages,” September 27, 2014. (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/27/us-afghanistan-attacks-idUSKCN0HM0BH20140927)
Palm trees, banana trees, and sugar cane everywhere – that was my first impression of Indonesia – as I travelled with colleagues from Naval Post Graduate School, from Surabaya to Situbondo by van. I arrived the night before – after a very long and tedious series of flights from Carlisle Barracks. I had to fly south from Harrisburg to Charlotte, NC and then fly past Harrisburg just a few hours later to get to Toronto. Toronto to Hong Kong – long lay over, and then Hong Kong to Surabaya. And now – there we were – travelling by van on narrow roads, jam packed with lorries, cars, motorcycles, bicycles, animals, and pedestrians. There was a natural flow to the traffic – like a river with merging streams. There were apparent rules of the road – differing honks of the horn forced differing actions. Not a place for me to drive.

Dr. Karen Finkenbinder below with a local village miner.
We arrived in Situbondo, checked into the hotel, and headed one hour out to the training site at Dodiklatpur. More sugar cane – lorries filled with it – everywhere. Our driver was very good – and though we had several “near misses,” each day brought us safely to the training site. It was August 31 and we started the Academic phase of the USARPAC CPX, Garuda Shield 2014. Garuda Shield is a bilateral military exercise that focuses on tactical interoperability and is sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific Command and hosted by the Indonesian Armed Forces. About 1,200 personnel from the U.S. Army (Hawaii National Guard and 25th ID) and the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) conducted a series of training events focused on peace support operations. I was there to work the CPX which included 120 personnel from the 29th Infantry Brigade, 103 Troop Command and 117th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment of the Hawaii National Guard.

After a few days of academics, in my case teaching the UNPOL portions and Negotiation – we moved into the CPX in which I role-played the UN Police. The exercise intended to enhance professional relationships and improve bilateral readings, cooperation and interoperability between the Indonesian and U.S. forces and from my perspective it did that. Though there were some challenges – in language and terminology – at the end of the day – the brigades worked together and accomplished the mission required of the UN Mandate. In my case, I had TNI officers assigned to assist with the policing tasks – and we had many laughs translating concepts and courses of action. And that is like every peacekeeping mission – challenges in translation, culture, and communication – yet tasks are accomplished, the mission moves forward and long-term relationships are established. The TNI understood peacekeeping; the Americans came in ready to repeat comprehensive stability operations, but quickly realized that recent efforts in Afghanistan and a peacekeeping mission are not the same.

During the 12 days of the exercise, we had one day off and I chose to visit Mt. Ijen – one of two volcanic lakes in the world known for “blue fire.” To get the full effect, this required hiring a driver, departing at 2300 for a three-hour drive over barely passable roads to the base of the mountain. Then a two-hour hike in the dark, up the mountain and to the sulfur mines. As daylight approached, I headed away from the mines and around the lake to see the sunrise and postcard views. The trip down the mountain was actually more treacherous than going up – sliding down the steep decline (thank goodness for the REI hiking stick I threw in the suitcase!). It is incredible that the miners make two to three trips up the mountain to mine, in what the BBC calls “the most dangerous place on earth.” Each trip earns between $5-10 a day. And they do this in minimal clothing, smoking cigarettes and often barefoot. Incredible! We made it down the mountain by 0700 and to Situbondo by 1000 for a well-deserved nap.

But the best thing about Indonesia – is the people. It is a gracious and hospitable culture – challenged by megacities and its propensity for natural disasters. Yet, there is a serenity that seems to blanket the areas we visited and it makes returning desirable.
The US Army War College hosted a US Africa Command conference on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) from 9-11 September 2014. Forty-five participants attended the conference, including representatives from Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Rwanda, Togo, Uganda, the African Union, the United Nations, the US State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Africa Command, the Stimson Center, and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.

WPS is currently a prominent international topic and includes gender participation issues as well as sexual violence. In part inspired by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (31 October 2000), the United States and several other countries have developed WPS National Action Plans. The U.S. National Action Plan was promulgated by President Obama on 19 December 2011 and subsequently prompted a Department of Defense Implementation Guide on WPS. The September WPS conference at Carlisle was an important effort to support these directives.

The conference was held at Upton Hall on Carlisle Barracks and was funded by AFRICOM’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program. Designed and facilitated by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the conference focused on the mitigation of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV). The conference objectives included the following:

- Further institutionalize WPS within African partner nations.
- Develop training tools related to CRSV mitigation.
- Analyze CRSV issues of peacekeeping missions in Africa.
- Connect African, US government, and other stakeholders that are working on CRSV issues.

Plenary sessions included a presentation by Major General (retired) Patrick Cammaert, a Dutch Marine with extensive UN experience and a globally-recognized expert on the Protection
of Civilians, robust peacekeeping, and the mitigation of CRSV. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Holt, another prominent authority in these areas, also addressed the audience. Colonel Ian Clark, head of the AFRICOM J-9 Outreach Directorate, provided the command’s perspective on CRSV and other issues.

Other collective sessions included a presentation on the Protection of Civilians by Dwight Raymond of PKSOI and an overview of United Nations CRSV training materials by Siva Methil of the UN’s Peacekeeping Best Practices Section. One of the conference’s high points was a panel discussion moderated by Alison Giffen of the Stimson Center and featuring Mumbi Mathangani (African Union), Mane Ahmed (African Union Mission in Somalia), and Jocelyn Kelly (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative).

Most of the conference consisted of working groups that reviewed a draft scenario-based training package developed by PKSOI for AFRICOM. The package consists of the following tactical CRSV-related scenarios:

- **Unit SOP for Handling CRSV Incidents.** The battalion commander directs the staff to develop a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for handling CRSV incidents, so units may be better prepared to address CRSV in a standardized but effective manner. At a minimum, the SOP should address how units handle both victims and perpetrators.

- **Unit CRSV Mitigation Preparations.** The battalion arrives in an unstable area with a history of numerous CRSV incidents. The unit intends to conduct frequent mounted and dismounted patrols to maintain an effective presence and help improve security. The commander directs the staff to prepare a CRSV checklist to help patrols identify and report on CRSV. In addition, the commander wants the staff to identify local actors, programs, and stakeholders that can help mitigate CRSV.

- **Unit CRSV Reporting.** In the past months, the peacekeeping battalion has received several reports of CRSV incidents from subordinate units. The battalion commander noticed excessive time is spent collecting information from the units and providing reports to the brigade-level headquarters. The commander directs the staff to create a report format to streamline this process and facilitate information management and assessment of trends.

- **Patrol Encounter: Rape Victim.** A squad-sized patrol is driving along a trail in an uninhabited area approximately three kilometers from the nearest village. They see a partially-clad woman crawling towards the trail and stop to render assistance. She appears to be in a state of shock, but is able to say that she was getting water for her family and was abducted by four armed men and gang-raped. The men wore different mixtures of military-type uniforms and spoke in a language she did not recognize. The rape occurred about 500 meters away, and she believes the rapists are probably still in that vicinity.

- **Patrol Encounter: Hostile Act in Progress.** A peacekeeping patrol passes an isolated host-state police checkpoint and observes a policeman dragging a struggling woman from a car to the guard shack while two other policemen restrain the car’s male driver at gunpoint. The patrol stops, and one of the policemen quickly comes over and states that the woman was the wife of the other policeman and that the vehicle’s driver is her brother. However, the patrol leader is skeptical about this explanation.

- **Checkpoint Encounter: Escaped Sex Slave.** A young woman approaches a peacekeeping checkpoint. The peacekeepers see that she has been injured and appears weak and dehydrated. Through an interpreter she states that she has been held against her will as a sex slave after being kidnapped by an armed group from her village several weeks ago. Two nights ago she escaped from the base camp which appears to be located to the northwest. The armed group has 20-30 personnel, including child soldiers, and she states that there are 14 other women and girls being held there, as well as four boys who are also being held as sex slaves. Her village is located approximately 20 kilometers to the north.
The training package included questions for discussion for each scenario, as well as facilitator notes with key learning points. The working groups provided valuable feedback on the training package and suggested additional scenarios that will be incorporated into the final product. Once completed, the package will be available for AFRICOM, subordinate units, regionally-aligned forces, and its partners to better prepare units for addressing CRSV.

Dwight Raymond joined PKSOI in July 2009 after retiring from the Army as an Infantry Colonel. His military assignments included infantry leadership, command, and staff positions; faculty positions at the United States Military Academy and the US Army War College, theater-level plans positions, and training and advisory assignments at the National Training Center and in Iraq as a Brigade Military Transition Team (MiTT) Chief. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, and Combat Infantryman's Badge. Dwight has a Bachelors Degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters Degrees from the University of Maryland, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the United States Army War College.

Author and conference leader/group facilitator Mr. Dwight Raymond above and lower left.
Civil-Military Cooperation in Natural Disaster:
A Case Study on JGSDF Humanitarian Assistance Operation in Haiti

by Lt. Col Norisha Urakami, PKSOI International Research Fellow

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Introduction

On January 12th, 2010, a 7.1-magnitude earthquake shook the Republic of Haiti. With the epicenter located about 12 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, the earthquake struck the capital and surrounding area. The Government of Haiti estimated that 200,000 people were killed from collapsed buildings. Another 600,000 were affected from the initial quake and the one that occurred three days later on January 15th.1 Water and electricity were disrupted. Roads and bridges were destroyed. More than 60 percent of the buildings collapsed. Search and rescue of the missing, recovery of the dead, and transportation and distribution of supplies and material by the Government of Haiti became extremely difficult tasks.

In response to the earthquake, on January 14th the Government of Japan dispatched a Japan Disaster Relief Team consisting of members of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to Haiti. A JGSDF medical unit was dispatched to Haiti on January 21st and replaced the JICA team. The Japan Red Cross subsequently took over the GSDF’s activity.

The immediacy of local needs created a requirement for unity of purpose and close coordination among civilian government agencies, military troops, and humanitarian organizations as represented by JICA, the GSDF, and the Japan Red Cross. The collaboration, in managing the limited humanitarian resources and assets among these organizations, was efficient and effective.

This paper examines GSDF’s international disaster relief activity that supported the international community to Haiti. The paper also illuminates the exceptional civil-military cooperation of the GSDF in the aftermath of a natural disaster. This civil-military cooperation yielded effective and efficient humanitarian assistance operations.

Support by International Community to Haiti

According to the Government of Haiti, the amount of damage caused by the earthquake was estimated at 79 million USD.2 This amount is equivalent to over 120% of Haitian Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The human toll had 200,000 missing or dead. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) were estimated at 1 million.

Survey, Search, Rescue & Relief teams were dispatched to Haiti by supporting countries, international organizations, and humanitarian organizations. Their operations also included food & water distribution, medical assistance, and other humanitarian aid activities.

The United States, Canada, and France dispatched military troops to Haiti. The U.S. deployed Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H). This force of 22,000 troops was under the command of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). This task force maintained security, provided medical aid, provided transportation, and distributed food and materials throughout Haiti.3 Canada deployed about 2,000 soldiers to the cities of Leogane and Jacmel. These soldiers maintained security and provided medical aid to affected people.4 France dispatched a specialized civil-military unit of 650 personnel, which operated search and rescue missions, and offered medical treatment in a field clinic.5

Regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and Caribbean Community (CARICOM), sent civilian rescue and support teams to the affected areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), other Red Cross teams, international NGOs such as Save the Children and World Vision, also started their support activities.

Deployment of the GSDF to Haiti

On January 14th, 2014, the Government of Japan stated that the assistance provided will consist of emergency grant aid totaling a maximum of 5 million USD, and emergency relief goods (tents, etc.) equivalent to approximately 30 million JPY. On January 20th, the Government of Japan decided to dispatch a GSDF unit to carry out disaster relief activity, mainly medical aid to Haiti. After arriving in Haiti, the GSDF started the medical aid activity on January 23rd (local time).

The JICA medical team of 24 doctors and nurses was dispatched. The Ministry of Defense of Japan redirected a C-130H, whose crew was conducting training in Arizona, U.S., to Homestead USAF Base, Florida, to transport the JICA team to Port-au-Prince, Haiti.8

The JICA team deployed to the Episcopal University Nursing Department in Leogane on January 18th and treated 534 victims for 8 days.9 Back in Japan, the Ministry of Defense issued an order on January 20th for the GSDF deployment to Haiti. The
A 100-personnel GSDF unit included 14 doctors was dispatched to Haiti, with the plan to take over JICA’s activity.10

Sequential Role Taking: JICA, GSDF, and Japan Red Cross

The GSDF took over JICA’s medical activity.11 The GSDF conducted medical aid from January 23rd to February 13th, and for 3 weeks, treated 2,954 patients. The GSDF unit had 14 doctors. However, it was difficult to equip the various medical departments. The unit did not possess medical devices and equipment for such specialty areas as pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynecology. The GSDF unit’s equipment was intended mainly to deal with emergency treatment and first aid, with no equipment for higher level surgery operations.

For example, in the case of the GSDF unit receiving a patient with a serious head injury requiring immediate surgery, the unit had to transfer the patient to some other organization with the capacity and capability to perform the surgery. This shortfall was addressed by transferring patients to a U.S. medical ship, the Canadian Army’s field hospital, or to an NGO’s medical operation camp. In case of infants, the GSDF team requested support from international NGOs with pediatric doctors.

On the other hand, the GSDF unit equipped with a blood test devices and X-ray machines, received numerous requests from NGOs who did not have such equipment. There were instances when some NGO mobile clinic teams transported patients to the GSDF camp, took X-rays, had then had surgery performed at the Canadian Army’s field hospital. International organizations, NGOs, and the GSDF all coordinated with one another to compensate for each’s deficits.

On February 13th, 2014, three weeks into the crisis, the medical aid activity of the GSDF unit was taken over by Japan Red Cross.12 This transfer from the GSDF to the Japan Red Cross was not envisioned at the time the GSDF units deployed to Haiti. The Japan Red Cross received an offer from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, after the first rotation team returned from Haiti after reviewing the possibility of the Japan Red Cross taking over the GSDF’s activity.13 JICA and the GSDF teams consisted of Japanese medical doctors who provided direct and immediate treatment to patients. A significant difference between the Japan Red Cross and JICA/GSDF services, was that JICA/GSDF had Japanese doctors, whereas the Japan Red Cross hired local doctors and nurses. Japanese doctors and nurses trained and instructed local doctors and nurses. The activity of the Japan Red Cross in Haiti was aimed to build capacity and lay the foundation for medical affairs in the long term. It is possible to categorize these activities as reconstruction and not the provision of immediate medical aid.

The activities of JICA and the GSDF were succeeded by the Japan Red Cross. This close coordination between Japanese civilian organizations and the military was the first of its kind during a humanitarian aid activity involving the deployment of Japanese organizations. During the initial phase of JICA and the GSDF activities, the plan was for the JICA activity to be succeeded by the GSDF. Equipment, tents, medicines, materials, facilities, local language interpreters, and medical volunteers from the Nursing Department, Episcopal University that was used by JICA were taken over by the GSDF.

In the deployment of the GSDF in Leogane and the surrounding area, JICA and the GSDF exchanged information relating to NGOs, international organizations, and agencies with activities from supporting countries.

In comparing activities, the JICA teams consisted of 24 personnel while the GSDF teams consisted of 100 strong. JICA prepared treatment booths and other materials that enabled the start of the GSDF’s medical activity after their arrival on site. The GSDF unit was able to start their operation immediately after arriving in Leogane because JICA had previously prepared...
to receive the GSDF. Coordination between both actors resulted in great efficiency in the use of limited resources and assets.

JICA and the GSDF deployed in the same area, and established a division of labor. This resulted in increased capacity for patients, and appropriately transferring patients between each other depending upon medical treatment required.

After the withdrawal of the JICA team, the GSDF continued medical aid, treating approximately 150 patients per day. The GSDF proceeded to exchange information and conduct coordination with the Japan Red Cross to hand over the activity. An issue for the Japan Red Cross in taking over the GSDF activity was the Sri Lankan peacekeepers at the site. The Sri Lankan unit, part of an infantry battalion to the United Nations Stabilization Operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH), had been providing security support for JICA when JICA deployed to Leogane. One squad had been staying in Episcopal University for security. The Sri Lankan unit had been deployed at the request of JICA due to the deteriorating security situation after the earthquake. Security support by the peacekeeping force was not acceptable for the Japan Red Cross who cited its organization principles, the Red Cross does not operate together with armed forces, nor does it operate in the same area. The GSDF asked the Sri Lankan unit to withdraw.

With the Japan Red Cross requesting the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force, it would appear difficult for the GSDF and Japan Red Cross to cooperate in the same area. However, in this case, the Japan Red Cross deployed after the withdrawal of the GSDF, taking over facility, tents, local staff and other material. The takeover of activities provided a medical activity for long term reconstruction as opposed to just first aid. In addition to the seamless support, both actors shares information according to their organizations’ aims, avoiding interference each other, thus, making it possible to cooperate while maintaining each organization’s principle of action.

Immediately after the earthquake the majority of patients required surgery. However, patient statistics one month after the earthquake indicated an increase in the number of chronic disease patients with illnesses as hypertension and visceral diseases. The local medical needs shifted from emergent immediate medical treatment to normal medical issues. Coordination and cooperation among the three actors, JICA, the GSDF, and the Japan Red Cross resulted in continuous and seamless Japanese support to affected people in Haiti.

**Conclusion**

International disaster relief activities after the earthquake in Haiti were led by the GSDF from JICA, and succeeded by the Japan Red Cross. The change from immediate medical aid to reconstruction reflected the changing local needs. With the exceptional coordination and cooperation among civilian actors and the GSDF, this case is viewed as a comprehensive approach, and a so-called ‘All Japan effort’ was realized. Furthermore, the GSDF provided their assets cooperatively to civilian organizations for medical aid activities and collaborated with NGOs to create a division of labor to effectively treat patients.

Deployment guidelines should be standardized. These standards should be identified as challenges for the GSDF, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and other related agencies. In today’s international humanitarian assistance operation, civil-military coordination is a necessity. Human resource development will be key in educating and training experts for future operations.

**Notes:**

1. The number of death revised as about 31.5 million by the Government of Haiti in January, 2011, after one year later the earthquake. [http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%8F%E3%82%A4%E3%83%81%E5%9C%B0%E9%9C%87_(2010%E5%B9%B4), accessed June 15, 2014.](http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%8F%E3%82%A4%E3%83%81%E5%9C%B0%E9%9C%87_(2010%E5%B9%B4))
2. [http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%8F%E3%82%A4%E3%83%81%E5%9C%B0%E9%9C%87_(2010%E5%B9%B4), accessed June 18, 2014.](http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%8F%E3%82%A4%E3%83%81%E5%9C%B0%E9%9C%87_(2010%E5%B9%B4))

by former PKSOI Intern Arianna De Reus, Penn State Univ.
As an intern with Penn State’s Strategic Intelligence Research Internship Program, I studied how natural resource constraints in African nations can lead to instability. While studying abroad last spring I conducted a research project to assess water security issues of Senegal, an arid country where water is a precious resource. Penn State’s Strategic and Global Security Program, sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, funded this research. By conducting 60 interviews, and with support from Dr. Ousman Sene, the director of the West African Research Center of Dakar, I learned how water is a natural resource that is increasingly in short supply in Senegal. The current population growth rate of Senegal is 2.48% and increased by over 3 million people in the past 12 years, expanding the national population to slightly over 13 million people today. Over 70% of Senegal’s population is below the age of 54, and over half of the population lives below the poverty line, making Senegal prone to instability when extreme water shortages occur. This was apparent during the fall 2013 riots when the water supply was cut in Senegal’s capital for three weeks while main water lines were repaired.

Senegal is viewed as a model in Africa for water infrastructure development. However, many people suffer from water insecurity, as their supply is not consistent, sufficient or sanitary. I conducted interviews with residents in urban and rural areas of Senegal to exemplify that despite the nation’s progress regarding water access, people continue to experience fundamental challenges with water access and sanitation, which can lead to future instability. The purpose of this study is to understand the specific water security challenges that people experience in Senegal, so that NGOs, companies, and the Senegalese government can better address these problems, improving water security and ensure future stability.

Achieving water security in developing nations will enable sustainable development, economic growth and poverty alleviation. An inter-agency entity of the United Nations, UN-Water defines water security as “The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of and acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.” The global water demand will increase by 40 percent in the next 15 years, making water security an issue of importance for the international community. The negative effects of climate change and population growth such as desertification and urbanization are particularly increasing water stress on African nations, putting fragile states at risk for conflict.

Demographically, African nations with large populations of young people will need to implement technological solutions in order to meet increasing water demands and ensure stability. In 2001, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of eight global goals to achieve improved health, equality, and sustainable development in developing nations. The seventh MDG is to halve the global population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. Senegal, is on track to reach the water access target of MDG 7. However, Senegal has not made enough progress to achieve the sanitation aspect of this goal by 2015. Due to a lack of infrastructure and investment, there is a stark contrast in water access and sanitation between rural and urban regions of Senegal. This study consists of 60 surveys, analyzing the apparent rural and urban water security challenges of people in Senegal, despite significant progress towards achieving MDG 7.

Despite Senegal’s political stability, it suffers from elements that lead to water insecurity, such as poverty, slow economic growth, population growth, climate change and a lack of infrastructure development. As Senegal’s population grows each year and more people move to urban areas, water becomes scarce due to limited infrastructure. By 2015, six of every 10 people are expected to live in urban areas of Senegal. As a country, Senegal’s population increases by 2.6% annually, intensifying stress on limited water resources in all regions.

Although Senegal greatly improved urban water infrastructure, a water shortage in September 2013 resulted in violent protests. The shortage was caused by a damaged pipeline, which cut off water to the capital city of Dakar for two weeks. This pipeline supplied water from a plant that served 3 million people in Dakar and the suburb. Such drastic shortages for millions of people create opportunities for instability, demonstrating how water security is crucial for national security. This shortage exemplifies how fragile the water security situation is for the urban population of Senegal.

The sample population consisted of participants 18 years of age and older, and all participants remained anonymous. A stratified random sample of 30 people in Mermoz, a suburb in the capital city of Dakar, were chosen for this study along with 30 people in the rural villages of Toubacouta, Dianglé and Tambanding, five hours from Dakar. The surveys consisted of thirteen questions, requiring qualitative and quantitative responses. Survey responses show that urban participants have readily available water in their homes, and the majority has sufficient amounts of water on a daily basis. People in Mermoz were able to store excessive amounts of water in advance and could afford...
Below are graphs that depict answers to three research questions:

Figure 1: Urban Causes of Water Shortages

Figure 2: Rural Causes of Water Shortages

Figure 3: Urban Water Access During a Shortage
Figure 4: Rural Water Access During a Shortage

Figure 5: Urban Water Access Challenges

Figure 6: Rural Water Access Challenges
to buy mineral water in times of a water shortage. Participants in this urban neighborhood experienced water shortages frequently due to infrastructure repair and maintenance. All urban participants paid for water access to the company Senegalaise Des Eaux (SDE), unless they were SDE employees. The majority of participants believed that their water was sanitary in the urban neighborhood, as they said it was treated by SDE. Participants in Mermoz believed that the cost of water did not change significantly throughout the year despite shortages. From these responses it is clear that residents of Mermoz found water quality and price to be their biggest water access challenge.

Overall, participants in the rural villages of Toubacouta, Dianglé and Tambanding believe they do not have enough water for everyday use, they have to go to wells or use public water taps, and they take time out of their day to access water. Infrastructure repair and salinity are the major causes of water shortages in these rural villages. Unlike urban residents, nearly one third of participants in rural villages never experienced water shortages because they could find wells to access water. The majority of participants did not believe that their water was sanitary, and used bleach to purify it before drinking. Participants did not choose to buy mineral water during water shortages because mineral water is expensive and not available in some villages. Most participants in rural villages paid for water access to the local water council while some participants only used well water, which is untreated and free. Distance and price were their biggest water access challenges for rural participants.

Half of participants in rural areas said the price of water increased during a shortage and half said it did not. This occurred because in the village of Toubacouta, water sellers increased prices of water and sold it to residents during water shortages. However, for participants in more the remote villages of Tambanding and Dianglé, there were no water sellers there during a shortage, so the prices of water did not increase.

More people in the urban neighborhood did not think that water access would be an issue in the next ten years, while almost all participants in rural villages believed that it would be an issue. Participants from urban and rural regions mentioned that during water shortages, they experienced issues with hygiene, inconvenience, cooking and taking care of children. Only residents in rural villages mentioned challenges with washing before prayers, taking care of domesticated animals and constructing new buildings. Rural residents had several concerns regarding water access in the next ten years because they relied on water from a water tower and wells. Participants from both...
regions mentioned that population growth would be an issue for water access in the future. These results show that people in both urban and rural locations experienced elements of water insecurity, due to a lack of consistent, easily available, sufficient and sanitary water at all times throughout the year.

Despite Senegal’s progress towards achieving MDG 7 by 2015, this study shows there are fundamental issues with water security affecting people in rural and urban areas. As a result, there is a need for increased infrastructure and investment throughout Senegal to improve water security for all citizens. It is crucial for the government of Senegal to work with development institutions and increase investment towards building water infrastructure for rural areas. The national water company Sénégalaise Des Eaux has a contract with the Senegalese government to provide water access for urban areas. However there is a need for a company work with the government and provide rural areas with water, to close the gap between water insecurity in urban and rural areas. This research was a part of Penn State’s Africana Research Center Undergraduate Research Exhibition, and is being used by Penn State’s Interinstitutional Consortium for Indigenous Knowledge (ICIK) for information on water security issues in Africa. Understanding the specific water security issues that participants face in this study provides an opportunity for stakeholders in Senegal’s national security such as government institutions, private water companies and NGOs to better address these problems in the future.

Notes:
2 (“Africa: Senegal,” 2014)
6 (“Global Trends,” 2012)
7 (“Global Trends,” 2012)
9 (Diagne et al., 2011)
11 (“Water Supply and Sanitation,” 2011)
15 (Ba, 2013)
16 (Ba, 2013)
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