INSIDE:

- The Stability Operations and Security Cooperation Nexus: Linkages, Challenges, and Recommendations
- Police Development: Why It’s Such a Challenge
- Why Should the U.S. Military Continue to Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts Abroad
- Peacekeeping in Somalia: U.S. Security Cooperation in Support of Uganda
- Surviving Green-on-Blue Attacks: Truth or Consequences
- Addressing Security Cooperation in the 21st Century
- Review of Arab Society in Revolt: The West’s Mediterranean Challenge
You can view previous issues and sign up for our mailing list @ [http://PKSOI.army.mil](http://PKSOI.army.mil)
The Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Journal Online theme for January covers a variety of select themes on security cooperation. As the reader will see, the subjects for this issue are diverse, informative, and pertinent to emerging challenges associated with security cooperation.

Colonel Lawrence E. Strobel and Mr. Robert J. Swope lead off with the feature article “The Stability Operations and Security Cooperation Nexus: Linkages, Challenges, and Recommendations,” examining the relationship between stability operations and security cooperation. Accordingly, the authors address the strategic context, overarching military responsibilities, current terminology, and challenges connected with stability operations and its subset, security cooperation.

In his article “Police Development: Why It’s Such a Challenge” Colonel Robert E. Lowe examines the demands emanating from police reform. Therein, he identifies some counterproductive concepts which may be suitable for modern police forces but unrealistic in a burgeoning force. Additionally, Colonel Lowe highlights the essential attributes of a functioning police force.

Colonel Michelle J. Stewart’s article, “Why Should the US Military Continue to Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts Abroad?” explores the strategic, operational, and political-military implications of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Intimately associated with the strategic themes of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (the 3Ds), both HA and DR undergird American smart power and its strategic values.


In his article, “Surviving Green-on-Blue Attacks: Truth or Consequences,” Colonel James M. Shelley provides a sobering reality for advisors in conflict areas—there are no rear areas or safe zones. Colonel Shelley cautions against the “noncombatant” mindset for advisors in Afghanistan which has crept into U.S. pre-deployment training and procedures in country. He offers sage and pragmatic solutions to protecting against Green-on-Blue attacks.

In the final article, “Addressing Security Cooperation in the 21st Century,” Ms. Melissa Ward assesses that the transmutation of security threats and challenges in the new century hearken the need to develop new paradigms for security cooperation. Ms Ward offers trenchant insights for the development of new approaches to security cooperation.

As a new feature to the journal, Ms Jennifer S. Bryson’s review of Arab Society in Revolt: The West’s Mediterranean Challenge provides insights on the latest thought-provoking essays on the Middle East.

As this month’s journal illustrates, PKSOI continues to focus on the horizon for future challenges and opportunities in national security. As always, the mandate of the journal is to remain thought-provoking rather than provocative, so I expect this issue will stimulate discussion in the security community.
The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 2009

Introduction

The Joint communities need to clearly articulate the practice and integration of stability operations in order for the Army to optimize efficiencies in applying the war-fighting functions across the range of military operations (ROMO) in support of Unified Action. Specifically, stability operations, as part of the Army’s decisive action, lack the clarity of a definitive relationship within the mosaic of building partner capacity, security cooperation, irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, security assistance, security force assistance and foreign internal defense. Practitioners draw inferences from this mosaic to develop policies, programs, missions, doctrine, and the associated purposes, relationships, terminology, concepts, authorities, and limitations required for conducting stability operations in support of the 2012 Defense Strategy. To conduct stability operations within the complex 21st century security environment in a period of constrained resources, understanding of the mosaic is fundamental.

The new focus on and elevation of stability operations represents a change in the way the Department of Defense has traditionally operated. As Mark Gerner notes, the military traditionally viewed warfare in terms of offense and defense. “Stability operations were accounted for and recognized,” he said, “but as a secondary role a consequence of the planned campaign.” As a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, national defense strategy has evolved placing stability alongside offense and defense on equal footing. Indeed, this policy is enshrined in Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which states that stability operations “are a core military mission that DoD shall be prepared to conduct and support.” Moreover, stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities.” A key aspect of stability operations in both peacetime and war is security cooperation, which entails the United States providing foreign governments and their security forces with various forms of aid in order to build their capacity to deal with security and stability challenges both internally and externally.
This paper examines the relationship between stability operations (SO) and security cooperation (SC), beginning with a look at the strategic context in which each takes place. It then examines how SO and SC fit into the overarching military responsibility of helping to achieve and preserve stability in countries where the United States maintains national security interests, in accordance with the National Security Strategy. This is followed by an examination of the official joint definitions for each term and how each fits into the range of military operations. The paper concludes by addressing various challenges associated with stability operations and security cooperation, which is then followed by recommendations for improving their understanding.

**The Strategic Context**

A variety of factors influence the way the United States military will conduct national security. Primary among them are fiscal problems which impact the United States' ability to engage in expensive, manpower-intensive state-building operations. As a result, the U.S. Armed Forces must find a way to better leverage its existing capabilities and expertise to help maintain stability across the globe by defeating transnational security threats, preventing new conflicts from emerging, and assisting legitimate states in resolving security challenges within their own territories. The low-cost way to do this is through greater security cooperation and viewing it as a principal task within the realm of global stability operations.

Both the 2010 National Security Strategy and the recent January 2012 defense strategic guidance document, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, (hereafter DSG), list as key military responsibilities the ability to counter destabilizing threats and build the capacity of partner nations to do the same. “Whenever possible,” the DSG states, “we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” This means the goal of maintaining global stability is tied to the task of increased security cooperation activity so that other actors are better positioned to maintain order in their own countries and regions without the need for the United States to become heavily involved. Reinforcing this idea the NSS states, “This international order will support our efforts to advance security, prosperity, and universal values, but it is also an end that we seek in its own right. Because without such an international order, the forces of instability and disorder will undermine global security.”

By thinking strategically and engaging in long-term efforts to help build the capacity of fragile governments to maintain security (and by extension, internal stability), along with the ability to prevent terrorists activities emanating from their soil, the United States will better achieve its goals of defending the homeland and helping maintain international peace and security. By investing in partner nations through building their capacity to prevent the outbreak of conflict and enabling them to deal with security challenges on their own, the United States further accomplishes its global security. The 2010 National Security Strategy directs, “We will also help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.” In this latter sense, improving security within at risk states can be seen as the exploitation of a global common good, one which leads to an outsized return by avoiding the necessity of large-scale military interventions in the future.

Engaging in security cooperation activities with partner nations will also provide additional dividends. Not only does it build partner capacity to resolve their own internal issues on their own, but such security cooperation also strengthens relationships that may lead to greater U.S. access and influence with partner nations. Security cooperation improves interoperability among allied nations, and may result in increased assistance to U.S. operations globally. Accordingly, this investment seeks to share the burden in traditional or irregular warfare, UN peacekeeping missions, or humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations.

**Definitions & Activities**

*Stability operations (SO) and security cooperation (SC)*

Stability operations are linked with all activities that fall within the ROMO engaged in by the U.S. military. “These operations,” explains Joint Publication 1 on *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, “vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns.”

Greater application and efficiency in security cooperation are particularly important because weak or failed states will continue to exist, potentially leading to ungoverned spaces from which terrorists may find sanctuary. The inability of a government to control its own territory and prevent violent extremists from operating allows groups such as al Qaeda, and similar organizations, to carry out attacks on an international scale.
Though SO are not specifically mentioned under the ROMO definition, stabilization tasks are required during every type of operation. Examples include building the capacity of partner nations during peacetime for continued stability or to counter incipient threats; assisting countries in maintaining or returning to stability during crises, such as man-made or natural disasters, and other limited contingency operations; and addressing stability issues during and upon the conclusion of major military operations and campaigns. Regardless of the scenario, stability operations are crucial to laying the foundation for sustainable security and development in partner nations, and essential to achieve America’s national security goals. The security goals that are outlined in the National Security Strategy are well integrated between the Departments of State and Defense. As outlined in ADRP 3-07, Figure 1 shows how linking the Army Stability Tasks, Joint Stability Functions, and Department of State Stability Sectors provides a clear linkage to achieve unity of effort.10

Stability operations is an overarching term that is doctrinally defined as “encompassing the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”11 Of the four listed tasks, it is important to note the first and most significant among them is the need for a safe and secure environment, upon which the other tasks rely if they are to be achieved. Furthermore, the military’s principle role in stability operations is security. As stated in JP 3-07, Stability Operations, “the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security.”12

Security cooperation, which is essential to maintain and achieve a “safe and secure environment,” is doctrinally defined as “all De-
The Stability Operations and Security Cooperation Nexus

Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. SC efforts undertaken by the U.S. Armed Forces, because of the important role they play to provide a safe and secure environment in partner nations and enable them to assist with other challenges outside their own domestic contexts, play a vital role in maintaining peace, security, and stability across the globe. Also, Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, identifies SC as “all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.”

Under the above SC definition there are three distinct yet related terms that may be viewed as subsets of SC, 1) security assistance (SA), 2) security force assistance (SFA), and 3) foreign internal defense (FID). Each categorizes the various SC activities the Defense Department conducts. Figure one shows the purpose of each term, which is the basis for determining how an activity should be defined.

The SO and SC Relationship within the Romo

International peace and security relies on stable countries and SO helps contribute to this end. The U.S. Government supports a host nation through that nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) programs through a whole of government approach. Since the key task and primary military contribution to SO is security, it makes sense that SC efforts play a vital, if not transformational, role in achieving stability and America’s larger strategic objectives. It is useful then to look first at how the SC subsidiary terms of SA, SFA, and FID contribute to the “safe and secure environment” line of operations in SO, then examine how SO supports DoD efforts across the ROMO. In doing so we can better understand how they are integrated and overlap, as well as identifying challenges in our understanding of the terms.

Security Assistance
Purpose: A specific group of programs for the transfer of military articles, training, and defense-related services to friendly foreign governments via grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security Force Assistance
Purpose: DoD activities that contribute to the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of objectives shared by the U.S. government.

Foreign Internal Defense
Purpose: The participation of USG civilian and military agencies in the action program taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
As seen in Figure 1, SA, SFA, and FID have discrete purposes. These activities are often integrated and overlapping, taking place across the spectrum of conflict and the ROMO. Despite the distinctions, however, all the terms serve the goal of building the capacity of partner nations to achieve security and stabilization objectives they share with the United States.

Security assistance, which consists of a series of programs funded and administered by the Department of State, yet implemented by the Department of Defense, helps contribute to the security of partner nations by primarily selling military goods and services, such as weapon systems, maintenance and training, to foreign nations so as to increase the capacity of their security forces. This program is known as Foreign Military Sales. SA also helps these nations make these purchases, via loans, grants, and other means, under a program known as Foreign Military Financing. The final major way SA contributes is through the International Military Education and Training program, which provides funding for foreign military personnel to attend U.S. military educational and training programs, as well as U.S. military personnel traveling overseas and providing localized training to foreign military personnel. Though these activities occur mainly in peacetime environments, they can take place in active war zones, such as has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. As should be obvious, the provision of military equipment and training to our foreign partners helps with increasing the hardware they have in place as well as their ability to provide a safe and secure environment for their populations, thereby having a stronger foundation for long-term development needs.

Security Force Assistance functions much like SA and shares similar types of programs, yet it is a DoD activity without DoS funding or management. Though SFA can involve the transfer of military equipment, it mainly deals with advisory and training activities meant to build the capacity of foreign security forces, including police, in addition to their supporting institutions, such as ministries of defense. The range of activities it takes part in is much broader than SA, and it uses a different sort of funding which requires the military to show that a SFA activity serves either training benefit to the Armed Forces or is in support of a mission important to U.S. national security. As the most prolific service in the use of SFA, the U.S. Army identifies six tasks in its SFA field manual, transcending SA. These tasks involve helping to organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise, and assist foreign security forces so that they may be “credible, competent, capable, committed, and confident” and become capable of “securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities.”

The final SC subset of Foreign Internal Defense is used to describe SC activities taking place under wartime conditions. There are three different types of FID. The first, FID Indirect Support, consists of “operations that emphasize building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.” Then there is FID Direct Support, which doesn’t involve combat operations, and are “FID operations providing direct assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military when the host nation has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with threats beyond its capability to handle,” and focus mainly on civil-military operations and psychological operations, but can also include intelligence cooperation, and support with mobility and logistics. Finally, there is FID Combat Operations, which consist of “U.S. participation in FID combat operations.” FID Combat Operations can be done independently or in cooperation with host nation military forces. Whereas SA and SFA can occur in both peace and war, FID is solely an activity that takes places during periods of insecurity and helps partner nation deal with an active security threat. In that sense, it may be seen as a greater contributor to stability operations as it directly targets instability.

All three of these SC subsidiary activities take part in building partner capacity to deal with security challenges, both active and inchoate. They also allow for these nations to take part in international efforts, including United Nations missions and those of regional organizations such as the African Union, or U.S.-led coalitions, to address security problems across the globe. In doing so, they provide a key contribution to stability operations by addressing the issue of providing a safe and secure environment and setting a strong foundation and enabling environment for other stability operations tasks to occur.

Stability operations, as noted in joint publications, occur across the ROMO. The ROMO is grouped into three areas: 1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence; 2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations; and 3) Major Operations and Campaigns. Individual missions in each of these areas vary in their purposes, size, level of risk, and combat intensity. Each relies on stability operations, to some degree, and this must be accounted for in planning and design. The following paragraphs take each area of the ROMO individually and discuss what sort of activities they encompass as well as where stability operations fit into them.
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence are generally peacetime activities although they can take place throughout the spectrum of conflict. According to JP 3-0, they “encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs (other government agencies) and cooperate with IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations.”

Examples include taking part in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament activities; the enforcement of sanctions or exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation; show of force operations; various types of assistance to emergency preparedness activities, both foreign and domestic; and all three security cooperation subsets (SA, SFA, and FID). Each of these tasks is tied to larger goals of assisting with stability. For instance, emergency preparedness assistance helps to build capacity to respond to humanitarian disasters, which is one of the four tasks listed in the definition of stability operations. Engaging in nonproliferation activities shows off the force, and security cooperation, all deal with improving security matters, whether domestically, with foreign nations, or internationally. Ensuring freedom of navigation and enforcing exclusion goals, in addition to helping with security by shielding key infrastructure (and thereby preventing the need for reconstruction), also helps with economics by ensuring trade and protecting markets, thereby safeguarding jobs and placing less strain on host nation governments or the international community when it comes to providing essential services or humanitarian relief for the people. These various tasks, when they help prevent conflict and destruction of lives and infrastructure, not only maintain stability, but help set the conditions for future development in areas where they take place.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations are more complex missions that straddle the region between the other two ROMO areas. They are operations for which joint force commanders must develop operational plans. According to JP 3-0, they include operations “to ensure the safety of American citizens and U.S. interests while maintaining and improving U.S. ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors.”

Typical operations are non-combatant evacuation missions; foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA); recovery operations; strikes and raids; homeland defense; and peace operations (PO). While some of these have little to do with stability, such as missile strikes or raids against terrorist targets, others, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and peace operations, are crucial to maintaining stability both in the countries in which they occur and the wider region. They also show the importance of security cooperation occurring before such events occur.

Through past security cooperation, the job of U.S. military members in such situations is made easier as relationships or goodwill between forces and a certain degree of interoperability have already been built. Helping provide security for supplies, assisting personnel, and members of the host population, is in itself a form of security cooperation that helps with stability. Furthermore, in both FHA and PO, engaging in security cooperation activities both prior to and during the missions helps contribute to the empowerment of other actors such as humanitarian organizations to act as adjuncts in stabilization situations. While stability operations in such situations also includes emergency humanitarian assistance that is not security-related, the above are clear examples of how both security cooperation and stability operations are interrelated and how SC efforts that take place before an event can contribute to stability when a crisis occurs.

Peace operations are another way security cooperation supports stability operations to achieve national objectives. Peace operations are defined as “multiagency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national power … to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.”

These types of operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. These missions generally consist of forces operating under a United Nations mandate and can be part of a UN mission or one belonging to a regional organization such as NATO or the African Union. Since these operations occur prior to, during, or after conflict, security cooperation plays a key role in achieving the peace or maintaining it for stability operations to continue in other areas. Examples include past security cooperation activities strengthening ties between multiple military forces and the United States in a way that promotes peace operations objectives, or by improving the capability and competency of fellow peacekeeping forces to carry out their respective roles in the mission. Peace operations are meant to achieve or maintain stability. In addition to providing a safe and secure environment, which security cooperation helps with, they also seek to address humanitarian concerns, engage in emergency infrastructure construction, and help provide essential government services, which are key tasks of stability operations.

The third and final ROMO category is Major Operations and Campaigns. This is what most people traditionally think of...
as war and it involves “large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state.”¹⁹ These situations can consist of major combat operations or irregular war, with the goal of quickly prevailing against an enemy and concluding hostilities while establishing conditions that favor the host nation, the U.S., and our multinational partners. JP 3-0 dedicates an entire section on balancing offense defense and stability operations. Stability operations, it says, “may occur through [a] campaign or operation.”²⁰

America’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan are two examples where stability operations have played a large role, particularly after the end of major combat operations. Security cooperation with each of these countries did not play a role before the conflict, but SC engagements with other countries prior to the outbreak of hostilities has improved the capability and efficiency of partner nations to carry out operations in these contexts, highlighting the linkage of SC to SO, how SC is important to SO, and how they contribute to achieving U.S. national security objectives.

Challenges

“Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.” ADP 3-07

Having analyzed SO and SC, how security cooperation contributes to stability operations, how they are related, and why both are important military activities, we can now address some of the challenges associated with our understanding of these activities.

Challenges associated with clarity of stability operations and security cooperation arise as the terminology is used interchangeably. Complications continue as the terminology of building partner capacity is introduced without an associated relationship with existing terminology. As TRADOC continues the capability based assessment (CBA) for building partner capacity, the process has defined BPC as an outcome. This requires that a process of incorporating comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements has already occurred to reach this outcome. As one of the principles of stability operations, building partner capacity is essential. This process helps achieve the execution of the remaining five stability tasks identified in ADP 3-07. For example, to develop partnership capacity in the area of security, the USG would conduct some type of security cooperation to assist the nation in need whether through security assistance, security force assistance, or foreign internal defense.

Clarity of terminology and the relationships of the terminology is imperative. The aphorism, “English is a precise language, when used precisely” rings true particularly for military doctrine and terminology. Many argue that these relationships are not required as they do not necessarily fit into neat boxes or have hierarchical relationships. Without these relationships however, clear understanding of the interaction of the terms, when to use each term, and how to use each term is open to the interpretation of the user. This open interpretation causes confusion when used improperly and results in confusing and misinterpreted guidance, ill-constructed policy, or added terminology that resembles terminology already in existence.

There are numerous incidents where a shift in national interest is a result of a shift in USG policy because of a newly identified term in order to acquire a funding stream to further expand an organization’s expanse of influence. It is important that a thorough review of Joint and Service doctrine occurs before these shifts develop. This review must include a review of doctrine which will serve as a basis of further thought and action and not as a result of senior leader desire to instill a new concept as doctrine. Many times a staff will press forward with a concept and terms as though they are doctrine before they are accepted as doctrine. This results in confusion and improper relationships and meaning for doctrine that already exists.

There is no doubt that new doctrine may be required as new concepts are developed and refined, nor is it impossible to adjust doctrine to include new terminology or to adjust the current terminology to include added concepts. The important point is that the process of developing new doctrine from new terminology and new concepts is important to follow.

After ten years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, understanding the nexus of stability operations and security cooperation is important. Understanding how security cooperation activities support one task within stability operations helps agencies and organizations within the USG realize the magnitude of work required to achieve stability in any fragile state, whether failing, failed, or recovering.

Conclusion

Even as work continues to further the concepts of building partner capacity and elements of security cooperation, such as security force assistance, it is important to understand the
relationships of the terminology and how these activities work together in support of the national security strategy.

Senior leaders and concept developers must stay true to current terminology. When new concepts require new terminology, senior leaders must understand current terminology before adopting terms that are ambiguous or already similar to terminology in existence. As new ideas develop, doctrine writers can easily be consulted to assist in clarification of how an old term may be used support a new idea or concept. When the new concept cannot apply any current terminology, doctrine writers can assist concept developers clearly articulate the terminology in order to avoid duplication or overlap.

Colonel Larry Strobel is assigned to PKSOI as the Division Chief for Security, Reconstruction and Transition. Mr. Robert Swope was assigned to PKSOI as a 2012 Summer Intern and is now a Fellow, Master of International Development at the Duke Center for International Development


Another similar article that may be of interest:

Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy

by Lieutenant Colonel (R) Michael Hartmayer, and Lieutenant Colonel (R) John Hansen

The message was clear and there was no questioning the intent. Even the body language spoke volumes on the ongoing discussion. It was the fall of 2008 at a command post on the sprawling base camp known as Camp Victory, Iraq. Collected together were the senior commander and several staff members from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). Understandably the dialogue was focused on security. A point was raised with respect to training and development of the Iraqi Police. The senior commander raised his eyebrows, postured himself in his chair and emphatically stated, “Until I receive an order from MNC-I I’m not concerned about training the police!” Leaning back in his chair, the senior officer was visibly frustrated by the question. Thus, the challenge and ongoing debate as to where exactly police training and development fit into the grand strategy for Iraq remained unresolved, at least for this one commander. Yet, this issue continues to mystify planners at all levels in most operations even after the rhetoric and abundance of resources were directed towards its development and execution in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

With a military and civilian mindset to avoid protracted operations that siphon precious resources and weaken public support, the training and development of a host nation’s police force can take years to gain proficiency. Moreover, such a plan is doubly challenging when the public has a negative view of the police force and has little to zero trust in its providing essential day-to-day security to the population. As Charles Call of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) stated, it requires more than simple “tinkering” of the police organization. Such development and modification must include merit-based selections, professional training, ethnic and religious group recognition and restructuring. Such an investment includes dedicated assets and one, two, or three years to truly gain proficiency. As James Wither in a recent article in PRISM opined, foreign forces “...sometimes emphasize rapid throughput to get boots on the ground rather than an investment in long-term quality policing.”

As a senior advisor to the Commanding General of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from 2011 – 2012, I grew increasingly frustrated watching my Afghan counterparts attempt to incorporate the myriad of technological recommendations being thrown at them supposedly to increase their proficiency. A case in point was a personnel data management system that was designed to track personnel statistics across the 15,000 strong ANCOP force. The only problem was lack of a truly capable computer system, an unreliable power source, and competing requirements between the coalition force and the Afghan leadership. When I confronted the ANCOP personnel manager charged with implementing this new system, he explained to me the challenges and benefits of the system. He then, however, retrieved an old ledger and explained he could do the same task on paper as the new computer program and do it ten times faster. I just shook my head. As Dr. William Durch of the Stimson Center points out and as I experienced, “it may be better to tilt toward low-tech solutions and to advise strategic planners on developing sustainable higher tech future options.” Thus, the lesson here of simplicity and low-tech solutions to police development can apply whether on a United Nations (UN) mission, a peacekeeping operation or a theater security cooperation effort.

Military planners will rightly discuss the importance of unity of effort in planning and executing military operations. The same concept should apply when describing the importance of
developing a nascent police force. In the case of Iraq this proved exceedingly frustrating. As Lee Hamilton of the Iraqi Study Group pointed out in congressional testimony, the training of the Iraqi police did not go well. With police responsibility leaping from the Department of State and contractors to the Department of Defense in early 2004, it quickly became apparent the military “does not have the right experience or personnel to provide the unique training that the Iraqi Police Services need.” While addressing the Iraq War, even former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated in his memoirs that policing the streets were not appropriate missions for the men and women in uniform to perform.

Thus, the question is asked then what is the US military’s role when it comes to training and developing a host nation police force, either through post conflict operations or through some semblance of a security cooperation effort? Dr. William Durch of the Stimson Center in his work on UN peace operations offered some key policing attributes for consideration:

▶ Involvement of local leaders and police officials throughout the planning process is critical. Moreover, inclusion of these officials at important junctures throughout the operation would prove beneficial
▶ Plans should highlight the development of essential administrative systems
▶ Plans should maximize resources towards capacity development over merely substitution of an asset (training and mentoring vice major operational roles)
▶ Plans should focus on long-term (more than a year) for organizational and capacity development versus the short-term solution which inevitably focuses on getting boots on the ground

Thus, military and civilian planners would be well served to keep these simple considerations in mind when developing plans for operations that may involve the training of a host nation police force.

Even with such measures in place, the training of a host nation police force may prove exceedingly more difficult than, say, that nation’s army. Where corruption abounds and poor governance exists, a host nation may view attempts to reform the police as detrimental to its existence. William Rosenau of the RAND Corporation warned that such “regimes are unlikely to accept reforms that threaten existing power arrangements.” Where such a vacuum of law and order exists, planners across all levels must make a realistic assessment as to what can truly be accomplished in terms of reforming the police. Moreover, if police are part of the problem then attempting reforms at that level may certainly increase the insider threat to trainers and mentors. Again, the planners and leaders must weigh and consider the risks involved when approaching a situation where reforming a police force is not in the interests of the existing government.

Planners must also be mindful of the militarization of a police force if US military forces are the primary trainers. Thus, a possible scenario may include a combination of US military forces and civilian experts. This may prove especially relevant if the police force is more aligned with the military than a separate entity under the government. Utilizing military forces only, “the police are more likely to become militarized if external armed forces are the main driver of local police-building work.” The authors from the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt concluded, “The police must therefore be as civilian as possible and should only be as military as is necessary.”

So, what can be done? First, bringing in civilian experts (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program are two) across various agencies early in the planning process is a good initial step. Robert Perito of the USIP back in 2004 recommended the establishment of a stability force that would also include a justice team to make it truly a rule of law task force. More recently, the United States Marine Corps has proposed a new organization to its structure-the Law Enforcement Battalion—that would execute some of these polic-
Police Development: Why It’s Such a Challenge

Four primary tasks include: law enforcement operations, policing operations, police advising/training, and limited detainee/corrections operations. Many organizations have addressed the problem over the years. Training, developing and sustaining a police force takes time. It’s not like assaulting a beachhead or taking a hill. So often, such development includes a complete change in mindset from all participants, to include the population, which the police are charged to protect. Gaining trust from the people and identifying ethical behavior play a role in policing. Properly equipping the police and continued professionalization to conduct their mission are just a few elements critical to overall success. However, these are elements that take time—often years—to fully develop. And these are timelines that future planners must consider when venturing into such an area where developing a host nation police force is critical to mission success.

Notes

6 Durch, 33.
9 Frisendorf and Krempel, 1.
10 Robert Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004), 334.

Colonel Robert Lowe is the Police reform Advisor and assigned to the PKSOI Security, Reconstruction, and Transition Division.
Stepping from the close quarters of the immense C-17 aircraft, SFC Simmons could feel the humidity soaking into his ACUs. He glanced to the east beyond the runway and saw pooled evidence of the flood that had recently surged through much of the surrounding area, flooding villages, ruining crops and infrastructure, drowning hundreds and displacing thousands. He was anxious to get his engineer platoon into the response effort as he knew their unique skills were desperately needed. Though the engineers had trained hard in garrison, this was the first time they had deployed since returning from Afghanistan over a year ago. Getting his soldiers ready and the equipment loaded for this short-notice mission was tougher than he'd imagined. He was looking forward to helping those whose lives were impacted by the flood, but he was also looking forward to the real-life opportunity to teach and train his soldiers. Additionally, his Commander had stressed the historic nature of working alongside the engineers of the local Army – this would be the first time American soldiers had worked with soldiers of this nation. Simmons knew his soldiers, and he knew they'd make America proud.

The United States is the world’s largest donor of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) aid to foreign nations, and has consistently secured this title annually for over two decades. The nation’s military plays a key role in delivering this aid, and frequently provides logistics and manpower in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DoS). In the recent presidential debates, candidates on both sides addressed public demands to reinvest in the American economy as efforts in Afghanistan wind down, evidence of a perceptible shift in American public focus from overseas conflicts to our own troubled economy. In this era of dwindling public resources and similarly decreased public enthusiasm for investing American dollars into economies other than our own, the question may well be asked: “Why should the US military continue to support HA/DR efforts abroad?”

The answer to this relatively simple question cannot adequately be answered by looking solely at the nation’s military objectives; rather, a broader understanding of the national security strategy is required. As President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy makes clear, advancing US foreign policy is not confined to military efforts. Recognizing the nation’s limited ability to continue to fund costly armed intervention, President Obama instead calls for a strategy of engagement; reaching out to old and new partners across the world to cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, in order to serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world. Assuring American security requires a long-term, whole-of-government effort to advance an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. In keeping with this strategy of preservation of order and stability, U.S. investment in HA/DR activities promotes stability, security, and opportunity by restoring capacity in nations threatened by the destabilizing forces of natural or manmade disaster or humanitarian emergency. There are clear economic and military benefits to the United States and to the global economy to avoid the costs of propping up a fragile or failing state - or the possible costs associated with the open conflict that often follows a failed one. The relatively minor costs of providing and delivering aid to a country in crisis may well avert the need to expend significantly more resources at a later date.
Military delivery of American aid to these nations, whether provided unilaterally or as part of a multinational effort, provides unique opportunities for the United States to increase influence in countries and regions where we might otherwise have limited access. HA/DR operations allow U.S. service members to work alongside service members of allies, partners, and nations to foster partnership and exercise existing or nascent interoperability. Offering another country a helping hand in a time of crisis makes a strong impression on the people of the affected region and serves to improve America’s image. The opportunity to deploy to affected nations and execute HA/DR relief missions exercises military planning, logistics, and leadership skills that might otherwise wither with lack of use in times of extended peace. Though non-kinetic in nature and comprising only a part of the larger U.S. Government effort, U.S. Defense Department activities in support of HA/DR can be a highly effective and cost-efficient means of maintaining critical military skill sets and advancing U.S. national interests abroad.

**The Strategic Rationale for HA/DR**

The United States has been the world’s largest humanitarian aid donor every year to date since 1990. In 2010, U.S. expenditures for humanitarian aid peaked at $4.9 billion, though this federal account is targeted for significant cuts in 2013 and beyond, in part due to the American public’s perception that we spend too much on foreign aid in general. Former USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, commented on this perception and the impact of the proposed cuts. “While no federal account should be protected from cuts given the magnitude and severity of the budget and debt crisis, singling out foreign aid for disproportionate cuts – which is exactly what has happened – is a serious mistake the United States as a world leader will pay for in the future. While polls show a majority of Americans believe foreign aid makes up 25 percent of the federal budget, in reality it is less than one percent: cutting foreign aid will not make a dent in the federal budget deficit, but it will leave a gaping hole in our foreign policy and diminish our position in the world as a great power.”

In fact, Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), an independent consortium that provides impartial information on development and humanitarian aid to the press, governments, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), reports the United States is not the most generous donor as a proportion of gross national income (GNI). In fact, the United States spends only 0.2 percent of its GNI on foreign aid with only 0.03 percent of its GNI expended on humanitarian aid. In terms of humanitarian aid as a factor of GNI, the United States ranks only 13th in the world. Perhaps the most telling statistic of all, GHA also reports that 91.5 percent of America’s humanitarian aid was spent in states GHA deem “fragile.”

Fragile states are those states facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. U.S. diplomats, like those of many other donor nations, recognize the destabilizing impact of a natural or manmade disaster or humanitarian emergency to an already-fragile state. Donors seek to target aid resources to these locations as an attempt to circumvent devolution into armed conflict. In the wake of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. national strategy evolved in response to the realization that the greatest threat facing America was not a conventional military bent on conquering territory, but more shadowy threats originating from elusive, non-state actors hiding among the people, often in failed or failing states, who threaten regional and global stability for their own agendas. In particular, President Obama’s strategy calls for the use of three instruments of national power to address the problems of fragile and failed states – defense, diplomacy, and development, the “3D’s – with the greatest emphasis on development. “These strategies have elevated development programs – which are funded using foreign aid dollars – to a central place in America’s global strategy because they are often the most effective of the three D’s in addressing state failure and fragility. To avoid the relatively high cost of a military response to a failed or failing state, and to promote greater global stability and security, President Obama advocates effective, well-placed use of foreign aid. HA/DR resources, notably targeted on fragile states, are critical components of this national security strategy.

The new strategy of achieving U.S. security objectives through diplomatic and developmental ways and means links DoD, DoS, and USAID more closely than ever. In 2010, under the leadership of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, DoS published the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Secretary Clinton modeled this new strategy document aptly subtitled “Leading Through Civilian Power” on DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), recognizing Defense’s QDR process “provided a strategic plan for the department” while “forcing hard decisions about priorities.”

Promulgation of the QDDR was just a start. Further efforts are underway to support collaborative planning among DoD, DoS, and USAID. Together, these entities seek to design a new framework for advancing U.S. interests abroad, “one focused less on repelling traditional cross-border invasions effecting regime change, and conducting large-scale stability operations and more on preserving access to key regions and the global commons, which are essential to U.S. security and prosperity.”
unprecedented “3D” collaboration and strategic application of US resources to missions like HA/DR that work toward maintenance of global stability.

**DoD HA/DR Missions in a Time of Austerity**

So 3D policy makers are entering a state of unparalleled collaboration to apply resources strategically to foreign aid and HA/DR missions to advance our national security interests, but what are the benefits to the Pentagon? Especially in austere times, what benefits do the nation’s armed forces garner from retaining the HA/DR mission set? The military stands to benefit from executing HA/DR in multiple ways, both indirectly and directly. Arguably the greatest incentive the military has to continue to support HA/DR missions is the indirect benefit realized if that aid fosters peaceful resolution of crises rather than conflict. Avoiding war saves soldiers’ lives and preserves the nation’s treasury. Another indirect benefit long enjoyed by the military as a profession is the consummate confidence and respect of the American people, which has been robustly enhanced throughout our history by acts of compassion in times of great need. An image of an American soldier bearing a refugee child to safety reflects America’s most cherished ideals, and thus incentivizes recruiting. Finally, DoD will benefit directly from the opportunity to deploy to affected nations to execute HA/DR relief. Such deployments exercise military planning, logistics, and leadership skills that might otherwise attenuate in times of extended peace. Further, these “real world” engagements offer military forces unique opportunities to interact with members of the host nation and possibly multinational partners, to practice operating jointly and within cultures foreign to them. As the defense budget shrinks, so, too, will opportunities for American troops to conduct realistic training away from home station.

With big defense cuts a certainty and sequestration looming, there is no doubt the military of 2013 and beyond will be smaller and more efficient. Voices within DoD, especially those representing the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, argue that America should focus its efforts—and its defense budget—on skill sets that focus on long-range strike operations. DoD could, potentially, resist collaboration with 3D partners and elect not to man, train, or equip adequately the forces required to execute the HA/DR mission set, reallocating resources saved to furthering its air and sea capability. Instead of slow rolling DoS and USAID, however, key DoD leaders are spearheading an effort to protect foreign aid, citing the important role of aid to national security. Former USAID director Andrew Natsios gratefully acknowledges DoD’s support. “National defense must be defined more broadly than simply a strong military. This is one reason why former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, dozens of retired senior military officers, and major business leaders are leading an effort to protect the U.S. government’s foreign aid program. It is the reason General David Petraeus . . . has consistently argued larger aid budgets protect our troops by making conflict less likely.”8 Any averted conflict saves lives and money, certainly an immediate benefit to the military.

The U.S. military has long embraced the HA/DR mission, and the successes its service members achieved in post-war Europe quickly come to mind as the most extensive, and most celebrated, use of the military in civil affairs in history. In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. military played a critical role in the administration, reconstruction and reestablishment of civil government and rule of law in Germany. After the conclusion of open hostilities, the U.S. viewed a free and independent Europe as the nation’s primary strategic objective, and reconstruction via the Marshall Plan was the means to this end. The military had expansive resources, much of that still forward located on the continent, and it controlled the logistics, so a natural association developed between humanitarian assistance and military involvement. American disaster relief specialist Frederick C. Cuny wrote about this historical nexus of humanitarian need and excess DoD resources. “The role of the military was expanded as never before. The public administrative function was perceived as so important by the Allies that special attention was given to recruiting civil administrators, city planners, urban development specialists, and hundreds of persons skilled in operating the systems of modern cities and their government.”9

This enormously feted military achievement was quickly followed by yet another heroic military achievement in response to a humanitarian crisis. In the late 1940’s, the Berlin Airlift “was an incredible feat wherein an entire city was totally supplied from the air. Probably in no other case has the military played so vital a humanitarian role.”10 Recent history as well is replete with examples of U.S. military engagement in humanitarian operations. By air-dropping food and other supplies into African nations stricken by famine, providing search and rescue teams to earthquake, tsunami, and mud slide victims in Asia and the Pacific, to engineering and technical support for victims of Japan’s 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent nuclear disaster, the American soldier, sailor, and airman has proudly served–quite publicly–as the benevolent face of America. News coverage of American soldiers or marines responding to a foreign crisis extols the virtues of the volunteer force, and this force relies on the American public to willingly commit its sons and daughters to public service. The public relations value of humanitarian aid

WHY SHOULD THE U.S. MILITARY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HA/DR EFFORTS ABROAD?

*pksoi.army.mil* 15
missions benefits not just the U.S. military, but the nation as a whole, and enhances America’s reputation globally.

The most direct benefit DoD gleans from supporting HA/DR missions is honing the support skill sets that are critical to fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The military, even in peacetime, maintains a vast array of well-trained planners, engineers, medics, veterinarians, logisticians, and communicators who require practical training to keep their skills sharp. The operators of the military’s ships, cargo planes, helicopters, and trucks are best trained when they operate their equipment in new and challenging conditions. The immense efforts required to activate and utilize the military’s vast transportation network must be exercised lest the skills required atrophy. The same is true for water purification units, communications nodes, civil affairs teams, and public affairs officers. Relief efforts that include acquiring, transporting, and distributing the commodities required to sustain life, or the construction and operation of large camps that feed, clothe, house, and provide for large numbers of personnel—these are the very skills required to sustain a military in combat. Perhaps most importantly, the challenge of interacting with local nationals on their turf requires military leaders and planners to foster the ability to function in an environment culturally foreign to them, a skill set notably vital to mission success in all of our recent armed conflicts.

In a time of austerity, it is in America’s national interests to encourage other nations to bear more of the burden of maintaining regional peace, security, and stability. Though other nations are often reluctant to engage in meaningful burden-sharing if it means committing significant assets, some nations are willing to expend limited resources in pursuit of increased regional influence. Positive results may lead to increased commitment; therefore, it is in the American interests for other countries to succeed in their HA/DR endeavors. Commitment of U.S. military support to HA/DR operations offers training opportunities with service members of other nations, to include engaging and training alongside the militaries of long-established partners, new allies, and nations with whom we’ve yet to establish a partner relationship. HA/DR provides a less-controversial means of opening access to foreign nations interested in establishing ties to the United States. Nations that are reluctant to admit armed foreign nationals through their borders may welcome the opportunity to train for or participate in a humanitarian mission. Nations that refrained from participating in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan find it politically more feasible to provide resources for disaster response. HA/DR support missions may provide the U.S. military unique opportunities to forge new relationships with service members of one or more foreign nations or to practice interoperability. Training other military personnel for HA/DR mission support also encourages other nations to take the lead in regional HA/DR contingency plans, thereby relieving the US and our partners from that responsibility.

Conclusion

The U.S. military is capable of providing substantive support to achieving the nation’s stated strategic security goals of furthering global peace and prosperity through execution of carefully selected HA/DR tasks, in full cooperation with DoS and USAID. DoD has enjoyed a long history of doing so and has benefited enormously from historical successes. Future HA/DR engagements promise the U.S. military opportunities to further the nation’s influence upon other nations, develop critically needed cultural awareness skills, exercise our military deployment system, and train our planners and our logisticians in the skills they require to fight and win the nation’s wars. In today’s global environment, with current fiscal realities, a US military capable of close collaboration with other federal agencies to execute targeted HA/DR is a vital component of the National Security Strategy.

Colonel Michelle Stewart is currently assigned to PKSOI as the Chief, Infrastructure and Essential Services Branch, Security, Reconstruction, and Transition Division.

Notes

4 Ibid.
5 Natsios, 1.
8 Natsios, 1.
10 Ibid.
Since 2005, the African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force has sought to establish security and stability after 20 years of near continuous civil war. During the period 2011 to 2012, this force achieved significant success towards realizing its mandate. The AMISOM mission itself is formed and led by African nations, with substantial support from international donors. While recognizing the tremendous sacrifices by the troop contributing countries (TCC), chiefly Uganda and Burundi, it must be noted that the external support provided to the AU force by the United States has been a critical enabler of these gains.

The AMISOM mandate evolved over time and changed according to conditions on the ground in Somalia. The unique construct of the AMISOM mission resulted in a multi-faceted program to support military operations. Security cooperation efforts by the international community have focused largely on training and equipping. This remains true at the time of this article’s writing.

Auspiciously, at the start of the mission AMISOM controlled only three city blocks in Mogadishu. As AMISOM made progress against the radical Islamist militants, Al Shabaab, in Mogadishu, the United States initiated a sustained comprehensive security cooperation effort to provide additional improved capabilities to the TCCs. Other donors have augmented these efforts with niche contributions as well. However, the United States has provided the bulk of support to AMISOM. This assistance has largely been provided bilaterally to the main TCCs of Uganda and Burundi.

As the provider of the majority of combatant units, headquarters staff personnel, and the force commander, Uganda has received significant support for its role in AMISOM. The Department of State provides general training, equipping, and logistical support to the Ugandan military. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds provide funding for participating members of internationally sanctioned peacekeeping missions. These funds are very flexible and able to support emerging requirements more easily than other traditional security assistance methods. The Department of Defense support to Ugandan forces is more limited and narrowly focused on providing specific military capabilities. This assistance is through funds earmarked for supporting partner nation forces engaged in counterterrorism operations under the 1206 (Global Train and Equip) and 1207 (Security, Reconstruction, and Stabilization) authorities of the National Defense Authorization Act. The support provided bilaterally by the United States to Uganda is provided through these two complimentary avenues.

Security cooperation planning, for design and implementation of specific programs, is a collaborative interagency process. This ensures U.S. programs are nested within overall U.S. policy towards AMISOM and Somalia, and for military engagement with Uganda. The partner nation also provides significant input to the process based upon their own needs assessment and feedback from battlefield commanders. The lead agencies responsible for this security cooperation are U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the State Department’s Africa Bureau Regional Security Affairs (AF/RSA) office, and the U.S. Embassy to Somalia.

Uganda. The embassy-based DoD-led Office of Security Cooperation is the main conduit for transmitting Ugandan priorities of effort to the U.S. Government (USG). Detailed programmatic design to fulfill highlighted capability gaps is performed by AFRICOM and AF/RSA. Both the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) supply coordinated and complimentary programs in support of Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) deployed to AMISOM. These programs include the full spectrum of security cooperation and security assistance tools available, from providing equipment to professional military education.

The Department of State’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) has arguably been the most influential security cooperation tool for the United States in Uganda. The ACOTA program is the successor to the African Crisis Response Initiative, which was established, in the mid-1990s, to train African militaries for peacekeeping operations. Each brigade-sized “Ugandan Battle Group” deployed to Somalia since 2008 has received training through ACOTA. The program of instruction (POI) governing the training is developed by requirements articulated by the UPDF and validated by U.S. security and military personnel. By obtaining support of host nation military leadership, strong emphasis is placed upon training delivered to the UPDF.

The training consists of 10-12 weeks of comprehensive, mission-focused, unit training from the individual to brigade level. Battle groups consist of between 1,600 to 3,100 personnel; thus, the numbers trained via ACOTA are significant. This training is provided by security contractors, many of whom have long experience in Africa working with indigenous militaries.

The U.S. military also provides uniformed mentors during ACOTA-sponsored training. These are requested by the Department of State’s ACOTA office and provided through AFRICOM. The combat effectiveness of Ugandan battle groups has increased since the onset of this training. The removal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, and the steadily improving security situation throughout Somalia, has validated the value of this program.

Through ACOTA, the UPDF has also received specialized training for combat enablers. Just as with the U.S. military, these “low density” units are in high demand for operations. These are often deployed at a much higher frequency than the light infantry battalions, which comprise the bulk of the battle group’s personnel. Some examples include United Nations’ certified Level 1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachments and select small boat units of the UPDF Marine Brigade. Additionally, ACOTA provides staff training to the AMISOM headquarters. This is not only for Ugandan officers assigned to the force headquarters but also to all staff officers from supporting African Union militaries, including those that do not provide formed units for general operations in Somalia.

Another slightly more controversial, and little known, program is the Department of State’s support to AMISOM by providing tactical mentors who operate alongside combat leaders. These mentors are largely third country nationals from various Western and African nations with long experience in counter-insurgency (COIN), peacekeeping, and military operations in Africa. The non-profit mentors are from Bancroft Global Development.

Over a decade of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown there are complex operational challenges associated with conducting a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. These mentors provide advice and best practices from their own experiences in similar operations. This is valuable for the UPDF because most commanders have not received COIN-specific training on employment of their forces at host nation Professional Military Education (PME) courses.

Several Department of Defense programs complement the multi-faceted security cooperation programs provided by the Department of State in support of the UPDF. These are largely conducted under 1206 and 1207 authorities granted to DoD by the National Defense Authorization Act. The two agencies collaborate closely, from the field to the Department level, to eliminate any possibility of redundancy. The authorities require “dual-key” Department of State concurrence for Department of Defense programs proposed for execution via 1206 and 1207. Several DoD entities are involved in planning, supervising, and executing security cooperation in support of the UPDF. These include AFRICOM, its service and functional component commands, and the embassy-based Office of Security Cooperation.

The Department of Defense programs are designed to fill capability gaps within the UPDF based upon identified requirements in battle. The funding comes through both Title 10 (governing the armed forces) and Title 22 (foreign relations) sources. These are developed in collaboration between DoD and DoS personnel working at the embassy, combatant command, and department levels. The security environment’s evolution since August 2011, starting with a sustained offensive against Al Shabaab in Mogadishu, resulted in additional requirements at the tactical level.
A good example is the training and equipping of several combat engineer companies to enable operations in complex urban terrain. These were proposed due to the losses suffered by AMISOM forces during fierce street-to-street urban combat in downtown Mogadishu. Future efforts will continue to focus on how to mitigate increasingly distant lines of communication as the UPDF operates farther afield from its supply base at the port of Mogadishu. Two areas of potential collaboration are increased capability for military police and multi-functional logistics companies.

There are also DoD security cooperation events that indirectly support UPDF operations in Somalia. The African Deployment Assistance Partnership Training (ADAPT) program is one example. It focuses on training logisticians in load planning and execution, for both ground and air platforms. Many of the soldiers trained through this program execute operations in Uganda, such as air cargo pallet building, in direct support of UPDF forces in AMISOM. Additionally, some of these personnel have deployed to join units and staff sections forward, taking their training with them.

U.S. Africa Command’s robust exercises, that involve the UPDF, provide additional security cooperation activities that indirectly support AMISOM. Ugandan military personnel contribute to U.S. military exercises throughout Africa, as participants and observers, often funded by U.S. Africa Command. The exercise scenario allows UPDF personnel to further hone skills to support forward peacekeepers. Additionally, the multi-lateral nature of many of these exercises builds international cooperation between many of the same militaries contributing staff officers to the AMISOM headquarters.

Traveling Contact Teams (TCT), also known as “mil-to-mil” events, are additional venues that provide relatively low-cost support to influence UPDF peacekeepers. Title 10 provides the authorities for partner engagement and familiarization, not training. The TCT program allows for targeting of very specific skillsets, such as familiarization through topical intelligence roundtables, medical logistics management, and visits to U.S. military facilities to observe best practices. These engagements generally last a week and are conducted by two to four personnel. While audience size varies, a benefit of this program is that it is very flexible due to its low-cost resource requirements. Additionally, TCTs can act as bridging events between Title 22 funded training, exercises, and operations.

Since TCTs do not conduct training there are no requirements for Leahy Human Rights Vetting. This requirement is defined by the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations or Defense Appropriations Acts and is named after Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont. The law prevents the United States from furnishing assistance to units or individuals that egregiously violate human rights. While not normally a significant issue, from a legal perspective, it can be an onerous requirement for partner nations. This is due to the requirement to collect private data, such as mothers’ and fathers’ names. However, submission timelines associated with HRV data collection can be challenging for developing partners without sophisticated databases and highly centralized chains of command.

Virtually all other security cooperation tools require Leahy Human Rights Vetting. All 1206 and 1207 funded activities require specific human rights training administered by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. These requirements reinforce U.S. military values, such as accountability to civilian authorities and protection of non-combatants. Both are important considerations for the UPDF’s COIN operations in Somalia.

Security assistance provided through International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another key indirect influencer. IMET is a Department of State directed program and is administered by the Department of Defense. The IMET program brings Ugandan, and other foreign, officers to the United States for professional military education, at all levels. These
courses last from a few weeks to over a year. Ugandan graduates from tactical task-oriented courses such as Small Boat Engine Repair, operationally oriented U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the strategic U.S. Army War College - are all directly engaged in AMISOM.

The United States incrementally increased security cooperation activities with Uganda to fulfill carefully targeted capability gaps within the UPDF. During the early period of AMISOM’s deployment, when the force was confined to several city blocks of Mogadishu, its success was far from assured. Even today, after five years of hard won gains, success remains tenuous and tied to Somalia’s political reconciliation. Throughout this period, U.S. security cooperation with Uganda has broadened and deepened. A deliberate, collaborative, interagency planning process, informed by partner nation’s requirements, has assisted the UPDF’s successes through training, equipping, and greater professionalization. This could provide a model for support to future peacekeeping operations, particularly those involving U.S. support to developing nations undertaking arduous military missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholson is the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kampala, Uganda

Notes

4 Global Peace Operations Initiative, US Department of State: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/
15 Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, US Department of Defense: https://www.diils.org/node/1455541/about/programs
Surviving Green-on-Blue Attacks:
Truth or Consequences
by Colonel James M. Shelley, U.S. Army National Guard

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are inherently dangerous because of host country instability and ambiguity, shifting relationships within the various actors operating in the host nation. Military personnel assigned to host nation advisory roles in the COIN environment are increasingly at risk from perceived “friendly forces” whenever Afghan forces turn on Coalition personnel, committing “Green-on-Blue” attacks. Mitigating the risk and effects of Green-on-Blue attacks requires an accurate understanding of the causes, proper training in how to reduce the risk, and reacting to an imminent threat, as well as being properly equipped to be ready if an attack occurs.

The number of Green-on-Blue attacks has increased five-fold in the past four years, with a dramatic increase in 2012. Once an isolated problem attributed to cultural and personnel differences, this increase appears to be part of a new insurgent tactic to undermine trust between host nation and Coalition forces. All personnel coming in contact with Afghan Security Forces (ANSF) are at risk, but a particularly vulnerable population is the senior staff officers embedded as advisors and trainers, many of whom are non-combat arms officers. Examples include the May 27, 2009 attack on Navy medical trainers by an Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier killing two at Camp Shaheen in Balkh Province and the February 25, 2012 attack at the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) headquarters in Kabul, killing two officers and dramatically altering the relationship between Coalition and ANSF.

The U.S. Military has developed training programs to prepare deploying security force assistance teams (SFAT) to identify indicators of Green-on-Blue threats and implement corrective measures and actions so as to prevent future occurrences. At least one of the most current training modules uses vignettes from recent attacks to identify teaching points. The vignettes, however, continue to propagate the practice of blaming the victims as the cause of the attacks, citing cultural and personal insensitivity on the part of Coalition personnel as the catalyst for ANSF violence towards them. Although there certainly are many occasions where cultural and personal friction have led to violence, one must not overlook the increasing appeal to Green-on-Blue attacks being instigated by insurgents in order to destabilize Coalition relations with the ANSF. Blaming the victims of Green-on-Blue attacks is analogous to the practice of blaming sexual assault victims (“they had it coming to them”) for their fate. What is lost is honest dialogue to identify the perpetrator’s reasons and motives such as affiliation with insurgents or underlying personality disorders or a history of violent behavior. One must remember that after over thirty years of war, famine, and death, Afghanistan has become a nation of posttraumatic stress disorder.

The risk of allowing preconceived notions to guide an interpretation of the facts that should be self-evident is all too common of a human trait. When facts are manipulated to “fit the narrative,” the greater risk is that the correct cause or causes and corrective actions will not be identified, increasing the overall risk to deploying personnel that have not had the advantage of accurate analysis. In most cases, as with most human behavior, the misinterpretation is not deliberate but occurs on a subconscious level. The end result, however, is that poor interpretation of events leads to poor planning to mitigate threats. In order to limit or reduce bias when interpreting facts and causes of armed
conflicts in civilian law enforcement, trained investigators without an interest in the outcome remain a standard operating procedure. The facts are collected and allowed to lead the investigation to its logical outcome with minimal perceptual distortion.

An example of blaming the victims is evident in current training, which references the February 25, 2012 murder of two Coalition officers working at the Ministry of Interior (MOI). In spite of significant evidence indicating the victims were targeted and the murders planned well in advance, current training attributes the killings to a spur-of-the-moment decision related to protests over burning of the Koran and unsubstantiated claims that one of the victims had spoken about the Koran burnings. Overlooked was the absence of proper vetting to the assailant, an Afghan National Police (ANP) intelligence specialist and other factors indicating that the assault was planned well before the Koran burnings and most likely involved co-conspirators. This does not mean that the murdered officers could not have possibly “colored” the interpretation of events.

Institutional denial of the ongoing Green-on-Blue threat, which may include factors other than cultural and personal friction, combined with the risk of premeditated attacks by insurgents infiltrating the ANSF, may delude COIN practitioners from being adequately prepared physically and mentally to confront threats to their personal safety. For an embedded advisor, skills and training which will be addressed later are only part of the equation of survival. The “Warrior Attitude,” often spoken in Army circles as the ability to transition quickly to the offense in reaction to a threat, is often not part of the staff officer’s psyche. Instead, many senior staff officers with their comfort zone as office workers building spreadsheets and presentations, lack the tactically offensive mindset and capability to react and respond to an immediate threat. The office is perceived as a sanctuary, a mindset that has been reinforced by most published emergency response plans that direct a passive response to an armed threat, advising personnel to “lock down” and avoid direct conflict rather than responding with appropriate deadly force.

Combat can occur anywhere on an asymmetric battlefield. In the garrison environment, response to an armed threat, known as an “active shooter,” is usually passive, which is not appropriate for combat environments. In a combat theater, everyone must be prepared to seek and destroy immediate threats, not lock oneself in an office and wait for help. A non-warrior mindset is reinforced when military personnel are required to have a letter from a general officer giving them permission to leave their base in a combat zone during a period of elevated threat in order to conduct their missions. This risk-adverse requirement contributes to an overall belief that staff officers operating in a combat zone are merely “going to the office” instead of going to war. All military personnel must be prepared to transition from non-threat to threat, responding in an aggressive, offensive manner.

Reaction by embedded staff officers to a Green-on-Blue attack is not a part of the standard training required for military personnel deploying into combat theaters. The Army’s training for deploying personnel has evolved over the past eleven years from a “one size fits all” to a tiered approach based on mission requirements. The training, however, still relies on required, standardized training packages that are rarely tailored to unique mission requirements. This does not prevent a commander from modifying training events or adding additional training, but the large amount of pre-deployment training often overwhelms a unit’s limited time resource for training. Additional training must be balanced against the growing number and exhaustive list of mandated training competing for valuable time resources.
Traditionally, Army combat skills such as marksmanship are trained, tested, and validated on ranges with the closest distance at 25 meters, and the goal is engaging a target at that and greater distances. In the February 25, 2012 Green-on-Blue attack at the Afghan MOI, the assailant was well within 10 feet (3 meters) of his two victims. In another Green-on-Blue attack in September 2011, nine advisors were murdered by a lone gunman. None of the victims of either of these attacks had a weapon loaded with a round chambered nor were their holsters designed to allow rapid drawing and employment of their weapons.

Reaction to close-in combat scenarios is not part of the standard training programs for military personnel, although at least one NATO command in Afghanistan does conduct a close quarter shooter reaction course for its embedded advisors. Currently, basic weapons marksmanship training and combatives (unarmed combat against an unarmed foe) training do not replicate real world conditions and miss the mark at providing a realistic, holistic skills set that can be applied to personnel operating as embedded advisors with host nation forces.

COIN shares many of the threats and skills requirements as that of policing in a large metropolitan police force in America, particularly when a city is under siege by a drug-related insurgency. A police officer in this environment must be able to deal effectively with the community, maintaining open communications, building trust and respect with the population, and all the while being prepared for the threat of being attacked. So in addition to the other skills sets of a COIN practitioner such as investigator, cultural anthropologist and negotiator, the successful police officer must be able to ensure his or her own safety in a violent, dynamic environment. Accepting that the threat from drug insurgents does not negate the value of COIN, metropolitan police officers must place all actors in their proper perspective with a cultural landscape of constantly shifting alliances and threats.

**Solution**

Most U.S. civilian police agencies employ a number of techniques for confronting an armed suspect, including methods other than shooting when disarming a foe in close quarters. To the untrained, some of these techniques such as rushing towards an armed person to disarm him may seem counterintuitive when in reality this action in close quarters may actually increase survival. Scenarios must be trained and drilled until sufficient “muscle memory” is developed. We require personnel in maneuver formations to continuously rehearse battle drills; why not our embedded staff officers? This training and expected behavior must include weapons posture, particularly with the side arm carried by almost all staff officers. It must be carried loaded with a round chambered. In the United States, civilian law enforcement officers routinely carry their assigned handgun loaded with a round chambered without being considered a safety risk. The risk-adverse decision to carry weapons unloaded or without a round chambered is more indicative of misunderstanding risk rather than ensuring adequate preparedness. Negligent discharges (ND) of weapons are more likely to occur with “unloaded” weapons. Although most NDs safely occur at the weapons clearing barrels located near the entry to most bases, NDs have had serious and occasionally fatal consequences. Conversely, a loaded, holstered weapon is not at risk of an ND.

Many times in a combat zone, the actual weapon posture of the individual is based more on personal choices that vary from location to location. It is not uncommon to observe military personnel, in particular staff officers, “outside the wire” with unloaded weapons or weapons carried in such a manner rendering them difficult to employ against an imminent threat. Not until August 2012, in response to the escalating Green-on-Blue threat did the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate that all military personnel carry their weapons loaded, even while on base.

Required training must focus on the skill sets that will be encountered by deployed military personnel, in particular for those operating as embedded advisors. A uniform, consistent, across-the-theater policy of weapon status must be established and enforced. Operating as an embedded advisor during an ongoing insurgency is inherently risky; no measure will completely remove the risk although measures can be taken to mitigate the risk. For staff officers and other personnel operating as embedded advisors, enhanced close combat training and a ready weapons posture are imperative to survival. Finally, all Green-on-Blue attacks must be investigated by an unbiased, third party without an interest in the investigation’s outcome. Only then can accurate analysis occur and objective corrective actions take place. The question becomes whether these lessons will be learned and assimilated into the military’s training or will the facts be subsumed by a wishful narrative.

Colonel James M. Shelley recently served in Afghanistan as ISAF Joint Command’s Deputy Director and Director of the National Police Coordination Center. A National Guard officer, the author is a retired Baltimore City law enforcement officer with a variety of patrol, investigative assignments as well as service as a police academy instructor for patrol, criminal investigation and firearms training topics.
As the U.S. government looks beyond the post-Iraq/Afghanistan conflict world, policy makers must carefully weigh options in a political landscape and among a citizenry weary of protracted land-based wars that have drained resources both human and monetary. In fact our successes will be directly linked to how well we are able to navigate within the human terrain. Security Cooperation will be a critical vehicle through which we can build rapport with our strategic partners.

If the USG is to remain at the helm of world leadership it must quickly engineer itself to meet the challenging and changing conflict paradigm that will dominate the 21st century, an era in which conflicts will not be well addressed with a military laden with heavy armor and equipment, heavily focused on kinetic operations. Such anachronistic approaches will stagnate the U.S. global strategy.

Security Cooperation will be nested in a somewhat different milieu in the 21st century requiring a shift in skill sets to address different problem sets. What will the 21st century fight look like? The World Bank’s 2012 World Development Report (WDR) asserts that 21st century violence does not fit the 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years. And the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or into “criminal violence” or “political violence.” Breaking these cycles of insecurity will require that the United States and its partners strengthen legitimate institutions and encourage governance that will provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. Additionally many U.S. alliances and strategies are one-off, isolated country plans. The WDR also suggests that refocusing on regional strategies will be more effective. Security forces will need to adapt accordingly.

More specifically, the WDR suggests that “linking military and policing assistance with justice assistance is crucial, since disconnects have been a pervasive source of problems in fragile situations.”1 This will require a stronger alliance among law enforcement, rule of law, and the military, not only in the host country but within the United States Interagency milieu as well. Effective and complementary programming and coordination will be imperative.

In this changing paradigm, conflict will increasingly be found in the urban terrain, and hinge on criminal-based violence. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that currently hinder the development and threaten security in many parts of Latin America and Mexico are good examples. These violent organizations are finding their way into western Africa nations following the narcotics trafficking and monies that finance and support these organizations. Viewing conflict from this perspective will require that the U.S. military reframe its policy and doctrine.

Most of the United States’ large operations are reactive—responding to conflict once it boils over and threatens to destabilize a region or country of strategic importance to the United States. The WDR suggests a more proactive and preventive approach. Proactive and preventive policies are challenging for a number of reasons. The most difficult is that they are difficult to measure in terms of overall effectiveness. How do you measure and quantify the number of lives you saved by preventing a war from occurring in Mali? Legislators much prefer quantifiable numbers and tangible things: number of tanks sold, enemy combatants killed or detained.

How is the United States presently aiming at fostering strategic alliances in the 21st century? Building capacity among U.S.
partners is one important aspect. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s January 2012 strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”, highlights Security Cooperation as an integral part of the strategy. Secretary Panetta has directed that “whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

The Office of Security Cooperation states that "establishing and fostering security relationships is imperative and must be at the foundation of capacity-building efforts. The importance of the human dimension cannot be overstated. Listening and learning skills are essential at every level of engagement. Impatience and a we-know-best attitude can stifle progress and trust.”

Progress and trust are best put into practice by training military (and civilians) with the right skill sets. Merely giving lip service to these noble traits is not sufficient. Training troops with these unique human capacity skill sets, focused on a profoundly different battlefield, will be necessary to carry out successful missions. Conversely, it will be imperative to train diplomatic and development counterparts in a commensurate manner. Painful lessons are still being learned in the Afghanistan theater of operations. Major General Charles Gurganus (subsequently succeeded by Lieutenant General Richard Mills) and Ms. Catriona Laing, who hold the top billets in the Regional Command South area, generated a “letter of cooperation” to each of their tribes. The underlying message was that if civilian and military expats are unable to get along, the end state and missions were doomed and their outcomes would be less than successful.

U.S. Security Cooperation is a vital part of building the capacity of partner nations; more specifically, looking at Africa is of strategic importance to the United States. Africa has abandoned its post-colonial era where it was exploited for its precious minerals, gems and petroleum. In fact, its marginalization has in many ways contributed to the growing illicit trafficking of drugs, people and arms which is now on the rise.

Africa is a complex geographic area that hosts a panoply of governments from dictatorships to democracies. Just off the coast of Somalia on the eastern seaboard, sea piracy vexes the maritime world, while inland al-Shabab governs with wily gun diplomacy wreaking havoc on the Somali population. Ungoverned pockets of the country invite unfettered terrorist activity. Nearby, the world’s newest country oil-rich and vulnerable, South Sudan embarks on its maiden voyage towards its own brand of democracy but could careen off course without strong support and leadership.

The west coast of Africa purports a multitude of fragile states, some who have recently emerged from civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone), and others still mired in decades-long civil wars (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo). Those countries which have managed to survive internecine conflicts now struggle to gain more secure footing and carve out more legitimate transparent governments held accountable to their citizens. Let us not forget the intractable dictator in Zimbabwe, where iron-fisted rule and expropriation of farm lands had further eroded the livelihood of citizens and has destabilized the southern region.

This inability to govern and lack of confidence in national institutions create conditions for many forms of insecurity that have far reaching implications, and also threaten U.S. national security. Replacing dysfunctional dictatorships and jump-starting new fledgling democracies are not easy tasks. Nor does it occur in a linear fashion. Cultivating a more nimble U.S. military armed with the cultural moxie required to address these challenges will yield more far-reaching results, and more importantly will inspire forward-thinking leaders to be less reliant on current doctrinal and procedural norms.

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Whisnant embodies such a forward-thinking leader about to embark on a Security Cooperation mission in Africa. He and his team will soon deploy to Africa.
Whisnant will be commanding a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF): SPMAGTF Africa 13.2. His Marine entity is made up of 150 Reserve Marines and sailors. Their efforts will support U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Marine Forces Africa by conducting U.S. Department of State sponsored security cooperation missions in Burundi, Senegal and Uganda. (NOTE: the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) is an entity used by the United States Marine Corps for theater security cooperation. It is primarily focused on building partner capacities.)

LtCol Whisnant personally believes that human capacity is a critical component for the 21st century fight, not the number of tanks or guns. Human skills have historically been necessary for the military to navigate within the human terrain—albeit awkwardly at times—and work more closely with civilian partners; a critical skill that will be even more important in the future. Whisnant managed to leverage specialized training for his team that hones those skills specific to the “human element.” One module he brought to the team, called “Rapid Rapport Training”—a term fondly coined by one of the facilitators, brings together the art and the science of neuro-linguistic training. This training breaks down the science of how we are wired behaviorally, and couples it with the art of building rapport, teaching students how to read others non-verbal cues and then translate that into how to build rapport more successfully—a cross cultural communications strategy with tangible results.

“We can select and train the right people,” Whisnant says. “Mapping out the humans you will work with and their skill sets is important. Gathering intelligence and fostering those relationships is key.” MAGTF 13.2 is a team of Reserve Marines.

“They bring real-life experiences gleaned from their day-to-day civilian worlds with them. This includes a more in-depth understanding of civilian culture, lexicon and problem solving skills.”

Whisnant sees a lot of talent in junior Marines as well—an important aspect of the future leadership of the Marines. “TBS4 graduates are exceedingly talented with advanced degrees. They have an amazing depth and emotional intelligence. Even many of my NCOs have advanced degrees. Unfortunately, investing in human capital is often difficult to justify as it is not tangible or measureable.”

A return to the unadulterated kinetic fight—the sexy operations Hollywood glorifies on the big screen, military recruiters happily exploit and many current top brass still strongly believe is their raison d’être—will be an egregious step backwards in time.

It will be a fight to not return to the fight. This will be an unequivocal challenge for forward-thinking leaders. This, coupled with the increasing possibility that policy makers, weary of long and costly wars and faced with budgetary constraints may be tempted to cut “soft” programs and training aimed at sustaining the human capacity, will make the forge ahead not meant for the leader lacking in tenacity.

This set of skills will be required to keep the U.S. military abreast of skills and cross cultural savvy required to address 21st century conflict. Beyond this, additional skills will be necessary to augment aptitudes to work in areas such as law enforcement, with an increased understanding of the complexities of the rule of law and inter-organizational coordination. Ceasing to train, develop and invest in those human resources to better prepare the forces for those land and littoral operations will cripple the 21st century fight.

Ms. Melissa Ward has a 20-year background in humanitarian relief and Civil-Military operations and has worked for DoS, USAID and the UN. She has managed refugee camps, run field offices and overseen emergency food aid portfolios. Ms. Ward has worked in many countries including Cambodia, Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Angola and served 16 months on a PRT in Kirkuk, Iraq. She now lives in Washington, DC and serves as the Interagency SME at the Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School in Quantico, VA

Notes

1 World Development Report 2011, World Bank pg 30
3 Office of Security Cooperation 2012
4 The Basics School – where Marine officer recruits at the lieutenant rank first start their education
Arab Society in Revolt offers policy-oriented advice from scholars in a variety of fields to help European and North American countries discern a way forward through the upheaval the “Arab Spring” has brought to the Middle East. The essays in this volume are substantive, research-rich, covering demographics and migration, Islamic revival movements and their relations to democracy, roles of women, use of modern communication technologies and platforms, and economics.

Some of the authors try to explain what the Arab Spring is, and is not. Merlini and Roy, for example, reject comparison of the Arab Spring to Iran’s 1979 revolution. They observe that in 1979, “the rebels took over power, did not care about building coalitions, and . . . they tried to export the revolution” (p. 6). Now, by contrast, the initial protestors have often not been the ones to obtain power, anyone who is serious about doing anything is trying to build a coalition, and the primary focus of each population in revolt remains domestic reform. In addition, constitutions as well as increasing recognition of diversity within societies are the new norm, and Islamists seeking power, or at least influence, are focused on maneuvering their way inside of, rather than abolishing, this reality.

Roberto Aliboni maintains that the real choice the West faces is between moderate and conservative Islamist movements, and not supporting the former would be a mistake. The only alternative to these two he sees as “weak and confused Western-style liberals” (p. 204).

Jonathan Laurence and Roberto Aliboni, respectively, provide overviews of U.S. and E.U. policies and programs in the Middle East. These surveys may be helpful to policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic (including Canada, although generally omitted from this volume) so that they may understand each other’s policies and programs. Merlini sees opportunity “to devise a strategy that takes advantage of . . . the complementarity between American and European priorities or capabilities” (p. 251).

Regarding U.S. efforts, Laurence points out that the plethora of U.S. programs don’t entirely reflect a clear policy. But even with this situation, he gives strong praise to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and its efforts to provide aid outside of government institutions to build civil society. As for European efforts, both Aliboni and Merlini warn in strong terms of the perils the Europeans will face if they continue to let their policies be shaped by poor information about and fear of what they perceive as Islam.

Roberto Aliboni maintains that the real choice the West faces is between moderate and conservative Islamist movements, and not supporting the former would be a mistake. The only alternative to these two he sees as “weak and confused Western-style liberals” (p. 204).

The one significant gap in this collection is how to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict gets passing mention in a few essays, but only in observations about how serious a problem this is, not in terms of potential ways to approach this. Laurence, for example, observes, “the continued resonance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict overshadowed even the most momentous attempts [by the U.S.] to reframe or reset relations” (pp. 155-156). In his concluding chapter Merlini notes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a challenge for the West going for-
ward. Yet none of the authors offer advice for the West on what, feasibly, can be done. Much has been written on this topic and tackling this in just a chapter would be difficult. Still, the absence of this topic is an elephant in the room for this book.

More positively, the advice these essays offer is not for governments alone. Businesses, NGOs, and private individuals seeking constructive ways to engage the Arab-Spring Middle East would also benefit from this volume. For example, Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandra Lorca examine the role of social and commercial entrepreneurship in the changes underway. Caroline Freund and Carlos A. Primo Barga provide an economic perspective on this, identifying problems which need to be tackled such as the need for rule of law, high unemployment, excessive bureaucratization of business regulation, etc. Also, Merlini notes opportunities may likely open with private sector engagement and potential for some partnerships in emerging activism by wealthy Gulf countries.

Gary R. Bunt surveys the diverse, active engagement of Muslims in several online platforms and via mobile phones. Bunt notes shifts in key networking nodes and proliferation of sources of “authoritative” Islamic opinion. He observes that increase in peer-to-peer knowledge sharing “has become a challenge to traditional top-down authority models,” including government control of religion, among Arab Muslims. (p. 79)

If readers have time for only one chapter of this book, I recommend the thoughtful, brief essay, “Islamic Revival and Democracy,” (Chapter 2, pp. 47-52) by Olivier Roy. Roy sees the handling of issues such as apostasy and conversion as something akin to a lynch pin in the democratization process, with political and religious freedoms serving as mutual reinforcement, and each being a sine qua non to the other. At a time when U.S. foreign policy shows signs of marginalizing religious freedom promotion as a niche-interest, and Europeans show themselves often disinterested in religious freedom, it is particularly interesting to see Roy stress the strategic implications of religious freedom. Roy highlights the risk of acting as if religious communities were closed, monolithic units, and in turn reducing religious liberty to protection of minorities. By contrast, maintains Roy, if apostasy and conversion for Muslims and all others in these societies were to cease to be state-governed crimes, in other words “if freedom of religion is defined as an individual right,” thus including freedom not to believe or convert, “and not a minority right, then there will be a correlation between religious and political freedom, the only way to reconcile citizenship and faith, democracy and religion.” (p. 52)
As we continue to look at the SOLLIMS knowledge environment, we need to discuss Metadata Development and Assignment. Metadata has often been defined as “information about information” or “data about data”. A key aspect about metadata or metatags assigned to either information or knowledge products is that they should be limited in scope to better support “getting the right information to the right individual ...” In the case of SOLLIMS, the metadata provides for highly focused data collection within the stability operations environment. We have borrowed from evolving stability operations doctrine as well as evolving stability operations concepts – e.g. protection of civilians, mass atrocity response, piracy, and child warriors. Information submitted directly into SOLLIMS using the Lesson or Knowledge Library submission forms will be ‘tagged’ with metadata to support both data archiving and associated data search operations.

When you submit either a Lesson or other product, you will be asked to assign metatags to your content. This is not intended to be an overwhelming task and can be achieved easily using SOLLIMS inherent tools – checkboxes / comment fields, during upload of a Lesson or other product at time of submission. To assist you with this process, we have provided a ‘pick list’ of what we consider are the key stability operations related metatags. Broken out in categories, the available metadata at the Master Portal level includes:

- **Disaster Response Functions**
  - Stability and Reconstruction Planning
  - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
  - Nutrition / Food Distribution / Food Security
  - Interim child care facilities / orphanage
  - Medical services / hospitals
  - Mortuary affairs / mass casualty response
  - Population control
  - Rioting / Criminal acts

- **Stability Operations Sector Designators**
  - Governance / Participation
  - Security Sector Reform

- **SSTRO Special Factors**
  - Stability and Reconstruction Planning
  - Mass Atrocities / Genocide
  - Medical Catastrophe
  - Public Health
  - Stability Policing Disarmament, Demobilization, & Reintegration (DDR)
  - Environmental Security
  - Governance – sub-national
  - Strategic Intelligence
  - Strategic Logistics
  - Building / Enabling Partnerships
  - Civil – Military Cooperation
  - Village Stability Operations
  - Admin_General

- **PMESII Indicators** [political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure]

- **DOTMLPF-P Indicators** [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy]

You will note that the metatags within the other sub-portals, e.g. ISAF and USAFRICOM, are tailored to include agency specific ‘tags’ which have been requested by the associated command/organization.

You are provided these to help stimulate your thoughts, focusing what you submit and to support other users as they search for information pertinent to their interests and/or information needs. If you have thoughts on either eliminating or adding to these lists please send us an email using the **CONTACT US** link at the bottom of the SOLLIMS homepage.
You could be in the next Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online!

Announcing the April 2013 theme: Training and Education in Peacekeeping and Stability Operations. If you are interested in contributing to the journal, send your letter or articles for submission to the PKSOI Publications Coordinator: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil no later than 15 March 2013 for consideration. Also provide sufficient contact information. Note that articles should reflect the topic of Training and Education in Peacekeeping and Stability operations. The Journal editing team may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only, and in coordination with the original author.