FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.
If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [http://pksoi.army.mil] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

Basrah, Iraq (30 Mar 2010) – U.S. Army Private Elijah Walters provides security for a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Basra, Iraq. The PRT officials are at the construction site of a new prison to ensure all logistical and quality standards are met, as well as to provide assistance to prison management.

[DoD photo by Specialist Christopher Wellner, U.S. Army]
INTRODUCTION

Welcome to this special edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler: Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students.

In Academic Year 2015, U.S. Army War College students in PKSOI elective courses were given the opportunity to enter a lesson learned into the SOLLIMS database – based on operational experience, course readings, research, or case studies. Most lessons were at the strategic level; however, several students also submitted lessons at the operational and tactical levels. Lessons encompassed an array of stability topics, including Security, Development, and Rule of Law.

The overriding theme of the lessons selected for this compendium is: “DoD - Interagency cooperation and collaboration” as indicated in highlights below:

- Lesson 1 discusses the response to the Ebola outbreak and why it would be prudent for Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) to work with interagency medical experts to be prepared to deal with regional health threats.
- Lesson 2 discusses climate change as a potential driver of conflict and instability, and it talks to the importance of DoD’s collaboration with USAID and the National Oceanic Atmosphere Administration (NOAA).
- Lesson 3 discusses interagency teaming and interaction with local land, facility and property managers during the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, and it cites how this translates/applies to foreign disaster relief missions.
- Lesson 4 discusses frictions and misunderstandings between a certain maneuver brigade and provincial reconstruction team during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and it recommends how this can be avoided in the future.
- Lesson 5 discusses how DoD and U.S. agencies improved coordination in advance of meetings with Iraqi officials within the Green Zone of Baghdad, and it provides several tips for bridging interagency cultural differences.
- Lesson 6 discusses an Infantry company commander’s engagements with an Iraqi council, judges, lawyers, and police, and it cites the need to train junior officers on tools such as USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework.
- Lesson 7 discusses the lack of “systems thinking” in the 3D (Diplomacy, Development, Defense) approach to the budget – and how addressing this shortfall might contribute to improving the impact of interventions abroad.
- Lesson 8 discusses the issue of gangs, violence, and poverty in Central America, and it then presents options for the U.S. Government and DoD to partner and help nations of the Northern Triangle build security capacity.

Readers are encouraged to take these students’ lessons into consideration for future efforts on strategy, engagements, and peace & stability operations. We also encourage readers to explore the many other lessons stored in SOLLIMS.
# Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students

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“QUICK LOOK”

Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

- The United States Army is moving toward an organizing principle of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). . . . Among the plethora of mission essential tasks that RAF brings to the table, forces should also prepare for the critical tasks of containing and treating pandemic health threats. [Read More ...]

- There is a growing interest and a growing body of research – some in the affirmative, some less declarative and even questioning – of climate change being a causative factor for conflict and instability. [Read More ...]

- During disaster recovery preparation and recovery operations, installation and local real-property, land, and facility managers are vital to effective and efficient use of all available resources. [Read More ...]

- Military leaders, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners, as well as their staffs and subordinate leaders, must fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization, in order to fully establish and exploit development unified action. [Read More ...]

- Over the last decade, diplomatic, development and military professionals have worked together at all levels to execute the “3D” pillars of U.S national security (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense). While integrated and coordinated strategic planning between the involved organizations has improved, there are still cultural impediments to success at the tactical level. [Read More ...]

- Tactical Commanders can have great influence within the sectors of development if educated properly and given the resources and freedom to execute. [Read More ...]

- During the “Smart Power at Work” panel discussion, then SECDEF Gates stated that success in Iraq and Afghanistan required development, but then stated that there was not enough funds supporting it. [Read More ...]

- The growth and spread of gangs in Central America is an issue of immense importance not only to the countries of the region, but to the United States as well. [Read More ...]
SUBJECT: Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Students

1. GENERAL

In Academic Year (AY) 2015, USAWC students submitted SOLLIMS lessons while participating in the following PKSOI elective courses:

- Peace & Stability Operations – Concepts & Principles
- Challenges in Economic Development
- International Development
- Security Sector Reform

The students’ lessons cover a wide range of operations – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation United Assistance (OUA), and Superstorm Sandy relief. Certain lessons also provide insights from research and analysis dealing with “climate change,” “systems thinking,” and “illegal immigration stemming from gang violence.”

This report presents just a small selection of the students’ lessons from AY 2015. All lessons in this compendium include recommendations & implications aimed at improving future peace & stability operations and enhancing national security.

2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Regionally Aligned Infectious Disease Control (1596)

Observation.

The United States Army is moving toward an organizing principle of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The purpose of RAF is to provide Combatant Commands with trained, tailored, and ready Army forces responsive to all missions. RAF allows the Army to maintain requisite war fighter skills while developing soft skills specific to a geographic region of the world. The concept centers on Army forces acquiring expertise in the language, culture, and physical landscape of a specific region of the globe before being called upon to deploy there. RAF also allows Army forces the chance to prepare for the likely threats and potential adversaries resident to their assigned geographic region. The U.S. Army is spending time
and resources committing to regional alignment and will remain organized under this construct for the foreseeable future. Among the plethora of mission essential tasks that RAF brings to the table, forces should also prepare for the critical tasks of containing and treating pandemic health threats.

**Discussion.**

The Ebola crisis beginning in March of 2014 was one of the worst pandemic outbreaks in recent history, affecting not only Africa but also the rest of the globe to include the United States. The Center for Disease Control (CDC), Doctors without Borders (aka Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)), and other world health partners are taking precautions to ensure further outbreaks do not occur. The U.S. Department of Defense must also take measures to help prevent the spread of Ebola and other infectious diseases as the U.S. military will certainly be called upon to support the next major pandemic outbreak.

The international health organizations that typically deal with infectious diseases, such as MSF, were overwhelmed with the 2014 Ebola outbreak. These world medical organizations typically have an aversion to collaborating with military forces based on principle. Yet despite their lofty principles, MSF turned to the U.S. Army out of desperation for support in containing Ebola in West Africa. MSF knew the U.S. Army was the only force in the world capable of providing timely support to this global health crisis. Even with the potential for international and domestic political controversy, President Obama authorized the Army to support the world health community in containing Ebola.

**Recommendation.**

1. U.S. military support in containing the recent Ebola outbreak has set a precedent. It is almost certain that U.S. forces will be called upon to lend support in combatting future infectious disease outbreaks around the globe. Knowing this, the recommendation advanced in this submission is that RAF need to train on infectious disease containment and treatment. Science proves that certain pandemics are more likely to occur in specific geographic regions around the world. For this reason, RAF should train on combatting the infectious diseases that are prone to occur within their area of operation. Soldiers can be equipped with the proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to reduce exposure while operating in close proximity to infected populations. An obvious example would be the RAF assigned to western Africa should be trained in Ebola treatment and containment.

2. Additionally, the Army should augment RAF with infectious disease medical expertise. This expertise can be delivered from a combination of military (Army Medical Service Corps), interagency (Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)), intergovernmental (USAID & CDC) and international (MSF) medical Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) schooled in pandemic treatment and control.
**Implications.**

If this recommendation is adopted, RAF will be better prepared to respond to infectious disease outbreaks within their geographic area of responsibility. The RAF would have a number of medical SMEs trained in infectious disease control available to offer recommendations to commanders and local authorities on the ground. The RAF will already be trained in the basic fundamentals of pandemic treatment and control. Additionally, Soldiers will have the PPE necessary to reduce exposure to pathogens. The training, equipment, and medical expertise provide to the RAF will help create the desired outcomes from a pandemic treatment and control standpoint. However, the most important benefit is reducing the likelihood of U.S. service members being infected while responding to a crisis.

The implications of not adopting this recommendation are disheartening. By not providing RAF with the training, equipment, and expertise necessary to support infectious disease control, the chances of success are diminished and the risk of soldier infection is increased. Not adopting some measure of this recommendation relegates RAF to a “pick-up” game when called upon to respond to high stakes infectious disease outbreaks. U.S. Soldiers deserve better preparation, equipment, and leadership knowing Army formations will certainly be called upon to address future global pandemic health concerns.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on recent and potential U.S. Army response to an international infectious disease outbreak.

b. **TOPIC.** Climate Change as a Driver of Conflict and Instability (1598)

**Observation.**

There is a growing interest and a growing body of research – some in the affirmative, some less declarative and even questioning – of climate change being a causative factor for conflict and instability.

**Discussion.**

There is a widespread and growing rhetoric – from the Norwegian Nobel Committee in 2007, the United Nations Security Council in 2007, and U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 and following years – that climate change is a driver of instability and conflict. More nuanced than these three sources is U.S.
Secretary of Defense Hagel’s 2013 statement that while not a direct cause, climate change “can significantly add to the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty and conflict.” The existing rhetoric is not matched by an equal body of systemic evidence that climate variability such as prolonged droughts or unusually warm weather is a causal link to instability and conflict [Theisen, et al.; see reference in Event Description below].

A recent academic that has researched and documented a causal link in the case of a multi-decadal drought and the on-going Syrian civil war is Dr. Colin P. Kelley [see reference in Event Description below]. Dr. Kelley makes the point that the degradation in agricultural productivity due to the drought caused food shortages, widespread unemployment in the agricultural sector and beyond, collapse of the rural social structure, and mass migrations into the cities, which in turn was at least partially responsible for the 2011 uprising against a government seen as unresponsive to the people’s needs. Dr. Kelley’s research suggests that the drying conditions occurred as a result of both naturally occurring and anthropogenic [human-effected] contributions to increased ground temperatures and reduced precipitation.

Theisen’s research shows few anecdotes that match the outcomes observed in Syria, which had a combustible mix of a repressive Shia [minority of the population, at 24%] Muslim government not responsive to and ultimately hostile to the needs of its displaced Sunni majority. Theisen predicts that:

“Future economic development is likely to further increase the ability of many societies to absorb natural disasters without great loss of human life, so an increase in extreme weather events need not be accompanied by higher casualty figures.” [Ref: Theisen et al.]

Theisen makes the point that although climate change may increase the motivation for migrating from climate-affected flood-zones or degraded agricultural lands, it may at the same time reduce the mobility capacity. The highest threat for migration pressures will likely occur first in the small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Low-lying areas in Indonesia and Thailand will also see the same pressures from predicted sea level rise.

The predicted increased incidences of high intensity storms – Category 4 and 5 hurricane/typhoon events – will continue to create disaster events with infrastructure damage and human loss of life. These events will continue to call for multinational responses with often heavy involvement by the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), with DoD sustainment, medical, security and other resources in support.

It is an important additional note that USAID is the “lead agency” for the U.S. Government’s response to climate change. USAID has a formal “Global Climate
Change Initiative” that is third in priority (as of 2014/2015) for programmatic agency actions following “Feed the Future” and “Global Health Initiatives.”

**Recommendation.**

1. DoD and especially Geographic Combatant Commands continue to scan the environment – physical and human terrain – with the world-leading science from the U.S. National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and, just as in the Arctic, can predict climate change factors that require either the near-term repositioning of Defense assets or, at a minimum, development of new contingency plans.

2. DoD will need to maintain and likely increase the capacity to conduct HA/DR in support of USAID’s OFDA.

3. As economic growth is critical to a nation’s ability to build resiliency to the negative effects of climate change, DoD’s support to the National Strategy of increased Development as part of Phase 0 “Shaping” operations will help mitigate climate change as a driver of instability.

4. DoD should invest further in research and development (R&D) to gather empirical data to better determine the existence of any causal link between climate change and conflict. “Simply assuming a link may lead peacemaking astray.” [Ref: Theisen et al.]

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based upon primary source research focused primarily on the three below:


c. **TOPIC. Relating Stability Operations (SO) Efforts to Experience in Domestic Response – Hurricane/Superstorm Sandy Support Base**

**Observation.**

During disaster recovery preparation and recovery operations, installation and local real-property, land, and facility managers are vital to effective and efficient use of all available resources. While this issue is domestic related, it also applies to international stability operations. For example, disaster recovery in Haiti needed an objective understanding of existing/supporting infrastructure for use by responders as a staging point – to provide essential services and to provide space for internally displaced persons, as well as lay-down areas for recovery resources.

**Discussion.**

During the onset of Hurricane or Superstorm Sandy, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst was named as an Incident Support Base (ISB). As a result of this designation, 87 different recovery missions encompassing over 5,500 individuals descended upon the ISB location looking for staging and operating space. Additionally, the ISB was set up to support displaced local community residents. Moving at a fast and furious pace, individuals at the ISB established operational locations and tracked bed-down locations of supporting missions. However, space became scarce and required unique solutions by real-property, land, and facility managers to ensure successful support to recovery teams. This experience relates to international recovery operations. For example in Haiti, regional areas are designated to provide specific efforts in response to disasters (manmade or otherwise). An early designation of locations to support recovery efforts informs international agencies, aligns efforts to support the provision of recovery supplies, and coordinates all supporting agency efforts to reduce and hopefully eliminate redundancy.

**Recommendation.**

1. Ensure real-property, land, and facility managers have a good grasp on available floor space and un-used land suitable for materials and equipment staging to facilitate command and control, as well as billeting bed-down and mission equipment and materials staging in locations suitable to facilitate efficient recovery operations.

2. Additionally, multiple printed maps to scale are very important to have in-hand when visiting selected locations for bed-down sites. Choosing a site that is in the incorrect location, or is incorrectly sized, diminishes recovery operations and causes significant friction to response efforts. Applying this to an international situation, Haiti required significant mapping efforts to determine where internally displaced persons would be placed, where essential services would be placed in...
support of governance and relief efforts, and where recovery materials would be placed for further distribution throughout the country.

3. Coordination with host nation real-property managers is essential to facilitate transition of initial onset of recovery and relief efforts.

**Implications.**

Without close tracking of available materials and equipment staging locations, as well as command, control, and billeting locations, critical space may be under-utilized, or overly extended, both of which severely hamper recovery preparations and operations.

**Event Description.**

Hurricane/Superstorm Sandy was a significant weather event on the eastern U.S. seaboard. Massive flooding, power outages, and infrastructure damage occurred as a result of the storm. Days leading up to the storm, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst was designated as an Incident Support Base (ISB) and facilitated the bed-down of 87 different recovery missions that included FEMA, foresters from California, commercial power teams from all over the U.S., law enforcement agents, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers power and pumping teams. Over 5,500 response individuals were billeted at the ISB. Office and billeting space near messing and latrine facilities and open space suitable for materials and equipment lay-down, staging, and forward distribution were at a premium. ISB operations were conducted for over a month. This situation translates to international recovery and relief efforts resulting from man-made or natural disasters.

d. **TOPIC.** Establishing CIV/MIL Development Unified Action in a Deployed Environment (1564)

**Observation.**

Military leaders, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners, as well as their staffs and subordinate leaders, must fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization, in order to fully establish and exploit development unified action. This seemingly easy task is only accomplished through frequent and open dialogue across each contributing organization, and through frequent collaboration. These efforts nest the collective efforts of the developmental team, while simultaneously looking for
opportunities to maximize the collective effects of the USG, U.S. Multinational partners and NGOs.

Discussion.

During my 2nd deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2007 to 2008, my brigade was privileged to have the support of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT); however, during this extended 15-month deployment, our brigade and the PRT didn’t establish unified action or maximize our collective potential for the entire duration of the deployment. Quite frankly, the results of this shortcoming were that we wasted valuable time and resources trying to comprehend each other’s roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and operational priorities, when we could have been effortlessly and efficiently providing assistance to the Iraqis and the Government of Iraq (GoI).

This friction began during our relief in place (RIP) as we arrived into our new area of operations (AO) and manifested for the next 6-8 months. As OIF progressed from a conventional military operation focused on combined arms maneuver and then transitioned into a counter insurgency (COIN) operation, the United States Army established a COIN Academy in Taji, Iraq in order to train and enlighten leaders on COIN operations as they arrived in theater. The training was both rewarding and worthwhile; however, it didn’t possess a single class or block of instruction on development and more importantly, PRTs. Additionally, although the leadership from the battalion that we were replacing made an effort to meet us at Taji prior to our final movement to our new AO, neither its parent brigade nor the region's PRT made an effort to send representatives.

As our brigade and battalions began arriving in the AO, the focus was clearly on maintaining security, transferring responsibilities, and handing over projects and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), while assisting our newly arrived units with understanding the VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment we were about to inherit. Again, at the battalion level, we weren't made aware of, or introduced to, a single representative from the PRT. In fact, our perceptions and understandings of the PRT at this point mirrored those of the battalion we were replacing, because their perspective was the only perspective we had, and it wasn’t a positive one. We didn't meet a single representative from the PRT for nearly four months after the completion of our RIP, and the first introduction of a single member was merely to provide the agriculture representative with a security patrol, so that he could inspect a grain project within our AO. Over the next month or so, our only interactions with the PRT were through project inspection security patrols, and these were limited to the platoon level. PRT representatives would fly to our outlying forward operating base (FOB), be met on the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) by one of our platoon leaders, and then they’d depart for the inspection after a short patrol brief. Once the inspection was complete, the platoon leader would ensure the PRT representative was
safely onboard his/her return flight, and then the platoon leader would submit his patrol outbrief to the battalion operations officer. Our battalion received no official outbrief from either our brigade or the PRT with regards to the support provided or the project inspected. At this point in the deployment, the only feedback we’d receive was through the platoon leader who provided the security and who engaged the PRT representative.

As our battalion began understanding our AO, our GoI representatives, and the needs of our local populace, we began submitting development project requests through our brigade. Unbeknownst to our staff, a number of the project requests had to be routed through the PRT for approval and feedback. This wasn't known or anticipated until the PRT began rejecting projects because they countered objectives and development projects the PRT was either leading or developing. As a result of our battalion's frustration with the PRT’s oversight into our AO and the fact that we had yet to actually meet and collaborate with members of the PRT, our battalion commander demanded a meeting with representatives from our region's PRT.

As a result, it took our battalion nearly 6-8 months to fully understand the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each development contributing organization within our AO and understand who could provide, fund, approve or support our development efforts. It’s worth noting that our battalion served as our brigade’s decisive effort for resources, funding and support. Although our brigade was applauded for eventually establishing “What Right Looks Like” with regards to development unified action, it could have been accomplished much earlier.

**Recommendation.**

1. Conduct a joint, combined, JIIM and multilateral operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing each time a new organization or task force (TF) is brought together or replaced within a specific area of operation or region. The briefing should include the following at a minimum: each organization's roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities for the specific mission.

2. Establish and/or invite representation to each board, cell, working group and staff section meeting in order to maintain transparency, collaboration, and unified action.

3. If applicable, CIV/MIL leadership should conduct battlefield circulation with representatives from the JIIM team in order to address subordinate unit requests for information and understanding.
4. Mandate and establish development-specific training venues and professional development forums during home station training, pre-deployment preparation, and combat training center (CTC) experiences.

Implications.

Without fully understanding the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization of the forward deployed CIV/MIL team, the following could occur:

1. The USG, the U.S. Military, the JIIM contributing members, and NGOs will not achieve unified action.

2. Instead of establishing trust, transparency and collaboration, friction, mistrust, avoidance and development fratricide will set in, as each organization reverts to a stove-piped approach vice a unified approach.

3. The affected nation, region, and population will be denied both timely assistance and the full benefits of the CIV/MIL development effort.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the author’s personal experience during a 15-month deployment to Kirkuk, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007-2008.

e. TOPIC. Practical Recommendations for DoD, USAID and DoS Personnel Working Together at the Tactical Level (1593)

Observation.

Over the last decade, diplomatic, development and military professionals have worked together at all levels to execute the “3D” pillars of U.S. national security (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense). While integrated and coordinated strategic planning between the involved organizations has improved, there are still cultural impediments to success at the tactical level. Diplomatic, development and military professionals whose tactical missions rely on the actions of personnel from the other organizations could benefit from an examination of how organizational culture differences can impact day-to-day operations in conflict or post-conflict environments.
**Discussion.**

In 2005, I deployed to Baghdad as a Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and was attached to the 143rd Area Support Group (Connecticut National Guard). This unit served as the Joint Area Support Group-Central (JASG-C), which handled security, logistics, communications, and administration for the Green Zone of Baghdad. During this time, most U.S. diplomatic and development personnel in Baghdad worked within the Green Zone due to the security situation outside the “wire.” This was an especially volatile time, as the first Iraqi elections had recently taken place and the Iraqi Interim Government was being formed. The diplomatic (and sometimes development) personnel needed to regularly meet with Iraqi officials inside the Green Zone – often with very little notice and very little control over Iraqi attendance. This requirement clashed with the military’s security posture and entry procedures for the Green Zone. Iraqi officials often had issues gaining access to the Green Zone, including long security lines outside the gates and intrusive search procedures. These officials were placing themselves in great danger by meeting with U.S. officials inside the Green Zone, and they were very uncomfortable with the process. The bottom line was that the military’s security requirements were hindering efforts of the other two pillars: diplomacy and development.

In response, the JASG-C Commander assigned me as the tactical liaison officer between the JASG-C, DoS personnel, and the presidential and vice presidential offices within the Iraqi Interim Government. My role was to ensure safe, quick passage into and out of the Green Zone whenever necessary. This often included securing transportation and actually picking up Iraqi officials in the city or being present at the gate to escort the Iraqis through security. As the liaison officer, I was able to more easily smooth any issues at the security checkpoints and ensure diplomatic and development efforts were not overly burdened or hampered by inflexible military procedures.

Through this experience, I learned first-hand the very different cultures and operating styles between the military, DoS, and USAID. For example, the consensus-building and inclusive decision-making style of my DoS counterparts often clashed with our/military hierarchical and directive decision-making style. Perceptions of time and responsiveness were also very different, not only between the military and the DoS, but also with our Iraqi counterparts. Over the course of the assignment, however, we found ways to work well together and execute the mission more effectively.

**Recommendation.**

These recommendations reflect actions we took to bridge organizational culture differences and effectively execute the tactical mission:
1. **Establish regular communication sessions with an understanding IN ADVANCE of what decisions need to come out of the meeting.** In the military, we are used to making decisions quickly and at any given moment. Our diplomatic/development counterparts often needed multiple meetings in order to introduce issues, discuss issues, get consensus and make final decisions. To overcome this, we established a system where issues were presented electronically in advance of set decision-making meetings. It sounds simple, but just having common expectations of what would be accomplished in each session made a lot of difference. We (the military) were happy to have timely decisions, and our diplomatic/development counterparts were still comfortable with the pace.

2. **Establish a common lexicon around expectations.** Words such as “now,” “soon,” or “later” have very different meanings depending on organizational culture. Since our mission depended on more precision, we established a common lexicon based on expectations. For example, in the beginning, I would be told our diplomatic personnel needed to meet with an Iraqi official “soon”… perhaps “later” in the day. This imprecision made it extremely difficult to ensure I could handle the Green Zone entry as was expected. In response, we developed a lexicon that assigned time windows to certain priority levels of visits. Again, this seems simple; however, it was very helpful in maintaining security while at the same time ensuring efficient mission execution.

3. **Make use of technology to enhance communications.** Despite resources being tight in this environment, we were able to acquire local Iraqi cell phones for everyone involved in the process, including phones for our counterparts within the presidential and vice presidential offices of the Iraqi Interim Government. This capability for immediate communication helped us make decisions quickly at the lowest level possible. It also allowed our diplomatic counterparts to quickly raise issues requiring a consensus decision.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the author’s personal experience in Baghdad, Iraq from January through July 2005.

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**f. TOPIC. Tactical Development Operations (1614)**

**Observation.**

Tactical Commanders can have great influence within the sectors of development if educated properly and given the resources and the freedom to execute.
Company and Battalion Commanders can affect development at the local level by engaging communities within traditional structures. Creating new structures or systems may not be the most effective or efficient method.

**Discussion.**

Commanders at all levels must be grounded in principles for development. Every action they take has a profound impact on the ability of a country to grow back into prosperity. Every action taken is like a building block for the foundation of a house. At times combat forces must remove or degrade that foundation, but understanding the significance and necessity of the foundation is critical to speeding recovery, after and during the big fight.

Using already proven and established traditional local structures will speed the efforts. The expectation that we can place a system from the first world into a third world and have immediate positive results is just not sound. Mentoring local structures will allow them to grow into something that will be long lasting for the people they serve.

As a Company Commander in Iraq, I balanced the need to engage the enemy with the needs of the population. This required me to implement significant changes to the way in which an Infantry Company operated. Understanding the significance of the power station which the Iraqi Army (IA) was using as a Headquarters (HQ) was key to empowering development. By guiding the local council to allocate funding for an IA HQ building, it expedited the power plant into operation, provided credibility to the local council, and increased local jobs. Community policing efforts, led by Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers (PTT – Police Transition Team) who worked with civilian policemen in the Iraqi communities, improved the quality of the Iraqi Police. Coupled with strong engagement with local judges, lawyers and court system personnel, we empowered the local council with the Rule of Law. Many other activities, not commonly associated with an Infantry Company, also took place that directly aided future development.

Understanding development principles and leveraging them at the local level will exponentially speed recovery and development. Applying USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) will help tactical commanders better understand their environment. Understanding the environment, along with applying the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) at the local level, can have strategic impacts.

**Recommendation.**

Increased understanding of these principles (CAF and S&R) should be included in either institutional training or as part of pre-deployment training for company grade maneuver officers.
**Implications.**

Including this training can exponentially improve development wherever the military operates. This includes phase zero operations and training events. If not included, we may continue to make some of the same mistakes, which impede development.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was prepared after reading and reflecting on the article “Putting Local Peace Builders First,” by Floribert Kazingfu and Bridget Moix, September 2014, at: http://buildingpeaceforum.com/2014/09/putting-local-peacebuilders-first. This lesson was also based on readings and classroom discussion from the USAWC PKSOI elective course PS2206 - Introduction to International Development, and on personal experience in Iraq.

**g. TOPIC. Systems Thinking in Budgeting for Three Ds (1592)**

**Observation.**

During the “Smart Power at Work” panel discussion, then SECDEF Gates stated that success in Iraq and Afghanistan required development, but then stated that there was not enough funds supporting it. He went on to say that development was part of Phase 0 activities and could prevent future conflict, thereby making deployment of the military unnecessary. However, while he advocated for more money for the Department of State and USAID, he made it clear that he did not want it coming out of the DoD's funds. While he may have said it somewhat facetiously, some truth exists to the statement as evidenced by the parochial discussions regarding the President's Budget.

As part of the curriculum, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) teaches systems thinking – having a holistic perspective rather than just looking at one’s own area of responsibility. For all of the future senior leaders – both military and civilian – who come through the senior service schools each year, I find it ironic that the national dialogue lacks any mention of this approach when it comes to the “three Ds” of U.S. foreign policy (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense). That is, most senior leaders continue to advocate for their piece of the pie – the pie being the U.S. budget – rather than how we can more effectively distribute the pie and feed more people. The current fiscal and political environment does not support getting a bigger pie right now.
Discussion.

Obviously, several counter-arguments exist that DoD should consider giving up a portion of its budget for the Department of State and USAID. First, one might argue that senior leaders make such statements, but it does not get covered in the media or with so many sources of media, one has to be specifically looking for it. Case in point, the earlier example of Secretary Gates was a senior defense department official advocating for more money for another executive department. It was in a round-table discussion rather than before Congress or the President, but it was made nonetheless.

Second, another counter-argument might be that unless one witnessed the discussions, one cannot say with 100 percent confidence that these statements do not occur behind closed doors between the President and his closest advisors. Since these discussions take place outside the purview of the media, then they have less chance of being reported. While much debate surrounds mainstream media, enough confidential sources exist that if such divergent discussions occurred, the chances of them being leaked would be high.

Third, one might argue that to even discuss such an option would be foolish in today’s fiscal environment. Anecdotes exist of entities offering to divest of current capabilities to free up resources to be used for new capabilities, only to lose those resources when the level above interprets those resources as being excess or not needed. Even if someone made such an offer, no guarantees exist that offering up resources for a specific cause would end up for that cause. Why would anyone take such a risk?

Last, one may argue that senior leaders of each department, whether appointed or competitively hired, have too much to do within their own sphere of influence, much less another department's. Or, some might consider them to be remiss in their duties if they spent time working on another department's issues.

The reality is that these are not “either-or” propositions and all of these could be true. Statements are made but do not receive widespread coverage; senior leaders hold such discussions and what we see is the result of those discussions; and, we hire/appoint competent leaders who are neither required nor want to be looking over their counterpart's shoulder and vice versa.

Why this is an issue is two-fold. One, if we cannot or do not think systemically within our own government and nation, it would follow that we might not do it so well in another country or at the global level. Comments from International Fellows that the U.S. sometimes focuses on what it wants at the cost of what might be better for everyone involved begs the question of whether we approach our global efforts with the same pattern we do our separate budgets. While understandable, it might hinder the effectiveness of our global efforts.
Two, the U.S. may be undermining its own credibility by espousing the three D’s but then allocating resources so disproportionately amongst them. What kind of message do we send by allocating over 25 times the amount to defense than we do to development – over $500B for DoD versus $20B for USAID? Granted, the USAID $20B budget does not include charitable giving and private donations from U.S. citizens, corporations, and NGOs, and the U.S. contributes to the global community in other ways than just USAID, but as the old adage goes, “Actions speak louder than words.”

**Recommendation.**

Just like systems thinking is taught at the USAWC, so is the concept of complex problems. While the tendency for most is to reduce a complex problem to its simplest form, this rarely works in solving the problem because there is usually a host of issues that interact in different ways and need to be resolved. Such a simple solution of taking funds from DoD’s budget to increase USAID’s budget is not a panacea, but if we invested more in our other instruments of power, we might find ourselves needing [to deploy] less of the military as a result of the increased security. And isn’t security our top national interest?

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the readings and discussions for Lesson 2 of USAWC PKSOI elective course PS 2206 - Introduction to International Development.

**Observation.**

The growth and spread of gangs in Central America is an issue of immense importance not only to the countries of the region but to the United States as well. Increasingly violent, well organized, and diverse, these gangs continue to extend their reach and influence across Central America and beyond, including into the U.S. Well beyond petty crime, drug dealing, and extortion, these increasingly powerful gangs are involved in narco-trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, intimidation, murder, and assassination on such a scale as to undermine political stability and rule of law, retard social development, discourage foreign investment, and create conditions which fuel the tide of illegal immigration from the region. While solutions to the problem have proved elusive, a recent regional initiative, the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, offers perhaps the best hope yet for an effective approach.
Discussion.

Simply pick up a newspaper, turn on a television, listen to a newscast on the radio, or scroll through the internet and you will quickly see just how controversial the topic of illegal immigration from Latin America is to the U.S. public. In fact, based on the heated tone in the media, a visitor from Mars may well believe it to be the most important issue of our time.

The basic cause of illegal immigration is simple – the desire for better opportunities to live, work, and support a family. The primary motivator then, writ large, throughout the region is economic opportunity. The personal experience I have in speaking with the several illegal immigrants whom I have known over the years bears this out and adds a further cultural component to the economic reason: that a man must be able to provide for his family (and in Hispanic culture this generally means the extended family). It’s worth noting, though, that, for Central America, the reason is increasingly tied to a desire to escape the violence brought about by the gangs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Looking to flee poverty or gang and drug related violence and death, immigrants from across Central America are willing to subject themselves to a journey of thousands of miles and full of incredible dangers, to illegally cross the U.S. border and live in constant fear of discovery, imprisonment and deportation.

The perils are continual and varied. The number of kidnappings alone is staggering; one estimate has the rates of kidnappings for those traveling through Mexico as high as 400 incidents involving 22,000 victims per year often with the compliance or involvement of corrupt government officials. Even more shocking is the number of sexual assaults on female immigrants. In the Guatemalan-Mexican frontier region alone, it is estimated that up to 70% of female illegal travelers will become victims of sexual violence. Worse still, some women and girls will become victims of human trafficking and forced into prostitution. The physical dangers of the journey are no less daunting, as injury and death are commonplace occurrences all along the route north. This is perhaps especially true for those choosing (as so many do) to ride the trains, or “la Bestia.” And the dangers don’t end upon arrival at the U.S.-Mexican border: in 2009 alone the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service found 417 bodies along the border.

The arrival of a massive surge (estimated between 50-70,000) at the U.S.-Mexican border of unaccompanied minors and young mothers during the summer of 2014 captured the attention of the U.S. and the world. Fleeing gang-related violence, Central American families were making the heartbreaking decision to send their children on a dangerous and uncertain journey in order to save them from the gang violence and recruitment in their native countries.

Seizing on the heightened awareness of the immigration issue, the presidents of Central America’s Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), working with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), developed a regional
plan for addressing the root causes of gang violence and immigration by improving security, increasing rule of law and good governance, and attracting regional and international investment. In short, the plan intends to make the region more livable.

The strategic actions of the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle aim to:

A. Stimulate the productive sector to create economic opportunities

B. Develop social and educational opportunities for the people

C. Improve public safety and enhance access to the legal system

D. Strengthen institutions to increase people’s trust in the State

The plan is unique in that it is was developed by the leaders of the region and not proposed by the U.S., and it requests that the countries of the region be measured and held accountable for progress or lack thereof. While the plan requests U.S. and IDB loans, grants and expertise, the countries themselves pledge to commit much more of their own funding and to making the reforms necessary for the success of the effort.

To date, the plan has been well received by the Obama Administration and by Congress. This is thanks in large part to the demonstrated leadership and commitment which each of the countries has made (specific legal, institutional, and security reforms) over recent months. If properly supported, implemented and monitored, this initiative has the potential to transform the security, business, and social climate of this volatile region and positively impact efforts to curb crime, violence, immigration and poverty.

Recommendation.

1. On the national strategic level, the U.S. should support the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle by providing the necessary funding and expertise required to launch and sustain the effort. The current administration is pledging one billion dollars for 2016, pending Congressional approval. If committed, that funding should be closely tied to specific performance measures (such as changes to policies and institutions) and possibly to measures of effects (such as increased enrollment in education and jobs programs, and increased tax collection).

2. A U.S. whole-of-government task force should be assembled to take advantage of the invitation being extended by the three countries of the Northern Triangle to provide expertise in rule of law, governance, taxation, and commerce. As we have learned in recent conflicts and crisis, the "go-to" teams of the U.S.
military and USAID can do many things well – but there are many areas which require bringing other agencies and institutions from across the panoply of U.S. government agencies.

3. On the more operational and tactical levels, U.S. military forces should be committed in increasing numbers to develop partner nation capacity of regional security forces. This important work provides practical experience for our forces in this important region while allowing the U.S. military to continue to be the partner of choice for these regional partners. Our interaction with the regional security forces will allow us to ensure that training is appropriate and proper conduct is integrated throughout all training, helping to create the professional forces required to "take back" sovereignty from gangs and TCOs.

4. Working under the Operational Control of U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South, U.S. Army Military Information Support Teams should be given proper authorities and funding to work with the U.S. Country Teams in the Northern Triangle to develop and implement regional information support operations in support of U.S. and partner nation objectives of the Alliance plan.

**Implication.**

While any student, or even casual observer, of Latin America could easily choose any number of issues affecting the region and the United States, it would be hard to deny the issues of gangs and illegal immigration a place in any top ten list. It could be argued that each issue on its own is a “wicked problem” which will defy easy or satisfactory solutions, and taken together, they interact in such a way as to form a complex adaptive system that feed one another and learn to adapt. What is certain is that it is in the vital interests of Latin American nations as well as the United States to invest attention and resources on these issues and search for whole-of-government approaches that target not just “downstream” enforcement such as tougher law enforcement, border control, etc., but which also address the root causes of the issues such as poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities, corruption, lack of governance, and inadequate rule of law.

**Event Description.**

This submission is based on various readings and research conducted for the Introduction to International Development course offered at the U.S. Army War College in conjunction with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, as well as personal experience.
3. **CONCLUSION**

The lessons submitted by USAWC students during Academic Year 2015 provide valuable insights toward improving peace & stability operations in the future. Below is a compilation of the key recommendations from the 8 lessons in this publication.

- **Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)** should train on infectious disease containment and treatment. Science proves that certain pandemics are more likely to occur in specific geographic regions around the world. For this reason, RAF should train on combatting the infectious diseases that are prone to occur within their area of operation.

- The Army should augment RAF with infectious disease medical expertise. This expertise can be delivered from a combination of military (Army Medical Service Corps), interagency (Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)), intergovernmental (USAID & CDC) and international (Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)) medical Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) schooled in pandemic treatment and control.

- DoD and especially Geographic Combatant Commands should continue to scan the environment – physical and human terrain – in collaboration with the U.S. National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and work to predict climate change factors that require either the near-term repositioning of Defense assets or, at a minimum, development of new contingency plans.

- DoD will need to maintain and likely increase the capacity to conduct HA/DR in support of USAID’s OFDA.

- In disaster relief operations, ensure that real-property, land, and facility managers have a good grasp of available floor space and unused land suitable for facilitating command & control, billeting internally displaced persons (IDPs), and staging mission equipment, materials, and supplies in order to maximize efficiency of relief operations.

- In disaster relief operations, invest early in mapping efforts to help planners and managers determine where IDPs should be placed, where essential services should be established in support of governance and relief efforts, and where recovery materials should be placed for further distribution throughout the country.

- In foreign disaster relief operations, work closely with host nation officials and property managers in order to facilitate transition of relief efforts to host nation control.

- Conduct a joint, combined, interagency, and multilateral operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing each time a new organization or task
force is brought together or replaced within a specific area of operation or region. The briefing should include the following at a minimum: each organization’s roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and priorities for the specific mission.

- Establish and/or invite representation to each board, cell, working group and staff section meeting in order to maintain transparency, collaboration, and unified action.

- If applicable, civ-mil leadership should conduct battlefield circulation with representatives from the JIIM team in order to address subordinate unit requests for information and understanding.

- Mandate and establish development-specific training venues and forums during home station training, pre-deployment preparation, and combat training center experiences.

- Establish regular communication sessions with interagency partners prior to holding meetings – to collaborate on what decisions shall come out of those meetings. In the military, we are used to making decisions quickly and at any given moment. On the other hand, our diplomatic/development counterparts often need multiple meetings to introduce issues, discuss issues, gain consensus, and make final decisions.

- Establish a common lexicon with interagency partners – and review expectations for the agreed upon terms

- Make use of technology to enhance communication with inter-agency partners, as well as with host nation partners.

- Applying USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) will help tactical commanders better understand their environment. Understanding the environment, along with applying the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) at the local level, can have strategic impacts. Increased understanding of these principles (CAF and S&R) should be included/emphasized in either institutional training or as part of pre-deployment training for company grade maneuver officers.

- The U.S. should consider investing more / increasing the budget for these two instruments of power: Diplomacy and Development.

- On the national strategic level, the U.S. should support the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala) by providing the necessary funding and expertise required not only to launch, but also to sustain the effort.
• A U.S. whole-of-government task force should be assembled to take advantage of the invitation being extended by the three countries of the Northern Triangle to provide expertise in rule of law, governance, taxation, and commerce.

• At the operational and tactical levels, U.S. military forces should be committed in increasing numbers to the Northern Triangle for developing partner nation capacity in the security sector – to help build the professional forces required to "take back" sovereignty from gangs and transnational criminal organizations.

• Working under the Operational Control of U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South, U.S. Army Military Information Support Teams should be given proper authorities and funding to work with the U.S. Country Teams in the Northern Triangle to develop and implement regional information support operations in support of U.S. and partner nation objectives of the Alliance plan.

Besides the recommendations above, many other thought-provoking lessons submitted by USAWC students – not to mention countless lessons contributed by other peace & stability practitioners – are readily available in the SOLLIMS database. We hope you’ll take some time to discover these lessons, utilize them in your planning and preparation for future stability operations, and that you’ll also share your experiences, insights, and perspectives with us!

4. **COMMAND POC**

Lessons selected by: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst.

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Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

- “BCT-PRT ‘Unity of Effort’ Reference Guide,” PKSOI, published by Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), September 2011
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Tikrit, Iraq (16 Sep 2009) – John Dunham, member of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Salad Ad Din, and the Director for Agriculture, Salah Ad Din Province, speak outside of Tikrit, Iraq. [State Department photo/public domain]
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