INSIDE:

PoC 101: A Basic Guide to the Protection of Civilians

2011 Army Stability Operations Stakeholders Conference

Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Workshop Report

Features

2 PoC 101: A Basic Guide to the Protection of Civilians
   by Dwight Raymond

6 Women, Peace, and Security: Toward a U.S. Action Plan
   by Sarah Williamson

11 Learning from the Other End of the Spectrum: Lessons from the Peace Corps Applicable to Stability Operations
   by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Feldman

16 PKSOI Fellows/Interns Update

17 Mass Atrocity: Prevention and Response
   Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Workshop Report
   by Dwight Raymond

23 2011 Army Stability Operations Stakeholders Conference
   by Colonel Lorelei Coplen

24 SOLLIMS Update, Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System
   by Dan French

25 PKSOI Upcoming Events, 17th Annual IAPTC Conference
   sponsored by PKSOI

Mass Atrocity:
Prevention and Response

Edited by Dwight Raymond
Foreword by Gen the Hon. Romeo A. Dallaire, (Ret'd), Senator

Report on PKSOI-Harvard Kennedy School
Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Workshop

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Our theme for this issue of the Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online is Protection of Civilians (PoC). This topic began to see renewed emphasis in recent years with the nature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. With the turbulent events surrounding Libya and other such countries in civil strife, the public debate surrounding issues and responsibilities of PoC make the articles in this edition of PKSOI’s Online Journal particularly topical.

We begin the Journal with a primer on our theme titled, “PoC 101: A Basic Guide to the Protection of Civilians.” The article is authored by PKSOI staff member Dwight Raymond. He provides a broad overview of the history of PoC and its meaning in a variety of contexts. PoC is complex – it often inspires as many questions as answers. Of particular interest in this article is the role of the military in such endeavors and the ongoing debate as to the depth and breadth of PoC. As such, the author discusses PoC’s role in “robust peacekeeping” and the disparate lexicon that is in use by the larger community of practice. As he concludes his article, Mr. Raymond discusses the moral issues surrounding PoC.

In her article, “Women, Peace, and Security: Toward a U.S. Action Plan,” Ms. Sarah Williamson provides insights on the involvement of women in peacekeeping operations, protection of women from sexual violence, and improving responsiveness to women’s specific needs in relief operations. This article focuses on U.S. efforts to develop a National Action Plan in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which calls on member states to make a greater commitment to women in peace and security operations. Lastly, Ms. Williamson brings us up-to-date on world-wide and U.S. efforts to ensure that Resolution 1325 has a significant impact on the multilateral institutions supported by the U.S.

In “Learning from the other end of the Spectrum: Lessons from the Peace Corps Applicable to Stability Operations,” Lieutenant Colonel (USAR) Robert Feldman proposes a novel way for the military to learn from the Peace Corps. He begins by addressing the obvious: in many ways there are perhaps not any more dissimilar organizations. However, as others have observed, many dissimilar sub-cultures such as the “robes and sandals” versus “dark suits” segments of the workforce can learn from each other and work together. Feldman proposes that the military, like Peace Corps volunteers, consider opportunities for Soldiers to work and live among the population he or she will serve, when feasible. He observes that whether we want soldiers to do it or not, they are often the only ones who can provide this direct interface with the population. His article focuses only on the things the military can learn from the Peace Corps. LTC Feldman does not suggest ways for the Peace Corps to learn from the military although he admits that such cross-fertilization is possible.

Ms. Karen Finkenbinder next provides an update on PKSOI’s robust Fellows and Interns Programs. She provides a focus on Mr. Nick Armstrong who is a Research Fellow with the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT).

Mr. Dwight Raymond has a second entry in this edition of the Journal by providing an abridged version of the soon to be released Mass Atrocity: Prevention and Response Workshop Report. This report is the result of the Workshop for Human Rights Policy held at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in December 2010 by PKSOI and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center.

Next, PKSOI’s Operations, Integration, and Policy Division Chief, Colonel Lorelei Coplen, reports on the March 2011 Army Stability Operations Stakeholders Working Group Conference. PKSOI hosted the conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CG, CAC) and in coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7.

PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) continues to grow and improve. In this journal edition, we provide an update on our ongoing efforts to data-share with Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) and other SOLLIMS initiatives.

We conclude this edition of the Journal with an overview of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) and its upcoming conference to be held the week of 13 November 2011 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. PKSOI has been a member of the IAPTC since 1995, and, along with the United States Army War College, will host the 17th annual IAPTC conference. This will be the first time the U.S. has hosted the annual IAPTC conference.
On March 19, 2011, two days after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) passed, a coalition including the United States commenced attacks by cruise missiles and aircraft on Libyan military targets. The primary stated objective of the attacks was the Protection of Civilians (PoC), and throughout its text UNSCR 1973 emphasizes PoC while authorizing Member States “to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack...while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory....”¹ A pre-existing debate intensified as to the objective(s) of these efforts; is the immediate protection of civilians sufficient, or is the ultimate removal of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime required? Related questions raised by some include whether opposition factions should be supported by these coalition military actions and what, precisely, PoC includes. In other words, what are civilians to be protected from?

Interpretations of PoC vary among a widespread community of interest that includes the United Nations, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, research institutions, and academia. Indeed, PoC as used in the case of UNSCR 1973 (a non-consensual intervention) appears to differ from its use in previous resolutions regarding consent-based peacekeeping missions.² At a minimum, PoC is commonly understood to encompass such situations as:

- Genocides and mass atrocities
- War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
- Deliberately being targeted during conflict
- Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) incidents caused by accident, negligence, or disproportionate means
- Terrorism

Additionally, if one adopts a broad interpretation of human security, PoC may address a variety of other threats and situations that pose threats to life, well-being, freedom, or property. Some of these potential circumstances could include:

- Effects of natural and man-made disasters
- Civil Defense against air raids, weapons of mass destruction, or other threats
- Civil Disorder
- Unsafe Environments
- Health Threats
- Poverty

For more than a decade, PoC has received an increasing amount of attention, particularly in the contexts of armed conflict and peacekeeping operations. Along with “robust peacekeeping,” PoC has been a salient topic among the UN and other interested organizations. This in part has been in recognition that in modern conflicts most casualties have been civilians, and also in response to the failure of peacekeeping forces to protect nearby civilians from violence. PoC has three related but distinct genealogical lines; the first is the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict which has been addressed in UNSCRs 1674 and 1738, among other documents.³ The second PoC line relates to the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations.⁴ Beginning in 1999 with UNSCR 1270 regarding the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), PoC mandates have routinely been included in UN resolutions and typically authorize peacekeeping forces to protect civilians from imminent violence within force’s area and capabilities and “without prejudice to the responsibilities” of the host government. However, the UN has not clarified what is...
meant by expressions such as “imminent violence,” “all necessary means,” or “prejudice to the responsibilities.” Some observers frequently use the term “PoC” as shorthand for either of these two lines which are heavily shaped by UN documents, resolutions, and activities.

The third PoC line is less tied to UN origins and subsumes the expanded list of human security threats identified above. Many of these PoC-related matters are important to a variety of civilian organizations, but they can also be vital considerations in military operations beyond armed conflict and peacekeeping missions. Indeed, the American military experiences of the past decade provide at least three significant reasons to account for PoC.

First, counterinsurgency experience and doctrine highlight that the population is the center of gravity of such efforts, and the population’s support in part is related to the counterinsurgent’s ability to provide protection from insurgents or, in some cases, from rival identity groups. Second, as has been amply shown in Afghanistan, CIVCAS can undermine military efforts and become a divisive issue between the United States and its multinational partners. Finally, while PoC during COIN and CIVCAS avoidance fits relatively neatly under the “PoC in Armed Conflict” bin, during stability operations military forces are to varying degrees involved in the primary tasks of establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development. An underlying objective for many of the supporting tasks is to protect civilians from threats that are not necessarily related to conflict, and under certain
circumstances addressing one of these other human security threats may be paramount. In other words, a complete PoC lens should account for more than the mandated objectives for UN peacekeeping missions or restraints on the targeting of civilians during conflict.

PoC clearly overlaps with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is also referenced in UNSCR 1973 on Libya, but the two terms are not synonymous. R2P as a concept generally is restricted to situations involving genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Rather than focus on when outside actors may have the right to intervene in a sovereign state, the R2P framework emphasizes that states have a responsibility to protect their populations and that the international community also has a responsibility to support states and, if necessary, to take action when states are unable or unwilling to live up to their responsibilities to protect.

In its path-breaking 2001 report, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) offered a three-stage R2P approach to genocide and mass atrocities that included prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. This framework was further developed in Gareth Evans’ subsequent book *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All,* and both works stressed that military intervention is a small and exceptional component of R2P. Responsibility to Protect was officially endorsed at the 2005 United Nations General Assembly World Summit, and subsequently shaped into “three pillars” which are different from (though not incompatible with) the three components (prevent, react, rebuild) of the ICISS report.

**Pillar One:** The enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.

**Pillar Two:** The commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations.

**Pillar Three:** The responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.

R2P, incidentally, has been skeptically received by some observers who are concerned that it is a convenient excuse for neo-imperialist interventions that will violate national sovereignty and open a Pandora’s box of interstate conflict. Some may view PoC essentially as a less inflammatory term than R2P but otherwise similar; others view PoC as being more closely related to UN peacekeeping operations.

Although PoC is generally viewed as a laudable goal by a wide range of constituents including humanitarians, militaries, governmental personnel, and academics, the topic contains numerous controversies or tradeoffs. One question pertains to where PoC ranks among other national interests, and whether a particular PoC effort is worth the costs, benefits, and risks. This question may be doubly vexing when a particular country is not deemed a vital national interest for the U.S. For example, some questioned whether the U.S. should have committed military forces to protect civilians in Libya.

As the Libyan case also illustrates, PoC goals can also become entangled with other issues such as sustaining the “Arab Spring,” supporting a faction in a civil war, and ousting a dictatorial regime that has also sponsored acts of terrorism. Some would add access to oil as yet another consideration; and many skeptics could believe that such issues are the real reasons behind an action ostensibly taken to protect civilians. One might argue that if the Qadhafi regime is the primary threat to civilians, the best recourse is to remove the regime and the best way to do this is to provide significant support to opposition groups. This line of thought is, at best, controversial and is unlikely to be convincing to many who supported the PoC components of UNSCR 1973. Conceivably, another potentially complicating objective of the Libyan intervention is to establish a useful precedent in terms of deterring future perpetrators and encouraging the UN to take quick and effective legitimizing action in necessary situations. As the intervention continues, it may be useful to nurture UN perceptions so that member states (especially other permanent members of the Security Council) are not soured by the experience.

Depending upon the situation, PoC may be the primary purpose of a mission or one of a mission’s many supporting tasks. An example of the former may include the Libyan intervention, while examples of the latter include various UN peacekeeping missions that have a mandated objective regarding PoC. Protection of Civilians can all too easily be displaced by other mission requirements, not the least of which may be the interveners’ perceived requirements to sustain and protect themselves. Organizations involved in PoC may also face the inevitable prospect of mission creep; what began as a mission to “stop the killing” logically becomes an effort to “stop the dying” from deplorable conditions in a fragile state.

Similarly, one can (and many do) also debate whether PoC efforts should strictly focus on protection from threats of physical
PoC 101: A Basic Guide to the Protection of Civilians

March 2011

violence or whether they should encompass a broader agenda of human rights and human security. The solution for many of these challenges frequently lies in the establishment of better governance, which leads to building the capacity of the host nation authorities. However, this may compromise the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian and human rights organizations if they engage in efforts that support governmental authorities or intervening actors and, by extension, oppose the efforts of other groups that act against the government. In such cases, humanitarian and human rights organizations will face a dilemma as to the extent they should coordinate and share information with any governmental or international organization (including military forces). In turn, governmental and international actors may have coordination expectations of NGOs that are apt to prove elusive.

Cooperation with some host nation actors may create moral dilemmas if their PoC pedigree is tarnished. While they are likely a key part of the solution, they may actually be part of the problem. PoC or R2P interventions also may undermine host nation sovereignty, which is a serious matter in its own right and is apt to complicate a straightforward PoC matter with a wide array of political contentiousness within the host nation, the intervening countries, and the international community. Such controversy will be especially pronounced with preventive efforts, because while it may be easy to legitimize action when PoC violations are occurring, such legitimacy is more questionable when egregious violations have not yet occurred. This can complicate the goal of preventing PoC violations, rather than responding to them after the fact. Additionally, the threshold for “egregious” is subjective and therefore debatable. Finally, PoC may conflict with a potential legitimacy goal of acting in accordance with mandates from the UN or other IGOs if these organizations do not achieve a consensus to act. That is, should a state take action to protect civilians at risk if such action is not approved by the UN or others?

PoC is interpreted differently by different observers; this is perhaps inevitable, but the different uses can create confusion and have important implications in certain situations. However it is viewed, PoC is consistent with American values and probably viewed by most as an important objective on its own merits. However, those inherently skeptical about the salience of such humanitarian goals should not dismiss its significance as a matter of practical national interest too quickly. Threats to civilians are correlated with poor governance, ungoverned spaces, and regional instability, all of which are breeding grounds for direct threats to other US interests. Early attention to PoC challenges may help preclude them from becoming even more intractable in the future, and consistent efforts to support PoC can avoid a track record that may haunt us in the future.


2Thanks to Sally Chin and Alison Giffen who independently emphasized these points, and who also provided other helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

3See Alison Giffen, Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Spring 2010).


5See Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (New York, NY: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, January 2009).


by Sarah Williamson, Senior Consultant with Global Emergency Group

Introduction

Ten years after the UN Security Council passed a landmark resolution encouraging greater participation of women in all aspects of international peace and security; the United States is just now developing a National Action Plan to put the resolution into effect across the government, in cooperation with civil society. Resolution 1325 calls for further international action on women’s involvement in the political process and security sector, inclusion of women in peacekeeping operations, protection of women from sexual violence, and improving responsiveness to women’s specific needs in relief operations.

The U.S. has strategic interests in countries where failures to protect women are indicative of weak governance, poor economic infrastructure, and fragile societies. Investments in women can have a significant impact on global stability. The U.S. National Action Plan on 1325 is expected to look at how current investments in international conflict and stability operations include and impact women. The plan also has the potential to make a greater impact on how women benefit from multilateral partnerships with UN agencies such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is increasingly mandated with the protection of civilians and prevention of gender violence.

What is Security Council Resolution 1325?

The United States is in the process of developing a National Action Plan to support the goals of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which calls on member states to make a greater commitment to women in peace and security. The resolution is comprised of four pillars: encouraging the participation of women in the political process; protection of women in peacekeeping mandates; prevention of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict; and a greater emphasis on the needs of displaced women and girls in relief and recovery operations.

Security Council Resolution 1325 passed in October of 2000. The U.S. voted for the resolution. In the ten years since the resolution passed, twenty-four countries have developed a National Action Plan (NAP) on the implementation of the resolution. However, the U.S. did not take specific action on it until last year when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. would begin to develop its own plan to realize the resolution’s goals.

U.S. Plan in Progress

The development of a U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) is underway, with an inter-agency process convened by the National Security Council (NSC). The Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are meeting regularly to assess women’s participation in U.S. political and security institutions. They are also reviewing programs across all agencies that touch on the protection of civilians, prevention of sexual violence, and relief efforts. This assessment is expected to highlight the good work already being done, and to generate new initiatives that boost the impact of current resources.

The U.S. plan has the potential to review domestic commitment to 1325 principals, bilateral programs, and multilateral partnerships with UN agencies to determine their collective impact on women and girls. The recently released Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) highlights programs of strategic interest, and serves as an
indicator of where the USG might look to strengthen efforts. For example, the State Department has bilateral programs to train and equip foreign militaries that contribute to international peacekeeping missions, but no specific gender standards are applied to these programs that would encourage women’s participation.\(^4\) There are additional ways to ensure that forces trained with U.S. resources have the operational skills to protect women from violence as part of their mandates.

The U.S. is also the largest donor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), but it is unclear how U.S. financial support increases the goal of having more female officers in UN missions. Women currently make up only 3% of all UN forces.\(^5\) The U.S. National Action Plan can bring these efforts together under a coherent strategy to increase support for women’s participation.

**Examples from Denmark and Canada**

Denmark and Canada are good examples of how donor countries have been able to achieve two objectives in their plans: 1) assess their domestic obligations under 1325 and 2) measure the impact of bilateral and multilateral contributions to women, peace, and security.

In October 2010, the U.S. embassy in Denmark held a conference on the ten-year anniversary of the resolution to discuss lessons learned and the path forward.\(^6\) The Government of Denmark plan on 1325 was discussed as one example for the United States to consider. The Denmark plan sets goals and objectives for each of the four pillars, with specific examples of how the country is achieving gender equality internally and how that translates to positive international action at the regional and global level.\(^7\) Denmark’s plan gives specific considerations for the promotion of 1325 within the European Union (EU), Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It also includes a commitment to ongoing consultations with Danish civil society organizations, including a provision about using their expertise in the training of Danish police and defense forces.

Canada’s response to implementing 1325 is also worth noting. In 2001, the government established a Canadian Committee on Women, Peace, and Security that included government officials, parliamentarians, and civil society representatives to inform the development of a National Action Plan. The committee tracks lessons learned in specific country contexts such as Haiti and Afghanistan, and monitors progress on Canada’s implementation of all Security Council resolutions pertaining to women and conflict. Canada now has an expanded plan on 1325 that takes other resolutions into consideration.\(^8\) One practical outcome of Canada’s plan is a Gender Training Initiative (GTI) for military and civilian personnel involved in Peace Support Operations (PSO) to become familiar with international humanitarian law and case studies on gender violence.\(^9\) Canada’s plan also establishes specific indicators and designates agencies within the government responsible for tracking progress.

**Status of Implementation**

In preparation for the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325, multiple UN agencies held their own review of progress made to date. While all aspects of the resolution were considered, peacekeeping issues received the most attention. This is in part due to recent missions in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where peacekeepers have been unable to prevent widespread violence against women.

Resolution 1325 specifically recognizes “the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” and ensure that “field operations include a gender component.” With 120,000 personnel deployed in fifteen theatres around the world, UN peacekeeping operations can be more inclusive of female officers and be better prepared to meet mandates to protect women.

The DPKO Department of Field Support commissioned a “Ten-year Impact Study” on 1325, finding that while peacekeeping missions had some success in elevating women’s participation in elections by improving the overall security environment, increasing women’s participation in the security sector remains difficult and protecting women against violence is a formidable challenge.\(^10\) While DPKO instituted a policy on gender balance in 2006 and developed a gender unit within its headquarters that provides a gender advisor to each mission in the field, this has proved to be a limited indicator of progress. In another report on the status of 1325, Canada acknowledged that mission mandates must have an explicit gender component or it will be very difficult for gender advisors to make the case once the mission is already underway.\(^11\) The DPKO Impact Study calls for tailored gender training for senior managers that will help them integrate gender perspectives into their work, regardless of the mission’s mandate.\(^12\)

In order to improve the UN performance on the protection of women, the Secretary General appointed a new Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margaret Wallstrom, and the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) was
consolidated along with several other agencies into a new organization, UN Women, led by former Prime Minister of Chile, Michelle Blanchett. These offices, together with support from DPKO, released another report on the anniversary of Resolution 1325, “An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice,” which reviews operational strategies for preventing sexual violence against women.

The inventory offers tasks and tactics that protect women, such as night and firewood collection patrols, joint protection teams with military and civilian personnel, deterrence strategies, and advice on how to liaise with community leaders. The inventory can serve as a practical “how to” guide for protecting women. Efforts are also underway to develop operational scenarios that help peacekeeping missions put the inventory into practice. However, the guidance is not yet available to missions that are also being tasked with protecting all civilians from harm.

The Protection of Civilians

The effort to clearly define the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates is happening concurrently with the anniversary of 1325. While the protection of civilians and gender issues are dealt with separately within the UN system, they are inherently connected. Women do not exist in a vacuum. They are part of families and communities. Where women are vulnerable to violence, the entire community is more likely to be at risk of harm.

While Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has stated that the United Nations charter places human security at the core of international responsibility, he also acknowledges that the need to “operationalize the concept of human protection” has only recently emerged with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and with new peacekeeping mandates that include the protection of civilians. Although peacekeepers have a long history of interacting with the humanitarian agencies by providing access to vulnerable people, they are not accustomed to communicating directly with communities. On the ground, peacekeepers often disagree about what it means to protect civilians in practice, and most forces do not know how to appropriately engage with women and communities at risk. Without engaging the population to listen to their fears and identify their vulnerabilities, protection is a nearly impossible task.

The UN is trying to fill this gap in a number of ways. The best practices division of DPKO developed an Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in 2010, laying out three different notions of protection within the UN system: 1) establishing a protective environment, 2) protection through political process, and 3) protection from physical harm. The concept paper does not weigh the importance of one perspective over another or clearly define the “protection of civilians” mandate for forces expected to carry it out. However, new training modules are being developed with operational scenarios to exemplify each of the above perspectives and will eventually become part of in-mission training.

Measuring Progress

UN efforts to improve the implementation of 1325 and protection of civilians can inform the U.S. National Action Plan. The U.S. effort to implement a “Whole of Government” approach to women’s empowerment is similar to the UN challenge of “Delivering as One.” Given the extent of the resolution, multiple agencies will be involved in delivering results. This can lead to tremendous internal effort to get everyone on the same page, all the while losing sight of what is needed to make improvements on the ground. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon recently admitted that when it comes to the UN response to human protection, “our words are ahead of our deeds.”

The U.S. can overcome this challenge by measuring progress at the country level. How does U.S. action make a difference in the lives of women in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan? Making the impact on women clear in countries where the U.S. is most involved in providing security and stability would be a good start.

The UN has agreed to a set of twenty-six indicators for tracking state progress on resolution 1325. These indicators rely heavily on the compilation of statistical data by states, resulting in criticism that measuring improvements in this way doesn’t show real change. What is needed is basic information such as: Are women more engaged? Are they safer? How do people in need of protection view the effectiveness of international efforts? Do military and peacekeeping personnel know what to do when confronted with situations of gender-based violence?

Getting concrete results will require field level analysis that tracks how funding, training, and equipping agencies charged with a protection mandate have made changes on the ground. Given the extent of U.S. international engagement, this is a unique contribution the U.S. Government can make toward implementing 1325, and is one reason why civil society is so engaged in the process.
Civil Society Engagement

Secretary Clinton’s interest in renewing U.S. commitment to 1325 has galvanized civil society support for the resolution at the national level. The high profile conference on Women and War hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and Women In International Security (WIIS) in November 2010 brought together U.S. government officials and civil society to discuss ways to turn the promise of the resolution into reality. USIP has also been at the forefront of convening a civil society working group on 1325 in Washington, D.C. that brings together think tanks, researchers and international organizations to provide insight and advice to officials developing the National Action Plan. The umbrella coalition of U.S. based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Interaction, has a Protection Working Group that focuses on addressing the needs of vulnerable people in conflict and disaster. They have provided additional analysis on the resolution to USIP. In addition, the United Nations Foundation has supported the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP), led by Refugees International and other organizations such as Citizens for Global Solutions. PEP meets together monthly at the Stimson Center. The group frequently invites government officials and DPKO mission representatives to join the discussion.

What these organizations have to offer is extensive knowledge on how to turn the intent of the resolution into good practice at the field level. International organizations have a wealth of case studies and program data that can feed into knowing what works and how to expand on best practices. Civil society organizations in the U.S. are connected to civil society organizations around the world whose valuable insight is often not considered within their own countries.

Humanitarian organizations also have different perspectives on what protection means, and the methods they use to deter violence vary. However, the humanitarian imperative requires agencies to define their success through the eyes of the beneficiary. If women are not sufficiently empowered, if they are consistently being violated, if relief does not reach the most vulnerable, then humanitarian agencies can and will strive to do better. The international system is striving in the direction of 1325, and the United States National Action Plan can serve as a catalyst for taking the resolution to the next level.

Conclusion

There is an unprecedented level of commitment to global women’s issues within the U.S. government. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made it clear that advancing the situation of women and girls is at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. The process of developing a U.S. National Action Plan for Security Council Resolution 1325 takes this commitment even further, and promises to have a significant impact on the multilateral institutions supported by the United States.

Security Council Resolution 1325 was intended to make substantial improvements in the participation of women in government and peacekeeping, protection of women in conflict, prevention of sexual violence, and gendered responses to humanitarian relief efforts. Ten years later, the U.S. National Action Plan can still make a difference by narrowing the gap between the intent of the resolution and concrete action for women. Civil society has high expectations that the plan will both elevate women’s role in global security and make women more secure. As the largest donor to numerous peace and security initiatives, the U.S. can bring a coherent strategy, consistency of approach, and real indicators of progress to the table.

About the Author

Sarah Williamson is a humanitarian protection expert with twelve years experience advising multilateral agencies and international organizations. She has extensive field experience in conflict and disaster zones in Haiti, Afghanistan, Thailand, and Kenya. Sarah holds a Master’s in Forced Migration from Oxford University. She is currently a Senior Consultant with the Global Emergency Group. The author wishes to thank Jolynn Shoemaker, Executive Director of Women in International Security (WIIS), and Kathleen Kuehnast, Director of the Gender and Peacebuilding Innovation Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) for reviewing the article.

1The full text of Security Council Resolution 1325 can be found online at www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf
2All twenty four National Action Plans can be viewed on the Peace Women website at www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/national-action-plans-naps
4While there is no overt barrier to women’s participation in bilateral political-military assistance, the government tends to contract with companies that use predominantly retired male military personnel to carry out these activities.
5DPKO/OMA Statistical Report on Female Military and Police


Features from the Conference on the Role of Women in Global Security are on the U.S. Embassy in Denmark website at http://denmark.usembassy.gov/news-events/rwgs/prg.html


Ibid.


The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international initiative that emphasizes the responsibility of sovereign states to protect their citizens from harm, and recognizes that states implicitly forfeit their sovereignty in grave situations of mass violence against civilians.


Modern-Complex-Peace-Operations-Seminar_en.pdf

Refugees International is working with DPKO on the scenarios as part of the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping initiative led by the United Nations Foundation.

The “Delivering as One” initiative was a way to ensure coherent UN leadership and planning across agencies at the country level.

Cyril Foster Lecture, Ibid.

Peace Women has the indicators on their website at: www.peacewomen.org/security_council_monitor/indicators


Highlights from the Women and War Conference can be found online at www.usip.org/events/woman-and-war

In 2006, the women of the Lahgman Province Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mehtarlam Afghanistan created an all women’s group with the Provincial members of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and representatives from the various districts. They discussed key issues pertaining to the future of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan.
Other than both being part of the government, the U.S. military and the Peace Corps are perhaps two of the most dissimilar organizations one can imagine. The military, with about 1.4 million people in uniform, has a budget in the hundreds of billions; the Peace Corps, with about 8,000 volunteers, has a budget in the hundreds of millions. The military, bristling with high tech weaponry, has as its primary purpose to provide national security; the Peace Corps, very low tech, strives to promote goodwill with others. Yet, despite being polar extremes, or maybe because they are so different, the two organizations can learn a great deal from one another.

As the military moves from its traditional role of mainly being an armed protector to one that also emphasizes stability operations at the individual and community levels, exemplified by Army Field Manual 3-0 released in February 2008, it would be helpful to look for practical experience from an organization that has been involved in just such grassroots endeavors for over four decades, the Peace Corps. During that time nearly 200,000 volunteers have served in 139 countries teaching people how to farm using sustainable techniques, staffing health clinics in rural areas, teaching science in schools that lack teachers, and working in numerous other projects to help nations develop. Many projects were successful, but there were also many failures along the way. Fortunately the Peace Corps often learns from these mistakes so as not to repeat them. It would be extremely beneficial for the military to take advantage of that cumulative knowledge in order to replicate the successes and avoid the failures.

The goal is not to turn the soldier into a Peace Corps volunteer but rather to borrow from the Peace Corps those skills that will make the soldier working in stability operations a more capable individual. He or she will still be a soldier, albeit one who will have the abilities to work side-by-side with host country nationals to get the job done, be it reclaiming environmentally degraded land, establishing aquaculture projects, or teaching children who have lost their parents to AIDS.

There are those who question the wisdom of having soldiers so heavily involved in stability operations. Some feel such tasks are better assigned to the State Department or NGOs. However, as Secretary of Defense Gates recently stated regarding humanitarian missions, “It is not a soldier’s job [but] sometimes only a soldier can do it.”

Where the Peace Corps and NGOs can provide the humanitarian assistance to bring “normalcy to the people” as FM 3-0 states, it should be mainly those organizations, and not the military, doing so. Unfortunately there are areas within countries and sometimes entire countries which could benefit from

Field Manual 3-0 formalizes the increased emphasis on stability operations, including humanitarian assistance, expected of the Army. A portion of the manual’s introduction places into perspective exactly how important the Army views such operations:

Success in future conflicts will require the protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the opponent with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the people.5
Learning from the Other End of the Spectrum

a Peace Corps presence but because of violence are unsafe for the placement of volunteers. In such situations it may fall upon the armed forces of the United States to provide the necessary expertise. Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of Latin America, and as AFRICOM stands up, parts of Africa, are some of the places soldiers may need to perform at least some of the functions of the Peace Corps.

Although the Peace Corps can also learn from the military, this article will only examine how the military can learn from the Peace Corps. In doing so it is helpful to look at the latter’s three goals:

1. Helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women.
2. Helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served.
3. Helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.

None of these Peace Corps goals is mutually exclusive with the military goal of national security. In fact, it is hoped that through development efforts and sharing experiences among different cultures the likelihood of war can be significantly reduced.

Training

One trains with weapons and in hand-to-hand combat, the other learns a foreign language and culture. In the end, one is prepared to go off to war, the other to make friends in foreign lands through school construction, health education, and similar projects. However, with the military’s expanding role in stability operations, there are some aspects of Peace Corps training that soldiers might want to incorporate into their own programs in order to better prepare for future humanitarian missions.

Many Special Operations Forces (SOF), to their credit, already incorporate language and culture training. Unfortunately for the military at large, such instruction for soldiers is frequently a few key foreign phrases, some guidance on how to avoid offending anyone, and a cheat sheet summarizing the culture. There has, however, been a renewed emphasis on having more bilingual officers and NCOs, and progress appears to be occurring in this endeavor.

In contrast, Peace Corps training is quite in-depth regarding language and culture. This is in large part because a volunteer is expected to be able to train a host country counterpart to take over the volunteer’s assignment, such as serving as a science teacher in a village school, when the volunteer completes his or her two year assignment and returns home to the states. Additional lectures on health, safety, politics and other topics help round out the training.

Many volunteers arrive in country already equipped with a practical set of skills. They are nurses, foresters, farmers and others whose civilian occupations can readily be utilized in the developing world. For those who do not arrive with useful expertise, the Peace Corps may provide additional training, perhaps in small-scale farming, public health methods, or another skill where basic principles can be learned in a relatively short period of time.

Looking at Peace Corps training there are several areas where the military could possibly adopt some of their methods when possible. These include:

- Providing language and additional training at a center in the host country. This allows training by native speakers and immersion in the language and culture before being sent out to various areas within the country on assignment.
- Having soldiers live with host families during language training. Following language class each day, this is an excellent way for the beginning speaker to incorporate new words and phrases in a real life setting. It also allows a soldier to experience
firsthand the cultural intricacies of their new assignments and to immediately make friends with local people. The host family also learns what an American soldier is really like as opposed to possibly distorted impressions they may have from movies and television.

- Providing training for possible humanitarian projects. During the time soldiers are at the training center they could be learning how to create a fish farm, reclaim environmentally degraded land, start a women’s cooperative, or other useful skill that could be used to assist the local people when the soldier is deployed to another area within that country. Which soldiers would be designated for this special training would depend on such factors as their interest, aptitude and projected amount of time available to work on development projects at their assigned locations. While Civil Affairs units would seem to be natural choices for such training, it is possible other units, such as infantry in certain situations, should also be considered.

Security concerns would be paramount if placing individual soldiers in the homes of host country nationals. However, it is important to note it has been the experience of the Peace Corps that not only the families but often the local communities are quite protective of their volunteers.

In order to maximize their cross cultural experience as well as language training it is important to place only one soldier per family. Having two Americans under the same household will result in English being spoken and decreased interaction with the family; having just one essentially forces that person to learn to speak the local language.

While living in the home of host country nationals is optimal for learning both the language and culture, if not feasible for security concerns or issues related to command and control of personnel, an option could be placing the soldier in his or her own home but relatively close to a host family. That way the soldier could regularly visit for language practice and to become acquainted with local customs.

Training Host Country Nationals

The work of the Civil Affairs and other units is incredibly helpful in promoting goodwill among peoples, and their efforts and accomplishments are in no way belittled or disparaged by having another model for humanitarian efforts. Civil Affairs frequently has projects which provide a large impact, such as vaccination programs or health clinics, that are put in place for a short period of time, maybe two weeks or so, utilizing a contingent of soldiers, though there certainly are exceptions. Host country nationals may or may not receive training, depending on the project.

The Peace Corps model is quite different. Volunteers are at an assigned location, frequently quite remote, for approximately two years. Having such a long time at a site allows them to plan for relatively long term projects as well as to train host country nationals to continue with the projects when the volunteers leave. Additionally, with such an extended period a volunteer can often see a project go through several iterations, enabling that individual to work on continual refinements. As an example, a first try at a fish farm may come up short, but with additional attempts incorporating lessons learned success can often be achieved.

Another difference between a Peace Corps project and maybe one from a Civil Affairs unit is the lack of resources available to the former. Whereas a Civil Affairs unit may bring in generators, tents, soldiers with various construction skills, food, and so forth; a volunteer, especially one in a remote site, might lack electricity, modern tools, and the technical talents of others. Resourcefulness becomes an essential trait if the volunteer wants to accomplish a demanding project.

Perhaps the biggest difference between Peace Corps projects and those performed by the military is that Peace Corps always expects the volunteer to train a host country counterpart to continue the project when the volunteer leaves. Though many military humanitarian efforts involve training host country nationals, not all of them do. Some involve American soldiers showing up, drilling a well, and moving on to the next town; or vaccinating a village and moving on; or a host of other short term projects which essentially involve the military doing something for the locals instead of training the locals to eventually do something for themselves. This is not to criticize these projects; they are extremely beneficial and frequently, because of resource requirements, unable to be accomplished by the Peace Corps, NGOs, or Host Government. They are, however, quite different than the model of development, which emphasizes factors such as sustainability and host country participation, the Peace Corps uses.

The lessons learned from volunteers in long term projects such as fish farming and developing teaching plans for a biology class in a school that does not have microscopes can be valuable for soldiers who generally have not participated in such endeavors. The skills in setting up a mobile field hospital, though critical for the military, are not the same as establishing a women’s cooperative and training someone to continue it when the
volunteer returns to the States. Should the military shift some of their humanitarian emphasis toward longer term projects at a grassroots level, as might occur in less developed countries where there are plans for a continuing presence of US troops, it would benefit from looking at what Peace Corps volunteers have done in the realm of training host country nationals and how they did it.

Promoting an Understanding of America

Peace Corps volunteers promote America in a positive manner by working at the grassroots level, helping the local people with humanitarian projects, speaking the local language, and dealing with an almost insatiable curiosity many people have about Americans by answering their questions. Volunteers are often described as Goodwill Ambassadors representing the United States.

With soldiers increasingly involved in stability operations activities it is important that they take the opportunity not only to succeed with their projects but to also build good rapport with the local people. Taking a cue from the Peace Corps, learning the local language goes a long way to building bridges between cultures. This needs to be more than the few transliterated phrases printed on the back of a card; it needs to be enough to converse at a level that the American working on a project can share some basic experiences with his or her counterparts and in turn understand much of what the counterparts are saying about their own lives.

Soldiers also need to become part of the local community. This is difficult if they are all living in a guarded compound, so when possible they should consider living with host country families. They should also take part in local events such as community celebrations. If possible they should play sports with the locals. Years from now when that soldier has long since left that community people might still be talking about how a member of the American military played soccer with the local kids.

Equipped with basic language and cultural skills soldiers will most likely discover what many Peace Corps volunteers find when dealing with host country nationals, that there is a certain tolerance provided for mistakes. When the soldier uses the male pronoun instead of the female when speaking the language, or seems to have incredibly poor soccer skills for someone who is 22 years old, chances are the locals will help that person out. There might be some good natured laughing and hopefully the soldier can laugh at his or her own mistakes, but in the end there is usually tolerance, help, the development of friendships, and an improvement of America’s image abroad.

Bringing the World Back Home

Of Peace Corps’ three goals it is probably the third, often simply stated as “bringing the world back home,” that the American military has most fallen short in implementing. Troops return to the states and perhaps share with family and friends how the food might have been different in Kenya or the style of dress different in Tanzania, but there appears to be no concerted effort to share their findings with the public. Peace Corps on the other hand encourages its returned volunteers to go into schools and other public places to speak about their experiences and findings. Along with pictures, a volunteer might bring some traditional food to share or traditional dress to show, and will probably discuss the customs of the people he or she lived with for two years. These activities go a long way to clear up misperceptions Americans may have about others.

A similar undertaking by even a fraction of the tens of thousands of soldiers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan would be extremely beneficial. The news carries a great deal about the fighting and the politics but precious little about how the Iraqis and Afghans live their day-to-day lives. Talks by returning soldiers can help Americans better understand the intricacies of how Iraqi and Afghani culture relate to the ongoing combat operations. Why do some Afghani villagers support the Taliban over democracy? Why is there animosity between Sunni and Shiite Iraqis? How do Afghans and Iraqis really feel about Americans? These and other questions beg to be explained by people who have been to the villages and worked hard to establish good rapport with the locals. Sweeping statements by politicians that relations are good are just that…sweeping statements. However, hearing from a young sergeant how he became close to an Iraqi family that shared both their hopes for freedom and their fears of ongoing violence, is a much more powerful and important message.

Thus, the military needs to work hard to match the Peace Corps’ goal of bringing the world back home. It can’t be done through announcements from a base Public Affairs Office; it has to be done through individual soldiers speaking at schools, at libraries, at gatherings in homes, and wherever and whenever people will listen. Armed with a better understanding of what is involved in foreign countries, Americans can make informed decisions regarding policies and politics. Additionally, this personal touch might lead people to develop a significantly deeper appreciation of their men and women in uniform.
Maintaining Each Organization’s Individuality

Since its inception, the Peace Corps has strived to maintain its distance from intelligence agencies and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the military. This is not just for philosophical reasons. A volunteer who comes in contact with a member of the intelligence community may appear suspect in the eyes of host country nationals, possibly resulting in their unwillingness to assist with development projects associated with that volunteer, and maybe even placing that volunteer’s life in danger. It’s important that Peace Corps be perceived by the foreign country as being there to help, not to spy or participate in political or military activities. Therefore, any training or joint efforts on projects between the Peace Corps and American military must be transparent, for the benefit of improving humanitarian missions, not associated with intelligence gathering, and reviewable by all parties involved including the host country.

It is also important that the overall mission of soldiers not be changed. As an example, if a known terrorist arrived in a village where there were Peace Corps volunteers, the volunteers would not be expected to attempt to capture or kill that person. For soldiers the difference is quite stark. They may be involved in humanitarian operations, but if their mission also includes capturing or killing terrorists, they are expected to do just that.

Where the Two Worlds Already Meet

Either directly or indirectly, the military and the Peace Corps occasionally meet for such activities as joint projects where each side takes advantage of the other’s strengths. As an example, a Peace Corps volunteer who is assigned to teach in a rural village may be at a school that was constructed using heavy equipment owned and operated by the American military. These tentative steps towards cooperation are probably precursors towards more involved joint projects in the future.

Language is another area where the Peace Corps and military meet. During the author’s travels in Africa on military assignments, he frequently encountered Peace Corps volunteers who would be the only people that spoke both English and the local language in remote villages. Additionally, many of the best American speakers of native languages at U.S. embassies were frequently previous Peace Corps volunteers who had taken positions with the Foreign Service. Finally, numerous foreign government officials who interact with the American military speak English thanks to Peace Corps Volunteers. In one instance an official told the author the name of the first volunteer who taught him English, relating how tough she was, and then mentioned the name of the second volunteer who taught him English, saying she was even tougher. His command of English was excellent and he remembered both volunteers, despite being demanding teachers, quite fondly. Thus, the Peace Corps to an extent paved the way for this person’s later dealings with the American military. They did this by teaching him English, introducing him to American culture, and creating a positive image of Americans. Should soldiers find themselves in remote villages for prolonged periods working on similar projects as Peace Corps volunteers, it can be expected, or at least hoped, that the same benefits regarding language training, both for the soldiers and the host country nationals, will accrue.

Learning from the Peace Corps

There are several ways the military could go about learning from the Peace Corps experience in foreign lands. Talking to former volunteers could be one method; talking to present volunteers, because of the chance people might associate them with the military, may not be as easy.

Should the military still want to learn from the Peace Corps but not have any direct contact with staff or volunteers from the organization, it could begin by accessing the excellent online library the Peace Corps maintains at its website, www.peacecorps.gov. Publications dealing with how to establish a microenterprise, designing and evaluating projects, working in different cultures, teaching English as a second language, and numerous other topics are available for viewing.

Most beneficial for soldiers about to deploy to a country where there are Peace Corps volunteers is to access the online Peace Corps wiki at www.peacecorpswiki.org. Information regarding the country’s culture, health and safety, and living conditions is often available. Additionally, many of the country entries also include a suggested packing list and a directory of pertinent online resources.

Perhaps most useful at the Peace Corps wiki site is the very last part of each country’s page, where it lists external links. This will take the reader to the blogs of the individual volunteers. It would be difficult to find a better set of American perspectives on a country - including topics pertinent to the military such as culture, unexpected obstacles to project completion, and safety - than what these individuals living long term among the local people have written.
Learning from the Other End of the Spectrum

Conclusion

It is not the job of the military to replace the Peace Corps in stable regions. Neither organization wants that. However, in areas where there is significant unrest and it is unsafe to place volunteers, and if the United States still wants to provide grassroots stabilizing efforts, the task will fall upon soldiers.

The military mission in stability operations appears to be evolving from one of generally short duration missions with little emphasis on training host country nationals to one involving more long term grassroots efforts. Additionally, in the past, stability operations generally did not focus on income generation projects. While drilling wells, building schools, and providing vaccinations certainly contribute to the wealth of a nation, they do not always directly and immediately lead to an increase in people’s income the way a women’s cooperative selling honey or an aquaculture project selling fish can contribute. Creating microenterprises that help raise the living standards of the poorest people are a large part of the Peace Corps experience. These income generating projects, as well as numerous other grassroots efforts in fields such as environmental protection, education, and health, are all part of the Peace Corps more than forty years in development. It would be unfortunate if the military did not take advantage of this expertise, as well as incorporating at least a sampling of the Peace Corps three goals: train others, promote an understanding of Americans, and bring the world back home.


PKSOI Fellows/Interns Update

by Karen Finkenbinder

PKSOI is very fortunate to have Fellows and Interns from a variety of academic and professional institutions. This issue we focus on one of our Fellows -

Nick Armstrong is a Research Fellow with the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), a research center jointly sponsored by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and the College of Law at Syracuse University. His research lies in the areas of international security and public management with a focus on postconflict statebuilding, security sector reform, and institutional resilience. Before joining INSCT, Nick served for eight years as a U.S. Army artillery officer. Throughout his tenure, he served in numerous leadership and staff positions, to include Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy Commanding General and Speechwriter to the Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division. Armstrong is a combat veteran with operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia spanning the full spectrum of military operations from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to counterinsurgency and combat operations.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Nick also holds a Master of Public Administration (MPA) and an advanced certificate (CAS) in Security Studies from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Nick is currently pursuing a security-focused Ph.D. and advanced certificate in Postconflict Reconstruction at the Maxwell School. Nick and Jacki Chura-Beaver recently published Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer.

INTERNS: PKSOI received 51 intern applications for the summer of 2011. As much as we would like to accept them all, we cannot. Our staff felt like a college admissions team and as most of us have college-aged children; it gave us a great deal of empathy for the difficult task of deciding whom to accept. We narrowed the pool to 19 – 8 of those graduate students – the undergraduates split among service academy cadets and students from Dickinson College, Pennsylvania State University, Tufts University, Georgetown University, and St. Mary’s University. Most of the graduate students and a few undergraduates are with us all summer; the others are here incrementally. Our philosophy is that each intern must have a real project, no “make work” here. We enjoy their presence – they bring youth, enthusiasm, novel ways of thinking and lower our staffs’ mean age.
Editor’s Note: This is an abridged version of the report on a MARO workshop conducted by PKSOI and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in December, 2010. The full report is available on the PKSOI website.

Foreword

LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator
Former Force Commander United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

What the MARO Project proposes, and indeed explores in considerable detail, is nothing short of a fundamental shift in thinking from the “whether” to the “how” of intervention. Mass atrocities are operationally unique; this important recognition has paved the path for MARO’s adoption into relevant military doctrine and its subsequent—and no less consequential—consideration at the top levels of policy-making. The Workshop convened in December 2010 was an essential step in addressing, among others, what Sarah Sewall called the “Inchoate Middle Ground” between mass atrocity prevention and response, a challenge being tackled presently at different levels and bureaus of the U.S. Government. While much progress has been made in addressing how to shore up this disconnect, much work remains.

Experience has taught me that whether at the policy, operational or tactical levels, actors’ roles and responsibilities must be clearly, expressly defined. Although MARO’s institutionalization and development within the U.S. makes mass atrocity planning, prevention and response sound exclusively like an American problem, this is quite obviously not the case. Nonetheless, without American engagement and leadership other actors will be ill-positioned to assess their own potential for influence and assistance. Though efforts have been made to identify and define key USG interagency roles, those of non-USG actors—including international and regional organizations, foreign governments, civil society and many others—must be more clearly spelled out. This area, the focus of the “Comprehensive Engagement” conference working group, is the fundamental next step. Burden-sharing not only makes intervention scenarios more palatable and appear to be more legitimate, it also allows a multitude of actors to operationalize their comparative advantages in order to achieve a unity of purpose.

In a perfect world there would be no need for MARO planning. And in the ideal world of military planning, any potential MARO would be deployed without any wrinkles. But in this world, a MARO will not only be about Army Operating Concepts but a whole system or package that will have to leverage the expertise, professionalism, logistic and strategic capabilities, and other resources of many actors and communities of practice. The campaign for MAROs will not be waged exclusively in the halls of decision-makers and on the battlefields of failed states but, as we know, too—and as we have seen through the revolutions spreading across North Africa and the Middle East—in the public’s imagination. It might thus be worthwhile to explore how broad-based support may be built within MARO-ready countries and at various levels of society to educate advocates in MARO-speak and build the critical mass necessary for the execution of MARO.

The work achieved here, and the challenges going forward, will consume many of our efforts for years to come. Nonetheless, we must embrace readily this task—for lives literally are at stake.

Allons-y,
LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator
A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) is an operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. Recent U.S. Government strategic documents including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) address the importance of preventing mass atrocities, and the NSS and QDR raise the possibility of military intervention if necessary. The MARO Project began in 2007 and has been a collaborative effort between Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The MARO Military Planning Handbook, which is intended to assist military forces that may have to plan for or conduct such interventions, was published in May 2010.

The first part of the MARO Handbook provides some conceptual considerations regarding MARO situations. These include the multi-party dynamics (between perpetrators, victims, interveners, and other actors which may be further sub-divided into bystanders, positive influences, and negative influences); the illusion of impartiality; and escalatory dynamics. This section also addresses several operational and political implications including:

- Different Information, From the Outset
- Advance Interagency Planning
- Speed Versus Mass
- The Power of Witness
- Symptoms or Root Causes—Can There Be A Handoff?
- Immediate Non-Military Requirements
- Moral Dilemmas
- Political Guidance

The second part of the handbook, and most of the annexes, are intended to support military planning required to understand the operational environment, frame the problem set, and develop an operational design. These sections support mission analysis, course of action development, and the creation of a MARO concept of operations (CONOPS). These discussions attempt to adapt military planning constructs to MARO situations and provide planners “70% solutions” that can be refined for particular cases. For example, the handbook describes how a MARO contingency plan can conform to the standard doctrinal planning phases:

- Phase 0: Shape (normal day-to-day affairs, theater security cooperation, planning)
- Phase I: Deter (crisis management, military support to diplomacy, shows of force, preparations)
- Phase II: Seize Initiative (initial deployment, secure footholds, establish credibility, secure vulnerable populations, attack resisters)
- Phase III: Dominate (main body deployment, secure necessary area, eliminate organized resistance, establish Transitional Military Authority)
- Phase IV: Stabilize (transfer responsibility to Transitional Civilian Authority, set conditions for Phase V)
- Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transition to original government, new indigenous government, or other legitimate authority)

While the MARO Handbook focuses primarily on the “intervention” (response) phases (II and III) and offers seven different conceptual approaches, planning may also have to address the earlier “prevention” phases (0 and I) and the subsequent “rebuild” phases (IV and V).

The third part of the handbook briefly addresses Future Research Areas and Ways Forward, and as an important step in this process the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy co-hosted a workshop on Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) in December 2010. The event followed the earlier publication of the MARO Military Planning Handbook, and was attended by 85 people from a diverse range of organizations. The workshop featured presentations by Sarah Sewall (Harvard Kennedy School); Dwight Raymond (PKSOI); Mike McNerney (Defense Department); Alison Giffen (Stimson Center); Linda Bishai (United States Institute of Peace); Tim Shortley (State Department); Colonel Stephen Mariano (United States Army Africa); Victoria Holt (State Department); James Waller (Keene State College); Sally Chin (Harvard Kennedy School); and Rosa Brooks (Defense Department).

Additionally, the workshop included breakout discussion groups on several topical areas; results of these sessions are elaborated upon in the full version of the report. To facilitate an open exchange of ideas, the workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution. The plenary sessions and working group discussions provided numerous useful insights concerning mass atrocity prevention and response. Three themes, however, seem particularly important for this widening community of interest.
The first workshop theme is what one speaker termed the “Inchoate Middle Ground between Prevention and Response.” Most would readily agree that preventing a mass atrocity situation in the first place is far better than having to intervene militarily, particularly since this implies that a mass atrocity does not occur. Within the U.S. Government, prevention is primarily the responsibility of the State Department and involves recognizing potential mass atrocity scenarios and investing resources to make them less likely. In principle, prevention occurs with prudent day-to-day engagement and diplomacy; it may be subsumed under a broader effort to stabilize or develop a host nation. With modest adjustments, U.S. military “Phase 0” security cooperation activities may constructively assist wider governmental efforts to prevent a mass atrocity situation from developing.

Prevention efforts, however, may be insufficient: “As a concept, prevention is often simultaneously ill-defined and all-encompassing.... [P]revention suggests that the solution to mass atrocities lies with stable, economically viable states that respect the human rights of all citizens. What problem would this not solve? This is a tautology, not a strategy.” In some situations, a military response may be required. A mass atrocity intervention would likely involve the commitment of a sizeable military force with participating U.S. units under a military chain of command responsible to the Secretary of Defense. Although non-military components of the U.S. government would not be subordinated to the military, in such cases diplomatic and other instruments would likely perform a supporting role until the situation stabilizes. A military commander is given a direct mission to halt mass atrocities or stabilize a situation and employs forces accordingly; this roughly coincides with Phases II and III of the joint phasing construct.

The “inchoate middle” refers to situations that require more than routine day-to-day activities (prevention-plus) but occur before a coercive intervention (response-minus). Disturbing events such as an increase in hate media, perpetrator mobilization, and increased acts of violence may indicate that a nation seems to be sliding towards a mass atrocity situation. In such cases, policymakers may seek ways to manage the apparent crisis and reverse these trends. They may also seek options “between the extremes of doing nothing and sending in the Marines.” One workshop participant recounted a recent circular conversation that essentially went as follows:

Policy Representative: What can the military do in this situation?

Military Representative: What is my mission?

Policy Representative: I can’t tell you the mission until I know what you can do.

Military Representative: I can’t tell you what I can do until I know the mission.

Within the context of Phase I (Deter), military instruments can be employed as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to support diplomatic efforts. FDOs may have different objectives such as: to monitor perpetrators and expose them to international scrutiny; establish credibility or build capability for a potential intervention; protect potential victims; dissuade, punish, or isolate perpetrators; or build and demonstrate international resolve.

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Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response: Military Roles
The MARO Handbook offers some suggestions using the military in a preventive role, and categorizes potential FDOs based upon their resource intensity, degree of risk, and potential encroachment on host nation sovereignty. It notes that, during periods of heightened concerns, pre-existing activities during Phase 0 (Shape) might be enhanced or reframed to provide some value as FDOs. This point was also emphasized by some of the workshop participants, and the principle is not limited to military activities as many other government programs have existing programs that can be capitalized upon in order to address a deteriorating situation.

A second workshop theme is the potential use of Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response as an Instrumental Vehicle to address functional issues, particularly with respect to comprehensive engagement and inter-organizational coordination. A wide array of organizations, inside and outside of the U.S. government, would be potentially significant in a mass atrocity situation. Some organizations tend to have a significant topical focus on issues such as mass atrocities, human rights, war crimes, or the Protection of Civilians. Others tend to specialize in regional affairs or functional issues such as logistics, communications, counterinsurgency, security force assistance, interagency coordination, peacekeeping, terrorism, or other matters. Many workshop participants expressed concern about the collective ability to identify emerging problems, forge a common purpose, bolster preventive efforts, and respond as necessary.

Whether at the policy level or in remote areas of operation, addressing modern security challenges requires a comprehensive approach in which military and non-military actors employ military and non-military methods to achieve military and non-military goals. With an increasing emphasis upon intra-state conflict, stabilization, and reconstruction, inter-organizational coordination is more important than ever. Preferably, information-sharing and coordination relationships should be established before a crisis and capitalized upon if one develops, rather than the haphazard alternative of forcing these relationships after a crisis is well under way. A potential obstacle to pre-crisis coordination is the lack of capacity or motivation among the relevant parties to do so. Mass atrocity scenarios may be useful in furthering these relationships, in part because the objective (stopping the mass killing of defenseless civilians) is one which most actors view as important. Moreover, the urgency of mass atrocity cases can enhance their value as planning scenarios, because if an organization can respond adequately to a mass atrocity situation, it likely would find other cases less challenging.

For example, military stability operations doctrine recognizes that most stabilization tasks are best performed by non-military actors, including NGOs, and these organizations may already be active in the host nation (HN) before an intervention. Many of these organizations, however, are reluctant to be perceived as military partners in most situations and will avoid being “coordinated.” Mass atrocity scenarios may provide sufficient incentive for NGO representatives, or others with NGO experience, to engage in discussions or exercises with the U.S. government and military, which would permit greater familiarity with NGO capabilities and requirements.

One issue when considering inter-organizational dialogue regarding mass atrocities is whether scenarios should be fictional or based upon real-world cases. While realism is normally preferred, actual cases will likely be politically sensitive and dissuade some participants from being associated with them.

The third and perhaps most significant workshop theme is Information Management and Policy Formulation. One of the working groups focused on policy issues, and they were prominent in the other working group discussions as well. Indeed, during the MARO project’s lifespan some skeptics have opined that the main void has been in the policy arena, rather than in military capability and doctrine.

Mass atrocity responses frequently will be a race against time, and consequently will demand an effective national-level cycle of observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA). However, each of these steps is laden with friction points and collectively they are less than ideal. An underlying theme of Samantha Power’s book A Problem from Hell is that the U.S. government’s policy-making process is skewed towards inaction, which partially explains American passivity during mass atrocity situations. More than one workshop speaker noted that government processes emphasize the potential risks and costs of positive action, thus resulting in inertia. Such tendencies were satirized in one episode of the BBC series Yes, Prime Minister, which presented the Foreign Ministry’s four-stage approach to managing a foreign policy crisis:

**Stage 1:** We say that nothing is going to happen.

**Stage 2:** We say that something may be going to happen, but we should do nothing about it.

**Stage 3:** We say that maybe we should do something about it, but there’s nothing we can do.

**Stage 4:** We say that maybe there was something we could have done but it’s too late now.
Practitioners who attended the workshop noted that during a crisis such as South Sudan there is usually a flurry of activity. There are lots of interesting meetings attended by interesting people, but some questioned whether these meetings have much practical impact in terms of efficiently “teeing up” information for decision-makers at different levels. In other words, the high level of internal activity does not generate action or actual decisions.

The MARO Handbook is agnostic about whether to intervene; it is intended to assist military forces in determining how to operate if political leadership decides that an intervention should occur. Some workshop participants indicated a similar policy guidebook could usefully inform members of the interagency policy community how to sift through information and formulate appropriate policy options for decision-makers. Such a handbook might clarify policy-making and governmental planning processes, identify participants and stakeholders, and address relevant considerations for contingency and crisis response situations. Additionally, the policy handbook would discuss the application of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of power to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

The workshop included a panel of experts who discussed prospects for South Sudan, which had its referendum a month after the workshop. Many observers have been concerned about the possibility of mass atrocities related to the secession; they could be manifested in North-South violence that centers on Abyei, South-South violence between tribes and other various armed groups, or a resurgence of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that exploits an anticipated security vacuum in South Sudan. Panelists also noted that another major area of concern includes violence against southern minorities in the north, and vice-versa. Additionally, South Sudan has complex linkages with two other mass atrocity situations in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The panel also noted that, in addition to the January referendum, the expiration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in July 2011 could prompt an outbreak of widespread violence. One panelist noted that a contributing factor could be a backlash by hardliners in the north that might seek to topple the Bashir government, establish Islamist rule, and reverse the perceived breakup of the Sudan. Panelists noted that South Sudan has recently been a major priority of the U.S. government, but that the U.S. military presently has limited resident capacity in theater (e.g., logistics, command and control, intelligence, and assigned forces) to launch an operation. A panelist noted that the U.S. country team is generally the focal point of U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities; this is problematic in situations where there is no actual country team in a country, or when multiple country teams or other ambassadorial offices are involved in a situation.

South Sudan was briefly included during some of the working group sessions as a useful case study with which to illustrate discussion topics. In particular, the country’s size, remoteness, and poor infrastructure present significant operational, logistical, and intelligence challenges. Policy complications include the difficulty in influencing a range of national, regional and international actors including the UN and African Union. Additionally, there is the dilemma of whether it is most effective to attempt to work with the Khartoum government as a responsible agent (albeit one whose President has been indicted by the International Criminal Court) or to deal with it as an adversary.

Workshop attendees had the opportunity to participate in small working groups to discuss topical areas in greater detail than was permitted in the plenary sessions. These groups and their respective discussion leaders included:

- Policy (Cliff Bernath, Defense Department)
- Intelligence (Lawrence Woocher, United States Institute of Peace)
- Operations (Dwight Raymond, PKSOI)
- Logistics (Colonel Larry Strobel, PKSOI)
- Comprehensive Engagement (Colonel Lorelei Coplen, PKSOI)
- Moral, Ethical, and Legal Issues (J. Holmes Armstead, Washington & Lee)

Some overlap between the working groups was inevitable, and during the discussions it was evident that the topical areas are interrelated; nevertheless, each of the groups was necessary and collectively they seemed sufficient to address most important mass atrocity prevention and response issues. Working group discussions were loosely structured to identify the parameters and current state of the topical area; analyze tradeoffs, gaps, and challenges; and develop recommendations for the way ahead. One speaker also noted that policy makers will invariably need to understand these complexities in order to formulate coherent options, policies, and plans.

This workshop, and other events that have occurred since the MARO Handbook’s May 2010 publication, provided several insights that if incorporated would usefully improve prevention of and response to mass atrocity situations. As one speaker noted, these efforts can be grouped in three “baskets” which...
address actions by the military, the interagency community and policy formulation, and other international actors.

The military basket includes such areas as exercises, contingency planning, and selected Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) improvements. The MARO Handbook, recently subsumed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO) initiative, was intended to assist these efforts by helping planners to understand the operational environment, frame, the problems, and develop operational solutions.

The second basket regarding interagency coordination and policy formulation is perhaps the area most in need of improvement. The interagency policy handbook mentioned earlier would assist policymakers in mapping stakeholders; implementing the emerging International Operational Response Framework (IORF) to conduct Situation Analysis and Assessment, Formulate Policy, and design strategies and operational plans for crises and contingencies; and applying diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. This handbook should be published by the end of 2011.

As there already is extensive focus on the Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect in a widespread community of interest, it would seem that these are the best avenues to influence the third basket of non-USG actors. As the UN and other international organizations crystallize their concepts, doctrine, and practices regarding PoC and R2P, these efforts incorporate the prevention of and response to mass atrocity situations. There would seem to be value in developing a PoC doctrine-like publication that could be adopted by UN peacekeeping missions, other IGOs, or national militaries.

There are other potential areas for related work. Some workshop participants suggested additional focused events on the working group topical areas to permit in-depth treatment of relevant issues. Additionally, a growing number of organizations are interested in incorporating mass atrocity considerations in planning, exercises, and education. An early topic raised during the MARO workshop was the differentiation between efforts to prevent mass atrocities and potential responses, the tension between the two, and the “inchoate middle ground between these areas.” It was noted that while prevention is obviously preferred, it is important to take the next step and consider response options as well. It should be clear that a credible response capability, understood by would-be perpetrators, provides an added deterrent component and supports prevention as well.

3Sarah Sewall; Dwight Raymond; and Sally Chin, MARO: A Military Planning Handbook (Cambridge, Mass: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2010). These approaches include Saturation; “Oil Spot;” Separation; Safe Areas; Partner Enabling; Containment; and Defeat Perpetrators. Pages 70-87 describe these approaches, explain when they may be appropriate, address their advantages and disadvantages, and discuss how they may be combined to formulate courses of action.
7Ibid., see especially 65-69; 96-7; and 120-127.
On behalf of the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CG, CAC) and in coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, PKSOI hosted the 2011 Army Stability Operations Stakeholders Working Group Conference from 22-24 March at Carlisle Barracks, PA. The primary purpose of the conference was to conduct a thorough review of the 2007 Army Action Plan for Stability Operations (AAP-SO) and to develop a “way ahead” for continued DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities) integration of stability operations.

The AAP-SO, originally approved on 2 August 2007, was intended to focus, integrate and institutionalize Army activities to improve the Army’s capability and capacity to conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment. The AAP-SO also directed the development of DOTMLPF solutions that positively impact the Army’s ability to effectively conduct stability operations. This version of the AAP-SO includes 56 stakeholders and 315 unique tasks.

Since the publication of the AAP-SO, the Army has undergone several changes with respect to the assignment of a proponent for stability operations, most recently assigning proponency of Full Spectrum Operations, including Stability Operations, to the CG CAC. In August of 2010 he assigned PKSOI as the lead for all duties and responsibilities related to integration of DOTMLPF for stability operations across the Army in order to ensure the Army effectively conducts stability operations as an element of full spectrum operations.

Upon assuming these responsibilities, PKSOI conducted a thorough mission analysis and decided that, despite the fact that the AAP-SO is nearly four years old, it still provides a solid foundation for the Army to re-energize its efforts to improve its capability and capacity with respect to stability operations. PKSOI quickly realized that the effort to update the AAP-SO must be collaborative and inclusive and set about establishing a stability operations community of interest.

The first official gathering of this growing community of interest was the PKSOI hosted 2011 Army Stability Operations Stakeholders Working Group Conference held on 22-24 March at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Although attendance at this event was somewhat sparse, PKSOI views this early effort as an unequivocal success. The conference was attended by representatives of 25 different organizations; an additional 4 organizations provided feedback, but were unable to attend. During the conference 216 tasks were thoroughly reviewed. Of those tasks: 50 were modified; 60 were deleted; 6 were merged; and 4 were reassigned. Additionally, 16 new tasks were added.

In addition to the great work done on reviewing the AAP-SO, a couple of other critical things happened at this conference. First, PKSOI was clearly identified as the Army’s lead for DOTMLPF integration of stability operations across the Army. LTG Caslen (CG, CAC) opening comments reinforced this point and also reinforced the importance of the work being done by the conference. Second, comments added by the Army G-3/5/7’s representative on the visibility of stability operations at the OSD level, to include his briefing on the biennial report, added to the importance of the effort.

PKSOI will continue to work with all stakeholders to refine the tasks in the AAP-SO. Immediate efforts will focus on contacting those organizations that were not present at the conference. PKSOI will continue to refine and prepare the AAP-SO for final formal staffing throughout the Army. The current plan calls for a release of the 2011 version of the AAP-SO prior to 30 September 2011. With the continued support of the community of interest, there should not be any problem with meeting this suspense.

In order to leverage collaborative technologies, PKSOI will continue to engage and grow the community of interest through regularly scheduled virtual meetings through Defense Connect OnLine (DCO), Video Teleconferences (VTCs), Teleconferences, online collaboration tools and other methods. If you have an interest in Army stability operations and want to ensure your voice is heard as this effort moves forward, contact PKSOI for inclusion in the community of interest.
Already in FY11 we have had some great successes with SOLLIMS technical development – especially in the area of data-sharing between separate web-based database environments. Working in conjunction with the development team at the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), by applying a web services approach, we now have the capability to share individual unclassified Observations and Recommendations (O&R's) across both databases.

This approach allows users to logon to either the JCISFA unclassified website or SOLLIMS and, using existing O&R search engines within each site, be able to “discover” data that exists in either database.

This technical approach is now being looked at by the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) community as a possible way to share data across the JLLIS Tier 1 subsites to allow full visibility of content across all tiers.

For more information about the web services initiative contact us at: CARL_SOLLIMS@us.army.mil

CIV – MIL Training Vignettes

By the end of FY11 we expect to be able to provide vetted civ-mil training vignettes and associated materials to our user community. Watch for these!

Other SOLLIMS Initiatives:

Support to USAWC International Fellows. Once the international students graduate, they no longer have access to the knowledge base that their U.S. counterparts enjoy. We are looking to provide a knowledge environment for them via SOLLIMS that supports their ‘life long learning’ requirements and fosters continuing camaraderie with U.S. coalition partner nations.
PKSOI, a member of the IAPTC since 1995, and the United States Army War College will host the next annual general meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The 17th annual conference will be held during the week of 13 November 2011. This will be the first time the US has hosted this event.

The aim of the Association is to facilitate communication and exchange of information between various peacekeeping training centers worldwide (for more details about the IAPTC, click on the link below.) The IAPTC meeting is a prestigious and highly visible event that brings together all of the peace training centers of the world. Attendees include the heads of these institutions and senior subject matter experts from the international peacekeeping community at the Ambassador, 3-star General Officer, and NGO senior administrator level. The IAPTC promotes better understanding of peacekeeping, its goals and objectives, and of the methods used in training for peace operations of all types. The conference is intended to broaden contacts between various international organizations, peacekeeping training centers and institutions, universities, and other interested groups, leading to more effective peace operations. The IAPTC offers peacekeeping training center personnel a forum for discussions relating to training. The Annual Conference includes both a broad multi-disciplinary agenda of interest to all centers as well as more specialized segments for military, civilian, and police centers.

The Executive Committee Meeting (ECM) of IAPTC was held the week of 27 March at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania to confirm facilities and schedules, explore themes, and nominate guest speakers and panel members. Attendees included Brigadier General Abul Basher Imamuzzaman, Commandant of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) and current IAPTC President; Assistant Commissioner Frank Prendergast of the Australian Federal Police and past president of the IAPTC; Colonel MK Bindal from the IAPTC Secretariat at India’s Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping, and Mr. Petteri Taitto from the Crisis Management Centre Finland, whose organization is sponsoring the 2012 Annual General Meeting.

As the themes and speakers will be finalized over the next months, continue to check the IAPTC website for details. These details along with reservation instructions and other information concerning the 2011 annual meeting will also be published in the next PKSOI Journal and other media as it becomes available.

IAPTC Website: http://www.iaptc.org/
Volume 1, Issue 3

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Announcing the July theme: Building Capacity

If you are interested in contributing to the journal, send your letter or articles for submission to the PKSOI Publications Coordinator: Carl_PKSOIResearchandPublications@conus.army.mil no later than 15 June 2011 for consideration in the next edition. Also provide sufficient contact information. Note that articles should reflect the topic of Building Capacity as it relates to Peace and Stability Operations. The Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only, and in coordination with original author.

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