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This journal focuses on the recent Stability Training and Education (SOTEW) Workshop hosted by George Mason University’s (GMU) Peace Operations Policy Program from 7-9 February 2012 at its Arlington, Virginia Campus. Training and education are paramount to institutionalizing peace and stability operations in the military and civilian sectors across national and international communities. Through our collective experience, we have learned that stability/peace training and education is a team sport optimized by collaborative development and execution. In this spirit, the unified workshop brought together 281 participants from 120 separate organizations across the training and education community, bringing diverse approaches and best practices and ensuring a rich and lively exchange of ideas. Remarks on the first day from Congressman Geoff Davis (Kentucky), Mr. Frank DiGiovanni (OSD), and Lieutenant General George Flynn (JS J7) stimulated participants’ thoughts for the various workgroups. For this year’s workshop, PKSOI partnered with the Joint Staff J7, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Training Readiness and Strategy, the Department of State’s Political-Military Section, the Foreign Service Institute, the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the US Institute of Peace, the Combined Arms Center, Naval Postgraduate School, US Agency for International Development, National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, and the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation. We would like to extend our deepest thanks to these organizations for their help to plan and execute this year’s conference this year, but reserve a special note of thanks to GMU for its role as host.

The Journal’s first article provides an overview of the workshop. This year’s workshop not only included the usual focus to promote collaboration for producing training and education programs, but also combined with the Integration and Exercise Workshop (IEW) to coordinate exercise partnership opportunities between military and civilian efforts.

The second article addresses collaborative work tying the 2010 SOTEW conference to the thematic discussions of the 2012 workshop. A long time supporter of the SOTEW series, Mr. Frank DiGiovanni, Director, Training and Readiness Strategy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), challenged workshop participants with three themes as they participated in panels. He discussed how challenges from the 2010 SOTEW conference and recent initiatives such as the Integrated Education and Training Working Group (IETWG) could form the basis for an action framework out of the 2012 workshop.

Colonel Steven Gilland, Senior Service Fellow at the Naval Post-graduate School provides an article, Non-Traditional PME: Using Social Entrepreneurship to Educate our Professionals. COL Gilland notes that we expect our leaders to be adaptive and innovative, yet we educate them in a traditional model that is not effective in preparing leaders to operate in a learning environment. He proposes that PME think outside the normal paradigm and look toward civilian graduate schools and their range of diverse and relevant disciplines. He promotes social entrepreneurship which catalyzes social change, innovates, adapts, is flexible and agile, and solves complex problems – precisely characteristics we say we want in our military leaders.

PKSOI Intern Rebecca Ben-Amou, Dickinson College, offers her observations of the SOTEW. She participated in a workgroup and was surprised to be engaged and have the opportunity to be included in the conversation. Her participation and observations during the conference led her to conclude that civilian-military relations must become systematic “which requires a joint understanding through common education.” She provides several ways this may be accomplished.

Dr. Steven Waller implores DoD to implement measures of effectiveness in stability operations, particularly those involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He informs us about a new working group, Measures of Effectiveness Working Group (MOE WG) established by the Joint Staff and COM surgeons. This group will inform senior leaders and work with educators, trainers, and researchers to identify needs and explore standardization and measurements.

Lastly, we are pleased to announce that SOLLIMS 2.0 has been released! Navigation is much easier. Please see the updated tutorial files to help you as you navigate the new Graphical User Interface (GUI). We think you will be pleased with the changes.
Thinking Strategically About Security Sector Reform

by Dr. Harry R. Yarger

Today, a population’s expectations of the state for “security” are greater than national defense and protection from unlawful use of force internally. Expectations also include the social freedoms of economic opportunity, employment, education, health care, intellectual freedom, justice, and social mobility. Cultural form may vary by state, but the parameters of a modern social contract are clear and you need to look no further than the Arab Spring to see it. Security as a broader concept is not a new idea and was instrumental in the success of the western democracies in the struggle with communist ideology:

Security is, after all, a derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.¹

This broader concept of human security created the conditions for the U.S. led democratic liberal capitalist globalization that ultimately exposed the fallacy of the Soviet communist system and contributed to its collapse. Security sector reform laid the foundation for the West’s success and economic development, democratization, and globalization were its essential companions.

Since the end of the Cold War, the nation states’ monopolies on the use of force and their legitimacy are being challenged in ways, on a level, and at a pace never experienced before. The information, communications, and transportation systems of globalization have “awakened previously nascent or dormant desires for identity and equity” to challenge the legitimacy of the state at home and abroad.² Notwithstanding the legitimate grievances of some ethnic groups and other disadvantaged members of many states’ populations, globalization presents unprecedented opportunities and capabilities to political opportunists, ideologues, criminals, and others who would gain advantage from insecurity and instability within a particular state or the international order. Natural disasters, wars, or terrorist acts disrupt state activities and impose physical damages and costs on their direct victims. But, they also levy a toll on the whole of the state, the region, and the international structure based on the perception of how that insecurity may affect aspects of trade, others’ security, and populations’ confidence in state and international governance. Therefore, any individuals, groups, states, and region’s insecurity potentially threatens the stability required for a successful globalized world order.

Security is essential to international and internal state stability, economic development, and progressive development. The question in the 21st century is what will be the shared sense of how such security is established and sustained.³

What is security sector reform? If we adhered to a broad human security model, security sector reform would be everything, therefore it would be nothing—and impossible to address. Fortunately, in the reconstruction efforts following the collapse of communism, assisting states and others found that if these states were to compete successfully in a globalize economy and provide a broader level of human security they must first suc-
Thinking Strategically About Security Sector Reform

ccessfully reform their security sectors and looked closely at the subject. The U.S. government rightly concluded the security sector in a modern 21st century state provides an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It consists of the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities by which the government provides safety, security, and justice. The U.S. definition assumes the essentiality of representative governance. It is true that non-representative states can provide safety and security—a sense of stability, but often at the cost of justice and with a lack of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to their populations. Such states will ultimately fail to meet the legitimate needs of their citizens or to be successful in a positively competing international order. They will be a source of instability as opposed to a contributing partner to international stability.

The security sector of a state has external and internal aspects and requires security providers for both aspects, even though some security forces may function in either. Sovereign state security providers are organized in various forms of military, paramilitary, and law enforcement structures: military forces—armies, navies, air forces, navies, and marines; border security forces, customs authorities, and coast guards; intelligence services; civilian police and specialized police units; national guards and government militias; and other security and civil defense units. States have various ways of categorizing these formal security forces, but in properly functioning states they share the common attribute of being responsive to and supportive of the state. In theory, through these forces, the state maintains territorial and sovereign security against external threats, maintains a monopoly over the use of violence internally, and provides for public order and physical security that enables other development.

Non-state security providers may exist within a state and contribute or detract from security or the state’s sovereignty and legitimacy. Non-state security and justice providers are those non-governmental systems or individuals who have varying degrees of formal and informal jurisdiction. Context determines the value of non-state security providers. Informal traditional justice systems or neighbor watch groups may enhance security, if united in common purpose with positive government goals. However, non-state militias, criminal organizations, and forces loyal to political opportunists or spoilers may constitute a challenge to the state’s security responsibilities, raising issues of sovereignty and legitimacy. In addition, outside agitators, such as international crime or business, other states, and special interest groups, may influence internal security. Internal security is complex and the dynamics can spill over into other states. Designated security providers are only one part of a functioning security sector in the 21st century. Government security management and oversight bodies are another essential element. These formal and informal bodies within the state oversee the security forces and agencies of the state and may be part of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, or special commissions and review boards. Such bodies ensure security providers serve the state with efficacy and in a lawful manner. If such bodies are unprepared, incompetent, corrupted, or nonexistent, the security sector is weakened correspondingly. Civil society also plays a vital role in overwatching the security sector through the media, related professional organizations, think tanks, academia, and advocacy groups. These groups critique and advise the security organizations and policy makers as well as keep the public informed. Good state security is a product of a constructive interaction among all these actors and agencies. Consequently, security sector reform must consider each.

Trends in the international security environment suggest that in the next two decades most states will need to reform their security sector, and that many of them will need assistance. If too many states fail, model, global instability will increase. All states within the international system and their populations will suffer, even if not equally, as violence expands, populations migrate, and political opportunists seek advantage in instability. However, over the past decade the international community has learned from research and practice, producing applicable doctrine that is readily available within various institutions and organizations. Key strategic perspectives have also been gained:

Security Sector Reform is a sovereign issue. SSR cannot be imposed and sustained externally within acceptable bounds of legitimacy and fiscal cost; even though some form of imposed outside security might be a necessity.
SSR must be resourced relative to needs and progress, not to artificial constructs or unfounded aspirations. Experience has shown that solutions that meet the local needs and portend a better way forward may be more optimal than implementing “better” outside solutions, even when the latter are well financed. Funding that is not clearly addressing relevant needs and bridging to a perceived better future promotes corruption and breeds disappointment as the population suffers, or perceives their needs as ignored. Transparency enhances the probability of proper reforms and the value derived from any fiscal expenditures.

Understanding what security sector reform is at the national and local level, why it is so important to the international security community, and how we should think about it from a strategic perspective allows us to better pursue that myriad of ideas and activities that constitute or contribute to effective reform.

5 Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2008), Glossary 9, 6-3 through 6-4.
6 U.S. Agency for International Development.
7 See United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 6-37 through 6-60 for a perspective of the range of security sector reform and the approaches and activities.
Strategic Considerations Relating to DDR
by Mr. Raymond Millen

At first blush, DDR—viz., Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of former warring factions into society—is rather straightforward, with degrees of success predicated on the amount of resources and time dedicated to its fulfillment. As a matter of practice, DDR often serves as the tactical component of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which serves as the overarching framework, focusing on the political-security reform strategy for a designated nation-state. By military analogy, DDR is the beachhead and SSR is the subsequent land campaign.

This subordinating relationship can potentially result in little or no strategic analysis necessary to formulating a DDR strategy. Implementing a DDR program is so complex, laborious, resource dependent, and time consuming, that it demands a thorough understanding of the strategic implications. Realistically, if donor nations and organizations are truly interested in assisting a post-war state, the effort requires a long-term DDR commitment.

Generally, there are two instances in which DDR is appropriate: at the request of an existing government involved in an extended insurgency; and in the aftermath of a conflict, resulting in regime change, wherein the new government seeks a fresh start through DDR. In both cases, a peace agreement among the former warring factions is an essential first step. The least desirable course is to implement a partial or unilateral DDR if a peace agreement is not implemented. Under these circumstances, peacekeeping or coalition troops would need to shoulder the security burden until the host nation security forces are ready to assume the burden. More problematic, the host nation is not impelled to provide security for the populace, which is a core function of the state, so legitimacy comes into question.

One should underscore that engaging in DDR activities signifies an intervention in a state’s internal affairs, which can create foreign policy dilemmas for the intervening powers: an entanglement in the domestic affairs of the host nation; a commitment to the survival of the regime; and a cultivation of host nation dependency on donor nations/organizations to the point of inhibiting its evolution as a democracy.

Because of the aforementioned implications of DDR, intervention is a high policy decision, implying the national deliberative body (i.e., the national security council or cabinet) should view DDR through a strategic lens. First, it must determine that the conditions are right for a DDR program to begin. Second, it must take structural reform of the host nation political system seriously rather than as a formality. Third, it must consider carefully the size, composition, and distribution of security forces necessary for a democracy to prosper. These strategic considerations represent the golden triangle of DDR, and if they are achieved, they will provide the host nation with a solid foundation for growth.

Determining the Prerequisites for Initiating DDR

As the national deliberative body considers the decision to initiate a DDR program, it must not become hostage to events or motivated by utopianism; instead discussion should focus on the strategic effects it seeks to attain. As strategic theorist Colin S. Gray instructs, strategy is the exercise of power in pursuit of political goals, and its purpose is to change the behavior of another political actor in ways the protect or promote national interests. The sum total of activities that support a strategy...
began DDR without a peace agreement with the Taliban, with Northern Alliance and warlord militias participating in the process. As a result, a security vacuum existed over large swaths of territory for years because the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police, and Coalition forces were insufficient for the task. Of course, UN or U.S. officials can and should be involved in peace negotiations, but no DDR activity should take place in anticipation of a final peace agreement. To do so would take away the incentive for ending the conflict, potentially leading to a new wave of conflict as factions take advantage of disarmament measures.

Another prerequisite for the initiation of DDR is a UN mandate, which provides legitimacy to the effort and underscores the impartiality of the DDR facilitators. Because of the UN’s internationally recognized standing, a UN mandate shields the intervening powers from potential allegations of unilateralism or imperialism. The host nation populace is more likely to accept and trust a DDR program under a UN mandate because of its history of impartiality. Additionally, a UN mandate increases the willingness of other nations to participate in the DDR effort as a coalition, sharing responsibilities, costs, and resources.

Reforming the Host Nation Political System

In view of the fact that the host nation is solicitous for assistance, it will be more amenable to political reforms during DDR than at any other time. Reforming a state’s political structure is a contentious subject because it has imperialist connotations. There is some validity to this charge since it entails foreign powers changing a state’s traditional political institutions. On the other hand, the underlying causes of an insurgency are the result of flaws in the political system, usually due to ineffective checks and balances, thus resulting in the accumulation of power in one person or group. This accumulation of power inevitably results in government corruption in the form of cronyism and patronage, and arbitrary governance. Thus, the linkage between tyrannical rule and unrest becomes self-evident.

Because political change results in political winners and losers, shifts in power, and a changing of patronage and patrons, DDR officials should pay particular attention to the crafting of a constitution as the means of cultivating democratic institutions. In this endeavor, constitutional scholars are needed to craft the constitution so as to avoid the pitfalls of utopianism.

Foremost, organization is the bulwark of democracy. Without proper organizational structure, a young democracy remains brittle, following two typical courses. First, it descends into political anarchy as the central government loses authority over...
the sub-national governments and citizenry. Consequently the federal government becomes susceptible to continual upheavals, unrest, and coup d’états. Second and in reaction to the first, the regime becomes authoritarian in pursuit of greater order, security, and direction. It should be noted that authoritocracies are very efficient and decisive political structures, which are very good at providing security. They also encroach on individual liberties, create inequalities through the practice of cronymism and patronage, and often pursue disastrous policies due to deficient balancing mechanisms. As a consequence, an unassisted democracy can fall into a cycle of anarchy and tyranny plaguing the affected society with endless instability, conflict, and poverty. Without an organizing structure, the whole premise of whether people can govern themselves becomes problematic.

The constitutional scholars’ first task is to craft the structure of government. Modern successful democracies have broken the aforementioned cycle through the separation of government into three essential branches, each autonomous as institutions but requiring the cooperation of the other branches to govern. Hence, the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches collaborate to craft, implement, and review laws, while jealously guarding against encroachments on their authority by the other two branches. This system of checks and balances intentionally trades efficiency, decisive decision-making for deliberate, collaborative policy formulation. It is a slow and contentious means of governance, but it also mitigates against rash policies, political corruption, and arbitrary governance.

The new constitution should also balance federal power by vesting it with only essential powers, devolving all other authority and responsibilities (which do not require articulation in the constitution) to sub-national government and the individual/family. To undergird this separation of power, the second echelon governments (i.e., states or provinces) should align their constitutions on the federal model, elect their government officials, and rely mainly on their local institutions for the resolution of issues. This separation of federal and sub-national governance ensures the federal government is not mired in minutiae, permitting it to focus on national-level matters of state, while also tacitly acknowledging that the citizens know how best to run their lives and leaving the delivery of goods and services to local governments.

A constitution, no matter how well crafted, will fail to become a strategic document unless it is revered by the citizenry. A national debate over its contents, the intent of its construct, and even the extent of the federal government’s reach not only informs the populace of the relationship between the government and the people, it also underscores a government of laws, not men. Through this national debate, the populace must understand that democracy is not a panacea against existing evils. Democracy does not automatically result in social harmony, physical security, sustenance, or jobs. If the political structure has the proper checks and balances, the articulation of rights is not necessary. The government can underscore a few inalienable rights as amendments, but they should not become a laundry list of utopian aspirations.

A well-balanced constitution combined with an informed populace gives a young democracy a solid foundation for stability and growth. A constitution is not a panacea to socio-economic ills; its virtue is to prevent the oppression of the majority by a select minority. As the young democracy matures, it will naturally seek to assume greater responsibilities, acceptance of which will rest on the populace. At such a time, the federal government will have gained the capacity, wealth, and knowledge to grow the nation in a deliberative manner.

Creating a State of Security, not State Security

Part of the calculus for reforming a state’s security forces (i.e., military and police) is obviously to provide adequate security so citizens can pursue happiness. But particular care must be taken to ensure security forces do not in time become obstacles to those pursuits. The military should not become so large that it poses a perceived threat to its neighbors, creating a security dilemma in the region. Treaties and alliances are an effective deterrent against potential foreign threats, so they should considered when crafting a DDR strategy.

One of the legacies of the Cold War is the maintenance of large militaries in lesser-developed states as a bulwark against revolutionary warfare. Not only is this practice unnecessary, it is also antithetical to democratic governance. As a practical matter, the military’s role should be limited to reducing the sophistication of an insurgency to the point the police can manage the threat by itself. Oftentimes, if an insurgency has broken out, it is due to dysfunctional government practices, so the military is a poor remedial instrument. In this case, the military is too blunt an instrument for the domestic emergency, making the cure worse than the disease. The best preventive medicine is adherence to the peace agreement and the constitution.

The greatest distribution of security should fall to the police, but not necessarily a national police force. To preclude the development of security vacuums in parts of the country, local or community police are necessary. While recognizing that local police can pose their own set of problems, such as preying on citizens, engaging in corruption, or becoming complicit...
in criminal activities, these concerns are secondary compared to the consequences of ungoverned areas. An ethical, effective community police has a better chance to mature if the local authorities select the recruits directly from the community since the policemen and their families have established roots and are committed to the preservation of the society. It becomes the local community’s responsibility to provide the salary and other compensations (lodging and meals) for their policemen, thereby relieving the fledgling central government of a particularly onerous burden. It is the community policeman’s relationship with the local populace which sets the conditions for harmony, dispute management, and early detection of trouble in the area. Conceptually, DDR facilitators can establish regional training centers for basic (two weeks), intermediate (six weeks), and advanced training (six months). By this approach, community police become over time a professional force with training and experience.

In comparison, national police should be relatively small and confined to the capital and other major cities. National police are an instrument of the central government and hence have the potential to oppress. Authoritarian regimes are called police states for a reason. Because of its manageable size, national police can receive a greater degree of professional training, equipment, and leadership commensurate to its intended capabilities. Over time, local police can receive this training, making all police professional forces.

As an aside, DDR is not about disarming the populace. In fact, trying to do so can lead to calamity. Philosophically, the inalienable right of self-protection should not be abridged by government. As a practical matter, self-protection is the first line of defense for society and by extension, the state.

The establishment of the military instrument requires a rational assessment of the national security needs of the state. President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated the dangers of excessive military expenditures, which not only undermines private enterprise but also erodes the moral fiber of the people for the sake of a garrison state. The paradox, as Eisenhower often warned, was that militarized states bankrupt their economies in the quest of seeking absolute security, which in turn leaves them defenseless. A small, professional military with expenditures not exceeding two percent of GDP annually is more likely to serve as a source of pride, providing adequate defense to the state.

**Conclusion**

A DDR strategy must be designed to provide fledgling democracies the chance to mature without descending into anarchy or tyranny. Because DDR is most often conducted in the wake of devastating insurgencies, government and societal institutions are often fractured, requiring long term assistance. What DDR facilitators must avoid is tacitly sanctioning the type of political behavior which destabilized the country in the first place. Accordingly, special attention to the peace agreement is essential so as to inspire confidence in the warring factions that participating in the DDR program would be mutually advantageous.

Special attention to reforming the host nation’s political structure is a strategic approach to state building. The question is not whether a nation-state is ready for democracy, but rather what organizational structures will protect inalienable rights best, forestall a return to political corruption in the form of cronyism, patronage, and kleptocracy, and serve to check the power of the central government. If insufficient attention is paid to political structures, recurring instability is highly probable. For society to thrive, a modicum of security is required. The challenge of course is determining the amount and type of security which serves the common good. Whether out of unfounded fear or unscrupulous design, politicians too often create national security forces well beyond necessity. Regardless of the original intent, a large security apparatus can just as easily be used to oppress as to defend. Hence, if an error is to be made, it should be in the formation of community policemen rather than national military and police forces.

A rational DDR strategy, understood and implemented properly, will go far in mitigating the unintended consequences of past practices, and it will make democratic political systems more attractive to struggling states.

2 In his excellent study on the causes of insurgencies, Jeff Goodwin makes a compelling argument that regime practices are the main culprit rather than external subversive forces: 1) State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions; 2) Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups from state power or resources; 3) Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violence against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures; 4) Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power; and 5) Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14, 44-49.
Harmonizing the Army’s Security Cooperation Doctrine

by Colonel Jody Petery

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.

U.S. DOS/DOD/USAID Statement on SSR (January 2009)

After 10 years of prolonged, costly conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and six years of economic decline, the United States has entered an era, referred to frequently as a “strategic inflection point,” where U.S. Security goals and strategy must be developed in an economically constrained environment. A key component of this strategy is a reliance on conflict prevention, and shaping of conditions to either prevent or quickly resolve conflicts.

A critical aspect of prevention and shaping is Security Cooperation (SC), specifically building a partner country’s capacity to share defense burdens around the world. SC is viewed as a small investment to secure US interests. Simultaneously, the Army in particular has recognized that after 10 years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that a generation of Soldiers is not proficient in offensive and defensive operations.

The Army’s new doctrine, dubbed Unified Land Operations, guides the Army to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations simultaneously in an environment summarized as coalition-centric, hybrid threat driven, and complex.1 The Army’s mantra on training has remained “train as you fight.” Given the Army intends to fight as part of a coalition—should the Army train in a coalition environment? This article explores a strategic opportunity to align the Army’s new found strategy which emphasizes SC with our apparent requirement to provide a coalition environment to Army trainers and units.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

SC requires several components to succeed. Successful SC requires a willing host nation partner, a U.S. unit, funding, and a venue. There are two significant limiting factors which will challenge our ability to conduct the envisioned volume of SC training—availability of U.S. units and a budget for anticipated costs. U.S. Army training requires a training audience, a scenario (which must include the complexities envisioned in the contemporary operating environment which include civilians, infrastructure, and coalition members), an opposing force (comprising a hybrid threat), and some training support including a Higher Headquarters Control Element (HICON), subordinate forces (live or constructive units) to provide stimulus, and some exercise controllers.2

The most rigorous U.S. Army unit training is conducted at the Army’s four combat training centers (CTCs) at the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, GE, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, and the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) stationed at Fort Leavenworth, KS.3 The CTCs are programmed to include all necessary components described above except for coalition members. Here, by combining SC with the CTC program, not only can an efficiency be found, but the quality of CTC training can be improved, while the volume of SC activities can be increased, without increasing the tempo of US units.

The Problem Statement(s)

There are several key problems the Army faces as it strives to provide relevant, proficient, affordable security to the Nation as a member of the Joint force. These problems can then be
The first is “How Does the Army Efficiently Ensure Readiness in Offensive, Defensive and Stability tasks?” Here the Army must balance its appetite for rigor and realism with the budget realities confronting readiness. The Army must also decide what level of proficiency the Army must maintain on a perpetual basis. Looked at from a different perspective, this can also be viewed as what level of risk in readiness the Army is comfortable managing. Here it is clear that the CTCs remain an important part, along with home-station training, to ensure readiness. The Army must make difficult choices about how completely it can replicate the environment, resource training units, and provide feedback to training units in the form of observers and instrumented After Action Reviews (AARs). 4

The second problem is “How Does the Army Provide U.S. Training Partners to conduct SC without causing an associated degradation in U.S. readiness?” Envisioned SC activities do not include entire units, but usually leaders. Separating leaders from their units reduces the unit’s ability to train as well as eliminates leader ability to engage with subordinates in a manner which reduces accidents, discipline problems, and loss of standards. Envisioned SC activities often lack the rigor of U.S. training and focus on small units or individuals. This dynamic makes it unlikely that U.S. units will be able to sustain readiness at company through brigade echelons while conducting SC tasks. Here the Army must ensure that quality resourced soldiers and leaders are made available to conduct SC, forging positive relationships with selected partner militaries, building professionalism and capability. Simultaneously, the Army must prevent units from becoming “hollow,” where the lack of leader presence negates the unit’s ability to maintain or gain readiness.

The third problem is “How Does the Army Provide an Appropriate Coalition Environment to Units Training at CTCs?” Neither the U.S. Army nor Forces Command (FORSCOM) has ready access to multinational (MN) forces. The Theater Armies have access to MN forces within their region, but lack the CTC’s training venue. National Guard Units have access to MN forces via the State Partnership Program (SPP) but have focused efforts abroad and have limited access to CTCs currently. SC activities have traditionally been conducted in foreign countries for a variety of reasons. Most significantly, foreign SC has facilitated U.S. Army access to multiple countries, improved the Army’s cultural skills, has served as a form of economic aid to these countries thus making these activities attractive to the host nation, and is less expensive than sending entire MN units to the United States for training. All of these concerns are valid. These concerns are exactly why they have conducted SC abroad, and have been the answer to question two above. But the Army has never successfully answered question three except in Europe at the JMRC and even then the solution was largely enabled by NATO’s role in Afghanistan and the fact that JMRC is on foreign soil.

If the Army decides that all three of the posed questions are important and valid, then combining the three into a broader problem offers an opportunity to solve several problems with one manageable solution. The combined problem statement is “How Does the Army Conduct SC Activities at our CTCs while SC partners simultaneously provide the MN/Coalition Environment our training units require?” The solution to this problem is to force SC activities to occur within the United States both as part of home-station training but more importantly as part of CTC rotations. It also means that the JMRC should be viewed and used as a Coalition training center able to conduct SC and gain US unit readiness, regardless of where the unit is stationed, simultaneously.

To enable this “way, “means” will need to be developed. Undoubtedly bureaucratic work is needed to develop mechanisms to gain funding, access to the United States (and Germany) for the MN units, and to schedule these activities using Army programming systems. A blending of responsibility must occur. The Army should align responsibility for both U.S. unit readiness and SC activities to eliminate the current competition between the Theater Armies and FORSCOM. The Army should resource the CTCs with MN forces to allow them to achieve the MN/Coalition environment described in U.S. doctrine. The Army should reform budget and scheduling processes to ensure availability of units (U.S. and MN), ability to achieve SC goals, and appropriate training time available for U.S. units. Such a system would allow increases in both effectiveness and efficiency. Such a system would likely be opposed initially by Theater Armies who might perceive a loss of flexibility. Upon further review, they will find that access, opportunity and rigor have all been improved for the militaries within their regions. Foreign governments may balk at the cost of these events but in the current budget environment the United States can no longer bear everyone else’s burdens.

Coincidental SC Opportunities

There are several other opportunities to conduct SC activities efficiently, building partner capacity at low or no cost to unit readiness. Throughout TRADOC, professional trainers and educators build lesson plans and curriculum to educate leaders,
and doctrine developers work on concepts then manuals—
could countries where our SC goals include building institu-
tional capacity in the areas the Army is focusing on not work
alongside and with these TRADOC professionals learning to
train and conduct operation X while building relationships
with U.S. counterparts, without any US person doing anything
other than his primary task?

**Embracing the Joint Force**

DOD exercises are not synchronized to allow multi-echelon
training and sharing of training resources. Joint Exercises (run
by either Combatant Commanders or Joint Staff J7) focus on
Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters who require Army divi-
sions or corps as subordinate units. In the current model, these
Army forces are viewed as “taskings.” Army division/corps
exercises (run by MCTP) require JTFs as higher headquarters,
and require brigades as subordinates units. Under the current
model, the Army tasks units, or pays contractors, to replicate
the same JTF HQs and subordinate brigades who are exercising
simultaneously but separately. Additionally, Army brigade exer-
cises require a division HQ as the Higher Headquarters. Under
the current model, the Army tasks units, or pays contractors to
replicate the same Division HQ who is exercising simultane-
ously. The alternative is to conduct multi-echelon exercises,
where all echelons are training audiences and the overhead is
eliminated.

**The Way We’ve Always Done It**

In essence, with a decreasing budget, the Army should sacrifice
flexibility to be able to afford more and better resourced events.
In this example, bureaucrats wed to rigid technical and budget-
ary systems will argue against this suggestion. Here too, senior
leadership will need to initiate necessary reforms to make logi-
cal solutions feasible.

**Conclusion**

The current SC system pits Army agencies against each other.
Force providers (FORSCOM) are charged with providing ready units to Combatant Commanders while U.S. Combat-
ant Commanders seek units to conduct SC activities which
generally not only fail to increase U.S. unit readiness but instead reduce readiness.

The CTCs are charged to provide a realistic training environ-
ment yet have little to no systemic access to the MN forces
necessary to allow U.S. leaders to operate as part of a coalition.
These separate responsibilities cause conflict and inefficiency.

The institutional Army, specifically TRADOC, conducts daily
activities which if leveraged by SC planners could provide part-
ner capacity building SC opportunities without diverting any
U.S. Army personnel from their primary tasks.

Finally, the “separate” (Joint, MCTP, “dirt” CTCs) exercise
programs are inefficient as the Army fails to share common
resources, making training more expensive than necessary. In
summary, the Army is pursuing countless initiatives which when
undertaken separately miss opportunities to gain efficiencies.
By failing to seize these opportunities, the Army artificially ex-
cerabates perceived budget shortages. The Army must find ways
to pursue more efficient, broad solutions to deeper problems to
gain efficiency, increase effectiveness, all while staying within its
Defense Budget and the limits of the professional force. After
ten years of Security Sector Reform (SSR) “away games” in the
Middle East, it’s time for an important “home game” here in the
United States.

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1 Hybrid threat – from ADP 3.0. A hybrid threat is the diverse
and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces,
terrorist forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these
forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting
effects. Hybrid threats may involve nation-state adversaries that
employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces
to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational
concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with
nation-states.

2 Constructive Training - M&S involving simulated people
operating simulated systems. Real people stimulate (provide
inputs) to such simulations, but are not involved in determining
the outcomes.

3 MCTP, while stationed at Fort Leavenworth KS, conducts its
training at the training unit’s installation(s). The other CTCs
are fixed sites where training units come to conduct training.

4 Instrumented AARs are post-training performance reviews
which are augmented by the extensive electronic collection
tools available at our CTCs and include audio recordings of
leader dialogue, images of activities which occurred, and serve
as valuable tools to help the training audience understand “what
happened” during training. Instrumentation also helps Observ-
er/Coach/Trainers maintain situational understanding so their
feedback is better informed and more effective.

5 The Army has 4 CTCs, 3 of which include live training on
tanks, fighting vehicles and against live Opposing forces (OP-
FOR). These 3 CTCs, called the “dirts” because their training
venue is in the dirt/ground are located at Forts Irwin (NTC),
Polk (JRTC), and Hohenfels GE (JMRC). MCTP is the 4th
CTC, but “non-dirt,” as its training venue is replicated by com-
puters, and plays out in the constructive training environment.
Ethical Considerations in Security Sector Reform
by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Calvert

The idea of a state security sector, or more broadly the systems and decisions around the control and legitimate use of force within any particular society, and civilization more generally, is central to the very concept of a functional and enduring modern world order. In the interest of collective security and peaceful coexistence of people with diverse individual interests and beliefs, each individual relinquishes a portion of their personal sovereignty and confers it to the state, expecting the state to provide protection, to keep in check the primal brutality that lies just beneath the surface of any society and threatens from beyond the borders of the state.

Because of the central and enduring nature of security and its intimate and far-reaching association with nearly every aspect of modern life, the ethical nature of the security sector and of security sector reform (SSR) is critical. Whenever the state or outside agents embark upon SSR, they must understand that they are operating upon a vital organ of state legitimacy where the stakes are invariably high with outcomes that are often hard to predict, and therefore the ethics of any such endeavor are of utmost importance. What are these ethics? What moral values must guide an understanding of what is permissible, what is essential, and what is prohibited in situations where leaders of good intention are working to build or reform the security sector, at home or in another country?

The range of potential scenarios—and thus the range of answers to the ethical questions—is extensive. All states undertake SSR in some form as they modernize, often on their own. Sometimes, assistance with SSR is requested by a cooperative partner and at other times it is imposed by intervening states. Often SSR means helping with incremental changes to improve an existing system in a relatively stable nation; other times it means implementing wholesale change in an unstable, dysfunctional, or tyrannical nation, or establishing a serviceable security system within a territory that has never enjoyed the benefits of a functional modern state. SSR is difficult even in developed states, and the range of cultural parameters and geo-political factors in each of these latter situations adds greater ethical complexity. In short, the scope of SSR is broad, its contexts vary greatly, and comprehensive ethical guidelines are elusive. Nonetheless, ethical thinking about SSR is improved by considering three broad frameworks: the ethics of the objective security sector, the ethics of getting involved in the security sector of another state, and the ethical obligations after involvement.

Ethics of the Objective Security Sector: Stewardship & Legitimacy

In the 21st century world order, recognition of the primacy of the people of a state, and the state’s role as a steward and guarantor of their universal rights, are primary ethical requirements for any security sector. A legitimate democratic state accepts that all rights and all concepts of sovereignty begin at the level of the individual, and the state has only that sovereignty granted it collectively by its citizens. As steward of this collective sovereignty, it is the ethical responsibility of the state to ensure that security sector mechanisms act at all times in the interest of the people in pursuit of their inalienable rights, rather than in the interests of statism or elites. When the people of the state accept the ends, ways, and means associated with the security sector, and trust its conduct in the pursuit of the interests of the people, the security sector has internal legitimacy. When the international community recognizes a state’s proper stewardship as measured by its acceptance and adherence to widely accepted sets of international ethical standards with regard to security, for example the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the state enjoys external legitimacy.
Legitimacy is an umbrella concept that covers a wide array of more specific modern ethical principles and concepts. The ethical codes specific to individual elements of the security sector, such as the professional ethical codes of the police force, the military, the judiciary, the executive branch, and the legislature, can be quite detailed, but they all reflect the larger ethical standards of the security sector as a whole. Legitimacy also ideally encompasses enabling concepts like transparency— that the people have a way of effectively monitoring the security sector, and balance— that the people have effective mechanisms for controlling it. The degree of recognized legitimacy the state’s security sector achieves and maintains internally and externally is thus a good general indication or measure of that state’s ethical stewardship and achievement of the objectives of a modern security sector.

**Ethics of Involvement: Sovereignty, Personal Responsibility, & “Responsibility to Protect”**

Primary responsibility for the ethical nature and effectiveness of a state’s security sector lies with the people of the state—it is their security, after all, and their sovereignty that are at stake. The idea of sovereignty is at the heart of the most basic principle of international law—the belief that states are sovereign and their internal affairs are not to be interfered in without grave justification. The historical position is that what happens within a sovereign state, for good or evil, is an internal affair and it is up to the people of that state to determine by whatever means necessary if they want to accept or change it. Through this collective international agreement, states greatly limited external interference in internal affairs and assured more stable borders. Such reliance on internal correction assumes people get the governance, and thus the safety, security, and justice, that they deserve, or at least that they are willing to accept. Whether an abused or unprotected citizenry actually “deserves” what it gets because it allows it to continue is a topic of 21st century debate. However, from a practical standpoint the strength and inviolability of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention have customarily set a very high threshold for legal intrusion.

For external state and non-state actors, there are two potential motivations for involvement. An actor might decide it is in its own self-interest to intervene, believing that states with dysfunctional security sectors can both give rise to and serve as a safe haven for bad things with regional or global reach, such as terrorism, crime, disease, and uncontrolled migration. States choose to act unilaterally or through intergovernmental organizations or other parties to prevent or preemptively mitigate some of these effects, with or without the permission of the host state. Alternatively, external actors might have a purely altruistic intent and become involved because they have the capacity, and thus feel an obligatory responsibility to help. There is an emerging international consensus that in at least some situations this sort of “good Samaritan” responsibility exists, and that it can sometimes be strong enough to override some prerogatives of state sovereignty. The United Nations version of “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine was adopted in 2005 and used as justification for recent actions in Libya, and the security sector is intimately involved in the four crimes the doctrine addresses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

The dynamics of the international community and the increasingly globalized nature of society blur the distinction between intervention for self-interest and altruism and make it more abstract. In many ways there is a self-interest justification for nearly any nation to work towards stability in any troubled state, as the consequences of security sector failure and instability rarely respect borders. In addition, self-interest and altruism are not mutually exclusive—action motivated primarily by self-interest can still be ethical if it coincides with the interests of the people of the troubled state, with their universal rights and the choices they would make in a democratic process.

Emerging standards of expected human security may ultimately create new accepted norms for ethical state behavior towards citizens and others, which the collective international community will enforce. For the near-term, however, the ethical
justification for involvement in the affairs of other states will be judged on a case-by-case basis with the severity of the specific circumstances, or the threats posed, bounding the ethical debates.

Ethics After Involvement: Stewardship, Movement Towards Legitimacy, & Balance

The ethical framework after involvement deals with both the nature and the effectiveness of reform efforts. As with the objective security sector, respect for the modern concept of stewardship is also a primary ethical requirement for outsiders involved in SSR. As suggested earlier, it is ethical for an intervening power to work in its own self-interest, as long as this does not usurp the legitimate interests of the host people in securing their universal rights. In practical terms, this means that any external SSR efforts to move the objective security sector towards greater effectiveness must also have a reasonable expectation of moving it towards greater legitimacy—anything less is ethically unacceptable.

That concept of “movement towards” is a critical caveat that allows some ethical pragmatism into the reform calculation. No security sector is perfect and all fall somewhere along dual continuums of effectiveness and legitimacy. The effectiveness continuum varies between complete enforced security at one end and anarchy at the other, while the legitimacy continuum varies from full individual liberty and universal rights to absolute despotism. The goal is to achieve a level of effectiveness that meets the needs of the people in the most legitimate manner. The SSR version of the ethical dictate “do no harm” applies here: reform efforts should produce sustainable forward movement along both continuums, so that the aided state is both more effective and more ethically legitimate than it was prior to reform.

The other critical dictum of SSR ethics is balance—it is unethical to build up a strong security sector in the absence of (or without also building up) those elements of society and of good governance that can counter-balance it. As a keystone element of functional modern society, the security sector must be strong and effective, but it must also be checked and balanced by other strong societal forces, with transparency and with mechanisms for restraint that rely upon more than just the good intent of those in power. This is always a relationship of dynamic tension, but the balance between the security sector and the rest of society is especially delicate in fragile or emerging states. Because of this, a careful and comprehensive approach that balances SSR with broader capacity building efforts is an ethical necessity.

Conclusion

The societal benefits of a security sector that is both effective and legitimate in its exercise of the people’s sovereignty are immense, both for the internal benefit of individual states and for regional and global stability. Security sector reform—both internal and external, and for whatever reason—has ethical considerations. The three frameworks provided suggest that regardless of the motivation or means, ethical answers focus on the state’s legitimacy as an effective steward of sovereignty in the interest of the universal rights of its citizens, and its effectiveness at providing security within the bounds of those rights. To remain ethical in the long term, the effort must work to achieve balance between the security sector and the society it serves, and it must contribute to a system that is ultimately more effective and more legitimate. Within the parameters of these three ethical frameworks, SSR can be both a practical and noble force for positive change.

1 Thomas Hobbes’ “state of nature” in all its manifestations.
2 Some of the most difficult ethical dilemmas arise when there is a conflict between internal legitimacy and external legitimacy – when the will of the people in a state is (or appears to be) contrary to acceptable international standards. There is no easy way through this problem, but a first step is to consider whether the internal legitimacy is real, whether it truly reflects the will of the people. For example, would a population with true and well-informed democratic freedom of choice accept a differential granting or enforcement of rights or protections?
3 According to jus ad bellum – the portion of Just War theory that addresses the right to go to war – war is justified only as a last resort for a legitimate authority with right intentions and a just cause, when there is reasonable probability of success and proportionality between expected benefits and expected harm. SSR isn’t always a war question, but the threshold for uninvited intervention is effectively the same.
4 More accurately, the argument is that a state has the responsibility to protect its citizens against certain offenses, and if it cannot or will not effectively do this, it is no longer legitimately sovereign and is thus no longer entitled to non-interference.
Disaster Response—a Military Perspective of the March 2011 Mega-Disaster
by LTC Misa Nakagawa, Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)

Since the second half of the 20th century, five mega earthquakes have rocked the world: Kamchatka 1952, the Aleutians 1957, Chili 1960, Alaska 1964, and Sumatra 2004. Interestingly, all of them occurred in the Asia-Pacific area.

On 11 March 2011, at 2:46 pm, another powerful earthquake struck off northeastern Japan. Though it was a magnitude 9.0, the largest earthquake ever to strike there, the Japanese people stood ready for such a natural disaster. As it was an earthquake-prone region, they were prepared with provisions, manuals and civil emergency drills. However, the subsequent tsunami overwhelmed all estimates and forecasts, just as the major flooding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005. The sudden and rapid surge of waves, stretching 380 miles wide, engulfed coastal settlements, crested river banks and hills, and surged over inland cities. Waters choked with mud and debris not only killed 16,000 people with another 3,000 missing, it also destroyed 400,000 buildings.1 The catastrophe deepened when damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant reached Chernobyl-like proportions. Consequently, the tsunami and radiation leakage forced the internal displacement of 390,000 people.2

In response, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) took up disaster relief operations with U.S. military forces providing assistance to the JSDF. Because this was the largest relief operation ever conducted by both Japan and the United States, this article examines key features and lessons learned as a contribution to the literature on security in Asia-Pacific area.

Features of Disaster Relief Operations

JSDF response

The Disaster Relief Act in Japan vests primary responsibility for disaster aid on local government leaders, but they have the authority to request JSDF support whenever damage is beyond their capabilities. The Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD) produces the Disaster Prevention Plan, which addresses JSDF activities for disaster response. Accordingly, JSDF readiness is maintained by a certain percentage of personnel, fleets, and rescue aircraft for an immediate disaster response. For example, when an earthquake above magnitude 6.0 occurs, all service personnel must report immediately to their designated areas.

The plan provides the authority for JMOD and JSDF designated commanders to increase unit readiness in preparation for imminent disasters. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, designated commanders have the authority to mobilize aircraft and units without prior notification by local authority if the exigencies preclude waiting.3 This new authority is a result of an amendment to the plan in 1995 after the great earthquake in western Japan revealed flaws in civil-military procedures which impeded immediate response. The amendment facilitated JSDF’s effective response to the March 2011 natural disasters. JMOD established a disaster headquarters at 2:50 pm, and JSDF aircraft were launched to collect information within twenty minutes of the earthquake.4 By the end of 11 March 2011, 8,400 personnel were committed to the relief operation.5

Incidentally, the JSDF conducts an average of 700 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations per year. However, the immensity and complexity of the March
2011 disaster placed enormous strain on HA/DR capabilities. Search and rescue operations continued for months for victims trapped in mud and rubble, submerged underwater, isolated in undiscovered buildings, and in radioactive-contaminated areas. Tens of thousands of survivors were scattered in shelters across provinces, suffering from serious shortages of food, water, medicine, and fuel due to the devastation of airports, seaports, roads, and railways. The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that some of the local HA/DR authorities were themselves victims. Frequent Magnitude 5 aftershocks, the tsunami, and radiation warnings severely hampered efforts. Thus, not only were efforts to locate survivors and bodies an urgent concern, but also providing sustenance to people, utilizing transportation lines, and implementing countermeasures for the crippled nuclear plant were becoming increasingly problematic.

To cope with the bitter aftermath, JSDF set three precedents in its history: organizing a Joint Task Force (JTF) for HA/DR, calling up reserves for the contingency, and dispatching a military unit to the nuclear emergency site.

The Disaster Dispatch Order created a JTF on 14 March from the Regional Army of the affected area. It comprised 107,000 personnel, 540 aircraft, and 60 ships at its peak, accounting for half of JSDF total strength and the largest mobilization of the JSDF ever. Assigned to assist the authorities and areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami, the JTF rescued 19,000 people (70 percent of everyone rescued), recovered 9,500 bodies (60 percent of the whole), transported 11,500 tons of supplies, and delivered 4,480,000 meals. In the course of this assistance, the JTF organized the nationwide transport system, resulting in the smooth delivery of aid through bases and aircraft as well as complementing the aid efforts already in place. Of note, 2,500 reserves augmented these activities, volunteering on their own and accomplishing a myriad of tasks, such as interpretation, medical work, and garrison duties like food service, bath, and guard.

The Central Readiness Force (CRF) started its operation near the nuclear plant simultaneously under the Nuclear Emergency Dispatch Order, while the Prime Minister was extremely concerned about the possible spread of radiation to the metropolitan areas, affecting 30,000,000. It was reinforced by ground chemical units and a combined Police and Fire Disaster Management Agency contingent to confront the most serious nuclear hazard in Japan since World War II. Though JSDF’s Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) capabilities, normally focused on enemy’s NBC weapons, the CRF stepped up to the challenge, assisting in the containment of the nuclear accident. Even though the CRF never numbered more than 500 personnel, it assisted in the cooling of the nuclear power plant with water delivered by air and ground, decontamination efforts, monitoring radiation levels, and emergency evacuation.

To accomplish such a large and complex operation, the JSDF conducted civil-military coordination and cooperation, working through complicated channels of communication ranging from the interagency to the local levels. Hence, the JTF interacted with governors, mayors and police forces throughout its vast area of responsibility (AOR). Similarly, the CRF engaged with the federal government and other national agencies including TEPCO, the owner of the nuclear plant. Because of the potential confusion arising from these multiple channels of communication, especially in the Fukushima province, which had suffered the most damage, the JSDF sent liaison officers to the civilian authorities and deployed units.

**JSDF—U.S. Forces Cooperation**

For the United States, the March 2011 mega-disaster was the most cataclysmic event in its 50-year relationship with Japan and was strategically pivotal. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) dispatched a quick reaction force under Operation TOMODACHI (Friend) to support the JSDF, which Vice Admiral Scott Van Buskirk described as “without a doubt the most complex humanitarian mission ever conducted.” The USPACOM deployment ceiling was 24,500 personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 vessels, and National Guard units in the continental United States supported them.

In the course of assisting the JSDF, the U.S. Forces provided the JSDF with unique capabilities. U.S. mobilization and mechanical forces immediately cleared debris and restored critical infrastructures to serve as logistics hubs; under the U.S. “seabasing” concept, navy vessels served as floating forward service bases for JSDF helicopters, and amphibious ships disembarked JSDF troops on the affected shore areas. The United States took particular care to respect the sovereignty of Japan, and as the Japanese media observed, “the US aid efforts are conducted under the direction of Japanese Government or military authorities.” Reciprocally, JSDF supported U.S. Forces with fuel and equipment, which not only exemplified interoperability and synergism, but also facilitated and accelerated the entire disaster relief effort.

Cooperation between the JSDF and U.S. Forces rests on several diplomatic arrangements, such as Bilateral Security Treaty (1960), Agreement of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Forces in Japan (1960), Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (1997), and
First is the need for a closer relationship with local authorities. Significant shortfalls existed in regards to search and rescue, life-saving, and evacuation because of the huge number of victims and JSDF unanticipated requirements such as mortuary affairs. Reinforcements deployed from other regions had to collaborate with communities rapidly in around-the-clock missions. Clearly, procedures were needed to facilitate cooperation and coordination.

Second is the need for the integration of joint forces. The JSDF joint forces were first established in 2006. Consequently, coordination among all headquarters, especially on command and control as well as air tasking orders, was problematic. On the other hand, despite deploying half of the JSDF to cope with the mega-disaster, the remaining joint forces still maintained their normal defense missions (warning and surveillance, etc).

Third is the need to enhance the Japan-U.S. partnership. Operation TOMODACHI highlighted requirements for identifying counterpart offices or staff between U.S. and JSDF Headquarters and improving interoperability in the arena of communications. Not only military-to-military level coordination but also the mechanism for U.S. Forces and Japanese whole-of-government should be consolidated.

Fourth is the need to enhance mental and physical care for soldiers. Long and tough operations in addition to confronting the devastation of their homeland and the condition of corpses placed great stress on soldiers. Moreover, frustration and anxiety mounted for soldiers who lost family members or for soldiers who could not participate in the operation. The JSDF assiduously attended to mental healthcare, but it wasn’t enough because of deficient training for unit commanders and shortages in psychological counselors.

Fifth is the need to improve equipment. In particular, new equipment, such as robots, UAVs, etc., is needed for response to nuclear accidents. Greater investment in research and development of new MEDEVAC equipment is indispensable to replace the current expensive but deficient equipment. Additionally, the existing facilities in military bases need to be strengthened to withstand the effects of natural disasters so the bases can continue to function during a crisis. For example, the existing bases were expected to work as logistic hubs, assembly areas for units, and evacuation centers for civilians, but this plan failed due to damage to the infrastructure and deficient life support capabilities. Some main camps in affected area had difficulties in feeding a number of units deploying into the area because of JSDF downsizing), which were unable to travel to the camps during the disaster. Military should maintain self-support abilities.

In conclusion, despite the enormity of the mega-disaster, the Japanese people displayed tremendous discipline and order. Even so, JSDF gave careful consideration to ease people’s sorrow and bolster them to facilitate the operation toward recovery. Soldiers paid proper respect to the dead. At the elementary school where 70 percent of the pupils were killed by the tsunami but with few bodies found, soldiers recovered their belongings for their heartbroken parents. Soldiers did not eat their rations in front of disaster victims so as not to appear callous, but saved their meals for later when they were alone. With the Mindset and Through the Eyes of People is the traditional motto for JSDF when conducting HA/DR both in Japan and overseas.


“Afghanistan’s security cannot only be measured by the absence of war. It has to be measured by whether people have jobs and economic opportunity, whether they believe their government is serving their needs, whether political reconciliation proceeds and succeeds.”

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
Tokyo Donors’ Conference: July 8, 2012

Broad “Security” Construct, Rising Public Expectations, and the Role of the State

The lead article in this journal, written by Dr. Harry R. Yarger long before Secretary Clinton’s statement above, perceptively asserts that in an age of increasing globalization a population’s expectations of the state extend beyond the traditional defense-centric view of “security” to include “...the social freedoms of economic opportunity, employment, education, health care, intellectual freedom, and social mobility.”

Populations increasingly hold their government leaders accountable for providing, or at least enabling, the conditions that support this broader security construct, especially the economic component. Well governed states can simultaneously achieve the strategic imperatives of security sector reform and economic security, especially if their leaders understand the context in which these interdependent imperatives operate. Understanding this context can be enhanced by conceptualizing it as a “competition” between the government and those seeking to undermine and/or replace it----including a competition for economic resources/factors of production (land, labor, and capital), legitimacy, and the people’s loyalty.

Government leaders should periodically re-assess public perceptions of the appropriate role of their state, recognizing that achieving a broader security construct requires not an exclusively governmental approach, but a community network approach that integrates the efforts of government, security and police forces, businesses, and civil society, including education and training institutions, service organizations, and religious leaders. The wickedly complex problems of the 21st Century, operating in the context of a globalized economy, cannot be solved by governments alone---they require effective integration of efforts across community networks.

Security Sector Reform and Economic Security are interdependent; therefore, they can and should be approached simultaneously, not sequentially. Increased physical security supports enhanced economic activity, including the security of markets, agricultural fields, and critical economic infrastructure (transportation, energy, water, and telecommunications). Meanwhile, economic security provides the state the revenues needed to fund the security sector, while offering military aged males productive work other than planting improvised explosive devices.

“Economic Security”---Defined, Measured, and Interdependent with Security Sector Reform

Before designing effective strategies for achieving a broader security construct, governmental leaders need to fully understand their operating environment and how their population defines “economic security.” It is also important to distinguish between economic security from the perspective of the individual and the state----as well as the linkage between the two. Not surprisingly, self interested individuals focus primarily on their own economic well-being while state leaders focus on the continued economic viability of the state, including the ability to fund security and police forces. First and foremost, both individuals and states seek to ensure that their income/revenue covers their living/essential services expenses. Individuals do so by securing and maintaining a job or financial assets that provide a reliable stream of sufficient income; governments do so by securing and maintaining an adequate source of public revenue through taxes, fees, state-owned enterprises, and other policy tools.

Quantifiable economic metrics provide useful insights into the perceived degree of economic security of both individuals and states. Such metrics include trend data for per capita income, unemployment, inflation and purchasing power, consumption, consumer confidence, savings and investment rates (foreign and domestic), new business startups, gross domestic product, and trade balance, as well as government spending, revenues, and debt. However, the effective functioning of an economic system and the individual’s sense of economic security within that system are not solely a function of these quantifiable factors---psychological factors/perceptions and individual preferences also play a significant role.
Psychological factors/perceptions and individual preferences significantly influence personal economic decisions such as choice of job and length of time spent in that job, level of educational achievement, level and type of consumption, savings rate, and lifestyle. Additionally, when aggregated across the markets for goods, services, and labor these individual microeconomic decisions drive the macroeconomic trends that determine the economic well-being and physical security of the state. For example, if individual consumers and shopkeepers become increasingly concerned about the security of bazaars and roadways, or they become pessimistic about the sustainability of the earning potential of their livelihood, then these individuals will likely reduce their consumption, production, and overall economic activity. These negative microeconomic trends quickly become negative macroeconomic trends across the economy, manifesting themselves as decreased gross domestic product and increased unemployment---which reduce the state revenues needed to pay security providers and prompt political instability due to the increased number of unemployed military aged males.

In addition to the metrics and psychological factors described above, individuals seeking personal economic security also look for some sense of confidence in the long-term sustainability of their country’s economic system. Accordingly, they assess the conditions needed for a “sustainable economy” and how well the state is enabling the economic capacity building systems that support achievement of those conditions. Two models help frame these two interdependent concepts: 1) Conditions needed for a sustainable economy, and 2) Supporting economic capacity building systems.

Elements of the first model are taken from The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, co-written by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. It asserts that the conditions needed to achieve a sustainable economy are:

1. **Macroeconomic Stabilization**: Pursue monetary and fiscal policies that maintain price and currency exchange rate stabil...
ity and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. Ensure the existence of an effective legislative and regulatory framework to govern property rights, commerce, fiscal operations, and foreign direct investment.

2. **Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace**: Prevent illicit wealth from determining who governs; prevent predatory actors from looting state resources; reintegrate ex-combatants and provide them jobs and/or benefits; and manage natural resource wealth accountably.

3. **Market Economy Sustainability**: Enable the market-based economy to thrive. Build or rehabilitate infrastructure; strengthen the private sector and the supporting human capital and financial sectors.

4. **Employment Generation**: Create job opportunities to yield quick impact and demonstrate progress employing military-age youths. Establish a foundation for sustainable livelihoods, including rehabilitation of the agricultural sector.

The second model, shown below, considers how interdependent economic capacity building systems can support achievement of the necessary conditions described in the model above. These four necessary conditions appear as ovals around the perimeter of the diagram below. By helping achieve these necessary conditions, the model also suggests that interdependent economic capacity building systems can support the foci of security sector reform posited in Dr. Yarger’s lead article: sustainability, capacity-building, and resilience. The key to success is for host nation people to become capable of managing these capacity building systems and to engage their entire community network to make their efforts effective, sustainable, and resilient.

As highlighted by its central position in the diagram on the previous page, the host nation’s Human Capacity Building system is crucial for achieving a sustainable economy and has a direct impact on all other supporting capacity building systems. Host nation people must ultimately take responsibility for managing all the economic capacity building systems if they are to achieve sustained economic security; therefore, these people must be educated, trained and healthy enough to meet the challenges

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**COMMUNITY NETWORK MODEL FOR BUILDING HUMAN CAPACITY**

- **Civil Society**
- **People (Human Capacity)**
  - Illiteracy / Uneducated
  - Unskilled workers
  - Health/Welfare issues
  - Insurgents undermine capacity building
- **Business**
- **Education & Training**
- **Government**
unique to their situation. As shown above, these challenges may include illiteracy, unskilled workers, and poor healthcare. Overcoming these challenges requires a community network approach — government can and should not attempt to do it all by itself.

As suggested in the diagram below, all the components of this community network have an important role to play in addressing the significant challenges to human capacity building:

1. **Government**: Government at all levels — from village to national — may assist with the funding of schools and training institutions, including those at the secondary level which educate and train teachers, doctors, and nurses. Additionally, governments can contribute by providing, or helping to provide, the infrastructure and essential services needed to support education, training, and healthcare facilities. Meanwhile, security and police forces may provide physical security to the schools/training/healthcare sites and transportation routes. Additionally, ex-combatants can be much more effectively reintegrated into society, including finding productive and licit work, if they too benefit from education/training/healthcare opportunities.

2. **Civil Society**: In addition to providing a healthy environment and encouragement in the family home, civil society actors may provide a wide range of volunteer and contributor services, including providing books and school supplies. Additionally, as Dr. Yarger asserts in his article in this journal, civil society also plays a critical over watch role, critiquing and providing feedback to policymakers as well as keeping the public informed.

3. **Business**: Businesses can help identify the skills most needed by their future employees and can actively participate in vocational training programs. In addition to the potential future jobs they can offer, businesses may help provide books and school supplies. Businesses, a part of civil society, are shown as a separate sector due to their critical role in achieving economic security.

4. **Education and Training Institutions**: Teachers and administrators in the schools/training facilities themselves are the primary contributors to the effectiveness of the educational experience for students. In addition to obtaining material assistance from government, civil society, and business, the teachers and administrators receive valuable feedback from these actors as well. Education and Training Institutions, which can be viewed as part of civil society, are also shown as a separate sector due to their critical role in achieving economic security.

The most effective governmental actors will be those that, realizing the valuable potential contributions of all the components of community networks, adopt the role of facilitator. The governmental actor who genuinely pursues the role of facilitator will be the one best able to inspire action, new ideas, and mutual trust while coordinating efforts within these capacity building system community networks — which are essentially networks of networks. Governmental actors, who previously conceived of their role more narrowly and directive in nature, may require a significant mindset change to adopt this facilitator role. This mindset change requires governmental actors to move beyond merely having a sense of obligation to assume a genuine sense of shared responsibility and appreciation for the power of collaborative action in a community network.

This community network model also applies to all the other capacity building systems described earlier. For example, all the community actors also have a role to play in providing and securing a viable Money, Banking, and Finance capacity building system. This system is essential for providing the stable currency and banking services needed for trade and the access to capital needed for those seeking to start or grow a business. Another example is community network involvement to enable a strong Rule of Law Capacity Building System that protects property rights, provides an orderly process for dispute resolution and contract enforcement, and undermines illicit economies and corruption. All members of the community network can directly assist this critical effort, especially military and police forces.

This short article merely scratches the surface of this important topic. Nevertheless, it is clear that in an age of increasing globalization and rising popular expectations of the state in the “security” arena, successful leaders must build economic capacity building systems using a community network approach that is effective, sustainable, resilient, and supports evolving security sector reform.


By late 2010, the police development team within NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan was looking to move beyond the boots-on-the-ground focus that had dominated development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) during the previous eight years. Major General Stu Beare, an experienced Canadian officer who was heading up the effort to build the ANP and the Ministry of Interior, had learned from his experience in Bosnia and elsewhere that if the NTM-A effort was to be sustainable, its focus needed to turn from train and equip, to professionalization; further development had to be embedded within a larger framework of comprehensive security sector reform. The idea briefed well but required a shift in thinking at every echelon throughout the advisory mission, so in order to change the paradigm, the police team’s mantra was that we were: “building a ministry; building an operating force; and building a culture.”

But what did “building a culture” really mean in concrete, measurable, executable terms? With the exception of its handful of civilian police officers, including the Carabinieri and Gendarmerie, almost no one on the NTM-A staff had any civilian law enforcement experience. Even fewer had participated in institutional development within a civilian governance sector, and no one inside the organization could answer (from an Afghan perspective) the fundamental question of what the Afghans wanted their police to do. Thus, in an effort to understand what we ourselves were trying to achieve, we began to talk about something that in Afghan terminology, was best expressed as the “soul” of the police.

Engaging on such a squishy topic was not something that most of the military advisors were very comfortable with, but surprisingly, this softer focus created a dialogue that the Afghans enthusiastically embraced, and it enabled the Police Team to understand some of the second and third order effects of the extant development strategy. It was also through this process of discovery that NTM-A began to recognize the emergence of true ANP leadership and the possibility that despite all of the naysayers, there may be an emerging generation of police officers that can take the ANP into the future.

The story that follows is true. We, the authors, worked closely with both Hamid and Major General Zamary. We traveled with them in their soft-skinned vehicles through areas that were not under their control; we sat with them as they conducted their own engagements with the citizens they are trying to serve; and we talked often about their vision of the future of Afghanistan and their place in that future. Finally, we asked if we could tell their story. They not only agreed, but they vetted our drafts and helped us to focus not what we thought was important, but on what they wanted us to share. Our hope is that this story will cause readers who are engaging in SSR activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere to step back occasionally and think about the following: What really matters when building a civilian security institution? What do the people who are served by it truly want? Are we training to what matters to them, or are we training to a standard model that conforms to our own experience? How do we react when those we bring into the institution make mistakes? Is there a way to salvage the good, without compromising the institutional culture we are trying to foster? Finally, are we measuring the right things—are we incentivizing the qualities that count the most toward creating an appropriate institutional culture—both for our host nation counterparts, and ourselves?

The Afghans say that in their country, everyone has a story, and this is the story about a young Pashtun police lieutenant named Hamid. His story, like thousands of others like his
throughout Afghanistan, is one of family, friendship, dedication, sacrifice, and the ongoing challenge of operating in spaces where the risks and rewards are not always clear. But this is more than Hamid’s story alone. It is also a story of leadership and policing development in an immensely challenging environment. For NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan understanding Hamid, and the experience of others like him, is critical to finding the soul of the Afghan National Police.

A 2008 article in Time magazine summarized the state of policing in Afghanistan: “A long history of corruption has reduced the image of Afghanistan’s police to little more than uniformed thieves, which in turn fosters a general distrust in government and a powerful propaganda tool for militants.” To address the problem, NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan was established in late 2009 with the mission, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international organizations, donors and NGOs, to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the Afghan National Security Force, developing leaders, and establishing enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable Afghan-led security. The task, however, was easier said than done as NTM-A was confronted with the reality of reforming a largely illiterate force that was riddled with drug use, corruption and a glaring lack of Afghan leadership.

To compound the difficulty, fewer than half of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) was thought to be trained, although at the time, NTM-A had no way of knowing the exact numbers. More than 60,000 Afghans had entered the force since 2003, but there were no personnel records, no training records, and no way to determine whether those who had received training were even still in service. What NTM-A knew for sure, however, was that if Afghanistan was to have a peaceful future, the shortcomings in the ANP had to be addressed, and “boots on the ground” alone could neither win the war nor hold the peace. The police, as the everyday face of government authority and the rule of law, must somehow become both credible and professional.

This ANP story is not just about moving beyond the numbers—rather, it is about a security force in search of a culture and an ethos. This story parallels the more visible and measurable efforts to recruit, train, and assign security forces where they need to serve. It overlaps with the qualities that define professionalism, but adds an intangible dimension that some would call “identity” and others, “values.” By any definition, it involves elements that are more easily sensed than measured, and will be observed by the public before they will be recognized by any outside coalition. Ultimately, this intangible element demands that NTM-A, and its Afghan and international partners adopt a creative, and comprehensive development approach because in the end, how the discovery and strengthening of the soul of policing in Afghanistan plays out could determine the success of the Afghan National Police.

Hamid is from Kandahar, the province that has been called the birthplace and the spiritual home of the Taliban. In Kandahar, the economy is built on trade and agriculture, and the poor are largely under the power of the religious leaders who also control much of the wealth. Typical of many Kandaharis, Hamid’s family owned a substantial amount of land, cultivated with orchards and vineyards, and even during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s they enjoyed a comfortable life. All of that changed in the early 1990’s when Hamid was ten years old. In order to escape the turmoil and oppression under Taliban leadership, the family was forced to flee to Pakistan where they remained for six years, during which the US-led coalition entered Afghanistan and President Hamid Karzai, himself a Pashtun, was elected to power. At that point, Hamid’s family decided it was safe to return.

Despite the improvements in security, not all was well. The government was widely distrusted and the local elders continued to hold sway. Villagers were threatened if they showed any support for the new democratic regime, and many of the Taliban-era prohibitions remained. Hamid’s father and uncle were approached specifically by the elders about their sons. “Enroll them in the Madrasas,” they ordered, “or things will go badly for you.” For the sake of their sons’ futures, Hamid’s father and uncle refused, but as the consequence of their disobedience, Hamid’s uncle and two of his cousins were killed. His father and the rest of the family fled to Kabul which secured their safety, but in doing so, they were forced once again to leave their land behind.

In Kabul, Hamid continued his education and in particular, he worked to improve his English. He believed that being able to speak English would be important for his future, but in 2006, there were few opportunities for a young man to put his education to work. He dreamed of becoming an airline pilot, but there were no openings and he didn’t have the right family connections to be considered a serious candidate. As an alternative, and because he wanted to help his people, at the age of 20 Hamid decided to join the ANP.

For the ANP, recruiting qualified, literate, and trustworthy trainees has been an enormous challenge. Afghans under the age of 30 have never experienced anything other than conflict, oppression, and endless cycles of violence and retaliation.
Because of this the people are distrustful of their leaders, and are tired of promises made and promises broken. There is a generation of young Afghans who have the energy and will to make a difference, but these young people don't always see that the opportunities can outweigh the risks of aligning themselves with a government that still has a tenuous hold on its power. In 2008, for example, only 12 percent of young Afghans expressed any desire to join the ANP. By early 2010, that percentage had increased to more than 30 percent, but the actual number of Afghans enlisting was still too low. In the drive to recruit young talent for the ANP, the government has struggled to reach this young generation and it wasn’t until November 2010 that ANP recruiting goals were finally met. To achieve this goal required an intensive, NTM-A supported effort to help the Afghans professionalize recruiting capacity, improve infrastructure and management at collection points, and reform the entire personnel accountability system.3

In a nation with an illiteracy rate exceeding 80 percent, Hamid was a standout recruit. His education qualified him to become a non-commissioned officer, and he attended the six-month NCO Course at the Kabul National Police Academy. Following his “very strong,” as he likes to describe it, police education, which included two and a half months of training back in his home province of Kandahar, he was assigned to a District in Kabul as a Police Sergeant in the AUP.

Initially, Hamid was happy with the job. He took great satisfaction in interacting with people, and he felt that helping them was the best part of his position. He was also fortunate in that he was assigned to work alongside Elias, an Academy classmate who had become his closest friend. While many of their colleagues didn’t care how effective they were, or were only working as police for the opportunities to make money through graft and corruption, Hamid and Elias shared the desire to serve. Patrolling within their district, they made an effective team.

At the end of 2007, Hamid and Elias were on duty securing the Kabul bazaar. The New Year’s festivities were approaching, so tensions were high and the young policemen were especially alert. As they patrolled, a man approached them wearing an Afghan National Army Uniform. Elias thought he looked suspicious, but because it’s tough for a cop to question a soldier in Afghanistan, neither he nor Hamid wanted to challenge him. Eventually however, they overcame their nerves and asked for his identification. The soldier, telling them only that his name was Abdullah, refused. As soon as he spoke, however, Hamid knew he was not a native Afghan. They pressed the man again for his military ID and as they did so, Abdullah threw open his jacket, revealing the wiring for a suicide vest. Elias shouted warnings to the surrounding pedestrians and shop owners, and Hamid struggled with Abdullah. Abdullah managed to break free but before he could either detonate the vest or escape, Hamid fired his weapon, seriously wounding him in the chest. Agents of the National Directorate for Security arrived, arrested the wounded Abdullah, and took him away.

Elias and Hamid were heroes. They were honored by the Minister of Interior himself, who awarded them 50,000 Afghans each and commissioned them as 2nd Lieutenants.4 The press was brought in to tell their story, and while Elias agreed to be interviewed, Hamid, still haunted by memories of his relatives’ murder in Kandahar, did not. Elias was found dead a week later. He had been shot multiple times in the head by the Taliban.

After the incident with Abdullah, Hamid was reassigned. Still in Kabul, he was put in charge of two checkpoints in a commercially active district and quickly discovered that money was the language of law enforcement and bribery was the order of the day. Truck drivers, shop-keepers, and criminal gangs would pay him to either protect them in some cases or look the other way in others. Hamid would take his cut and pass the rest up his chain of command. When Hamid’s father found out, however, he told his son that he was ashamed of him and gave him a choice. Either he stopped taking bribes, or he would have to leave the family home. Instead of being disappointed, Hamid was relieved. Bribery is contrary to Muslim beliefs and violated his sense of what public service was all about, so his father’s disapproval provided him with the exit he sought. Unfortunately, the policing culture and his AUP chain of command did not support his decision to stop. As a result, after two years in the
ANP, Hamid walked away from the force and left Afghanistan to live and work with relatives in Dubai.

Corruption is an enduring problem in policing development, and the ANP is no exception. In 2011, the Minister of Interior (MoI) made countering corruption one of his top priorities and in support, NTM-A pursued a proactive, multi-pronged, development approach to inoculate the system through internal and external controls embedded in both ministerial and operational functions. The plan would also strengthen discipline and enforcement and inculcate a culture of accountability and public service. Reforms covered areas such as equipment accountability, procurement reform, pay and personnel management, drug screening, and the establishment of clear standards of professional performance. Civil society engagement was seen as crucial, and inculcating the values of integrity, honesty, and public service over personal interest begins with recruitment and continues throughout vetting, training, and assignment. Finally, NTM-A and other international partners, including those from the European Union Policing Mission worked intensively with the Afghans to institutionalize the roles of the legal office, anti-corruption investigations, and the Inspector General within the MoI, and to strengthen codes of conduct and other instruments that govern policing behavior.

A comprehensive strategy such as this one is difficult to implement, and doesn’t produce quick wins or immediate returns on investment. However, NTM-A believed that over the long haul it would increase the integrity of the ANP and the competence of its governing structures, and therefore committed itself to mainstreaming accountability as an integral part of the institutional culture. Whether this proactive, rather than reactive, strategy will work remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that ignoring the problems, or in the alternative, treating them as issues that could be addressed through high profile rewards and punishments alone, was not effective by any measure.

After spending eight months in Dubai and Turkey, working in shops and looking for opportunities, Hamid realized that his future remained in Afghanistan, so he returned. Nervously, he contacted the ANP to find out whether he could rejoin the force, hoping this time to be reassigned to a Criminal Investigative Unit. Much to his surprise, the ANP agreed that he could return with his officer rank, but only on the condition that he join the Afghan Civil Order Police.

Hamid wasn’t so sure about ANCOP. It was originally modeled on the highly-professional, paramilitary national police forces of the French Gendarmerie and the Italian Carabinieri, with the mission of maintaining and restoring public order in the face of high-end threats such as civil unrest or terrorist activities. As ANCOP has matured, however, it has become the most visible policing contribution to the counterinsurgency. ANCOP forces come in behind the military to hold territory as it is cleared of insurgents. The units are deployed for three months at a time, and suffer the highest casualty rates of any police in Afghanistan. Their training is also more rigorous. Standards for recruitment and performance are higher than for the rest of the ANP, and because ANCOP forces are not embedded within communities the way the AUP are, the opportunities for corruption, while still present, are less.

Initially, when Hamid was offered the chance to come back as an ANCOP officer, he thought of it as a punishment for his desertion. But friends told him that the discipline was better, and there was a strong esprit de corps. The uniforms were impressive, there was bonus pay, and ANCOP enjoyed greater public confidence than the other elements of the ANP. It seemed like a good option, so Hamid agreed.

To be an ANCOP officer is not an easy job. Under the command of Major General Zamary, a charismatic former Army commander, who carries a well-worn copy of the Afghan Constitution whenever he engages with his men, ANCOP has become a respected, capable security force that is contributing significantly to public order and stability in Afghanistan. For Zamary, policing is about the relationship between the police and the population, and leadership requires adherence to strict standards of performance and care of the men and women who serve. He believes his mission is to demonstrate the govern-
ment’s respect for its own people and works to instill this as part of the ANCOP ethic. He generously recognizes the accomplishments of both officers and NCOs, and works to instill strong Muslim values as part of the ANCOP culture. As a result, ANCOP enjoys a high degree of confidence from the Afghan people, who recognize that ANCOP is both capable and accountable. Zamary works hard to maintain the peoples trust, meeting constantly with governors, elders, and tribesmen. He tells them, “Give me your sons to be ANCOP. I will take care of them, and they will take care of you.” He tells his Commanders that they must talk to the people before they do anything else. “When someone is appearing in front of the public, he must know the requirements of the public,” he says. “He cannot be disconnected.”

In ANCOP, Hamid finally found the professionalism he craved. He met the ANCOP standards and is currently MG Zamary’s Aide-de-Camp, but at a personal cost. He endures an endless cycle of ANCOP deployments and the personal risk that being part of an elite police force in a country as volatile as Afghanistan carries with it, but his Father is again proud of his police officer son. Hamid is now married, and he worries about the Afghanistan that his children will know.

As for MG Zamary, he sees a real generational divide in Afghanistan between leaders who are “real” Afghans, and leaders who, in his mind, do not have a heart for the country. He laments that there are not more who want to serve, and adds that when he is asked to speak at official events, the Afghan officials do not want to hear the voice of the people. He sees in Hamid the future of Afghanistan. Indeed, it is that future that Hamid now sees in himself.

Conclusion

The story of the ANP is still being written and the challenges that existed when NTM-A recalibrated the policing development mission in 2009 are all still present. ANCOP is only one police pillar among six in the ANP. ANCOP has proven be an incredibly capable force. Having learned many lessons throughout 2011, ANCOP performed admirably during periods of serious civil unrest in early 2012. Arguably, with its higher recruitment standards and focused mission, ANCOP may have an easier time of it, but the fact remains that MG Zamary has been able to recognize and retain young talent like Hamid.

Literacy remains a huge impediment to professionalization across the ANP, corruption is a problem at every level, and questions remain about whether the ANP as a whole are truly capable of conducting policing operations to support the rule of law. However, Hamid’s experience, and the success of ANCOP of which he is now a part, is representative of what can be accomplished when individuals and units are given the opportunity to find their way toward an Afghan model of professionalism and an Afghan ethic of public service and accountability. And in the end, understanding Hamid may be the key to discovering the soul of policing in Afghanistan.

1  http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852296,00.html#ixzz1GhUNLtkM
3  Survey data taken from NTM-A Deep Dive Reports to COMISAF, May, August, and November 2010.
4  50,000 Afghans is equal to approximately $1150.00 US, or 765 Euros.
We're hot! SOLLIMS v2.0 incorporates our completely revised Graphical User Interface (GUI) with many functional enhancements. You will find navigation much easier and we have improved our data entry form – displayed in tabular format with progress bar and more informative markings on navigation buttons. We formally rolled-out the new GUI on 11 April 2012. Since then we have been working to clean up the minor glitches always related with a major system change – right now, although we are certain that there are no major problems, there still may be some that we haven’t caught. As you work within “SOLLIMS 2.0”, look for updated tutorial files to assist you in getting to know the new GUI and new capabilities – let us know what isn’t working.

We continue to post ‘events’ to our Facebook page – jump online and let us know what you think about the issues we are posting. The Strategic Lessons series is also a new focus area within SOLLIMS where you can get involved. Look under SOLLIMS DOCS for an example of the format – it’s pretty simple; put one together and send it via e-mail – we’ll review and either post or contact you to edit. Feedback from the user community is critical for making our lessons accurate and worthwhile; get your point across the whole of the Peace and Stability Operations community. We need to know what you know – contribute to the SOLLIMS database!
Volume 2, Issue 4

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