Inside:

1. The History of PKI/PKSOI: The Early Years and a Snapshot of the Past 20 years
   by former PKSOI Interns Michael Bruno & Jason Kring

2. Director’s Corner
   by former PKI/PKSOI Directors

16. PKSOI Anniversary Gathering: Celebrating 1993-2013
   by PKSOI Intern CJ Restemayer

29. The History of PKI
   by the first PKI Director COL Karl Farris, USA Ret.

29. PKI to PKSOI
   by former PKI Teammate Mr. Steve Henthorne

31. PKI/PKSOI Articles of Experience
   by COL George Oliver, USA Ret., COL Karl Farris, USA Ret. and Mr. Steve Henthorne

33. Portrait of GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret. with the PKI/PKSOI Directors

You can view previous issues and sign up for our mailing list @ http://PKSOI.army.mil
The History of PKI/PKSOI:
The Early Years: A History of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and a snapshot of the Past 20 years
by former PKSOI Interns, Michael Bruno and Jason Kring

1993 - PKI is Established

With the United States the sole superpower, the mission of its Armed Forces would have to change to prepare for the next unpredictable challenge. One of those challenges, the humanitarian aid and peacekeeping effort in Somalia, came crashing into the world headfirst in 1992. This type of operation, called Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), was greeted with mostly apprehension from most senior military officials. The military saw these types of missions as an exception rather than a common mission of the Army for the future. Others, especially General Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, saw them as a foreshadowing the missions that the United States would, more often than not, be engaged in.

In 1992, Major General William Stofft and General Sullivan began discussing the subject of peacekeeping. Intrigued and driven to find out more about the subject, they reached out to organizations such as the United Nations, the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After conducting some initial research, they found the subject to be insufficiently studied and embraced.

Coincidentally, a few days later Ambassador Madeline Albright wrote to General Stofft and General Sullivan about Colonel Karl Farris, U.S. Army, who was doing great work with the UN mission in Cambodia. General Stofft contacted Colonel Farris and asked if he would like to help him create a peacekeeping institute within the Center for Strategic Leadership at USAWC. Farris remembers that at the time his thoughts were that regular contact with diverse organizations would carry over when co-deployed and make “coordination-cooperation-consensus” much easier in the early days of a crisis when “fog-of-relief” rules.

Then, after a period of time, when cooperation and coordination processes were worked out, the joint task forces normally assigned to the reserve-component civil affairs unit could assume the leadership of the civil-military operations center and of civil-military coordination. He received a note back from General Sullivan, by way of General Stofft, that this was “exactly what he wanted.”
I was working as a “Strategic Fellow” for General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff. In the latter part of 1992, he asked us to study and brief him on the Army’s future in international peacekeeping, both UN-led and non-UN-led (“Alliance or Coalition of the Willing”). We developed the study in about two months and then briefed him the results. In summary, these were: like it or not, the Army would become more involved in peacekeeping with what was then seen as a post-Cold War world in which the UN would be newly resurgent in global peace and security issues.

First requirement was to develop a doctrinal (Doctrine) base for the new and highly intrusive multi-component interventions (which were also at times coercive) but were being launched under the generic label of peacekeeping (e.g., Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia). Our first recommendation was to task TRADOC to write a 100-level doctrinal manual for peacekeeping. We further recommended TRADOC review and identify training requirements for peacekeeping; both in terms of individual skills and unit collective tasks. Also, it needed to identify what, if any, educational programs were needed in the Army’s sequential and progressive NCO and Officer leader development programs. At this time we could not identify any specific organization, materiel or soldier issues relevant to peacekeeping operations. But we recognized such would probably emerge through “Lessons Learned” as the Army deployed more times to such operations.

While in Cambodia I received a letter from MG Bill Stofft, Commandant of the USAWC, who informed me that General Sullivan had tasked him to establish a “Peacekeeping Institute” at Carlisle to deal with peacekeeping issues for the Army at the high operational and military strategic levels. And, that he wanted me to head it. I agreed, returned to Carlisle and set about establishing PKI. We started with a small mixed civilian/military staff of eight. PKI was administratively assigned to the Center for Strategic Leadership. This relieved us of most administrative distractions.

The years 1996-1998 were exciting ones for PKI. We were instrumental in developing peace operations doctrine; hosting the annual CJCS Peacekeeping Seminars; facilitating strategic after action reviews of operations, such as Somalia and Bosnia; and developing and implementing an interagency course for Deputy Assistant Secretaries as prescribed by PDD 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations. Members of PKI participated in ongoing operations to collect lessons learned, wrote operational plans, and advised on specialized functions such as overseeing elections. In addition to working closely with the interagency, PKI sponsored conferences that included representatives of the international peace operations community to include NGOs (and contributed to a Handbook on NGOS used by deployed units), and participated in various warfighter exercises. PKI also collaborated closely with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), and assisted with the establishment of a Lessons Learned Unit there. Both to represent the U.S. on peace operations doctrine and to absorb new ideas and approaches to peacekeeping, PKI participated in multiple conferences around the world in places such as the UK, Russia, Japan, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, and Malta; plus we taught a peacekeeping course at the South African Staff College. PKI members contributed to multiple books and publications to include Ambassador Oakley’s book, Policing the New World Disorder, and the UN handbook for CIVPOL personnel. Of course, what made this period special was the extremely talented members of PKI from the active duty and retired Army, Department of State (a former Ambassador), and a visiting professor with a distinguished multiple agency background. We were also blessed with the volunteer services of distinguished peacekeepers who acted as adjunct professors of the institute.
From 1999-2003, PKI certainly faced its most important successes and its most serious challenges. The end of the Cold War saw international security challenges changing rapidly. Peacekeeping was growing in importance and the initial U.S. Army draft doctrine (1994) (also done by PKI) needed updating. PKI consulted with the Combined Arms Center to rewrite the peace operations manual and create the stability operations doctrine. At the time there was no stability operations doctrine, yet the ideas for it were rooted in the soon to be released (2001) FM 3-0, Offense, Defense and Stability Support Operations. While the Institute was writing those, PKI engaged in teaching, researching and exchanging ideas about peace operations. Those were exciting times as the small ten-person staff of PKI made its mark within the Army, the UN and the broader international community of peacekeepers. An annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference gathered lessons and explored the evolving nature of peace operations. Semi-annual conferences with several key nations helped shape international peacekeeping, and PKI was one of the charter members.

Unfortunately, in 2002, the issue of downsizing Army staffs impacted on PKI. It was directed to close operations in mid-2003, but this was a time the organization was needed the most! Once it was realized that the lessons and skills developed by peacekeepers were necessary to rebuild Iraq, the Defense Department leadership decided to retain the organization. “Stability Operations” was added to its official name and the organization expanded dramatically to meet the needs of the Army and the international community.

In 2004 the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was reborn as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute with a much broader mandate. A mandate to influence and change the way U.S. Government entities work together and with other key participants in pre, post and conflict environments. The mandate was further solidified and expanded by the recent designation of PKSOI as the Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations. When I think of the tone set by PKSOI in this period and as its trajectory forward, I am reminded of the following quote from Martin Luther King Jr.:

“Peace is not merely the absence of violence but the presence of Justice:”

The quote reminds us that inherent in PKSOI’s mission is a need to develop the whole of government and whole of society partners and teams that lead the thinking on how to synchronize security, governance and economic development within a framework bound by the rule of law, so that environments, impervious to catalysts of violence, are built and sustained by the indigenous populations and governments we support.
During May 2008 - May 2010, PKSOI continued to evolve as the Army’s Center of Excellence for Peace and Stability Operations at the strategic and operational levels. The addition of manpower and new skill sets in 2008 provided the organization the capability to address a wider range of topics, while more robustly supporting key efforts. PKSOI continued to use its unique experience, expertise, and credibility to lead, facilitate, and contribute to numerous efforts across the military, interagency, and international communities. Key efforts were initiated to better integrate peace and stability operations into professional military education, develop interagency team training and education, create whole of government approaches to crises, and support deployed and deploying units.

One of PKSOI’s core competencies was leading thought development for connecting U.S. military and civilian agencies working on peace and stability operations. It accomplished this largely by identifying and filling knowledge gaps in policy, doctrine, training, and education. Helping to ensure that stability operations concepts, doctrine, and principles were understood and that they provided a common basis for decision making and execution was an ongoing effort. Towards this end, PKSOI actively participated with the State Department, S/CRS, USAID, DoD staff, and many others in developing and exercising the Interagency Management System and the Interagency Planning Framework to improve whole of government approaches to crisis planning and execution. PKSOI also worked extensively with these organizations to implement interagency team training and education plans approved by the Deputies Committee.

PKSOI’s contributions to peace and stability operations doctrine took many forms. It continued its long-standing relationship with doctrine developers at the Combined Arms Center, TRADOC, JFCOM, and elsewhere for numerous military publications. For military and civilian leaders in the field, PKSOI developed handbooks on critical, evolving topics, which had never before been addressed in writing. In conjunction with long-term partners, PKSOI made similar contributions to doctrine, principles, and planning handbooks within the interagency and international communities. PKSOI’s work with United Nations planners and operators helped develop what could be considered the UN’s first military doctrine.

During this period, PKSOI expanded its support to the institutional Army and forces in the field. At the service level, it worked closely with DA G3/5/7 to help ensure that the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations was effectively implemented. PKSOI provided subject matter experts to deployed and deploying forces during home station preparation and mission execution in Iraq and Afghanistan. PKSOI initiated efforts with USAWC department heads to incorporate stability operations into Army War College core courses. This course material was also made available to training centers and deploying units. Through expanded publications and a growing SOLLIMS website, PKSOI became an increasingly important source for lesson sharing among senior leaders and practitioners worldwide.

From 2010 to 2011 PKSOI continued to grow while adding new missions. The Institute completed its hire of 25 expert civilian staff, nearly doubling its size and greatly increasing its capability and capacity. It fielded the U.S. military’s first open source lessons learned database for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, attracting international attention. PKSOI continued its ongoing efforts to assist the State Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) to develop intergovernmental planning capacity. Recognizing the need to educate future leaders on Afghanistan, the Institute helped establish a 3-credit elective program for students at USAWC. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) designated PKSOI as the Army’s Proponent for Stability Operations, establishing a closer working relationship with the CAC Commander. This led to the Army’s first Stability Operations conference, designed to evaluate the Army’s compliance with DOD directives. PKSOI prepared to assume the presidency of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and to host the IAPTC annual meeting in 2011, both firsts for the COL.
Beginning in April 2011, U.S. Army budget cuts resulted in various proposals to eliminate or subsume PKSOI. In addressing these diverse efforts, PKSOI was able to demonstrate its unparalleled value to the Army, DoD, and the Nation. Its accomplishments included planning and executing the first ever U.S.-hosted IAPTC Annual conference in November 2011 for which Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton wrote a personal letter of thanks to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. While acting as IAPTC President over the following year, PKSOI increased the interaction of Geographic Combatant Commands and the U.S. interagency with this significant international forum. HQDA assigned PKSOI as the Army’s integration lead for its newest topic of Protection of Civilians resulting in a series of new manuals. The Institute also worked with HQDA to oversee the first-ever Joint Capabilities Based Assessment for Peace and Stability Operations, re-wrote FM 3-07 (Stability), incorporated the Army Action Plan for Stability Ops into the Army Campaign Plan, provided direct support to the new COIN seminars for deploying BCTs, and integrated the annual Stability Ops Training and Education Workshop with the JS J7 resulting in a 75% participation increase. PKSOI was a principal contributor in developing the UN’s first ever training standards for troop contributing nations, was the lead organization for seven initiatives in the OEF Commander’s Lessons Learned Forum, and provided foundational support to HQDA’s new Army Security Cooperation Course. Through all of these contributions into 2013, PKSOI was able to better leverage outside funding and actually decreased its budget expenditures by over 15% during a tumultuous two-year period.

As we celebrate the first twenty years of PKSOI existence, and reflect on a number of important contributions PKSOI has made to our Army and Nation, it’s equally appropriate that we look to the future and visualize what the next twenty years may bring for PKSOI. At a critical time in our Nation’s future, when difficult decisions must be made about our role as a World Leader, and domestic spending priorities and economic difficulties are driving defense spending reductions, PKSOI’s role becomes more important than ever.

In the next five years, PKSOI will focus on two critical areas. First, PKSOI will assume its newly designated role as the Lead Agent for Joint Proponency for Peace and Stability Operations. In this role, PKSOI will execute a multitude of tasks derived from the Stability Operations Joint Capabilities Assessment. These tasks can be summarized as ensuring the feasibility and practicability of Chairman Martin Dempsey’s guidance on Stability Operations – given force structure cuts, ensure the reversibility and expandability of our Armed Forces to meet large scale conflict or stability requirements lost during downsizing. PKSOI and its partners will focus on collecting the key lessons learned over the last Decade of War, and ensuring that any of these lost capabilities can be quickly re-established. Second, PKSOI will increasingly focus on UN Peacekeeping proficiency and mission conduct. While U.S. Military members are not currently actively participating in UN PK missions on a large scale, the participation trend is increasing and our Security Cooperation activities with partner nations is focused on preparing them to succeed while on UN PK missions. PKSOI will be the pre-eminent trainer of U.S. forces preparing to train Multinational Peacekeepers as well as the authors of updated U.S. PK doctrine. As long as conflict exists in the World, the need for Peacekeepers will remain PKSOI, and its partners will see a steady increase in our focus on UN (and other) PK missions and proficiency. As a very low cost, but high impact organization, in an environment where PK is a “growth industry”, PKSOI will remain a vital agency for the U.S. Government and Department of Defense.
1994  Operation Support Hope was the military component of the U.S. relief effort in Rwanda and Zaire, July-October 1995. While a small operation, the Joint Task Force never exceeded 3,600 military in the AOR, it is important for four very critical reasons. First, the assigned mission was accomplished. Second, there were no U.S. causalities related directly or indirectly to the operation. Third, this operation showed the value of military forces as enablers, not as replacements for other relief agencies of the U.S. government and the UN. Fourth, the JTF was disestablished upon mission accomplishment.

This After Action Report was intentionally prepared in a brief, unclassified and a format desired to encourage its use in learning the lessons of Operation Support Hope. For those wishing amplification of issues raised in the report each chapter in appendix A had at least two points of contact listed. The files of the JTF were in the custody of The United States European Command J-1. The United States Army PeaceKeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17013-5050, maintained copies of many of the documents relating to the operation. The United States Army Europe’s Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) branch imputed the JTF’s lessons learned into the JULLs data files.

1995  The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) and the Joint Staff J8, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division (SAGD), hosted the first annual “CJCS Peace Operations Seminar/Game” at the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) from 12-15 June 1995. The purpose of the initiative was to provide a forum in which flag/general officers and senior representatives from the political and humanitarian relief communities could discuss and game critical issues raised when attempting to harmonize their efforts in peace operations. Participants included flag/general officer level representatives from the Combatant Commands, Services, NATO and multinational forces, along with senior civilian and military representatives from the United Nations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and several Non-Governmental Organizations/Private Voluntary Organizations (NGOs/PVOs).
The Bosnia Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I) was held at Carlisle Barracks, 20-23 May 1996, as the first of two AAR conferences to examine the strategic implications of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) for the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The first conference, the essence of the report, examined the planning, preparation, deployment, and early entry operations of OJE from a U.S. perspective. The second conference, BHAAR II, held early in 1997, focused on operations, transition and exit strategy, and redeployment of U.S. forces.

The conference at the heart of BHAAR I consisted of forty five participants from twenty six organizations who analyzed thirteen critical issues that they themselves determined were essential for strategic review and of interest to the CSA. The participants were divided into three groups; validated issues associated with each group, analyzed the issues, and made presentations to a plenary panel. The report captured the essence of this process so as to provide a product of value to the senior Army leadership for shaping doctrine, refining education, and incorporating in leader development. The report served as a source document for planners for future peace operation missions.

The third annual “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’S) Peace Operations Seminar/Game” was conducted by PKI at the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) from 9 to 13 June 1997, under the sponsorship of the Joint Staff J8 Studies Analysis and Gaming Division (SAGD). Participants included flag level representatives from U.S. Combatant Commands, the Military Services, Canada, the United Kingdom, and senior civilian and military leaders from the United Nations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The Fund for Peace, the Foundation for Election Systems, the Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were among the NGOs represented.

Participants in the 1997 Seminar/Game dealt with two critical issues in Peace Operations: 1) sustainable security, and 2) military support to civil operations. Guest speakers and panel presentations provided a foundation for work group discussions. Discussions were conducted at the policy, strategic and operational levels and focused on the two named dimensions of peace operations and humanitarian emergencies. Participants developed conclusions and recommendations on these issues, which were presented in the form of an out-brief to Vice Admiral Dennis C. Blair III, Director of the Joint Staff.
The Fourth Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peace Operations Seminar was conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks from 9 to 11 June 1998 with the support of the Joint Staff, J8 Studies Analysis and Gaming Division (SAGD). The seminar was initiated in 1995 at the direction of the CJCS, General John M. Shalikashvili. In keeping with the Chairman’s original guidance, there were two overall goals for the seminar. The first was to provide a forum for education and training on political, military and humanitarian issues related to the conduct of peace operations. The second was to give participants an opportunity to interact with senior representatives of the U.S. Government, the United Nations and the humanitarian and development communities. Subsequently, PKI was assigned responsibility for organizing and conducting the program on an annual basis.

The theme, “Peace Operations in the International Environment”, was a timely one. Multinational/multilateral, U.S. Government supported peace operations conducted at the operational level require CINCs and CJTF Commanders to capitalize on coordination within the international humanitarian and development architecture at different levels.

The purpose of the CJCS Seminar is to bring senior military leaders together with senior representatives from the political, humanitarian and development communities to examine issues in peace operations and improve interoperability. Participants include flag/general military officers (U.S. and non-U.S.), senior civilians from the U.S. Government, senior representatives from the United Nations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. One of the strengths of this seminar is that we tackle difficult issues in small groups and develop recommendations for presentation to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the conference.

For further details, please contact LTC Mike Harwood, US Army Peacekeeping Institute at telephone (717) 245-4266/fax 3279 or via email harwoodm@csl.carlisle.army.mil.

The theme was, “The Security Lifecycle in Peace Operations: Issues of Transition and How We Get There From Here” was a timely one. The success of a peace operations and the quality of the resulting security hand-over dictates the pace of political reconciliation, economic recovery and development efforts and ultimately impacts accomplishment of the mandate. The specific objectives of the 1999 Peace Operations Seminar were to:

- Familiarize senior participants with issues of transition in peace operations and how those issues related to other key aspects of the mission.
- Sequence critical events/tasks within a peace operation from the accomplishment of military/security objectives to the establishment and domestic sustenance of public order and the ultimate realization of the desired endstate.
- Develop security transition guidelines for mission success.
2000 A seminar entitled, “The Role of the Military in Establishing the Rule of Law in Peace Operations”, specifically on military support to CIVPOL and Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD71) was conducted. The conference brought together 70 participants, including 16 U.S. general officers, one general officer from Canada, field grade officers from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Italy (representing SHAPE). In addition, two officials from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), two former police commissioners from the International Police Task Force, a representative from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and three U.S. ambassadors were in attendance. Numerous senior civilians from the Department of State, Department of Justice, the United Nations, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense also participated. The group briefed LTG Anderson, J5 Joint Staff representing the CJCS. The briefing highlighted the challenges faced in a peace operation in filling the security gap between the arrival of military forces, the subsequent arrival of international civilian police (CIVPOL) and eventually the establishment of law and order using local police.

2001 On November 14, 2001—the day after the fall of Kabul—the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, in collaboration with the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University, hosted an informal meeting on Afghanistan. The meeting brought together a mixture of experts on Afghanistan, humanitarian and military operations, and transitional political arrangements. Most of those present were current or former U.S. and UN officials. This combination of experts allowed the synthesis of multi-dimensional operational planning experience and Afghan-specific knowledge to produce comprehensive mission planning considerations. The purpose of the meeting was to explore a range of options and issues affecting the design of international intervention in Afghanistan. The report reflected the issues discussed, and incorporated many of the ideas contributed by meeting participants. The recommendations are the responsibility of the authors alone.
2002  The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute hosted the 8th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed seminar from 11-13 June 2002 at the Collins Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College. The seminar explored information operations and examined DoD’s ability to influence opinions, attitudes, and actions. Information operations are an often-misunderstood component of military operations and it was the Joint Staff’s desire to use this seminar to help prepare future Joint Force commanders to better utilize the power of information during complex contingencies.

Seminar attendees included U.S. Government agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense, combined with participation from the Joint Staff, the Services, and functional and regional Combatant Commands. A distinguished group of panelists and guest speakers contributed to the rich dialogue between seminar attendees.

2003  The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College, previously conducted studies of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in U.S. military engagements abroad. Based on comments from various levels of command engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the proper time to do an assessment of CMO there. Most participants would have completed tours and have the time and perspective to reflect on their experiences. In late FY 03, PKI was reorganized into the U.S. Army PeaceKeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). This report was published under the auspices of PKSOI.

The report covered the period from 11 September 2001 until the end of December 2002. Afghanistan remained a dynamic situation; therefore, the details associated with the findings were temporally bound. The report attempts to identify the trends and concerns that still exist, although their dimensions and magnitude may change.
2004  The Rule of Law Conference was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 6-9 July 2004. This was the first Rule of Law Conference and the first conference hosted by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the successor to the Peacekeeping Institute.

The rule of Law Conference was designed to accomplish three major goals:

- To inform senior U.S. civilian and military leaders regarding Rule of Law issues through a published conference report and recommended changes to concepts and doctrine.
- To collect information needed for the Rule of Law Chapter in the Phase II Concluding Report of the “Challenges to Peacekeeping: Into the 21st Century Project”.
- To inform U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute staff members regarding Rule of Law issues.

2005  The Peace and Stability Education Workshop was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 13 – 15 September 2005. This was the first of what would become an annual conference on the education of students and instructors in the field of peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations (PS&RO). PKSOI explored incorporating the workshop into the Eisenhower series of seminars.

The education workshop was designed to accomplish three major goals:

- Capture best practices and identify gaps in education
- Identify the programs, subject matter experts and initiatives in the field
- Establish a collaborative relationship among all participants that can form the basis for continuing dialogue
**2006** During fiscal year 2006 (October 2005 through September 2006), the Eisenhower National Security Series hosted a special series on stabilization and reconstruction operations. Under its auspices, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the National War College (NWC), with support from the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), hosted a roundtable series to foster a comprehensive and coordinated, cross-sectoral approach to dealing with spoilers to viable peace.

The Spoilers Program was undertaken to explore current approaches, experience, and lessons learned in dealing with a set of actors—spoilers—in post-conflict settings. Spoilers are not merely generic criminals or “bad actors” whose actions threaten local stability. They are those players with goals and agendas counter to U.S. policy and with sufficient capacity to take steps to undermine or act to defeat programs that advance U.S. interests.

**2007** The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) conducted an unclassified doctrine workshop from 8 to 11 January 2007 in support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The co-hosts were the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the Henry L. Stimson Center, and the United States Institute for Peace. The workshop was conducted on the campus of Dickinson College, Carlisle PA near the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA.

As all were aware, there has been significant change in the size, scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations in the fifty plus years since the UN first developed its fundamental peacekeeping principles of “consent”, “impartiality” and the “non-use of force, except in self-defense.” As part of its Peace Operations 2010 reform agenda, UNDPKO aimed to develop high-level, “capstone” doctrine documents that clearly set out the appropriate principles, core functions and factors that are needed for success in modern UN peacekeeping operations.
2008  Sponsored by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University and The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 24-25 September, 2008 at The Ronald Reagan Building, Washington DC.

The objective of the MARO Project is to enhance interagency assessment and planning capacity for mass atrocity situations and promote informed national decision making. The Project has assembled a core group of military planners who used the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as the basis for an Annotated Commander’s Estimate and Annotated Operation Plan (OPLAN) that is tailored to the unique requirements of responding to genocide and mass atrocity. The MARO products were released in early 2009. Throughout 2009 and 2010, the Project shared these tools with interested organizations and countries and exercised the tools for selected crisis scenarios.

2009  This workshop was hosted by the Challenges Forum Partner U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, United States and focused on “Multidimensional Peace Operations Concepts and Doctrine Development”.

In order to contribute to the improvement of harmonisation of international and multidimensional peace operations practice, the Challenges Forum Partnership decided in October 2008 to; first, remain engaged with the UN’s doctrine project through discussion, advocacy and where possible substantive support. Second, to support the development of an interactive Challenges Forum website for the sharing and promulgation of guidance material for peacekeeping best practice. Third, to contribute to the articulation of operational level guidance material through the sponsorship of inclusive workshops and follow-on papers on each of the three core business work strands identified, but not elaborated upon, in the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines document.
2010 Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions was hosted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in November 2010. With the support of thirteen co-sponsors spanning government, academic, international and non-governmental sectors, the conference served as a vehicle to explore a broader and more common understanding of post-conflict and post-disaster transitions and their proper practice—creating a baseline for various communities to further expand understanding and practice of this important strategic concept. In order to establish this baseline, the conference pursued the objectives and methodology depicted below.

The conference brought together key thinkers and practitioners from international academia, civilian agencies and organizations, and military services to examine the issues, challenges, and solutions in the empowerment of host nation governments and civil society and subsequent transition of responsibility and control to these indigenous agencies and organizations. Additionally, the conference advanced opportunities for new thinking, networking, and collaboration among the various communities involved in transition activities. An edited text of conference presentations was released in early 2011.

2011 The U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations co-hosted the annual International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) conference, from 14 to 18 November 2011.

The IAPTC is an open and voluntary association of approximately 90 different centers, institutions, organizations, and agencies from all regions of the world, dealing with peace operations research, education, and training. The association includes the United Nations major uniformed personnel contributing countries (i.e. Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Nigeria) and the major providers of assessed contributions (i.e. USA, Japan, UK, and Germany) as well as countries of interest in the Asia Pacific Region (China, Australia and others).
2012 The Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO) Policy Planning Handbook was a collaborative effort intended to assist the policy community in addressing mass atrocity situations. The MAPRO Handbook supplemented the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Military Planning Handbook, which was developed by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and PKSOI. The MAPRO Handbook provides guidelines and frameworks for the formulation of options, policies, and plans, and discusses the application of all elements of national influence in order to prevent or respond to mass atrocities.

Effective mass atrocity prevention and response options (MAPRO) should happen early. The longer it takes to act, the greater the risk that mass atrocities will occur and more people will die. On the other hand, inadequate time devoted to planning and risk assessment can result in ineffective MAPRO measures or undesired second-order effects. This is why it is essential for the USG and the international community to have in-place policies, plans, doctrine, and procedures before we are faced with mass atrocity situations.

2013 The Director of Training, Readiness and Strategy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Readiness teams with Joint Staff/J7, George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program (GMU/POPP), the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and other stakeholders conducted a unified workshop on peace and stability operations education, training and exercises at George Mason University’s Arlington campus from 28 – 31 January 2013.

The workshop brought together two efforts simultaneously, that previously had been conducted as stand-alone events, in order to gain greater synergy and cross-talk among the civilian and military communities focused on developing education, training and exercise programs that prepare leaders and practitioners for future service in complex environments including peace and stability operations.
The PKSOI 20th Anniversary Event and Future of Peace and Stability Panel reflects the efforts and dedication of the PKSOI community to develop capabilities, institutionalize skills, and study peacekeeping and stability operations. These efforts have kept the Institute alive and kept stability as a major focus of U.S. international operations. The Institute has succeeded only because of the cooperation and support of a wide range of committed individuals and institutions: governmental, academic, military, civilian, domestic and international. Moreover, the Panelists represent organizations from those fields and offer a variety of perspectives.

**Background**

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) hosted the event which included senior leaders from the United States Army War College, National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, the U.S. Army War College’s School of Strategic Landpower, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), George Mason University, the New American Foundation’s Open Technology Initiative, the Department of Defense’s Training Readiness and Strategy Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the U.S. Institute of Peace to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of PKSOI. Held at AUSA on 25 November 2013, the celebration included a panel discussion on the future of peace and stability operations and the role PKSOI in that future. The event brought together past and current PKI/PKSOI members and other organizations in order to both celebrate and to gain greater insight among civilian and military communities focused on peace and stability operations.

**The Event – Overview**

The event began with a lunch reception. Many distinguished guests and old friends celebrated the longevity of PKSOI. Several distinguished speakers gave opening remarks and two keynote addresses following the reception. Next, the Panel gave brief introductions and remarks on the future of peace and stability followed by questions. The event closed with a cake cutting ceremony.

**The Event - Details**

After the reception, a series of senior leaders provide opening remarks to set the context of the panel. Speakers highlighted the achievements and struggles of PKSOI and the importance of maintaining programs dedicated to peace and stability studies and operations. U.S. Army War College Commandant MG Anthony A. Cucolo III opened with the official welcome and an opening presentation. In addition to welcoming attendants, Gen Cucolo discussed the expectations during the creation of the Peacekeeping Institute and the necessity to continue the role PKSOI plays today.

*General Cucolo’s remarks are as follows:*

“Good afternoon and welcome, I’m Tony Cucolo, the current commandant of the United States Army War College and the Commanding General of the most strategic 500-acres in all of professional military education at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and home of that national asset we now call the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti-
PKSOI Anniversary Gathering: Celebrating 1993-2013

Back in 1993, the world was attempting to shake off the cold of the Cold War. It was a volatile and violent, uncertain, but certainly complex, ambiguous atmosphere for the world than ever before. General Gordon Sullivan, our 32nd Chief of Staff, who had been our Vice Chief of Staff too, just prior to becoming Chief of Staff — and I’d like also to mention, by the way, that this year we speak off, 1993, was also acting Secretary of the Army. He had a front row seat, on this complexity and uncertainty. Particularly as it pertained to force requirements that demand for land power in the national interest for operations other than war. General Sullivan looked at the present day back in 1993, and looked over our far horizon and with great prescience, saw the need for a place to study a whole of government and international approach to this complexity. And he directed the establishment of the Peacekeeping Institute.

Soon after its birth, if I can speak from a soldier’s point of view, an operator’s point of view, we were flooded with a new lexicon of named operations and we supported or engaged them. Named operations: Assistance Mission, Protective Force, Verification Missions, Mission of Support, Troops Supervision, Transitional Administration, Interim Force, Implementation Force, and Stabilization Force. Assistance force by security named operations made legitimate by an agreement. An agreement among violently disagreeing parties, not between a winner and a loser. Names carefully crafted to get an acceptance of an agreement by these belligerents so that a diplomatic and military force could be introduced and accepted on contested grounds.

But unfortunately, as we practitioners in the room also know, a name cannot remove the ambiguity of the situation on the ground nor does a name adequately describe the risk borne by those who place themselves between warring factions or between parties who are willing to kill anyone in the way or their desires or anyone seeking adjustments to their acceptable status quo.

‘Peacekeeper’ is a noble role, it requires unquestioned credibility and warrior skills and discriminate application of force. It requires leaders who are masters of chaos and uncertainty. It requires warriors, both leaders and led who have a reflexive desire to enforce basic human rights and simple justice. And who understand the long view and who believe they can make a positive difference in the human condition in the area of which they are responsible. They believe they can make a positive difference in the world.

And if there is to be mastery in this, then there must be a place to study these complex operations. A place to share lessons internationally, a place that promotes dialogue among civilian, military, government, and other non-government organizations. A place that is so sufficiently acceptable and agreeable to political and diplomatic masters that maybe new relationships between nations, relations perhaps never before considered, become possible.

The first decade of the Peacekeeping Institute and the last decade of PKSOI have exceeded all expectations, if there was to be a proof of concept of General Sullivan’s and our State Department colleagues’ vision. To the uninformed, much of what PKSOI puts their hands on looks tactical and operational. Most of peacekeeping civilian operations, after all, do focus on the grassroots level of sources of conflict. But all of you assembled here know that affected peace and stability operations are for a strategic purpose. They must be undertaken with a strategic end in mind. So it makes complete sense for the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to be based at the home of the U.S. Army’s strategic heart, the U.S. Army War College, barely two hours from the nation’s capital and less than four hours from the United Nations. As I arrived at the War College the summer of ’12, I heard the rumblings from nearsighted budgeters about PKSOI relevance. And as I considered the current state of the human domain, I believed our future once again holds a more active role in peacekeeping and stability operations.
We Americans have always accepted a level of instability in the world. Some things simply did not matter enough for us to act. But today our global economy is so interconnected, and gets more connected each day, and the speed of human interaction is so fast due to the world wide web and social media, that I believe our threshold of acceptable instability for both our policy makers and the American people is getting lower and lower. And I believe our future alliance operations and U.N. operations will be more frequent and there will be few places we will go alone as a nation. And I would offer too as this interconnected world of ours gets smaller and smaller, our national interests will require military influence and power in the human domain and land power and we will execute peace and stability operations with our State Department and non-governmental organization colleagues.

This anniversary today is as much honoring a milestone as it is a punctuation mark, recognition of the Institute’s relevance. Once again, I recognize you all and thank the Association of the United States Army for hosting this great event, I hope all participants here leave with fresh ideas, a reenergized commitment to move the ball further forward in the context of peace and stability operations, and a quiet pride that all of you as practitioners and members of key organizations or in the international brotherhood and sisterhood of profession of arms, that what you do matters in the world.

Thank you for listening to me. And now I’d like to turn the podium over to Colonel Jody Petery, the current director of this 20-year-old institute. Thank you.

Next, Colonel Jody Petery, the current director of PKSOI, briefly spoke to the current status of PKSOI. He also, fittingly, recognized the former directors over the past 20 years. Those former PKSOI directors in attendance included COL (Ret.) Larry Forster, COL (Ret.) George Oliver, COL (Ret.) John Agoglia, COL (Ret.) John Kardos, COL (Ret.) Stephen Smith, and COL (Ret.) Cliff Crofford.

The first keynote speaker was GEN (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan, AUSA’s President and Chief Executive Officer and PKSOI founder. Gen Sullivan’s keynote address covered Moving Toward a New Future.

His speech, summarized, is as follows:

First of all, welcome to the home of the Association of the United States Army, it’s nice to have all of you here on a day I’m not sure any of us, certainly I didn’t, think was going to happen. So, it’s nice to have you here. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for coming, distinguished guests, former directors of PKSOI, thanks to everyone one of you for helping to make today possible. I’m going to start by giving you my perspective on things and try to keep it somewhat short, but I do think we need to put some stuff on the table here.

Twenty-one years ago during the early days of the Somalia Operation in ’92, when the focus was primarily humanitarian assistance, it became apparent to me during my first visit and more and more when I went back that we, the Army, were not fully prepared to deal effectively with the complexities of the humanitarian aid process. This principally was because we didn’t even know, or understand, the missions/capabilities, of the various NGOs and PVOs operating in Somalia nor did we know about what we didn’t know to prepare our leaders and troops for what would confront them upon arrival. For some reasons we had not captured what we learned with our forces including huge humanitarian and stability situations.

I recall I was the G3 of the Army when we invaded Panama, and that went off like clockwork. Twenty-seven objectives, midnight to daylight, then next day everything was great until the next day somebody called and said, “Who is going to feed the Panamanians?” We presumed they were going to feed themselves – wrong answer. We wound up with that on our plate. So the fact of the matter is, we had not prepared ourselves, all of the troops, I was not necessarily worried about preparing myself for it, but we had not prepared the troops as well as we should have for what was a major event.
Only through the initiative of the leaders such as MG Steve Arnold, GC 10th Mountain Division, as well as other senior and junior leaders, we were able to figure out who was there and how we could operate in such an alien environment, effectively as humanitarian assistance forces, and in turn leverage the contributions of the United Nations and NGOs, who had been in Somalia for some time, and ultimately to assist them as they tried to achieve their goals. Admittedly it was a trial and error process not without some bruised egos on both sides. Without boring you with all the details, let me simply say I felt we had not prepared our leaders to operate effectively in such a complex environment. We clearly did not know the actors either in the UN or the most specialized NGOs, and subjects such as education and training were being developed. Our work in Panama and Kurdistan provided us some insights for actions in operational training settings and looking in retrospect at these two operations, it was obvious we had some basis upon which to build doctrine, TTP, and lessons learned. I believe military organizations perform better if they have a doctrine and people have thought about it – intellectual leads physical – and trained to do it. And that’s why PKI was developed.

I felt we, the institution, could have done a better job in preparing them and we also knew we needed to get in the game. We had to get in the game and had to show the UN and Washington we were willing to be in the game. Without going into all the details of the creation of what was initially known as PKI, Peacekeeping Institute, I turned to MG Bill Stofft, Commandant of U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, to create a small organization designed to interface with the UN and the humanitarian relief organizations best reached then through Inter Action, an umbrella organization headed by the late Julia Taft, the UN, humanitarian relief people, as well as NGOs and PVOs. We felt the Post-Cold War Army already had experience and, interestingly, we would become a very significant player in this arena in the near future: Peacekeeping, stability ops, and humanitarian assistance.

These arenas included Panama, Hurricane Andrew, Resettlement of Kurds, Somalia, Rwanda ’94 – today. If you think for a minute that when I was commissioned in 1959 that I thought I would wind-up in deepest, darkest Africa, with a parachute infantry company surrounding me, in such far away places where U.S. Army soldiers were pulling bodies out of the water so they could put the suction hoses in so they could pump fresh water, you are just flat kidding yourself. I don’t think any of us thought we’d be any places like this, any of us that were there. It was
quite an eye-opener. The Balkans, Haiti (multiple times), Afghanistan, and Iraq. What have we learned in all of those places? And you can see in the various posters around this room, that all of this work is starting to be codified in very important ways.

One thing I knew was that all Army leaders and others did not intellectually embrace the emerging demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, either related to manmade events or natural disaster. We had a leadership challenge, and in turn, I felt an organization at Carlisle, which was designed to develop doctrine and in turn stimulate the education and training process. It was the right thing to do.

First, Army leaders needed to know we were serious about our performance in these matters. We had to be in the game and in fact developed training scenarios used at JRTC – Ambassador Albright, the Honorable Madeleine Albright, was the Ambassador to the UN and actually came to some of our training at JRTC. Karl Farris, the first director of PKSOI, was singled out by her because of some work he’d done in Cambodia, which is why I grabbed him and made him the first director of PKI. We had to ensure that the UN knew that the U.S. Army was in the game.

Second, contact with the UN, U.S. Dept. of State—USAID, USIP and Inter Action was critical in my mind. Being seen as a reluctant dragon was not the answer. I was introduced to the late Julia Taft, who was the director of an outfit, which is still in existence, that’s an umbrella organization for disparate NGOs, whether they be U.S. or international, here in Washington. That was an important epiphany, some of the most courageous people I know, actually most of them young women, who are out in these far away places being rescued from these situations they kept getting into, like in Somalia and really bad places. We started to build a relationship and leverage that in our training.

Third, working with NGOs in dangerous places was not always easy and we had to learn more about these organizations, their values, their missions, capabilities, and visions and know how to be a good team member. This meant, no orders and no authoritative posturing. We were there to facilitate the flow of information. ‘Tomorrow the Army will have a convoy moving food from warehouses at 1100 hrs should you wish to be included, there will be air coverage.’ The food was there, they just had an issue of how to move it. Because the warlords would steal it and the people where starving. So we learned we just had to have a meeting telling people this information. People starting showing up because they realized ‘hey, these people aren’t going to tell us what to do, they are going to facilitate.’ Every once in a while they’d have to rescue some missionaries because they had helicopters.

What does the future hold for organizations involved in humanitarian disaster relief and assistance to those in need of help as a result of manmade crises – increased demand in global climate change, ethnic/religious conflict, and international extremism? The demand is rising and the willingness of donors to support relief efforts is declining. If you want to see that go to the Inter Action website to see what sequestration is doing on AIDS/HIV treatment, prophylactic devises/medicine, insecticides, and mosquitoes nets. Support for global health from people in the United States Congress is down. That increases the demands.

In our own country we often hear, or read, the American people are exhausted by the recent war in Iraq and the, too often forgotten, continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Whether this is an assertion or a reality is problematic, but even I know there is declining ... interest in overseas activities compounded by diminishing support for humanitarian relief and the activities by private organizations involved in humanitarian relief.

I often turn to our historical accounts of the past for strength and it will come as no surprise to most of you that one source of inspiration has always been General George Marshall. One of his signature achievements was the Marshall Plan. His speech at Harvard 5 June 1947 – I quote:

‘It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.’

He said that in 1947, different context, but the thought travels. And what you are doing is very important. My experience and my studies combine to make me believe the world has changed. You don’t have to be an Oxford don or a post doctoral pundit to see the differences in a post Cold War multipolar world, affected by global climate change, the diminishing stability of artificially created national states, ethnic and religious conflict, extremism and international terrorism, as well as globalization and the opportunities and instabilities inherent in it.

To paraphrase Trotsky ‘... You may not like chaos created by wars, joblessness, poverty and climate change, but it likes you.’ We have no choice, ‘it likes you.’ If not the U.S., then who? Ask
yourself ‘who?’ Change is hard work. That is what is represented right here. And the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, along with his partners, demonstrates commitment to this issue. We can’t kid ourselves. And we have to be in the game – stability is better than war. Taking care of people who cannot take care of themselves is noble work.

General Sherman writes a letter to General Grant, now admittedly different context, but same thought though. Sherman says to him, ‘throughout the war you have always been in my mind. I always know that if I am ever in trouble and you are still alive that you would come to my assistance.’ There are people out there who know very little about the United States of America other than an image in their mind of the Statue of Liberty, ‘If we’re in trouble, the United States of America is going to come help us.’ That is both a burden and a blessing. It’s a two-edge sword. And we have challenges, the country has challenges, real change takes real effort. Secretary of Defense on 11 June 2013 legitimizes the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The Secretary of the Army stamps it, passing it down on 28 October 2013. The mission is now legit: write doctrine, develop organizations, write training, provide materials to support all of that, leader development and education, and work on the personnel issues. This included a legitimate budget. Today’s celebration is very significant in my mind, this is the most legitimate institutional legitimization of PKSOI and I congratulate all who have been involved in this to include Karen Finkenbinder, who helped pull this together and Bill Flavin, who has been here from the very beginning. He’s everywhere like Chicken Man. It’s a big deal, what you’re doing is great and I think you all feel very good about it and what’s been done. PKSOI is more important today than it was 20 years ago.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, I’m going to turn it over to you and welcome you to our podium. Thank you.”

Ambassador John E. Herbst followed Gen. Sullivan as the second keynote speaker. His keynote address covered Challenges and Opportunities.

His speech, summarized, is as follows:

“General Sullivan, thank you, General Cucolo, Colonel Petery, I thank you all for being here. General, that was a very inspiration talk, and I will now give you the real world. I am a little less optimistic, although ultimately hopeful.

PKSOI deals with failed and failing states and the chaos of a post cold war world. The world has always had what is referred to as historical marches or badlands, spaces in between civilized societies inhabited with nomads or others. But, it was only after the Cold War that the problem of ungoverned spaces reemerged at least in the modern era. So it took tremendous foresight, and for that matter extraordinary flexibility on the part of the military, to establish PKSOI at such an early point in the new era.

Now, I’m here to talk about the present and future. But to do that we have to get some kind of idea as to where we’ve been. So
let’s take a quick look back at what has happened since the early 90s. In that time, we saw an explosion of peacekeeping operations. You have Haiti in Latin America, you have the war by the Liberians in Sierra Leone in Africa, the Balkans in Europe, and of course you have the East-Asian Timor.

[Ambassador Herbst discussed the two previous administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, respectively. He focused on their ability to understand and formulate solutions to this new problem. He then spoke to the newest strategies of the U.S. government.]

The defense strategy, articulated by the Secretary of Defense in 2012, now focuses on small-scale operations. It looks to scaling down current operations, so that we have the resources to implement immediate large-scale operations if needed, but also have the ability to scale back up if the need arises. And we have to maintain after action “lessons learned” for this decade of war. This concern stems from the American people and the military not wanting to get into any large-scale military operations.

Other issues discussed included budget issues and the cost of military operations. The political environment between neo-cons and libertarian interventionists, the ‘intellectual elite who are still keen to engage.’ Search for alternative between intervention and lack of needed participation. Finally, he discussed recent missions including Libya and Syria and President Obama’s policies.]

It’s possible what you are seeing in a sense the American public talking back to the foreign policy leaders who have dominated this discussion over the past fifteen years. They say, ‘wait a minute guys, we’ve already given too much already in the way of blood and treasure for these types of operations where we don’t see an imperative American interest.’ Not no American interest, but an imperative one, in play. I’m not saying it’s for sure, but it’s possible. And I think we are seeing something right now that will tell us, about the future of our environment and that something right now is Iran.

[Amb. Herbst discussed President Obama’s current position on Iran.]
First, Assistant Professor Janine Davidson, George Mason University, read comments on behalf of absent panelist Beth Cole from USAID. Then, Dr. Davidson made her own presentation, as follows:

First of all I’d like to say I’m absolutely thrilled to be here, probably like many of you in this room, thrilled to see that PKSOI is at its 20th year, it’s truly amazing. The one person that should be on this panel that isn’t is Beth Cole. Beth and I actually met at a PKSOI event that was one of the launching points of the education and training event. We worked on things together like the civil and military guidelines, she led all these efforts for the NGOs and the military together. It took her two years to produce this document to help these two communities to work together and talk to each other in the field. She helped me launch the CCO, she wrote what we would consider civilian doctrine that we use at George Mason University to teach the next generation of students about peacekeeping and stability operations. She is truly in the trenches on this issue, and is absolutely disappointed not to be here. She is now running the office of military affairs at USAID. And she’s home sick so I texted her and asked her ‘what should I tell people in your name?’ She says this:

‘PKSOI is our bellybutton and we need one in the U.S. military. What she means by that is we, civilians, need a place to go where we can coordinate these types of things. “The future seems to point to three different types of peacekeeping ops that we are not prepared for: (1) transitional, things like Afghanistan, (2) Persistent, she’s talking about things like the DRC and Haiti, (3) New Hybrids, things like South Sudan, Somalia, and Mali. On top of that she says how we are going to deal with the rise of mega cities, climate change, inadequate access to water and energy, food and security, and the rise of infectious disease that will characterize the environment of the future. What is the role of the U.S. Army and the U.S. military?’

I just want to say for my part, three major points. There are a lot of lessons, myths, and delusions we tell ourselves about this mission set and the purpose of PKSOI. First, I think this is a lesson, many have tried and many have failed to shut down PKSOI. It is here to stay. I think not only the environment that Beth and General Sullivan talk about, but the history that demonstrates we need a place were we can have this kind of discussion where we can develop doctrine and combine our efforts.

The next item builds on that but in the category of myths. The 2012 strategy that Amb. Herbst talked about, the military DOD strategy. A lot of people quote the piece in there that ‘we will no longer size for large scale military operations’ like Iraq and Afghanistan. And you know those types of people desperately don’t want to have to do those types of messy stuff every again, take that as a sign that says, ‘see, we don’t have to do it. It’s not our job, it was never our job, and people are finally seeing the light.’ Well, those of us in this room who have studied history probably know what folly that would be. Also, not only that, but it’s a complete misinterpretation of that document. It says explicitly, I know because I helped write, ‘U.S. forces will
retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counter insurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Where is that going to happen? Where it’s always happened - at PKSOI. When I was studying the way the military learned PKSOI, was that engine room, that belly button for civilians like Beth said, but the engine room for the intellectuals, I think, and really importantly, the doctrine development was PKSOI. It’s what I call a hot house, really a place for growing these ideas and testing them out. Now, more than ever we’re going to need that kind of place.

I think there is a lot of uncertainty in the environment about what our budget is, what our roles are going to be, but I think when it comes to this mission set in particular, people miss the point. Especially a lot of journalists out there who try to infer the direction of the Department of Defense by reading between the budget lines. They want to see what the military is buying. What you really need to understand is what the military is thinking and what the military is teaching the next generation. And that happens through doctrine, training, and education. And the engine room for a lot of the doctrine, training, and education for this mission set is PKSOI. So if you’re looking to see what they are buying you’re missing the point. Capturing the lessons and continuing to push them into the institution that is the military is the absolute key here, and PKSOI is the most important. I genuinely believe that, not just for the Army, but also for the rest of the joint enterprise and the rest of the government.

And the third point, just like in previous eras, we may wish for a certain kind of future. We may wish for a certain kind of mission for the Army. But we are not likely to get something very linear or something very easy. Not only is the environment going to continue to be chaotic but we also have to take stock of what the ‘bad guys’ have been learning the last ten years. This peacekeeping mission has had so many elements to it. It’s gone from humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace enforcement – everything seems to get dumped on PKSOI – then its counterinsurgency, then its counterterrorism. And what I’m seeing is a blurring of the line of what we consider to be crime and what we consider to be war. Now, that’s just what we consider it to be. What we consider to be the work of cop and what we consider to be the work of military. And we’ve been debating this in the military for 200 years, whether or not the military should be doing this kind of stuff. The more we say we’re not going to do it, the more the cops are going to have to do it. And I do believe that the bad guys don’t differentiate one from the other. Whether they’re insurgents on the street in Baghdad, broad daylight in the middle of the day they can pull a bunch of election workers from their cars and shoot them in head in the middle of the street for effect. And those same guys in that organization that night can launch a raid on farm. And what do we do? Say ‘oh that’s yours’ ‘oh that’s mine’ ‘you have the authorities to do this…you have the authorities to do that.’ It’s just a big mess and I think it’s only going to get worse. So this blurring the line between crime and war, the way in which the bad guys are going to think about this, don’t think they accidently operate in the gap. They actively exploit our cultural predisposition to bifurcate these two areas that is hardwired and baked into our institutions, our bureaucracies, and our laws. So, I think we need to get a grip on that - that’s my addition to what’s already been said about the chaotic environment. So I think PKSOI has it’s work cut out for it coming in the next decade, in the next two decades. And I also think they’re well equipped intellectually and otherwise to handle that.

Lorelei Kelly followed Dr. Davidson by discussing the role of Congress and open technology. Her presentation is as follows:

Thank you. It’s great to be here. I’ve been out of my national security world for the last four years or so. So I figured a good
way to start my talk here is with my story of PKSOI and how I know about it. I left national security academia to move into technology about four years ago and one of the reasons is that I realized I was on Capital Hill for almost nine years. And unless we change the policy process and how we talk about security were not going to be able to understand security and address the complex problems we face in the U.S.A. or assist others around the world.

I was on the Hill in 2003, and I had moved to D.C. from Northern California to put together a new education system under the committee system of Congress by my best friend who was a member of Congress because this old committee system couldn’t handle or appreciate the mass of dramatic changes happening after the Cold War. Still today I think, Congress is more comfortable looking for Napoleon on the plains of Prussia, than any number of complex, interdependent, blended threats that we’re facing. It needs a real deliberate strategy to deal with that complexity and we’ve just started to look at our failure to address this what is happening with this right now the NSA over-surveillance is one, Afghanistan as a political-social problem that required a whole different set of tools.

I was lucky enough to be found by the Army as soon as I got to D.C., and they realized I was an expert on conflict resolution and decision analysis. And they said, ‘Well we want to solve conflict and we want to talk about how you do it preventively.’ So I found myself a Northern California academic type hanging out with the Army, a lot. It was a wonderful home for me and I’m eternally grateful for it.

PKSOI has always been a leader on the curve of understanding, dealing, and coping with that complexity and understanding the true meaning of resilience. And I’d like to introduce a term that I know has been talk about already today one way or the other called resilient governance.

In 2003 and leading up to the War in Iraq, I had a meeting one morning with the Quakers and in the afternoon with the Army War College. Basically, both of these philosophically different groups were saying the same thing. One said, ‘We shouldn’t do this, don’t do this, we can’t do this.’ The other is saying, ‘we actually can’t do this. We can’t execute an occupation, here’s the list.’ So I took that list and thought, the Army and the Quakers are on the same page. This is a truly democratic moment, something is happening here. How come these people didn’t find each other in time?

Next, I heard that PKSOI was being threatened with elimination. I didn’t know how this could be happening. The very people who were in the middle of two completely nontraditional land wars and the only place that has the institutional memory of all of this is being threatened with elimination as a line-item for posterity and efficiency issues in the budget.

It became very clear to me this disconnect that was going on, and all these good intentions aside, these people that needed to be talking to each other hadn’t found each other yet. So, I dedicated myself to this and tried to put myself in a place where I could get these people together and on the same page.

Interestingly, I jumped out of national security into technology four years ago and I’m still interested in Congress. I love Congress; I think I’m one of the only people that would say that. I find Congress interesting, an organic institution, and it along with a lot of civics in the United States has fallen into this memory hole and it’s causing a lot of problems. Now, we have a real hard time talking about democracy because they look at us and say why don’t you take care of your problem at home. I’m trying to develop a way to talk about it; you all know what I mean when I say resilient governance. But how does this relate to our own democratic system and what does it mean for today’s national security? Power is being redistributed the world over but our most plural branch government is becoming a single failure. Resilience is not having a single point of failure, we have one and it’s the legislative branch – the first branch of government. It cannot participate and/or navigate change, much less disruption.

What I’m doing is looking at the information management system of Congress. Smart Congress is looking at the inventory oversight process. I’m looking at where technology coincides with transparency changes, and these have been mandated changes in open government. You see it a lot in the executive branch, but a similar revolution is happening in Congress and hardly anybody is paying attention to it. Mostly because everybody is mad at Congress but also because it’s a really complicated process and there are these five people and they’ve been up there for years. They’re in the clerk’s office, the Library of Congress, but they are plugging away making every committee document machine-readable and every committee hearing webcast. The opportunity to be inside the policy process now is unprecedented. So I’m looking at how we create a curated system of knowledge that matters and also has a political constituency that is in Texas, in Oklahoma, and in California. It’s not all required to be proximate or on the Hill because that has happened and now we’ve created this kind of cartel-like information management system where it’s a private market for influence on Capital Hill. So, how do we disrupt that and evolve our democratic progress at the same time?
So, I got into technology and right about the same time there was a democratic revolution around the world. What I’ve noticed is the gap between revolutions and institutions everywhere. It’s happening everywhere. I’ve noticed the people that can handle complexity, because they deal with situational awareness constantly and also they’ve created tools for it, are in uniform. So we’ve migrated all of these responsibilities for handling complex problem solving into the military. [Ms. Kelly then gives a few examples of where is has happened with Afghanistan and the NSA over-surveillance.] What I’m looking at is how we bridge that gap between [technologists’] revolution and our institutions.

So the idea of governance is different than government. Government is marble buildings on the Mall. Governance is a relationship: it’s about inclusiveness, participation, and mutual beneficial outcomes that are a collective nature. How do we take some of the things the military uses for things like situational awareness, one of them is predictive modeling? What if we could create predictive modeling capacity hearings, so that there are five choices in front of a member and they choose one of them and vote on it? That then creates an accountability system for using empirical knowledge. The technology for this already exists in Congress, but we don’t have the big data capacity, we haven’t experimented with this quite enough. We need to figure out a way to migrate these skills back to civilians. At the end of the day it’s the civilian leadership that needs to put that forward as a country that presents itself as a democracy. The way we understand security right now is not necessarily leading to peace.

I look forward to this community developing ways to start migrating this capacity back into the hands of civilians as civilian leaders. Thank you.

Next, Defense Department’s Frank DiGiovanni then spoke to the bureaucratic angle of peace and security. His presentation is as follows:

So, first of all, it’s an honor to come and speak to you all today. PKSOI has been a professional organization since the day I became involved in it. There is a history of this organization producing some outstanding knowledge and understanding across the services. I certainly would like to recognize General Sullivan for his role, General Cucolo, Dr. Shear, and others, it’s quite an honor to be here and talk about PKSOI.

When I looked at this title The Future of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, -that’s a really tough question. I’m not sure I have an answer. I hope to touch on a few things in the next few minutes that might help show where it’s headed. We are at a turning point. This 20-year anniversary is kind of apropos, 12 years of conflict but if I did my math right, in 1993 we were involved in a pull out of a major conflict, Operation Desert Storm. And now, 20 years later, we find ourselves kind of at the same crossroad as we withdraw ourselves from Afghanistan and we’ve withdrawn from Iraq.

I believe if you look at the strategic scenarios in the future, we’re going to be looking at the kind of the middle of the road with some excursions into major operations. But for the most part, we’re going to see the Somalias, we’re going to see the things that are going to be relatively short, hopefully. Because I don’t think there is any patience in the country for anything long again. And that peacekeeping and stability is something we’re going to need to keep on the front burner.

I am the bureaucrat in the room, my office does readiness and readiness assessment for the Department. [...] QDR doesn’t show any major revelations, maybe I still have hope that the QDR will produce something interesting but I can’t tell. Strategic land power, a very interesting concept; I took a briefing recently on that. It’s talking about the human domain, that’s what this is about, that’s what peacekeeping is about. They said that the audience is about half and half. Half get that we need to focus on the human domain and the other half don’t know what you’re talking about. I think the strategic land concept is the right concept at this point.
They also told me there’s a new term for the Regionally Aligned Forces. I said ‘RAF’ and they told me the new term was ‘Regionally Engaged Forces, REF.’ I think the reason is the “alignment” term is problematic because commanders see the word “alignment” and think possession. So I do believe that the term “alignment” will fall off to the wayside and we’ll use “engage” because then that doesn’t presuppose that the aligned forces are not yours.

The discussion purpose MAC test for the Marine Corps. is another interesting concept. I do find it interesting that only the ground forces are talking about things like that. The Navy and Air Force don’t have to worry about things like that. [Dr. DiGiovanni mentions several positive steps that have occurred furthering peace and stability operations including stability police forces and Fort Leonard Wood’s MP school where, upon graduation, an MP is certified as a police officer in the state of Missouri.]

The countering points, what we’re seeing on the bad side, the budget. It has consumed me, it’s killing me. Just like when it gets cold outside, the blood in your extremities goes to the core – that is what I see happening in the services. The budget environment is cold and the blood is withdrawing from the extremities, from the things like stability operations: it’s the ‘lesser included’ concept.

I saw a slide of what all four services were doing for their advisory forces, what they were doing to their counterinsurgency training – they were cutting them. They were cutting them all. That doesn’t bode well for the future.

Based on that, you be the judge. There are some positive things; there are some negative things. So, I can’t really say what the future will hold and for me it appears unclear. But if the past is prologue, then we’re going to see that this particular field is not going to get a lot of resources.

So, what do we do? I do training, education and exercises. One of things we’ve tried to do is stay engaged with the Interagency. Stay engaged with others that have a stake with this in the future and one of the ways to do this is to train and exercise together. It gives you something common to work against.

When I first started I couldn’t figure out how to break into my counterparts in other federal agencies. It’s all about trust and you develop trust during exercises. I learned more about the capabilities of the other agencies in the planning cycle than I did in the actual exercises.

So, my approach is to look for every opportunity to plan, exercise and train; continue to support PKSOI’s initiatives to engage with the Inter Agency; and to keep this subject alive. Leveraging technology I think is important. What I find interesting is that social media has created something I call ‘virtual tribes.’ I think there are ways to engage that are low costs using social media and virtual tribes.

I’m going to close with that and all that I ask of you is please go out there and continue to be the missionaries that you have been and come beat me upside the head if there is something I can do to help you.

Finally, William B. Taylor, Jr., the representative from the U.S. Institute of Peace concluded the panelist presentations. His presentation is as follows:

I am very pleased to represent the Institute of Peace here at this 20th anniversary of PKSOI. USIP is now led by a former Army Ranger who served in Vietnam, so we have this mission to resolve conflicts and that is what we’re focused on doing. We have had cooperative agreements, or arrangements, since PKSOI started. The conflict resolution, by nature, is both military and civilian, so that relationship - the civil-military connection is how we’ve worked closely with PKSOI over the years.

Dr. Davidson mentioned the doctrine that was put together by Beth Cole, who put that together from USIP. That connection was something we’re really proud of, I’m glad to hear it’s still being taught. There is also work that will continue on these lines:

Mr. William B. Taylor, Jr., the representative from the U.S. Institute of Peace concluded the panelist presentations.
military, civilian, government, and nongovernment workings groups on civilian-military relations. We hope that PKSOI will continue to work with us on those and the handbooks that go along with them.

We’re very pleased that PKSOI is going to be the Joint lead for peace and stability operations. That will give us another area where the Institute of Peace and the PKSOI missions meld. We have a new vice president at the Institute for the Academy who will be focused on training under George Lopez.

I certainly agree that we have not seen the last of the civil-military work, the construction work, and the stabilization work. There’s not an appetite for it now, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t going to happen again. I am absolutely sure that it will. The lessons, the doctrine, the experience, the capabilities, that PKSOI has developed and will continue to develop will be important as those reoccur.

In Libya, the U.S. military, along with some other allies, want to train some 5000-8000 Libyans toward a professional military that is, as we can see every day, needed in Libya. That with institutional development in Libya, is another area that I think PKSOI along with the State Department and USAID will be big components of. In Syria, we will see at some point, probably later rather than sooner, the need for some of the reconstruction lessons or stabilization lessons that PKSOI has learned over the past 20 years.

After the Panelist presentations, Dr. Lacquement opened the floor for questions and discussion.

Closing

After the conclusion of the Panel Session, COL Petery and COL (Ret.) Bill Flavin, Assistant Director of PKSOI, presented plaques to each of the Panelists and Keynote Speakers. General Sullivan gave closing remarks. The event concluded with a Cake Cutting ceremony with the former directors.

This event drew on both civilian and military experience to capture ideas and trends that may outline future challenges and opportunities to map the way ahead for PKSOI in the years to come.
For General Sullivan, as the Army’s CEO, there were some things he could initiate/direct to prepare the force to operate efficiently in peacekeeping missions while at the same time maintaining its primary focus on core warfighting capabilities. DOTLMS were seen as the key to institutionalizing a peacekeeping capability in the force. As we (four Colonels) were doing our research, I learned that the Army was looking for a Colonel to head our 48-officer UN Military Observer contingent in UNTAC, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. I asked DCSOPS (Army’s lead for UN support) to give me three weeks to see if I could get out of the “Strategic Fellow” position and, if so, I would volunteer for the UNMO position. I was released by the CSA and was on my way to Cambodia early January 1993. I remained there until the UNTAC ended in August 1993.

MG Stofft and I set about developing an operational “focus” for PKI. We established three main areas of effort:

1) Provide “peacekeeping” instruction to USAWC students. This was to be in the form of a one-day seminar on peacekeeping to the entire student body and then peacekeeping subject related electives during the second and third USAWC trimesters.

2) Establish liaison and maintain close contact with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as other International Organizations and large Non-governmental Organizations that traditionally deploy to what were then starting to be referred to as “complex emergencies.”

3) Provide an educational resource in “peacekeeping” to “Combattant Commanders” who may be standing-up a JTF for deployment to a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, if requested, form the core of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) that would deploy with a JTF on an operational mission. The CMOC’s primary responsibility would be to establish liaison, interface and coordination between the JTF and the wide array of UN, IO and NGO’s deployed to the intervention area. It was thought that the personal relationships nurtured by PKI with UN/IO/NGO representatives and PKI’s understanding of their operational cultures would facilitate the early operational effectiveness of the CMOC.

This “charter” was forwarded to and approved by General Sullivan. By 1994, PKI was fully operational.

PKI to PKSOI

by Mr. Steve Henthorne

The main motivation for Colonel Oliver, by then in his new position as the Director of PKI, to bring me to PKI, was based on his desire to develop a supplemental funding stream that would allow the Institute greater flexibility in executing, stabilizing, and hopefully expanding its mission. He wanted to utilize my recognized skills with four techniques: Supplemental Funding, Enhanced Marketing, Comprehensive Networking and my dedication for building functional bridges between dysfunctional civil & military partners, to help accomplish his goals for PKI.

It has always been my belief that PKI/PKSOI has had a great deal of value to offer not only the Army, but in joint & com-
combined operations as well throughout all three levels of operation; but especially when Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 was issued on September 16, 2009, and visualized that three major areas that comprise full spectrum operations, were each of equal importance: offense, defense, and stability. That document clearly stated that stability operations are the core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. There was no organization with a greater potential, if properly funded and staffed, to support that instruction than PKI.

During the years 2002 & 2003, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) was in serious danger of becoming a casualty of “Force Realignment,” and closure. I had the opportunity to function as an unofficial ombudsman for a small group of select individuals, both civilians and military, that all worked extremely hard to save PKI. As a result this group significantly contributed to the establishment of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), which remains operational today.

I would especially credit the success of this group to the tireless efforts of both COL(R) Bill Flavin, who worked determinedly behind the scenes to save PKI. Through many more skirmishes, hard fought campaigns, and political intrigues than almost anyone else inside PKSOI, he continues to secure permanent stability for PKSOI as much as possible. A great share of the credit should also go to Lorelei Kelly, who worked tirelessly in Washington, DC to take the fight to the halls of Congress to save PKI.

Sadly though, since the founding of PKI, by General Sullivan, neither PKI nor PKSOI have ever been allowed to fully function at the highest levels of their capacity and capabilities as the U.S. military’s premier Center of Excellence for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations. The real challenge in telling the history of PKI is that, at the end of the day, after PKI was saved, and transitioned into PKSOI, the new organization continued to be treated with an air of indifference, which only continued to stifle the functional abilities of PKSOI.

The main reasons for this lack of functionality range from a consistent lack of funding, both for normal operations and for supplemental development, marketing & networking operations, to General Sullivan’s 1993 published comment that the Army just “didn’t understand the dimensions of the peacekeeping world;” and as a result, by 2005, the Army’s attention was focused elsewhere; on the “War on Terror,” in providing the necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies, as well as continuing to build the modular brigade combat teams, which are the centerpiece of the Army’s largest transformation since WWII.

Even today, when the Department of Defense is facing completely new kinds of threats that could best be answered with a truly comprehensive non-kinetic response, and PKSOI should be at the forefront of the action in contributing to the leadership of that response, the U.S. military continues to make it quite clear to many organizations that if an organization doesn’t have some direct support link to kinetic operations, then that organization has little, if any, value. Yet in that hostile environment, PKSOI continues to provide quality expertise thanks to some very dedicated efforts by an ever-shrinking handful of dedicated people, both inside and outside Upton Hall. The ground truth remains that non-kinetic stability operations make up almost 80% of the effort in an operational theatre, while kinetic operations really only take up about 20% of the effort. The U.S. Department of Defense should be stabilizing, growing and more fully utilizing PKSOI.
It is hard to believe that PKSOI has lasted twenty years. There were certainly some ups and downs toward maintaining PKSOI as a viable organization. The vision and creation of PKSOI can be attributed to General Gordon Sullivan (U.S. Army Retired). At the time of the organization’s creation in 1994, the U.S. Army was engaged in several peacekeeping operations. American peacekeepers were in and out of Somalia, working in Haiti and gearing up for Bosnia. General Sullivan’s guidance to the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College was to “develop a peacekeeping battle lab in an effort to bring together the total Army effort in regard to our expanding role with the United Nations.” Many lessons were learned through those early years, and PKI was instrumental in sharing those lessons with the U.S. Army and the United Nations.

PKSOI has accomplished much since its creation. As of this writing there are only a handful of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines engaged in UN peacekeeping and another 700 still in the Sinai. The U.S. military is out of Iraq and will soon be out of Afghanistan. As was the case after almost every American war, the military is downsizing, yet the global situation is more complex than any time in history. The Army should consider re-engaging in UN peacekeeping. Much has been learned since the early 1990s and now 117 nations contribute to UN peacekeeping. The U.S. ranks 61 out of those 117 nations in the number of peacekeepers deployed. One hundred and sixteen Americans are deployed in UN missions, yet only 32 are soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines. The rest are all police officers. Now is the time for the U.S. Army to re-engage in peacekeeping and retain the skills developed through ten years of conducting peace and stability operations. The skills learned in peacekeeping help senior leaders understand the nuances of stability operations. Those skills should not atrophy like they did in the past.

COL Karl Farris, USA Ret.

1991-1992 I was working as a “Strategic Fellow” for General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff. He would assign our 4-Col-
PKI/PKSOI Articles of Experience

staff of eight. PKI was administratively assigned to the Center for Strategic Leadership. This relieved us of most administrative distractions.

MG Stofft and I set about developing an operational “focus” for PKI. We established three main areas of effort:

1) Provide “peacekeeping” instruction to USAWC students. This was to be in the form of a one-day seminar on peacekeeping to the entire student body and then peacekeeping subject related electives during the second and third USAWC trimesters.

2) Establish liaison and maintain close contact with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as other International Organizations and large Non-governmental Organizations that traditionally deploy to what were then starting to be referred to as “complex emergencies.”

3) Provide an educational resource in “peacekeeping” to “Combatant Commander’s” who may be standing-up a JTF for deployment to a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, if requested, form the core of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) that would deploy with a JTF on an operational mission. The CMOC’s primary responsibility would be to establish liaison, interface and coordination between the JTF and the wide array of UN, IO and NGO’s deployed to the intervention area. It was thought that the personal relationships nurtured by PKI with UN/IO/NGO representatives and PKI’s understanding of their operational cultures would facilitate the early operational effectiveness of the CMOC.

This “charter” was forwarded to and approved by General Sullivan. By 1994 PKI was fully operational. I left PKI in April 1996, retiring from the U.S. Army after 30 years service. General Sullivan came to Carlisle to officiate at my retirement.

Mr. Steve Henthorne

I was originally brought to the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) in June of 2002, by Colonel George Oliver, whom I had known in his prior position as the Commander of the U.S. Military Mission to the United Nations. My appointment was as the Visiting Professor of Civil-Military Relations, under the IPA-Mobility Act Assignment Title IV of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (5 U.S.C. 3371-3376).

My appointment was based on my extensive experience in Disaster Management, Humanitarian Assistance, the relief of internally displaced persons & refugees, and my in-depth experience in fundraising and advising in the establishment of non-profit organizations. As my IPA documents would indicate, I was invited by the U.S. Army War College to basically “serve as their key link between the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and the various non-governmental organizations that the Army works with during Civil-Military Operations.” To that end I worked closely with not only the U.S. Army Civil Affairs community and those of our allies, lecturing on the many varied aspects of Civil-Military Relations. I also functioned as a member of the Joint Combined Civil-Military Operations Task Force then currently supporting U.S. Missions in Afghanistan in 2002, as well as supporting the activities of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq in early 2003. Also during 2003-2004, I was frequently assigned to support pre-deployment training at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Louisiana.

I can honestly say that my time at PKSOI greatly enhanced both my desire and ability to continue building functional bridges between dysfunctional civil & military partners, but it also prepared me for an expanded role with the UN, EU, and especially as a Senior Advisor with the NATO Accredited CIMIC Centre of Excellence. PKSOI also gave me the opportunity to meet and work with some truly outstanding people, who have remained colleagues and friends, and from whom I have learned a great deal.
PKSOI’s Founder General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret. with the PKI/PKSOI Directors
You could be in the next Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online!

Announcing the April 2014 theme: Training and Education. If you are interested in contributing to the journal, send your letter or articles for submission to the PKSOI Publications Coordinator: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil no later than 15 March 2014 for consideration. Also provide sufficient contact information. Note that articles should reflect the topic of Training and Education. The Journal editing team may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only, and in coordination with the original author.