MASS ATROCITY: PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

A Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Workshop Report

Editor
Dwight Raymond
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

Foreword by
LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator

April 2011

Report on PKSOI-Harvard Kennedy School MARO Workshop
December 8-9, 2010
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

The views expressed in this report are those of the editor and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword: LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator ........................................... iii

Executive Summary ........................................ v

Introduction ................................................... 1

Workshop Themes ........................................... 5

Working Group Discussions .......................... 12

Conclusions .................................................. 42

Annexes ....................................................... 47
   A. Workshop Agenda
   B. Workshop Participants
   C. Biographies of Speakers and Moderators
   D. MARO Handbook Summary
   E. Resources

Acknowledgments .......................................... 71

Endnotes ...................................................... 75
FOREWORD

LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator
Former Force Commander United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda

What the MARO Project proposes, and indeed explores in considerable detail, is nothing short of a fundamental shift in thinking from the “whether” to the “how” of intervention. Mass atrocities are operationally unique; this important recognition has paved the path for MARO’s adoption into relevant military doctrine and its subsequent—and no less consequential—consideration at the top levels of policy-making. The Workshop convened in December 2010 was an essential step in addressing, among others, what Sarah Sewall called the “Inchoate Middle Ground” between mass atrocity prevention and response, a challenge being tackled presently at different levels and bureaus of the U.S. Government. While much progress has been made in addressing how to shore up this disconnect, much work remains.

Experience has taught me that whether at the policy, operational or tactical levels, actors’ roles and responsibilities must be clearly, expressly defined. Although MARO’s institutionalization and development within the U.S. makes mass atrocity planning, prevention and response sound exclusively like an American problem, this is quite obviously not the case. Nonetheless, without American engagement and leadership other actors will be ill-positioned to assess their own potential for influence and assistance. Though efforts have been made to identify and define key USG interagency roles, those of non-USG actors—including international and regional organizations, foreign
governments, civil society and many others—must be more clearly spelled out. This area, the focus of the “Comprehensive Engagement” conference working group, is the fundamental next step. Burden-sharing not only makes intervention scenarios more palatable and appear to be more legitimate, it also allows a multitude of actors to operationalize their comparative advantages in order to achieve a unity of purpose.

In a perfect world there would be no need for MARO planning. And in the ideal world of military planning, any potential MARO would be deployed without any wrinkles. But in this world, a MARO will not only be about Army Operating Concepts but a whole system or package that will have to leverage the expertise, professionalism, logistic and strategic capabilities, and other resources of many actors and communities of practice. The campaign for MAROs will not be waged exclusively in the halls of decision-makers and on the battlefields of failed states but, as we know, too—and as we have seen through the revolutions spreading across North Africa and the Middle East—in the public’s imagination. It might thus be worthwhile to explore how broad-based support may be built within MARO-ready countries and at various levels of society to educate advocates in MARO-speak and build the critical mass necessary for the execution of MARO.

The work achieved here, and the challenges going forward, will consume many of our efforts for years to come. Nonetheless, we must embrace readily this task—for lives literally are at stake.

Allons-y,
LGen the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire,
(Ret’d), Senator
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In December 2010, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy co-hosted a workshop on Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). The event followed the earlier publication of the MARO Military Planning Handbook, and was attended by 85 people from a diverse range of organizations. The workshop featured presentations by Sarah Sewall, Dwight Raymond, Mike McNerney, Alison Giffen, Linda Bishai, Tim Shortley, Stephen Mariano, Victoria Holt, James Waller, Sally Chin, and Rosa Brooks; additionally, it included breakout discussion groups on the following topical areas: Policy; Intelligence; Operations; Logistics; Comprehensive Engagement; and Moral, Ethical, & Legal Issues.

Three major themes emerged from the workshop; these included the “Inchoate Middle Ground” between mass atrocity prevention (primarily a diplomatic endeavor) and response (primarily military). The second theme pertained to the utility of MARO as an Instrumental Vehicle to facilitate cross-organizational dialogue on functional issues such as inter-agency coordination or logistics. Third, Information Management and Policy Formulation was frequently referred to as an area requiring additional development and structure, to ensure that relevant information is effectively presented to policy makers.

The workshop included a panel discussion on South Sudan. Panelists noted that in addition to the potential for violence associated with the January 9th secession referendum, another period of concern will be when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement expires.
in July 2011. In addition to possible mass atrocities related to North-South issues (e.g., Abyei), South-South conflict between tribal and other groups, and the Lord’s Resistance Army’s resurgence in South Sudan, we should also be concerned about southern minorities in the North and vice-versa. Additionally, the Bashir government could potentially be displaced by hardliners who would prove even more problematic.

Results of the six breakout working groups are summarized in this report. Future MARO-related efforts include the development of a companion policy formulation handbook, a Protection of Civilians manual with application for international organizations and national militaries, and potential collaboration with organizations such as NATO, continued testing and exercising within U.S. combatant commands and the interagency community, and further exploration of both “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” Flexible Deterrent Options.
I. INTRODUCTION

A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) is an operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. Recent U.S. Government strategic documents including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) address the importance of preventing mass atrocities, and the NSS and QDR raise the possibility of military intervention if necessary.1 The MARO Project began in 2007 and has been a collaborative effort between Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). In 2010, we published the MARO Military Planning Handbook which is intended to assist military forces that may have to plan for or conduct such interventions.2

Broadly speaking, future MARO-related efforts fall into three baskets. The first of these is the “DoD Basket” and remains the MARO project’s primary orientation. This includes addressing mass atrocity response more prominently in military doctrine, contingency planning, and exercises as well as other means to improve military capabilities for conducting such operations. The second is the “Policy Basket” and focuses on Whole-of-Government capability to manage information and formulate policy to prevent and respond to mass atrocity situations. Third, the “International Basket” addresses the potential role of other international actors and could include, for example, the formulation of Protection of Civilians doctrine for United Nations and other peacekeeping forces. This
basket is important because mass atrocity prevention and response should not be unilateral U.S. efforts.

On 8-9 December 2010 PKSOI and Harvard’s Kennedy School hosted a MARO workshop attended by some 85 participants from the military, other governmental agencies, international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic and research institutions, and the private sector. To facilitate an open exchange of ideas, the workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution. The workshop was designed to pursue several objectives, including:

• Further institutionalize MARO within the USG by educating a broad audience
• Define interagency roles and roles of non-USG actors during a mass atrocity situation
• Analyze key MARO-related issues during working group sessions
• Connect U.S. military, non-military, and non-governmental actors that are working on mass atrocity issues
• Identify and refine concepts for mass atrocity policy guide
• Analyze response options for potential scenarios involving mass atrocities

To support these objectives, the workshop featured a combination of plenary sessions and six breakout working groups (see agenda at Annex A). Working groups examined different topical areas, and results of their discussions are provided later in this report. Although the topical areas were mutually-dependent and in some cases overlapped, they provided a useful
grouping of discussion topics. The six working groups included:

- Policy
- Intelligence
- Operations
- Logistics
- Comprehensive Engagement
- Moral, Ethical, and Legal Issues

The workshop also brought together a panel of experts to discuss prospects for South Sudan, which had its referendum a month after the workshop. Many observers have been concerned about the possibility of mass atrocities related to the secession; they could be manifested in North-South violence that centers on Abyei, South-South violence between tribes and other various armed groups, or a resurgence of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that exploits an expected security vacuum in South Sudan. Panelists also noted that another major area of concern includes violence against southern minorities in the north, and vice-versa. Additionally, South Sudan has complex linkages with two other mass atrocity situations in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The panel also noted that, in addition to the January referendum, the expiration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in July 2011 could prompt an outbreak of widespread violence. One panelist noted that a contributing factor could be a backlash by hardliners in the north that might seek to topple the Bashir government, establish Islamist rule, and reverse the perceived breakup of the Sudan. Panelists noted that South Sudan has recently been a major priority of the
U.S. government, but that the U.S. military presently has limited resident capacity in theater (e.g., logistics, command and control, intelligence, and assigned forces) to launch an operation. A panelist noted that the U.S. country team is generally the focal point of U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities; this is problematic in situations where there is no actual country team in a country, or when multiple country teams or other ambassadorial offices are involved in a situation.

South Sudan was briefly included during some of the working group sessions as a useful case study with which to illustrate discussion topics. In particular, the county’s size, remoteness, and poor infrastructure present significant operational, logistical, and intelligence challenges. Policy complications include the difficulty in influencing a range of national, regional and international actors including the UN and African Union. Additionally, there is the dilemma of whether it is most effective to attempt to work with the Khartoum government as a responsible agent (albeit one whose President has been indicted by the International Criminal Court) or to deal with it as an adversary.

This report discusses many of the topics explored in the workshop’s plenary and working group sessions. While not a transcript of the entire fruitful dialogue, it captures most of the main themes addressed by the participants and supplements the workshop proceedings with other insights. During the workshop, participants occasionally offered some useful comments for improving the MARO Handbook. The report concludes by consolidating these and other considerations for the Handbook’s readers.
II. WORKSHOP THEMES

The plenary sessions and working group discussions provided numerous useful insights concerning mass atrocity prevention and response. Three themes, however, seem particularly important for this widening community of interest.

The first theme is what one speaker termed the “Inchoate Middle Ground between Prevention and Response.” Most would readily agree that preventing a mass atrocity situation in the first place is far better than having to intervene militarily, particularly since this implies that a mass atrocity does not occur. Within the U.S. Government, prevention is primarily the responsibility of the State Department and involves recognizing potential mass atrocity scenarios and investing resources to make them less likely. In principle, prevention occurs with prudent day-to-day engagement and diplomacy; it may be subsumed under a broader effort to stabilize or develop a host nation. With modest adjustments, U.S. military “Phase 0” security cooperation activities may constructively assist wider governmental efforts to prevent a mass atrocity situation from developing.

Prevention efforts, however, may be insufficient: “As a concept, prevention is often simultaneously ill-defined and all-encompassing.... [P]revention suggests that the solution to mass atrocities lies with stable, economically viable states that respect the human rights of all citizens. What problem would this not solve? This is a tautology, not a strategy.” In some situations, a military response may be required. A mass atrocity intervention would likely involve the commitment of a sizeable military force with partici-
pating U.S. units under a military chain of command responsible to the Secretary of Defense. Although non-military components of the U.S. government would not be subordinated to the military, in such cases diplomatic and other instruments would likely perform a supporting role until the situation stabilizes. A military commander is given a direct mission to halt mass atrocities or stabilize a situation and employs forces accordingly; this roughly coincides with Phases II and III of the joint phasing construct.

The “inchoate middle” refers to situations that require more than routine day-to-day activities (prevention-plus) but occur before a coercive intervention (response-minus). Disturbing events such as an increase in hate media, perpetrator mobilization, and increased acts of violence may indicate that a nation seems to be sliding towards a mass atrocity situation. In such cases, policymakers may seek ways to manage the apparent crisis and reverse these trends. They may also seek options “between the extremes of doing nothing and sending in the Marines.” One workshop participant recounted a recent circular conversation that essentially went as follows:

• Policy Representative: What can the military do in this situation?
• Military Representative: What is my mission?
• Policy Representative: I can’t tell you the mission until I know what you can do.
• Military Representative: I can’t tell you what I can do until I know the mission.

Within the context of Phase I (Deter), military instruments can be employed as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to support diplomatic efforts. FDOs
may have different objectives such as: to monitor perpetrators and expose them to international scrutiny; establish credibility or build capability for a potential intervention; protect potential victims; dissuade, punish, or isolate perpetrators; or build and demonstrate international resolve.  

The MARO Handbook offers some suggestions using the military in a preventive role, and categorizes potential FDOs based upon their resource intensity, degree of risk, and potential encroachment on host nation sovereignty. It notes that, during periods of heightened concern, pre-existing activities during Phase 0 (Shape) might be enhanced or reframed to provide some value as FDOs. This point was also emphasized by some of the workshop participants, and the principle is not limited to military activities as many other government programs have existing agencies that can be capitalized upon in order to address a deteriorating situation.

**Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response:**

**Military Roles**

A second workshop theme is the potential use of Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response as an Instrumental Vehicle to address functional issues, par-
particularly with respect to comprehensive engagement and inter-organizational coordination. A wide array of organizations, inside and outside of the U.S. government, would be potentially significant in a mass atrocity situation. Some organizations tend to have a significant topical focus on issues such as mass atrocities, human rights, war crimes, or the Protection of Civilians. Others tend to specialize in regional affairs or functional issues such as logistics, communications, counterinsurgency, security force assistance, interagency coordination, peacekeeping, terrorism, or other matters. Many workshop participants expressed concern about the collective ability to identify emerging problems, forge a common purpose, bolster preventive efforts, and respond as necessary.

Whether at the policy level or in remote areas of operation, addressing modern security challenges requires a comprehensive approach in which military and non-military actors employ military and non-military methods to achieve military and non-military goals. With an increasing emphasis upon intra-state conflict, stabilization, and reconstruction, inter-organizational coordination is more important than ever. Preferably, information-sharing and coordination relationships should be established before a crisis and capitalized upon if one develops, rather than the haphazard alternative of forging these relationships after a crisis is well under way. A potential obstacle to pre-crisis coordination is the lack of capacity or motivation among the relevant parties to do so. Mass atrocity scenarios may be useful in furthering these relationships, in part because the objective (stopping the mass killing of defenseless civilians) is one which most actors view as important. Moreover, the urgency of mass atrocity cases can enhance their value as plan-
ning scenarios, because if an organization can respond adequately to a mass atrocity situation, it likely would find other cases less challenging.

For example, military stability operations doctrine recognizes that most stabilization tasks are best performed by non-military actors, including NGOs, and these organizations may already be active in the host nation (HN) before an intervention. Many of these organizations, however, are reluctant to be perceived as military partners in most situations and will avoid being “coordinated.” Mass atrocity scenarios may provide sufficient incentive for NGO representatives, or others with NGO experience, to engage in discussions or exercises with the U.S. government and military, which would permit greater familiarity with NGO capabilities and requirements.

One issue when considering inter-organizational dialogue regarding mass atrocities is whether scenarios should be fictional or based upon real-world cases. While realism is normally preferred, actual cases will likely be politically sensitive and dissuade some participants from being associated with them.

The third and perhaps most significant workshop theme is **Information Management and Policy Formulation**. One of the working groups focused on policy issues, and they were prominent in the other working group discussions as well. Indeed, during the MARO project’s lifespan some skeptics have opined that the main void has been in the policy arena, rather than in military capability and doctrine.

Mass atrocity responses frequently will be a race against time, and consequently will demand an effective national-level cycle of observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA). However, each of these steps is laden with friction points and collectively they are less
than ideal. An underlying theme of Samantha Power’s book *A Problem from Hell* is that the U.S. government’s policy-making process is skewed towards inaction, which partially explains American passivity during mass atrocity situations. More than one workshop speaker noted that government processes emphasize the potential risks and costs of positive action, thus resulting in inertia. Such tendencies were satirized in one episode of the BBC series *Yes, Prime Minister*, which presented the Foreign Ministry’s four-stage approach to managing a foreign policy crisis:

- **Stage 1:** We say that nothing is going to happen.
- **Stage 2:** We say that something may be going to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
- **Stage 3:** We say that maybe we should do something about it, but there’s nothing we can do.
- **Stage 4:** We say that maybe there was something we could have done but it’s too late now.

Practitioners who attended the workshop noted that during a crisis such as South Sudan there is usually a flurry of activity. There are lots of interesting meetings attended by interesting people, but some questioned whether these meetings have much practical impact in terms of efficiently “teeing up” information for decision-makers at different levels. In other words, the high level of internal activity does not generate action or actual decisions.

The MARO Handbook is agnostic about whether to intervene; it is intended to assist military forces in determining *how* to operate if political leadership de-
cides that an intervention should occur. Some workshop participants indicated a similar genocide and mass atrocity policy guidebook could usefully inform members of the interagency policy community how to sift through information and formulate appropriate policy options for decision-makers. Such a handbook might clarify policy-making and governmental planning processes, identify participants and stakeholders, and address relevant considerations for contingency and crisis response situations. Additionally, the policy handbook would discuss the application of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of power to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.
III. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Workshop attendees had the opportunity to participate in small working groups to discuss topical areas in greater detail than was permitted in the plenary sessions. These groups included:

- Policy
- Intelligence
- Operations
- Logistics
- Comprehensive Engagement
- Moral, Ethical, and Legal Issues

Some overlap between the working groups was inevitable, and during the discussions it was evident that the topical areas are interrelated; nevertheless, each of the groups was necessary and collectively they seemed sufficient to address most important mass atrocity prevention and response issues. Working group discussions were loosely structured to identify the parameters and current state of the topical area; analyze tradeoffs, gaps, and challenges; and develop recommendations for the way ahead. One speaker also noted that policy makers will invariably need to understand these complexities in order to formulate coherent options, policies, and plans.
Policy Working Group
Moderator: Cliff Bernath (Office of the Secretary of Defense)

The Policy working group addressed a wide array of topics such as Stakeholder Mapping; Whole of Government Planning; Policy Development; Strategic Communication; Supporting Diplomacy (e.g., in the UN, within the appropriate region, within a coalition, and with global powers); and Congressional Consultation.

The need to respond as a nation to mass atrocities is established in the National Security Strategy and flows through many policy-level documents (National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, QDR, QDDR, for example). These documents provide high-level aspirational guidance supporting USG response to mass atrocities. Within DoD, there is high-level acknowledgement of the mission to be prepared for mass atrocity response, but specific operational and doctrinal guidance has not been developed regarding mass atrocity prevention and response operations. In fact, there is no agreed upon definition of the term “mass atrocity.” Other shortfalls in basic understanding and tools regarding mass atrocities include:

- Lack of early warning signs, systems and phased response options within USG
- Lack of intelligence in conflict areas—particularly in the area of cultural awareness
- Lack of specific focal points within agencies and among interagency components
• Lack of a framework to gather and assess early warning signs and formulate specific options across the phases of developing crisis for use by decision-makers.

The most effective method to address mass atrocities is to stop them before they begin. Typically, however, by the time senior decision-makers engage, the window for nonlethal prevention has often closed. To a great extent, U.S. and international inability to respond effectively to mass atrocity situations is a failure to identify and plan for a comprehensive range of options to offer decision-makers, other than “sending in the troops.” The U.S. government needs to improve its ability to predict, prevent and respond to potential and ongoing mass atrocities and to develop realistic, coordinated, targeted and phased options for positive engagement. However, the interagency process lacks the infrastructure needed to present a full spectrum of atrocity prevention options to senior decision-makers. The government does not have a dedicated and institutionalized mechanism to communicate endstates, allocate resources, and develop a full range of nonlethal and lethal options for addressing mass atrocity prevention and response.

Policy: Tradeoffs, Gaps and Challenges.

One speaker noted that many ascribe the failure to respond to past mass atrocities as a reflection of a lack of political will. In reality, it is at least partially due to the nature of policy formulation systems. The decision to develop national capability to prevent, mitigate or stop a mass atrocity has risks and tradeoffs. Focusing on mass atrocities may signal less emphasis upon other humanitarian crises, while formalizing this capa-
bility may create unrealistic expectations among our citizens, our allies, and the international community, including potential victim groups.

As indicated earlier, we lack understanding and support systems that affect our ability to prevent, mitigate and stop mass atrocities. These gaps include mechanisms for gathering, sharing and synchronizing intelligence and other information about developing crises.

Mechanisms for joint interagency planning and capturing interagency lessons-learned are ill-developed and necessitate starting over for each crisis. Moreover, we are poor at systematically getting the right information and options to the right decision-makers in a timely manner so they can respond effectively when needed. Policy discussions tend to address prevention but, as one speaker noted, they should delve into the “inchoate middle ground between prevention and response” and also address response options when prevention fails. While it would certainly be helpful to do contingency planning for areas that are likely to experience some level of conflict, resources for such contingency planning are lacking.

Intervention invariably incurs risks and unforeseen results. Policymakers must take care that our responses prevent, mitigate or stop crises, and not inflame them. We have to weigh the costs (time, money, people—including casualties) of intervening versus not intervening. This includes risks of long-term engagements if our intervention requires the use of U.S. forces.

Each of the different types of intervention (unilateral, multi-lateral, UN, coalition) has advantages and disadvantages which must be weighed and balanced. Policymakers must also consider the precedent value
of the current case, as it may apply to future situations. For example, effective response in one case may deter other perpetrators and make future scenarios less likely.

Policy: The Way Ahead. Many in the working group felt that a commonly-accepted definition of “Mass Atrocity” would help focus governmental prevention and response efforts. Such a definition should include the widespread and systematic nature of violent actions taken against populations, and could include genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Observers disagree as to whether it is helpful to include a numerical threshold in a definition, or what a threshold should be. The following definition, derived from the MARO Handbook, may serve as a starting point: “Mass Atrocity: The widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.” The Handbook’s authors deliberately refrained from greater specificity under the premise that, for the military, political leadership would determine when a particular situation was or was not a mass atrocity.

One of the working group members reported that a Presidential Study Directive (PSD) regarding genocide and mass atrocity prevention has been drafted. A signed PSD would prompt improved efforts regarding mass atrocities and would facilitate planning across the interagency community.

Recent policy formulation experiences regarding the Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, and Cote d’Ivoire can be instructive regarding national and international responses, and relevant lessons-learned should be captured. Workshop participants were divided in their assessments as to how effective these policy formu-
lation efforts have been. The DoD has established a focal point for such efforts and is working to institutionalize Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO) throughout the Department and to promote whole-of-government planning, coordination, and responses throughout all phases of operational planning (Phases 0-V). Similar interagency focal points are needed to enhance information sharing and synchronization. Many of these focal points do exist, but members of the community of practice in many cases have limited mutual awareness.

The portfolio of actual responsibilities for a national focal point is open to debate, but a recent study suggested it would include: providing early analysis of emerging situations; providing advice directly to the executive about matters relating to the prevention of mass atrocities; coordinating national responses to mass atrocities; spearheading cooperation with the UN Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide/Responsibility to Protect and other relevant agencies; helping to foster international consensus on the results of early analysis; enabling governments to respond to mass atrocities in a timely and decisive fashion; and collaborating with other focal points.10

Some of the workshop speakers addressed the question of who in the USG should be the overall focal point, and judgments were divided. On the one hand, the National Security Staff (NSS) has a director for such issues, broad interagency perspective, and quick access to the President. On the other hand, it may lack the manpower and “organizational tentacles” to manage such an effort. Another issue noted by a speaker is that in a specific crisis the role of functional agencies (such as those focused upon war crimes or mass atrocities) is often superseded by regional experts
who have a broader portfolio and normally have the lead regarding regional response. It is important to have routine, established interdepartmental and interregional conversations that provide the foundation for crisis response, rather than spontaneously react to crises in an *ad hoc* manner.

One speaker noted that what is needed is a “shift from the default,” which tends towards inertia, to developing effective mechanisms for gathering and sharing information, standardizing terminology, presenting options to decision makers, and protecting channels of dissent.

### Intelligence Working Group

**Moderator: Lawrence Woocher (United States Institute of Peace)**

The Intelligence working group’s domain as included information and analytical support regarding mass atrocity situations. There are three principal types of information/analysis required to support successful prevention and response:

- Situational understanding/background knowledge about the context in which mass atrocities are occurring. This would account for political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) considerations including the history, culture, government, economy, etc., as well as “root causes” of conflict.

- Detailed information about specific actors. In any mass atrocity situation the relevant actors will include at least the perpetrators (architects, facilitators, and foot soldiers), victims, bystanders, and other important third parties (e.g.,
neighboring governments, major corporations, multinational forces or civilian personnel). An intervening task force would benefit from understanding the interests, specific capabilities, and opportunities regarding these groups/individuals.

- Indicators and warnings. This category of information should include generic risk factors for mass atrocities as well as case specific indicators or warning signs to watch for that correspond with preparation for attacks or an escalation of violence.

The current state of affairs regarding intelligence is mixed. On the positive side of the ledger, there is a wealth of information and analytical resources of the types described above. However, much of this is not in the U.S. intelligence community or even the U.S. government. Academics, NGOs, and various civil society actors in local communities are, thus, extremely important resources in this domain.

Despite some recent efforts, the U.S. government struggles to leverage the insights from this wider community. In fact, even within the U.S. government there continue to be challenges in sharing intelligence through all relevant offices, in part because the USG has not promulgated a set of agreed indicators for mass atrocities or trained personnel on how to watch for signs of mass atrocities. Another difficulty is that the parts of the world at greatest risk of experiencing mass atrocities may not overlap well with geographic priorities for U.S. intelligence collection. A final challenge is the particular difficulty in understanding the specific motives of actors in potential mass atrocity
situations. Since multiple actors may have the means and opportunity to commit mass atrocities, understanding motive is often the critical analytic question.

The group discussed the concept of "the power of witness" described in the MARO Handbook. Several questions were raised about how reliable and powerful witness is in itself—i.e., without being linked to sanctions or other means of influence. Some but not all perpetrators may be sensitive to public shaming. There could also be unintended consequences if the USG tried to leverage the power of witness by providing cameras or other means to local witnesses. The group concluded that more work needs to be done on the concept of the power of witness.

At the same time, surveillance can be a quite powerful tool. When subjects know they are being watched, it forces them to hide, adjust their communications patterns, or risk being exposed. And when surveillance is linked to other tools of leverage (e.g., targeted sanctions, targeted use of force), it can be a powerful combination. On the other hand, rather than dissuade perpetrators, knowing they are subject to surveillance may motivate them to conceal their crimes or obfuscate them with propaganda efforts.

**Intelligence: Trade-offs, Gaps and Challenges.** The lack of a community of practice that regularly shares mass atrocities-related intelligence/information is a major issue given the diversity of actors that hold potentially important insights. Creating this kind of broad community has not historically been a strength of the U.S. intelligence community, in part because of classification challenges and concerns about protecting sources. Promoting cooperation between intelligence organizations and non-governmental ac-
tors working in the field, where their operations and staff safety can be at risk if they are perceived to be intelligence collectors, is a special challenge.

One gap that makes this kind of cooperation more difficult is the lack of a general list of indicators and/or warning signs to determine when a mass atrocity is about to occur/is occurring. Much will depend on the specifics of a particular case, but simply having a set of categories for people to watch for should help generate more salient information and facilitate cooperation across organizations.

As noted above, understanding motives or intent will frequently be the core analytical challenge in a mass atrocity situation. HUMINT is especially critical for this, and it is often in short supply. This will be a more acute problem when mass atrocities occur in a place where there was little pre-existing U.S. engagement or intelligence gathering.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that mass atrocity situations are extremely dynamic. Information and analytic support, therefore, must be equally dynamic, collecting and analyzing information in an ongoing fashion and being open to the possibility of fundamental changes in the situation. Even a well done intelligence assessment, if static, will seriously jeopardize the success of this type of operation.

**Intelligence: The Way Ahead.** The working group generated recommendations in three major areas: internal USG organization (“hardware”); policies, procedures, and training (“software”); and fostering cooperation (“networking”).

Regarding organization of mass atrocity-related intelligence in the USG, it would help to designate a lead agency within the intelligence community. Some
participants thought that the ODNI was already the lead, but the uncertainty on this point underscored the need to communicate clearly across the community about who the lead agency is. Likewise, each member of the intelligence community should designate a point of contact for mass atrocity issues. Even for agencies that rarely contribute to mass atrocity-related intelligence, it is important that at least one person is familiar with the central analytic questions to facilitate rapid cooperation in specific cases.

The second area of recommendations concerns education, training, exercises, and establishing regular policies and procedures. The effort to develop doctrine related to mass atrocity prevention and response should include a portion on intelligence. Education and training programs, as well as guidance on tactics, techniques and procedures, should follow the development of doctrine. To generate these resources, a group of experts and officials needs to agree on a set of terms and definitions and validate a set of generic mass atrocity indicators. In addition, this set of activities should include the conduct of case studies of intelligence issues related to mass atrocities to glean lessons from past experience. Some part of the USG needs to take the lead on each of these tasks.

The third recommendation is to foster a broader community of interest, including non-government representatives, to discuss and collaborate on mass atrocity-related information and analysis. This will be a major challenge. Using technological tools (e.g., that provide ways to share information anonymously) can help bridge gaps between diverse groups and enhance the ability to collaborate. Creating guidelines for working across government-NGO lines could help address concerns about exacerbating the threat to
communities and staff at risk. However, even the best
tentions and best processes will not erase these con-
cerns entirely because real risks will remain. Identifying projects or specific issues for collaborative work could help promote a spirit of collegiality. Deepening our understanding of the power of witness and how it could be leveraged strategically could be one such agenda for collaborative work.

**Operations Working Group**

**Moderator: Dwight Raymond (PKSOI)**

This working group addressed the employment of military forces to prevent and respond to mass atroci-
ties. Some of the issues considered included preven-
tive measures and Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), Courses of Action, Command Relationships and part-
nerships with other organizations, and Force Require-
ments, Composition, and Capabilities. Part of the dis-
cussion used a notional South Sudan intervention to discuss some issues more concretely.

There is a growing community of interest regarding mass atrocity prevention and response, which pro-
vides general increased understanding of the relevant operational issues. Additionally, a case can be made that since the 1990s there has been some institutional improvement in the United Nations, African Union, and Troop-Contributing Countries regarding Protec-
tion of Civilians and robust peacekeeping. While the U.S. military has been focused on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and has had little operational experience regarding UN peacekeeping missions, its recent increased emphasis on stability operations may have a positive impact on its ability to respond to mass atroci-
ties.

Additionally, there is probably a greater under-
standing that Phase 0 (Shape) efforts are important and security cooperation activities (which can help prevent mass atrocities from occurring) are improved. The activation of AFRICOM has likely been a positive development regarding the continent most susceptible to future mass atrocity situations. However, current operational commitments mean that the U.S. military is probably less capable of quickly deploying a force to stop mass atrocities than it was a decade ago.

Operations: Tradeoffs, Gaps, and Challenges. The MARO Handbook discusses many risks, challenges, and tensions that would accompany an intervention and a brief consideration of a hypothetical South Sudan intervention helped illustrate several operational issues. First, operational considerations are heavily shaped by issues addressed in the other working groups. For example, if attempting to prevent further mass atrocities by the Lord’s Resistance Army (which does not recognize international borders), a policy decision will be required as to whether LRA targets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, or Darfur can be attacked. Such issues may be so sensitive that obtaining clear guidance may be difficult. Operations would be similarly dependent upon logistical arrangements, intelligence, the potential role of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and other variables.

A second major concern pertains to command relationships. Some workshop participants noted that many in the government have been studying and planning South Sudan scenarios for some time. While this was a relief to some, to a large extent until an intervention force (1) is aware that it is designated as such and (2) begins to consider the problem, actual
planning really has not begun. Ideally, real planning should be done as early as practicable by all the primary components of a Joint Task Force and its component and supporting commands (i.e., commanders, staffs, and units).

Command and supporting relationships, as well as responsibilities and authorities, would have to be clarified at three levels. First would be within AFRICOM (especially the JTF which would have to be formed). The second level includes relations between interagency actors. South Sudan is particularly complicated in this regard because there are several potential candidates who could have responsibility for interagency policy formulation and provide direction to the interagency partners with whom a joint task force would coordinate. The third level involves the JTF’s relationships with international actors, such as UNMIS, UNAMID, the SPLM/A, and Government of Sudan. Particularly at the second and third levels traditional military unity of command principles will likely not apply; however, it may be possible to achieve an understanding as to which organizations are supported or supporting in particular situations.

Another operational issue in the South Sudan case is the lack of standing theater capacity, particularly regarding military intelligence, signals, and sustainment. An intervention would require an adequate foundation in these three areas, but AFRICOM does not have permanently-assigned units to conduct these functions. Consequently, an intervention would be impeded or even delayed until these capabilities could be planned and established.

**Operations: The Way Ahead.** The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) identifies seven categories that should be considered when
new capabilities are required; these include doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and these categories collectively provide a useful framework to identify potential improvements for operational capability; indeed, a recent unanimous Senate Concurrent Resolution (S.Con.Res 71, December 22, 2010) urged the Secretary of Defense to conduct an analysis of DOTMLPF requirements to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities. While DOTMLPF is a U.S. military construct, it can be adapted for other organizations as well, such as the United Nations, the African Standby Force, and civilian agencies.

Some participants noted that military doctrine can readily be modified to comply with recent aspiration-al strategic guidance and to account for some of the concepts in the MARO Handbook. An organizational solution in some potential mass atrocity situations may be to establish a formal Military Advisory Group (MIL GRP or MAG) to advise relevant host nation or regional military forces and monitor conditions in at-risk countries. Suitable command relationships would have to be determined; for example, MIL GRPs could report to the military combatant commander or to the Chief of Mission.

As discussed earlier, one of the workshop’s themes included the potential utility of using mass atrocity scenarios as vehicles for addressing other topics, and such scenarios can be incorporated into training and exercises to improve unit capability during complex operations. One materiel issue discussed was the consideration that light infantry units may be capable of deploying quickly, only to have limited mobility once deployed. Consequently, they may require light vehicles that are also easily deployable; this is a consider-
ation that applies to other rapid deployment scenarios as well. Depending upon the perpetrator’s military capabilities, intervening forces may also need to be bolstered with their own armor or anti-armor capabilities.

In addition to these and other DOTMLPF considerations, working group members and some workshop speakers noted that security cooperation activities may be adjusted to support mass atrocity prevention as appropriate; for example previously scheduled exercises could be reframed to provide value as an FDO. Additionally, while it is useful to conduct governmental-level studies of potential scenarios, contingency planning by units that would actually be committed in a response would be most important to the mission’s success. Planning, defined by one speaker as “rigorous, structured dialogue,” would be most efficient with visibility on policy formulation and vice versa.

Logistics Working Group
Moderator: Colonel Larry Strobel (PKSOI)

A mass atrocity situation will have several key logistical considerations which are normally factors in other rapid response scenarios. The first of these is deployment, in which sea lift is more efficient but largely impracticable for remote areas such as South Sudan. A closely related issue is basing, both in the country of interest and the region. Infrastructure both affects deployment and sustainment, and is often the binding constraint on air, sea, and ground lines of communication. Additional matters include sustainment issues such as life support, aerial refueling bridges, supply chains, services, medical, mortuary affairs, support for and agreements with partners, and host nation and
contractor support (which is often the vehicle through which NGOs execute the programs of IGOs and governmental organizations such as USAID). Since logistics would be interconnected with operational plans and policy-related developments, these areas should be worked in concert, rather than in isolation. The logistics working group analyzed mass atrocity response from several points of reference: time, functional area, and phasing. In mass atrocity situations, the logistical needs of the population (food, water, shelter, levels of medical care including restorative care for traumatized victims) will likely be more daunting than those of the intervening force, and if not met will likely call the mission’s success into question.

Effective logistics requires networks; a likely situation is that different actors will have disconnected networks that compete for existing infrastructure. Participants noted that U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and other agencies have several initiatives that could be helpful in a mass atrocity scenario; these include Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stocks, the Coalition Mobility System (CMS), the Coalition Deployment Planner (CDP) and the Adaptive Logistics Network (ALN) and Multi-National Experiment (MNE) initiatives.

**Logistics: Tradeoffs, Gaps, and Challenges.** Much of the working group’s discussion focused on policy and communication, and the group recognized the importance of a clear understanding of operational and policy imperatives, since logistics is after all a requirements-based endeavor. Logistical cross-talk regarding the capability and requirements of other actors, such as the NGO community and IGOs, can be difficult because non-military organizations shun be-
ing “coordinated.” Military forces are limited in their ability to provide humanitarian assistance and restore essential service to populations; however, it is difficult for them to effect coordination with non-military organizations, particularly NGOs. Lacking visibility of other organizations’ capabilities, requirements, and activities creates redundancies, gaps in services, and competition for limited infrastructure such as ports, airfields, and roads.

Logistical assumptions, arrangements, and requirements are shaped by policy decisions, particularly with respect to the desired endstate and anticipated duration of the operation; however, these policy decisions may be too vague or untimely. Two topics highlighted were mortuary affairs and the implications of providing civilian medical care, which normally is limited by U.S. law. Religious and cultural burial time-frames and treatment of bodies can be a major logistical concern, but the gathering of required forensic evidence for prosecution and accurate reporting is also an important consideration. The offering of civilian medical care was also discussed at length, with the main focus on expectation management, and the implications for progressive levels of care, and “who owns” this responsibility. Clear policy guidelines and procedures addressing these issues will be necessary in future mass atrocity situations. As strategic planners and policy makers look to influence potential cases they must consider logistics as potential FDOs. For example, medical contact missions; starting or expanding key infrastructure including airstrips, ports, hospitals, and water sources; or initial basing could help prevent, mitigate, deter, or stop mass atrocities.

Ideally, the logistics plan would be worked through the Combatant Command’s (CCMD) Theater Campaign Plan well in advance of a military deploy-
ment, while taking into account any deteriorating situation on the ground. Key logistics considerations and agreements such as acquisition and cross service agreements, diplomatic clearances for national over-flight agreements, port access, logistics footprints, and the identification of strategic basing and intermediate basing sites (including sea basing) should be determined, as well as planning for the deployment of advanced logistics cells.

Logisticians must anticipate that the overall mission can easily change from “stop the killing” to “stop the dying” with the attendant possibility of “mission creep” that requires humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in a wide area, as well as increased coordination with non-military organizations. Logistical lead times for mission changes and transitions can be significant and ultimately must be nested within an exit plan.

By themselves, military forces will have limited capacity and authority to provide support to the population. One of the biggest logistical challenges is the ability of U.S. forces to integrate their logistical efforts with those of other potential partners such as NGOs, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) cluster system which consists of a loose organization of thirteen functional clusters. These organizations would likely be vital actors but tend to eschew contact with the military, avoid advance planning for particular scenarios, prefer to maintain strict neutrality, and adopt approaches that could create operational problems (such as to not create barriers to population movement). It may be possible to create “humanitarian space” for them and
share information, but this potentially could jeopardize the neutrality that they value. Without efficient coordination it is difficult to obtain an effective division of labor and gain a mutual understanding of who is responsible for such matters as food distribution, health care, and mortuary affairs. A related issue is the means of inter-organization communications. Procedural and technical methods are required so that disparate organizations can share and prioritize information without compromising the status of humanitarian actors.

**Logistics: The Way Ahead.** A key area for improvement is information sharing between relevant actors, both for developing general capability and with regard to particular scenarios. Workshops, conferences, exercises, and networking can be useful mechanisms to provide better collective understanding of requirements and capabilities. These measures can help develop strategic logistic alliances and relationships and, when focused upon specific cases, can help create a concept of operations between civilian-military partners. Additionally, they can assist in enhancing general partner capability and capacity long before they would actually be required in a crisis.

Logistical preparations should always be included when FDOs are contemplated. These include basing, transportation, and sustainment arrangements for the FDOs as well as precursors to any subsequent intervention. Logistical FDOs may include prepositioning of supplies and equipment and the development of inter-organizational support relationships that will be expanded later. In addition to the practical benefits of preparation, such measures can also enhance Strategic Communication efforts if appropriately highlighted.
Some efforts, such as Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) and infrastructure development can also benefit local populations.

As discussed earlier, logistical matters are inextricably linked to policy decisions. Policy should be formulated with input from logisticians and should consider sustainment constraints and requirements while addressing matters such as care for civilian populations, mortuary affairs, and the potential for “mission creep” if humanitarian assistance is required. In some cases, routine (Phase 0) regional engagements by military and non-military USG organizations can assist advance planning by considering the logistical aspects of mass atrocity-related contingencies.

Ultimately, refined logistical contingency plans should consider issues such as the operational area(s) to be supported, locations of logistical hubs, means of delivery, and the providers and recipients of logistical support. A recurring suggestion during the working group’s discussions was to use mass atrocity scenarios to bring together diverse civilian-military stakeholders that presumably share a strong interest in mitigating such situations. This would develop relationships and mutual awareness that would facilitate response during an actual crisis. Coordination measures can be explored, potentially to include the use of satellite phones, e-mail, and text-based messages for inter-organizational communication.

**Comprehensive Engagement Working Group**
**Moderator: Colonel Lorelei Coplen (PKSOI)**

“Comprehensive engagement” is an ill-defined and emerging concept, but essentially refers to the multiparty and multilevel relationships that must be
cultivated during complex operations such as mass atrocity prevention and response. Intervening military forces, and governmental agencies, must be prepared to collaborate, coordinate, or communicate with other actors including other governmental agencies, IGOs, IOs, NGOs, coalition partners, the host nation government and military, combatants, private individuals, and regional nations. A broader, amorphous “civil society” in the country of interest and abroad is increasingly significant, particularly with the expansion of social media. The group, and some workshop speakers, noted that civil society is often overlooked, is not well understood, yet can be decisive.

This list of actors masks further differentiation; for example, engaging with the UN may entail dialogue with the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSO) in a country, and UN field agencies and military commanders.

A mass atrocity situation requires comprehensive engagement at all levels, from the nation’s political leadership to military commanders on the ground; collectively, its components include:

- Multiparty and Multilevel Interaction
- Multinational/International
- Intergovernmental
- Host Nation, Civil Society, and Private Sector
- A General Unity of Purpose
- Communication and Trust
• An Understanding of Each Other’s Capabilities

These components usually cannot be assumed and it may require substantial negotiation and effort to obtain even modest and the vaguest levels of agreement. Informal networks may be more prevalent than formal hierarchies. An actor’s relevance may depend upon the stage of a mass atrocity situation (i.e., before, during, or after the intervention). Ideally, actors will operationalize their comparative advantages to support a common purpose. One speaker noted that other actors need to be considered with respect to the following:

• Their authority to take action
• Their willingness to protect the civilian population
• Their capacity to protect the civilian population
• Their knowledge regarding civilian protection
• Their strategy and leadership to protect the civilian population

Comprehensive Engagement: Tradeoffs, Gaps, and Challenges. “Unity of Command” is a longstanding Principle of War that must arguably be jettisoned as unrealistic in modern complex operations. It has been supplanted by terms such as “unified action,” “unity of effort,” “unity of purpose,” and the “comprehensive approach;” all of these imply a situation in which there are no common lines of authority but (perhaps) some common understanding of the problem to be resolved. Collectively, the disparate actors may benefit from coordination, collaboration, synchronization, information sharing, or at a mini-
mum mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities, limitations requirements, goals, and activities. Individually, they may be concerned about burden and cost sharing as well as a reluctance to be perceived as proxies for other actors.

In practice, however, such efforts are likely to resemble the proverbial cat-herding. Any interaction is apt to be complicated by the multiplicity of actors, each with different goals, perspectives, incentives, cultures, processes, and capacity to devote to any proposed interactions. Some actors will have inherently unfavorable impressions of others or be suspicious of their motives. In some cases they may even be competitors. An intervening force may be forced to muddle through by working with those willing to cooperate, attempting to marginalize those in opposition, and accommodating those with benign disagreements.

NGOs and host nation representatives may be reluctant to coordinate with the U.S. military because they do not want to jeopardize their neutral status or be seen as collaborators. Invariably, different actors will have dissimilar expectations as to the degree of interaction that should occur. As one former NGO representative said, “We didn’t want the military around, until we wanted them around.” Military personnel, conversely, tend to strive for synchronization, situational awareness, structure, advance planning, and meetings. Human rights and humanitarian organizations may share some interests with military forces, particularly if the latter’s mission is to stop widespread killing, but will generally shun being perceived as “partners” to be “integrated.”

One speaker noted that IGOs, especially the UN, have extensive recent peacekeeping experience that can be gainfully harnessed in support of mass atrocity
prevention and response. The speaker also noted that a very real issue with the UN in its emphasis upon robust peacekeeping is the point at which it should cross the line regarding coercion. The UN, and other organizations, should be considered both with regards to individual missions as well as the longer-term strategic structural framework.

Organizational issues may be impediments; in some cases, lower-level actors may be constrained by their own higher authorities. In many situations, coordination will be hampered by distance, language differences, or other competing requirements.

**Comprehensive Engagement: The Way Ahead.** Although a perfect solution will likely remain elusive, there are methods to facilitate improved engagement or at least manage expectations at a reasonable level. Some level of institutionalization may be possible, such as with respect to lessons learned and information-sharing. Pre-crisis dialogue between potential partners can help develop networks that could prove valuable; venues may include conferences, workshops, visits, and over the internet. Relevant topics could include the relationship between human security and national security, the Protection of Civilians, mass atrocity prevention and response, and particular scenarios of concern.

Some in the working group suggested that a related handbook for the civil society and non-military actors, with an annex for the private sector, would be a helpful document and could assist in broader efforts to educate and train stakeholders at multiple levels. While military organizations may find it difficult to coordinate directly with some NGOs, many former NGO personnel now work in the U.S. government,
or in academic and research institutions. They tend to maintain contacts with NGOs and, in any event, can provide valuable insight regarding their capabilities and perspectives. During an operation, military forces may be able to communicate with NGOs through intermediaries in USAID, the UN, or the host nation.

**Moral, Ethical & Legal Issues Working Group**  
**Moderator: J. Holmes Armstead**  
*(Washington and Lee University)*

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, which holds that states have a responsibility for their citizens and that the international community has a responsibility to assist or intervene when states are unwilling or unable to afford protection to the population, has gained traction in the last decade. However, its actual significance is far from universally understood or accepted. As discussed in the MARO handbook, mass atrocity situations can pose complex moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas. Prevention and response efforts can be problematic because operations to protect fundamental human rights can conflict with state sovereignty. At best, the legal authority for (armed) humanitarian intervention is uncertain absent Security Council action or state consent. The international community and UN may be slow or unwilling to react to mass atrocities, and in many cases the state is culpable in mass atrocity situations; international law has not developed clear legal frameworks for such interventions. Moreover, the perception of an intervention will vary among actors and stakeholders, and there is no universal moral consensus for military intervention. Any intervention will likely result in domestic and in-
ternational debate about its legitimacy, and domestic political considerations such as the role of Congress and the War Powers Act could be significant factors.

**Moral, Ethical, & Legal Issues: Tradeoffs, Gaps, and Challenges.** An intervention force will likely face tradeoffs between competing requirements such as compliance with legal and political constraints, protecting potential victims, force protection, protecting NGOs and other humanitarian actors, extending operational reach, and neutralizing perpetrators. The operation’s robustness in terms of size and activities also entails tradeoffs; an overly-robust effort could yield excessive collateral damage and civilian casualties, while too weak an effort could be ineffective in terms of stopping atrocities and may place the force itself at risk. A similar tradeoff applies to rules of engagement; too loose jeopardizes innocents, while too restrictive ROEs can endanger the mission or force.

The working group discussions emphasized the importance of professional standards, codes of conduct, ethical behavior, and accountability; however, in some situations different actors (e.g., U.S. forces, HN security forces, UN peacekeeping missions, or Coalition partners) may have dissimilar standards of behavior. In a prevention or response operation which opposes perpetrators or attempts to foster improved governance, humanitarian actors as well as interveners may be perceived as partial, which may jeopardize any desired neutrality. Although the original intention of an intervention may be limited to stopping the killing of unarmed civilians, if circumstances are otherwise dire enough the U.S. may inherit a moral obligation to mitigate other forms of suffering as well, particularly if the intervention has undermined the
ability of host nation authorities to do so. Standing or future International Criminal Court indictments, or other legal actions, may have an impact on an intervening force (such as to support investigations).

Relations with host nation authorities can present at least two other related challenges. First, objectives and actions of the interveners may conflict with the host nation’s sovereignty at all levels. Second, the force will invariably have to work with and through host nation officials, many of whose hands will be tainted by some level of dirtiness. For that matter, in a mass atrocity environment it may be difficult to find actors who are either completely innocent or completely guilty. Similar issues may apply with other potential actors such as security contractors or the militaries of other nations. U.S. forces may quickly find themselves in a position where competing interests such as supporting the improvement of governance and rule of law may conflict with or go beyond the original mandate to stop mass atrocities. Once again, this highlights the importance of working with other actors that are appropriate for assuming responsibility for this role. At a minimum, any necessary Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts with HN security forces will be problematic if the latter cannot be vetted for a positive human rights record, as law requires.

Finally, U.S. forces may be required to consider actions that may be morally right but legally prohibited or questionable. These actions may include the provision of medical care to non-U.S. personnel, providing support to local police forces, or humanitarian demining. These and other activities, without special provisions, are restricted by U.S. law.
Moral, Ethical, & Legal Issues: The Way Ahead.

Clear and practical guidance regarding mission goals, rules of engagement, and end states will help navigation through the moral, ethical, and legal forest. These guidelines should address likely situations such as engagement of unlawful combatants. It is also important to establish responsive communication channels to address issues as they arise; these channels will likely be required across the U.S. government and elsewhere—not just within the military chain of command.

There was a general consensus amongst the working group for the need to develop greater professional standards and codes of conduct in areas such as genocide prevention and an appropriate consideration of neutrality and impartiality. As the MARO Handbook notes, although an intervention may be designed to be impartial and supportive of objectively moral goals, the force will likely not be perceived as neutral by the conflicting parties who likely view their own objectives as legitimate.

Defining norms and standards of conduct from a legal perspective produces a different category of results than those considered from a purely humanitarian perspective. This demonstrates the need for a holistic approach when developing codes of conduct. It is not only vital to define key elements but comprehensive planning and definition generation must include consideration and feedback from the wide range of actors involved from local leaders and grassroots NGOs to military and political leaders. Determining who should define norms and standards poses a difficult challenge.

Lawyers deployed on mass atrocity prevention and response missions must be up-to-date on applicable principles as well as human rights law and its
derivatives. In a non-traditional setting, it can be difficult to determine whether American criminal law, local criminal law, or international law should be applied. These considerations are especially problematic during an internal armed conflict. The working group noted that it will frequently be important to create an environment conducive to reconciliation and the establishment of the rule of law. As was discussed in other working groups, this easily becomes another factor that can result in “mission creep.”
IV. CONCLUSIONS

This workshop, and other events that have occurred since the MARO Handbook’s May 2010 publication, provided several insights that if incorporated would usefully improve prevention of and response to mass atrocity situations. As mentioned earlier, these efforts can be grouped in three “baskets” which address actions by the military, the interagency community and policy formulation, and other international actors.

The military basket includes such areas as exercises, contingency planning, and selected DOTMLPF improvements. The MARO Handbook, recently subsumed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s MAPRO initiative, was intended to assist the military basket and since its publication several modifications have been suggested. The Handbook attempted to assist planners in understanding the operational environment by discussing different categories of actors (perpetrators, victims, interveners, and others) and potential political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational considerations. Discussion tended to emphasize the importance of identity groups (such as ethnic, tribal, or religious); one possibility that was overlooked is that a “professional” or “educated” class could transcend identity groups and become an influential set of actors. For example, teachers, doctors, lawyers, or prominent business persons could be enlightened voices (“positive influences”) that may restrain the negative tendencies of a regime or other perpetrators. Of course, these groups in other circumstances could be specifically targeted as victims or in some cases be culpable as perpetrators or negative influences.
Additionally, it would have been helpful to disaggregate the Handbook’s discussion of “perpetrators” further, and distinguish between the “architects,” “facilitators,” and “rank and file” perpetrators of mass atrocities. The critical factors analysis used in the Handbook may vary depending upon the level of perpetrator under scrutiny, and some scholars have noted that while the latter category does most (if not all) of the killing, it is largely comprised of people who are otherwise “normal” with presumably normal reluctance to commit such actions. The contributing dynamics of peer pressure, bureaucratic specialization, and gradual desensitization could be addressed further in the Handbook.16

Since the Handbook’s publication, the term “Wide Area Security” has gained prominence in Army conceptual documents.17 Distinguished from “Combined Arms Maneuver,” it basically refers to situations in which units conduct long-term counterinsurgency, security, or stability operations over an extended area and largely captures the intent of the “Saturation Approach” as discussed in the MARO Handbook and may be a better term.18

It has been pointed out that a very critical addition to the Handbook would be discussion on the importance of leadership. This point may seem self-evident, but it would be nonetheless helpful to explain how leadership can be the deciding factor in responding to mass atrocities, particularly when mandates or guidance are unclear or contradictory. Recent international experiences have provided both positive and negative instructive lessons. It is also important to note that leadership in armed host nation groups can be decisive in establishing the command climates that determine whether or not these groups become perpetrators of mass atrocities.
Some Handbook readers have requested more specificity on the potential size and composition of an intervention Task Force. In the spirit of the Handbook’s goal to provide “70%-solution” templates, it would have been potentially helpful to sketch out different force organizations (e.g., of 5, 12, or 20 thousand troops) and likewise address some deployment planning factors. It may also be useful to provide some discussion on the force size required, although such calculations are always situational and highly debatable.\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, while the Handbook attempts to provide suggestions regarding Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to mitigate potential mass atrocity situations,\textsuperscript{20} the discussion could be expanded to provide a more comprehensive set of possible military and non-military actions. Some additional measures could include preparatory logistical FDOs such as establishing over-flight arrangements and port-access arrangements; signing agreements for staging basis in neighboring countries; coordinating logistical capabilities and requirements of other actors; extending runways and taxiways of relevant airports; conducting logistics exercises with potential partners; and establishing arrangements with neighboring countries to provide healthcare services to potentially impacted populations. Similarly, the discussion of non-military FDOs could be elaborated; for example, an additional diplomatic measure could include targeted restrictions on visas for suspected perpetrators, associates, or family members.

As has been mentioned, the second basket regarding interagency coordination and policy formulation is perhaps the area most in need of improvement. An interagency policy handbook is being drafted to assist
policymakers in mapping stakeholders; implementing the emerging International Operational Response Framework (IORF) to conduct Situation Analysis and Assessment, Policy Formulation, and design strategies and operational plans for crises and contingencies; and applying diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. This handbook should be published by the end of 2011.

As there already is extensive focus on the Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect in a widespread community of interest, it would seem that these are the best avenues to influence the third basket of non-USG actors. As the UN and other international organizations crystallize their concepts, doctrine, and practices regarding PoC and R2P, these efforts should incorporate the prevention of and response to mass atrocity situations. There would seem to be value in developing a PoC doctrine-like publication that could be adopted by UN peacekeeping missions, other IGOs, or national militaries.

There are other potential areas for related work. Some workshop participants suggested additional focused events on the working group topical areas to permit in-depth treatment of relevant issues. Additionally, a growing number of organizations are interested in incorporating mass atrocity considerations in planning, exercises, and education.

An early topic raised during the MARO workshop was the differentiation between efforts to prevent mass atrocities and potential responses, the tension between the two, and the “inchoate middle ground between these areas.” It was noted that while prevention is obviously preferred, it is important to take the next step and consider response options as well.
It should be clear that a credible response capability, understood by would-be perpetrators, provides an added deterrent component and supports prevention as well.
## ANNEX A: MARO WORKSHOP AGENDA

### Wednesday, 8 December 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:30-8:30</td>
<td>Registration/Breakfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30-9:00</td>
<td>Welcome and Introductions (Dwight Raymond, PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00-10:00</td>
<td>Keynote Address (Sarah Sewall, Harvard Kennedy School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:45</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45-11:45</td>
<td>MARO Overview (Dwight Raymond, PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45-1:00</td>
<td>Lunch (Speaker: Mike McNerney, OSD Plans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00-2:15</td>
<td>South Sudan Panel Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderator: Allison Giffen, Stimson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant: Dr. Linda Bishai, U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant: Tim Shortley, Deputy to the Special Envoy to the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant: COL Stephen Mariano, U.S. Army Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:15-2:30</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30-5:00</td>
<td>Working Group Session #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Policy (Cliff Bernath, USD(P) Rule of Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Intelligence (Lawrence Woocher, USIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Operations (Dwight Raymond, PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Logistics (COL Larry Strobel, PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Comprehensive Engagement (COL Lorelei Coplen, PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Moral, Ethical, Legal Issues (Dr. J. Holmes Armstead, Wash &amp; Lee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5:00-6:00  Social
6:00-8:00  Dinner (Speaker: Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State)

Thursday, 9 December 2010

8:00-10:15  Working Group Session #2
10:15-10:30  Break
10:30-11:30  Updates from Workshop Participants
Prevention Protection Working Group (Mary Stata)
Genocide Prevention Course and Human Rights Staff Rides (Mike Hoffman)
CountingCasualties.org/Points (Dr. Taylor Seybolt)
FBI Capabilities for MA Prevention and Response (Bill Corbett)
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Military Education (Dr. Bridget Conley-Zilkic)
Integrating Civilian Strategies into Civilian Protection (Dr. Daniel Levine)
KSC Genocide Prevention Master’s Program (Dr. Jim Waller)
Raphael Lemkin Seminar Program (Tibi Galis)
Protection of Civilians Research (Alison Giffen)

11:30-1:00  Lunch (Speaker: Dr. James Waller, Keene State College: “Becoming Evil: Psychology of Perpetrators and Mass Atrocity”)
1:00-2:30  Working Group Outbriefs (Sally Chin, Harvard Kennedy School)
2:30-3:00  Closing Remarks (Rosa Brooks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense)
**ANNEX B: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. J. Holmes Armstead</td>
<td>Washington &amp; Lee (Moral, Ethical, and Legal Working Group Moderator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Deane Baker</td>
<td>United States Naval Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cliff Bernath</td>
<td>Department of Defense (Policy Working Group Moderator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffrey Bernstein</td>
<td>Office of LGen the Honourable Roméo A. Dallaire Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Linda Bishai</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace (Panelist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Braderman</td>
<td>PKSOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Brady</td>
<td>USAID/PKSOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosa Brooks</td>
<td>Department of Defense (Guest Speaker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Calahan</td>
<td>Flynt Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance Carpenter</td>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally Chin</td>
<td>Harvard Kennedy School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacki Chura-Beaver</td>
<td>PKSOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer Ciardelli</td>
<td>U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan Clayburn</td>
<td>George Mason University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Colligan</td>
<td>National Defense Intelligence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bridget Conley-Zilkic</td>
<td>U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Lorelei Coplen</td>
<td>PKSOI (Comprehensive Engagement Working Group Moderator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Corbett</td>
<td>FBI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Corneretto</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Steve Cunningham</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr. Michael Dziedzic  United States Institute of Peace
Dr. Jim Embrey  PKSOI
Dr. Bill Flynt  Flynt Group
Jim Forrest  Department of Defense
LTC Deborah Anne Freiberg  304th Civil Affairs Brigade
Dr. David Frey  United States Military Academy
Julia Fromholz  Human Rights First
Tibi Galis  Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
Alison Giffen  Stimson Center (Panel Moderator)
Stacy Gilbert  Department of State
Matthew Gillett  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Mike Grow  Mission Essential Personnel
Nate Haken  Fund for Peace
Guy Hammond  Stimson Center
Stuart Hendin  University of Ottawa
CDR Bruno Himmler  Department of Health and Human Services
Professor Michael Hoffman  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Victoria Holt  Department of State (Guest Speaker)
Dr. Kimberly Hudson  Air Force Culture and Language Center
Tamara Klajn  Department of Defense
LTC Natalie Kolb  Department of State
Matthew Levenson  University of Georgia
Dr. Daniel Levine  University of Maryland
Dr. Matthew Levinger  United States Institute of Peace
Tomas Malina  University of Pittsburgh
COL Stephen Mariano  U.S. Army Africa (Panelist)
Mike McNerney    Department of Defense (Guest Speaker)
Susan Megy    Stimson Center
Susan Merrill    Brigham Young University
David Mitchell    George Mason University
COL Roberto Nang    PKSOI
Paul Nell    MPRI
Dr. Paula Newberg    Georgetown University
Hank Nichols    PKSOI
Michael Pates    American Bar Association
COL Walt Piatt    Georgetown University
Bharathi Radhakrishnan    Harvard Kennedy School
Dwight Raymond    PKSOI (Operations Working Group Moderator)
LTC Chuck Rush    Center for Army Analysis
Fred Schwartz    Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
Valerie Serrels    Eastern Mennonite University
Sarah Sewall    Harvard Kennedy School (Guest Speaker)
Dr. Taylor Seybolt    University of Pittsburgh
COL Tom Sheperd    U.S. Army War College
Tim Shortley    Department of State (Panelist)
Gretchen Skidmore    U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
Dr. Shannon Smith    Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Andrew Snyder    George Mason University
Mary Stata    Friends Committee on National Legislation
COL Larry Strobel    PKSOI (Logistics Working Group Moderator)
Rachel Sturm    FBI
LTC Hiroaki Takano  Japan Self Defense Force
Chris Taylor  Mission Essential Personnel
Lem Thornton  HQDA G-4
Charlie Trumbull  Department of State
LTC Chris Valentino  Office of the Army Judge Advocate General
Chuck Waggoner  Mission Essential Personnel
Dr. Jim Waller  Keene State College (Guest Speaker)
LTC Tim Watson  Harvard Kennedy School
Mike Weaver  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Capt Matthew Williams  Department of Defense
Sean Wolfgang  University of Pittsburgh
Lawrence Woocher  U.S. Institute of Peace (Intelligence Working Group Moderator)

John Zavales  Department of State
Ken Zurcher  Department of State
ANNEX C: BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS AND MODERATORS

Professor J. Holmes Armstead
Professor J. Holmes Armstead is a retired professor of strategy, public policy and international who has taught at Stanford, the University of California, Pepperdine, the University of London, University d’ Pau, the Virginia Military Institute, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Washington and Lee, and the U.S. Naval War College. He is a retired Army Colonel who has had armor, JAG, and civil affairs assignments. As a lawyer, he has served with the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a prosecutor in Chicago, and in private practice. He has served on several international negotiating teams and has been an election observer for the European Community and the United Nations. He is widely published, is a frequent lecturer on international law and security, has served as a chief of staff for a U.S. Congressman, and has served three terms as a city councilman in California. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Illinois, a law degree from DePaul University, and a doctorate from Pacific Western University.

Cliff Bernath
Mr. Bernath is a member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and leads the Department’s efforts regarding Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO). He also leads a DoD policy development team regarding the roles of women in promoting peace and stability in conflict and post-conflict activi-
ties. He has previously served at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, as Director of Conflict Resolution and Prevention for Refugees International, Director of the American Forces Information Service, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and is a retired Army officer and Vietnam veteran. He has conducted firsthand research in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea) and the Great Lakes (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda). He published four major peacekeeping studies and briefed his findings at the United Nations and various forums in Washington DC, Paris, London, Canada, and New York (including the Council on Foreign Relations). Mr. Bernath holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Missouri, and a Master of Science degree in Journalism and Mass Communications from Kansas State University.

Dr. Linda Bishai

Linda Bishai is a senior program officer in the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, where she focuses on secondary and university education in international relations, conflict resolution, human rights and peace studies. She is responsible for curriculum development and developing faculty and teacher workshops throughout the United States and in conflict zones, especially the Sudan. Before coming to USIP, Dr. Bishai was an assistant professor of political science at Towson University, where she taught courses in international relations, international law, the use of force and human rights. Her research interests include identity politics, international human rights law in domestic courts, and the development of international law after the Nurem-
berg trials. During 2003-2004, Dr. Bishai served as a Supreme Court Fellow at the Federal Judicial Center, where she worked on an introduction to international human rights law for the federal judiciary. She has also taught at Brunel University, the London School of Economics, and the University of Stockholm. Dr. Bishai holds a B.A. in history and literature from Harvard University, a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center, and a Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics.

Rosa Brooks

Rosa Brooks serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rule of Law and International Humanitarian Policy and as Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She is currently on a public service leave from her position as a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, where she specializes in international law. Ms. Brooks has had a varied career in government, academia, the media and the NGO world. From 2005 to March 2009, she was a foreign policy columnist for the Los Angeles Times. Ms. Brooks has also served as Special Counsel to the President of the Open Society Institute, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law; Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, a consultant for Human Rights Watch, a lecturer at Yale Law School, a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a fellow at the Carr Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Her work has brought her to more than thirty countries, from Indonesia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Russia to China, India, Iraq and Afghanistan. She has also served on numerous boards and advisory groups, including the
Board of Directors of the National Security Network, the steering committee of the White Oak Foreign Policy Leaders’ Project, the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Fragile States, the board of directors of Amnesty International USA, and the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law. Ms. Brooks has published numerous scholarly articles on international law, state failure, post-conflict reconstruction and the rule of law, terrorism, and the law of armed conflict. With Jane Stromseth and David Wippman, she is the co-author of “Can Might Make Rights? The Rule of Law After Military Interventions” (Cambridge University Press, 2006). Ms. Brooks received her A.B. from Harvard, followed by a master’s degree from Oxford (where she was a Marshall Scholar) and a law degree from Yale.

**Sally Chin**

Sally Chin is the MARO Project Director, is one of the primary authors of the MARO Handbook, and has over a decade of experience working in the field of conflict prevention and resolution, with half of that time spent in Africa. She has worked for Search for Common Ground, the Fondation Hirondelle, Refugees International, International Crisis Group, and Oxfam GB. She has extensive field experience as a program manager, policy adviser, analyst and advocate, particularly with regards to the conflicts in the DRC, Sudan, Chad and the Horn of Africa. Sally’s research and publications have focused on conflict-related displacement and humanitarian responses, regional and international peacekeeping capacities, small arms and light weapons, protection of civilians, and drivers of conflict. She is on the Board of Directors of Ushahidi, a project which uses crowdsourcing to map crises inter-
nationally. Sally is a graduate of Swarthmore College and has an MSc in Comparative Politics, with a focus on conflict and genocide early warning, from the London School of Economics.

COL Lorelei E. W. Coplen

Colonel Lorelei Coplen, U.S. Army, is Director of the Operations Integration and Policy Division at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. An Aviation officer with over 23 years service, she has had command, operations, logistics, and human resource management assignments in airborne, air assault, and various functional headquarters from division through Army staff, to include the United States Military Academy. She served in Iraq as the Strategic Outreach officer for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and as Commander, 563rd Aviation Battalion (Support), 159th Combat Aviation Brigade. She also served in the initial Balkan stabilization and peace-keeping efforts, as an aviation company commander in Desert Shield/Storm, and has participated in numerous domestic disaster relief actions as well as international exercises and relief efforts, particularly in Central America. She holds a Masters Degree in Organizational Leadership as an Eisenhower Fellow, as well as a Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations from the United States Military Academy. As a USAWC graduate, she earned the Masters Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies, and was recognized for excellence in strategy research.

Alison Giffen

Alison Giffen is the deputy director of the Future of Peace Operations program. She is responsible for leading the program’s efforts to advance civilian pro-
tection in war-torn societies, and to increase global preparedness to respond to mass atrocities. Giffen joined Stimson in 2009 with more than a dozen years experience monitoring and advocating on human rights and humanitarian crises. Giffen previously served as an advocacy and strategy coordinator for a large humanitarian organization in Sudan, where she led the design and implementation of the organization’s global strategy to secure civilians’ rights to protection and assistance. As a policy analyst for the Open Society Institute, Giffen promoted multilateral U.S. foreign engagement and U.S. support of UN reform initiatives. She was project director of a groundbreaking study on ex-combatants in Sierra Leone and was the founding director of the U.S. Office on Colombia, an international coalition of groups promoting peace and human rights in Colombia. Giffen received her MA in international affairs from the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and received her BA in diplomacy and world affairs from Occidental College.

**Victoria Holt**

Victoria K. Holt joined the Bureau of International Organization Affairs as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in August 2009. Ms. Holt is responsible for the international security portfolio, overseeing offices that address UN political affairs and the Security Council, peace operations, sanctions, and regional organizations. Prior to assuming this position, Ms. Holt was a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank where she co-directed the Future of Peace Operations program. During her tenure at Stimson, Ms. Holt wrote and spoke on peace and security issues, including the UN and regional peace operations, protection of civilians, targeted sanc-
tions, rule of law and U.S. policy. Ms. Holt previously served at the State Department, where in 1999-2000 she was Senior Policy Advisor in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs. Prior to that experience, Ms. Holt directed programs at Washington-based policy institutes on international affairs, and served for seven years as a senior Congressional staffer. She is a graduate of the Naval War College and Wesleyan University.

**COL Stephen Mariano**

Colonel Stephen J. Mariano is the U.S. Army Africa Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans, Policies, and Assessments (G-5). Commissioned in 1986, he has extensive military experience to include tactical level command and staff positions and other assignments including Assistant Professor of Military Strategy and Comparative Military Systems at West Point, Chief of the Coalition Planning Group for Counter Terrorism at European Command, Strategic Plans & Policy Officer at NATO, Military Advisor to NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, and Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, Deputy J5, Chief of Strategy, Plans and Assessments. He has a Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Santa Barbara, a Master’s degree in Strategic Planning, International Organizations and Negotiations from the Naval Postgraduate School. He was the United States Army War College Fellow at the Queen’s University Center for International Relations, in Canada and is a doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada. His military awards include the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Combat Action Badge, Airborne Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Ranger Tab.
Michael McNerney

Michael McNerney is the Principal Director for Plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and is a member of the Senior Executive Service. He and his staff support the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic-level policy guidance on Defense Department and interagency plans, planning assessments, force management, and overseas basing. Previously, as Director of International Capacity Building, he was responsible for Department of Defense efforts to build the capacity of partner countries to conduct stability operations and irregular warfare. He has also served on the faculty of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and has had earlier OSD policy assignments regarding U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, international environmental issues, nuclear arms control, and defense budgeting. Prior to working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNerney worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Mr. McNerney has an MA in International Relations from the University of Maryland, a BA in Government and German from the University of Notre Dame and attended the University of Innsbruck as a foreign exchange student. He has written or co-authored book chapters on civil-military operations in Afghanistan, military involvement in humanitarian activities, and conventional arms control, and an article in Parameters on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

Dwight Raymond

Dwight Raymond joined PKSOI in July 2009 after retiring from the Army as an Infantry Colonel. His military assignments included infantry leadership,
command, and staff positions; faculty positions at the United States Military Academy and the U.S. Army War College, theater-level plans positions in Korea, and training and advisory assignments at the National Training Center and in Iraq as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and the Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder qualification badges. Dwight has a Bachelor’s Degree from the United States Military Academy and Master’s Degrees from the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the United States Army War College. He is one of the primary authors of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Military Planning Handbook.

Sarah Sewall

Sarah Sewall teaches international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, where she also directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights. She led the Obama Transition Team’s National Security Agency Review process in 2008. During the Clinton Administration, Sewall served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance. From 1983-1996, she served as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell on the Democratic Policy Committee and the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. Before joining Harvard, Sewall was at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences where she edited The United States and the International Criminal Court (2002). Her more recent publications include the Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook (2010), with
Dwight Raymond and Sally Chin, the introduction to the University of Chicago Edition of the *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual* (2007) and *Parameters of Partnership: U.S. Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century* (2009), with John White. She is a member of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and the Center for Naval Analyses Defense Advisory Committee and is on the board of Oxfam America. She graduated from Harvard College and Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. In 2007, Sewall founded the MARO Project to create a military concept of operations for intervening to halt mass atrocity.

**Tim Shortley**

Timothy R. Shortley presently serves as the Deputy to the Special Envoy to Sudan in the Office of the Special Envoy to Sudan. He is a career State Department employee after transitioning over from USAID. Prior to the State Department, Mr. Shortley served on the National Security Council staff at the White House as a Director for African Affairs. His portfolio included Sudan, East Africa as well as Security, AFRICOM, and Humanitarian issues. While with USAID, Mr. Shortley worked in the areas of humanitarian relief, conflict response, and development to include tours in Rwanda and Ethiopia. Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Shortley was employed at the United Nations World Food Program in Rome where he specialized in Resource Mobilization efforts for refugee and displaced persons operations and management of the United States Government account to the World Food Program. Mr. Shortley received a Bachelor’s degree from Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio and a degree from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the
Naval War College. Mr. Shortley and his family live in Laytonsville, Maryland where his wife Michele is a member of the Laytonsville Historical Council.

**COL Larry Strobel**

Larry Strobel joined PKSOI in July 2009 after commanding the Headquarters Support Group, JFC Brunssum, the Netherlands. An Army Officer with 26 years of experience, three combat tours and 15 years of service in Europe, he served in NATO, U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, three U.S. Army Divisions and several non-Divisional logistics units. He served as the 1st Infantry Division G4 from 2002-2004 deploying the Division to Mardin, Turkey and Tikrit, Iraq and commanded the 201st Forward Support Battalion, from 2000-2002. Prior to commanding his battalion, Colonel Strobel served as the G4, TF Falcon in Kosovo. At PKSOI he serves as the subject matter expert on peace and stability operations sustainment. This includes just not U.S. sustainment systems but also those of the UN, NATO, ABCA, NGO, IGO, and contractors. Additionally he is the primary logistics expert for Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). Colonel Strobel was educated at the Pennsylvania State University, U.S. Army War College, and Florida Institute of Technology, holding a bachelors degree in Applied Science and two master degrees; a M.A. in National Security Strategic Studies and a M.S. in Logistics Management.

**Dr. James Waller**

Dr. Waller, Cohen Chair for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Keene State College in New Hampshire,
Lawrence Woocher is a senior program officer in the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, where he focuses on early warning, conflict prevention, and the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. He was a member of the executive committee and lead expert on early warning
for the Genocide Prevention Task Force, co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen. He is also a lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Before joining USIP in late 2006, Woocher was a research fellow at Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict Resolution and, concurrently, a consultant on early warning to the Office of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. From 2004 to 2006 he served as program manager of Global Policy Programs at the United Nations Association of the USA. From 2001 to 2003 he was a research associate/special projects manager at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Woocher received a master’s in public policy with a focus on international security and political economy from Harvard’s Kennedy School, and a bachelor’s in neuroscience from Brown University. Among his many publications are “A Smart Use of Intelligence: Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing” (Georgetown Journal, 2010) and “How Genocide Became a National Security Threat” (with Michael Abramowitz, Foreign Policy, February 26, 2010).
ANNEX D: MARO HANDBOOK SUMMARY

The first part of the MARO Handbook provides some conceptual considerations regarding MARO situations. These include the multi-party dynamics (between perpetrators, victims, interveners, and other actors which may be further sub-divided into bystanders, positive influences, and negative influences); the illusion of impartiality; and escalatory dynamics. This section also addresses several operational and political implications including:

• Different Information, From the Outset
• Advance Interagency Planning
• Speed Versus Mass
• The Power of Witness
• Symptoms or Root Causes—Can There Be A Handoff?
• Immediate Non-Military Requirements
• Moral Dilemmas
• Political Guidance

The second part of the handbook, and most of the annexes, are intended to support military planning required to understand the operational environment, frame the problem set, and develop an operational design. These sections support mission analysis, course of action development, and the creation of a MARO concept of operations (CONOPS). These discussions attempt to adapt military planning constructs to MARO situations and provide planners “70% solutions” that can be refined for particular cases. For example, the handbook describes how a MARO con-
A contingency plan can conform to the standard doctrinal planning phases:

- **Phase 0: Shape** (normal day-to-day affairs, theater security cooperation, planning)
- **Phase I: Deter** (crisis management, military support to diplomacy, shows of force, preparations)
- **Phase II: Seize Initiative** (initial deployment, secure footholds, establish credibility, secure vulnerable populations, attack resisters)
- **Phase III: Dominate** (main body deployment, secure necessary area, eliminate organized resistance, establish Transitional Military Authority)
- **Phase IV: Stabilize** (transfer responsibility to Transitional Civilian Authority, set conditions for Phase V)
- **Phase V: Enable Civil Authority** (transition to original government, new indigenous government, or other legitimate authority)

While the MARO Handbook focuses primarily on the “intervention” (response) phases (II and III) and offers seven different conceptual approaches, planning may also have to address the earlier “prevention” phases (0 and I) and the subsequent “rebuild” phases (IV and V).

The third part of the handbook briefly addresses Future Research Areas and Ways Forward, and this workshop was an important step in this process. Broadly speaking, future MARO efforts fall into three baskets. The first of these is the “DoD Basket” and remains the MARO project’s primary orientation.
This includes including mass atrocity response more prominently in military doctrine, contingency planning, and exercises as well as other means to improve military capabilities for conducting such operations. The second is the “Policy Basket” and focuses on Whole-of-Government capability to manage information and formulate policy to prevent and respond to mass atrocity situations. Third, the “International Basket” addresses the potential role of other international actors and could include, for example, the formulation of Protection of Civilians doctrine for United Nations and other peacekeeping forces.
ANNEX E: RESOURCES

Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy
   Homepage: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/
   MARO Project Homepage: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
   Homepages: www.pksoi.mil and www.pksoi.org
   Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS): http://sollims.pksoi.org

Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
   Homepage: http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/

Counting Casualties (Carnegie Mellon University & University of Pittsburgh)
   Homepage: www.CountingCasualties.org

Stimson Center Future of Peace Operation Project
   Homepage: http://www.stimson.org/programs/future-of-peace-operations/
   Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit:
   http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/addressing-the-doctrinal-deficit/

United Nations Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide

U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
   Homepage: http://www.ushmm.org/
U.S. Institute of Peace
   Homepage: http://www.usip.org/
   Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a deep and widespread debt of gratitude to numerous individuals who assisted with the MARO workshop and the MARO Project in general. At the top of the list, of course, are my partners at the Carr Center: Sarah Sewall (MARO’s visionary founder and perpetual source of energy), Sally Chin (my main comrade during the past 18 months), and Bharathi Radhakrishnan (MARO’s ever-resourceful research assistant). Working with them has been one of the best experiences of my professional career.

I cannot thank our guest speakers enough for juggling their schedules in order to provide their gifts of insight to the workshop. Sarah Sewall’s keynote launched the workshop perfectly and framed some contentious issues in her usual brilliant fashion. Mike McNerney’s cogent explanation of planning de-mystified a complex topic; as a former theater planner I bow to an obvious master. We were extremely fortunate to have Alison Giffen moderate an equally talented panel that included Tim Shortley, Linda Bishai, and Colonel Stephen Mariano. All four panelists triumphed over other commitments, the tyranny of distance, and/or illness and provided exceptional analysis derived from their intellectual skills and real-world experiences. Tori Holt has been a shining star in the field of civilian protection, and her presentation was stellar as well. Given her other important commitments at the time of the workshop, I am particularly appreciative that she took the time to share her wisdom and grace with us. Having had the privilege of hearing Jim Waller speak before, I had high expectations that
the participants would be fascinated by his research on perpetrators, and based upon the survey results he exceeded those expectations. Finally, I want to thank Rosa Brooks who in her closing remarks was able to pull together the workshop’s disparate threads into a comprehensive and conclusive synthesis.

Given the talent of the workshop participants and the complexity of the topics, it was important to provide the opportunity for active dialogue. We accomplished this with six breakout groups, and I deeply appreciate the moderators who graciously took the time from their busy schedules to orchestrate the proceedings in these groups. Cliff Bernath (OSD Policy), Lawrence Woocher (U.S. Institute of Peace), Colonel Larry Strobel (PKSOI), Colonel Lorelei Coplen (PKSOI) and Jim Armstead (Washington & Lee) superbly guided their group discussions with minimal oversight from me, and also provided summaries of their respective working group discussions which are included in this report. They, along with Sally Chin, Alison Giffen, and Jeff Bernstein, kindly reviewed the report’s initial draft and provided valuable suggestions.

According to the workshop surveys, one of its highlights was the opportunity for participants to meet with a richly diverse and talented mix of colleagues. I want to thank all of the workshop attendees for joining us during a hectic time of the year, for their substantive contributions, and especially for their positive and cooperative attitudes. One of our speakers, when discussing the theory that group dynamics can lead to collective evil action, suggested that instead of an inevitable slide to mob rule what often occurs is that groups tend to accentuate the inclinations
(positive or negative) of their members. One of our workshop assistants who has had ample previous experience with conferences noted that the attendees at the MARO workshop were “a good group…. They’re very nice and they don’t fight about little things.” The point here being that, in addition to complimenting their positive inclinations, I owe profound thanks to the participants identified in Annex B for making the workshop a success.

Many people assisted with the planning, preparation, and administration of the workshop. First, I would like to thank our six volunteer recorders: David Mitchell, Andrew Snyder, Ryan Clayburn (George Mason University); Bharathi Radhakrishnan (Harvard Kennedy School); Valerie Serrels (Eastern Mennonite University); and Jacki Chura-Beaver (PKSOI) assisted their working group moderators, provided informed notes from the proceedings, and cheerfully pitched in when needed to assist with setup, move things, and accomplish a myriad of menial but essential tasks (not the least of which included computer-related functions that seems second-nature to them).

I also thank the staff at the Gettysburg Wyndham conference center, particularly Mary Ellen Wyrick and Raini Wynn. They provided a first-class venue and service, and were exceptionally flexible and good-natured in accommodating our frequent modifications regarding the workshop. Additionally, I want to thank the War College Foundation and Humanity United for providing the funding required for the workshop. Without their support this event could not have happened.
Finally, I want to thank my colleagues at PKSOI and the Army War College for their support of the workshop and the MARO Project. In addition to Larry Strobel and Lorelei Coplen who served as working group moderators and others who participated in the workshop, Colonel Steve Smith, Colonel John Bessler, and Bill Flavin provided much-needed guidance during the event’s planning. Major General Gregg Martin provided welcome command support and presence for the workshop. Tom Kruegler and John Stepansky ensured that the administrative arrangements occurred without a hitch; John in particular went to extraordinary lengths for this event. Tadd Clouse provided responsive automation support before and after the workshop, and Chris Browne provided the supplies, signs, display materials, and numerous other appointments. Marcy Robey, the workshop’s primary and peerless assistant, was absolutely wonderful and was the workshop’s backbone. Last but certainly not least, my wife Youngae volunteered her unsurpassed organizational skills and meticulous attention to detail while assisting with the workshop.

Dwight Raymond
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., see especially 65-69; 96-7; and 120-127.


10. Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, February 2011), 16.

11. A short list includes Special Envoy to the Sudan, Khartoum Chief of Mission, Juba Chief of Mission, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Director, National Security Council Director for War Crimes and Atrocities. Other high-ranking
officials may not have primary responsibility but would nevertheless be instrumental as supporting agents; these could include Ambassadors to the neighboring countries and the United Nations and the African Bureau Chief.


13. The workshop organizers selected this term as an adaptation of the cross-cutting principle of “Regional Engagement” which is presented in The United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington DC: USIP, 2009), section 3-9. In addition to regional considerations, “Comprehensive Engagement” is intended to account for local interactions as well as matters associated with the “Comprehensive Approach” concept (see section 5 of Guiding Principles). Some workshop participants expressed concern that the term “Comprehensive Engagement” has an overly-military flavor.

14. Joint Publication 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2008) explains Unity of Command as follows: “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Applying a force’s full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort. The joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational nature of unified action creates situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the operational area. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort (page A-3).” Also see Colonel Ian Hope, Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2008.)

15. Two noteworthy references include Philipp Rotmann, Built on Shaky Ground: The Comprehensive Approach in Practice, NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 63 (Rome: NATO


19. For example, the counterinsurgency “rule-of-thumb” of 20 security force personnel per 1000 inhabitants could be applied, or one could adopt some number less than that. Another basis might be the number of armed perpetrators that would have to be confronted.


21. These approaches include Saturation; “Oil Spot;” Separation; Safe Areas; Partner Enabling; Containment; and Defeat Perpetrators. Pages 70-87 describe these approaches, explain when they may be appropriate, address their advantages and disadvantages, and discuss how they may be combined to formulate courses of action.