INSIDE:

2013 Unified Peace & Stability Operations Training and Education and Integration & Exercise Workshop

- Stability Operations: Policy and Doctrine Awaiting Execution
- Personal Contact in Security Cooperation: Towards Guard Dogs, Not Wolves
- Socio-Cultural Analysis at the Combatant Command
- SOLLIMS Update
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It is my pleasure to have been selected as the new Director of the Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, following the impending retirement of Colonel Cliff Crofford. As we bid farewell to Cliff and thank him for his 30 years of service to our Nation, we are confident that those of you who have had the pleasure of knowing and working with Cliff will join us in wishing him the very best as he retires.

This journal is devoted to peace and stability operations training and education. We have been very fortunate to work with many Interagency and International partners that understand our complex environment and the necessity to create training and education appropriate for such conditions. Our lead article is an executive summary of the Unified Stability and Education Training and Integration and Exercise Workshop. Essentially, we took two annual workshops and combined them, realizing that most attendees are engaged in both communities of practice. This decision also aligned with current fiscal realities. We were able to maximize our limited time together, while saving precious travel funds.

The 2013 workshop was held from 28-31 January at George Mason University and was jointly sponsored by the Director of Training, Readiness and Strategy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff/J7; George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program; the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI); and other stakeholders. The Integrated Exercise Workshop (IEW) is a JS J-7 conducted annual event and provides the opportunity for Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian partners to collaborate on mission and training needs and match those needs to exercises. They accomplished this at the workshop.

The Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop began with a plenary in which senior leaders set the context for the work groups. The workgroups were: Prevention of Violent Conflict; Conflict Response; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. These workgroups and the IEW workgroup reported their findings and recommendations to a panel of senior civilian and military leaders that form the Integrated Education and Training Working Group (IETWG).

Colonel Robert Campbell, U.S. Army War College Student, offers an article, Stability Operations: Policy and Doctrine Awaiting Execution, in which he observes that though offense and defense will remain essential core Army competencies, as they should, in actuality, it is stability which remains the most likely future mission of the Army. But, it remains inadequately addressed, particularly in brigade combat teams (BCTs) and in the Army’s generating force. He postulates that this is due to the Army’s organization, processes, and culture. And though he sees a multitude of problems, he believes the Army has the capability to address it, even in an era of shrinking budgets.

Colonel Jeffrey Calvert, PKSOI, provides an article, Personal Contact in Security Cooperation: Towards Guard Dogs, Not Wolves. Colonel Calvert looks at security cooperation, particularly training and equipping foreign militaries, as having the potential for great good but also great harm. He concludes that the best way to influence those that we engage with is through high quality face-to-face interactions and individual execution of cooperative roles. To do this right, we must put the best people forward, with the best training and education, and structure them for long-term success.

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Kolva, AFRICOM, provides a primer on Socio-Cultural Analysis at the Combatant Command. He emphasizes the necessity to have well-trained and educated socio-cultural practitioners as a permanent presence within commands. He promotes using civilian social scientists and analysts as they offer an alternative perspective to those versed in the military planning methodology. But, he found through his research that socio-cultural analysis and social sciences, in general, have not been incorporated in USG endeavors. He informs us about those things that AFRICOM is trying to do to bridge this gap so that planners and leaders can understand, analyze and engage with diverse populations.

Lastly, we provide the latest information on the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS). For those that may not be aware, SOLLIMS was created out of a recognized need, reinforced at an early Stability Operations and Training Education Workshop (SOTEW), for a place in which collaborators across the interagency and international stability operations community can connect for lessons learned and information. We welcome your contributions to SOLLIMS.
The Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop reflects the efforts and dedication from the community of interest focused on ensuring the necessary emphasis and discussion occurs in regard to Peacekeeping, Stability Operations and emerging exercises. These efforts will ensure that, as a group, we will continue to place the resources, time and energy towards Peacekeeping and Stability Operations and the associated exercises to further the discussion, educate and promulgate the ideas, concepts and principles that allow us to work in synergy on furthering the knowledge and efforts in Peacekeeping, and Stability Operations. Many organizations participated. A list of these organizations and their principal points of contact are located at the end of this article.

Background

The Director of Training, Readiness and Strategy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Readiness teams with Joint Staff/J7, George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program (GMU/POPP), the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and other stakeholders conducted a unified workshop on peace and stability operations education, training and exercises at George Mason University’s Arlington campus from 28 – 31 January 2013. The workshop brought together two efforts, simultaneously, that previously had been conducted as stand-alone events, in order to gain greater synergy and cross-talk among the civilian and military communities focused on developing education, training and exercise programs that prepare leaders and practitioners for future service in complex environments including peace and stability operations.

Workshop Objectives

The workshop objectives were broken into those relevant for the Integrated Exercise Workshop (IEW) and the Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop:

The Integrated Exercise Workshop (IEW) was a JS J-7 conducted annual event and provided the opportunity for Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian partners to collaborate on mission and training needs and match those needs to DoD and partner exercises. Specifically, the IEW provided DoD and civilian partners the opportunity to identify specific exercises where Conflict Prevention (CP), Conflict Response (CR), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) can be incorporated to improve operational alignment and provide leader education. The IEW objectives were:

- Develop agreements for collaboration and/or participation in remaining FY13 and upcoming FY14 Training and Education (T&E) events, including those that facilitate globally integrated operations;
- Increase understanding of partner T&E objectives, capabilities, interests, and opportunities;
- Develop a compendium of training/exercise interests and collaboration opportunities; and
- Identify best practices for improving T&E collaboration.

The Peace and Stability Operations (PSO) Training and Education Workshop (SOTEW) brought together community
The Conference - Overview

Day 1 began in plenary with a series of senior leaders representing selected organizations providing remarks to set the context for the follow on workgroup sessions. Speakers discussed both challenges and opportunities to the participants and charged them with maintaining the efforts in what is to be a volatile and uncertain future. The keynote for the plenary was former Congressman Ike Skelton, D-MO and former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and author of Interagency legislation. The first day of the workshop officially concluded after the question and answer period that followed the keynote speech and remarks by several dignitaries.

Day 2 saw the participants split into one of four workgroups designed to delve deeper into their specific themes. The workgroup facilitators, drawn from the stakeholders, began their sessions with a series of presenters and panelists meant to immerse into the themes while providing context for the discussion. As each workgroup began its work it was asked to keep in mind the use of a common framework in the following areas:

Envision: what are the challenges of future operating environments and the challenges that leaders must face?

Preserve: what is the current state of thinking/implementation in training/education in these areas that serves the community well? And

Adapt: where does the community need to move in the future (topics/methods/abilities) to prepare leaders for the future?

Day 3 saw the workgroups continue their dialogue and begin preparation for their final out-briefs to the senior panel. A change to this year’s workshop was the addition of community of interest marketplace. The marketplace allowed community of interest organizations to set up booths that displayed stability and peace operations education and training information. The marketplace, occurring during the noontime hours, allowed participants to have more in-depth conversations with stability operations organizations regarding their capabilities.

At the conclusion of the two and a half days designated for workgroup dialogue, selected members were asked to present their findings and recommendations to a senior panel consisting of senior leaders from civilian – military organizations that make up the Integrated Education and Training Working Group (IETWG).
The Conference – Details

Day 1 – Plenary

The intent of the plenary session was to have senior level speakers provide comments and concepts to set the strategic stage and provide a vision for the participants to immerse themselves in deeper discussions during the subsequent workgroup sessions.

The plenary portion of the workshop began with remarks provided by the host, Dr. Allison Frendak-Blume, Director of George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program. In addition to welcoming the participants, she noted that the workshop was intended to accomplish a few things: better prepare practitioners; encourage dialogue amongst the community; expand networking education, training and exercises, and finally to gain awareness and understanding of existing needs.

Dr. Frendak-Blume was following Mr. Frank DiGiovanni, OSD. He welcomed participants and encouraged them to consider the following: We have to balance our resourcing – we had plenty of volunteers to take on the offensive – minded tasks but not nearly enough for reconstruction and stabilization ones; we have to continually adapt — always questioning the normal and asking is what I am doing right?; unity of purpose will be critical as unity of command is unobtainable; we must develop trust and build relationships; anticipate — we must engage and prepare rather than react, and finally we need to continue to maintain the momentum and not lose it.

Mr. DiGiovanni was followed by the Keynote Speaker, the Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO). Congressman Skelton’s remarks, summarized, are as follows:

Thanks for your generous introduction. I wish my parents were living to hear it. My mother would believe them and my dad would be amused. What you do is very important. Understanding stabilization is not going to go away so do your homework well. I compliment you for attending the conference. We will stabilize in Mali. The U.S. is providing intelligence and assistance to the French in Mali. Some countries specialize in peacekeeping. I led a small delegation to Ireland and received a brief from the Irish Army Chief of Staff. They do peacekeeping as a specialty.

Circumstances change. We never know what day will bring differences from the day before. Study and learn a great deal. Our country is more and more involved in peace operations. Churchill and Clinton said that America is the indispensable nation. History books will tell that. I cannot stress more the importance of studying history: military history and social history. People thinking strategically made good things happen. The post-war occupations of Germany and Japan are examples of doing it right. A lot depends on the country and the culture. Being able to do the peacekeeping efforts correctly will make it effective. Planning is important. I was invited to the White House for the Iraq invasion briefing. The President went over the plan but did not include the complete plan. Based on my knowledge of Sun Tzu, I sent a letter to the President that suggested a country should consider the ending before the beginning of a conflict. I sent a letter to the President and did not receive an answer. I met with White House staff and said I never got a letter back. The staffer said “that is okay; we do not need your vote.” As it turns out, the post-conflict part of Iraq was not textbook. The end of the conflict should be thoroughly planned and that means: stability operations. So far, they have been like a backyard pickup baseball game. Three areas of conflict in a war plan are: tactical; operational, which is theatre; and the big picture which is strategy. Strategy is involved in conflict and diplomacy. In any military engagement stability should be present and accounted for. Most confuse tactics with strategy. There are many great tacticians without strategy. That is the purpose of war colleges. MG Bob Scales, former commandant of the Army War College, was asked by Ike: Of all graduating classes, of about 100, how many could have a sit-down and visit with George C. Marshall? MG Scales said two or three. This presents a number of problems. Problem number one is identifying them. Problem two is taking care of them and putting them in the right spots to make those decisions. Study history. History doesn’t repeat itself but it sure rhymes...
Local cultures define stability operations. Study it early and study it well. Good luck, learn well and ask good questions. Carry it on to your next assignment, wherever it may be.

Questions and Answers:

You anticipated the need to look at stability operations post-Iraq. What would you tell us to focus on now? The crystal ball is fuzzy.

The Boy Scout motto is to be prepared. Be sure that the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College do their best, at not just winning, but at strategic level engagement, in stability operations, when necessary. A recent article about Africa says that we may be engaged there. We are. We are supporting the French and I don’t know what is next. War Colleges should do their best to anticipate things. We did well in anticipating after WW II because heavy hitters in the Army were given instructor positions at the War College. 31 Corps Commanders, in WW II, taught at military colleges prior to the war. Being put in charge of instructing forced them to learn the art of war in order to teach it. Today, teaching at the war college is not necessarily career enhancing. I researched it with four full-colonels. In Leavenworth the instructors were bitter because they didn’t get resident CGSC and then they ended up teaching there! We can’t have that. It must be career enhancing and make them leaders in later days.

Since you are out of Congress now, considering the sequestration….where are we going to be hurt the most?

I was pretty pessimistic. I still am. They did successfully kick the can down the road. But cutting the budget is still the challenge. It’s going to be difficult. It’s going to be devastating to the military if it lasts more than a few days. It will cut contracts, programs, personnel, small end strength in each of the services; particularly Marine and Army. Equipment and maintenance will come to a screeching halt and our adversaries, and they are out there, will take advantage of it. I hope people will get along. I have seen great debates and great arguments, but also great compromises. The sequestration section of the Budget Act of 2011 was meant to cause Congress to come to agreement and it didn’t happen.

Let me tell you, I asked the Library of Congress for a review of the 34 years I spent in Congress, for a paper on all the major engagements that we were involved in. The total was 12: every 3-5 years. This surprised me. America has been engaged in major challenges, most unanticipated.

You anticipated the need to look. Another moment in time, what things would you tell us to focus on (If there was a charge for this group to have success in the future)?

We would need a clear crystal ball to answer this question. Be prepared. Make sure War Colleges do their best to instruct in this business where they can apply, not just winning a strategic level engagement, but also stability operations where necessary. Not sure if you can do more than that. Recently an article on the importance of Africa was published and it was mentioned that we may be engaged there. The war college should do their best to anticipate in those things that come along. Why did we do well in areas of stability after the WWII? Many of the heavy hitters, particularly in the Army, were given position in the war colleges. In charge of teaching and learning the art of war; today the teaching in a war college in not necessarily career enhancing and that bothers me. We conducted an investigation of war colleges in 1988. We need it to be career enhancing for bright, young, strategic thinkers; officers who can think/plan ahead and make them part of faculty. They are the ones that will pay the dividends.

Thank you, God Bless.

Congressman Skelton was followed by remarks from several distinguished visitors: Ms. Whiteside, Foreign Service Institute; Ms. Aall, United State Institute of Peace; Ms. Greenberg, Alliance for Peace; Major General Stough, JS J7; Major General
Cucolo, Commandant, U.S. Army War College; and Professor Davis, George Mason University. Mr. DiGiovanni then gave the workgroup participants their challenge for the days ahead. He noted that four years prior to WWII, we sent people to school to learn and teach stabilization and reconstruction processes – we did that because we looked at what occurred in WWI. He challenged the audience to focus on the themes: envisioning, learning and adapting.

Summaries of the Work Groups follow:

The Workgroups

Work Group 1: Prevention of Violence Conflict (PVC)

Major Questions:

- **ENVISION**: What does the future of Conflict Prevention for the U.S. (Government) look like?
- **SUSTAIN**: Which characteristics and challenges in our common, shared space must we prepare ourselves, as a community, to operate and cooperate effectively, within?
- **ADAPT**: Where do we need to move to prepare leaders for the future? What skills or capabilities do we need to develop through training and education?

**Envision**

- Reality
  - Fiscal Constraints
  - PVC can compete with other national security objectives
  - Departments, agencies and NGOs will not have shared goals

- Future: Institutionalizing and Coordinating PVC
  - BEST:
    - “Vanguard” office focused on PVC
    - Mainstream (“knowledge, skills, authorities, roles, responsibilities) across departments and agencies

  - SECOND BEST: Mainstream * PVC across departments and agencies

**Sustain/Preserve**

- Lessons Learned from recent conflict response are applicable to prevention – don’t lose them!

Adapt

- QDR & QDDR > to operational PVC guidance
- Train and education to next level:
  - PVC skills, tools, best practices
  - Operationalizing PVC with U.S.’s Busan commitment
- Make case for VPC to U.S. public and USG leaders
- Encourage sharing of research and experience

Work Group 2: Conflict Response

**Definition**: Intervention of a range of national civilian and military capabilities and resources into complex, dynamic, and violent environments.

**Key Differences among Us:**

- Lexicon/Terminology
- Perception of “Conflict”
- Access/experience in conflict zones

**Major Questions:**

- ENVISION: What conditions and challenges will the environment present that affects practitioners understand-
SUSTAIN: Given this operational environment, what current objectives and across our communities continue to serve us well?

ADAPT: Where do we need to move in the future to remain relevant and prepare our practitioners for the future?

Envision the Future Environment

- Ambiguous and complex
- Actors/Networks
- Culture/History Narrative
- Trans-Boundary
- Internal/External
- Speed - Accelerating decision making process
- Cyber, Information, Social Media, Technology
- Legal Typology
- Armed Conflict/Other situations of Violence

Sustain Selected Efforts

- JPME
- Experiential Training (CTC, Atterbury)
- IA Exchange Programs (assignments, fellowships, education)
- Language (FSI, DLI, RS&L)
- Cultural Training and Education (FSI, NPS, RS&L, OES)
- Military Planning Process
- Conflict Assessment (GMU)
- FBI Academy/IA/Joint Exercise Programs
- Lessons Learned Programs
- Information Sharing and Channels of Communication
  - Working Groups (Conferences, CoP, CoI)
  - Online Training
  - Professional Development Schools
  - Joint Exercises/Assessments
  - Network Maintenance (Formal/Informal, Social, Talent ID, Global Database)
  - Research/Reachback Field Support
  - Liaison Representatives
  - Reflecting Intl Knowledge/Perception
  - NGO Interactions
  - Think Tanks/Academia

How can we sustain these amid current challenges?

- Distributed
- Integrated
- Collaborative training and education
- Leveraging for cross-agency use
- Information sharing

What programs/methods can we share to be more effective together?

- Broaden access to cross-agency training and education programs
- Review agency programs for redundancy and consolidation
- Expand existing programs to incorporate broader collaboration/communications of outside organizations

Adapt for the Future

- Interagency Awareness (assignments, training, education)
- Cross-Cultural Training & Education
- Increase Language and Cultural Awareness Training
- Comprehensive Interagency Planning Framework
- Communicate Conflict Assessment Frameworks enabled by technology
- Core Interagency Curriculum
- Expand Interagency/NGO Exchange Programs (academic, fellowships, assignments)
- Leverage Academia
- Educate conflict responders on the nature of violence
**Challenges and Recommendations**

- Establish shared learning portal (lessons learned, case studies, reports)
- Shared electronic course catalogue linked to POI/ syllabus
- Review training and education programs for purpose of consolidation or elimination
- Create training/education “float” within multiple agencies
- Expand distributive learning programs
- Establish tuition reimbursement programs
- Create a learning management system that catalogues and schedules classes/modules for training and education
- Expanding exchange programs...nationally and internationally (assignments, education, fellowships)
- Expand external participating in experiential learning exercises and programs

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**Work Group 3: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)**

**Definition:** The Initial Response to an International, Rapid Onset Disaster

**Key Differences among Us:**
- Definition of Terms
- Approaches to Training
- Resourcing

**Major Questions:**

- **ENVISION:** What problem are we trying to address with education and training? What are the gaps that we currently see?

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**Envision**

- Leadership and staffs at all levels are educated and trained on the international HA/DR response systems/models/ processes
- Understand language/systems/cultures across the USG and international agencies

**Sustain**

- Each organization has established and is continuously developing curriculum appropriate to their perspective of the evolving threat environment
- Preserve interagency coordination processes that currently exist between DoS and DoD regarding HA/DR and expand across USG

**Adapt**

- Review and validate our proposed core elements of HADR activity
- Work with USAID/OFDA to consider incorporating approved core elements into training under development
- Develop tiered approach to training

**Challenges**

- Organizational culture diversity
- Policy, authority and resourcing
- Collateral effort for the community of practice
- Transparency
- Natural tendency to seek a one size solution

**Recommendations**

- Organizational culture diversity
- Policy, authority and resourcing
- Collateral effort for the community of practice
- Transparency
- Natural tendency to seek a one size solution

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**Working Group 4: The Integration & Exercise Workshop**

The IEW: Brought together individuals interested in training and exercises from DoD, the (rest of) interagency, NGOs, and international partners as a means of improving civilian – military relationships and operations.
What we came here to do:
- Discuss major training and exercise initiatives to better align common mission interests
- Work together to improve preparedness for future operating environments
- Enhance relationships, increase understanding, and expand networks by identifying common goals, themes, and initiatives

How we did it:
- 14 DoD, 9 interagency, and 4 collaboration forums* presented their mission, capabilities, and coordination processes as well as discussed their exercise and training needs
- Focused on events that would benefit from enhanced training and exercise coalitions and partnerships
- Concentrated on DoD high priority inter-agency exercise support

What we took away:
- Themes we should incorporate into future training scenarios
  - Food Security
  - Gender/Women Issues
  - Strategic Messaging (Global Health Risk Messaging)
- Cross Regional Threats
  - Health
  - Cyber
  - Complex Disasters
  - Conflict
- Exercise planning considerations
  - Earlier engagement in planning cycle
- Includes advisors and LNOs
  - Higher fidelity, earlier, in support requests
  - Review of planning assumptions (replication vs. play)
  - Thorough training for exercise participants
  - Increase use of tabletops
  - Increase availability/use of distributed participation in T&E planning and execution
  - Use central points to assist with identifying participants
- Leverage exercises beyond the objectives
  - Improve job functions/awareness of capabilities
  - Highlight relationships and friction points
- Participant Surveys
  - Asked participants to rate the IEW in 9 categories

Next Steps:
- Communicate findings (needs/interests)
  - Review outcomes with ESG tri-chairs and ESG working group for incorporation in efforts and update IET-WG leadership
  - Update DoD Interagency WG
- Determine how immediate takeaways can be incorporated into current/emerging initiatives
- Review IETWG/SOTEW relationships
- Incorporate design comments into 2014 IEW

Stakeholders
OSD for Training and Readiness – Mr Storm Jackson
Joint Staff J7 – Mr Gary Quay and Mr Mike Dawson
Simons Center – MG ret Ray Barrett
Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute – Ms Patti McNerny and Ms Stacy Nichols
US Agency for International Development – Mr Mike Carney
Naval Post Graduate School – Dr Karen Guttieri
US Institute for Peace – Ms Marcia Wong, Dr Lauren Van Metre and Mr Brian Rose
The US Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute – Dr Jim Embrey, Professor Bill Flavin, Ms Marcy Robey and Mr Dave Hagg
George Mason University – Dr Allison Frendak-Blume
Center for Complex Operations – Mr Dale Erickson

Plenary Presenters
Dr. Allison Frendak-Blume, Academic Director for Peace Operations Policy Program, George Mason University; Mr Frank DiGiovanni, Director, Training Readiness and Strategy, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Ms Ruth Whiteside, Director of the Foreign Service Institute; Ms Pamela Aall, Provost, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, US Institute for Peace; Ms Melanie Greenberg, President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding; Maj Gen Stough, Deputy Joint Staff J7; MG Cucolo, Commandant of the US Army War College; Mr Dave Davis, Professor, George Mason University.

A special thank you to the Honorable and Former Congressman Ike Skelton, (D-MO) for sharing his insights and thoughts as the workshop’s keynote speaker.
Department of Defense (DoD) spending represents the greatest portion (25 percent 2012) of the U.S. Federal budget. Although shrinking, this spending will dominate budget allocations for the foreseeable future. When our civilian leaders demand a return on this taxpayer investment, the military, specifically the Army, must be ready to fight and win the conflicts we are presented rather than the ones we would choose. National strategy, policy, and doctrine direct the Army to perform missions across the spectrum of conflict (offense, defense, and stability). Though offense and defense will (and should) remain essential core Army competencies, it is stability which remains the most likely mission the Army will conduct. However, stability remains inadequately addressed in brigade combat teams (BCTs) and in the Army’s generating force due to organization, processes, and culture.

Stability Operations and the Contemporary Threat Environment

In a world which has changed rapidly over the last decade, the Army endeavors to define its current and future operational environment (OE). Most contemporary studies describe a diverse milieu which poses varied security challenges for the United States and its allies. In places like Syria, Congo or the Balkans, U.S. land forces could be deployed as the lead element, or in an advise-and-assist role, to accomplish a variety of security tasks. Regardless of the mission, the end result would be to stabilize the area. Consequently, the Army must be prepared to mitigate a variety of threats, most of which cannot be defeated with offense and defense alone. Acknowledging this must be a priority for shaping Army capabilities.

The Army has conducted stability operations every 25 years since the Mexican War in 1840. Following its trials with stability operations in Vietnam, the Army turned its attention to conventional threats. This focus led to decisive victory in Desert Storm yet produced a force which struggled greatly to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army fought as it had trained and while it successfully defeated conventional military formations, was less effective against lightly armed insurgents who gained public support. While some units had success adopting innovative tactics, overall the Army’s approach to operations remained fundamentally unchanged. Even after the Army developed doctrine and altered strategy, stability gains were either late coming or never achieved.

Strategy, Policy, and Doctrine

In 2005, DoD created Instruction Memorandum (DoDI) 3000.5. This unprecedented directive orders stability as a core military mission equivalent to combat operations. More recently, following the issuance of the Obama Administration’s Priorities for 21st Century Defense, DoD and the Army released Guidance Outlining Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance. These directives identify ten missions for the military, ranging from...
irregular warfare to disaster relief. Seven of these missions require proficiency in stability operations. With these directives and the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-07 (Stability) series, never before has so much guidance existed. Yet in Army tactical formations and in training institutions it is not being implemented. As an illustration, a sampling of BCT training guidance memorandums, Combat Training Center (CTC) mission letters, and a review of Army training institution programs of instruction (POI) show stability comprises of 1 percent of the total guidance or instruction.

Obstacles to Achieving Stability Effectiveness and Steps to Address Them

There are three primary causes of stability underperformance. The first is a military culture (beliefs which shape how we act) of lethality. The leaders of these organizations, many of which grew up in the Cold War, interpret guidance in a way familiar and comfortable to their conventional roots. General John R. Galvan stated “When we think about the possibilities of conflict we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war . . . one that fits our preconceived ideas.” For example, many commanders falling victim to their interpretations have emphasized conventional skills at the cost of stability training. Second, BCTs are structured primarily for lethal missions and third, use related processes in training and operations which do not facilitate stability. To repair this, BCTs, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) must address culture and encourage force tailoring.

BCT Organization

General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, directed, “the Army must develop new capabilities and adapt new processes and ensure it is an agile, responsive, tailorable force.” Abiding by this guidance, BCTs must tailor organizational structure, establish relevant processes, and train and educate their personnel. Consider the augmentation required for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as human terrain teams, law enforcement professionals, and interagency specialists. Expecting this type of augmentation and/or permanent BCT organizational changes is unreasonable in a time downsizing. However, effective, internal adaptations can be made.

To illustrate this, examine the depth found in the fire support (FS) structure in a BCT. FS personnel and supporting processes are resident all the way down to the platoon and squad. For the stability task of governance, a stability task, there are only two civil affairs persons in the BCT. Building a governance structure and supporting systems from the squad to the BCT using existing personnel would address this shortfall.

Commanders should look inside their organizations for individuals possessing education or cognitive skills which would allow them to grasp stability tasks such as governance and rule of law. BCTs must continue to resource company intelligence support teams (COIST). Even in companies and below, select members would need additional non-MOS skills (surveying, conflict resolution, etc.). Once organized, commanders should train and test staffs, units, and processes using situational training exercises (STX).

BCT Procedures

A study by the Joint Coalition Operational Analysis Division (JCOA), J7, Joint Staff, concluded that the “failure to understand the operational environment” was the number one lesson learned from the last decade. This was due in part because of ineffective intelligence structure and procedures in BCTs. The development of COIST teams helped address this shortfall, however many units still used legacy intelligence procedures centered on enemy disposition instead of the underlying causes and societal failures which facilitated their existence. Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (then Major General, ISAF Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence Operations) noted in 2010, “that we were largely uninformed about populations and ill-prepared to understand them, is a natural consequence of the intelligence community being built upon the edifice of Cold War politics.” Even population assessment tools like ASCOPE/PEMSII failed to describe the relevance to the local population.

To address this challenge, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD created the District Stability Framework (DSF). DSF helps field practitioners understand sources of instability through the eyes of the local population. The Army incorporated DSF in doctrine (ADP 3-07) but did not establish a pre-deployment training program or enforce its use at CTCs. Unaccustomed to DSF, commanders were averse to incorporating it into their processes during chaotic Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) pre-deployment periods and while deployed.

BCT commanders can take two primary steps to achieve effective procedures. First, DSF must be trained and utilized across the BCT. Second, processes modeled after targeting must be developed, prioritized, and exercised for stability tasks such as...
governance and development. CTCs must become experts in DSF and help units develop and exercise processes specific to stability.

Army Level Fixes

To address a culture fixed on lethality, adverse to change, TRADOC must exercise what sociologist Edgar Schein calls cultural embedding mechanisms. These include, what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control. TRADOC should resource and sanction PKSOI to conduct a thorough analysis of generating and operational forces to identify where stability shortfalls exist and why. Using these findings, TRADOC leadership, applying oversight of training institutions and CTCs, can re-balance offense, defense, and stability training. FORSCOM can complement this effort with division and BCT oversight. Reporting procedures and subsequent directives complimenting this effort will ensure proper measurement and control.

The problems presented above are well within the capability of the Army to address, even amidst shrinking budgets. Policy, strategy, and doctrine speak clearly of the requirement to maintain stability operations as a core competency. However, if the Army forgets its recent past and shifts its training priority to offense and defense it risks arriving on the next battlefield unprepared. The newly formed Decisive Action Training Environment and TRADOC’s strategic adaptability provide a unique opportunity to institute changes forcing units to tailor their organization and processes to achieve stability proficiency.

Notes

6. This statistic comes from a collection and analysis of 15 Division and BCT training guidance memorandums, mission letters for Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) CTC rotations and combat arms training institution (basic, career, NCO courses) POIs. Tasks and guidance relating specifically to offense, defense, and stability proficiency were tallied (tasks like leader development, fitness, and administration were not counted), and averaged across the 15 documents and POIs. A total of 15 stability related tasks were found as opposed to 165 offense and defense tasks. This equated to an average of .090% (percent of each document or POI related to a stability task or guidance), (collected and assessed November through February 2012-2013).
11. Ibid.
There are many good reasons for security cooperation, and many positive results to be achieved for U.S. national security and for the broader causes of regional and global stability, democracy, and human rights. But security cooperation is a complex undertaking, and some aspects of it – particularly training and equipping foreign militaries – have the potential to do great harm as well as great good. Despite the best intentions and the tightest controls, there is no certainty of responsible future use.

A weapon system is only as safe as the mentality and morality of the person in control of it, and a soldier who learns marksmanship or patrolling or tactical decision-making learns those things for life, regardless of how he chooses to use them in the future. This is the dark side of the “teach a man to fish” paradigm for capacity building – the fact that a skill taught or a capability given cannot be undone when the motivations of the recipient change, and that the teacher’s influence on those motivations is often uncertain.

The mujahedeen of the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation in the 1980s were made effective in part by U.S. support, but later provided a pool of lethal talent for strikes against U.S. interests. The same potential for bad outcomes exists anytime support is given, and the risk is often greatest in those situations with the greatest level of need, where there is less inherent stability, less resiliency and societal depth. The need to mitigate this uncertainty and lack of future control presents a fundamental security cooperation dilemma: how to ensure that the trajectory set for a supported force is a good and lasting one that will give the partner country competent, reliable, and effective guardians who will not drift into feral behavior that threatens other nations or their own populace.

The system is a start

There are no easy or complete answers to the problem, but there are many safeguards and control measures built into the system. The strategic and operational planning that drives security cooperation attempts to account for risks and make wise choices about whom to support and in what way, and to consider the unintended consequences and second and third order effects of that support. It attempts to be comprehensive and ensure that security forces do not gain strength in a vacuum, but rather as a component of larger security sector reforms that include the judicial system and rule of law, civilian oversight, and societal checks and balances. It is deliberate, cyclical, multi-tiered, and sensitive to input from all levels to provide responsive decisions. But it is always based on incomplete information, cannot predict all contingencies, and may not account for important nuances of unique local situations.

Systemic checks such as the Leahy Amendment deny support to individuals or units that have a history of human rights violations, and there are boilerplate contractual restrictions that forbid misuse. But the Leahy Amendment is not predictive – a clean past does not guarantee a clean future, especially when new capabilities or resources give a force increased power relative to its neighbors and the population it is supposed to protect. And it is impossible to contractually control knowledge, skills, and experience in the same way as technology or a piece of equipment.

Even the complexity of the system itself serves as a check. Multiple executive departments, multiple authorities and appropriations, technical definitions that break security cooperation into many carefully defined and regulated flavors of support – all act
to slow the process and ensure that decision-making is conscious and deliberate.

**But the system isn’t enough – people are the key**

It is a fundamental truth of this endeavor that conscientious and balanced planning, rules, and systemic control mechanisms can only go so far to influence the minds of partner nation individuals who will be leading forces or manning weapon systems, and who will surely be faced with difficult ethical decisions. The best way to influence those minds towards the good is at the point of contact, by the quality of face-to-face interactions and the individual execution of cooperative roles. This critical intangible presents itself over and over in lessons-learned analysis, regardless of theater or level of operation: personal interaction and relationships have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of security cooperation. It is therefore imperative to give careful attention to selecting the right personnel, preparing them properly, and structuring their interactions for long-term success.

Each contact with foreign military personnel, at every level from private to general, is significant and has the potential to create critical influence in one direction or another. Each interaction is an opportunity to demonstrate what “right” looks like, to show the values, attitudes, and professionalism that will earn the partners acceptance within their own society and the international community. But only if the teachers know for themselves what “right” looks like and live that code.

This implies a distinct requirement for quality control, preparation, and vetting of personnel for security cooperation. They must be the right people, who understand the purpose and significance of their mission and the interactions they will have, who accept that role and are good at it. And they must be prepared beyond just technical qualifications. It is just as important that they know and understand people, realize the importance of first impressions, have an attitude of cultural understanding, and that they are good teachers. Sometimes the most important learning comes not from what is specifically taught, but rather from how it is taught and the way the person in charge conducts himself – the example they set and the quality of the connection they make. This is true regardless of the nature of the cooperative relationship, whether teacher, trainer, mentor, advisor, or working partner.

The stage is set for new prominence and increased effectiveness for security cooperation. In times of austerity, leverage gained through security cooperation is particularly important. Ten years of difficult combat experience has given the U.S. a strong cohort of capable personnel who, because of that experience, have enhanced credibility with partners and potential partners. At the same time, the Army is moving towards greater regional force alignment that can enable longer and more stable partnership relationships with deeper and more enduring results. To take full advantage of the possibilities, the Army must focus on those relationships and support them with the right resources and, most importantly, the right people. Done well, this can help solve that security cooperation dilemma and build a world where security forces act as reliable guard dogs, rather than as wolves.
**Introdction**

Within the Africa Command (AFRICOM) Intelligence Directorate (J2) exists regional subject matter experts (SMEs) who regularly explain the local cultures and perspectives in Africa in order to ensure the US military does not make dangerous mistakes in a region we know little about. These socio-cultural practitioners are now a permanent fixture in command activities such as planning operations and exercises and reaching out to external agencies concerning populations in Africa. The AFRICOM J2 can offer an example on how to integrate socio-cultural analysis (SCA) into the combatant command (CCMD). The Social Science Research Branch (SSRB), where the SCA capability resides in AFRICOM, is filled with academic researchers and analysts who provide an understanding of today’s asymmetric, non-standard, understudied, and intelligence resource scarce operating environment in Africa. The aim of this paper is to recognize the knowledge gaps in the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR), demonstrate the capabilities of SCA at the CCMD, and how AFRICOM integrates SCA into the strategic intelligence toolkit.

**Recent History of Cultural Knowledge in the Military (Knowledge Gaps)**

The integration of SCA into the common operational picture for commanders and national security officials has been a systematic problem for many decades, especially for asymmetric warfare. In Vietnam, while social scientists helped develop a plan for strategic hamlets in southern Vietnam, the forces on the ground and political actors in the US failed to implement a strategy that both provided security for these small villages as well as incorporate the history, culture and needs of the local communities. This failed implementation of strategic hamlets in Vietnam later became a source for new counter-insurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the Department of the Army created the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the intelligence community has again failed to understand and describe the socio-cultural environment to the commander in order to effectively and quickly neutralize or destroy al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In recent combat environments, allied forces were slow to implement plans concerning culture and the beliefs and attitudes of the populations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These hard learned lessons occurred during the Phase III operations or during war as described in LTG Flynn’s Conflict Continuum model (see graph on next page). In Afghanistan, there was:

“...a large void of understanding of the socio-cultural issues which inevitably impact our operations and efforts to counter the Taliban-led insurgency. The resulting failures of misunderstanding the routine values and behaviors, or culture, which characterize the human terrain our forces operate amongst vary from intelligence assessments afflicted with ethnocentric bias which do not accurately reflect how our adversary would perceive and respond to our actions to a complete lack of under...”
SOCIOCULTURAL ANALYSIS AT THE Combatant Command

SOciO-cultural analySiS at the cOmbatant cOmmand standing of how local dynamics fuel elements of the conflict. In contrast, the Taliban hold a distinct advantage over Western forces in that they have an intimate understanding of the local population and are able to use this knowledge against us. 

One example of this misunderstanding occurred when well-intentioned humanitarian efforts led to attempting to feed MRE’s with pork to a hungry population. The lack of knowledge and an understanding of the people and their dietary customs failed to win the population.

The Conflict Continuum

In Iraq, misunderstanding the population's ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions amplified the insurgency's cause.

“We entered Iraq with no understanding of the sociological and cultural dynamic and influence of the tribes and the tribal elders within the populations of the cities and provinces. We also did not fully understand or comprehend the dynamics which existed between the Shi‘ites, the Sunnis and the Kurds. By not recognizing their importance and influence we ignored the tribes and did not attempt to develop a working relationship or engage them which is why they initially elected to align themselves and partner with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Once we recognized and accepted the importance of the tribes; coupled with a dedicated effort to engage and work with the tribes, al-Qaeda was successfully driven out of the Anbar Province.”

SCA conducted at the right levels of planning prior to United States government (USG) engagements in Iraq could have prevented learning these lessons the hard way, saving USG blood and treasure.

Based on the aforementioned experience in the Middle East, a greater understanding of the operational environment in Africa is warranted in order to prevent re-learning the same lessons in the asymmetric battle space. Africa lacks the depth of study and historic foundation found in other CCMD AORs and is most likely to host asymmetric warfare. Africa has been ignored by strategic thinkers over the last century, and the AFRICOM planners and staff began with a steep learning curve. Bringing in social scientists, analysts, historians, anthropologists and other academics that have made studying and understanding African populations their life’s work has certainly helped bring the command up to speed. Integrating this capability into everyday CCMD activity in the most efficient manner helped the command avoid mistakes and ensures strategic success in the future. As an example, during the command headquarters exercise Judicious Response 2012, a socio-cultural analyst offered crucial advice during a briefing to the AFRICOM Deputy Commanding Officer regarding the use of military forces with NGOs. This advice changed the planning for the exercise and prevented a potential negative scenario (albeit notional) for the command. Further examples are available at a higher classification.
SOCIO-CULTURAL ANALYSIS AT THE COMBATANT COMMAND

Social Science Capabilities: Common SCA Attributes

SCA practitioners have education and experience in specific countries or regions in which they apply their skills. Most have on-the-ground experience interacting with populations in local languages. Many lack military experience. This, however, may be a reason to advocate SCA expertise. The social scientist and analyst generally lacks the biases often associated with military planner groupthink and problem solving methodologies. The SCA practitioners not only provide outside-the-box thinking, but also see Africa from a different perspective. Also, the SCA practitioner with the aforementioned experience is free to let the senior leaders in a command know when they (unintentionally) approach a new population the wrong way as previously mentioned during the 2012 command exercise, something junior officers on a planning staff may be less inclined to do.

According to Defense Science Board studies conducted over the last six years, SCA and social sciences in general have not been incorporated into USG endeavors. These studies have suggested that USG should start using social sciences, and that doing so would improve operational readiness for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and perhaps even prevent conflict.

“Human terrain preparation will enable U.S. forces to better understand how individuals, groups, societies and nations behave, and then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces and (2) understand and shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra-, and post-conflict situations.”

“The USG is not investing adequately in the development of social and behavioral science information that is critically important for COIN.”

SCA provides population-centric products that fill gaps of understanding for senior leaders and planners. When the Defense Science Board Task Force met to investigate the use of SCA, they determined that “the emphasis should be on human dynamics ‘products’ in addition to centralized databases and supposed systems.” These products include world-view documents and micro-regional history products. The Defense Science Board continued by saying “The range of anticipated contingencies and adversaries will increasingly require deployment of US military forces among populations, rather than isolated across defined military-military lines.”

The SSRB members who provide this type of service to AFRICOM have successfully produced academic briefings, lectures, and papers, as well as Theater Analysis Reports (TARs), which describe population-centric factors often missed in traditional nation-state centric intelligence production. “The ability of all US echelons to distinguish between – and appropriately engage with – adversaries, competitors, neutrals, and friends will require varying degrees of

SAMPLE SSRB EXPERIENCE

Oral history research funded by the Fulbright program (Burundi)
Oral history research funded by the MacArthur Foundation (Tanzania)
UN High Commissariat for Human Rights Field Operation/UNAMIR (Rwanda)
Human Rights Watch/FIDH (Rwanda)
Research Fellow, University of Texas at Austin
Research Fellow, Center on Conflict, Development and Peace Building (Geneva)
Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey
Political Affairs Officer, UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
Academic Coordinator at The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)
Analyst with International Crisis Group in West Africa
Research Analyst, U.S. State Department
Counterterrorism analyst, NYPD Intelligence Division, terrorist threats from Africa
Other formal in-country research: Liberia, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mali, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti
cross-cultural awareness, competence, and astuteness.” While SCA products cannot replace all-source or any other type of analysis, SCA practitioners within the AFRICOM Intelligence and Knowledge Development (IKD) Directorate are filling population-centric knowledge gaps for the CCMD.

A New Approach to SCA: Consider it ISR

“When SCA methodologies and techniques are applied, strategic indications and warning can be derived…”

The answer to closing many intelligence gaps, at the CCMD and higher echelons, seems to be more Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). With more technological assets available, the thought goes, we can learn more about the operational environment. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), however, is encouraging a paradigm shift. The author of Fixing Intel and the latest article Left of Bang highlight this new direction. “What remains is for the IC (Intelligence Community) to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for incorporating [it] into the intelligence process.” The IC requires a paradigm shift from using traditional intelligence assets to find, fix and finish the enemy to understand, analyze, and engage with populations. If the intent of ISR is to understand the environment, then SCA needs to be incorporated into it and perhaps even be thought of as an “INT” of its own. Whether it is called socio-cultural analysis or intelligence, in the regions and areas where ISR assets are lacking, SCA should be mandatory. Having regional experts who have studied and understand the populations in areas of interest would not only amplify data from traditional ISR, but also would help the IC use ISR more efficiently and effectively.

AFRICOM, formed under the auspices of a new kind of command, has been the perfect test bed for implementing SCA into traditional ISR. AFRICOM considers SCA to be a form of ISR that helps the command and staff and greater USG understand the populations in which we may engage. We gain understanding and potentially reduce the risk associated with the limited overhead systems allocated to AFRICOM. According to the Defense Science Board, “the deluge of sensor data is creating a crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communication, as well as an increasing need for advanced analysis that addresses behavior of groups and the cultural framework of group decisions.” Perhaps joining, or in some cases, replacing traditional ISR with SCA practitioners could reduce the dependency on sensors by better using knowledgeable on-the-ground experience and education.

Managing SCA: Where does it fit at the CCMD?

The AFRICOM intelligence directorate has made great strides in instilling SCA into intelligence analysis. There are numerous CCMD level activities in which SCA is involved in AFRICOM. From command planning activities, to exercise participation, to various forms of academic outreach, SCA practitioners help enhance command activities. Here are specific activities in which the SCA practitioner should and does participate.

Research- Over the last year, the AFRICOM J2 has implemented a Knowledge Development Board (KDB) which receives research requirements from throughout the AFRICOM joint staff. These research requests are validated by the board members, who represent each directorate within AFRICOM. Project validation is based on the CCMD lines of effort, priorities and objectives. End products from KDB approved research projects have included written products and briefings from both primary and secondary research. It is important to note that these projects are often durable long-term initiatives in which continued dialogue occurs even after the final products are produced. SCA practitioners will produce branches and sequels based on the needs of the CCMD.

Planning- AFRICOM SCA practitioners actively participate in both long-term strategic planning (Joint Planning Teams (JPT)) and crisis reaction planning (Operational Planning Teams (OPT)). However, this is an ad hoc team in which only the most engaged and astute SCA leaders facilitate involvement. This type of planning interaction is prescribed by the joint publication Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
“All relevant physical and nonphysical aspects of the operational environment are analyzed by JIPOE analysts, combatant command personnel, and GEOINT analysts to produce a geospatial perspective and develop a systems perspective through the analysis of relevant socio-cultural factors and system/subsystem nodes and links.”

Exercises - SCA has a lot to offer and has contributed significantly to both CCMD headquarters and component command exercises over the last few years. The exercise Judicious Response 2012 scenario primarily focused on Mass Atrocities and Response Operations (MARO). The SSRB provided a social scientist to the exercise planning staff and provided subject matter expertise on the socio-cultural indicators and warnings of mass atrocities that may require MARO, often citing real-world events in Africa. Additionally, the SSRB provided pre-exercise academics covering the regional channels of conflict for the training audience. Component commands have used SSRB subject matter expertise in a similar matter, conducting exercises in Africa with partner nations. Social scientists prepare US military units not only for the exercise scenario, but also for working with partner nation militaries as well. In addition, these SCA practitioners provide an environmental assessment before and after the exercise to ensure the local populace is not negatively affected by, or have a negative perception of, the USG.

Outreach - The Intelligence, Security, Cooperation and Engagement (ISCE) Division is responsible for assisting African partner nations in building and developing intelligence capacity and facilitating intelligence sharing. Often times, intelligence sharing is difficult and slow due to the lack of intelligence sharing agreements with partner nations. Since SCA is often performed at the unclassified level, AFRICOM has looked to the SSRB to provide unclassified papers for partner nations. It should also be noted that the SCA practitioner often has language skills that could enhance intelligence engagements with African partner nations. Finally, as academic researchers, SCA practitioners can assist the AFRICOM J95 with academic outreach, by reconnecting with previous academic institutions, regional centers and think tanks both in the US and in Africa. This type of academic outreach not only helps build relationships with partner nations, but also helps the USG understand regional perspectives on shared problem sets in Africa.

Civil Information Fusion Center - The Joint Staff J-7 has identified the need for better use and management of population-centric civil information in accordance with LTG Flynn’s article Fixing Intel. “CCMDs lack a sufficient capability and capacity to analyze and provide relevant civil information to command processes.” The SCA practitioners within the AFRICOM J2 are currently playing a large role in testing and facilitating this capability. When Civil Affairs professionals gather white data (information pertaining to the local civilian populace) and green data (local or neutral government entities) on the ground in Africa, this data should be maintained and analyzed at the CCMD. SCA practitioners can provide the significance to the data collected. This will certainly enhance understanding of the environment in Africa and give the CCMD a better common operating picture.

Conclusion

The most understudied region in the world falls within AFRICOM’s AOR. Coupled with the least amount of intelligence resources and the likelihood of an asymmetric warfare environment, SCA plays a vital role on how AFRICOM’s staff views the operating environment in Africa. Socio-cultural analysis provides an effective way to provide CCMD leadership the information required to understand, analyze, and engage with populations. Finally, focusing SCA on planning activities, CCMD and component level exercises, and academic outreach will enhance primary command activities and help attain success in the related CCMD lines of effort. These activities, which integrate SCA into the AFRICOM information management cycle should be a model for other CCMDs. Ultimately, socio-cultural analysis can have a global impact, allowing the USG and partner nations to use intelligence resources in a more effective and efficient way.
Notes

1 For the purpose of this paper, the term “cultural expert” refers to individuals with specific education and experience regarding specific populations and/or functional topics in Africa. The Knowledge Development Division in AFRICOM particularly has anthropologists, sociologists, historians and a variety of individuals educated across the social sciences with on the ground experience with particular populations.

2 For the purposes of this paper, the term “practitioners” includes both socio-cultural scientists and analysts.


6 The Canadian Army Journal, Volume 13.1, 2010

7 Diana Sorrentino, Ph.D. “Socio-Cultural Intelligence,” 2011


9 Diana Sorrentino, Ph.D. “Socio-Cultural Intelligence,” 2011


20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01.3, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment," June 2009


22 Joint Staff J7, Civil Information Fusion Center (CIFC) Concept of Operation (CONOPS), Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Suffolk, VA, 3 December 2012.
Extracting “lessons” from exercises and experiments – (Part 1 of 2.)

**General.** Exercises and Experiments (E&E) provide an ideal environment from which to capture both perishable and enduring 'lessons' / observations (Observations, Issues, Lessons (OIL) // Observations and Recommendations (O&R)) – especially in the area of Civ-Mil interaction and interoperability. Many of the key, national level, GCC and ACC-sponsored exercises/experiments, have specific objectives and MSEL (Master Scenario Events List) events that are intended to 'exercise' or test concepts relating to Civ-Mil cooperation – e.g. integration of interagency (IA) elements; Civ-Mil communications; synchronization of programs and coordination between the military commander’s and the civilian head-of-mission's stability/reconstruction program objectives; related activities of military units on the ground and IA objectives and activity in the military commander’s Area of Operations. Many “lessons” can be gleaned from these events which are usually lost after the event occurs – even though a comprehensive AAR may be prepared. The AAR information is often not entered into a true ‘database’ environment to allow subsequent recall of the information in a clear and usable format. The process below outlines “a way” that can be used to better capture, and then make available for analysis observations, issues and ‘lessons’ from E&E events.

**Collection Opportunities.** The primary E&E events usually include the IPC (Initial Planning Conference), MSEL (Master Scenario Events List) development seminars/working groups, Mid and Final Planning Conferences (MPC/FPC), the exercise/experiment itself and then the AAR/backbrief. During each of these events there are tremendous opportunities to capture, ‘learn’ – disseminate and integrate – lessons, articulate key observations, and identify stability operations related issues that are of significant value to the Stability Operations / Reconstruction community writ large.

**E&E Data Collection:** Specific activities include:

**Prior to E&E Event/Activity:** The unit/agency representative or other designated Lessons Learned collection coordinator obtains information about the exercise (eMail, website, TSCMIS, JTIMS ?) – e.g. exercise objectives; plan for Inter-agency integration, if any; names of Interagency players – where and when possible, the unit/agency representative / collection coordinator should assist the Exercise Director with identifying and contacting proposed Interagency players to help in garnering Interagency support/participation; initial concept for stability operations “play” during the exercise – sometimes referred to as ”injects” during the exercise. The unit collection coordinator then reviews a “Standing Collection Plan” – this can be a unit/agency/GCC or ACC prepared list - to identify the appropriate areas and questions for the upcoming E&E event; then develop an event/exercise specific data collection plan. The collection coordinator can share this with the Exercise Director to help shape/form the Interagency/ stability operations “play” during the exercise. You’re now ready to pack your bags and head off to the exercise IPC / MSEL conference / MPC / FPC or the actual exercise.

Join us next quarter when in Part 2 of “Extracting “lessons” from exercises and experiments” we will discuss activities to take during and after the E&E event. Can’t wait --- You can email us to get a full text version including both Parts 1 and 2.
Announcing the July 2013 theme: Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations. If you are interested in contributing to the journal, send your letter or articles for submission to the PKSOI Publications Coordinator: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil no later than 15 June 2013 for consideration. Also provide sufficient contact information. Note that articles should reflect the topic of Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations. The Journal editing team may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only, and in coordination with the original author.