Thanks to some terrific in-briefs by the staff here and our high-tempo schedule, I have hit the ground running as the new Director of PKSOI. As I learn the ropes, I look forward to hearing from our partners and stakeholders about how PKSOI can continue to improve the quality of our work and grow in our ability to act as a change agent and facilitator for the Peace and Stability Operations communities (P&SO). I look forward to meeting each of you and your teams as soon as possible. I’d like to wish my friend and predecessor COL Jody Petery a rewarding year as the Chief of Staff for the Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan. Jody’s leadership of PKSOI, and collaboration with our partners in the U.S. Government, the IGO and NGO communities, the UN and elsewhere has helped advance the quality and quantity of interaction and output among P&SO experts and organizations around the world. Under his stewardship, PKSOI became the Army’s Lead for Joint Proponency for Peace and Stability Operations. This leadership role will enable us to accelerate the production of quality Peace and Stability Operations doctrine, education, and training material across our force and government as a whole.

We’ve changed our P&SO Journal format to improve its readability and appeal. It’s designed to be a true eJournal that is pleasant on the eye and easy to navigate. We received significant input from our staff and college interns, and hope that the new look and content exceeds expectation. Many thanks to all who participated.

This edition starts with a thought-provoking article on the U.S. counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan by Dr. Inge Fryklund. A former Chicago prosecutor, who in addition to work in Iraq, Tajikistan, Kosovo, and the West Bank, spent almost 5 years in Afghanistan, takes a hard-hitting look at the Afghan Drug War.

Mr. Ryan Burke assesses the civil-military culture gap in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, and offers recommendations to address it. His article is timely, as we enter into a time in which such events appear more common, and in recent years, more deadly. As tornadoes whirl their way through our own U.S. southern states, we are reminded of the power and fury of Mother Nature, and the need to do everything in our power to minimize friction between the elements that respond to disasters.

First Lieutenant Matthew Archuleta asks if the Army can prepare a generation of Warfighters to become Peacekeepers? His question is highly relevant – “can we not only win the peace but keep it?” His and my answers are the same – YES – but only if we accept the mission, and make the minor but important changes necessary to policy, doctrine, and training to achieve it.

Major Fred Williams from USARCENT, provides an overview of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Central first Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Symposium, recently held in Carlisle. Thirty one officers from nine nations visited, as well as many officers from the Army National Guard State Partnership Program – and we were glad to have assisted. As this goes to publication, our Spring interns are about ready to depart. We enjoyed being able to assist in their educational development and provide opportunities for them to test the professional waters of peace and stability operations and national security. We are getting ready for a robust summer internship program – to bring cadets and civilian college students together, to work in a civilian-military environment, and see how things work at the strategic level.

I am extremely happy to be a part of this community, and look forward to opportunities for me and my team here at PKSOI to help move the all of our critical P&SO conversations toward effective products and action!
Our Disastrous Afghan Drug War: Whatever Were We Thinking?

by Dr. Inge Fryklund
Our war on poppy production in Afghanistan has complicated and slowed the prosecution of the war against the perpetrators and facilitators of the September 11 attacks, distracted attention from Afghan governance deficiencies that are drivers of the conflict, impeded economic development and the rule of law, fostered corruption, and resulted in the deaths of U.S. and Coalition forces caught up in our crusade against drugs.

For its own internal political reasons, the U.S. government (USG) has been unwilling or unable to acknowledge that Afghan poppy production is driven by demand in the West and that local eradication is irrelevant in the worldwide context. We have been unable logically to connect the dots to see how our anti-poppy tactics have fostered crime and corruption within the Afghan government—even as we demand that President Karzai do something about corruption. As we flail about to implement the flavor of the month for deterring poppy production, development assistance has too often been a matter of short-term and shortsighted projects that result in no sustainable development of either agriculture or government institutions. At best, our drug war has been a distraction, resulting in incoherence for our governance and economic development programs. At worst, it has undercut all our ostensible objectives. The problem is not the absence of a coherent anti-drug policy or strategy. That would be analogous to arguing that with a better strategy, King Canute would have been able to command the tides. We decided to fight an unwinnable drug war that should never have been fought, taking our eye off the ball for the things that really matter for the stability of Afghanistan and our own security.

My perspective and conclusions are based on almost five years on the ground in Afghanistan—between May 2004 and March 2012—working at various times for USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), UNDP (U.N. Development Program), USAID contractors, and with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. I have lived in Kabul, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand and traveled widely throughout the country, and have watched the steady deterioration of both security and confidence in the Afghan government and rule of law.

Some History: Poppy has long been grown in Afghanistan, though on a minimal scale, mostly for local use—e.g., for warding off hunger, and as the only remedy available in case of sickness, such as for babies with coughs. Interestingly, anthropologist Louis Dupree’s extensive study of Afghanistan, published in 1973, mentions poppy only in Appendix C on medicinal plants (“A narcotic: a pastime and painkiller”).

Poppy production in Afghanistan began seriously only about 1980—when the U.S. pushed poppy out of Burma and Thailand (the Golden Triangle). This “success” was due to a combination of police action and economic development—and the coincidental availability of a convenient alternate location for the crop: Afghanistan. The Afghan climate was suitable and the Soviet invasion created enough disorganization in the country that poppy could be grown without interference. There is no indication that world-wide demand changed; production simply moved from one location to another in response to pressures that made one location less hospitable and another more so. This alone should have told us something about the futility of efforts to extirpate poppy from one location—it will simply migrate.

Why do Afghan farmers grow poppy? For a number of reasons, poppy is a crop well suited to rural Afghanistan. It can be profitably grown in tiny plots and in dry conditions. While poppy actually requires as much or more water per plant as wheat, it does not require the irrigation infrastructure needed for growing crops that require more acreage for profitability. In Laghman Province, for example, an elaborate and well-maintained system of water out-takes on the Alisheng and Alinghar Rivers, long diversion canals, and allocation of water among individual plots, all managed by the local mirab (water master), make rice growing profitable. Laghman was one of the luckier provinces. It has been estimated that countrywide, between the Soviets and the Taliban, about one third of the irrigation infrastructure was destroyed. (This is a simple way of destroying a local community without having to fight.)

For poppy, extensive irrigation infrastructure—both physical and managerial—is not required. Individual farmers can produce small quantities of poppy along with their other crops. The harvested product is also compact, does not deteriorate over time, can be safely concealed in the home, and transported if the family is displaced due to fighting. It is a personal savings account that can be tapped whenever the family needs to make a cash purchase. In a land of such uncertainty and personal insecurity, poppy is a very valuable resource.

For several years now, Taliban have had a well-developed agriculture extension program that would be recognizable in any U.S. land grant university. Loans are made at the time of planting, there is technical advice on growing, and the product is picked up from the farm after harvest. For poppy, the “farm to market” problem is solved. The Afghan Ministry of Agriculture is unprepared to offer similar services for other crops and the private market infrastructure is insufficiently developed. Unfor-
It's here. We're here. We must do something.” Poppy became the omy of Afghanistan or what was driving production. “It’s bad. Production fit into the culture and subsistence agricultural econ anti-drug policies in the U.S. without any analysis of how pro looking back and trying to reconstruct, it appears that the ini... was viewed as “a bad thing” and it provided is that poppy was simply viewed as “a bad thing” and it provided... In 2004 at the U.S. Embassy at which poppy was discussed. I... U.S. government at all, given that our invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was in response to September 11. Interestingly enough, it appears that our initial anti-poppy efforts occurred precisely because of the absence of Taliban. In 2000, the Taliban had forbidden the cultivation of poppy, and production plummeted to essentially zero; the Taliban penchant for violence was a credible deterrent. The USAID Mission, just getting off the ground in 2002, was concerned that in the absence of Taliban enforcement, farmers would again plant poppy. It was not until several years later that U.S. interpretation shifted 180 degrees and poppy was viewed as supporting the Taliban.

The earliest USAID Mission emphasis was on road construction and a very successful effort to issue and stabilize a new currency. (USAID Mission efforts in general have been aimed at helping to fix a broken country and have not been explicitly connected with the military effort.) The agriculture program was one of the later ones to be designed (into 2003), by which time poppy was becoming more prevalent, and agriculture assistance became coupled to anti-poppy efforts. It is still not obvious why agricultural assistance was key to poppy—whether grown with Taliban support or despite it. Poppy production was still minimal and the Taliban were not yet resurgent. My recollection from being in the USAID Mission in Kabul in 2004-05 is that poppy was simply viewed as “a bad thing” and it provided a focus for agricultural efforts. I recall participating in a meeting in 2004 at the U.S. Embassy at which poppy was discussed. I inquired whether we were considering legalization as an option. I was told that legalization was “off the table” as a matter of U.S. policy, and it was not to be mentioned again.

Looking back and trying to reconstruct, it appears that the initial concern about poppy reflected a mindset carried over from anti-drug policies in the U.S. without any analysis of how production fit into the culture and subsistence agricultural economy of Afghanistan or what was driving production. “It’s bad. It’s here. We’re here. We must do something.” Poppy became the tail that wagged the dog of U.S. efforts, with no analysis permitted.

Production has snowballed over the years in a self-reinforcing cycle. The seeds of political deterioration were planted in 2001 when the warlords who had devastated Kabul during the 1990s returned to positions of influence as we sought their help in chasing al Qaeda. After the portions of the 2004 Constitution providing for accountable local government were not implemented and power was increasingly centralized in Kabul, the population became increasingly disaffected. Taliban (with support from Pakistan) and various other insurgents were consequently supported or tolerated by the population, leading to increased insecurity and a lack of economic development, which increased the attractiveness of poppy, leading to both Afghan governmental and police corruption and to eradication efforts that drove farmers into the arms of the Taliban, further increasing insecurity, and round and round in a downward spiral. Our anti-poppy campaign has steadily reinforced the nexus between the Taliban and rural Afghan farmers: whether protecting farmers from eradication, taxing their production, threatening them, or demanding increased production, Taliban have become deeply intertwined with rural agriculture.

Massive amounts of foreign aid, given with no accountability, have further destabilized the country. With our endgame approaching, matters are further complicated by a “get while the getting’s good” mentality among Afghan governmental officials and those holding supply and transport contracts for the U.S. military.

At no point has U.S. policy acknowledged that the Afghan supply is only meeting worldwide demand. In 2012, UNODC (the UN Office on Drugs and Crime) estimated the ultimate annual street value of the opiates produced in southern Afghanistan at $68 billion (2009 production). (Relatively little of this sum remains in Afghanistan.) Clearly the incentives for production are huge. As long as the demand is there, someone, somewhere on the planet will supply it. A focus on curtailing supply in particular locations, with no consideration of demand and no appreciation for the collateral consequences of illegality per se, has been predictably unsuccessful.

Alternative Livelihoods: The earliest U.S. government anti-poppy efforts in Afghanistan employed the carrot rather than the stick. Beginning in 2004, USAID’s agricultural programming focused on “Alternative Livelihoods,” known less formally as the “please don’t grow poppy” program. That is, poppy growing was assumed to be the default livelihood and anything
else must be an alternative. (We did not ask why poppy might be so attractive to the farmer.)

The main crop pushed by USAID and the military was wheat. However, the wheat-opium price differential does not favor wheat.² Price estimates vary, but one recent report suggested $160 to $200 for one kilogram of dry opium, compared to 41 cents for one kilogram of wheat. Any Afghan can do the math.

It should also be clear that these crops do not substitute for one another. Wheat is for eating and poppy is for cash—for purchasing all the family needs that cannot be homegrown.³ Afghans understand that they need both. One year (in Helmand, if I recall correctly), farmers got so carried away with producing poppy that there was a bread shortage; adjustments were made in the crop mix for the following year. While wheat is not a substitute for poppy, there are other high value crops that might provide stable and diversified economic development—an important goal for both economic stability and nutrition quite apart from whether the country is or is not also producing poppy. High quality fruits and nuts were exported, including to the U.S., back in the 1970s. (After regularly eating the green Kandahar raisins, I no longer have an appetite for Sunsweet raisins.) The 3-5 years it takes before a bush or grapevine produces marketable fruit (perhaps 10 years or more for a tree) has been a deterrent to promoting fruit crop development. What will farmers do before they can go to market with the fruit? In 2002-03, USAID programmers proposed subsidizing farmers during the years it took for such plants to mature. This was rejected by the Ambassador in favor of sending in DEA (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration) to burn poppy fields.

Our insistence upon immediate results works against long-term development. The military has been particularly uninterested in orchards. The current rotation (responding to the military’s internal incentives) always wants to see outcomes during their tour and this is not going to happen with an orchard. Wheat would be visibly harvested even if it has no effect on the dynamics of the economy. Year after year, U.S. civilians and military have distributed wheat seed—probably appreciated, but having no effect on poppy production or the largely subsistence economy.

Afghan pomegranates (delicious!) offer both a high profit and export potential. USAID has sponsored some orchard planting and export initiatives (e.g., to Dubai), but the effort has been small relative to the size of the economy and the farm to export market is not well developed. Pomegranate orchards around Kandahar (Arghandab, Panjway and Zhari districts) have fallen victim to the heavy fighting there—damaged in crossfire between ISAF and Taliban, by mines planted by the Taliban and by helicopter gunships trying to dislodge Taliban.¹¹ Saffron has been mooted about as a poppy substitute, but it is harder to grow, the farm to market infrastructure is not there, and its high world price reflects its scarcity. Flooding the market with Afghan saffron could be counterproductive.

Neither is the market infrastructure for perishable produce present. In 2005 in Nangarhar, USAID encouraged production of tomatoes. Piles rotted when the market could not profitably absorb all the fresh tomatoes and there were no facilities for drying or canning, or ready markets for the results.

In short, it appears that the centrality of poppy in USG thinking has prevented sustained concentration on agricultural redevelopment and has led only to short-term scatter-shot initiatives that have not supported a sustainable value chain for any crop.

Cash for Work: Paying “cash-for-work” was another Alternative Livelihoods initiative. Various programs paid Afghan men $3-4/day (a respectable wage) to clean canals, etc.—like WPA projects during the Great Depression in the U.S.—on the theory that if men were occupied away from home during the day, they would be unable to work the poppy fields. (It was also hoped that those joining the Taliban just for the pay would similarly opt for canal cleaning.) The cash income was also thought to obviate the need for growing the poppy cash crop. Afghans, however, are apparently quite capable of assessing the situation and scheduling their time accordingly. I remember in 2006 in Nangarhar, when poppy harvest time came, the cash-for-workforce promptly disappeared for the duration of the harvest. Furthermore, a $4/day wage, for a period of uncertain duration, is no match for the security that a stash of poppy represents. USAID programming changes direction frequently and even if a program lasted for the 2-3 years typical for an implementer contract, this is an insufficient time horizon for any Afghan family to change its risk calculus and abandon the poppy business.

Perverse incentives: USAID Alternative Livelihood and other development resources were poured into provinces such as Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand, which were prime poppy-growing territory. In effect we were rewarding poppy-growers with programs and cash-for-work. Even in these provinces, however, promised development projects conditioned on ceasing poppy planting were rarely forthcoming, and farmers soon learned to distrust promises of future benefit.

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The Northern provinces, quite stable in the early years of our intervention, received little aid or technical assistance at a time when good security would have allowed them to make some real progress in rebuilding their economy. I remember an official from a northern province who said to me, “What do we need to do to get some attention around here? Grow poppy?”

**Those greedy farmers:** At a meeting in 2006 at the Jalalabad PRT in Nangarhar, some members of the U.S. Embassy came out to give us the word on the anti-poppy campaign. When we pointed out the economic incentives for subsistence farmers, the answer was roughly, “Those greedy farmers. They don’t need the extra money. They could survive just growing wheat.” (This from a young staffer who was collecting his extra danger pay for leaving Kabul for a day.) I don’t think “greed” is the appropriate term to apply to Afghan farmers living in mud brick buildings without electricity or clean water, and who can expect (statistically) that one quarter of their children will die before the age of five from diseases that should be easily preventable. Expecting some of the world’s most vulnerable people to bear the costs of the U.S.’s crusade against drugs is hard to swallow.

**Governor-led eradication:** As the years passed and poppy production expanded, the carrot increasingly gave way to the stick. In a later USG initiative, “Governor-Led Eradication,” governors who eradicated poppy fields were rewarded from a Good Performers Initiative fund (paid by U.S. tax dollars). In practical terms, this meant that to the extent poppy fields were eradicated at all, it was fields belonging to the governor’s political enemies that were eradicated, and those belonging to his allies or tribe were not touched. We supplied a tool for further political polarization and paid governors to use it. This, of course, left the individual farmer at the mercy of capricious decisions about whom to eradicate, which further drove the anti-government insurgency. These difficulties were noted by U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke in 2009, who announced that the policy was only driving farmers into the arms of the Taliban; strategy should shift to interdiction, rule of law and alternative crops. Nevertheless, eradication and payments to governors continue to this day.

Governor-led eradication had collateral negative effects on governance. Under the governance arrangements that have long been in place in Afghanistan, and were largely unchanged in the 2004 Constitution, governors are simply the President’s representatives, appointed by him with no confirmation by Parliament. Governors have no employees or budget beyond immediate office staff, no taxing authority, and no service delivery responsibilities. The main official function of effective governors is the coordination of the provincial line ministries, which are responsible for constructing and maintaining roads and operating schools and health clinics. (Municipalities—which do have taxing authority—are responsible for garbage collection and roads within towns.) By giving budgets to governors and raising their status, we have disrupted constitutional governance arrangements, undercutting those institutions that do have responsibilities, employees and budgets that should endure beyond our departure.

**Poppy-free provinces:** USAID, DEA and INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, a division of the U.S. Department of State) have touted success measured by the number of provinces deemed “poppy free.” It is a meaningless statistic. Afghanistan at the moment has 34 provinces. Provinces are simply political subdivisions of the central government. Over the years, the five main regions now constituting Afghanistan (Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, Loya Paktia and Kabul) have been subdivided as various rulers either rewarded some constituency (e.g., Tajiks in Panjshir) with provincial status or employed divide and conquer tactics to make regional cooperation against Kabul more difficult. What possible difference does the number of today’s subdivisions with or without poppy actually make? (With enough subdivision, the country could be declared 99% poppy free.) Furthermore, the vast majority of poppy is grown in Helmand. (UNODC in 2011 estimated 85% of the world’s supply came out of RC-SW—Nimroz and Helmand.) If 32 or 33 other provinces were or were not poppy-free, it would have no practical significance either for Afghanistan or worldwide consumption.

**Relocating the poppy:** In Helmand, the “Food Zone” is the populated area adjacent to the Helmand River. (This is the area irrigated by the Kajaki Dam and irrigation system, patterned on Tennessee Valley Authority, and built by Morrison Knudsen, hired by the King, back in the 1950s.) Most of the population lives here and food crops are grown. By 2012, with the support of then Governor Mangal, poppy production was pushed out of the Food Zone and into the sparsely populated desert (the “dasht”). What purpose was served? Production out of Helmand Province continued unabated. We had succeeded only in making life more difficult for the farmers engaged in growing. If their families moved with them, children were unlikely to have a nearby school to attend and women would be even more isolated.

In 2012, at a meeting at Camp Leatherneck, chaired by the British Deputy Commander, a delegation from INL in Kabul pointed with pride to the elimination of poppy from the Food Zone. I pointed out that while we were pretty good at dislodg-
ing poppy from targeted areas, it simply popped up elsewhere at locations chosen by the growers, not by us; it did not vanish, and we were reactive, not proactive. I asked whether the U.S. and British Embassies had a policy about where they positively did want the poppy grown—the dasht in Helmand? Farah Province to the north? Iran? Local military could herd production from one place to another, but it would be helpful to know to where our governments wanted production relocated. There was no answer.

While news accounts often say that poppy production has increased despite eradication and alternative crop subsidy efforts (over $6 billion by one estimate), it might be more accurate to say that production has increased because of our various scattered and destabilizing interventions as efficient criminal networks funding production have emerged.

**Does poppy fund the insurgency?** Although the question may appear cavalier, it is important that we first ask a fundamental question: Why does it matter to us if the Afghans grow poppy? Little Afghan product makes its way to the U.S. Most Afghan poppy goes to Russia and Europe; ours comes from Colombia and Mexico. Is there some reason aside from general disapproval of the substance? The most compelling argument has been that poppy funds the insurgents, so part of the evil of poppy is the terrorism nexus, and eliminating poppy is necessary to control the insurgency. (Some U.S. domestic anti-drug propaganda asserts that smoking a joint is in effect funding a terrorist.)

Let’s examine the costs at issue. While working in Helmand, I asked the Marines S2 shop what it cost the insurgency to operate. I.e., what costs must be covered by poppy or other sources of funds? The answer was that there was no information; no one had had any reason to try to estimate it. (For setting policy, perhaps?) Upon further inquiry, the highest estimate I got from any source was $350 million per year. Another source cites $155 million as the yearly Taliban take. Either estimate is peanuts! The insurgency could be funded out of a bake sale. Compare this with the billions that the U.S. is spending to keep our troops in Afghanistan.

Various clues are consistent with the supposition that the insurgency is indeed a low-budget operation. One survey of insurgents captured indicated that most were fighting within 25 km of home. (They could have gone home for dinner.) They also appear to be minimally equipped—wearing salwar kameez, no body armor, flip flops, and armed with AK-47s. (One reason they so easily melt into the population is that they do not have 80 lbs of kit to conceal.) While there are indeed “foreign fighters” present, those seem to be similarly (un)equipped. There is nothing comparable to our ISAF advice, equipment, training, logistics, air assets, medevac, etc.—and of course the payroll for both ANA (Afghan National Army) and ANP (Afghan National Police). We do know our own spending on the Afghan forces—$11.9 billion and we have been talking about $4.1 billion/year for all ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) support after 2014. While costs for American forces and the Afghan forces they advise may not always be easy to disaggregate, the order of magnitude of the ANSF-insurgent difference is clear.

Insurgents of any stripe in any country undoubtedly make use of any resources available. This would include poppy, and Taliban do indeed tax farmers who grow poppy (reportedly 10%). Taxing poppy makes sense because poppy is the only locally available cash crop. It is easy to transport and can be harvested and taxed at a local level—which is consistent with a picture of insurgents fighting close to home. Those Taliban affiliated with al Qaeda, directed out of the Quetta Shura in Pakistan and probably funded by the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) are more likely to be getting resources originating in Saudi Arabia or other Gulf countries rather than in local Helmand poppy fields. While poppy is a convenient resource, it is easily replaced by foreign donations. The insurgencies (and there are several quite distinct reasons for fighting the Karzai government) are therefore sustainable even if poppy were displaced to some location outside Afghanistan.

**Illegality of poppy fuels corruption:** While poppy may or may not fuel the insurgency, it certainly fuels Afghan governmental corruption. A country that supplies 80-90% of the world’s poppy must necessarily be corrupt. Intel in Helmand as of 2011 indicated that the price to purchase a district police chief position was $150,000—and a similar payment would be required each subsequent year. This payment, of course, went to those higher up in the Ministry of Interior, fueling corruption throughout the ministry responsible for the police.

Police chiefs (and Border and Highway Police) naturally expect a return on their investment. In Helmand, this undoubtedly comes from extortion of (or active collusion with) those growing poppy and transporting it along Highway 1 (the Ring Road) through Gereshk, west into Delaram in Nimroz Province, then down the Delaram-Zaranj highway for export into Iran or Pakistan. Extortion of individual citizens at checkpoints was and is a constant problem as well. Some proceeds were likely passed up the chain of command; others probably stay with the local police manning the checkpoints. In either case, the climate of impunity in the Interior Ministry makes it open season on the
hapless traveler. A common theme in Helmand reporting by local Afghan collectors was, “We really appreciate the Americans paving the road, but we can’t drive on it because there are so many ANP checkpoints demanding bribes and we never know how much it will cost.” (Word on the street was that payments required at Taliban checkpoints were at least predictable—which would be consistent with the predictable 10% tax on poppy farmers.) Small wonder that Afghans rarely look to the police for protection; they want protection from the police. No amount of U.S. dollars devoted to police training is going to overcome the incentive structure.

The Afghan Anti-Narcotics Law: On December 18, 2005, Karzai signed into law a Draconian counter-narcotics law. This was viewed in Washington as a huge success and a big step in our war against drugs. The Afghans didn’t see it that way.

The law was drafted by two Assistant U.S. Attorneys on assignment in Kabul with the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ). While there was some consultation with a few Afghans, the document was drafted in English, with concepts and language that would be difficult to render into Dari, and even if translated, not readily comprehensible by Afghan police, prosecutors and judges.20 Even at the time of Karzai’s signing, it was not fully translated into Dari, and not into Pashtu at all.

Buried within the dense text of the 55-page October 3, 2005 draft were provisions including three-strikes sentencing (20 years to life), forfeitures, prohibition of suspended sentences and home leave for prisoners, realignment of police and prosecutorial functions in ways that conflicted with the Penal Code, and procedural details that effectively re-wrote the Interim Criminal Procedure Code—for example, allowing searches and wiretapping in all criminal and intelligence cases, not just in narcotics cases. (All these policy questions should, of course, be the subject of debate in a sovereign country.) When Afghan prosecutors were asked if they understood all this, they were horrified and insisted upon changes. Indeed, one might suspect active attempts by the DoJ drafters to conceal this, they were horrified and insisted upon changes. Indeed, one might suspect active attempts by the DoJ drafters to conceal the entire intent of the legislation from Afghans.21 The draft was captioned (in English) “Law on the Classification of Drugs and Precursors, Regulation of Licit Activities, and Drugs Related Offences”—not exactly a tipoff that this was a counter-narcotics law.

The reason for the fast track process was that Afghanistan’s new Parliament, elected September 18, 2005, was to take office on December 19, 2005. December 18 was the last possible date to enact a law on Karzai’s signature alone. The Afghans (I was working with the Interim Supreme Court at the time) viewed this as a huge affront. We were devaluing their political process and undercutting the new Parliament, and clearly had no respect for their legal system and how laws in Afghanistan are drafted.22 Even as early as 2005, when the Taliban had yet to become resurgent, our insistence on the primacy of drug enforcement was undercutting the rule of law and relations with Afghans.

Under this law, major narcotics cases are prosecuted in the Special Narcotics Court (of dubious constitutionality) in Kabul. DoJ has put approximately $12 million into a special secure courthouse, and recruitment of vetted (by us) judges who are paid $600/month—in comparison with all other Afghan judges who were paid less than $100/month. The Afghan judiciary was not impressed by our priorities—in a country with many blown-up courthouses and a paucity of statute books available. Twelve million dollars could have gone a long ways towards alleviating some of the legal system deficiencies of concern to the judiciary and to the average Afghan citizen. Our aid was given to address U.S. concerns, not Afghan concerns. My prediction is that this court will last only as long as the U.S. finances it.

How would legalization affect Afghanistan? Legalization would have to begin in the U.S. since it is our policy that has been forced upon the rest of the world (something we never attempted to do during Prohibition of alcohol). If poppy were no longer illegal, it would simply become another commodity—supported, taxed or regulated as the country saw fit. Afghanistan could fund its own development and military out of legal exports of a product with worldwide demand. Corrupt Afghan officials would suddenly lose a major source of income, as bribes could no longer be demanded for moving and protecting the product. There would be little reason for individuals to purchase police chief positions and the Afghan National Police might even take up policing. The Taliban would no longer be able to demand protection money from farmers or tax the drug trade. Afghans (and many others in the U.S. and around the world) currently profiting from the illegality of the drug trade would probably be dismayed at this turn of events.

There would, of course, be some transition challenges since government officials would have monopolized current distribution channels. This is not unlike the situation in Chicago after 1933. We still suffer the effects of the organized crime that developed under Prohibition of alcohol (1920-1933).

With some of the underbrush of anti-drug confusion cleared away, we might be able to think more clearly about the Afghan conflict and its drivers. We could differentiate among the various categories of “insurgents.” For instance, in north-
ern Helmand, there are numerous small insurgent networks that seemed to be nothing more than tribal affiliates trying to control their portion of the drug transit near Highway 1. (It reminded me of Chicago street gangs fighting tenaciously over two square blocks of turf.) They have no apparent interest in attacking the United States and we should have no reason to fight them. Similarly, the Baluch in Nimroz were in the import-export business—drugs out and heroin precursor chemicals and Toyota parts in. Again, they have no apparent anti-U.S. animus, but simply want to conduct business. To the extent they have any foreign affairs interests, it is in Baluch independence (their population spreads across eastern Iran, southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan). Both of these “insurgent” categories will fight anyone—including U.S. military—who entered their territory, but if poppy were legal, there would be no U.S. interest in their operations or local disputes. The handful of ideological Taliban, particularly those al Qaeda-affiliated, are the people we should be fighting. A more focused war would increase our effectiveness even with a smaller force.

Other insurgents are simply anti-Karzai government—with good reason given the level of corruption and his refusal to implement the portions of the 2004 Constitution that require elected city, village and district councils, and the election of mayors; Karzai personally appoints every mayor in the country. In 2005, I heard an Afghan-American anthropologist speaking at the American University of Kabul argue that this lack of governmental accountability was the root problem in Afghanistan and the main driver of the insurgency—which was then not yet visible to the rest of us. As he put it, under the current system, “Afghans are not citizens. They are subjects.” The Afghans in the room cheered.

A way forward? Two points of leverage would break the cycle of violence and insecurity in Afghanistan: legalize poppy to remove the violence and corruption, and establish accountable government as required under the 2004 Constitution. (Minimizing interference from Pakistan would also be helpful.) With district and city officials locally elected, “throw the bums out” is a time-honored means of dealing with corrupt or incompetent officials. It is probably too late in the game for us to insist upon implementation of the Constitution. Our leverage is gone.

We do, however, have control over legalization of poppy, and have the power to remove the incentives for violence and corruption that illegality engenders—in the U.S. and worldwide as well as in Afghanistan. We can call a halt to our destructive war on Afghan poppy and for our remaining time in the country, concentrate on activities that contribute to Afghan stability and safeguard our genuine long-term interests.

Notes:

1 Ms Fryklund, JD, PhD, is a former Chicago prosecutor who has spent almost five years in Afghanistan as well as working in Iraq, Tajikistan, Kosovo and the West Bank. She was USAID’s Rule of Law Adviser in Kabul 2004-06 and Field Program Officer covering the Jalalabad and Mehtarlam PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in 2006. In 2007, she worked with UNDP on the Afghan National Development Strategy. She worked with the Afghan Independent Election Commission on the 2009 Presidential Election and was part of the post-election vote fraud investigation in Kandahar. She also worked on a municipal governance project in Kandahar 2010-11, and was ROL/Governance Adviser to the Marine Corps HQ in Helmand, 2011-12. She is a member of LEAP, Law Enforcement against Prohibition.


3 In retrospect, it appears that the Taliban were not so much ideologically opposed to poppy as desirous of cornering the market and profiting from the expected price increase.

4 Personal communication.


6 UNODC 2012 World Drug Report at 60.

7 It is cited as some sort of indictment of Afghanistan that it supplies 90% of the world’s poppy. Whether worldwide demand is 5 kilos or 5000, 100% of the demand must be supplied from somewhere. Given that poppy must be produced to satisfy worldwide demand, it is not obviously better to have it dispersed around the world rather than concentrated in one country.


9 Aarne Heikkila, NBC News, November 13, 2013, Afghanistan opium production hits record despite billions spent to combat trade.

10 Don Chisholm, Professional Military Education (PME) lecture delivered at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand, October 23, 2011.

11 IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 19 October 2010, AFGHANISTAN: Pomegranate farmers rue Kandahar fighting.

12 U.S. State Department Media Note (website). U.S. and Afghanistan Announce $18.2 Million in Good Performers Initiative Awards for Provincial Counternarcotics Achievements (Feb. 13,
2013). “GPI awards are given to provinces that achieved or retained poppy-free status, reduced net poppy cultivation by more than 10 percent over the previous year, or made other exceptional counternarcotics efforts during the cultivation season. Twenty-one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces received GPI awards, including 17 provinces that earned $1 million awards for being poppy-free.”


14 Of course, some governors, such as Mohammad Noor Atta in Balkh and Gul Aga Sherzai, until recently Governor in Nangarhar, have enough independent resources—often due to appropriating the customs revenue—that they cannot be involuntarily dislodged. However, that is a reflection of local power politics and availability of fighters, not of the Constitutional scheme.


19 We might also ask why the highly funded Afghan Army is unable to prevail against the under-resourced insurgents. See e.g., Inge Fryklund, Training the Afghan National Army, SWJ Blog Post, August 1, 2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/training-the-afghan-national-army.

20 The law was also drafted from an Anglo-American Common Law perspective, including terms such as “reasonableness.” The drafters may not have understood that Afghanistan is a Civil Code country, with its formal legal system based on the French Civil Code. They also talked about the need for “precedential” cases, a concept irrelevant in a Civil Code legal system.

21 One of the DoJ drafters once said to me, “All we want the Afghans to do is adopt what we write for them.”

22 The project that I was overseeing for USAID in Kabul in 2004-06 worked with the interim Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice. Afghanistan has a sophisticated legislative drafting bureau (the Taqnin) within the Ministry of Justice, which publishes newly enacted legislation in the Gazette. Issues of the Gazette were sequentially numbered beginning in 1964, and by 2004 the sequence was up to the 800s. (The law-drafting process carried on unabated throughout all the years of conflict under the Soviets, Taliban and warlords.) One of the first requests to our project was for help locating the statutes; many copies had been physically destroyed during the years of fighting. It took about six months and a number of Afghan judges, prosecutors and lawyers pitching in, but the team successfully located every issue of the Gazette. USAID printed copies of the most frequently referenced laws and distributed them to all courthouses. In a two-year project, all 37,000 pages of the Gazettes were typed into a fully word-searchable database distributed on CD-ROM. Afghanistan is not a country without law!

23 Interestingly enough, Robert Gates’ new memoir, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (2014) mentions Afghan governmental corruption and incompetence as an obstacle to winning the war, but never pursued the implications of that insight, focusing only on military solutions. He noted only that more civilians from USAID and State were needed to train government officials, but training is a minor issue when the fundamental problem is accountability, and it is hard to see the point of training when any official can be moved around at will by Karzai. I personally have never seen evidence that Afghan officials, particularly at local level, were in any need of training in order to manage their own affairs. Any training deficit pales into insignificance in comparison with the lack of authority and structural accountability.
NATO – TEPSO WG
PKSOI participated at the Spring 2014 meeting of NATO TEPSO WG (Training and Education for Peace Support Operations). Results: A draft of a training idea on Protection of Civilians was discussed and the proposal of PKSOI waits for approval by NATO. Also discussed Gender, C-IED and Counter Insider threats.

PSOTEW
2014 Peace & Stability Operations Workshop (PSOTEW) got underway at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia on Monday, March 24. The workshop’s objective was to develop recommendations to benefit all within the community of practice. The theme for this year’s workshop was “Partnerships and Innovation: Novel approaches to Training, Educating, and Engaging in Peacekeeping and Stability Operations.” Details will follow in the next PKSOI journal.

EXERCISE VIKING 2014
PKSOI’s deputy director COL Ed Lowe and Dr. Karen Finkenbinder provided policing subject matter expertise to UN personnel at exercise Viking 14 hosted and organized in Sweden by Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Swedish Armed Forces.

EXERCISE SOUTHERN ACCORD/WESTERN ACCORD
COL Randy White attended the Final Planning Events for USARAF exercises Western & Southern Accord to finalize the PKSOI requirements for a variety of academic instruction which will take place in the week prior to each exercise. Western Accord will be held in Dakar, Senegal with ECOWAS partners from 14-27 June. Southern Accord will be held in Lilongwe, Malawi with SADC partners from 12-25 July.

Protection of Civilians
From 18-20 March, PKSOI participated in a mobile education and training team that provided instruction to Colombian judge advocate generals in Armenia City, Colombia. This program was conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) which is based in Newport, Rhode Island. DIILS conducts numerous international missions to help develop the legal capacity in foreign militaries, and this particular engagement was intended to help Colombia prepare for expanded participation in UN peacekeeping missions. PKSOI provided classes on UN Peacekeeping, national policy-making, and the Protection of Civilians. This was the third DIILS engagement to Colombia that PKSOI has supported in recent months.

The Rule of the Clan
On April 16, at Dickinson College the author Mark S. Weiner, presented his new book, The Rule of the Clan which discusses the role that existing tribal and clan-based legal systems have on the democratic political development of a nation and the specific problems that arise from the conflict between existing clan ties and government institutions. Following his presentation, panelists Ms. Carol Horning, PKSOI’s visiting professor of International Development from USAID, and Andrew Wolf, assistant professor of political science at Dickinson College, discussed clan rule and conflict.
PKSOI is developing an Army manual on the Protection of Civilians (PoC), which refers to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and create a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. PoC is a moral, political, legal, and strategic priority for multidimensional peacekeeping and other military operations. Communities on the ground and around the world expect uniformed personnel to protect the population; failure to do so jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the operation and can undermine other objectives. The manual, which will be designated as Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, expands on PoC doctrine in other publications and will be published in early 2015. If you are interested, please contact Mr. Dwight Raymond via email at allen.d.raymond2.civ@mail.mil
The 2008 version of FM 3-07, Stability Operations, was broken up into three separate publications. All three publications are entitled Stability. The first two, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP 3-07, were published in August 2012. The ADP covers the fundamental principles of stability in operations. The ADRP provides a more detailed explanation of these principles. Think of the ADP as the executive summary of the ADRP.

The division of the 2008 version of FM 3-07 has caused a major revision of the field manual to occur. Because the principles are covered in the ADP/ADRP, the 2014 version of the FM does not cover the fundamental principles.

The FM’s purpose is to add detail on how Army forces will employ those principles throughout all types of military actions - from peace through war. Some of the topics emphasized in the new FM are transitions, assessments, considerations in various types of operations, and considerations in the whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches. The new FM also sets up the organization of stability tasks across the stability framework, which is discussed in detail in the Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Stability Techniques, published in 2012.

The ATP will be revised over the next year to keep it in line with the ADP/ADRP/FM suite of publications.

Revision of U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability Operations

As the action agency for the Department of Defense joint proponent on stability and peace operations, PKSOI assumed the lead authorship for JP 3-07, Stability Operations. The revision of the 2011 version of JP 3-07 is in the initial stages and the program directive is expected to be published soon. The revision will take place over the next two years with JP 3-07 scheduled for publication in October 2015. The initial draft will be staffed in the fall of 2014. The planning for an organizational meeting is in its early stage. Tentatively, it will be held in May or early June to flesh out a table of contents, examine a revision of the definition, and gain volunteers to assist in writing sections of the JP. If you are interested, please contact Mr. Michael Esper via email at michael.esper@us.army.mil.
PKSOI supports the development process at UN of guidance material with the valuable leadership of Member States (MSs).

The purpose of developing the UNMUM is to provide unit/sub-unit Commanders and staff with a reference guide in support of their planning and conduct of operations to execute UN mandated tasks. The implementation of standards should enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency, and improve safety and security of peacekeepers in the field. The project will also meet a request for support from several TCCs and senior officers in field missions.

The UNMUM has the following characteristics: 1) guidance document and not imposing solutions; 2) guidance is generic in nature, to be adapted by relevant stakeholders; 3) lay out only minimum standards; 3) aligned to reflect UN values, policies and practices.

These Manuals will be read in conjunction with the UNIBAM and Force Headquarters (FHQ) Manual, particularly with regard to guidance on UN policies and practices, as well as the mission support aspects.

The UNMUM shall serve the following audiences: 1) TCCs military leadership and planners, Peacekeeping Training Institutes (PKTIs), unit/sub-unit Commanders and national staff; 2) field mission leadership, including the Head of Military Component or Force Commander (HoMC/FC), FHQ staffs, subordinate headquarters and staff, and mission support entities; 3) UNHQ planners at Office of Operations (OO) and Office of Military Affairs (OMA) for the purpose of planning and force generation; 4) Department of Policy, Evaluation & Training (DPET) in formulating training standards; and 5) donor MSs in third party assistance in the field, e.g., training, equipment.
PKSOI developed the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Program of Instruction (POI) to meet the needs of United States Army trainers who may be required to train partner nations for service on UN peacekeeping missions. The 30-hour POI focuses on missions and tasks unique to UN peacekeeping which are not contained in an Army unit’s Decisive Action Missions Essential Task List (DA METL). PKSOI developed the course in response to tasking in the RAF EXORD. The POI and accompanying training materials are derived from UN required training materials and intended to provide a shared understanding of the principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent manner. The overall structure of the training provides basic understanding of UN peacekeeping operations, important Peacekeeping tasks such as protective of civilians, and hand-on situational training and command post exercises. At the end of training, full training support packages are issued to trainers for use with partners. For more information or to schedule training, contact Dave Hagg, PKSOI Stability Operations Training and Education Coordinator at 717-245-4479 or david.l.hagg.civ@mail.mil.
Same Objectives; Different Perspectives: Assessing the Civil-Military Culture Gap in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response

by Mr. Ryan P. Burke
Ph. D. candidate
University of Delaware
Introduction

When United States Marines landed in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013, it marked the 44th time in 8 years that the U.S. military has engaged in international humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Historically, the U.S. military participates in less than 10 percent of international disaster response and relief missions. However, when the U.S. military does participate, they often operate alongside civilian actors from a variety of aid agencies. Domestic civil support operations are no different. When called to support civil authorities, the U.S. military regularly engages with and operates alongside civilian personnel, often from varying backgrounds and differing cultural perspectives. The cultural differences between civilian actors and military forces create seemingly palpable tensions during critical response operations both domestically and abroad. This paper attempts to examine the root of these tensions by assessing the apparent cultural gap between civilian and military organizations during disaster response operations. It offers new knowledge to the civil-military culture gap conversation by presenting a series of observations from a different lens; one that blends recent military experience with ongoing scholarly research. From this perspective, the paper argues that both military and civilian organizations think they understand the cultures operating alongside them when, in reality, they do not. After thoroughly examining the nature of the reasons for the differences and the apparent effect on interaction and cooperation, the paper will outline a series of recommendations intended to improve our ability to bridge the aforementioned gap and ultimately enhance our joint operational response capabilities and capacities.

Assessing the Cultural Divide: Research-based Observations

The apparent cultural divide between civilian and military actors is evident across several mediums: research literature, direct observation, and informational interviews among others. In order to assess the civil-military culture gap, this research effort combines an in-depth literature review of relevant civil-military publications, recent military experience/observation, and several personal interviews with current military officers and civilian aid workers alike. Based on the research presented, the common recurring themes noted that contribute to the civil-military cultural divide are: different values; stereotyping; conflicting mission priorities/intent; risk perception; and role legitimacy (Table 1).

Values

At the philosophical level, civilian organizations such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) hold greatly different values than their military counterparts. Whereas military personnel generally value structure, discipline, chains of command, and attention to detail, NGO/PVOs generally prefer flexibility, freedom of choice, and loosely defined lines of authority. These divergent values influence widely disparate approaches and actions during disaster response events. The notable differences in value systems between the two translate not only into differing approaches; it also results in routine stereotyping and assumptions that help to widen the cultural gap through animosity and contention.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 1: Assessing the Civil Military Culture Gap</th>
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<td><strong>Civilian</strong></td>
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Stereotyping

Of the themes noted, none is more pervasive than stereotyping. Whether researching articles outlining civil-military tensions or speaking with people representing both cultures, both sides concede that there is a growing distance between the military and civilian workers regarding organizational stereotypes. To compound the tensions already present as a result of divergent core values, military and civilian organizations seem to share mutual contempt towards each other as a result of cultural assumptions and stereotypes; most of which are rather negative. This pervas-
sive negative stereotyping continues to erode the already fragile
relations between military and civilian organizations during
disaster response. While there is no shortage of examples to
draw from, trying to understand the root of these stereotypes
has proven to be a challenge.

The culture-clash and lack of cooperation between military and
civilians “can be largely blamed on a two-way lack of familiarity
for the attitudinal abyss which separates aid workers from the
military.”5 We can assume that this lack of familiarity stems
from a dearth of personnel experienced in both military and
civil aid organizations. Just as one without military experience
would find it difficult to understand certain aspects of a military
culture, the same can be said for those lacking civil aid experi-
ence. This is not a unique challenge to civil-military operations.
Like many interacting organizations, military and civilian work-
ers operate under different doctrine and language and come
from distinctly different training backgrounds. These basic
organizational differences and a lack of understanding facilitate
stereotypes that are rampant and condescending:

For example: the military is often characterized as an
insensitive, ill-informed, controlling, and inflexible
war-machine, while NGO personnel are seen as san-
dal-wearing, two-faced, undisciplined and uncoordinat-
ed liberals.6

Beyond this, military officers largely assume relief workers and
other such civilian aid personnel to be “do-gooders” ignorant
to the broader scope surrounding domestic and international
response efforts (politics, diplomacy, finances, etc; all of which,
according to military personnel, have significant influence on
the conduct of response operations).7 Likewise, civilian aid
workers see military personnel, especially officers, as rigid, au-
uthoritarian, and abrasive toward those outside of the military.8
These are shared sentiments observed by other researchers in
previous studies:

(military) Officers simply did not see women in their
late-twenties wearing Birkenstock sandals and ‘Save the
Whales’ T-shirts as experts worthy of consultation. At
the same time, many relief workers saw military officers as
inflexible, conservative and bureaucratic.9

The negative perceptions are not limited to attitudinal dif-
ferences. Civilian and military personnel regularly characterize
the other’s operational approaches as ineffective or improper. For
instance, civilian aid workers, researchers, and others unfamiliar
with military doctrine routinely refer to the military approach
to operations management as “command and control.” While
this is an appropriate use of terminology, the perception of com-
mand and control methods is largely inaccurate and a source of
unwarranted frustration between military and civilian counter-
parts in HA/DR and/or civil support contexts.

For decades, military command and control was viewed as the
“dominant model” of disaster response.10 According to research
observations, this military model advocated for rigid centraliza-
tion, structured hierarchal approaches, and closed communica-
tions in an effort to establish a “command over the chaos and
regain control over the disorganization of individuals.”11 These
assumptions are still prevalent in the research literature and in
the minds of many aid workers despite the changes in today’s
modern military doctrine. Researchers and NGOs criticize this
approach and instead advocate for a decentralized, coordinated,
and collaborative approach to disaster response.121314 However,
the Civil Defense and Vietnam-era perspectives of the U.S. mil-
tary held by many are ironically rooted in “false assumptions
and inappropriate analogies” in a manner contrasting Dynes’
(1994) like-titled article that evaluates the different approaches
to disaster response.

In contrast to Dynes’ and others’ assertions in the research,
today’s military is an adaptive and agile force in readiness. The
military’s adoption of decentralized leadership is the same
approach supported by researchers; a method of flexible con-
tral and decision making noted to be the best course of action
for disaster response. While hierarchical chains of command
provide organizational structure, modern military leadership
philosophies now advocate for increased autonomy and decen-
tralized decision making down to the lowest level of the com-
mand structure.15 This is similar to the coordinated approach
to emergency management advocated by scholars and NGOs
alike. However, this is an unrealized parallel due to the mis-
conceptions of military command and control stemming from
outdated knowledge and sustaining assumptions.16 This lasting
misconception has resulted in a growing consensus among
researchers and civilians that American military officers are “ar-
rogant martinets’ that demand the blind obedience of mindless
brutes”17 Instead, modern military command and control:

...tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Or-
ders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying
on subordinates to effect the necessary coordination
and on the human capacity for implicit communica-
tion—mutual understanding with minimal information
exchange. By decentralizing decision making authority,
mission command and control seeks to increase tempo
and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly
situations.18

Despite fears that the ‘military machine’ will roll into a disaster
and exert unnecessary command and control over the situation,
military response is likely to be one that fosters flexibility and
improvisation and is therefore more conducive to collaboration with civilian organizations operating within the same area. Unfortunately, this realization requires more integration and cooperation between military and civilians during disaster response; something that continues to prove problematic despite years of research suggesting the same.

Improving civil-military interaction and cooperation is challenging due to the aforementioned attitudinal differences, divergent values, and continued negative stereotyping. Beyond values, structures, and stereotypes, military and civilian organizations approach humanitarian aid and disaster response missions from greatly different perspectives. While the main objective in most scenarios is consistent for both (save lives, prevent suffering, and aid in recovery), the intent of most military response missions conflicts with the intent of their civilian counterparts.

**Mission Intent**

In areas where the military operated alongside PVO’s, the military thought its mission was to complete a project and move out. In contrast, PVO’s were committed to a longer timeframe. This difference in perspective caused friction as the military viewed PVO’s as part of the problem. The PVO’s viewed the military as failing to address the underlying issues.¹⁹

Not surprisingly, there is a difference of opinion between the role of the military and civilian organizations in HA/DR operations. On paper, it seems, the objectives of each are consistent. Military and civilian organizations both strive to provide relief that contributes to saving lives, preventing suffering, and aiding in recovery. However, research illustrates that the approach toward achieving these objectives is vastly different. Some suggest that military forces are often insensitive and apathetic to the social needs of victims during response efforts. Instead, others argue that military forces are solely focused on immediate mission objectives such as providing food, water, shelter, and emergency medical assistance.²⁰²¹²² With this perceived “stop the bleeding” approach, some view the military as caustic, abrasive, and socially inept during disaster assistance and response.²³²⁴²⁵ Many view military HA/DR as a short-term solution to a long-term problem. According to these same perspectives, response efforts using military forces are chiefly engineered by Washington bureaucrats for the sole purpose of achieving political objectives and without concern for the long-term social impacts in disaster affected areas.²⁶ Researchers even suggest that the DoD views civilian organizations in HA/DR as “soft weaponry” for democracy building operations.²⁷ The DoD by contrast views itself as a superior response force capable of providing “unmatched capabilities in logistics, transportation, command, control, and communications.”²⁸ The perceived civil-military mission disparities were distinctly noted in 1993 during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia:

Military actors frequently clash with civilian actors over basic questions of the means and ends of their mission, based on differing conceptions of the mandate. The two cultures also differ in methods of decision-making, approaches to accountability, operational and management styles (command structures, hierarchy and procedure versus fast-moving flexibility and decentralization), use of force, approaches to time and success (short-term objectives versus long-term processes), media styles (theatrical versus secrecy and control), and relationship with the local populations.²⁹

From humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1993 to more recent humanitarian missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, perhaps the biggest contributor to the conflicting perspectives is the emphasis on operational security. In many cases, military personnel emphasize security as the primary focus necessary to accomplish a given mission. From the military perspective, a secure environment facilitates more efficient, effective, and safe aid distribution for participating civilian personnel. In contrast, NGO/PVO, and other civilian aid groups view military presence, mostly in international efforts, as a reason to be concerned about security. From the NGO/PVO perspective, military forces symbolize conflict and violence and present likely targets for acts of war and/or terrorism.³⁰ Aid workers think of themselves as a neutral presence in humanitarian operations. Without military presence, security concerns are minimized due to the generally peaceful nature of humanitarian aid operations.³¹

For military personnel trained in combat skills and tactics, neutrality is a more abstract concept. In certain operational environments (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, etc.), military forces sometimes see unarmed, non-combatant aid workers as “easy targets” for terrorist activity. From the military perspective, altruism does not create an invisible blanket of protection from certain acts of violence possible in unstable areas. These notable tensions generate additional conflict and substance for increased risk perception among both military and civilian personnel within the HA/DR mission.

**Risk perception**

As discussed, NGO/PVOs in the humanitarian space often see the military as a threat to their own security. In many cases according to researchers, military intervention is objectionable in the minds of civilian aid workers for this exact reason; the presence of military personnel “blurs the line” between aid worker
tensions, assessing the effect of these tensions to achieve consensus agreement and directed courses of action towards improvement is more challenging.

**Assessing the Effect on Interagency Cooperation and Interaction**

After reviewing the relevant research and speaking with both military and civilian aid workers, it is clear that the above listed cultural issues have a pronounced effect on the ability of military and civilian organizations to effectively interact and cooperate. Despite opposing views regarding the proper approach to HA/DR operations, experienced military and NGO/PVO personnel, as well as some researchers, acknowledge the need for successful integration between the two entities. Still, there are oppositions to this perspective.

Those who oppose enhanced integration between civil-military force structures emphasize, among other things, the aforementioned risks to NGO/PVO personnel operating with military personnel. Another opposing position suggests that large converging operations presumably involving military forces are incapable of addressing the underlying social needs of affected populations. This position supports the notion previously addressed that some NGOs perceive military forces as intruding war fighters rather than aid forces; and in contrast, view themselves as authentic humanitarians and experts in HA/DR operations. Lastly, NGO/PVOs contend that governments providing military forces during HA/DR operations are not always committed to long-term recovery. Thus, according to researchers and NGO/PVOs alike, military intervention in HA/DR missions often results in slowed recovery, hindered development efforts, and an increased dependency on foreign aid. In this context, NGO’s see the military as uncommitted to recovery and dismissive of long-term development issues. This adds to the existing tensions between civilian aid workers and military personnel operating within the same area. Further, these tensions reinforce cultural motivations for civilian aid workers to reclaim the HA/DR territory as their own. The cultural divide and sense of competition propagates increased condemnation between civilian and military perspectives, ultimately leading to negative effects on interaction and cooperation. The resulting effect is stove piping of information, mission creep and competition, and in some cases, profit marginalization (Table 2).

**Stove Piping**

Regardless of the setting, both researchers and practitioners agree that multi-actor interagency response efforts require effective information sharing and collaboration. “Stove piping,” a common metaphor used in government circles to describe compartmentalization of information, often occurs when
organizations fail to establish cordial working relationships and therefore refuse to share information. In the case of HA/DR, civil-military operations regularly encounter stove piping as a result of the cultural divide present. As discussed, both military and civilian workers often maintain negative stereotypes of their respective counterparts. This can facilitate the withholding of mission-critical information that ultimately leads to less effective response efforts and further conflict. Part of the motivation for withholding information, on both sides, is in an effort to maintain role legitimacy by avoiding mission creep.

### Mission Creep

During response efforts, every participating organization has the same basic objective: save lives and prevent suffering. While the tactics for accomplishing this objective vary greatly between the military and civilian organizations, the motivations are quite similar. As a result of tensions over role legitimacy, it is argued that the territorial disputes and competition between civil-military response entities stem from a basic need for effective recruiting and public relations. Recruiting is a business for both military and civilian organizations. While neither is profit-motivated, both entities rely on external funding, whether it is congressional appropriations, donations, or some other form of funding. As is the case with most agencies and organizations, funding is often justified through mission requirements and performance objectives. When organizations need funding, they often look for ways to legitimize their roles. Disasters and other emergencies provide an ideal recruiting platform for responding organizations. Combining media coverage with self-promotion during such events, organizations can leverage the exposure toward recruiting efforts that will ultimately serve to further the organization’s justification for funding and role legitimacy.

In recent years, the U.S. military and civilian aid organizations alike have been actively engaged in recruiting campaigns designed to appeal to a new generational sense of altruism thought to be present among a younger demographic. With current combat operations in Afghanistan nearing an end, the role of the U.S. military will begin shifting towards security and stability operations both at home and abroad. In addition to ongoing NGO/PVO recruiting efforts that rarely change rhetoric, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and even the National Guard have emphasized HA/DR mission capabilities in recent commercials and other recruiting efforts. With the increasing emphasis on recruiting and funding and their connections to mission legitimacy, intense territorial disputes can occur as both the military and civilian components fight for valuable public exposure. This same exposure that can often lead to increased public interest, organizational expansion, greater mission presence and thus justification for increased funding. Given the recruiting value such efforts bring to an organization, there is even more incentive for military and civilian response agencies to participate in disaster response efforts. However, more extensive, stove piped, and competing responses can also have a negative effect on profit-driven companies, furthering the divide between civil-military cultures.

### Profit Marginalization

In disasters and emergencies, for better or worse, there is an urgent need for debris clearance, power restoration, fuel distribution, water purification, and other such critical services. In many cases, but more specifically in domestic response efforts, local contractors and other privately owned companies seek to provide these services to affected areas. Sometimes, civilian aid workers and/or military forces engage in a social convergence of sorts, helping to remove debris and assist in other tasks as needed. While not always an issue of concern, such “free labor” comes at a cost, both to the taxpayers and to the contractor who loses business as a result of external assistance. Many such examples of profit marginalization have occurred in past events, with the most recent example occurring during the November 2012 response to Hurricane Sandy in New York.

On November 4, 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps began conducting debris clearance operations on New York’s Staten Island. While the circumstances leading to the request for the Marines’ support are disputed among many with knowledge relevant to the response, the consensus among members of the National Guard and active component military is that debris clearance and removal did not directly contribute to saving lives, preventing suffering, or mitigating great property damage, per the requirements of Department of Defense Instruction 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Instead, according to interview participants, the Marines’ debris clearance activities...
resulted in lost business for local contractors. This loss of business served as the basis for a series of complaints filed on behalf of local civil labor unions, citing violations of certain Economy Act provisions intended to protect such workers. While there is no doubt the Marines’ action on Staten Island benefitted local residents, this support was, by some accounts, in violation of policy and carried out at the expense of the American taxpayer.

The problem is not that the Marines came ashore and supported local authorities by clearing and removing debris; the problem is that local authorities and businesses were not given the opportunity to provide this service using available resources. This oversight in decision making at the local level resulted in lost wages and business for local contractors. The aforementioned cultural divide between civilian and military actors is partially to blame. And while this is a small example, it is indicative of a larger communication and coordination issue facing multi-agency response operations that must be addressed.

Whether the result is stove piping of information that hinders coordination, mission creep and role legitimacy stemming from competition for recruits, or profit marginalization, the effects of civil-military tensions on interagency cooperation are pronounced. Despite regular and consistent efforts to call attention to these issues, the civil-military cultural divide still influences multi-agency coordination and collaboration efforts.

**Research-based Recommendations**

HA/DR operations involving multiple agencies, departments, and organizations will routinely experience turf disputes, disagreements over mission objectives, and arguments regarding the roles and responsibilities of each entity in the area of operation. However, improvements in operational efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved with the proper knowledge and awareness between key personnel at each level and within each organization.

Expanding knowledge, training, and integration between NGO/PVO’s and the U.S. military is one way to improve tensions during HA/DR operations. The military is taking active steps to address these issues. In response to the recent Stability Operations Directive published by the DoD in 2005, the U.S. military has increased its attention to training personnel in civil and foreign affairs, engineering, and psychological operations, specifically. Training more personnel in civil/social engagement will undoubtedly benefit the military and the aid-receiving populace when military forces respond to future disaster scenarios. Beyond this, the military needs to further examine other relevant joint publications and doctrine outlining its role in civil-military operations.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil Military Operations, for instance, provides the military doctrinal approach for planning and coordinating civil-military operations among multiple agencies and organizations. In addition to outlining roles and responsibilities for military forces conducting civil-military operations, JP 3-57 provides detailed guidance for coordinating and collaborating with civil agencies and organizations within the broad range of military operations. Whereas this publication provides over 170 pages of detailed instruction and guidance concerning civil-military operations, the military would benefit from assessing the applicability and usefulness of this reference.

The publication offers notional operational command architectures and suggested performance metrics for civil-military operations, among other things. However, beyond a growing number of specially trained or otherwise tasked personnel within designated military occupational specialties or specialized units, many military personnel that find themselves executing civil-military operations are unfamiliar with this reference and are therefore unable to benefit from or implement its guidance. The U.S. military should design a study to determine the extent to which JP 3-57 is used during actual civil-military operations and to what degree military personnel feel they benefit from the guidance. Are the models, recommendations, and guidance being used? If so, are they effective? If not, then changes should be considered.

Beyond this reference and others like it, the military should also consider expanding its Civil Affairs (CA) training activities, offering more regular and detailed training to members likely to experience civil support and/or HA/DR operations in the future. These training sessions can and should be offered specifically to logistics units responsible for the conduct and execution of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI). In addition, officers and senior enlisted personnel assigned to units that may participate in DoD-relevant National Response Framework Emergency Support Functions should also receive this training.

Training alone cannot solve every issue plaguing civil-military operations. Integrating academic researchers, civilian aid workers, and military forces will serve to accomplish several things. Most notably, integrated research and operational collaboration beyond our current levels will lead to a closure of the culture gap among academics, NGO's, and military practitioners. As discussed, many of the existing tensions between these groups are a result of ill-informed and inaccurate stereotypes. A 2013 Rand report noted successes in using Military Liaison Units between USAID and Pacific Command during several recent Asia-Pacific HA/DR operations. Building on this, the military should consider establishing civil-military operations centers during
training and real world operations. These CMOCs will provide a conduit for both entities to share information via a neutral setting and could potentially alleviate some of the coordination challenges experienced in past events. In addition to designated liaisons and coordination centers, we must engage in and continue to encourage applied research examining civil-military relations in a variety of operational environments.

Much has been said among researchers and practitioners regarding the need to bridge the gap between the military and academia. This particular area of interest is no different. However, unlike other military-focused topics that rarely involve civilian organizations, the civil-military conversation is one that would not only benefit from multiple perspectives, it requires them. Currently, there is a defined bias further dividing this conversation into two distinct perspectives: one representing the military perspective, the other representing the civilian perspective. Many civilian researchers/authors with experience writing on the subject project a decided bias against the military; perhaps due to a lack of military service or an unfavorable past military experience. These researchers largely favor the civilian perspective and cast doubts about the presence of military forces in HA/DR. Likewise, those writing from the military perspective present a decided and expected bias towards the military view. These practices widen the gap further through the promotion of obviously biased, antagonistic, and sometimes inaccurate language, assumptions, and observations about an unfamiliar culture. Continuing to promote biases in research between civilians and military personnel only reinforces the “us vs. them” mentality already present in the civil-military conversation. This does nothing toward enhancing operations and only serves to worsen the problem. We need to create engaging and productive partnerships among civilian researchers, military professionals, and NGO/PVO personnel. The only way to address these issues is through collaboration and communication. Without such action, the gap will only continue to grow leading to worsening tensions and less effective future operations.

Conclusion

This is not the first paper to examine the civil-military culture gap; nor will it be the last. While the existing body of knowledge serves as a substantial foundation for furthering the civil-military culture gap conversation, it lacks the perspective and analysis offered here. The paper combined an extensive literature review with personal interviews and recent military experience to identify trends and themes dividing civil-military cultures during HA/DR operations. These themes were analyzed and presented as causal factors responsible for furthering civil-military tensions. After identifying the themes, the paper assessed the effect these issues have had on past operations and the effect they will continue to have on future civil-military operations. Further, the paper analyzed both the causes and perceived effects of civil-military tensions and provided a series of recommendations for consideration aimed at improving future agency interaction and coordination efforts. Lastly, the paper identified potential courses of action to employ in support of efforts to improve relations between military, NGO/PVO, and researchers alike, noting that it is important to bridge the perceived gap through integrated research and training.

Through increased collaboration among all key actors in HA/DR operations, it is likely that considerable strides can be made toward achieving enhanced working relationships between researchers, NGO’s, and the military. Knowledge gained from a mutual understanding can produce benefits across the broad spectrum of HA/DR and the range of military operations. The key to establishing these relationships is developing an effective approach to bring these perspectives together. Building successful and enduring partnerships is much easier in theory than in practice, however. While this may be difficult, it is not an unattainable goal. What we must realize is, as others have said, regardless of the perspective held on the issue of civil-military operations, the military has and will continue to be a key actor in disaster response operations well into the future. Likewise, civilian aid organizations have and will continue to play an important role in disaster response and recovery. Improving the existing relationships between the military, academia, and NGO/PVO practitioners will lead to enhancements in response operations that will ultimately serve to, per defense support of civil authorities guidance, “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage” (DoDD 3025.18, 2012).

Notes:

2 Ibid., p. 67.
4 Interview conducted by the author with a NGO employee (name and organization anonymity requested), March 2013.
6 Ibid., p. 149.
7 Interviews conducted by the author with officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy who participated in Operation Unified Response (Haiti Earthquake, 2010), February – April 2013.
8 Interview conducted by the author with a NGO employee (name and organization anonymity requested), March 2013.
11 Ibid., p. 145.
12 Ibid., pp. 143-149.
18 Command and Control, p. 79.
20 Duffy, pp. 149-154.
21 McCleary, pp. 154-156.
23 Duffy, pp. 154-156.
28 Ibid.
29 Duffy, p. 149.
30 Interview conducted by author with a NGO employee (name and organization anonymity requested), March 2013.
31 Ibid.
37 McCleary, p. 155.
38 Hannigan, p. 110.
40 McCleary, p. 155.
41 Hannigan, p. 110.
42 Interview conducted by author with a NGO employee (name and organization anonymity requested), March 2013.
43 Interviews conducted by the author with officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy who participated in Operation Unified Response (Haiti Earthquake, 2010), February – April 2013.
44 Rietjens et al., p. 413.
46 Fordham, pp. 58-64.
47 Hannigan, p. 19.
48 Hannigan, pp. 109-111.
50 For more, see Marine Corps recruiting campaign “Towards the Sounds of Chaos”; Navy recruiting campaign “A Global Force for Good.”
51 Interviews conducted by the author with officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and Army National Guard who directly participated in the Hurricane Sandy response in New York, December 2013 – February 2014.
53 Interviews conducted by the author with officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and Army National Guard who directly participated in the Hurricane Sandy response in New York, December 2013 – February 2014.
56 Currently, the DoD is listed as the Coordinator and Primary Agency for National Response Framework Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3, Public Works and Engineering. Per this recommendation, all military units with relevant capabilities (pump units, engineer units, etc) should receive CA training specific to Defense Support of Civil Authorities and/or Foreign Disaster Assistance operations.
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Weaponizing Peace:
Can the Army Prepare a Generation of Warfighters to Become Peacekeepers?

by First Lieutenant Matthew Archuleta
United States Army
As the U.S. Army’s role in Afghanistan transitions from warfighter to adviser, the battle-hardened veterans of multiple deployments will learn what it is like to survive a garrison lifestyle. In confronting a training environment similar to the 1990s, today’s Army faces a major test - after a decade of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations, the Army is no longer asking its active duty members to win the peace, but rather to keep it. My experience as a Platoon Leader highlights the impending paradox at the tactical level: Can the Army prepare a generation of warfighters to become peacekeepers?

The persistent deployment rotations during the last ten years retired much of the breadth and depth of the peacekeeping force of the 1980s and 1990s. The remaining soldiers, who at this point command or lead from the battalion level and above, do not have the strategic peacekeeping experience of their predecessors. According to the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Robert W. Cone, “…we mortgaged our leader development system to provide immediate battlefield leadership.” Therefore the leader development required for Peace Stability Operations (PSO) at the tactical level is almost nonexistent. PSO training also falls short because it lacks a strong institutional foundation. Senior leaders should place an emphasis on reforming the shortcomings of tactical PSO training now that instability in North Africa and the Middle East are gaining global attention. The Army should institute an integrated PSO leader development program focused on theory, planning, mission command, tactics, and training to meet the ensuing challenge.

I returned from Afghanistan in September 2012, after serving as an infantry platoon leader in 1BCT, 82nd Airborne Division - then heralded as the last combat brigade to be deployed in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Now it is described as the “last major clearing operation” of the war. I am presently an infantry platoon leader with the first active duty brigade to deploy to Kosovo in support of OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN since 2002. The banner under which a soldier deploys in no way reduces the threat of personal injury; danger is as present to advisers as it is to combatants. I do not believe I have a unique perspective because I am one of the last warfighters, but because I am one of the first peacekeepers of my generation.

As the American military exits the country’s longest conflict, the United States must redefine its Army’s role. With an abundance of young combat leaders, the Army strives to mentor and develop its human capital like never before. By guiding tactical leaders toward a broader form of “military leadership” - the “why,” not just the “how” - they may adapt to any operational environment. For example, soldiers learned for over a decade that distance fosters safety. Now as peacekeepers, soldiers must walk through congested areas without thumbing their weapon. Soldiers are finding themselves on the inactive setting of the binary scale. The Army can reverse the training deficit now and equip leaders with the proper tactical and mission command training. Leaders can guide this generation’s transition from warfighter to peacekeeper.

The Binary Army

Does an army moving away from conflict automatically mean it is transitioning toward peacekeeping? Despite claims of being capable of “full spectrum” operations, the Army only excels at a single task. While the Army as an institution is capable of Unified Land Operations (ULO), units are constrained by mission, resources, and time from reaching their full potential of combining offense, defense, and stability.

Institutionally, Army doctrine has evolved over the last 30 years to meet threats presented to the United States by state and non-state actors alike. The Army’s operational concepts, AirLand Battle through Unified Land Operations, adapted to the changing battlefield by taking a more holistic approach. Unified Land Operations “introduces combined arms maneuver and wide area security as means to link offense, defense, and stability operations to the purpose of gaining and maintaining the initiative.”

Doctrinally, the U.S. Army maintains the capacity for both conflict and peacekeeping, circumventing chaotic transitions of a binary force.

Operationally, brigades that are able to rapidly and effectively transition between offense, defense, and stability meet the doctrinal standard and may exist in the future. Currently, however, most units are only capable of maintaining a functional offensive or defensive mission set based on available resources and time. The Army Force Generation (ARFOR-GEN) cycle of persistent deployments, coupled with rotational leave, only allow units at the operational level to conduct a handful of offensive and defensive mission essential training exercises annually. Furthermore, strategists place little to no emphasis on stability training due to nearsightedness focused too heavily on the “clear” and “hold” phases of an operation. The lesson learned from Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the significance of how a practiced and systematic “build,” or stability, phase advantageously affects the end state.

From the Platoon Leader to the Brigade Commander, there is only so much time, resource availability, and opportunity to
train for each mission set. Therefore, the inability of the Army to meet its doctrinal potential will lead to separate units ready for either PSO or ULO. At present, that capability is far from realized. Instead, brigades and battalions prepare for deployment by attempting to sieve crucial priorities of the operation. On the ground, whether proficient in offensive, defensive, and/or stability operations, tactical leaders will apply Mission Command to determine the lethality necessary to accomplish the mission.

Inculcating Peace

The Army exists to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill the nation’s military responsibilities. Leadership is the principle Warfighting Function in the Army’s drive to fulfill this comprehensive and challenging mandate. Army doctrine defines Leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” With the mission in mind and Leadership defined, my unit prepared for the elusive purpose, direction, and motivation for a “peacekeeping” mission my generation has only seen in movies.

As an American, acknowledging the purpose behind a peacekeeping mission in a location with a history of ethnic conflict is the easy part - the purpose of every action we take while in support of OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN revolves around maintaining a “Safe and Secure Environment (SASE)” and protecting “Freedom of Movement (FOM)” for all citizens of Kosovo. After more than a decade at war, the tactical leaders of my generation are wary of long-term constabulary operations around the world, but once we studied the history of the region, we understood the necessity behind our presence. Upon arrival in Kosovo, the palpable and festering ethnic divide confirmed we understood the necessity behind our presence. Upon arrival in Kosovo, the palpable and festering ethnic divide confirmed our sense of purpose.

Of the three aspects of leadership, direction proved to be the most difficult to define for this mission. The conflict/mission falls under several doctrinal publications that vaguely guide the strategy for keeping the peace. These documents include the Army Joint Publication (AJP), United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, and Military Technical Agreement (MTA). Upon receiving the mission, these references directed my higher headquarters toward a goal, but the lack of peacekeeping experience impeded the translation of task and purpose from strategy to the tactical level. The heavy pre-deployment influx of personnel combined with a general inexperience with PSO resulted in a paralysis of the Brigade staff’s mission intent.

At the tactical level, a diplomatic agreement is not a tangible path toward mission success. Sometimes it takes a bold and unpopular decision to help the lowest echelon understand the direction needed to meet the mission end state. For my unit, that decision came within weeks of deploying - all Soldiers would wear the Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP) equipment on the deployment, a decision vociferously opposed and strictly enforced. At the time, we did not understand why the order made sense. Tactically, the UCP pattern blends in poorly with a heavily vegetated environment. Additionally, Army “one size fits all” equipment can inhibit shooter efficiency. Soldiers plainly saw this as a tactical and financial burden while the intent of the decision relied on a simple concept: If we are the first active duty unit to replace a National Guard unit in over ten years, then in order to avoid concerning or scaring the populace, we should resemble the units that came before us.

Though direction proved the most difficult tenant of Leadership to define in the context of OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN, many leaders predicted that motivation for a peacekeeping mission would be the most challenging to garner. By reaching out to tactical leaders, units can muster the will to succeed in any situation or environment. Without those leaders, the mission is sure to hemorrhage personnel as soldiers lose focus. The threat comes from two directions, the deployed environment and the home front. Not surprisingly, the generally safe setting of Kosovo, combined with greater technological amenities, facilitates a larger danger as soldiers with more distractions lose focus. Any leader past or present can attest to complacency being the most prominent self-inflicted risk to both combat and non-combat environments. The battle for motivation occurs at the tactical level, but the result reverberates across the operational and strategic levels.

Having studied peacekeeping operations and cultural engagement at the United States Military Academy at West Point, I spent nearly four years of my education exploring the possibility of a peacetime mission. One course in particular, “Winning the Peace” (WTP), emphasized the magnitude of operations tactical leaders faced in Iraq and Afghanistan and how those missions do not always result in peacekeeping. The course description calls attention to the situations leaders encounter:

For years, Lieutenants have been leading missions with strategic influence in some of the most challenging environments imaginable. Assisted by a multitude of organizations and countries, junior officers are expected to help resettle displaced populations, restart economies, form local governing councils, lead town hall meetings, rebuild schools, train local security forces, and rebuild
the basic physical and societal infrastructure. While our technological superiority and professionalism make us the greatest Army the world has ever known, this does not necessarily translate into success in stability, security, transition, reconstruction (SSTR) or peace operations. This course aims to fill that gap by creating strategically-minded Citizen Soldiers for the United States Army at the Company Grade level.

The exposure to cultures and scenarios that WTP facilitated proved to be my most personally rewarding course at West Point. That type of leadership exposure is what makes the difference to tactical leaders because no matter where I am, when I am not pulling the trigger I am shaking a hand.

**Weaponizing Peace**

During my pre-deployment training with my first unit, the 82nd Airborne Division, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) trained and validated my platoon as tactically competent and qualified to engage in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 2012, the training revolved around the tactics, techniques, and procedures that Taliban fighters use against Coalition Forces. The training focused on reacting to small arms fire, vehicle borne IED’s, suicide vests, and working alongside a foreign army (in this case, the Afghan National Army). The training was especially demanding due to its intense scenario-based environment: JRTC modeled every day to represent the worst possible day in Afghanistan. Luckily, as is the intent of the Army’s hierarchical structure, I had over 75 months of combat experience in the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) whom I had the privilege to lead. Their experiences helped shape my platoon’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) quickly and effectively.

This year, the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center (JMRC) trained and validated my specialty platoon as tactically competent and qualified to engage in Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Kosovo. The training revolved around reacting to unexploded ordinance (UXO), crowd riot control (CRC), and establishing traffic control points (TCP’s). The training was especially frustrating due to its dynamic scenario-based environment. This time, every day was the worst day in Kosovo. Once again, having a new group of NCO’s with over 75 months of combat experience, not to mention my own, led to the production of our SOPs. Unlike my train-up for Afghanistan, we marred and maimed the procedures repeatedly, exposing a very sobering reality - we had zero experience in PSO.

Each shortcoming highlighted the unspoken conflict between the escalation of force by the on-scene Commander, and the intent of the Brigade Commander. Soldiers complained during CRC training that they lacked the ability to escalate and de-escalate during the intense riot scenarios; they possessed only an “on/off switch” for extreme violence. After struggling through the squad and platoon training, my Squadron Commander espoused a valuable piece of advice before the five-day culminating exercise. He said, “Sometimes doing nothing can be the something that is needed to de-escalate a situation.” Upon completing our exercise, Staff Sergeant Robert Musil, our most combat experienced Platoon Sergeant, became particularly frustrated with the training rotation stating, “How do you train for Peace Stability Operations? It’s like walking into a dark room.” Consequently, we spent a great deal of time examining each task and meticulously applying the five principles of patrolling once we arrived in Kosovo:

**Planning**

The very detailed process of mission planning ensures tactical leaders can develop and deliver the critical information whether the mission will take place in one hour or one week. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan progressed, the strategy in both theaters shifted toward a population-centric fight. During my first deployment, my actions at the tactical level affected the handful of Afghan villages in which I operated. However, in an environment like Kosovo, civilian considerations (ASCOPE and PMESII) are the core of my mission planning and have an effect that ripples across the country and region. The level of detail to which we scrutinize and apply civil considerations to mission planning in Kosovo is directly relatable to the minutiae of enemy courses of action (COA) we prepared for while operating in Afghanistan.

**Reconnaissance**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) unrestricted freedom of movement throughout the country allows for unlimited reconnaissance. However, universal phone/Internet-ownership grants citizens the ability to transmit live data. In Afghanistan, a “spotter” uses a cell phone or radio to warn nearby Taliban and/or target Coalition Forces. This same early warning system is amplified in Kosovo where technology is more accessible - a once busy road suddenly becomes empty immediately after U.S. forces cross the intersection. This is not a new challenge, but continues to affect the accuracy of gathered information.
Security

Any combat veteran will agree that no matter the circumstance, security is paramount. Imagine our dismay when we were told hours before takeoff to the Balkans that we had to stow our M4’s under the plane and our M9’s in our carry-on bags. All my training and experience in Afghanistan taught me that if I am ever without my rifle, without a means to defend myself at a second’s notice, then I have already lost. Growing up in a training paradigm saturated with green-on-blue scenarios, the concept of a truly “secure” area is foreign to my generation. The notion that a diplomatic agreement can secure my welfare better than I can with my weapon seems both foreign and dangerous.

Control

In any situation involving live ammunition, clear and concise Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be published in order to control the use of force. To produce this level of detail, the Army describes the minimum standard needed - Hostile Acts and/or Hostile Intent. The pendulum of definitive hostile acts/intents has swung back and forth during U.S. involvement in OEF and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Defining the ROE for an environment like Kosovo proved to be the most daunting task for my operational leaders. These limitations adjusted with each new legal briefing, prior to and during the deployment, causing tactical leaders to wince. What had once been the basis for providing soldiers a sense of security in knowing they can defend themselves now seems to be a dilemma that will leave Soldiers undoubtedly hesitant to act.

Common Sense

As mentioned earlier, we had strict orders not to deviate from the UCP pattern for all items. At the operational level, this made sense. However, anyone with combat experience will tell you that a soldier’s kit should be set with “shooter preference” in mind. Soldiers come in all shapes and sizes, left or right handed, and with prior nagging injuries. Therefore, in a combat environment, units typically allow the soldier to wear what passes the common sense test tactically and efficiently. Tactically, the UCP pattern blends in poorly in a heavily vegetated theater. As far as efficiency is concerned, soldiers replace many Army mass-produced items for customized “aftermarket” equipment for comfort and tactical design. In this operating environment, though, risking a split second of efficiency by wearing Army issued ACU equipment has a far greater reward - a less threatening appearance for the local populace. Eventually, after getting the lower echelon leadership buy-in, this passes the common sense test at the tactical level too.

Never before had PSO been a priority for any of us until OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN in Kosovo. The effort to rehabilitate our shortcomings depended heavily on very detailed PSO doctrine. Doctrine without experience can only bring a unit to a very basic level of understanding. The only way to gain necessary PSO experience is to teach and train tactical leaders.

The Training Paradigm

As momentum builds toward peacekeeping missions around the globe, the U.S. military must ask, “What needs to change in the training paradigm?” I entered an environment nearing the end of U.S. dependency, but as more American personnel are being sent to North Africa and the Middle East, the model must change for the future. Since leader development is not merely “the outcome of classes or the product of a sequence of assignments”10 I have five progressive recommendations for today’s army. If the paradigm focuses on theory, planning, mission command, tactics, and training then the Army can meet the ensuing PSO challenge.

First, the Army must incorporate a more direct PSO requirement on commissioning sources. Academy and ROTC cadets are saturated with war fighting functions but not at all with PSO. One article published in Armed Forces Journal, speaks to future PSO: “If history is any guide, we will continue to be called upon to intervene in small wars that test our ability to wage stability operations.”11 I opted to take the “Winning the Peace” course at West Point as an elective, which became the most extensive peacekeeping theory that I studied during my academic career. Future officers require this exposure in the Academies and ROTC programs. Officer Candidates School (OCS), though brief, should also have a PSO academic requirement. By replacing the Combined Arms Integration Development (CAID) emphasis, OCS could employ brief reading lists, online courses, and/or a pen pal mentorship system on PSO. I recommend establishing a relationship with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute for additional resources.

Second, leaders must go beyond theory by planning missions based on existing case studies. The Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) can serve as the “practical exercise” of PSO. BOLC’s can train their branch specific mission set as it pertains to peacekeeping. One study published by the Strategic Studies Institute states that if violence in the Balkans12 escalates significantly, then calls for peacekeeping missions will increase in the region and the US would then have to weigh the costs and benefits of committing ground forces back into the Balkans. Using sce-
narios or case studies of U.S. involvement in PSO such as this one would expand the knowledge and scope of future tactical leaders. Moreover, the NCO Corps could greatly benefit by requiring this same training at the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) for future Squad/Section Leaders. It is vital to emphasize leadership development in peacekeeping at the tactical level.

Third, the Army must develop commanders for PSO. Though training officers in the classroom to communicate, interpret, and implement intent is extremely difficult, employing intent on the battlefield is especially problematic. Leaders can mentor subordinates through practical exercise. LTC Shattuck in “Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence” explains a cost efficient and simple exercise that disseminates commander’s intent down the chain of command. This repetition at the lowest level can have immeasurable effects when soldiers are presented with scenarios that can alter the status quo of a region. Shattuck advises commanders to take the time to develop leaders:

When situations permit, commanders should explain how they arrived at the decision. Explaining the rationale helps subordinates understand and develop similar patterns of thought. Frequent interaction - formal and informal, professional and social - will provide subordinates additional opportunities to learn how their commanders think.

Tactical leaders with a firm grasp of commander’s intent will more likely act toward the desired mission end state precisely. This is especially difficult in PSO since the current interaction with the concept is limited.

Fourth, the Army should integrate tactical leader employment of the commander’s intent during pre-deployment training. The current PSO training offered by JMRC is often both unrealistic and uninformed. There are two reasons for this. Initially, JMRC is at the mercy of the experience level of soldiers stationed at Hohenfels, Germany. Next, the Observer/Controller Teams (OCT) often have less understanding of the operational environment than the deploying unit. Why isn’t there a place for PSO to be trained both by recent veterans of the theater and academics of the region? What if TRADOC created a CONUS Peacekeeping Operations Center (JMPSOC)? This would allow the Army to place nearby soldiers on temporary duty at a fraction of what it costs to send them to Hohenfels, which should mean more OCTs. Having a depth of trainers could mean an OCT paired down to the squad leader level. The training can be broken down into two sites: one city and one plywood village. Soldiers could fly to Ft. Bragg to meet with regional subject matter experts hosted by the Research Triangle rather than expensively travelling to Germany for similar training.

Lastly, train for peace year round. Garrison peacekeeping training should focus on two core functions of the tactical PSO mission set: the shaping and control of the operational environment and the direct application of military techniques. Initially, units must incorporate the shaping and controlling function of PSO into Quarterly Training Plans. Training must emphasize negotiation, Crowd Riot Control, and Traffic Control Points. Moreover, these peacekeeping mission essential tasks provide commanders a unique opportunity to impart presence and intent upon tactical leaders. Next, the unit can most effectively prepare for PSO by training basic military techniques alongside foreign armies. Though potentially costly, if U.S. units could train level-one military tasks with foreign counterparts at least once a year, leaders could identify key cultural and operational friction points while simultaneously fostering much needed professional rapport. Only the military has the relationships with foreign security officials to make any immediate impact on the ground. At the very least, a handful of military liaisons can mitigate future joint complications.

In a time when military officers are calling for greater leadership development, leaders spanning from the tactical to strategic level are getting reacquainted with peace keeping and not peace winning. Thus, leaders are circumventing a decade’s worth of tactical training. Combining that knowledge with a focused PSO training paradigm will develop leaders for the future. By initiating a plan now, the Army can actively recall its stability operations memory while cataloging its COIN institutional memory.

Notes:

MAJ Angelica Martinez provided this syllabus, “XH Winning the Peace Syllabus 10-02,” for the class titled, “Winning the Peace.” The United States Military Academy offered this course in the spring semester of 2010.

LTC Eric S. Crider, Squadron Commander for 1-38 CAV, made this statement on May 06, 2013 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).

SSG Robert Musil, Platoon Sergeant for C Co. (LRS)(ABN), made this statement on May 13, 2013 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).


Ibid., p. 72.

Headquarters, NATO, Army Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Brussels Headquarters: NATO, p. 6-2.

Interns Corner

Natalie Cake
Pennsylvania State University
Project: Research transitional military governance and advisor PKSOI Journal design

Rachel Kass
Dickinson College
Project: Develop a training module on “Transnational Crime” for participants at UN Peacekeeping Missions.

Christopher Wysocki
Pennsylvania State University
Project: Develop a training module on “Gender” for participants at UN Peacekeeping Missions.

Julia Hanks
University of Scranton
Project: Compare, contrast, improve, and link PKSOI’s bedrock documentation, uncover gaps, and consequently identify additional work needed to finalize.

Elizabeth Irwin
Syracuse University
Project: Research on Peace Operations Policy

Jessica Karlberg
Dickinson College
Project: Edit initial draft of US Army Manual on Protection of Civilians (PoC) and assist in developing PoC training for Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)
Interns Corner

Tyler Riegel
Dickinson College
Project: Research and develop course material on “Emerging global challenges and development trends”

Isaac Schaphorst
Dickinson College

Mu Mu
Dickinson College
Project: Research transitional military governance

Tess Whittlesey
Dickinson College
Project: Research the presence of religion in the US Army War College curriculum and develop a curriculum model.

Daniel Smith
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Interested in an Internship?
Contact: Karen Finkenbinder
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A particular SOLLIMS’ resource we would like to showcase in this edition of the PKSOI Journal is the “SOLLIMS Sampler” series. Every quarter we produce a “Sampler” dedicated to a “hot topic” or other key emerging concept within the P&SO arena. A “Sampler” is a lessons-learned compendium that contains just a sample – hence the name “Sampler” in the title – of the observations, insights and lessons, available within the SOL-LIMS database, related to that “hot topic” or emerging concept.

These lessons are worth sharing with senior military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian P&SO practitioners preparing for or currently deployed on a P&SO mission – e.g. UN mission, multi-national peacekeeping mission. This also includes the “institutional” Army, US and international policy makers and other senior leaders at the theater and national levels.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes:

1. **an Introduction** that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the topic area;
2. **the “Quick Look”** that provides a short description of the observations and insights included in the Sampler;
3. **the “Lesson Report”** that shows the full text of the observations and insights; and
4. **links** to additional reports and other references.

Upcoming SOLLIMS Samplers will include the following topic areas:

- Development and Stability
- Security Sector Reform
- Planning Peace & Stability Operations
- Women, Peace, Security
- Trends in HA/DR
- Population Information

We encourage you to Register for a SOLLIMS account so that you too can submit personal Observations and Insights in these areas. We will then be able to include your contributions in these future SOLLIMS Samplers.
Partners Gather to Keep the ‘Peace’ in Peacekeeping Operations

by MAJ Fred Williams

USARCENT Public Affairs
International Peace and Stability in 2013. Since its first peacekeeping operations in the Congo in 1960, Pakistan has provided more than 150,000 soldiers to serve as peacekeepers on 41 different UN peacekeeping operations and has treated more than a million civilians in its deployed military hospitals, as part of its contributions to peacekeeping operations.

“This symposium provided us an opportunity to share our feelings, our experiences with the other members, and we have gained some things which we can contribute once we go back,” said Pakistani Col. Moeen Ud Din, peacekeeping cell analyst. “We have learned a lot from the U.S. Army and the other members who have participated in this symposium.”

Jordan, a top-ten contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and the second largest contributor among U.S. Army Central partner nations, also gave a briefing during the symposium. Jordan briefed the history of its participation in UN peacekeeping operations and also discussed its own NATO-accredited Peace Operation Training Center, which includes a fully functional training village with role players, in addition to classroom instruction. Jordan has lost 38 soldiers in the course of UN peacekeeping duty and has treated more than 4 million civilians at its aid stations and field hospitals during its support of peacekeeping operations.

Throughout our participation in the symposium, we have understood the great efforts undertaken by the United States in peacekeeping operations all over the world,” said Col. Ali Abdallah Ghadaireh, Jordanian chief of peacekeeping branch, joint military directorate. “Jordan also realizes that achieving world peace and security is not the responsibility of only one country, but is the duty of the international community, as a whole.”

U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Central plan to co-host additional symposiums of this kind in the future.

“Peacekeeping and stability operations are, and will continue to be, an integral part of operations conducted by partner nations in the CENTCOM area of operations,” said Mr. Pete Clymer, USARCENT deputy branch chief of the Arabian Peninsula and Levant Branch, international military affairs. “It is a capability that lends itself to developing capacities desired in partner nations, as well as increasing their ability to operate with U.S. forces in other contingency operations.”
Here’s What’s in the Next Edition:

- Peace and Stability Training and Education
- Tackling Africa’s First Narco-State?
- Religion and Peace Operations?

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