Beyond Access and Influence: Accountability in Military Humanitarian Operations

Non-traditional PME: Using Social Entrepreneurship to Educate our Professionals

Observations from a Novice
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This journal focuses on the recent Stability Training and Education (SOTEW) Workshop hosted by George Mason University’s (GMU) Peace Operations Policy Program from 7-9 February 2012 at its Arlington, Virginia Campus. Training and education are paramount to institutionalizing peace and stability operations in the military and civilian sectors across national and international communities. Through our collective experience, we have learned that stability/peace training and education is a team sport optimized by collaborative development and execution. In this spirit, the unified workshop brought together 281 participants from 120 separate organizations across the training and education community, bringing diverse approaches and best practices and ensuring a rich and lively exchange of ideas. Remarks on the first day from Congressman Geoff Davis (Kentucky), Mr. Frank DiGiovanni (OSD), and Lieutenant General George Flynn (JS J7) stimulated participants’ thoughts for the various workgroups. For this year’s workshop, PKSOI partnered with the Joint Staff J7, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Training Readiness and Strategy, the Department of State’s Political-Military Section, the Foreign Service Institute, the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the US Institute of Peace, the Combined Arms Center, Naval Postgraduate School, US Agency for International Development, National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, and the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation. We would like to extend our deepest thanks to these organizations for their help to plan and execute this year’s conference this year, but reserve a special note of thanks to GMU for its role as host.

The Journal’s first article provides an overview of the workshop. This year’s workshop not only included the usual focus to promote collaboration for producing training and education programs, but also combined with the Integration and Exercise Workshop (IEW) to coordinate exercise partnership opportunities between military and civilian efforts.

The second article addresses collaborative work tying the 2010 SOTEW conference to the thematic discussions of the 2012 workshop. A long time supporter of the SOTEW series, Mr. Frank DiGiovanni, Director, Training and Readiness Strategy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), challenged workshop participants with three themes as they participated in panels. He discussed how challenges from the 2010 SOTEW conference and recent initiatives such as the Integrated Education and Training Working Group (IETWG) could form the basis for an action framework out of the 2012 workshop.

Colonel Steven Gilland, Senior Service Fellow at the Naval Post-graduate School provides an article, Non-Traditional PME: Using Social Entrepreneurship to Educate our Professionals. COL Gilland notes that we expect our leaders to be adaptive and innovative, yet we educate them in a traditional model that is not effective in preparing leaders to operate in a learning environment. He proposes that PME think outside the normal paradigm and look toward civilian graduate schools and their range of diverse and relevant disciplines. He promotes social entrepreneurship which catalyzes social change, innovates, adapts, is flexible and agile, and solves complex problems – precisely characteristics we say we want in our military leaders.

PKSOI Intern Rebecca Ben-Amou, Dickinson College, offers her observations of the SOTEW. She participated in a workgroup and was surprised to be engaged and have the opportunity to be included in the conversation. Her participation and observations during the conference led her to conclude that civilian-military relations must become systematic “which requires a joint understanding through common education.” She provides several ways this may be accomplished.

Dr. Steven Waller implores DoD to implement measures of effectiveness in stability operations, particularly those involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He informs us about a new working group, Measures of Effectiveness Working Group (MOE WG) established by the Joint Staff and COM surgeons. This group will inform senior leaders and work with educators, trainers, and researchers to identify needs and explore standardization and measurements.

Lastly, we are pleased to announce that SOLLIMS 2.0 has been released! Navigation is much easier. Please see the updated tutorial files to help you as you navigate the new Graphical User Interface (GUI). We think you will be pleased with the changes.
The Joint Staff J7 teamed with the Peace Operations Policy Program at George Mason University (GMU), the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and other stakeholders to conduct a unified workshop at George Mason University, Arlington Campus, from 7-9 February 2012. The workshop provided a forum for trainers, educators, planners and practitioners from the U.S., international governmental and military organizations, international non-governmental organizations, military and civilian peace and stability training centers and academic institutions to share current challenges and best practices toward improving civilian and military teaming efforts, promoting synergy, and reducing ad hoc efforts that address interrelated challenges. 281 representatives from over 120 organizations across the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations and exercises training and education Community of Practice attended the workshop. The exchange between individuals representing many diverse organizational cultures ensured a rich and lively discussion.

GOALS AND THEME

The theme of the workshop was enhancing training, education, and exercises by thinking and working collectively and collaboratively to achieve unity of purpose through a comprehensive approach. The goal of the workshop was to facilitate dialogue on collaboration opportunities, increase understanding of attendees’ organizational needs, and expand networking opportunities across shared communities of interest.

CONFERENCE DESIGN AND FOCUS AREAS

The workshop was designed to promote collaborative discussion on opportunities and methodologies to produce focused training, exercise, and education programs and events that use a comprehensive approach to meet current and future complex challenges. This was the first combined Integration and Exercise Workshop (IEW) and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (SOTEW). The IEW provided the opportunity to coordinate exercise partnership opportunities to achieve organizational goals and improve the harmonization and alignment of civilian and military efforts. The SOTEW provided an opportunity for educators, trainers and practitioners to share and assist one another as they developed and refined curriculum and exercise scenario content to train and educate their personnel and students based on emerging trends in collective and collaborative thought and implementation toward common goals. The workshop stakeholders will publish a workshop findings report and a proposed plan for continued cooperation and research, as well as a compendium of collaboration opportunities and training and exercise needs to the workshop webpage at http://pksoi.army.mil/conferences/sotew/default.cfm.

Opening Comments. LtGen George Flynn, Director of Joint Force Development J7 on the Joint Staff (JS), provided opening remarks, highlighting JS J7 responsibility for maintaining “jointness” throughout DoD in order to facilitate partnering. A key lesson from the past 10 years of conflict is the interdependence of U.S. government (USG) agencies, civilian institutions and our military, and the critical role each agency plays in preventing and responding to conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The J7 was tasked to rewrite the Capstone Concept on Joint Operations (CCJO), which will better define partnerships to include USG departments, foreign and non-governmental agencies, and the civilian sector. The Capstone Concept will outline the interrelationship between each USG agency and highlight the necessity for specific cooperative partnerships between agencies. LtGen Flynn asked the working groups to address our challenges and develop a strategy to make progress on these topics between annual workshops, and make recommendations on the best approach to handling partnership in the new CCJO.
Keynote highlights. Congressman Geoff Davis, Republican serving Kentucky’s Fourth District, provided his observations on the future of national security with reference to stability and peacekeeping operations. “On Capital Hill, it is easy to treat the symptoms in an attempt to do something of value, all the while not treating the root cause. We are approaching a period of great change for society, Congress, and the Interagency, similar to the Army and Marines transformation after Vietnam. Politics will always affect national security, so the Interagency (IA) community must engage and build relationships with Congress and Capital Hill to keep them informed of operational challenges and needs in the field. If the IA builds strong ties, then Congress and Capital Hill will turn to the agencies to validate the effects impending legislation will have on the IA’s operational capabilities. Congress relies on the military to conduct tasks for which DoD is not the most qualified agency, simply because DoD has the operational planning and projection capability to provide the short term solution. DoD will have to transfer some operational capacity to other more capable IA agencies for long term development solutions. One of the keys to success will be to invest in people, and build personal relationships with younger colleagues, so they know who to talk to, and what to do on the ground. DoD and the non-uniformed IA need to understand the consequences and cost of policy, as those consequences are often not felt by the American population.”

CONFERENCE FINDINGS

Workgroup 1 addressed, “What do we consider relevant case studies in the field of peace and stability operations and how do we apply them in our education and training curricula?” Case studies are an important educational tool to build a common understanding of particular topics (the “learning outcomes”) among diverse actors with organizational biases or different perspectives, and develop key intellectual group-problem solving skills. Interagency case studies allow for exploration and experimentation of complex problems, and increase the understanding of interagency partner capabilities with reference to a specific problem set.

The workgroup concluded that a good IA case study is realistic, relevant, scalable, explorable, and offers a new perspective to a complex problem, which is not tied to a school solution. An IA case study should contribute to the understanding of partner’s strengths/capabilities/limitations, and is driven by the practitioner’s desire to determine their impact and role in the solution.

The greatest challenges to developing relevant IA case studies are: a lack of common learning objectives, classification/proprietary knowledge concerns, and too much focus on a single actor’s needs.

The workgroup recommended the following procedures to facilitate IA case study development. 1) Each IA partner must identify a champion to promote sharing of case studies. 2) A common case study portal needs to be established to share, collaborate and assess relevant case studies. 3) Common case studies should be used at each partner’s education/training institute, based off of common learning objectives. 4) PKSOI should leverage its position as IAPTC president to seek international collaboration to develop common standards and case studies.

Workgroup 2 discussed, “What would a future civilian and military partnering model look like, and what are the components of a successful partnering campaign? Partnering was defined as organizations or entities that agree to collaborate on shared interests for mutual benefit. Civilian Military (CivMil) partnering was further defined as the marshaling of resources, authorities, and expertise to solve problems, and then developing solutions toward achieving the OUTCOMES as defined by national strategic goals. Successful teaming components are developing relationships, and understanding/effectively leveraging capabilities, both of which are accomplished through embedded personnel.

The workgroup determined that experiential learning is a cost effective means to enhance CivMil partnering, while enabling IA partner cultural understanding. Legislation is likely necessary to encourage USG departmental incentive programs for IA assignment to overcome the perception that such assignments are less important for promotion and rewards, thus assisting in reconstituting current existing capabilities. Such a program would be enhanced by enacting a National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative that included the development of a community of practice and an education program track for Civ-Mil team competencies, similar to the UN OCHA IM-PACT program.

Teaming Lessons Learned must be captured, analyzed, inculcated into policy/doctrine/education/training, and used to develop Lessons Anticipated for Conflict Prevention, which will be a primary IA mission focus as Iraq and Afghanistan conclude.

An IA teaming Knowledge Management portal would increase contact and sharing opportunities between liaison officers, Combatant Commands (COCOM), Country Teams and multi-national agencies, while developing intellectual capital to empower legislative and policy development. The Department of Homeland Security national exercise program must be synchronized with Joint Staff and Combatant Command exercise programs.
Workgroup 3 considered, “How do we teach students to think and consider national objectives, and incorporate other agencies’ philosophies and mandates, to formulate common goals; and, What are the best instructional methodologies to facilitate these learning outcomes?” A good methodology for incorporation into instruction materials is to develop a process for “Lessons Anticipated” rather than “Lesson Learned”. By uncovering assumptions in past Lessons Learned, we can question those lessons to identify essential missing capabilities and systems requiring future development, as well as counters to the systems and counters to the counters. By considering new scenarios, conducting risk assessments and applying creative, critical thinking with consideration given to the political impact of the scenario, we have created an educational exercise which may have future anticipatory planning for fragile states and Conflict Prevention implications.

Some of the greatest challenges to IA education and training are a lack of leadership or proponency, as well as common core competencies, standards and requirements. The development of uniform IA education standards is very difficult due to organizational uniqueness and the multitude of diverse operational environments. Cultural attitudes toward education and training coupled with a lack of a supportive personnel policy program that backfills personnel in school and maintains their career competitiveness, has led many potential outstanding IA candidates to refuse training and education opportunities, as those specific skill sets are not highly desired by their department.

The IA needs a structured professional education program, based off of the military template to include a fully integrated mentorship and leadership development program. Legislation is required for a fully funded educational initiative with inherent incentive programs for participation based off of career progression. Several instructional methodologies with the greatest utility for thinking and planning collaboratively are case studies, simulations, practical application exercises, and staff rides, as the majority of the methodologies can be incorporated into distributed learning technologies reaching the largest audience at great distances. An innovative instructional methodology for potential use in IA training and education programs would be to use avatars and Artificial Intelligence scenarios which constantly change based on the groups’ decisions, and can be quickly rewound to validate new hypotheses. Another unique opportunity would be to conduct staff ride focused on the IA interaction during a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief event.

Workgroup 4 undertook the theme of, “What exercise partnership opportunities exist to achieve organizational goals and improve the harmonization and alignment of civilian and military efforts to promote peace and stability? The IA attendance at this forum was the largest to date. Through the empowerment of the IA civilian partner’s in the synchronization and alignment and shaping of exercises process, open and frank discussions resulted. This dynamic learning environment, enabled participants to gain a better working knowledge of IA partner capabilities, structures and limitations, which assisted in the identification of gaps and seams in the alignment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the planning cycle. Due to the limited number of potential IA participants in the exercise process, DoD must prioritize their requests.

An inherent challenge is for DoD to translate their exercise needs into civilian terminology, while also aligning exercise opportunities with IA training requirements. As part of the way ahead, quarterly meetings will be held to review and shape Pre-Exercise design collaboration and integration into the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS), culminating in a final face to face IEW annual meeting.

The IEW Way Ahead is to leverage efforts of various adhoc training related working groups to address findings, develop processes, and implement solutions to improve comprehensive approaches to training for complex operations.

Closing Considerations. Ten years of conflict has presented numerous opportunities to approach education training and exercising in a comprehensive approach. Although much progress has been made towards solutions the community of practice still has a ways to go. Perhaps we have gone as far as we can without a forcing function. Below are a few closing recommendations for getting the community closer to the end line. Legislation will be required to serve as that forcing function that will make the IA even more cooperative and collaborative. Legislation is essential to further the development of a IA professional development, leadership and education and training programs. Another recommendation is that conflict prevention and building partner capacity needs to be part of the IA lexicon and inculcated into education, training and exercise initiatives. Finally, the professional education group is excellent source pool for IA exercises, as many have interned or worked in multiple USG departments. Interagency education opportunities are abundant, but we must update curriculum and increase attendance. The challenges of linking internally among IA partners are universal to those faced when integrating with partners and allies.
One of the longtime supporters of the Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop SOTEW) series is Mr. Frank DiGiovanni, Director, Training Readiness and Strategy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness).

Mr. DiGiovanni opened the 2010 SOTEW where he encouraged conference attendees to consider several themes when being out briefed by the four conference panels. First, learning lessons requires institutional policy and procedural changes and such changes require a generation to occur. Secondly, civilian exercise participation often lacks direct engagement with civilian counterparts which means that their capabilities, limitation, and operational mandates are not understood. To rectify this, engagement with civilian counterparts during exercises and simulations is crucial for operational planning purposes and cannot be replaced by expertise or analysis. Lastly, military personnel and civilians need to communicate more effectively and this can be enhanced by a common lexicon. Lack of civilian engagement may be due to inadequate civilian-military communication.

After reviewing the findings from the 2010 SOTEC, Mr. DiGiovanni, as a co-chair of the USG Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Sub-IPC on Training, Education, Exercises and Experiments (TE3), challenged the conference attendees to address the three following concerns, and consider these challenges as potential themes for the 2011 conference. The 2011 conference was changed into a workshop and occurred in February 2012 due to other operational challenges. The TE3 is in the process of completing a Functional Essential Task list, which is a step toward defining Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PSO) practitioners’ skills. A missing element is defining the characteristics and essential skills sets for PSO leaders. The initial TE3 challenge is to identify and stratify 10 or less fundamental skills for successful CivMil teaming. Following along this same theme, the second TE3 challenge was to develop a list of 10 or less PSO essential learning objectives, which would drive scenario and vignette development.

The final TE3 challenge was based on the findings from the fourth SOTEC panel recommending that the PSO T&E community develop an implementation strategy for collecting, validating and disseminating lessons learned, ultimately for inculcation into PSO curriculum.

Workshop Interim Activities

Two major efforts were undertaken during the intervening year between workshops. The first initiative was not directly related to findings from the 2010 SOTEW workshop, but the concept for the workgroup touched upon many of the challenges presented at the 2010 SOTEW. Throughout the fall representatives of fifteen institutions involved in conflict and humanitarian assistance and disaster response conducted a strategic review of education and training in order to improve institutional cooperation, and better prepare practitioners for work in these challenging environments. The Integrated Education and Training Working Group (IETWG) focused on three areas: humanitarian assistance and disaster response, conflict response, and conflict prevention. From these meetings a set of
recommendations emerged for promoting a comprehensive and cohesive education and training (E&T) approach that leverages existing E&T programs and supports international engagement in fragile, failing and conflict states.

**Key recommendations** from the IETWG were to:

- Define a *foundational curriculum* to prepare USG staff elements to work competently across response environments and in different types of crises, and to develop institutional capacity for engaging in integrated, strategic responses,

- Support *annual cross-community colloquia* to routinely share information about education and training programs, and focus the community on critical training needs,

- Create an *exercise support group* to shape military exercises, and develop civilian exercises on issues critical where the military plays a supporting role,

- Create a *lessons and mapping group* to document what lessons exist from recent missions to inform education and training, and develop a database of existing education and training across the community and the mapping of institutional roles and responsibilities to serve as the foundation for integrated education and training curricula.

A second major effort between workshops stemmed from Mr. DiGiovanni’s request to identify and stratify 10 or less fundamental skills for successful CivMil teaming. PKSOI in partnership with the Army Research Institute contracted a study on CivMil teaming, which was completed and published in February 2012. The nature and complexity of today’s military operations are such that no single organization, department or agency has all the requisite resources, authority or expertise to single-handedly provide an effective response. A successful CivMil teaming model has three high order meta competencies: adapts across organizations and cultures, builds partnering relationships, and collaborate to solve problems. The team identified 12 competencies that fell under the meta competencies: understands the cultural context of situations, cultural agility, understand multiple perspectives, understand capabilities of partners and systems, establish effective partnerships & teams, develops positive relationships, builds common ground & shared purpose, manages conflict, manages communication flow, uses integrative methods for planning and problem-solving, synchronizes tactical actions/operational objectives/strategic goals, applies available resources & expertise. A preliminary review of existing training suggests that a number of these competencies are not currently covered in the professional military education.

Mr. DiGiovanni’s challenges from the 2010 SOTEW conference, and the findings from the IETWG and ARI competencies research study, formed a basis for furthering the initiatives from the past conference to the thematic development of the 2012 workshop.
Non-traditional PME: Using Social Entrepreneurship to Educate our Professionals

by Colonel Steven Gilland

“Our profession demands leaders with greater imagination and increased awareness of the “weak signals” of impending change. We see it as our responsibility to think differently about institutional adaptation—shifting from a reactive to a proactive stance to recognize and influence change before “strong signals” force us to adapt on others’ terms.” -- General Martin E. Dempsey

The complex environment of today and tomorrow is one that is populated by many actors and motivations. Many times, we are not even sure what the problem is that we have been tasked to solve. Our service members are thrust into positions of responsibility in these environments with the intent of “Figure it out.” We expect them to employ “innovation, adaptation, flexibility, agility, and complex problem solving skills” in the JIIM (joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental, and multinational) environment, yet we do not provide training and educational opportunities to develop these skills. The recently published 38th Chief of Staff of the Army Marching Orders describes the characteristics of the future force in which two of the characteristics are adaptive and innovative leaders.

Senior Army leaders recognize that the 21st century’s security environment is one that will require adaptive and innovative leaders and that developing such leaders is essential. Such senior leaders also recognize the traditional training and education model will not be effective in preparing leaders to operate in a learning environment. As the number of deployed forces decreases in the next few years, leaders must be prepared to lead in complex environments. This will require educating our personnel with more than the usual staff and war colleges focused on security studies alone, but also through civilian graduate schools and their range of diverse and relevant disciplines.

Future problem solving requires a continued shift in our approach to defining the challenges we face, and in identifying enduring solutions. As a result of the counter-insurgency focused effort over the last few years, we have increased the emphasis of our leader development programs to focus on a variety of cultural and value systems, in order to develop leaders who can view problems through multiple perspectives. This also requires officers to be life-long learners and “intellectually engaged” throughout their careers.

Integrating other methods into our leader development programs to solve problems that are rapidly spreading throughout the world produces a better leader with multiple perspectives and foundational experience to be used when encountering the many complex challenges of our future environments. One approach to shifting our cultural norm of thinking, traditional in nature, is through the programs offered by various organizations that promote social entrepreneurship.

Some of the leading organizations for sponsoring social entrepreneurship are Ashoka, Echoing Green, TED.com, and the Schwab and Skoll foundations.

Who are Social Entrepreneurs?

Social entrepreneurs are individuals who create innovative solutions for distinct social problems. They solve problems through system change, spreading the solution, and persuading society to take new leaps. Their ideas should be user-friendly, understandable, and garner support that motivates the citizen sector to seize upon the idea and implement it. They possess similar traits that the military desires from its personnel. The previously mentioned organizations sponsor people who are “uniquely suited to make headway on problems that have resisted considerable money and intelligence. Where traditional organizations look at problems from the outside, social entrepreneurs come to

"Marching Orders
38th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

America’s Force of Decisive Action
January 2012

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Leading social entrepreneur theorists view the social entrepreneur as agents of social change, who are masters of innovation, adaptation, flexibility, agility, and complex problem solving in challenging environments, all characteristics we want in our military leaders of today and tomorrow.

Non-traditional opportunities, such as social entrepreneurship, present additional methods for our leaders, at all levels, to develop critical problem solving skills. Most importantly, they offer the military a different perspective on problem solving, which is a collection of experts across multiple disciplines that collaborate on defining the problem, then provide a variety of solutions for implementation. Since we are a learning organization, we could benefit a great deal from these multiple organizations that promote social entrepreneurship. The following behaviors are typically associated with entrepreneurs: bold; innovative; resourceful; obsessive; motivators; charismatic; never satisfied; capable of synthesizing/analyzing data; educators; opportunity driven; desires to help; willing to fail; courage; compassion; risk taker; persistent; passionate; empathetic; and persons of action. These behaviors characterize our best soldiers.

What do they do?

Social entrepreneurs focus on creating long term systemic change in areas of education, health care, finance, agriculture, the environment, etc. They are people who possess the ability to inspire, create, take action, be courageous, and maintain fortitude. These people come up with “brilliant ideas and defying multiple challenges, risks, and odds, successfully create new products and/or services that greatly improve people’s lives” on a societal scale.

Their problem solving method is not just about identifying the problem; it is the process of analyzing the problem and creating new, innovative solutions. As part of their process, social entrepreneurs leverage experts across multiple disciplines to develop effective and efficient sustainable solutions. They also invite collaboration to “build human capacity.” Doesn’t this sound familiar? Most of these organizations are viewed as non-governmental organizations, which we encounter quite often in the complex operating environment. In terms of critical thinking, innovative processes, and becoming change agents, our military could benefit tremendously from the practices of these organizations. This requires a shift from our traditional professional military education mindset, which is the immersion of our professionals in opportunities that are “safe” in nature. We send our best people to large corporations for training opportunities, the best graduate schools in the United States, and to our traditional military institutes. Even though these opportunities are tremendously beneficial, we typically stay within our comfort zone and rarely venture outside of the proverbial “box.” Immersion in the world of social entrepreneurship is certainly outside the parameters that we typically envision with our professional military education system.

How could the military benefit?

So where are the military’s “social entrepreneurs” or “agents of change”? Do we find them through our various accession processes, are they manning billets in a variety of units, or do we create them? I believe they exist throughout our services without our leaders, or more importantly the service members themselves, realizing it. In today’s military, we talk about our future challenges. One of those challenges is doing more with less, operating in austere complex environments. I suggest, through internships and fellowships, we immerse select individuals in the environments that these entrepreneurial organizations operate. These organizations require the entrepreneur to be culturally aware and possess the ability to communicate in a foreign language, along with the other behavioral traits previously described, as they typically promote innovation in foreign lands. Culture and language has proven repeatedly to be a shortcoming amongst our military personnel. Our unknown operating environments of tomorrow require culturally astute and foreign language competent personnel to accomplish their given missions. Immersion in these types of organizations will expose those selected individuals to the broad spectrum of experiences, while navigating the nuances of cultural and language barriers/differences.

The military embodies many of the same attributes that successful entrepreneurs use in their respective ventures, thus multiple parallels can be drawn. “Entrepreneurship connotes a special, innate ability to sense and act on opportunity, combining out of the box thinking with a unique brand of determination to create or bring about something new to the world.” General Martin Dempsey has indicated that our next generation of leaders need “inquisitiveness, adaptability, and innovation.” The counter-insurgency doctrine our military has subscribed to over the last 10 years emphasizes the promotion of security and tangible socioeconomic improvement. The military has invested in the establishment of wells, schools and education, healthcare, and other social benefits, in order to re-establish productive societies that value the contributions of all people rather than the select few. In many places in Iraq and Afghanistan, it wasn’t leading governmental or non-governmental organizations bringing power to villages, building schools, coalescing tribal leaders, or determining the “culturally appropriate” form of development
for a region or tribe. Well before our counter-insurgency doctrine was formalized, we had young service members in Iraq and Afghanistan providing security, books, and desks for the local school or establishing medical clinics in the villages. They were identifying social problems and implementing solutions. In many cases, these military leaders were not given specific guidance on how to solve the problems, “just to do it.” Our military tasks did not specify social change or implementing various practices to achieve a level of social improvement that mirrors the social entrepreneur’s objectives, but that is exactly what our professionals were achieving. They were our leading social entrepreneurs and they didn’t even know it.

According to Ashoka, (Investing in New Solutions for our World’s Toughest Problems) social entrepreneurship is nothing less than a revolution. “Rather than leaving societal needs for the government or business sectors to address, social entrepreneurs are creating innovative solutions, [and] delivering extraordinary results.” We can participate in the revolution and capitalize on the multiple benefits that these organizations can provide to the development of our leaders, not only at the tactical level but the strategic level also. The value of this organizational thought process is that “innovations cut across the disciplinary and organizational boundaries created to solve old problems.” This is what is asked of our strategic leaders. Develop new ideas, tear down the stovepipes, and implement change across multiple organizations.

What Do We Do?

Currently we offer fellowships to distinguished civilian graduate schools, think tanks, and Training with Industry. These institutes, organizations, and corporations are outstanding, but I submit we need to look at other venues for developing our intellectual capacity: the social entrepreneur network. I had not heard of these organizations; Ashoka, TED.com, and Echoing Green Foundation, to name a few, until being immersed in a design course, Coping with Wicked Problems, at the Naval Postgraduate School. It introduced me to critically analyzing problems through various lenses/perspectives and realizing my problem solving abilities were fairly limited in scope, given the routine nature of problem solving that we have adopted over the years of persistent conflict. An internship or fellowship in this type of organization allows personnel to experience leadership from a very different perspective. Our personnel will be exposed to very creative thinkers, not unlike themselves, in complex environments. This will enhance the development of the cultural and language skills that our traditional fellowships and internships do not consider. These types of opportunities develop leaders to determine and understand what the problem is before attempting to solve the problem.

Our training and educational system would offer various opportunities to junior and senior officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to participate in programs that focus on being agents of change. We want military personnel who are problem solvers, who can operate outside of their comfort zone, and who can develop solutions using multiple lenses rather than the traditional lens the military tends to equip us with throughout years of service. Personnel could compete for selected fellowships and internships to these various organizations. An individual’s language capability should be a consideration for selection, but the lack of a language should not eliminate personnel from executing an assignment such as this. The personnel would be expected to adapt to the situation. Additionally, the assignment would be considered broadening for the individual’s career.

In return, we would expose the members of these organizations to the men and women of our armed forces. Some may say that we have had too much exposure to our military over the years, but many people believe, due to the very small percentage of our overall population who serve or have served in the military, the military is disconnected from our citizens. This could be considered an outreach program that educates these organizations on the military and demonstrates that the military consists of personnel who possess high-end intellectual capital capable of operating in multiple complex environments and tackling various problems.

The design of the program should encourage immersion within the social entrepreneurship network. It would require personnel to attend conferences, conduct field work in various environments, document their experiences, and correlate their experiences with current problems/issues that the various services are coping with every year. Select personnel would have ownership of the key/critical issue which would be a major contributing factor to follow on assignments post fellowship or internship. Respective areas of expertise that the personnel could be drawn from initially are Special Operations Forces, Civil Affairs, Foreign Area Officers, and Engineers. This would not be inclusive of these areas, but should be open to all Military Occupational Skill sets.

In the beginning of General George C. Marshall’s tenure as the Chief of Staff of the Army, he issued the statement “It became clear to me that at the age of 58 I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.” Our business remains fighting our Nation’s wars. This type of training and education opportunity does not preclude this fact. Social entrepreneurship is simply an avenue into creating the innova-
tive, adaptive, and flexible people that our Nation’s civilian and military leadership desires from its Armed Forces.

Social entrepreneur organizations are a viable option for developing a new set of skills in our current and future leaders to solve many of our challenging problems in complex environments. It will require a paradigm shift within our Professional Military Education system to leverage the collaborative powers of socially focused organizations to develop agents of change. It is never too late to learn some new tricks.

Notes

3. “Army leaders accept that there are no predetermined solutions to problems. Army leaders adapt their thinking, formations, and employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable and innovative mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. Accordingly, thorough understanding and wise application of cultural knowledge and language skills are tantamount to our success. So too are training, leader development, and personnel policies aimed at fostering creativity at every level.”
5. Odierno, 2.
7. “The complexity of the future suggests that the education of senior officers must not remain limited to staff and war colleges, but should extend to the world’s best graduate schools. Professional military education must impart the ability to think critically and creatively in both the conduct of military operations and acquisition and resource allocation. The Services should draw from a breadth and depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, cultural studies, the ‘hard’ sciences, law, and strategic communication. In other words, the educational development of America’s future military leaders must not remain confined to the school house, but must involve self-directed study and intellectual engagement by officers throughout their careers.”
9. Social entrepreneurs are viewed as “transformative forces: people with new ideas to address major problems who are relentless in the pursuit of their visions.” Their focus is addressing “inadequate education and health systems, environmental threats, declining trust in political institutions, poverty, etc. Given most of these types of issues reside in poorer countries; the social entrepreneur has to reach a wide array of people with far less resources available, which emphasizes the use of innovation in order to achieve an impact on the desired scale”.
11. Bornstein, xii
15. Bornstein, How to Change the World, xii
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
How can civilians and military experts work together to serve the national interest? I recently had the opportunity to attend and participate in an annual stability operations training and education workshop that was merged with another annual workshop – the joint staff’s integrated exercise. The purpose of the workshop was to bring together trainers, educators, planners, and practitioners from across the Training, Exercise and Education community to address interrelated challenges and share best practices for improving civilian and military collaboration. More specifically, this was an opportunity for practitioners to collectively align shared goals and objectives and discuss future support of one another.

As a first time attendee I assumed that the perspective of an intern was invalid or unwelcomed in a room of experienced professionals. Yet, after sitting in on a workgroup focused on civilian – military teaming, it became clear that there was value in a novice opinion on certain aspects of the workgroup topic. As a current undergraduate, I may not be partial to either a civilian or military agency, but that can’t be said for my bias towards academia. In this circumstance, it seems that bias was eye opening. This short article will provide insight into an experience that is rare amongst undergraduate students. I will touch on particular issues and provide recommendations that may assist in bringing “a whole of community” effort.

After listening to the perspectives of one of the keynote speakers, Congressman Geoff Davis (R-KY), it was clear that two major themes were on his mind that fit nicely into the themes of the workshop. First, Congressman Davis touched on the importance of relationships between civilian and military actors in achieving interagency goals. The development of these relationships can happen in a number of ways, but it always involves individual members of different areas of government or Non-Governmental Organizations making personal connections to their peers in other sectors. Second, and related, was the idea of a need to “invest in people,” which might suggest a gap in the education of key actors in stability operations and peacekeeping. In order to develop personal relationships, individuals must be open-minded, educated, and aware of the gains of cooperation.

This strategic backdrop transitioned the conference into dividing the attendees into workgroups to discuss particular themes. I had the pleasure of sitting in on a working group that discussed the evolution of civilian-military relations over the last ten years and the future of this relationship. Within my workgroup, there was a heavy military presence, limited civilian agency presence, and barely any Non-Governmental Organization representation. I did not know what to expect, and simply planned on listening. Yet, not much time passed before I was incorporated into the conversation, and my perspective was welcomed. As it was noted in the workgroup, the development of relationships in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last ten years increased the effectiveness of actions on the ground. Collaboration now is at a high point as compared to 2001 or 2003. After listening to remarks in the workgroup, it is clear that in order to continue on this path, the relationships that have been made must become systemic, which requires a joint understanding through common education.

The National Security Strategy of the United States is meant to establish the guiding principles which all agencies in the government work to uphold and strive for. Yet, military and civilian agencies can look at this document and come away with entirely different responses based on their perspectives and education. While the military is bound to view this document strategically and adapt its ideals into a National Defense Strategy, the civil-
ian agencies work to uphold the values of this document diplomatically and developmentally. These differing perspectives are acceptable so long as there is a mutual understanding. In this case, the difference in perspective leads to difference in opinion and unilateral agency work. One thing is for sure: military and civilian agencies simply do not think the same way. There are limited options for closing this gap in perspective and overcoming the stereotypes it evokes.

Even after a decade of war, the progress made on collaboration and integration between the civilian and military organizations is not institutionalized. Given today’s fiscal environment, it will be even easier to dismiss the progress made and revert back to old and poor habits. In order to avoid this, we must continue to emphasize the value of relationships. These relationships, perspectives, and skills must be built earlier in order to institutionalize the civilian-military relationship, and then should be implemented at each level of a person’s career. I believe there are three crucial steps in accomplishing this change in the system: civilian-military integration at the undergraduate level, a reevaluation of graduate education in security studies, and mid-level personnel swaps between the military and civilian agencies.

Integration of the education of military and civilian students at the undergraduate is fairly weak. Implementing joint undergraduate education for the military and for civilians interested in a future in military policy, security studies, and foreign policy is crucial to changing the nature of the system. Providing civilian access to courses required for Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) students would be an optimal way of accomplishing this. Courses like “Approaches to Stability Operations” would be extremely effective in introducing civilians to the perspectives of military-affiliated students. This type of course could address approaches to stability operations, who/which agency is best equipped to do each task, the resources needed to accomplish tasks, and the need for joint education and training. Coursework focusing on jointness at the undergraduate level builds the groundwork for these relationships at a higher level.

In addition to the importance of undergraduate education, graduate institutions should reevaluate and incorporate ideas from the military in courses relating to strategic studies. In order to effectively educate the civilian agencies and NGOs, future meetings like SOTEW should include faculty from “feeder schools” to the major civilian agencies in government. Schools like the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins or the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown send large portions of their graduating classes to serve in civilian agencies. While these educators are prepared to teach courses relevant to security and military policy in a broad context, the ability to discuss personal experiences with students and varied perspectives derived from a conference like SOTEW could greatly strengthen the discussions at these graduate institutions. Additionally, if civilian academics attend future conferences, they will be more likely to incorporate strategic ideas into diplomatic education.

The challenge obviously is to involve the right people in meaningful conversations on the future of “whole of government” initiatives, while also ensuring that the academics invited bring the knowledge they acquire back to their home institutions. Organizations like the Association of Professional Schools of International Studies (APSIA), the American Political Science Association (APSA), and the International Studies Association (ISA) could facilitate a connection between their members and military representatives to discuss stability operations. Members of these organizations are respected in the field, and are likely to have an interesting alternative and non-bureaucratic perspective. Additionally, many of these members teach at top graduate institutions and can relay strategic messages effectively to their students.

A final recommendation that has short-term implications is that the military and civilian agencies should engage in personnel swaps of mid-level professionals. While this practice has been implemented on a small scale, it could be built into the educational framework for all government agencies. It should be a requirement for Foreign Service Officers and members of other executive branch agencies to engage in this “personnel swap” before qualifying for higher-level positions. Not only does this help train and educate civilians on the military, but it also allows military personnel access to the civilian agency perspective. A combination of undergraduate education integration, increased involvement of academia, and personnel swaps can yield better cooperation and understanding among colleagues. Admittedly, education is not the only aspect to improving civilian-military relations. Yet, when seeking a long run solution, altering the system through education can foster a new institutionalized sense of cooperation, based of course off of personal relationships.
As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down and commanders look to the future, improved execution of stability operations will be a top priority. Humanitarian assistance, one of the four components of stability operations, has been in military’s bag of tricks since President Thomas Jefferson sent Captain Meriwether Lewis west in 1801 with a smallpox vaccine to use to create access and influence with the Sioux of the Dakotas. This article describes some simple improvements in stability operations that commanders can make today with no new Congressional authorization, appropriations, or agencies. Taking these simple steps can pay substantial dividends in saved costs, manpower, and resources.

Army Chief of Staff H.K. Johnson first used the doctrinal term stability operations in 1967. GEN Johnson directed the writing of Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations--U.S. Army Doctrine, which defined stability operations as assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved. The term and its Field Manual did not survive the Cold War. In recent years, the Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3000.05 resurrected the term as a core military mission, which DoD should be prepared to conduct with a proficiency equivalent to combat operations. It has four components: establish civil security and civil control, restore or provide essential services, repair critical infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance. Doing each of these tasks proficiently is a tall order. I will limit my comments to the humanitarian assistance mandate, of which health care is often a key feature.

Humanitarian relief in support of stability operations come in a variety of forms, from the fine RED HORSE or Seabee construction efforts seen in every theater to Expanded Military Education and Training courses to the provision of medical care to partner nation citizens. The funding comes from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency if the activity is primarily medical, or from line Operations and Maintenance funding if the mission is primarily military training for the deployed forces. The author’s humanitarian service experience, as a career Air Force flight surgeon and ophthalmologist, is with the teaching and delivery of health care and disaster response skills in allied countries.

About 25 years ago, the author was commander of a portable hospital at Clark Air Base, Philippines. One of our deployments was to a rural area of Luzon as part of the annual bilateral exercise. Our mission was to see as many indigent Filipino patients as possible, and to familiarize ourselves with the operation of the portable medical equipment and our wartime role. Our wise Senior Master Sergeant knew how to move the patients and document every encounter. At the end of five days, we had 14,000 documented patient visits, and a letter of congratulations from the headquarters in Hawaii. Few of our patients had received any long-term benefit, and some peasants who stood in line did not receive care and may have left our deployment site unhappy. Was that, as Jack Nicholson has said, “as good as it gets”? I didn’t think so.

I was surprised to find that the evaluation of deployed medical work was done with an essay-style ‘after action report’. The bottom-line results were safety of the deployed team, measures of effort, and compliance with the exercise budget. The judge of success was the author of the essay. The regional 4-star commander had no objective measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to determine the relative value of my team’s work, compared to other missions in the Pacific theater that year. There was no
effort to determine the opinion of the other important parties—stakeholders—of the outcomes and missed opportunities of the mission. Finally, there was no attempt to evaluate the sustainable legacy of the mission six months or a year later, when the unintended consequences would be visible, and lessons would be manifest.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also been disappointed, and has repeatedly criticized DoD humanitarian operations over the past twenty years for these faults. A 1993 GAO report recommended that the commands evaluate projects to determine their effectiveness. The implementing guidance and the version current now, DoD Instruction 2205.2, directs that this be done by submission of after-action reports. Humanitarian missions are reported and judged today in much the same way as my portable hospital twenty-five years ago.

What are measures of effectiveness? A measure of effectiveness can be simple data gathered during the project, such as patients seen or teeth pulled, or the perspective of the mission from host nation officials. It is most often an outcome or causal result of the project, like healthier children or more vigorous economy.

The determination of value of the activity, relative to other activities in that fiscal year, is a key step forward for humanitarian activities. There are some factors, common to all missions, which can be scored, and that these scores can be used as part of an annual ‘rack-and-stack’ process at the regional military headquarters, now called Combatant Command (COCOM). There are many other considerations, such as Theater Security Cooperation Plan priorities, Ambassador’s country plan, and political agendas, which drive the humanitarian activity priorities in each Area of Focus. But having such a relative scoring of last year’s missions would be a new and valuable addition to these other considerations when the coming year’s budget and mission planning were due.

Measuring the long-term outcomes, or impact, of each mission would also be a paradigm change of significant value to the COCOM. The results of a medical mission, as understood on the redeployment date, may not be the ones that are remembered six months or a year later. Complications and idiosyncratic reactions to treatment can occur, and publicity can be negative. Local physicians can be displaced or discredited, and a vacuum created where it did not exist before the mission. Local diseases may be more resistant to U.S.-style treatment than expected, due to genetic or nutritional differences that the deploying team did not anticipate. The program may not be sustainable by the host nation. The impact evaluation of the mission requires a long view, at least six to twelve months after redeployment for medical humanitarian activities. Real cost-benefit analysis can only be done when all the costs are quantified and understood.

A key reason for impact evaluations is the attribution challenge, the establishment of cause-effect links between program activities and specific outcomes. The non-governmental organization (NGO) community has seen the value of impact evaluations in their humanitarian work. A leading consortium of donors and research institutions from 36 countries is the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), founded in 2008 in response to a perceived ‘evaluation gap’. The 3ie group awards grants to developing country agencies to perform high-quality impact evaluations to meet the attribution challenge. Their donor group encourages evidence-based policy-making, engagement of key host-nation stakeholders from an early stage, and innovative impact evaluation methodologies.

The author deployed with Air Force eye surgery teams to Honduras a number of times during the 1990s. We had a very capable host nation liaison physician who screened patients before we deployed and arranged local follow-up care for our patients if needed. He called a group of our post-operative patients from previous missions back for examinations during one of our deployments. We were surprised to find that many had retinal damage from toxoplasmosis, a disease that is much more common in Honduras than in the US. Our surgical outcomes were excellent (often better than published US standards), but damage from the disease limited the long-term impact of our work. While there is no good solution to finding this disease before future surgery, we have a more realistic perspective of the long-term value of the surgery activities in Honduras. Like total cost accounting, measures of all costs over the life of the mission’s impact are the only honest way to determine the COCOM’s return on investment. This type of impact evaluation should be done for most humanitarian work, yet it is still very uncommon. It is a complex effort, but making a good faith effort will provide data that is not currently available for making future resource decisions.

Effective humanitarian work should be sustainable, and create ongoing momentum for good in the host nation that continues after redeployment of US forces. The nonprofit organization Orbis is a fine example of this characteristic. They deploy in an aircraft that houses lecture and operating room facilities, and provide three-fold services to the host nation: teaching local surgeons, teaching operating room support personnel, and teaching medical equipment maintenance personnel. Many developing world hospitals have storage areas cluttered with...
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Andrew Natsios in 2005, likewise emphasize the value of stakeholder insights. Unintended consequences are often determined in such a process, and action can be taken to avoid such errors in the future. With the standard report, this information is never learned, and resources are wasted year after year.

Gathering all this new data is a challenge. I maintain it can be done with no new funding, authorization, or agency by modifying the after-action report into a more useful tool, one that can create a score and a rank for each mission, and be utilized to measure the long-term impact of each mission. The scorecard questions can be written to be understood and used by the entire stakeholder community. The format I suggest is a simple one: short questions with forced-choice, yes-no answers, divided into before, during, and after the deployment phases. The specific questions can be designed by each COCOM, but I suggest some questions are so basic that they should be used by all COCOMs, which would permit comparison across COCOM borders. The importance of coordination with all stakeholders, for example, is universal. Assessing the humanitarian activity for coherence with theater cooperation strategy is critical to the judgment of mission success. Comprehensive planning, output and productivity that met objective standards, a pre-deployment site survey that also clarified expectations for host nation personnel — each mission could be scored on the accomplishment of these and other milestones.

The scorecard data must be compiled and examined by the COCOM, and this creates manpower requirements that are not present today. I propose two thoughts here: the information would reduce manpower requirements during subsequent budget and planning activities, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's online mission support program, OHA-SIS (Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System), could be modified to gather scorecard data for the COCOMs. It already asks a few of these questions in the format I recommend, so adding enough questions to create a ranking would not be a big step. Such a scoring system could be searchable, a useful feature that has not been possible in the past.

The civilian humanitarian community has been grappling with these same issues of accountability, cost-effectiveness, and limited resources. Non-military government agencies and NGOs have made great strides in the evaluation of humanitarian medical work, and have learned valuable lessons regarding evaluation that may be equally as valuable to military medical personnel. Their donors expect transparent reporting of results that are valid and reliable. The response has been to organize alliances, often including 200 organizations, which set perfor-

Local villagers receive humanitarian aid from the Bagram Provincial Reconstruction Team in the village of Nijrab in the Kapisa Province of Afghanistan, Jan. 14, 2008. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Tyffani L. Davis

donated but non-functional equipment. The Orbis airplane carries repair manuals and wiring diagrams for most ophthalmic instruments made during the past century. Supplying a new bulb or fuse is a temporary fix, but providing a copy of the wiring diagram and the source for future bulb and fuse supplies empowers the host nation maintenance technician to keep the equipment working sustainably. When the airplane moves to a new venue, it leaves an empowered, more capable medical community and much formerly non-functional equipment in working condition, as well as host nation repair personnel able to independently address most future equipment failures.

Efforts to gather the insights and concerns of the wide group of involved stakeholders of each mission should be made. This group includes the COCOM leadership, of course, the U.S. Ambassador of the host nation and his or her military attaché, and any interagency partners. But it also includes the host nation Ministry of Health or Ministry of Defense personnel, the provincial health director, the mayor and hospital director from the deployed location, representatives of the patients, Peace Corps and non-governmental organization partners from the area, and the entire deployed team – not just the leader, who writes the after-action report. Each of these individuals and groups have important and unique perspectives, and their reports can add immeasurable value to the after-action document. Building partner nation capacity requires stakeholder input, while efforts to achieve access do not.

The principles of development of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as described by Administrator
manance standards, disseminate lessons learned, and advocate for accountability. Large NGO alliances like Interaction and the Sphere Project, and International Organizations such as the UN’s InterAgency Standing Committee and the World Bank have been active in this work for decades. Evaluation of activities for relative value, long-term impact, and comprehensive stakeholder input are common to their humanitarian operations. DoD can adopt some of these same policies, and benefits will accrue immediately.

The concern with outcomes, strategic focus, and relative value of missions is reminiscent of the controversy over effects-based operations, a post-Cold War concept that attempted to help warfighters keep their eye on the ball. The prior regime of winning by attrition or by out-spending the Soviets was obsolete. Likewise, in today’s humanitarian operations, leaders must be confident their activities are delivering an optimal return on investment.

Implementing measures of effectiveness programs into DoD humanitarian operations in a meaningful way could be done in this fiscal year, with significant resource savings, clearer focus on strategic goals and sustainable efforts, and improvements in security cooperation results. No new legislation or agencies are needed. Budgeting for the evaluation of humanitarian activities could be a planned portion of the original activity budget. (USAID often dedicates 3 - 10 percent of a mission’s budget for evaluation tasks.) Evaluation could be part of the original plan and budget, not supplemental nor occasional. With such measure in hand, as one of a larger group of factors to consider, planners can be more objective in the future year budget and resourcing process. DoD can create humanitarian missions and MSO that better serve our partner nation recipients, the CO-COM, the taxpayers and our allies.

In the past year, the Joint Staff Surgeon has made great strides in creating MOEs appropriate for mission sets involving humanitarian civic assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and medical support for stability operations. Together with the COCOM Surgeons, the Joint Staff Surgeon has established a Measures of Effectiveness Working Group (MOE WG). Its mission is to support the COCOMs in identifying need areas and exploring standardization of measurements. The MOE WG will inform senior leaders and provide a conduit to DoD organizations involved in education, training, and research. The MOE WG is sponsored by the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences in Bethesda, and the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance in Hawaii.

In summary, today’s stability operations commanders can get return on investment answers for humanitarian relief work that were not available during my Clark Air Base tour of duty. DoD can provide services that are focused on the larger strategic goal, like the priorities in the Theater Security Engagement Plan, and the impact of each humanitarian activity can enhance security cooperation for years. The perspective of all stakeholders can be used to evaluate the outcome of the activity, for priceless insights not available with today’s after-action reports. The military humanitarian mission can be scored after redeployment by benchmarks established by internationally accepted standards, and these outcomes can drive future humanitarian operations planning and budgeting in ways that are not currently considered under the existing system.
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