Civil Military Teaming:
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE

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National Conference Center
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Teaming Challenges and Best Practices

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Welcome to a new year and the latest iteration of the Journal. In this addition, we address Challenges to CivMil integration. Some of these challenges include: limited available time for civilian training; incomplete understanding of required knowledge and skill sets; varied deployment schedules; the inability to build Unity of Purpose; and a lack of emphasis on pre-deployment training from senior departmental leadership. To succeed in complex operations, U.S. governmental departments and our partners must institutionalize an education and training construct that provides the necessary knowledge and skills to support CivMil integration, while maximizing the capabilities of each organization. Articles in this edition provide perspectives on developing a comprehensive senior leader development program for Peace and Stability Operations (PSO) and the incorporation of Lessons Learned into curriculum.

The initial article addresses the findings from PKSOI’s October 2010 Stability Operations Training and Education Conference. This conference brought together practitioners and educators to address CivMil teaming challenges under a variety of PSO environments. The conference goal was to establish a systematic methodology for capturing and validating teaming challenges from the field, and to incorporate Lessons Learned (LL) into curriculum development. Understanding culture, building relationships and negotiating with host nation officials were identified as essential skill sets for successful PSO. These skills require immersive classroom instruction partnered with practical application to develop true cognitive understanding. Three findings from the 2010 conference will be studied and addressed at the 2011 conference: develop a community wide approach for capturing whole of government (WOG) LL; identify essential Knowledge Skills and Abilities for successful Civ-Mil PSO; define WOG practitioner learning objectives to drive the development of scenarios, case studies and vignettes.

The second article, by Professor William Flavin, highlights the 3rd International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations discussion on strengthening the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in Multidimensional Peace Operations. While host governments have primary PoC responsibility, PoC is part of the UN Charter despite the lack of a universal understanding of the concept. Political commitment is a PoC major challenge, especially when host nation and warring parties could be accused of PoC atrocities. A mission-wide PoC strategy is necessary to integrate military and policing efforts with long term objectives of disarmament-demobilization-reintegration and community policing efforts. All UN elements must have requisite training, equipment, psychological preparation and support from their government to undertake the necessary tasks.

After reviewing international challenges, Dr. James Embrey outlines the Army’s senior leader education strategy for PSO. PKSOI has inculcated the PSO principles and doctrine into existing core curriculum and electives at the US. Army War College through extensive interaction with War College instructors during the faculty and curriculum development processes. PKSOI is developing a distance learning module to instruct practitioners on key PSO policy, doctrine and principles that enhance performance in planning for and operating in a PSO environment from a Whole of Government and United Nations Comprehensive Approach perspective. An essential element of PSO training is the integral incorporation of case studies, scenarios and vignettes to facilitate the learning process. Integrated practical field application exercises are essential culminating endeavors prior to deployment to ensure PSO principals comprehend and operational integration with other governmental partners.

The fourth article from Nathan Freier on “The Effective Advisor—Steps Toward Providing Strategic Advice,” provides an effective methodology for senior leaders in complex contingencies to rely on the counsel they receive from close advisors. This type of unfiltered advice bypasses the normal staff chain and can be the most influential and therefore must be the most informed advice. This article focuses on how one prepares for the inevitable day they are asked, “What do you think?”

The fifth article from Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory addresses an innovative simulation enabling SO planners to exercise various courses of action. Players leverage various instruments of national power and social indicators to discern the most appropriate influencers to achieve expected goals. The gaming model can be used to validate a proposed SO strategy.

We hope you find these articles thought provoking and we encourage you to open a dialogue with PKSOI on one of these subjects.
Conference Report: Peace and Stability Operations Education & Training:
Teaming Challenges and Best Practices
by Lisa Leicht

From 26 to 28 October 2010, PKSOI held the 5th annual Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (SOTEW), entitled “Peace and Stability Operations Education and Training: Teaming Challenges and Best Practices” at the National Conference Center, Lansdowne, Virginia. The workshop provided a forum for trainers and educators from within U.S. Government (USG) civilian and military agencies, academic institutions, and international and non-government organizations to discuss best practices in Stability Operations (SO) training and education (T&E), in order to develop future collaborative projects in management, delivery, and evaluation tools. The goal is to create synergistic effective training and education programs throughout the community while reducing redundancy along common task lines.

The 2010 SOTEW conference addressed current challenges and best practices toward improving civilian and military (CivMil) teaming efforts from a variety of different Peace and Stability Operational environments from a comprehensive approach perspective. The conference investigated the collection, validation, distribution and incorporation process of integrating lessons learned into Stability Operations T&E curricula.

The conference brought together over 130 trainers, educators and practitioners from the U.S. and international governmental and military organizations, international and non-governmental organizations, military and civilian peace and stability training centers, and academic institutions. Three key note speakers set the stage for the follow-on panels by addressing the host nation and U.S. National perspectives on the operational challenges to a comprehensive approach. The conference consisted of panel presentations addressing specific Peace and Stability Operational environments, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan. The final panel assessed the most appropriate model for collecting observations from the field, validating the content, distributing the most comprehensive best practices, and then incorporating those lessons learned into Peace & Stability Operations (PSO) curricula.

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

The Honorable Ali Jalali
Minister Ali Jalali, former Afghan Minister of the Interior, provided a Host Nation perspective on International teaming challenges in Afghanistan. Minister Jalali presented four challenges for the international community to address, if Afghanistan is to become a self-reliant entity. Afghanistan will only achieve peace and prosperity through a whole-of-government approach addressing protection of civilians’ security concerns; delivery of essential services; establishment of rule of law and a sustainable justice system; and safeguarding of national interests. These goals must meet host nation approval, and must be sustainable by Afghan leaders. The international community must develop a coherent vision for the future of Afghanistan and must coordinate their efforts to achieve peace in Afghanistan and in the region. The Afghan government has been hampered by the failure of the international community to develop and adhere to a long-term plan for the future of Afghanistan. Subversion from abroad undermines the support of the Afghan people for the central government, allowing foreign supporters of insurgencies to enter Afghanistan and assist the Taliban in the subversion of the Afghan government. International actors must take seriously the penetration of Afghan borders by supporters of insurgencies, and must work to prevent subversive forces from undermining the confidence of the Afghan people in their government.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Susan D. Page
The workshop’s second keynote speaker was Susan D. Page, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Ms. Page outlined five priorities that govern the USG’s relationships with African countries. The U.S. is focused on promoting good government throughout Africa by helping to build strong, stable democracies and by protecting democratic gains made in recent years. The U.S. administration is also committed to working alongside African countries to advance sustainable economic growth. The U.S. intends to continue its focus on public health and health-related issues in Africa by working with African governments and civilan organizations to ensure that quality health care is accessible to all communities. The U.S. is committed to working with African governments and the international community to help prevent, resolve and mitigate conflicts and disputes. And finally, the U.S. intends to deepen its focus on transnational challenges facing African countries, e.g., trafficking in persons, arms and illegal drugs; and the illegal exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources. U.S. priorities play a critical role in balancing UN and Host Nation interests in Africa.

LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr.
The first key note speaker for the second day of the SOTEW was LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., commander of the Combined Arms
Center, who spoke on Interagency Teaming Challenges in Iraq. He presented four issues to consider in connection with challenges in Iraq.

**First**, security is a challenge of paramount importance. The government capacity to establish security, including securing roads and borders to ensure the flow of goods and services, makes a difference in the everyday lives of the Iraqi people. The populace is beginning to view the Iraqi government as legitimate due to the improving economy and flow of essential services, thus weakening the insurgents’ argument that the government lacks capacity to secure key infrastructure nodes.

**Second**, communication and cooperation are essential. U.S. Army personnel received limited training in establishing cooperative relationships with other government agencies, and even less exposure to building host nation governments and economies. U.S., international and Host-Nation partners must work in concert to establish security and to strengthen the institutions which depend on security, e.g., judicial institutions.

**Third**, one of the key doctrines of counterinsurgency is reestablishing the local natural hierarchy in order to legitimize authority. Ignoring the local hierarchy leads to resolving Iraqi problems with American solutions, which likely results in failure. As the PRTs shifted ownership of the microloans process to the provincial councils, the local government became empowered in the eyes of the population.

**Fourth**, a major challenge is to train the trainers to function in complex environments. The ability to function in kinetic environments is not enough. For coaching and mentoring to be successful, U.S. forces must establish partnerships with host nation counterparts based on interpersonal relationships.

**PANEL DISCUSSIONS**

**UN Integrated Mission Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The challenge of translational research is to resist the tendency to avoid regions where research is particularly problematic and complex, e.g., areas presenting linguistic and cultural barriers, or those that are in a constant state of flux. Research in these regions is all the more important because they are less well understood than more stable areas. Research should be triangulated. Multiple methodologies and surveys of multiple populations are more complex than more limited research strategies, but yield more accurate and more useful results. Gender-based violence is a security issue that needs to be incorporated into strategic thinking about security measures. Rape of a community’s women destroys households and families, and can have a lasting effect on the social structure and the economy of a community. Communities that encourage women to work can have a positive, empowering effect on women who have been raped, as well as improving the local economy. While enhanced communication between civilians and military personnel improves efficiency, the nature of civilian functions needs to be clarified in order to increase effectiveness.

**Continuity of Stability and Reconstruction Initiatives in Haiti during a Disaster Response**

The U.S. needs to develop a comprehensive disaster plan which includes provisions for unity of command, communication systems and mechanisms to evaluate progress of relief efforts. Pre-deployment training, including role-playing, needs to be designed specifically to prepare civilians and military personnel to work together in a crisis. Of paramount importance during the planning phase is to carefully consider the equal distribution of relief supplies, while allocating adequate logistical support to ensure the effective distribution of relief supplies to the most stricken population.

**Comparison of CivMil PRT Teaming Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan**

One of the challenges common to both Iraq and Afghanistan is the disconnect between higher and lower political levels. National and sub-national political bodies are not well coordinated. A related challenge is the fact that provinces within each country differ substantially from one another. There is a tendency to assume, often incorrectly, that lessons learned in one province are transferable to other provinces within the same country. There is an underlying presumption that the mere construction of a building or an institution results in the achievement of specific long-term goals. For example, the construction of a school is presumed to result in a more educated local population, although this is not necessarily the case. The presence of new facilities or institutions does not guarantee that the purposes for which they were constructed will be fulfilled.
Incorporation of Lessons Learned into Curriculum Development and Practical Application

Despite the enormous efforts of large numbers of very bright people, there is an increasing tendency for the same conflicts to recur in the same places. Lessons are not always adequately learned. Absorbing lessons learned takes time. Lessons learned from several months in the field may take several weeks to learn. By sending people into the field with inadequate knowledge of local languages and cultures, we are undercutting our own efforts. Those who deploy need to know the local language, culture and history before deployment. Local ownership is necessary. However, attempts to encourage local ownership are likely to fail if those deployed do not have adequate knowledge of the cultural context.

CONFERENCE FINDINGS

One theme became apparent throughout the conference that being that the PSO T&E community needs to establish a systematic, cognitive, community-wide approach for developing a comprehensive approach to lessons anticipated.

Personal interaction and knowledge of cultural context are paramount. Awareness of, and respect for, cultural differences is critical to achieving host nation buy-in for R&S efforts. An essential step in relationship building is developing trust. If one can build trust through personal relationships with counterparts, then negotiations become simpler when attempting to gain concurrence toward common goals and objectives. Negotiation skills must be integrated into all senior leader curriculums.

Case Studies, scenarios and vignettes are terms for which many organizations have different utilities and definitions. We need to create a community wide set of definitions and practical applications for these terms, and define the components of comprehensive Whole of Government case studies, scenarios or vignettes. These programs should be built in a collaborative environment and stored in an easily accessible location for the entire community to use in training and education packets. The utility of these programs is to highlight tangible actors and outcomes which offer the learner the opportunity to apply these scenarios to new circumstances.

Immersive experiences, combined with cultural and linguistic knowledge, are necessary components of training. An immersive approach to training is always better than an observational one. Immersive training causes individuals to practically apply educational theory to a realistic, complex decision making scenario in an environment where the practitioner can learn from his or her mistakes, prior to deployment. SO practitioners must always question the norm, and become comfortable in a highly ambiguous environment, in order to adapt their decision making process to match the circumstances.

TRAINING, EDUCATION, EXERCISES AND EXPERIMENTS TE3 WAY AHEAD

After reviewing the findings from the 2010 SOTEC, the USG Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Sub-IPC on Training, Education, Exercises and Experiments (TE3) challenged the conference attendees and stakeholders to collaboratively research the following concerns, and consider these challenges leading up to the 2011 conference. The findings of this research will be presented at the 2011 conference, and will help develop the conference theme.

The TE3 is in the process of completing a Functional Essential Task list, which is a step toward defining PSO practitioners’ skills. A missing element is defining the characteristics and essential skills sets for PSO leaders. The initial TE3 challenge is to identify and stratify ten or less fundamental skills for successful CivMil teaming.

The second TE3 challenge is to develop a list of ten or less PSO essential learning objectives, which would drive scenario and vignette development.

The final TE3 challenge is based on the findings from the fourth SOTEC panel recommending that the PSO T&E community develop an implementation strategy for collecting, validating and disseminating lessons learned, ultimately for inculcation into PSO curriculum.

SOTEC STAKEHOLDERS WAY AHEAD

The SOTEC stakeholders met immediately after the conclusion of the conference and agreed to transition back to the annual workshop format, and attempt to coordinate dates with other key conferences to enhance international participation. The stakeholders will meet quarterly via teleconference or video teleconference to discuss research initiatives, develop conference themes and build a five year roadmap to guide discussions and actions. The Stakeholders will establish working groups for 2-3 key research topics to feed into the 2011 workshop theme. PKSOI will provide findings/recommendations from the conference and stakeholders meeting to the TE3 for consideration when developing their FY11 work plan.
The Third International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations met in Queanbeyan, Australia 27-29 April 2010 to discuss the Challenges of Strengthening the Protection of Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations. The discussion was based on the background paper “Challenges of Strengthening the Protection of Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations: Consolidated Recommendations” by William Durch and Alison Giffen from the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington D.C. and is located @ http://www.stimson.org/

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations issues and matters in a timely, effective and inclusive manner. It is composed of 17 partner nations the aim of which is to contribute to the global dialogue on the preparation, implementation and evaluation of peace operations, to generate practical recommendations and to encourage action for their effective implementation.

Separately, Forum participants also engaged upon the ongoing Challenges Partnership project Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations. While relevant to POC, this project covers a much broader range of issues of importance to mission leadership. The project report, when finalized and published, will provide a valuable contribution to enhancing UN peacekeeping.

Within the overall theme, the Forum discussed and presented papers and discussion on the following topics: The overall summary of these topics is located @ http://www.challenges-forum.org/cms/Themes.do?pageId=188

- The importance of protecting civilians
- The challenges of protecting civilians
- The responsibilities for protecting civilians

The importance of protecting civilians

The POC responsibilities of peacekeepers have now become a critical focus of the international community. The issue has commanded international attention following high profile civilian protection challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the centrality of protection in the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the focus of civilian protection by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Many resolutions, policy papers and studies have been published since 2008 dealing with various aspects of this issue.

While host state governments have primary responsibility for ensuring the security of their civilian populations, the international community has a moral duty to protect civilians from violence. The UN has a special responsibility in this regard as the protection of individuals, through human rights, is at the heart of its Charter. While 1999 was a landmark year for progress on civilian protection with the Security Council specifically mandating POC by UN peacekeepers, ‘Blue Helmets’ have been entrusted with civilian protection since 1961, when the Council in Resolution 161 mandated the use of force to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Republic of the Congo. There is general consensus among the international community regarding the importance of POC, but less agreement regarding the appropriate role for the UN and other external actors in its implementation. The rest of the conference discussed what that role should be.

The Challenges of Protecting Civilians

There is neither a universal understanding of the concept of POC nor of the specific Security Council mandate language, even among the UN institutional family. The humanitarian community, human rights professionals, TCCs/PCCs, the UN Secretariat, senior mission leadership, General Assembly bodies, and even Security Council members, have struggled with the practical meaning of the language. Protection can be viewed in many ways: as a set of legal obligations; as an objective; and as a set of activities. While the DPKO/DFS Concept Note published earlier this year provides much needed strategic clarity, there are several critical ‘gray areas’ that the Concept Note does not address.

The difficulty underlying all of the key operational challenges (examined below) is that of political commitment. A peacekeeping mission will not be able to effectively protect civilians in the absence of the commitment of the host state and the warring parties to a viable peace process and to the presence of the peacekeeping operation. Long term sustainable POC must include the pursuit of accountability for violence against civilians and fight against for impunity of those who should be
Priorities for the Security Council should include: ensuring security protocols in peace agreements/processes; and involvement in a mission’s disarmament-demobilization-reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and demining activities. Military personnel must have the requisite training, equipment, psychological preparation and support from their government to undertake the necessary tasks. The military component of a peacekeeping mission needs a POC CONOPS that coordinates the protection activities of sub-components and communicates the Force Commander’s intent down to the lowest levels. The military component must have the capacity to gather, analyze and disseminate information, and to connect into mission-wide information capabilities.

Priorities for the Secretariat should include: ensuring early, consistent, frank and more rigorous reporting on civilian protection issues; the development of system-wide protection strategies; and ensuring the inclusion of protection issues in the Strategic Assessment, Under Secretary-General’s Planning Directive, TAM, Secretary-General’s Report, ROE and CONOPS. Other priorities should include undertaking POC capability needs assessments and the further development of doctrine and training.

Priorities for Mission Leadership should include: developing a mission-wide protection strategy; ensuring the inclusion of protection in mission component CONOPS; developing requisite intelligence processes and capabilities; and ensuring a comprehensive understanding of and in a number of ways. They can provide collective protection through the provision of security against criminal threats to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps, or other population centers. They can also contribute to longer-term individual protection through community policing involving developing community partnerships, facilitating organizational transformation and problem solving. One of the most important roles that police can undertake in POC is developing a local policing culture which engenders the confidence of the local population and their willingness to provide information to the police and participate in the maintenance of law and order.

The policy and practice of protection is generally more advanced within the humanitarian community than in the broader peacekeeping community. However the humanitarian community continues to struggle with several protection challenges. The two key challenges are ensuring that their activities do not increase the vulnerability of populations they are trying to assist, and focusing their work and coordinating their activities to ensure that they are able to maintain, and be seen to be maintaining humanitarian principles.

Conclusions

The Responsibilities for Protection of Civilians

Given its key role in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has a unique responsibility for POC. Essentially this responsibility comprises being consistent in identifying attacks against civilians as threats to international peace and security, and responding in a way that facilitates the effective action of the international community. The role of the UN Secretariat is critical to translating mandate language into effective protection activity in the field.

The teams of senior leaders in a UN mission bear an important responsibility for implementing protection mandates. This responsibility centers on developing and implementing a mission-wide protection strategy. The military component of a peacekeeping mission plays a unique and critical role in POC. With its capacity to use force it plays a central role in preventing, deterring and responding to attacks against civilians. However the role of the military extends beyond the physical protection aspects of the mandate, and includes: providing security and support to other protection actors (particularly humanitarian and development actors); observation and facilitation of security protocols in peace agreements/processes; and involvement in a mission’s disarmament-demobilization-reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and demining activities. Military personnel must have the requisite training, equipment, psychological preparation and support from their government to undertake the necessary tasks. The military component of a peacekeeping mission needs a POC CONOPS that coordinates the protection activities of sub-components and communicates the Force Commander’s intent down to the lowest levels. The military component must have the capacity to gather, analyze and disseminate information, and to connect into mission-wide information capabilities.

Protecting civilians is core business for police. Police components in missions can execute their protection responsibilities held responsible. However, due to political sensitivities, Member States often shirk away from making pronouncements, and when such declarations are made they are rarely followed up.

Even when the strategic, conceptual and political challenges can be overcome or minimized, many practical challenges remain to effectively implement POC mandates. These include coordination of efforts among the spectrum of protection actors, the need for clear doctrine and guidance, the need for adequate training, and the need for the requisite quantity, quality and type of resources, and the need to establish viable benchmarking.

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Mission leadership should also ensure that missions with POC mandates have personnel with the requisite POC expertise.

- Priorities for UN TCCs/PCCs should include: ensuring their personnel are appropriately prepared, trained and equipped for protection activity; removing national caveats; and ensuring national political support for the participation of personnel in robust protection activity when necessary. TCCs/PCCs should develop national doctrine on POC. Other priorities should include bolstering the participation of female personnel and officers with specialist skills.

- Priorities for non-UN TCCs/PCCs should include contributing personnel (contingents, niche or strategic reserve) or material resources to UN missions, and supporting existing UN TCCs/PCCs in their preparation and training. Non-UN TCCs/PCCs should also develop national doctrine on POC.

- Priorities for C-34 members should include: supporting the Secretariat in their development of policy and guidance; supporting Secretariat efforts on generating and building requisite intelligence capabilities; and renewing discussions on strategic reserves.

- Priorities for Fifth Committee members should include engaging with the Security Council and the Secretariat to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the resource requirements for POC.

We continue to be very busy with SOLLIMS developments and enhancements to the SOLLIMS online experience. There are many exciting new functions and capabilities that we are looking to implement in FY11 that we believe will be of value to the Peace and Stability Operations (P/So) community. Here are the top priority development initiatives we hope to bring online in FY11:

**SOLLIMS Lite:**

A low bandwidth version of SOLLIMS. At logon the User will be presented an ‘option’ to open SOLLIMS in a “lite” view - needing minimal bandwidth while preserving all of SOLLIMS’ functions and capabilities. (coming 3rd or 4th quarter).

Data Sharing across disparate P/So database environments: Perhaps our most exciting initiative. Using a web-services approach we are working to “Share” Lessons Learned data elements with other P/So lessons data repositories. (“proof-of-principle” coming in 2nd quarter).

**SOLLIMS Mobile:**

A stand-alone version of SOLLIMS that an individual User can download from the SOLLIMS master site and load on their PC or laptop; intended to support O&R data collection in remote areas where there is no Internet connectivity. (coming 4th quarter).

P/So Personalities Directory: creation of an online address book of P/So personalities – inclusive across the JIIM environment.

FY11 looks to be a busy year for the PKSOI SOLLIMS’ team. We encourage your personal input in the form of documents, articles and O&R data entry. Remember, we are always available to provide an online demo of SOLLIMS for you and/or your organization; we can also set up a Tier 1 workspace for your organization at no cost so that you can start building your own focused P/So knowledge environment – embedded within the SOLLIMS architecture.

For more about SOLLIMS Lite and SOLLIMS Mobile or to register for a SOLLIMS account please follow the link provided below:

http://sollims.pksoi.org
PKSOI Approach to Leader Development in Peace and Stability Operations
by Dr. James Embrey

In contributing to U.S. strategic success in violent conflict, joint military forces integrate their efforts with interagency and multinational partners to generate and exercise Land Power that accomplish two distinct missions: to defeat violent adversaries that block policy success and to embrace stability that secures and protects people, terrain and resources while creating the conditions for longer term efforts at reconstruction and development. However, the focus of education and training within U.S. military forces after Desert Storm onward has been overwhelmingly weighted toward the defeat of enemy forces as the core, unique competency that only intensively-trained military forces can accomplish. Developing leader competency in stability operations has usually been seen as the bill-payer for this focus, given the finite and often limited training time available in both military and civilian arenas alike. In all, this approach has caused us as military leaders to place overwhelming emphasis on sharpening our swords for decisive military success. This has left the rest of our arsenal of professional competencies, particularly those needed to transform short-term “victory” into strategic success during post-conflict operations, to rust away, unmaintained, in a corner of our senior leaders’ arsenals.

Why Leader Development in Peace and Stability Operations?

Leader Development in both of these areas is a matter of not only following strategic guidance, but of simple necessity for military and civilian leaders alike. For the military, the Secretary of Defense has consistently emphasized that our Nation demands leaders who can envision and utilize military forces in flexible and adaptive ways across a broad spectrum of conflict that spans peace, conflict and war. In addition, our last two Secretaries have directed, through both DoD memoranda and instructions, that stability operations be accorded equal emphasis, preparation, planning and resourcing with that of traditional operations which are centered around delivering decisive force through offensive and defensive operations. However, even more practical considerations prevail: leaders and the forces under their command must be equally skilled in defeating and removing violent threats that block strategic success, and seamlessly transitioning into stabilizing those areas under the temporary control of military forces. It is in the latter that strategic as well as military victory is sealed – by establishing security and restoring the essential elements of governance, human services, and economic viability that then sets the conditions for transforming the environment of conflict into one of sustainable peace which is at the core of overall strategic success.

However, much of recent experience in education and training has been that developing leader knowledge, skills and abilities in both of these areas has been a “big and little brother” approach. While the overwhelming predominance of time has been spent on developing the “core competencies” of offense and defensive operations (and rightfully so, as the U.S. military is the only element of the USG that possesses these unique skills), the “economy of force” effort in developing senior leaders has been in developing understanding for the complexities of stability operations. This is somewhat ironic. While operations focused on kinetic force require in-depth professional expertise, most all of such operations are done within a common joint culture and operational system with agreed upon doctrine, procedures, and standards that provide a common framework for all participants. Ironically, what is under-trained and ill-prepared are the leadership skills needed for more complex, vague and difficult areas – of understanding the dynamics that underlie violent conflict, the diversity of actors and approaches engaged in transforming conflict, and the challenges of working constructively in a common operational environment to develop a “comprehensive approach” – a series of complementary efforts that brings diverse actors together around a common purpose of assisting the host-nation government and peoples to build, what Mr Len Hawley has called, an “enduring, viable peace.”

To most all strategic leaders, the previous statements may seem to be a blinding flash of the obvious. No responsible senior leader would structure for success only in their own organization’s lane, knowing that the resources bought to bear – the “mass” needed for enduring efforts and success – must come from collective, purposeful action. Equally, no military commander would voluntarily surrender the initiative gained through armed conflict to the enemy by failing to ensure that follow-on operations set the conditions for others passing through to assume the lead. However, our current approach does not set us up for success. Military and civilian programs alike emphasize the learning in their own “core” competencies; for military, these include the delivery of force and physical defeat and destruction of enemy/adversary groups. However, this
PKSOI Approach to Leader Development in Peace & Stability Operations

Approach leaves us often unprepared to fight and win against the larger, more confusing “enemy” – the conditions in the operational environment that brought on or perpetuate violent conflict. If not acted upon with the same focused and aggressive manner, the overall lack of governance, essential services, jobs and security may result in the return to violence as the needs of the host nation people are not met, giving rise to old and/or possibly new adversaries. In all, senior leaders must be prepared to envision, design, and direct operations that rapidly and effectively hold and begin the building process from the areas cleared of enemy control, often alongside a diversity of actors who intervene in conflict areas for a variety of reasons.

From the joint perspective, our approach has also been somewhat insular – training and education has focused on mastering military design, planning and execution skills with little “time as available” devoted to understanding the tasks and challenges ahead from the perspectives of key partners across the interagency, international civilian, multinational military and – most importantly – the host nation which we will operate within, alongside of, and for the benefit of. Our lack on emphasis and available time has made the task equally difficult by the lack on interagency emphasis and available numbers for civilian-military (civ-mil) training. Given our joint training and education background over the last two decades, our approach to achieving success has been predictable – military leaders with energy, enthusiasm and commitment are working hard to achieve their own individual/unit version of success and do so without an overarching understanding of the guiding principles, integrating concepts, and inter-organizational challenges as seen from the perspectives of other (potential and necessary) partners looking “outside – in.” In all, our results are also predictable: military organizations applying overwhelming numbers and resources to achieve rapid results are seen by civilian counterparts as demanding, single-minded and overbearing, and receive little buy-in and cooperation for efforts that are seen (internally) as a well thought out, meticulously planned, and well coordinated operations. In “doing things the best we can,” we are the source of our own frustration as we approach things in ways that might not, or cannot, be feasible options given the national and organizational cultures of potential partners. Just as we are the source of our own successes, we are the source of our own frustration and failure – we expect unity of effort, without first achieving unity of understanding and purpose with other actors within the operational environment.

PKSOI Approach: Understanding and Transforming Conflict – Among Adversaries and Partners

As part of its ongoing mission, PKSOI has been working intensively to expand senior leader understanding of peace and stability operations across the Joint Interagency Intergovernment, Multi-national (JIIM) community. Our focus across this broad community has been on discussion and consensus building on the principles, concepts, practices and challenges inherent in successful efforts to establish stability and build enduring peace. Within the military community, our efforts emphasize understanding that winning a conflict and transforming a conflict are not necessarily one in the same. While joint education and training efforts, particularly in the intelligence, maneuver and information operations areas have traditionally focused on identifying, assessing and focusing efforts against armed enemies, PKSOI’s approach focuses on developing leader understanding of the broader dynamics of why conflict occurs and how adversaries – both violent and non-violent – arise from and are supported by conditions that make conflict a first and best option for groups in gaining and/or maintaining their goals. This understanding of conflict also helps us understand why host nation and international actors (and potential partners) intervene in different aspects of the conflict, often for differing purposes, and to achieve differing ends. Last, this focus on assessing the overall conflict (rather than just the adversary) also enables senior leaders to understand the multiple dynamics involved in the crisis area, some of which are constructive and competitive in nature, that must be accounted for and actively managed to bring about agreement among partners, encourage cooperation among those with competing motivations for participating in a peace process, and induce change in a host nation through non-violent competition.

In addition to this emphasis on conflict analysis, our education strategy stresses developing a shared understanding by leaders of the multiple approaches taken in Peace and Stability operations across the JIIM community. Building this understanding of goals, motivations, and methods enables future senior leaders to more effectively form teams and build consensus that span the shared perspective necessary for an effective “comprehensive approach.” These include:

- Understand the United States Government’s (USG) approach to peace and stability operations (PSO), to include:
  - the goals, objectives and principles underlying interagency efforts in “Whole of Government” planning
  - their interrelationship and linkages of this system to the established and emerging DoD/Military Joint Operational
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Adaptive Planning processes

- Understand and analyze the principles, doctrine, organization and practices among theJIIM community, where they converge and diverge, and challenges to effective cooperation within and amongst the following major PSO communities of practice:
  - Military: Army and Joint
  - Interagency: DoS/SCRS, USAID and other key players
  - International: United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations
  - Multinational: NATO operations, as well as regionally focused coalition efforts

- Through the use of modern case studies and present day events, develop future leaders’ perspectives on how to successfully envision, design and plan PSO at the strategic and operational levels

- Analyze the challenges of forming, employing and maintaining multinational civilian and military cooperative efforts under a comprehensive approach in a complex environment

In developing our overall program and course content, we center our efforts around four major areas for leader understanding and analysis of peace and stability operations across the spectrum of conflict. In each of these, we seek to develop leader knowledge, skill and abilities (KSAs) in the following areas that we consider critical to professional effectiveness:

**Area #1: Understanding the Strategic and Operational Environment.** Efforts in this foundational area focus on developing leader abilities to understand the complex and interrelated aspects of the conflict environment. Additionally, this sets the stage for in-depth learning by developing an effective framework built around selected guiding principles and concepts essential for overall effective civ-mil integration, along with an appreciation for the critical contributions made by stability operations in transforming conflict in order to achieve desired military and strategic success. Key elements include:

- Understanding the broadly accepted and utilized “guiding principles” and approved doctrine for stability operations
- Synthesizing the variety of methods in use across the JIIM community for analyzing and assessing the sources, drivers and dynamics of conflict

**Major Areas for Leader Education in Stability Operations**

**Understand the Strategic and Operational Environment:**
- Understand how joint, interagency, multinational, and private efforts can be integrated to achieve strategic success
- Understand how stability operations are envisioned, integrated and assessed in Joint Ops/Campaigns
- Understand ongoing and future stab ops that effect U.S. & allies

**Understand HOW OPERATIONAL EFFORTS ARE EMPLOYED TO ACHIEVE UNIFIED ACTION:**
- Analyze how military and civil operations are integrated through “mutually supporting and supported relationships”

**Envision, Design and Direct Stability Operations:**
- Develop, plan and execute successful stability operations that achieve success through civil-military unity of effort

**Analyze Strategic Considerations and Future Challenges:**
- Analyze case studies – illustrate decisions/challenges for Senior Ldrs
Area #2: Analyzing How Civilian and Military Operational Efforts are Integrated to Achieve Unified Action. Building upon an understanding of the common principles, our program focuses on how effective civil-military operations are informed by focused intelligence and carried out across the 5 major stability sectors. In each stability sector, analysis and discussion focus on how civilian and military efforts are integrated with each side being at various points of the overall campaign either “supporting” or “supported” by one another. Strategic partnering with Interagency efforts is a key theme during our discussion of military “full spectrum” operations in each of the 5 stability sectors, with an emphasis on understanding the major civilian efforts and how military tasks can enable overall success:

» Understanding and applying the “whole of government” approach to stability and reconstruction design and planning
» Understanding multinational perspectives and approaches toward security, stability and reconstruction operations, with emphasis on current coalition, NATO, and UN practices
» Understand and analyze potential points for common efforts with civil programs conducted by NGO, PVO, and academic communities

- "Establishing Civil Security" with military Security Operations, and the conduct of Security Force Assistance in building and/or improving host nation security forces
- "Providing for Justice and Reconciliation" with military supporting efforts to enable Rule of Law under effective civil control
- Providing “Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being,” enabled by military support to provide emergency assistance and restore essential services such as power, water, etc. This block also emphasizes the key actions and contributions of NGO’s/PVO’s in relieving humanitarian suffering and developing human capital through long-term development efforts
- Empowering “Governance and Participation,” enabled by military efforts to support governance development and building leadership/management capacity
- Enabling “Economic Stability and Infrastructure,” supported by military programs designed to support and expand economic opportunity for the populace in stability areas

Senior Leader Education Framework for Stability Operations

Strategic and Operational Environment:
- Overview of Key Principles for Stability Operations
- Operational Environment and Factors for S.O.
- U.S. “Whole of Government Approach” to Stability and Reconstruction
- Multinational Perspectives on Security, Stability, & Reconstruction
- Civil Perspectives and Programs: NGO/PVO’s, Contractors and Academic Community

Operational Efforts – Success by Unified Action:
- Full Spectrum Operations for Civil-Military Unity of Effort;
- Intelligence in Stab Ops and Assessing the Ops Environment
- Strategic Partnering with Interagency Efforts

Effort 1: Emplace Security
Effort 2: Effective Civil Control
Effort 3: Ensure Essential Svcs
Effort 4: Empower Legitimate Govt
Effort 5: Enable Econ Development

Establish Civil Security
Establish Civil Control
Hum Asst & Social Well-Being
Governance & Participation
Spt Econ & Infrstr Develop

Design and Plan Stability Operations: Overview and Process
Exercise 1: Assess the Operational Environment (OE)
Exercise 2: Analyzing Strategic Requirements and Developing Campaign Focus
Exercise 3: Developing CDR’s Vision for Stability Ops throughout the Campaign

Overview of Ongoing Ops
- Future Operational Environment – U.S.
- International Ops – “Hotspots”

Case Studies in Stability Ops
Analyze/illustrate principles, challenges and potential solutions
While discussions focus on the key interrelationships and tasks in each functional area, we stress that efforts must be approached simultaneously across all five sectors, and that success in any one area is insufficient to guarantee overall success. Continued emphasis in on the interrelationship of all areas with one another and on how actions, successes and failures in any one area impact each of the other four remaining areas as well as overall strategic and mission success.

**Area #3: Developing Leader Abilities to Envision, Design and Direct Stability Operations** Leaders must not only know, they must be able to do – to adequately build teams, forge cooperation, and direct effective action during future operations. The key skill for leaders is envisioning success and articulating clear, concise and direct guidance that provides for unity of purpose and effort across a broad range of actors involved in a comprehensive approach. This is also the practical, hands-on portion of the program, designed to exercise senior leader analysis, envisionment and decision-making skill through the use of case-studies and realistic, challenging scenarios that portray the most likely aspects of future crisis environments, the most probable policy guidance that can be expected to guide operational efforts, and the anticipated challenges that civ-mil efforts will face. Using seminar discussion and scenario-based decision making, instructional efforts focus on developing leader understanding and proficiency in:

- Directing the design and planning for restoring stability through joint operations
- Assessing the Operational Environment, using established joint and interagency methods such as Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information Systems (PMESII) and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)
- Synthesizing strategic/operational requirements and guidance, and determining the objectives and tasks required for overall success in restoring stability
- Developing the mission and vision for overall campaign/strategic success in both defeating adversaries and establishing stability, along with the capability to clearly and succinctly deliver this guidance to superiors for approval, to contemporaries for approval/buy-in, and subordinates for effective planning and execution

**Area #4: Strategic Considerations and Future Challenges.** Senior Leaders must maintain currency in understanding the breadth and depth of ongoing peace and stability operations, and how practices and techniques being employed are or are not effective. Through the presentation of historical case studies that provide examples of key principles and challenges, the examination of lessons learned and best practices emerging from the field, and the analysis of ongoing operations that provide insights on emerging threats, techniques and challenges, senior leaders have the opportunity to synthesize the current and future practice of peace and stability operations from both international and U.S. perspectives.

**PKSOI Education Program for Resident and Distance Professional Education**

Over the past three years, PKSOI has expanded its leader programs and cooperative efforts with partner institutions to add both depth and breadth to the Institute's education and training program. At the core of this effort is support to the U.S. Army War College whose mission is to produce strategic leaders for future service to our nation in peace, conflict and war. While PKSOI has contributed continuously to enhancing understanding of stability operations in the core (required) courses of the curriculum as well as the capstone Strategic Decision Making Exercise (SDME), much of the Institute’s efforts have been focused on offering an expanded electives programs that provide future senior leaders the opportunity to study the complexities and challenges of peace and stability operations (PSO) in depth.

At the core of our PSO program for senior leaders are two electives which provide an overall framework for understanding across the four major areas noted above. Our initial course in the “Principles, Concepts and Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations” provides students with an overview of the guiding principles, doctrine, processes, and challenges faced by civilian and military leaders in designing and planning operations at the strategic and higher operational levels. To emphasize the diversity of organizational approaches within the USG, the course includes visits to the Departments of Defense and State as well as the Agency for International Development where students interact with senior leaders in each of the “3 D’s”-diplomacy, defense, development- that form the centerpiece of U.S. action in crisis environments. Building upon this is the second part of our core program, “Design and Planning of Peace and Stability Operations for Commanders,” which provides a practical, “hands-on” opportunity to explore the challenges of forming coalitions and envisioning, designing, planning and executing major multinational operations. This course also includes extensive use of case studies and a practical exercise that challenge future leaders to envision how they would guide the initial steps of designing and planning a major intervention. As this course is focused on exploring multinational operations, it includes several guest speakers who have exercised senior command in
PSO’s, as well as visits to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations Mission and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

Complementing and expanding upon these core elements are several supporting electives that provide opportunities for future senior leaders to expand their breadth and depth of understanding and/or expertise in specific areas. Functional and special area courses offer future leaders/commanders the ability to expand their understanding and expertise of conflict assessment and analysis, international development (with a focus on USAID strategy/programs, security sector reform, rule of law development, economics and infrastructure restoration, mass atrocity response, and asymmetric warfare (using the historical example of the American Indian wars).

Additionally, PKSOI has teamed with other elements of USAWC in preparing senior leaders for future service in Afghanistan. Our members support the Department of National Security Studies in the teaching of “Understanding Afghanistan and Its Region,” a course that provides an overview of Afghan history, culture, governance, economics and politics, along with an analysis of the major challenges to governmental legitimacy to include the insurgency, corruption, and criminal activities. In the second half of the academic year, PKSOI sponsors a second interdepartmental course on “The U.S. in Afghanistan” which examines U.S. policy, strategy, operational efforts, and future challenges in order to provide future leaders in Afghanistan a firm foundation for understanding the interrelationship of coalition and Afghan efforts. Supporting these course efforts are PKSOI’s ongoing conference and speaker series that sponsor senior interagency and multinational speakers who highlight the challenges of transitions, intergovernmental and international planning, and civ-mil cooperation in crisis and conflict areas.

Finally, PKSOI also pioneers several efforts to export our learning opportunities to civilian and military professionals in order to support joint, interagency, and multinational audiences. Our core course in the Principles, Concepts and Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations is offered through distance education to Army War College students enrolled in the on-line version of Senior Service College. This core course in PSO has also been offered as a pilot program to U.S. and multinational faculty at SOUTHCOM’s Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and complemented by a three day, onsite seminar focused on Commander’s envisionment and design for stability operations. Other complementary efforts are also ongoing through offering summer graduate seminars on the various functional aspects (Security, interagency planning, rule of law, etc) in support of USAWC’s DDE program; developing education modules for individual study and/or instructor use in the major functional areas of PSO such as building partner capacity in security, United Nations operations, rule of law, SSR, etc; and support packages for leader education and training of major commands in the planning of joint peace and stability operations at the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) level and above.

A Final Thought

As we look forward to the future, our senior leadership continues to remind us that not only the world political and economic structures are rapidly evolving, but also the nature of armed conflict and practice applying military force to achieve our national objectives. The era of “Decisive Force” that preoccupied our past efforts in Panama, Desert Storm, and the like has now given way to a new and often uncertain era where the utility of force in accomplishing strategic objectives must be seen in a broader, more flexible manner than just whether the Nation should or should not commit our military forces to war. Our overall education and training program at PKSOI focuses on developing and providing leaders the opportunity to study and develop their professional expertise in peace and stability operations. These are areas in which senior leaders for U.S. military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other future areas have, and will be, required to design and execute a variety of military operations that involve the application of decisive force to not only defeat adversaries, but to work cooperatively with a broad community of actors to accomplish an overall, comprehensive success in restoring and maintaining a viable peace in areas of strategic significance for the U.S. and its Allies.
In a period when senior military and defense leaders are more often practitioners of 'armed social science' than they are of pure military science, they benefit greatly from the strategic advice of individuals often operating outside the control of time-tested bureaucracies and staff structures. The proliferation of initiatives groups, outside assessment teams, special assistants, and strategic advisers — commonly answering only to the most senior officers or officials — necessitates that those chosen to fulfill one of these roles approaches their new responsibilities with thoughtful sophistication about what they should and should not be doing.

Strategic advisers should not supplant routine staff competencies found in a large military headquarters or executive departments. Indeed, if they hope to perform their unique role satisfactorily, they would do well not running afoul of the staff as they will come to rely on an informal network that includes key staff officers. The strategic adviser's most common roles are: 1) helping senior leaders assess and define the context within which they operate; 2) identifying the strategic courses of action appropriate to addressing their myriad challenges; 3) assessing institutional and mission effectiveness and progress from a holistic perspective; and, finally, 4) persistently surveying the strategic landscape for key risks to future success. In this regard, the strategic adviser doesn't work against the staff but instead works parallel to it, often assisting senior leaders most by helping them formulate and refine their guidance based on a more global appreciation of internal and external drivers and challenges. The following are a few rules new strategic advisers might consider following. Some also provide hints for senior leaders on the selection and missioning of their advisers.

The Nine Rules

Rule Number 1. The best advice is personal. Often, senior leaders feel most comfortable making decisions 'among friends.' This shouldn't necessarily be taken literally. But let me be clear, it's not a crime — in fact it's often an advantage — for senior leaders to surround themselves with people they know or know of and, ultimately, trust. This, of course, is a double-edged sword. For example, a strategic adviser drawn from among a list of world-class tacticians and selected by a senior leader specifically out of friendship does not necessarily set a valuable precedent. Thus, the right combination of familiarity and strategic-level acumen are essential. The personal comfort of familiarity makes the substantive disagreement that that often distinguishes 'best strategic advice' that much more palatable and useful for senior leaders. Thus, as senior leaders ascend through the ranks, they should strive to build a bullpen of future strategic advisers who: 1) are known quantities to them but are also recognized for their talents beyond the senior leaders inner circle; 2) never get "star struck" regardless of who's in the room; 3) are familiar and function well with the senior leader's personal style; 4) can operate with humility and discretion to influence outcomes at, above, and below the parent organization; and, finally, 5) are confident enough in their position and intellect that they will unflinchingly provide high-quality advice that may run counter to conventional wisdom. The standard personnel system will not satisfy these demands. In the end, the best advice comes from those who commonly question prevailing opinion and freely offer constructive alternatives without fear of sanction. A new adviser's competence and intellectual curiosity matched either with long familiarity or rapid cultivation of trust with the principal is the surest route to success in this regard.

Rule Number 2. The boss isn't always right. If you accept the first rule ("the best advice is personal"), then this second rule shouldn't be a surprise. In private counsel, no effective adviser can automatically defer to the senior leader's judgment. Regardless of differences in age, rank, education, or experience, the odds that any senior leader is always right are quite small. Senior leaders come to the table with an abundance of professional experience. In fact, past experience is commonly their strongest influence. But experience by itself isn't a road map in today's environment. Experience is context specific. And, not all experience is equally relevant. Often too senior leaders lack time — time to reflect, to personally investigate, and, ultimately, to weigh alternatives. The strategic adviser helps senior leaders combine their personal experience with a variety of other relevant inputs. Thus, close-in strategic advice fills in inevitable blind spots. In short, regardless of how capable, successful, or experienced senior leaders are, they will at times find themselves navigating unfamiliar decision making terrain. Therefore, enter the candid strategic adviser.

This is not a license for insolence. However, those around senior leaders prone to employing too fine a filter on advice or...
These alternatives commonly flow directly through the strategic adviser, as they are often very close to the boss. In this regard, the strategic adviser can’t be an obstacle — the jealous ‘gate guard’ covetous of face time with the boss and persistently seeking credit for solutions. Nor can advisers simply be the affable ‘doorman’, allowing thousands of unnecessary flowers to bloom in front of an already time-challenged senior leader.

The adviser has to be a positive filter. While senior leaders can’t possibly stay abreast of every alternative impacting their portfolio, effective strategic advisers can and should. Among their most important responsibilities is identifying, understanding, and articulating the views of others or seeing that the most important stakeholder positions are adequately represented in all strategic decision making.

If the senior leader’s experience might sometimes stand in the way of the best decisions, the strategic adviser’s potential for vanity is equally dangerous as it applies to this rule. A thorough understanding of the competing cultures and interests of key stakeholders — regardless of how different they are from their own — provides strategic advisers with their first, most useful guide for identifying the perspectives that most deserve a hearing. In the end, it is important for strategic advisers to recognize that they ‘advise.’ Their responsibility is enabling the best decision making environment, not predetermining decisions. After all, the senior leader bears the burden of command or leadership and therefore, by implication full responsibility for outcomes.

**Rule Number 3. You can’t be either a gate guard or a doorman.** Senior leaders should recognize that intellectual pluralism is far more important than personal validation. As described above, openly airing alternative perspectives is critical to effective strategic decision making. Arriving at the right solution is more important than arriving at the favored, easy, or comfortable one. Senior leaders simply can’t get to ‘right’ without considering a manageable number of alternative courses of action.

Prematurely concluding either that ‘the boss is right on this’ or ‘the boss will never go for that’ need not apply as strategic advisers. When senior leaders identify “red” as “green” or “grey” as “black” and their advisers fail to raise reasonable alternatives, effective institutional decision making suffers. For their part, senior leaders should be comfortable with advisers that see the world through a very different lens than they do and, therefore, process choices differently as well. There is a useful synergy in quietly combining competing worldviews.

Without question, the best among our current senior leaders have driven innovation; addressing institutional blind spots while filling in their own. And, none of this is meant to suggest that senior leader judgment is consistently wrong. But, context is constantly changing in the contemporary environment. And, the strategic adviser should constantly monitor changes in context and help senior leaders adjust accordingly. In the end, the boss may be right. The adviser helps confirm that. The boss may be partially or even mostly correct. The adviser then is positioned to influence some modification of senior leader perspectives. Or, the boss may be wrong, affording the adviser an important opportunity to change the senior leader’s view with a competing narrative.

**Rule Number 4. Staff elements have lanes; strategic advisers don’t.** Large institutions — military or civilian — have hierarchical staffs with specialized responsibilities. Regardless of professional background, the strategic adviser is not a traditional staff officer. Instead, he or she needs to be a generalist — a quick study, curious, jack of all trades.

Formal staffs work according to standard operating procedures. They have a formal rhythm and tempo. The strategic adviser, on the other hand, shouldn’t be constrained by either. Nor, should advisers confine themselves to the areas where they are most familiar or comfortable. Doing so leads to an incomplete decision making picture (and in the end probably poor decisions). Indeed, the strategic adviser would be well-advised to answer the boss’s questions and frequently strive to offer answers to questions he or she thinks the boss should have asked. In the end, strategic advisers are never prepared to give perfect counsel but should nonetheless always be preparing to do so. Adequate preparation is the result of persistent attention to topics that are important now and those that are likely will be important in the future.
Rule Number 5. You are your network. As introduced above, over-confidence (or vanity) is potentially the greatest pitfall for any strategic adviser. Because strategic advisers are commonly ‘ministers without portfolio’ and thus, asked to take on a variety of challenges effecting an organization, knowing a great deal may be less important than knowing what you don’t know and building a bench of colleagues that can help fill in the blanks.

Establishing a good network and selectively employing it are essential. It is simply not possible for a single person to have fingertip sensitivity over all of the information and every issue important to the boss and his/her organization. It is, however, possible to build a network that — in a collective body — approximates that expertise on call. Strategic advisers need to leverage their networks constantly. The network is both a general information (and intelligence) gathering tool, as well as an extended decision making tool reaching from senior leadership through the strategic adviser and out into the most important communities of interest and practice.

By virtue of its multi-channel connectivity, a good network at the disposal of an effective strategic adviser instantly flattens hierarchical, heavily stove-piped organizations. Further still, it gives senior leaders access to a universe of key nodes beyond their own staff. This can be particularly useful inside a large military headquarters. In the end, the strategic leader and the institution will benefit from the adviser’s persistent networking.

Rule Number 6. Do your homework. Strategic decision making in defense and military institutions — where lives, money, material, and strategic position are consistently in play — is a very serious business. There is very little ‘lite’ about the subject matter. As such, senior leaders charged with making strategic decisions require that those advising them come to the table with the best possible advice.

In matters of strategy and design at the most senior levels, where multiple variables are in play, well-prepared advisers should enter every deliberation assuming they have a decisive contribution to make.

Time is limited with the boss. Therefore, strategic advisers should treat every opportunity with senior leaders as if it were their last for a while. Therefore, consistently being ready with the best possible information at the time is essential. Obviously, with time, the quality of the information available and the certainty of resulting recommendations improves. However, time often is not on the strategic adviser’s side. The strategic adviser should also recognize that deliberately thinking through a specific problem is as important as production. Too often, we in the defense and military establishment are slaves to presentation. A strategic adviser should enter every consequential discussion with a concept, a way ahead, a general design, and a method for communicating all of these succinctly. That means, in a crunch, a clear set of talking points should suffice as an outline for a much richer and detailed discussion. Presentation will naturally follow.

Often big decisions are made on the ‘elevator speech’ alone. Alternatively, some senior leaders might value extended, unstructured discussions on available courses of action. In either case, having the benefit of time and intellectual breathing space, the strategic adviser needs to have considered the issues at hand from its many different angles. And, as a consequence, be prepared to offer a well-considered bottom-line at every opportunity.
When asked substantive questions, the strategic adviser should be prepared to answer yes, no, or maybe, each time capable of defending in detail why he or she has come to that conclusion. Sometimes ‘maybe’ is the most overlooked among these answers. If the situation is unclear or the information unreliable, the courage to say “I am not yet certain” is often the best course of action.

Rule Number 7. Be a good colleague; never make enemies. If confidence is a supreme quality when dealing with the boss; then, humility is paramount when dealing with your peers. Sitting close to the flagpole is a privilege, not a right. The adviser should therefore recognize that he or she represents hundreds of others rowing tirelessly across the institution. Representing the best of their thinking to the boss and accurately crediting the source is among the more under-appreciated services rendered by the adviser.

In the end, establishing and maintaining cordial, productive, and mutually supporting relationships with the senior leader’s formal staff is critical to networking anyway. Mistrust is a common problem when strategic leaders maintain their own stable of ‘smart guys’. The adviser needs to be especially sensitive to this. Poor relations between the strategic adviser and the staff will not serve the institution well. And, because the best courses of action may be syntheses of a range of perspectives, close working relationships with formal staff agencies will only reinforce the quality of independent advice.

Rule Number 8. Look for trouble where others aren’t. The strategic adviser is separated enough from the grind of daily staff functions to recognize that where there’s smoke there quite often is fire as well. Often, the principal obstacle to optimum decision making seems to come from a kind of groupthink or collective myopia that misses indications of either smoke or fire. The last decade has provided a clinic in this regard, as a variety of pressures and biases blinded senior-level defense and military leaders to serial hazards to success in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

Therefore, a key role for the strategic adviser is risk assessment. This function is founded in the certainty that every course of action considered or decision taken has within it fundamental risks. These are not always or even commonly imminent show-stoppers that require the adoption of alternative courses of action. They are, however, important real or perceived obstacles that carry within them the potential to cause failure or prohibitive cost en route to one or more of the enterprise’s strategic objectives. The strategic adviser then helps senior leaders identify and characterize these threats, as well as consider key approaches to either prevent their occurrence or mitigate their impact. Learning to calculate risk and communicate in the language of risk provides the strategic adviser with a powerful tool for identifying and defending various positions.

Rule Number 9. Don’t be afraid to be wrong and be comfortable implementing the uncomfortable. Strategic advisers will sometimes be wrong. Perhaps more often they will be overruled. However, the effort invested in helping a senior leader understand the breadth and impact of his or her various choices will positively impact the quality of enterprise-level decision making. The strategic adviser’s first responsibility is not that his or her recommendations are taken fully on board but rather that senior-level decisions are made with the best information, having considered all possible courses of action. The strategic adviser’s greatest satisfaction should not come from serial ‘wins’ but instead from simply having had the opportunity to decisively effect important outcomes.

In the end, once a decision is made the strategic adviser needs to be a positive force in making whatever was decided work. In this regard, sometimes what distinguishes effective strategic advisers from ‘palace cynics’ is their ability to consistently offer alternative views and then rapidly shift into effective implementation after decisions have gone against them. Thus, regardless of the adviser’s previous positions, a new strategic direction establishes a new context. It requires identification of new supporting courses or action, as well as ‘branches’ and ‘sequels’ associated with the selected path. Once under way, progress will have to be tracked and evaluated objectively. Finally, new approaches inevitably uncover new risks. And, thus, the strategic adviser goes head down again, focused on a new set of strategic challenges.
Peace-gaming with the Green Country Model
by Alex Ihde (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)

Background

Several years ago, researchers at Johns Hopkins University / Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) undertook to build a wargame that reflected all the instruments of national power and considered the social impacts that power may produce. Originally conceived as a simple test bed for a social affinity research model, the game became popular with playtesters and was developed into a product suitable for external use. The result of that effort is the Green Country Model (GCM), a game that extends beyond kinetic applications of military power and includes a variety of other instruments of power as means to achieving victory.

The Green Country Model is a computer-based, multi-sided competitive influence game for interagency and stability operations. Its integration of diplomacy, intelligence, strategic communications, economics and military actions is unusual in automated games, and allows players to combine a variety of resources to achieve goals. Players may represent diverse groups: from a Joint Task Force to international corporations, national and local governments, Non-government organizations and non-state actors such as criminal or terror groups. Besides players controlled by humans, non-player actors (NPAs) controlled by the game provide an additional dynamic. Interaction with these NPAs is crucial as players are seldom resourced to accomplish their objectives without the cooperation of these local actors.

To fit the needs of social science research, developers were asked to include four instruments of national power: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military and Economics (hereafter referred to as DIME). Furthermore, developers were asked to include social indicators under the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) rubric. Collectively, these indicators describe the social conditions in a region and present players with appropriate “terrain” for GCM gaming.
Game Basics

At its heart, the Green Country Model is a simple game. Players expend resources to take actions. These actions, in turn, influence game conditions in ways to enable achievement of assigned goals. Players observe the change in game conditions resulting from their (and other players') actions, re-orient themselves accordingly, and develop new courses of action. The dynamic of multiple players provides the challenge and teaches lessons to the players, for in the end the game is about people.

As mentioned above, players represent diverse interest groups who wield at least some of the DIME instruments of national power. They are assigned goals in the game scenario. These goals may be to influence other players directly, impact player-player relationships, or to affect conditions on the game map. In some scenarios, players may find collaboration preferable to competition.

Relationships between every pair of players are tracked explicitly by the GCM. In the model, Affinity represents the level of friendship or cooperation between two players. It affects the likelihood that NPAs will behave to the player’s benefit. One NPA’s affinity with another NPA will influence whether the first will ally with a player against the second or join the second in resistance against the player. GCM requires a player consider the diplomatic consequences of military actions as well as the impact actions may have on the local population and NPAs; their cooperation may be needed in future turns.

Application

Because of its scope beyond military power, GCM is suitable for modeling joint and interagency operations in complex, multilateral environments. It does not provide detailed modeling of kinetic military operations, nor does it consider tactical deployment of forces. For analysis of such problems, tactical military combat models should be used.

Rather, GCM lends itself perfectly to Peacekeeping and Stability Operations. A diverse menu of actions includes diplomatic outreaches, strategic communications, security operations, law enforcement and military strikes against criminal groups, and economic actions. New actions can be developed if needed. Specific scenarios might include Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Nation Building, or Counterinsurgency.

GCM is suitable for wargaming analysis and for training. It is not predictive: no one should use this model to assess whether an economic stimulus package is preferable to covert security
operations. It does, however, allow players to gain insight into the possible consequences of these actions. It also provides a forum in which experts from diverse fields (such as diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence and economics) may gather and make equal contributions in developing courses of action. Results are influenced by game conditions, but may still surprise human players. Reactions to game results and the discussions that follow provide further training benefit to players.

The GCM has been employed by the U.S. Army to assist in seminars analyzing specific regions of the world. These regions have included areas where local governments exert limited influence and entities hostile to the United States are present.

Players have used the game to test courses of action and to challenge the thinking of gathered experts on how to deal with problems in the game region. Post-game reaction has been universally positive.

Games and seminars allow students to broaden their perspectives through meaningful interaction with representatives of the interagency community. GCM wargaming may be used in the study of international relations, by embassies, Joint Task Forces and schools for training mid-level and senior military leadership. Wargames of any kind are an excellent means to stimulate conversation and promote learning through doing. Classes oriented toward stability or other interagency operations may use wargames to exercise the principles communicated in the instruction.

JHU APL and the Department of Defense developed an interagency teaming handbook, which outlines many of the principles necessary for developing a collaborative plan between civilian and military components that would enhance cooperation in the Green Country Peace-Gaming model.

The Handbook’s purpose is to assist DoD field commanders, as well as interagency team leaders and team members engaged incountering irregular threats, to gain insights of relevant practices on how to effectively engage, develop, and sustain interagency partnerships. Research for the handbook was accomplished by a team at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) through an online survey, interviews, site visits, and a literature review, all conducted between August and October 2009, and the handbook is anticipated to be widely disseminated in early CY 2010.

For the purposes of this handbook, “irregular threat” operations, both domestic and international, were categorized into 10 broad areas:

- Counter Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- Counternarcotics
- Counter-Threat Finance
- Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS)
- Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- Counterterrorism
- Counter Cyberwarfare
- Counterinsurgency (COIN)
- Counter Piracy

Although security, stabilization, nation-building, and related efforts are not explicitly listed, these activities are integral parts of the approach to countering an irregular threat such as an insurgency.

A case study on nine of these irregular threat operations (all but Unconventional Warfare) was included in the handbook. The handbook also includes an overview of the challenges to interagency teaming, suggests best practices gleaned from research in interagency teaming as well as from the broader fields of cross-cultural communications and organizational change; and provides resources for further study. To view the handbook, proceed to the Asymmetric Warfare Group knowledge network portal, and look in the AWG Information papers section under the Products and Links page.

Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats

by Lesa A. McComas
Supervisor, Smart Power and Irregular Warfare Analysis Section
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

In March and May 2009, representatives from a number of departments and agencies came together to discuss problem areas and shortcomings in interagency teaming, and they agreed to explore potential steps that the interagency community could take to bridge these gaps and improve communication and information sharing. The group concluded that a handbook produced for wide U.S. government dissemination would be a useful tool for initiatives to counter irregular threats, and outlined the key characteristics of the handbook.
PKSOI and the United States Army War College will host the next annual meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The 17th annual conference will be held during the week of 13 November 2011. The aim of the Association is to facilitate communication and exchange of information between various peacekeeping training centers worldwide (for more details about the IATC, click on the link below.) More information concerning the 2011 annual meeting will be published in upcoming PKSOI Journals.

IAPTC conference : http://www.iaptc.org

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To register or for more info on the AAP-SO conference : http://pksoi.army.mil/events/aap/index.cfm

AAP-SO CONFERENCE
22-24 March 2011
Letort View Community Center
Carlisle Barracks, PA

Purpose
• Bring staff action officers together from pertinent Army units and agencies in order to (IOT):
  • Build on the current status of Army efforts IAW 2007 Army Action Plan for Stability Operations (AAP-SO)
  • Develop recommendations for a revision of the AAP-SO for approval
  • Integrate SO and SO-related initiatives and current practices within the DOTMLPF framework IOT institutionalize systems and processes as part of the Army’s Full Spectrum Operations Readiness

Intent
• Provide sufficient pre-conference guidance to participants for upfront “Homework,” to include workshop Terms of Reference (TOR)
• Ensure participants arrive with substantial analysis of parent organization’s current AAP-SO-implementation status and modified/new SO initiatives
Announcing the April theme: Protection of Civilians

If you are interested in contributing to the journal, send your letter or articles for submission to the PKSOI Publications Coordinator: Carl_PKSOIResearchandPublications@conus.army.mil no later than 1 March 2011 for consideration in the next edition. Also provide sufficient contact information. Note that articles should reflect the topic of Protection of Civilians as it relates to Peace and Stability Operations. The Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only, and in coordination with original author.

For article submission to future editions disregard the theme, and it will be consideration for future inclusion.

For more information visit http://pksoi.army.mil

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