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The benefit of peacekeeping operations is a topic that generates robust debate amongst national security professionals. This edition is designed to stimulate new thoughts and discussion on the relative merits of peace operations worldwide. In a world where there are ever increasing financial challenges, demand for more peacekeeping, and even nascent concepts centered around the execution of peacekeeping, the inevitable question is asked—what are the benefits?

Colonel Bo Balcavage, USA, leads off this edition with “PKSOI Supports US Army Exercise Western Accord”. Col. Balcavage along with three other PKSOI staff members traveled to Ghana in support of a premier training and security cooperation event, Western Accord 2013 (WA13). Sponsored by US Africa Command (AFRICOM), this event was designed to promote interoperability between the participating nations. He further describes how the exercise both leveraged and shaped the US Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission across Africa. Moreover, he observed throughout the exercise how important this exercise was in preparing ECOWAS Soldiers for the UN mission in Mali.

Lieutenant Jonathan Ryan, USN, provides intimate detailed, personal account of his personal experience in “Military Observer in West Africa”. In this perspective he discusses the challenging experience in training to be the “eyes and ears” of the United Nations Mission In Liberia (UNMIL) force. In addition, he provides personal detail of his experience traveling to Liberia to serve as an observer and his exciting role in ensuring the security situation remains calm.

Summer interns Cadet Wade Allen, from West Point, and Cadet Chase Englund, from Pennsylvania State University, examine how the United States has approached peacekeeping and the way forward in “Words and Actions; The American Style of Peacekeeping”. Furthermore, they address critical issues related to austerity and troop contributions in order to eventually improve the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

William K. Kuhn, PKSOI’s senior intern from Arcadia University’s graduate program in International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), discusses a key current issue that is relevant to KFOR and those facing policing challenges in peacekeeping environments. “Finding a Way: Integration of Northern Municipality Police Officer into the Kosovo Police Service” he addresses the complex issue of how to integrate two separate police services in the Kosovo post-conflict environment given recent agreements.

Another young professional, Logan Ferrell, from the college of William & Mary addresses the challenges US policy makers face in terms of redefining strategic priorities as we approach the the end of thirteen years of war and face current and looming fiscal constraints. Recently, solutions to this challenge have been condensed into an informal doctrine known as ‘light footprint’ military engagement. While the “light footprint” faces implicit constraints, it also leaves room for complementary operations that help achieve strategic goals. He points out that specifically, peace support operations can help reinforce the positive effects of targeted engagement while limiting the long term costs of the US.

Kevin Doyle, a Russian major and intern from Dickinson College raises lingering concerns that the current college age population within the United States has on peacekeeping against the backdrop of a nation tied to conflicts within the past dozen years. He also considers the impact of generational culture on our current national security perspective regarding stability operations. He examines whether an emerging generation formed during Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom will have a different perspective on the future than a generation who managed these conflicts and was mentored by a generation shaped by their Vietnam experiences.

Intern Jeffery Forshey from Penn State University recently met with Rwandan Brigadier General Charles Rudakubana, an International Fellow attending the US Army War College. BG Rudakubana previously was the Director of Peace Operations in the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) and was able to discuss with Jeffery the successes and challenges experienced by the RDF in peacekeeping operations.

Lastly, PKSOI provides the latest information on the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS). We welcome your contributions to SOLLIMS.
PKSOI Supports U.S. Army Exercise Western Accord 13

by Colonel Bo Balcavage, PKSOI

The US Army’s War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) personnel including Colonels Ed Lowe, Jim McFadden, and Bo Balcavage, along with retired Colonel Tony Lieto, traveled to West Africa in June 2013 to support one of US Army Africa’s (USARAF) premier training and security cooperation events, exercise Western Accord 2013 (WA13). Eleven West Africa nations participated in WA13, hosted by the country of Ghana, at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in the city of Accra to promote interoperability between the participating nations, and to prepare many of the participating Soldiers for potential deployment in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other peacekeeping activities across Africa. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) sponsored this Joint and Combined regional exercise executed with the support of military and civilian instructors and trainers from the UN, France, the Netherlands, and the US. Several of the trainers arrived straight from peacekeeping duty with the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali.

Western Accord 13 was one of a series of exercises conducted by USARAF across the continent to strengthen Military-to-Military relationships and regional security in West Africa. The exercise had the added benefit of familiarizing US Forces with Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and UN standard operating procedures - training that will prove invaluable as the US Army conducts what it calls RAF (Regionally Aligned Forces) mission across Africa.

Much of the US support to WA13 came from Soldiers of the US Army’s Dagger Brigade, (2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division), the first unit to be apportioned as a RAF. Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army’s nascent concept for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. Regionally Aligned Forces meet combatant commanders’ requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. Regional alignment synchronizes the Army’s strategic framework of Prevent, Shape, and Win by addressing Army’s enhanced regional and global presence. The RAF’s Prevent effort improves the global security environment by increasing partner capacity (Shape) and underpinning the Army Total Force capability, capacity, and readiness to Win. As part of the joint force and as America’s Army, in all that it offers, the Army provides the versatility, responsiveness, and consistency to Prevent, Shape, and Win.

While these ECOWAS Soldiers honed their skills in Accra, many of their peers were already forward deployed to Mali, an ECOWAS-organized military mission sent to support the government of Mali against Islamist rebels in the Northern Mali conflict. The mission was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2085, in December 2012. In January, as violence in Mali spiked, France intervened to begin a parallel operation in Mali, aimed at disrupting and destroying Al Qaeda growth and terrorism. UN Resolution 2100, signed in April 2013, authorized the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA, effective 1 July 2013. This transition signaled a change of UN mandate, rules of engagement, and head gear for many of the West Africans already posted in Mali. Significantly, the transition to becoming a UN mission meant increased mission credibility and aid, in addition to a wider range of donor nations.
The pending deployment to serve as members of MINUSMA charged the exercise with a sense of urgency and consequence. Brigadier General (BG) Koko-Eissen, of the Nigerian Army, was slated to command a sector in Mali just weeks from the completion of WA13. Lieutenant Colonel Mahamadou Seidou, the Joint Task Force J3 during the exercise, knew he would be deploying to Mali in that same capacity, and likely working for General Koko-Eissen.

After opening ceremonies, Western Accord 13 launched with a series of PKSOI-led classes on mission planning and planning considerations, as well as peacekeeping instruction that focused on the Rule of Law, Protection of Civilians, Integrated Planning, Multinational Task Force Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance. French and American officers, flown in from Mali, provided an in-depth information brief on the current belligerents, on-going Mali Defense Force operations, and the physical environment in Mali. BG Koko-Eissen, seized the opportunity, to inject the product of his four years of UN service, and quizzed instructors with the intensity of an officer charged with the responsibility of leading his West African peers into potential conflict. The West Africans peppered the guests with challenging questions that the presenters adeptly answered. Human Terrain analysts, observing the interaction between the ECOWAS members themselves, and the WA13 instructors, remarked that they had rarely witnessed such vigorous interaction.

Between the academic instruction and the Command Post Exercise, the Ghanan Army hosted an ECOWAS vs. Instructor sports day, a tour of Ghana’s tactical training center, and a short trip to local shopping areas.

The Command Post Exercise featured a scenario that replicated the current operational environment in Mali, and presented the West Africans with many of the challenges they know they’ll face daily in cities and villages across Mali - food and water shortages, competition for local security control, election security, and securing freedom of movement throughout the country, so that the Mali government, police, and military could rebuild from the recent chaos. French and US members who recently served alongside the Africans in Bamako, Mali, were encouraged to see the cooperation and mutual trust enjoyed by the multinational training audience. The Joint Task Force received their (exercise) mission from higher headquarters, conducted analysis and prepared multiple courses of action to BG Koko-Eissen for decision and order development, in synch with the established timeline. ECOWAS officers constructed a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to track operations, as battalion cells reported information, and requested assistance from the headquarters. By the second day of the exercise, JTF officers took it upon themselves to conduct in-stride self assessments to further their progress.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) commander, General David M. Rodriguez, and US Ambassador to Ghana, Gene A. Cretz, assisted by USARAF Deputy Commander, MG Eric Vollmecke, escorted senior officials from each of the participating countries to witness the Command Post Exercise, and US Marine-trained ECOWAS soldiers demonstrating crowd control and riot reduction competence. Impressively, BG Koko-Eissen explained his (exercise) mission intent to the distinguished visitors by way of the alliteration, “Prevent, Protect, and Prevail”.

At the conclusion of the Command Post Exercise, PKSOI Colonel Balcavage, addressed the proud but weary JTF, “We’ve given you our mentorship, advice, and assistance over the past several days, now tell us what you’ve learned.” The West African appreciation for the event was overwhelming. ECOWAS leaders talked about how they had each learned more French or English, how they learned to take time to ensure mutual understanding, their pride in achieving so much staff proficiency in so little time, despite working to build a team from 11 different nations, and two different languages. Major Zhongo, the Civil Affairs Officer from Burkina Fhaso, poked his comrades, “When we began, you were all laughing at how unimportant my
The Senegalese Chief of Staff, Colonel Fagay acknowledged the importance of time management, prioritization of work, and execution of crisis action planning. “I have never practiced crisis action planning before, but after two days of it, I am truly a believer.”

While the West Africans learned much about interoperability, they weren’t the only ones getting “schooled.” USARAF conducted extensive assessments throughout the exercise and will publish a lessons-learned product soon that should be critically important to future RAF-enabled deployments to Africa and beyond. US members were reminded that the West African’s planning prowess was a result of decades of military-to-military investment in the region. Many members noted the importance of distributing the applicable doctrine at the latter exercise planning conferences; that common doctrine serves to reduce the typical friction of multination, bilingual exercises. Some members suggested combining the military decision making process instruction with hands-on analysis of the exercise mission to reduce multinational planning friction and to give the ‘trainees’ more repetitions in the CPX. Protection of Civilian training sparked more discussion than any other topic except for the AFISMA SITREP.

Exercises like USARAF’s Western Accord 13 are a critical part of AFRICOM’s Security Cooperation effort, and vital to US Security Policy. For PKSOI, the mission served as an opportunity to reinforce understanding of UN Peacekeeping application, provide relevant peacekeeping and responsibility to protect training to a deploying multinational force, and to provide timely, germane assistance to Geographic Combatant Commanders. USARAF planners are working with ECOWAS to host Western Accord 2014 in Dakar, Senegal, with the intent of bringing several of the WA13 members who will have MI-NUSMA experience into the planning and oversight of the next Western Accord.

Exercise Western Accord also highlighted the potential opportunity for entities across the U.S. Army War College to collaborate and support exercises in the future. The combined synthesis of intellectual capacity within Carlisle Barracks to such exercises would further promulgate the fact that the US Army War College is, indeed, the school for strategic landpower, delivering quality training and education to commands in the field.

USARAF Exercise Division personnel, to include Mr. Jeffries, LTC Romans, and the personnel at Vicenza and Ghana, proved invaluable in making Western Accord a success. The USARAF
Seven months ago, in early February, I was enjoying my position as the Diversity Assistant Operations Officer with Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). Life was good, the prospect of spring was in the air as birds chirped and the climate was starting to change for the better. Then I was told about an Individual Augmentation assignment that NRC had to fill. This assignment was for a Military Observer and I unwittingly thought it could not be too hard – after all, I would just have to drive around and look at stuff all day. How wrong I was! Instead, I found myself using every bit of my eleven years of military experience and all of my senses.

So, my second Individual Augmentation tour, this time to Liberia, a small, austere country in Africa, was quite different from my first one. Only two months after accepting the orders, I began training with United States Military Observers Group-Washington (USMOG-W) at Quantico Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia. This training started in April 2012 with three weeks of intensive training with USMOG-W. Throughout the three weeks, we reinforced routine military skills and learned new ones that will benefit us for life. Training included Back Country Driving Skills¹, Basic and Advanced first aid and Interagency Familiarization. As a Surface Warfare Officer, assigned to Navy warships for 10 years of my life, 4x4 off-road driving skills had not been a normal part of my previous duties.

Assigned with me at training, and later in Liberia, were two of the most interesting and knowledgeable military officers I have had the pleasure to meet and know: Navy Commander Shannon Corkill (Call Sign: Joe Dirt) is a Naval Flight Officer and a prior Seabee Team Leading Petty Officer, an expert in auto mechanics and enthusiastic about missions that involve risk and danger. Army Lieutenant Colonel Eric Puls is an Aviation Branch Officer and prior enlisted Helicopter Crew Chief. Puls and Corkill shared with me many years of experience and skills in survival and tactics which I had applied in my work on the ground.

From there, Corkill, Puls and I embarked on our adventure to Africa, first upgrading our flights to business class, at our expense, from Washington D.C. to Liberia. It was the most beautiful flight I had ever experienced, with champagne, chocolate covered strawberries and hot towels at my beckon call. But as the plane was descending into Accra, Ghana, the reality of my assignment suddenly hit me hard. It was a stark contrast. The view out the airplane window was like a scene out of a National Geographic, only this was reality. Impoverished villages, dirt roads, jungle conditions and muddy rivers were not merely pictures on the pages of a magazine. Only the glass separated me from the harsh living conditions in this part of the world.

The transition from attending collegiate level national conferences to recruit America’s best and brightest men and women to that of working in a region where most people do not have the means or opportunity to receive a higher education, was immediate.
Military observers are described as the “eyes and ears” of the UNMIL force. They are boots on the ground and interact daily with the local population patrolling various local government agencies and villages in designated areas of responsibility. The main purposes of the patrols in Liberia are to deter possible security threats and aid in the maintenance of peace. Teams of 8-10 Military Observers are assigned to each of the 11 Observer team sites strategically located throughout the country.

As a Military Observer, my job is to visit at least three locations per day to meet with local “Town Chiefs.” They are the senior elected or appointed male member of each local village. We report current village conditions and, more importantly, ensure the security situation remains calm. During the rainy season, from May to October, history has proven that villages and refugee camps are susceptible to recruitment opportunities by rebel soldiers and fears are that they might take the fight across the border to Cote D’Ivoire. Because my area of responsibility extends to both the Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea border areas, my team remains especially vigilant for suspicious activity and illegal cross border movements. In addition to Town Chiefs, we also meet with government administrators and law enforcement officials.

I have been living and working in the town of Ganta, which borders Guinea, for more than five months. As the Military Information Officer for one of the United Nation observer teams spread throughout Liberia, the daily maintenance of peace, security and well-being for village residents and refugees has been my primary focus.

Since I began working in Liberia, life has been anything but boring. I have personally met with many people of high influence, such as the county Superintendent; refugees who were previously part of warring factions and a senator who once was considered to be a warlord, all in the interest of maintaining peace in Liberia. I have also met with many decent, hard-working citizens of Liberia who work hard from day to day, barely earning enough money to put food on the table. Most folks living in “the bush” do not have the means to leave the remote and austere villages in which they reside. The sun comes up and goes down over their village, from birth to death, and most people never set foot outside their immediate surroundings. It is difficult for me to fathom living my life in a village without television, news of the world, a movie theater, Wal-Mart, Chick-fil-A, a supermarket, a toilet, and in many cases, electricity. The capitalist way of life is unknown. Although basic amenities which we all enjoy are lacking, most people seem to be content in their lifestyle. We cannot miss what we never had.

With three months of this assignment in the rear view mirror, I am excited to discover what the next three months will bring. I feel fortunate to have been given the rare opportunity to experience this unique mission but thank God, every day, for the privilege of being born in the US.
Deciphering US peacekeeping policy is a task as challenging as it is intriguing. The American public’s experience with peacekeeping has been a dynamic, volatile, and episodic relationship. Americans are increasingly wary of fighting “other peoples’ wars” following recent US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the US continues to contribute towards what are called “peacekeeping” operations through organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). American peacekeeping missions outside of the UN are generally undertaken more solely for American interests, and thus should not be considered non-partisan. American policy defers this role to the UN, making the UN the best option for this type of broad conflict prevention. American support of UN peacekeeping is a five-fold policy which is adhered to in varying degrees of commitment, but is primarily financial. This raises two important questions; how will coming austerity affect US/UN peacekeeping, and how can the UN encourage the US to make more substantive commitments of non-financial assets such as troops to its peacekeeping operations? The answers are complex but the answers are integral to understanding how peacekeeping will develop in the coming decades.

US Efforts in Non-UN Peacekeeping

American policy towards what NATO refers to as “Peace Support Operations” is remarkable in part for its lack of public explicitness. In fact, American leaders tend to describe these missions as anything but peacekeeping. Deployments to Lebanon, Korea, Iraq, Kosovo, and others have consistently been billed in terms other than peacekeeping. Depending on the audience, NATO missions are billed as stability operations, counterinsurgency, or peacekeeping. President Obama praised NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, although he avoided calling them peacekeeping operations. Indeed, President Obama declared the NATO intervention in Kosovo as potentially “historic.” The US has consistently pledged “ironclad support” for NATO but stressed that European member states need to share in the burden in order to assure Americans that NATO isn’t becoming overly dependent on American military capabilities.

The American peacekeeping effort through NATO has also taken on a significantly more self-interested role than efforts made through the UN. Aside from minor support operations in Africa, the NATO allies operate peacekeeping exclusively in their own interest, with a heavy emphasis on American interest. Aside from naval operations to protect major shipping routes, the only two NATO peacekeeping operations are KFOR in Kosovo, and ISAF in Afghanistan.

Stabilization in the Kosovo region (as opposed to other regions experiencing similar phenomena at the same time) was likely pursued, in part, because of the close proximity to large European markets, as well as the strategic importance of this region as a hedge against Russian influence. The peace that is being kept here is not the product of some organic regional compromise, but rather the enforcement of a partisan surrender treaty which mandated the withdrawal of the Serbians from the region following the massive NATO bombing campaign on the side of the Albanians during the Kosovo War. The KFOR operation has been scaled down greatly since the 1999 end to the war. Serbian states no longer dispute relinquishing de facto control over southern Kosovo, and remaining disputes concern control over Serbian enclaves in the northern regions, as well as control...
of the northern border. The lead contributing nations in this effort are Germany, which has a historical connection to the region, and the US, who provide security and demilitarization support, as well as development assistance. Although development is an important activity, the primary activity of NATO is security, especially along checkpoints and borders. The total US troop presence here fell to less than 800 soldiers, however this number has risen as commitments in Iraq have been reduced.

The ISAF mission, which operates exclusively in Afghanistan, was initiated by the American campaign already underway in this country. This mission represents the most extensive of global peacekeeping efforts by any organization, and is the largest NATO peacekeeping effort to date. It is comprised primarily of American troops, which currently number 68,000. NATO troops in this region do not act as “peacekeepers” in any traditional or nonpartisan sense, but actively and violently contend with the Taliban and other Islamic groups for control of the fledgling state. The full account of their operations is too extensive to detail here, but they are comprised primarily of counterinsurgency-type operations, as well as training of the Afghan National Security Forces and economic and social development initiatives in support of the American-backed government. The American military shoulders not only the brunt of the personnel requirements, but also the financial cost for these operations, up to 75% of the budget. In fact, NATO efforts here are so American-centric that it has become a point of discord between the US and its NATO allies.

American policy on unilateral and multinational operations (neither UN nor NATO affiliated) is rarely publicly stated in any unified, coherent fashion. And as such, few Americans even know about the US-led multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, the US Second Infantry Division serves in a role similar to a peacekeeping force along the Korean Demilitarized Zone but is treated by American military and political leaders as a forward deployed force. These missions are distinct from the more engaging and multi-dimensional peacekeeping actions undertaken with the UN and NATO. Here the US actively protects contentious borders and stations troops in various strategically important “hot spots.” These forces operate checkpoints, as well as conduct patrols and various training. These forces do not interact extensively with indigenous populations, and exist solely to protect American interests in sensitive areas. The US has also made personnel and financial contributions to various OSCE missions, but these were negligible in significance.

US Efforts in UN Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping is in fact the only defined peacekeeping policy that the US promotes. According to statements from President Barack Obama, the American policy towards the UN peacekeeping effort can be thought of in five distinct branches. First, the United States will train and equip UN Peacekeeping forces. The State Department Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) represents the brunt of this effort. GPOI is the U.S. contribution to the G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations and was adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit. Originally approved for five years, it was renewed in 2009 and will last through 2014. This first phase was to directly train approximately 75,000 foreign troops with an emphasis in Africa to engage in UN and regional peacekeeping operations. In the second phase, the US will assist states in building peacekeeping capability via monetary support and indirect military training. Second, the United States will provide logistical assistance as well as medical support and airlift capabilities. Third, uniformed members of the American armed forces will join UN Peacekeeping Missions. Fourth, the American Department of State will actively work to negotiate and reinforce ceasefires and peace agreements in the UN Peacekeeping Missions’ Areas of Operations (AO). Finally, President Obama reaffirmed America’s economic support of the UN peacekeeping effort, pledging $2.26 billion.
In terms of training and equipping peacekeeping forces, the United States policy has aligned relatively well with executive branch rhetoric. Actual implementation of the GPOI program has moved according to schedule. Although it began with a heavy focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, the program has expanded from its focused beginnings to include a host of partners in strategically important regions, particularly Southeast Asia. State Department and DoD staff, as well as contingents of US armed forces, have participated in providing training as well as equipment and facility support. However, as with the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, a Department of State program, GPOI has been criticized by its partners as having unwarranted focus on anti-terrorism for US purposes. Furthermore, as troop demand and budget concerns have become more prevalent, the burden of actual implementation has largely fallen to government contractors.

The provision of logistical services has also been present over the past five years, and remains an important service provided by the military on as-needed basis, usually at the request of the State Department. This has been done not only to assist the UN, but also NATO missions, as well as in support of regional partners. There is also a pre-deployment assistance part of GPOI which provides support to deploying units and helps to address any capacity shortfalls.

The third tenant of American-UN peacekeeping policy is where we see the largest rift between objectives and execution. The contribution of actual personnel has always been a political one.
challenge in the US, where public attitude towards peacekeeping is wary. Furthermore, the demands of maintaining two occupations, as well as manning a global web of bases and outposts, has proven challenging from a personnel standpoint, leaving little residual manpower. Although the US has contributed personnel to six UN peacekeeping missions, the majority of personnel are in Haiti. US military troop contributions to UN missions have largely been symbolic measures and though often in important positions, such as the Chief of Staff or Chief of Logistics, actually numbers are quite small. UN peacekeeping troops continue to come primarily from the global south, whose contributing countries are incentivized through reimbursement funding mechanisms. The US does contribute police and military observers, though still few in number. Roles for police and military observers in UN peace operations require fewer personnel, ostensibly making it easier for the US to contribute in a meaningful way; however, it is still sometimes a challenge to fill the few slots needed. Furthermore, many of the personnel filling police roles are often civilian police contractors because few civilian police agencies allow their police officers to take leaves of absence and serve in peacekeeping operations.

The Department of State also continues to help “negotiate” and “reinforce” ceasefires and peace agreements in conjunction with the UN, however these actions are primarily verbal, and align with US interests in such a way that these actions cannot be considered ancillary to UN efforts or distinct from normal US diplomatic actions.

The final branch of policy, financial support, is the cornerstone of American peacekeeping efforts and emblematic of the American approach to peacekeeping as a whole. The US has maintained its substantial (some would say indispensable) financial support for UN core operations for the past five years, paying a full 22%, and its support of the peacekeeping budget represents an even larger percentage of its total funding (now upwards of 27%) and has continued a slight rise for the past five years. This contribution overshadows all other US peacekeeping efforts in the scope of its impact. However, even this aspect of US peacekeeping is not without its flaws. The current administration has made a point to pay UN dues on time; however the UN still contends that the US owes $1.2 billion in arrears.

Addressing Critical Issues

Thus, as we can see, the American role in non-UN missions is more focused on American security concerns than on broad peacekeeping. Despite imperfections, the UN appears to be the “least-worst option” in pursuing non-partisan peacekeeping.

So this brings to light two important questions; first, how will austerity measures occurring across the western world affect the financial sustainability of UN peacekeeping operations? Second, how can we engage first world states, such as the US, to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in other ways than financial support? After all, first world militaries contain the most disciplined and effective troops for these types of operations.

Critical Issues: Austerity

The effects of austerity are already beginning to take a toll on UN missions. Although the Obama administration has made a point to pay all UN dues in full and on time, it faces increasing political pressures to reduce US obligations. Current budget woes see domestic programs being slashed under sequestration and the pressure to divert scarce resources away from “good will” expenditures like the UN, toward helping mitigate the reduction of various benefits for American citizens, is going to become harder and harder for politicians to ignore. There are already strong voices in congress calling for a 2% reduction in American contributions. If Europe is any indication of future trends, we can expect the US to reduce its financial support for the UN within five years. These reductions threaten to dismantle the current “those who pay” and “those who play” structure of UN peacekeeping. As the largest, traditionally poor states who provide the most troops to these missions (such as India) have become more developed, troop contributions have become less profit-driven and more politics-driven as a means of staving off the obligation to provide more finances. But as rich states lower their commitments, states like India will have the political flexibility to in turn reduce their troop commitments, compounding the harm to UN peacekeeping. This effect has already been witnessed in Sudan, where India recently recalled most of their helicopters. This reduction of troops makes our second question even more salient.

Critical Issues: Troop Contributions

The second question is more complex than the first. Encouraging rich, influential states to place large contingencies, which could otherwise be pursuing national foreign objectives under the control of the UN may be an impossible goal. It is well understood that poor nations typically contribute troops when the UN reimbursement represents the chance to earn revenue, and furthermore only when the troops are not required domestically. Troop contributors may also be motivated by external or internal political factors. Thus, the primary goal should be to create incentives for rich nations to contribute troops.
The UN troop contribution reimbursements are far too low to be considered a viable method of offering financial incentive. However, as has already been discussed, backlogged dues in the billions of dollars are not unheard of among rich nations, and these nonpayment issues may only get worse with austerity measures. Thus it would be fairly easy for the UN to institute debt relief in exchange for troop contributions. Furthermore, payment premiums could be made available, beyond normal rates, in exchange for specialized or highly-demanded troops or vehicles. Beyond direct reimbursement such as this, the UN would benefit by better conveying the potential cost savings of their operations. The UN is forced to operate very cheaply in comparison with the relatively decadent counterpart operations put on by wealthy nations, which can in some cases cost over twice as much. In potentially unstable regions, nations may be willing to sacrifice political control of forces in exchange for the cost savings of letting the UN take over, particularly if the UN mandate is at least somewhat convergent with their national interests.

Incentivizing developed nations to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions is also reliant upon acknowledging their unique political sensitivity to casualties, and finding ways to compensate for this. This can include (discreetly) assigning these troops to rear echelon type roles, and emphasizing methods of contribution that do not put personnel in harm’s way, such as through the donation of aircraft and vehicles. The US Department of Defense already has programs such as Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Service which sells and donates excess military equipment. The United Nations could make good use of such equipment. Again, donations could also help relieve dues, adding a financial incentive to this option.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United Nations would benefit from an altered political environment in which peacekeeping was a higher priority among first world constituencies. Despite the unpopularity of costly foreign interventions, public opinion of United Nations peacekeeping efforts has remained relatively high. Leaders ultimately want to stay in power, and thus the best, and perhaps only good way to stop them from viewing these missions as a waste of political capital is to make it important electorally. This is obviously a slow process, but can be achieved through effective awareness, marketing, and lobbying campaigns. The successes of similar advocacy movements such as the environmental or gay-rights lobbies are encouraging. Furthermore, external political pressure will also increase as rich states are forced to justify the reduction of their financial commitments, as already discussed. This will create a positive pressure on troop contribution levels. Part of gaining increased political support is contingent upon increasing the effectiveness of these operations, and decreasing their negative externalities, such as theft and rape by UN troops. Finally, US public opinion and its domestic reality may well be a show stopper for increased US participation.

Improving the quality of current UN operations would require several bold initiatives. First, the arbitrary “come as you are” and “do as you like” basis upon which UN peacekeeping troops are currently paid needs serious reconsideration and reimbursement needs to be pro-rated based on the quality and performance of troops during operations. Increasing the duration of troop rotations would also serve to allow troops to better familiarize themselves with the operating environment. Second, the currently logistical framework through which UN “force generation” operates is too slow and too reactionary. Steps need to be taken to improve the planning, reconnaissance, supplying, and responsiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. This would almost certainly require a permanent planning staff, and likely a force of private contractors such as firms like the Paramount Group, which provides equipment, resupply, and training for UN forces. Pursuing more exotic options such as introducing financial investment incentives to peacekeeping would greatly benefit the quality of the missions and reduce the difficulty of raising and maintaining forces. Securing concessions or rights to certain financial assets or resources and using these to attract investment in peace would greatly expand the UN’s ability to create lasting change in troubled regions, although capitalistic approaches such as this are likely to meet resistance from smaller states fearing exploitation. Securing “permanent” contributions or hiring private security firms which could be called upon at any time for any mission would also greatly benefit efficiency. However, measures such as this would also be likely met intense political resistance, reducing the feasibility of this option as well.

The United States’ expressed policy towards nonpartisan peacekeeping and its actual implementation of means varies depending on the political climate. Actions taken outside of UN missions, such as those with NATO, may be discounted as thinly veiled pursuits of national security interests, and in fact are most often not even referred to as peacekeeping. American policy towards to the UN is expressed in five overarching initiatives, which are followed by varying degrees. American contributions of personnel are often symbolic, and the largest contributions by far are financial ones. This begs two important questions in regards to the future of UN peacekeeping, namely; will US financial support continue, and how can the UN encourage more significant troop contributions from the US? It seems difficult
to conclude that austerity will not have significant negative impacts on UN peacekeeping, but there seem to be measures the UN can take to increase troop contributions and efficiency, perhaps compensating somewhat for the decrease in financial support. Unilateral peacekeeping remains an important force against human right abuses and a catalyst for market development around the globe, and as the world’s premier power, the United States is in a unique position to either neglect or enhance the progress towards these goals. Understanding US peacekeeping policy is therefore crucial to all those who wish to assist in this progress, and will remain an important topic as the 21st century unfolds.

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Notes:
14 Ibid. 3
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27 Ibid. 24


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36 Ibid. 24


41 Ibid. 39

Introduction

Due to the recent April 19th agreement, principles governing the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, was designed to normalize relations between the two governments, concerns have grown on how to implement this agreement. One of the points in the agreement calls for the integration of Northern Municipality (Serb) police officers into the Kosovo Police Service. This integration is one of the most controversial unresolved issues following the reaching of the new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. Creating security in the north is crucial for the implementation of the agreement and integration of the north into Kosovo’s system of governance. Issues raised in this paper that might sound technical or too specific need to be considered in order to create security and a functioning and effective police service in the north.

The purpose of this analysis is to propose policy options that would successfully incorporate northern police officers within the Kosovo Police. As a result, three policy options are proposed; direct integration to the Kosovo Police, retraining of northern municipality police officers, and the development of an Integrated Task Force (ITF) to train and assess incoming officers. These policy proposals should be viewed as a tool to improve the Kosovo Police Service and its image and relations with those living in the northern municipalities.

Background

Since 6 September 1999 there has been a functioning Kosovo Police (KP) in accordance with United Nations (UN) Resolution 1244. This police service has been evaluated and restructured several times in order to refine its operational techniques and command structure. At the same time, the northern municipalities have also had parallel police formations funded by Serbia rather than Kosovo and a part of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and its command structure. These police structures were strengthened following Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008 and were largely in control of the situation there. Daily policing was thrown into a limbo. KP exercised little control. This has left the north of Kosovo with essentially two separate police services but only one recognized by Pristina and the international community.

Since 1999 the Kosovo Police Service has experienced a ‘tug of war’ in establishing effective programs and institutional structures that assisted in creating a sense of legitimacy amongst the various ethnic communities inside Kosovo. Most of Kosovo’s police structures were created through the United Nation Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1999 to 2006 such as the Professional Standards Unit (PSU), the Ombudsperson Institution, and the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo. Since 2006 the Kosovo Police has commanded all police stations and since 2008 all regional headquarters with the exception of the headquarters in Mitrovica North.

It is noteworthy to acknowledge that Kosovo policing has focused more on the community with the emphasis of Community Safety Action Teams in order to connect the police service with their communities. Now, in 2013, the Kosovo Police is considered one of the more trusted Kosovo institutions (outside of its northern part) but still requires work in addressing the areas of criminal investigations, organized, crime and the high ethnic tension in the north.
In 2007, the Ahtisari Plan⁶ proposed the structure of the Kosovo Police Service in Annex VIII, Kosovo Security Sector, Article 2. Although the plan was not agreed upon, it still did not address the integration of serving police officers in the northern municipalities. Recently though there is an agreement that would basically implement the Ahtisari Plan, requiring the Kosovo Police to absorb the personnel from the northern municipality police service.

**Problem Description**

According to the recent April 19, 2013 agreement, the Kosovo Police shall take responsibility of the northern Kosovo municipalities and those who were serving as police officers within KP or MUP will now be allowed to integrate into the Kosovo Police framework. The question remains on how this will be executed and the impact it will have on the Kosovo Police. Currently there is no policy on how to integrate the northern municipality police officers into the Kosovo Police Service.

As of January 2013, according to the OSCE, nearly 90 officers are currently stationed in the northern municipalities.⁷ That means that these officers will have to be integrated into the current Kosovo Police in an official and professional manner. Logistically integrating the force will be a feat if the operational differences potentially impacting the working relationship and practices of the current Kosovo Police Service are not addressed.

The potential impacts of this integration will be primarily focused on two areas; ethnic diversity and operational standards. The northern municipalities are majority Serb that have had a long and strong connection to the Serbian government in Belgrade. They do not identify themselves with Kosovo or the government in Pristina. This creates and reinforces points of contention between Serb and Albanian populations that have not been easily resolved. For fourteen years, the northern municipalities have enjoyed a sense of belonging to Serbia rather than to Kosovo and have managed to police itself but with funding and material support through Belgrade.

This large influx of additional Serbs in the Kosovo Police will result in a new level of representation by this ethnic community. As of 2009, it was estimated that 86 per cent of the Kosovo Police was comprised of ethnic Albanians while only 9 percent represented the ethnic Serb population.⁸

The potential impacts on operational standards lie in the concern about the capabilities of current serving police officers in the northern municipalities. This is not to say that police officers in those areas are unprofessional or lacking in any manner but it is an unknown element to consider. Their loyalty to their new employer is unclear as well. It is also unknown as to whether or not northern municipality police officers perform tasks to the same standard that Kosovo Police preforms; simply filing a report could be executed differently. These differences could merely be minute changes in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or complete overhauls in training, discipline, structure, or operational capabilities. This is hard to answer without extensive evaluations or joint cohesive training exercises and operations. However it is better to learn these differences in a controlled environment rather than in the field.

**Required Considerations**

Due to the above stated concerns, a conscious effort must be made to address both the concerns for ethnicity issues and operational standards. In order to do this, multiple options should be developed to give the Kosovo government and the Kosovo Police choices on how to address these concerns. Along with these options exist topics of required consideration, should a policy option hope to succeed.

There are three areas of concern that will have to be addressed no matter which policy option may be adopted. Concerns with amnesty, a vetting process for police officer selection, and joblessness will have to be addressed because the three are interconnected. Their interconnection is the bi-product of the conflict and combined measures in which to help resolve the conflict.
It will be difficult to integrate police officers who were before working against the Kosovo government, and in order to do this some mechanism must be in place to ensure no action is taken against them for their prior political position.

The new Kosovo Amnesty law\(^9\) passed on 11 July 2013 is a step in this direction. Granted there is much debate in Kosovo about the law but it will however allow (within the limits of the law) potential officers to not have any legal action taken against them merely for being a northern Kosovo police officer who worked for the Serbian MUP. The next question though is the vetting process; how it will be implemented, supervised, the level of transparency, and the level of non-majority population involvement within the process. It is important to remind populations that the process must take place to ensure that no one is accepted into the police service who has committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. It is important that this be performed as a preventive measure rather than a reactionary one.

The last consideration is that of what will happen to those not integrated? What happens when people lose their jobs? This can cause an inherently hostile environment that could be a breeding ground for spoilers, driving security challenges. These obstacles are topics that can be prevented should the right steps be taken to address a community’s needs.

**Policy Options**

There are three options in which to integrate northern municipality police officers into the Kosovo Police; direct integration, retraining, and an Integration Task Force.

**Direct Integration:** Direct integration is a policy option that would immediately address the changes from the principles governing the normalization of relations agreement, specifically principle number seven. Direct integration would essentially maintain the current operational structure of the police in the northern municipalities but simply alter name, symbols, uniforms, and any other identifying elements that distinguished that police force from the Kosovo Police.

This process would occur immediately, requiring that all northern municipality police officers to don Kosovo Police uniforms and replace any symbols with that of the Kosovo Police. This process would require the supervision and support of the Kosovo Police in the form of a small team that would provide oversight in the administrative and logistical aspects of the transition and would report on the status of the transition to the General Director of the Police (GDP). The team would ideally be comprised of both Serb and Albanian police officers in order to facilitate communication and a sense of shared communal responsibility. Northern police officers who would become newly in-coming Kosovo Police officers would be expected to work alongside this team and develop a plan for transition that is cost and time manageable within the current budget.

The advantages of the direct integration policy option would be the retaining of communal familiarity of police officers in the area. Communities would already have built trust with those officers and their immediate incorporation in the Kosovo Police would allow for a sense of continuity during a chaotic and potentially confusing transition. Another advantage to this option is that it would incur lower costs; lower than any of the options presented in this text. Primarily, cost would be derived from the physical/purchasing of new uniforms, vehicle markings, and any additional equipment or administrative supplies needed to conduct daily operations at the Kosovo Police level. Minimal costs would be incurred by the development of the small transition team; primarily in the form of training and lodging while carrying out the transition.

The potential concerns of this option lie in not fully knowing the standards from which those officers operate and understand Kosovo laws and police practices. In order to perform this task one would require more time, staff, and funding. The second caution comes from a concern that this option does not encourage inter-communal communication between those of the north and elsewhere in Kosovo. This option can, unless performed in a supportive manner, make those police officers...
feel separated from the rest of the Kosovo Police service, an unwanted result for a job so reliant on a team mentality.

**Retraining**: Integration of the northern municipality police officers through retraining is an option that would require the complete retraining and certification of inbound police officers from the north in order to serve in the Kosovo Police service. This would require all police officers from the north, who are intending to join the Kosovo Police, to attend the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety (KAPS).

This option would benefit the Kosovo Police in providing well educated and trained officers to the force. Officers would take a temporary break from their current post in order to attend KAPS, and upon completion of the school they would return to their respective position. In order to maintain operational effectiveness, a certain percentage of officers would be placed in each KAPS class. The decision on the percentage of officers sent should be determined at a later time by the GDP due to potential budgetary constraints.

Daily police operations will continue throughout the execution of this option. Police stations will remain manned and able to provide protection, security, and service to the community. Should operational effectiveness be compromised due to the number of personnel attending KAPS, additional police officers will be temporarily stationed in the area of concern in order to maintain good public order and safety.

Police officers who return from KAPS will be able to provide additional instruction and training programs in order to help develop local police operations and preparation for KAPS. This idea of ‘training the trainer’ is one that gives the KAPS graduate the knowledge and ability to professionally develop fellow officers.

This option supports the notion that officers could be trained concurrently while other officers are carrying out operations in the region. It also increases the Serb population in the Kosovo Police service; demonstrating a better-rounded multiethnic police force. This option also encourages the development of ‘train the trainer’ programs.

One concern with this option is the possibility that additional officers may be required to fill the temporary gaps while officers are attending KAPS. This option is also a time consuming option that may stretch out over a long period of time. Since the KAPS basic course consists of 20 weeks of training, temporary leave for KAPS attendance will place a strain on the Kosovo Police.

**Integration Task Force (ITF)**: The option of establishing an Integration Task Force (ITF) is one that combines both previous options in order to ensure that current serving police officers in the northern municipalities have an equal opportunity to serve and are performing to the Kosovo Police standard. Incoming officers would have to be assessed and potentially retrained on tested tasks in order to become a certified Kosovo Police officer. This would also offer incoming officers two attempts for the assessment before they would have to resort to traditional Kosovo Police entrance processes. They would not attend training twice but could only be assessed twice.

The ITF would be an established but temporary assessment and training unit comprised of multi-ethnic trainers and evaluators. Training and assessment standards would be derived from current Kosovo Police and KAPS teachings and practices. Research and creation of this unit would be performed by a small group of individuals, ideally from KAPS, that would determine the location and specific structure of the program. ITF would require a staff composed of administrative personnel, trainers, and evaluators. These staff members would be multi-ethnic and provide an equal representation of ethnicities; for example if there are ten trainers, five would be Albanian and the other five would be Serb in order to create a cohesive multiethnic training environment.

Administrative personnel would provide leadership, logistical support, in and out processing capabilities, and a review/appeals board for formal concerns on course withdrawal or dismissal. The appeals board would be comprised of three members, one ITF leader, one trainer, and one evaluator. Should the trainee object to the appeals board then that trainee can request further review through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).

Trainers would provide instruction on key tasks and concepts that were considered by the research team to be essential performance tasks in order to be an effective Kosovo Police officer. Trainers would ideally come from KAPS initially and develop trainers that would eventually replace them. These tasks taught during training will be instructed based on the Kosovo Police standards.

Evaluators will conduct assessments on the performance of officers in key tasks for which they were trained based off of the Kosovo Police standard. Key tasks will be determined by the collaboration of the research team and KAPS. The standards by which these tasks are graded should not be any easier or harder than currently expected of Kosovo Police officers or KAPS. Evaluators will carry out the direct supervision and grading of the assessment. Upon successful completion of the assessment,
officers will attend a graduation ceremony and receive a certification officially introducing these officers into the Kosovo Police Service.

This is a moderate option compared to the previous two options. It ensures that all officers are performing to the Kosovo Police standard. This option would incorporate multiple ethnicities in a positive manner that would increase Serb representation within the service. ITF could be researched, built, and executed concurrently with daily police operations.

It could be costly to set up. Extra cost would come from land or facility procurement, and the associated cost of employing officers to be trainers in addition to those instructing at KAPS. Some additional cost may be entailed because of equipment but this would have to be further analyzed. ITF may not be worthwhile depending on the size of anticipated transitional officers. It could cause stress on the service as a whole, in the temporary replacement of attending officers and on KAPS staff, perhaps due to limited numbers.

Recommendations

It is recommended that great consideration be given to the ITF option. This option provides a higher likelihood of success because of its more moderate approach compared to the direct integration and retrain options. It also demonstrates a level of professionalism and advancement of the Kosovo Police Service and the seriousness in which it selects and trains police officers. An additional aspect of the ITF model would be to rely on current KAPS facilities and instructors but maintain the ITF format. This is recommended if the number of incoming officers from the north is too small to warrant the creation of a larger certification framework.

It is recommended that Kosovo Police funding be increased in order to accomplish this task. It should be noted that training could be a secondary option if it is decided to first assess officers before retraining them. If they would be negatively assessed then they would have to attend training before being reassessed. The officer would still retain the ability to be assessed twice.

It is also recommended that ITF be implemented concurrently with current daily police operations. For the interim period, officers would transition to the Kosovo Police Service but not be certified. While officers are attending ITF they would have to have a replacement officer fill their position temporarily, if needed, until that individual returns to duty.

It is also highly encouraged that ITF staff members be bilingual, as difficult as this requirement would be to achieve. This is especially important, however, in Mitrovica north and along the Ibar River. It will take time but promoting the requirement could greatly improve the working environment for officers and the communities they serve. By encouraging officers to be bilingual, it could be a possible promotion or financial incentive later on, should the service choose to implement.

Utilizing the ITF option and subsequent recommendations will result in a larger, but still representative, Serb presence in the Kosovo Police Service. This will impact the image of the police service in a positive manner and respective communities will have a better feeling of equality because their police officers, of their ethnicity, are treated respectfully and equally in a modernized professional communal policing service...and will make a crucial contribution to successful integration of the north into the rest of Kosovo.

Notes:

1 First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations, Accessed on 29 April 2013
2 Kosovo Police History, Kosovo Police, 2009
5 Bennet, Richard, Friedman, Jonathan, and Greene, Morgan, Rebuilding the Police in Kosovo, Foreign Policy, 18 July, 2012, accessed on 12 July 2013 from http://www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2012/07/18/rebuilding_the_police_in_kosovo?page=0.2
6 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, United Nations Security Council, 26 March 2007,
7 Mitrovica/Mitrovica, Municipal Profiles, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, January 2013
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10 Kosovo Academy for Public Safety, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Republic of Kosovo, 2012
Introduction

In both policy and academic circles, arguments in favor of peace operations vary widely from the strictly empirical to the inherently moralistic. Peace operations can serve as valuable monitoring mechanisms that help alleviate the commitment problem between warring states. They can help reduce the odds of a war-torn society falling back into violent conflict. Additionally, they can lend further legitimacy to international organizations by allowing cooperative use of force. Together, such arguments provide valuable frameworks to explain how the international system attempts to contain and prevent violent conflict. However, such models fall short in reaching one key audience: policymakers seeking to understand how the conceptual benefits of peace operations match concrete strategic interests.

This provides an especially relevant and time-critical question for policymakers in the U.S. government. Fiscal constraints and the end of nearly 13 years of war have forced the U.S. defense community to reconsider priorities with regards to how and when it will project force abroad. For planners weary of costly, large-scale interventions, an amorphous “light-footprint” strategy has come to define these discussions. This approach broadly describes a strategy built around advising partner states and occasional, rapid direct action by U.S. forces; the primary instruments of such a strategy lie in airpower, unmanned platforms, and special operations forces (SOF).

As with any doctrine, the potential consequences of relying on a “light footprint” may be as numerous as the benefits. That said, the new unwritten doctrine could be complemented by other types of operations to expand and reinforce its benefits. In coming years, peace operations especially can fill critical gaps in the revised strategic vision of “light footprint”. Peace operations build on the effects of advisory missions, provide training to U.S. troops in key skills, and expand connections with partner militaries. Through these effects, peace operations offer the U.S. military the opportunity to project force in support of strategic objectives while avoiding the high financial and human costs of maintaining large-scale interventions with long-term unilateral commitments.

Building on Effects of the “Light Footprint”

The entry of the phrase “light footprint” into the U.S. defense lexicon signifies an intellectual response to the last 13 years of war. The perception of large-scale interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as overly costly and minimally successful has renewed interest in past small-scale attempts at counterinsurgency and security assistance. Looking to historical U.S. assistance to Columbia, El Salvador, and the Philippines, “light footprint” advocates offer a supposedly cheaper model of counterinsurgency (COIN) built around advisory capacity and technical support. Indeed, these cases and non-U.S. examples such as British assistance to Oman illustrate some successful aspects of supporting host-nation led COIN.

However, a broader examination of such cases likewise illustrates the inherent limits of the strategy. A 2012 RAND Corporation survey of small-scale assistance missions highlighted
a key limit; such operations rarely lead to decisive defeat of insurgent groups, but instead preserve stalemates during which governments arrange political trade-offs with their challengers. In many such cases, the presence of external assistance merely curtails violence to an “acceptable” level of state stability. Even such minimalist definitions of success can require long-term, costly commitments as host-nations face political incentives to perform poorly in COIN and often require external organization.

While such outcomes may be viewed as challenges to U.S. policy, they may also be viewed as opportunities to begin complementary peace operations. The stalemate scenarios described by the RAND survey provide basic political equilibriums around which the U.N. or other multilateral organizations can structure operations. U.S. assistance in the form of air support, SOF advisors, or direct action may shift the balance of power in civil war or COIN settings. Resulting stalemates can create the minimum level of stability needed to begin reconstruction, mediation, and demobilization of former combatants. In such scenarios, the deployment of a U.N. or other peacekeeping force could eliminate the need to field a similarly sized U.S. contingent.

Such operations help the U.S. manage the consequences of “light footprint” actions at significantly lower cost. For example, in 2013 the U.N. mission in Darfur (the largest ongoing mission) operated on an annual budget of approximately $1.5 billion; this can be compared to the $1 billion average monthly cost incurred by U.S. forces in Afghanistan during the lowest level of troop presence. Likewise, unless the U.S. drastically increased its participation in peace operations, this approach would also reduce the number of U.S. service members deployed in such efforts.

This proposed supplement to the “light footprint” strategy has also been previously tested. Other major powers have used small-scale interventions to secure vital national interests, then endorsed multi-national peacekeeping missions as instruments for reconstruction. For example, in 2000 the U.K. rapidly deployed forces to Sierra Leone in order to evacuate British nationals and bolster the U.N. mission (UNAMSIL). These forces used selective direct action and began additional training for the military of Sierra Leone; arguably this small-scale, unilateral intervention helped create the stability necessary for UNAMSIL to enforce the transition to peace.

Another nascent example of this model can also be seen in recent French operations in Mali. In early 2013, French forces rapidly deployed in northern Mali to conduct offensive counterterrorist operations. The French campaign, Operation Serval, was planned as a short, small-scale intervention from the outset. Once French troops altered the military balance in Mali, the task of monitoring and post-conflict reconstruction was quickly delegated to first an African peacekeeping force (AFISMA) and then a follow-on U.N. peace mission (MINUSMA).

These examples illustrate that small-scale, unilateral actions (whether advisory or direct) need not be followed by costly post-war interventions by single states. Rather, the employment of multi-national peacekeeping forces can complement such “light footprint” operations. Subsequent peace operations can often foster long-term progress in economic, political, and social spheres without placing the burden solely on the U.S.

Building Crucial Skill Sets

Ongoing troop reductions and fiscal trade-offs have also prompted a new discussion of what skill sets should be prioritized in training U.S. forces for future conflicts. Prominent defense intellectuals have vigorously debated the necessity of maintaining COIN skills in a post-Afghanistan era; on this a debate over strategic interests converges with a discussion of training priorities.

The strategic debate can only be settled by policymakers. Training, however, should strive to best prepare U.S. troops for all possible contingencies; this necessitates a need to maintain skills in COIN, reconstruction, and peace operations. Such training ensures that future conflicts do not find U.S. forces lacking in necessary institutional memory and human capital.
Recognizing this, peace operations appear as a pragmatic opportunity to provide U.S. forces real training. By participating in U.N. or other peace operations, U.S. forces practice vital skills such as protecting civilians, building rapport, and operating alongside foreign militaries. In peacekeeping operations, these tasks must be executed in politically complex environments that require officers and soldiers alike to make tactical decisions with potentially strategic consequences. While such decision making can be taught in classrooms and arenas like the National Training Center, real mission experience can more thoroughly prepare U.S. forces for future contingencies.

These missions present a unique opportunity for U.S. forces in transition. While the stress of 13 years of counterinsurgency operations has refocused interest on “conventional” force capabilities, peace operations can complement stateside training on existing “core competencies”. Continued participation in such operations can reinforce key skills for personnel and keep leaders intellectually engaged with a variety of mission profiles. These opportunities should not be taken lightly; they provide a crucial counter to institutional amnesia that can leave U.S. forces dangerously unprepared.

Building Connections with Strategic Partners

In addition to reinforcing the capabilities of U.S. forces, participation in multi-lateral peace operations helps strengthen military connections to partner states. U.N. and other peace operations create complex operational environments, which compel troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to cooperate on every level from political down to tactical.

At the most basic level, this allows U.S. troops a unique type of experiential learning by operating with foreign forces. Likewise, operating alongside U.S. forces exposes foreign troops to normative priorities such as true civilian control of the military and the protection of civilians. While these of course provide for valuable tactical development, the greater utility of such operations lies in the strategic and political connections formed between TCCs.

Cooperating under the shared objectives of a U.N. or other mandate, states lay the foundation for expanded military-to-military cooperation in the form of future exercises and exchanges. These exchanges, often conducted for higher-level military education, solidify a degree of personal and political influence. Closer connections with partner militaries can reduce the transaction and planning costs for future joint operations. Likewise, when dealing with some militaries, such shared relationships can allow the U.S. opportunities to influence political change.

Conclusion and Implications

U.S. policymakers currently face a critical period of strategic transition. Constrained by fiscal challenges and the strain of 13 years of consistent deployment, U.S. forces have adjusted to a new strategy of “light footprint” force projection. This unwritten doctrine offers an opportunity for the U.S. to use peace operations as a complementary strategic instrument. These operations build on the effects of small-scale interventions, reinforce key skill sets, and strengthen military-to-military connections with strategic partners.

These conclusions offer a simplistic policy implication: the U.S. should continue to participate in multi-lateral peace operations as a contributor of resources and troops. While the tempo of two large-scale COIN campaigns has largely eliminated the U.S. role in peacekeeping since 2001, the opportunities presented above provide some incentive to expand participation. As U.S. forces rebuild and refocus after the 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan, incrementally increasing engagement in peace operations...
The opening ceremony of exercise Western Accord 2013 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2013. Western Accord is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored, Marine Forces Africa-led multilateral field exercise and humanitarian mission in Senegal designed to increase interoperability between the United States and several West African partner nations.

can yield strategic benefits. This need not be done instantly; increased engagement can begin with expanded rotation of U.S. officers onto the staffs of U.N. and other missions. Logistical factors and policy goals will likely decide whether such a change could be followed by expanding the U.S. role as a TCC.

However, this policy implication carries an important final caveat. While the model presented above reconciles peace operations with a “light footprint”, it is not a catch-all prescription. Some U.S. interests will continue to require decisive action without the follow-on support of long-term U.N. operations. Likewise, while peace operations have yielded success stories, they face very real limits. Spreading the cost among partner states should not obscure the fact that not all conflicts can be contained or transformed by international intervention. Therefore, if peace operations are reintegrated as a U.S. policy option, they must be guided by realistic assessments of strategic interests and humble understanding of the conflicts they seek to end.

Notes:


The Dilemma

If I were to ask many of my college friends if they would support a U.S. military stability operation to rebuild infrastructure, restore order and rule of law, and provide humanitarian assistance in a troubled country, I imagine most of them would skeptically ask, “How much will it cost?,” or “How long will it take?” This skepticism is the problem that the government and military are facing in winning the public support of my generation for peacekeeping and stability operations. Like any generation, my generation wants to see greater peace and stability in the world; it appears we just do not want to invest in it nor appreciate what it means to accomplish it. The non-interventionist ideas that are held by so many of my peers are the result of what my generation has seen. We have witnessed the non-traditional warfare of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and many of our professors come from the generation that saw Vietnam. Obviously, the differences between America’s more recent engagements (OIF, OEF) and Vietnam are huge (for one, we are not in the Cold War anymore, and the environment, culture, and threats/insurgents of recent operations are vastly different from Vietnam), yet people have perpetuated the false analogies. That being said, there are some problems with peacekeeping and stability operations that are eternal: the public’s patience, political continuity, and accusations of imperialism. But my generation presents some new challenges in gaining support for peacekeeping and stability operations: the rise of non-interventionism, the distrust of the government coupled with the “Google” mentality to information (i.e., one can get a dearth of information instantaneously, often seemingly more credible than the government’s press releases), and what I call being “utilitarians of convenience.”

What My Generation Thinks

As I have mentioned, the mere utterance of “intervention” is cause for skepticism among my peers. Many view America’s interventions across the world as quasi-imperialistic. As a Bulgarian friend claimed, “America cannot keep on walking around, acting like it is the only country that matters.” Many young Americans see interventions as costly, unnecessary applications of military power, which America uses primarily to secure natural resources. Most of my peers also view Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a selectively employed and self-serving doctrine. They will point to Rwanda and Darfur as examples of America selectively choosing not to use this doctrine. In The Atlantic, Stewart M. Patrick points out that, “the bloody situation in Syria...has fostered disillusionment with (though not yet the demise of ) R2P.” My peers will point to the resources that Iraq and Afghanistan hold. They will use the key-word to discredit the legitimacy of OIF, OEF, and other operations: “self-interest.” To my generation, any action the U.S. Government performs in the name of self-interest is an evil action. Sending foreign aid to an African country? It is just self-interest as we imperialistically position ourselves against China. Helping out in disaster relief in Haiti? It is just self-interest as we want to stabilize Haiti to reduce refugees or criminals coming to America. The average American college student skeptically examines any U.S. international involvement, looking for signs of self-interest. Even if one cannot find any evidence of self-interest,
Opening Ceremony of exercise Western Accord 2013 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2013. Shown above are the senior panel members including U.S. Ambassador to Ghana Gene A. Cretz and MG Vollmecke (AFRICOM).

the patience of many in my generation is exceptionally thin. We are often described as the “instant-gratification generation” that has little patience for antiquities such as dial-up internet or library card catalog systems. This brings even more challenges to creating support from my generation for a long-term U.S. peacekeeping and stability operation in a foreign country. Experience has shown, however, that establishing rule of law, building infrastructure, increasing security, peace-building and nation-building are long-term ventures.

Coupled with the American college students’ impatience is their shortsightedness. Even though many in my generation cannot see past five minutes from now, we live in the most interconnected world ever. On the internet, we can seamlessly bounce between watching a Korean music video, checking up on cricket scores in Pakistan, and ordering tea from Britain. We have instant access to the world at large, but often fail to see the intricate connections between “us and them” and their implications for the future. This can be seen in the so-called “freedom of information” movements which are exceptionally popular among those who roam website forums like Reddit and Ars Technica (Edward Snowden was an avid poster on Ars Technica). Many of these forum participants think that state secrets are merely digitized self-interest actions/programs used to further political agendas and to control the people (and any opposition). Unlike the military and intelligence community that realize the necessity of these secrets, many young people of the internet generation cannot comprehend a world in which there is not instant access to any/all information. WikiLeaks, a website often championed by the freedom of information movement, is the prime example of this shortsightedness. Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks released thousands of classified U.S. documents and assured the public that he had done his part in editing out compromising sections and that no collateral damage would occur. Despite Assange’s assurances, many sources have now shown that damage has indeed happened. An Ethiopian journalist had to flee Ethiopia (for fear of reprisal) and Zimbabwean generals face treason trials all because Assange (and the leaker, Bradley Manning) thought they were doing the world a service.² The highly individual nature of the freedom of information movement is also a product of modern technology. A leaker, like Bradley Manning or Edward Snowden, can be the lone perpetrator of the leak. One person can release thousands of documents because of the ease of simply downloading and uploading digital files from a classified system/domain to the public domain (in violation of security policies and procedures). This can seem empowering to those of my generation who believe that the government needs to be, and can be, brought down, somewhat like “David vs. Goliath,” especially if they aim to minimize the role of the government and its interventions.

My generation has reasons for their moral qualms with government surveillance. When the recent leaks happened at the National Security Agency (NSA), the NSA instantly tried to justify its actions by citing the terrorist plots it foiled.³ This appeal can be effective with those of my generation because they are what I would call “utilitarians of convenience.” Many in my generation see foreign actions as the means to some end. Most of today’s young adults, I would argue, give little thought to the legitimacy of the means, but are only concerned about the ends. A prime example of this is drone strikes. Granted, many of my non-intervention-minded friends became anti-drone after Rand Paul’s publicized filibuster, but I would not say that drones occupy a high priority in their political concerns. Many Americans are fine with the multiple drone strikes that have occurred in countries where the U.S. is not at war – such as Pakistan. But as soon as an American citizen or civilian is killed by a drone, there is an outrage (and I think rightly so), but not because drones are morally questionable tools of non-traditional warfare, but because they did not accomplish what the people wanted (i.e., an American was killed vice solely destroying a foreign terrorist threat). When the end was acceptable, many of the same college students who would normally tell you that “America is too involved in other countries,” were out during the numerous rallies at colleges after Osama Bin Laden’s death cheering “USA, USA, USA!” This is one of the problems with my generation. Although some of us are legitimately concerned about the
moral validity of American military tools and actions, the majority seem to be only concerned about the outcome of military actions. We wanted both OIF and OEF to be like the First Gulf War: a quick, traditional, relatively painless, and overwhelmingly successful campaign. However, that is not the nature of most foreign interventions anymore. Stability operations are long, non-traditional (posing many moral dilemmas), costly, and not instantaneously successful (i.e., it may take 20 years to see significant positive results).

What Should Be Done

While the whole of U.S. Government policy and the military should not be subject to trends in thinking by any one population group, the way that my generation looks at stability operations should at least be taken into account by governmental policymakers and leaders of stability operations.

As mentioned earlier, “self-interest” is what my generation objects to; hence, it may be useful for U.S. Government leaders (particularly in the Department of State) to consider clarifying the basis of foreign interventions – i.e., citing the national interests involved, whether security, economic, or otherwise. Of course, most international actions taken by the U.S. are for a gain of some type (although we do not always reap the benefits as so often claimed, like how half of the oil in Iraq is actually going to China*), but it should be explained that self-interest and helping (e.g., providing humanitarian assistance, establishing a safe and secure environment, improving governance, promoting justice, development, education, health, etc.) are not mutually exclusive. Many of America’s greatest successes in helping foreign countries are not noticed because they are not “news-worthy,” exciting, or prominent. Many often forget that post-World War II, America helped to rebuild many of the former Axis countries. In part, America did this to keep some of these countries from falling to Communism and becoming allies of the Soviet Union, but this does not discredit the great things that America did with regard to nation-building, stabilization, and reconstruction – investing extensive resources and long-term commitment.

U.S. Government leaders, military personnel, and educators should remind my generation that foreign interventions are a long-term investment. All of America’s greatest stability operations did not happen quickly, and they likely will not happen any quicker in the coming decades. Just as American military personnel have diligently worked to win the “hearts and minds” of the citizens in many countries they are intervening in, they should also work to win the “hearts of minds” of Americans, to get them to support the operations.

One of the best ways to win the hearts and minds of the American public is to humanize the military. Programs like the internship I am participating in at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) do a great job of connecting civilians to the military. This civ-mil connection is crucial for the long, arduous work that stability operations require. The military needs the expertise of many civilians, and likewise the civilians of America (and elsewhere) need the protection of the military. The more cooperation between these two groups – military and civilians – the better. Systems like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) foster such understanding across the agencies, making it easier for the entire government to carry out whatever it is that the U.S. is trying to accomplish. It also makes it harder for the media to ignore the great successes in stability operations if the whole government is involved.

Convincing my generation that classified information is necessary is a tough sell, but this needs to be done. The best way to do this is to make sure that the young talented people of my generation working in the intelligence community or otherwise working with classified material realize the significance of what they are doing. We now know that all it takes is for one Bradley Manning or Edward Snowden to release thousands of documents, causing many programs and people to be compromised, and national security to be adversely impacted. However, there
should also be a greater movement towards not putting classifications/restrictions on documents if they have no sensitive/classified information. There are many documents that should be declassified, that are not. I realize the government moves with discretion, but we should try our hardest to release the information that we can.

Tackling my generation’s moral code of being “utilitarians of convenience” is tricky. I think the best way to approach this is to work on having legitimate means to fighting wars. Terrorism has forced us into many moral quagmires, but that does not mean that we should abandon all ideas of holding the “moral upper ground.” When we and NATO received U.N. approval for the intervention in Libya aimed at protecting civilians, it was one of our more successful operations (minus the subsequent spillover of weapons into Mali). Some of the media criticized the operation, but overall it accomplished what it set out to do, and swung the war in favor of the rebels and helped establish a democratic government. These are the kinds of operations we should strive for, operations that much of the international community can support. I realize the U.N. and other countries’ support may not always be necessary (or possible), but I think striving to ensure operations have widespread support is the best option.

Many proclaim that the age of traditional warfare is dead. This most likely means we will see a rise in stability operations and counter-terrorism, something America will likely play a part in, whether we want to or not. Americans in leadership positions and those of my generation should both realize that even though the problems of other countries are not our problems, they do affect us. America cannot exist and thrive in isolation. Hopefully my generation can realize this and can help promote the use of American resources (political, military, economic, etc.) to create a more stable and peaceful world.

Notes:

2 http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/
Located in the Cumberland Valley region of southern Pennsylvania is the United States Army War College of Carlisle, PA. The Army War College is a master’s level academic institute which educates senior level military officials in strategic studies. It is also home to the United States Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. This institute serves as the “army’s center of excellence for stability and peace operations at the strategic and operations levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution” (PKSOI mission statement). In addition to PKSOI, the Army War College is home to 77 international fellows. These fellows are senior level military officers from over 67 countries. Throughout the academic year, these fellows are exposed to and instructed in military concepts and doctrine of national security strategies. This year the War College has the pleasure of accepting Brigadier General Charles Rudakubana of Rwanda into its academic class of 2014. BG Rudakubana previously worked as Director of Peace Operations in Rwanda Defense Force.

While there are many positive aspects to UN Peace Operations, there are also the negatives which make it hard for peacekeepers to conduct their missions sufficiently. Some of the common critiques of peacekeeping include the Protection of Civilians standards and equipment acquisition. The protection of civilians standards have been criticized due to their unclear rules of engagement in various mandates. This also includes who is considered a civilian which requires protecting and who they are protecting the civilians from, which in many cases includes other civilian militia. The second note of criticism is that many of the undeveloped countries find it difficult to acquire the necessary Country Owned Equipment. This makes it extremely difficult to complete missions.

There are also many positive things that we can highlight from the Rwandan Defense Forces. They performed extremely well in peacekeeping missions around the world. The experience they have acquired over the years has been priceless. They have benefited extremely from the pre-deployment training they have received from the UN. This includes the most popular ACOTA training facilitated by the United States. Throughout their missions, they have excelled in high standards of discipline and robust posture when required.

The RDF has also placed a large focus on respect of local cultures and mission territories. A critical part of peacekeeping missions is gaining the trust of the civilian population to which you are assigned to protect. This is commonly done by building confidence and friendships with the local community. Additionally this allows free dialog with all participating parties. “It is important to remember everyone is a brother, or a sister, or a wife or a father. These people have a family who rely on them. We must do our best to assist them, and provide them protection when needed. We can build a working relation with them, or even better, a friendship,” commented Rudakubuna. “It is challenging to transition from a military force, to a peacekeeping force,” said General Rudakubana. In this context you are no longer fighting an enemy rebel, but protecting newly acquired friends.

Brigadier General Charles Rudakubana will spend the next year attending lectures and seminars on security and military leadership at the United States Army War College. Upon completion of his courses, he will return to his home country of Rwanda where he will continue his military and peacekeeping career at a senior leadership level. His profession as a peacekeeper has aided him in serving thousands of people from his home country as well as around the world. His efforts will strengthen at the operations level of peacekeeping missions around the world as he continues his graduate level education here at the US Army War College.
Extracting “lessons” from exercises and experiments – (Part 2 of 2.)

Recall from last quarter’s Journal that we were discussing how to prepare for capturing and developing key Observations, Insights, and Lessons (OIL) from Exercises and Experiments (E&E). E&E are often supported or driven by a model or simulation tool; events happen as “game turns” and the Exercise Director usually has a list of situations/challenges that he/she can present during the course of the exercise – these may be referred to as “injects.” E&E are also conducted as Table Top Exercises, or “TTX” where the exercise ‘game turns’ are more esoteric and designed more around “table top” discussions by the participants with oversight by a senior mentor – a General Officer, senior Department of State official, a representative from a UN Head of Mission (HOM).

At this point, we recommend you review Part 1 in last quarter’s Journal. This will help you to better understand the following discussion. Combining parts 1 and 2 will provide you with a good ‘SOP’ for collecting/capturing “lessons”/OIL from exercises and experiments. (The following scenario/discussion assumes the reader is using SOLLIMS for data capture/collection.)

The scenario continues - you have arrived at the exercise site, unpacked your bags, picked up your I/D Badge and set up at your “workstation.”

E&E Data Collection: Specific activities include:

**During event:** The unit/activity representative or designated Lessons Learned collection coordinator completes at least one data entry per day of event – consider applying the jingle “don’t quit until you submit”; this is achieved by either personal observation or by working with Joint / Multi-National / IA participants/partners. The collection should be related to the previously reviewed items/questions from the unit’s/agency’s Standing Collection Plan (SCP) and may also come from discussion / dialogue with other exercise participants, mentors and/or the Exercise Director/’White Cell’. (Tutorials are available online to instruct SOLLIMS users how to submit data into the SOLLIMS collection tool. SOLLIMS users can go to [https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm?disp=doc_lib.cfm&pid=1&access=display](https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm?disp=doc_lib.cfm&pid=1&access=display) to view/download the SOLLIMS “HELP and Tutorial Files.”)

The unit/activity representative should be proactive in initiating dialogue to gain new insights appropriate as data points for their LL collection plan/efforts. If available, a PKSOI representative should be asked to demonstrate the data entry process for the PKSOI Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) and assist, in particular, Interagency/NGO reps-counterparts with registering and submitting independent data/observations.

Note: when entering data, say you are pressed for time, you have the option to save your work without completing all required field by using the “Save Progress” option. As you begin to enter data, along the bottom of the date entry screens there is a Progress bar showing percentage completed and providing a “Save Progress” button.
When you use this option, you can return to the data entry and pick up where you left off. The completed data entry is only submitted when you select “Submit Final”.

of submission. Once vetted, the status of the individual data entry changes to “ACTIVE” creating open-access status.

Post event: Unit/activity representative should make sure that he/she has copy (hard copy and digits if possible) of the exercise AAR or other reports (operational, not technical) generated during the exercise itself. Upon return to home station, the unit/activity representative then works with appropriate P&SO analysts/SMEs, within an existing P&SO SME network/group, and/or becomes the analyst himself/herself, to review these documents to further extract lessons to post in SOLLIMS.

Additional activities may include the development of an E&E Initial Impressions Report (IIR), one or more PKSOI Viewpoints/ Perspectives documents, input to quarterly PKSOI Journal/Bulletin, use the data/ information to form the basis for new PKSOI Papers/issue Handbook development or to provide input for ongoing research and analysis efforts within PKSOI. All data becomes part of PKSOI stability operations master knowledge repository/database.

That’s it! You are now ready to capture key Observations, Insights and Lessons during Exercises and Experiments. The processes outlined in last quarter’s Journal combined with the discussion above form what you need to develop a unit/agency data collection SOP. Good luck and remember – “Don’t quit until you submit !!!”

“Behind the Scenes” at PKSOI. Chief, LL PKSOI, or the PKSOI LL Analyst, reviews “lessons”/OIL submitted into SOLLIMS and passes them to an appropriate PKSOI stability operations SME/analytics to begin the data vetting process; a unit/activity’s designated Command Lesson Manager (CLM)\(^1\) may also be asked to review submitted “lessons”/OIL.

Data is maintained with a status of either “Pending” or “Hold” until an SME/analytics or unit CLM completes vetting\(^2\) and notifies the Chief, LL that data is approved for general posting. The Chief, LL will then change the status to “Active” making the entry public/ accessible to all SOLLIMS users. In some cases, the unit CLM may be granted privileges to change status of exercise-specific data entries to “Active;” this will be coordinated with PKSOI prior to the exercise event.

As appropriate, the unit/activity representative can also set up new or enter other/ external ongoing Forums/Discussion Groups/CoPs to continue knowledge development on a particular topic; to expand the “Discussion” field in the data entry process.

\(^1\) CLM duties and responsibilities will be described in the next PKSOI Journal.
\(^2\) As a general rule, the goal is to have data vetted within 10 days.

pksoi.army.mil
For more information visit http://pksoi.army.mil

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