Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Building Stable Governance

Volume 7, Issue 1
March 2016

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Building Stable Governance available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account.
in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the
stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any
given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference
for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box
that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your
browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We
welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we
provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our
website at [http://pksoi.army.mil] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS
online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org] to help us identify issues and
resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

---

FARAH, Afghanistan (8 June 2012). Nancy Abella (U.S. State Department representative)
and U.S. Army Major Melvin Holland (Civil Affairs officer) of Provincial Reconstruction
Team Farah (PRT Farah) met with Farah Provincial Council Deputy Chairman Abdul Hamid
and council member Juma Rafat at the provincial governor’s compound to discuss a
recent trip to Kabul. “The provincial council head, deputy head, and secretary traveled to
Kabul and reported back on several meetings they had with ministers, the first vice
president, and the Meshrano Jirga, which is their equivalent of the Senate in their
parliament, all discussing issues about Farah,” said Abella... “I was impressed. I felt like
they were doing the things that elected representatives are supposed to do.”
(Article and photo by Lt. Benjamin Addison, U.S. Navy, PRT Farah Public Affairs Officer)
INTRODUCTION

This edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler explores the challenges and complexities of Building Stable Governance. Along with a selection of thought-provoking lessons, this Sampler provides an extensive list (on pages 40-42) of references, documents, and links. Among them you’ll find the following key guides:

- “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP/PKSOI publication, October 2009

The above-mentioned “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” provides the following description of “stable governance”:

Stable governance refers to an end state where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources; government officials are held accountable through political and legal processes; and the population can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political parties.

“Building stable governance” accordingly involves: helping leaders, government personnel, and civil society acquire the skills and tools needed to govern accountably, participate in political processes, and provide core services for the population. This might also require helping to build the capacity of informal / non-state governance institutions to complement formal / state functions.

NATO’s Civil Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) goes one step further in its publication “Good Governance Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission.” It outlines the concept of “good governance,” discusses several interrelated dimensions of “good governance,” and explains how Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel can assess, evaluate, and promote various aspects of “good governance” in particular situations and operations.

The Lesson Report that follows provides further insights and recommendations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LESSON REPORT</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. GENERAL</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LESSONS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Governance and Democracy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Building Governance Capacity in Afghanistan through the ALBA Program</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Obstacles to Local Governance – Insights from Eastern Afghanistan</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Making a Viable Peace – Intervention in Kosovo</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Decentralization for Participatory Governance</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Public Sector Reform and State-Citizen Relations in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. What Is “Good Enough” for the Military as an End Point for Governance in Stability Operations?</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. COMMAND POC</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX A: Related Documents, References, and Links</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX B: What Is Good Governance?</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX C: Key Partners for DoD in Governance Strengthening and Support</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX D: Military Contribution – Governance and Participation</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX E: Preventing Electoral Violence</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX F: Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disclaimer:** All content in this document to include any publications provided through digital attachment is considered unclassified, for open access. This compendium contains no restriction on sharing / distribution within the public domain. Existing research and publishing norms and formats should be used when citing “Sampler” content and any publications provided.
"QUICK LOOK" (Preview of the Lessons)
Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

- The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to be a struggle for nations well into the future. [Read More ...]

- USAID'S Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA) program has been active in building governance capacity in the National Assembly (Parliament) of Afghanistan, yet achievements have been minimal due in part to a 6-month gap that occurred between the predecessor program and the launch of ALBA, but much more so due to systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector concerning budget control and the power of the Executive Branch. [Read More ...]

- Building local governance in a "conflict-affected" state can be a slow, difficult process. In Eastern Afghanistan, local governance efforts made only marginal progress over the 2004-2008 timeframe, with the driving factors proving to be: the level of security vis-a-vis the insurgent threat, the availability of civil servants, the level of corruption among government officials, the country's hold-over system for the administration of local governance, and the availability of resources (both coalition and host nation) for dedicating to local governance efforts. [Read More ...]

- The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was successful in establishing a viable political framework in its initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy, but relied instead on the pursuit of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts. [Read More ...]

- Decentralized government is an effective instrument for building and sustaining peace in post-conflict countries. Decentralization creates a situation in which citizens are more engaged in governance and have a forum to air their views on the development and reconstruction process. [Read More ...]

- Strengthening public servants' knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key to any improvement in government performance, because it is through public servants that services are planned and delivered. [Read More ...]

- Over the 2002-2015 timeframe, Sierra Leone has seen notable progress in public sector reform and avenues for participation by civil society organizations (CSOs) – owing largely to donor programs / external assistance. Significant challenges remain, however, particularly limited government acceptance of inputs/concerns from CSOs, government favoritism toward a select few CSOs, and capacity short-falls of CSOs limiting collaboration and influence. [Read More ...]

- Contemplating the condition of “good enough” for military involvement in stability operations is very much dependent on the end state strategic criteria and objectives determined by both the host nation and intervening members in establishing effective government and governance. [Read More ...]
SUBJECT: Building Stable Governance

1. GENERAL

“Building stable governance” is a long-term endeavor. In order to achieve the desired end-state (i.e., “stable governance”), the following conditions are imperative:

- Provision of essential services – whereby the host nation government provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance, and basic human needs services; essential services are provided without discrimination; and, the host nation government has the capacity for provision of essential services without significant assistance from the international community.

- Stewardship of resources – whereby national and subnational institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is brought under accountable civilian control; and, national/subnational resources are protected through responsible management.

- Political moderation and accountability – whereby the host nation government enables a political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue; and, is able to manage change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges.

- Civic participation and empowerment – whereby civil society is empowered, protected, and accountable; media are present, professional, and independent of government/political influence; equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld; and, political parties are able to form freely and are protected.

It is not, however, the role of the military to take over the work of local civilian actors in creating or sustaining the aforementioned conditions. US military involvement typically takes place within an interagency or “whole-of-government” context – led by the Department of State and USAID and aimed at ensuring host nation ownership. Nonetheless, attaining “stable governance” often forms a crucial element for military mission success in stability operations. The following lessons are illustrative of these points.
2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Governance and Democracy (1346)

Observation.

The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to be a struggle for nations well into the future. However, the importance of democratic governments for the well-being of citizens cannot be overstated. In a world that continues to reshape borders and work through conflict and security issues while continuing on a path of globalization, democratic governance is the key to future success.

Discussion.

Governance is hard. Establishing a government that is capable to govern within the framework of a democracy is even harder. In today’s complex world, the U.S. and many other western governments seek a more democratic world with values-based national governments that are freely elected; listen to, support, and respect their constituents; and, provide their citizens opportunity. Opportunity is measured in many forms; some include economic development, improved health and social services, and education. However, opportunity for the “pursuit of happiness” may be the most self-motivating inspiration that a government can provide its citizens.

Re-establishing a government at all levels is extremely challenging. This lesson was learned in Iraq, once De-Baathification was instituted. This wholesale dismissal of the government created instability down to the lowest level of governance within the neighborhoods. While deployed to the east side of Baghdad, my unit was responsible for the suburb of Zafraniyah. Composed of three neighborhoods, Zafraniyah is a mixed industrial and agricultural suburb of the Karadah governance district within Baghdad. Zafraniyah had the ability to thrive economically with initial assistance from the city and national government.

Although elusive for many, the right to a democratic government is seen as a legal entitlement by world organizations and western governments. However, the right to a democratic government, regularly freely elected by the people, with representation powers, and a voice for the minority, is more than a legal entitlement. It is a human entitlement. This human entitlement is what provides the impetus for self-determination in the establishment of a nation. My experience in Iraq was that many wanted a legitimate government that would take care of their basic needs while promoting opportunity to grow economically. With a stable government, self-determination drives economic success. At my level, it was critical to ensure the local government was functioning and considered legitimate in Zafraniyah. We had to ensure the integrity of a voting process, effective local neighborhood meetings, and that Zafraniyah leadership provided a unified front.
at district level meetings. As a major hub of potential economic activity, the neighborhoods had to come together to speak with one clear voice at the district meetings to ensure the flow of resources.

The establishment and support of fledgling democracies is very challenging and intensive. This is one of the most critical areas for development, since solid governance feeds the overall national psyche. There are many reasons for the lack of democracy. The most inhibiting is the desire for power – controlling resources to control the population. Power struggles were a constant source of tension at many district level meetings, putting the fledgling democratic process at risk. Many countries that are a democracy for a short time period are most at risk of losing sight of the desire to remain a democracy. This is due to the inherent risks to personal security, the possible lack of infrastructure, and the perceived lack of access to resources – especially formerly provided state resources. Establishing legitimacy is also a major issue for a new form of government.

In Zafraniyah many of the local neighborhood representatives did not trust the district council, the city, or the national level government to provide their basic needs. Bribery was rampant, and there was no system of accountability. There were three critical areas local citizens felt were not getting enough attention. They were: security, water/health, and economic development. In order to establish the credibility of the local government and produce results for the citizens, we began, on a small scale, a city planning process to compile a list of projects required in each neighborhood. Once established the local council held weekly meetings with the public to inform them of the projects and way ahead. When attending district level meetings, the representatives of Zafraniyah briefed their projects with the current status and resources needed to move forward. We then ensured that the neighborhood representatives collaborated, through the district level, with Baghdad government offices to ensure their projects moved forward. Many of the projects included rebuilding of essential infrastructure for the area.

In addition to this process, we recommended that the neighborhoods conduct local elections to ensure fair representation at the district level meetings. This was a long process as it involved developing a plan with the local police for security during the election process, the establishment of voting sites, and a method of tabulating votes. As well, the local politicians had to develop a way to communicate with a population that was mostly illiterate. Unique to this part of the Karadah governance district was the election of women to many of the district boards and as neighborhood representatives. This demonstrated to the local citizens that everyone can contribute to the cause of making their lives better regardless of gender.

Once the local government was established and a process was followed to interact with higher levels of government, more resources began to flow to
Zafraniyah. As this continued, many local entrepreneurs started to establish businesses and hiring local people. This began to build the confidence of the local population and an understanding of how a democratic process functions. The local government was seen as legitimate, and conflict among the neighborhoods was resolved locally.

The establishment of a democratic process at the lowest level can build momentum. However, that momentum can be easily lost, especially when the security apparatus begins to falter and opportunities become fleeting. After a generation or so of suffering under a democracy that has lost momentum, it is possible that some will turn back to their previous form of government if they have no sense of a positive future. This is especially true if they had not suffered under the previous establishment. Given this, there is still hope as the economics of globalization continues to move forward.

 Democracies will never go away, and the world will continue to have many points of transition and governments. Moreover, citizens will continue to learn that a freely elected government by the people is the best choice for their nation. Iraq has a great deal of potential; it will flourish under the right government, legitimately elected and representative of the people.

**Recommendation.**

1. To ensure the stability, integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is important to establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the local population. All U.S. persons involved in this process require an understanding of the local culture and historical animosities, with a solid understanding of how governance functions. For the military, this may require instruction on how to establish local governments and how they tie in to each level of government above the neighborhood or tribal areas. It also means knowing and understanding whom to go to for help. In this case, it was leveraging the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to facilitate the process and help educate local politicians.

2. Foreign aid to nations that develop government based on democratic values should be increased. Refocus aid away from those that refuse or do not desire to uphold democratic values with legally elected representation for their people. This can be done at the local level as well as the national level. In repressive countries, devise programs to further the ideals of freedom and democracy through creative means. Enable populations to communicate through various media platforms – to include through the airwaves.

3. On the global platform, point out governments that continue to repress their citizens in open forums; hold accountable those governments that are beginning to slip out of democracy through international pressure. Aggressively use a whole-of-government approach to entice further reform in non-democratic
nations. The U.S. cannot do it alone; we must garner the support of international partners, foreign governments, and the NGO community to facilitate the spread of democracy and the necessity of good governance.

**Implications.**

Only when democratic governments are formed will people begin their “pursuit of happiness” – when this occurs they begin to thrive economically. With positive economics, people begin to pull themselves out of poverty. Democracy, economic development, and the reduction of poverty are all interrelated. Democratic governments bring opportunity to those that are without, raise the standard of living of the poor, and empower women. Women form the cornerstone of the family and can support their family not just from a maternal aspect but also from an economic basis. The success and survival of the family is critical to the future of a nation. True democracies establish systems that enable their population to better themselves. Global democracy is in the best interests of the U.S. and our democratic partners.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on readings from U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2206 – International Development, and personal experience.

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Wayne Grieme, US Army

**b. TOPIC. Building Governance Capacity in Afghanistan through the ALBA Program**

**Observation.**

USAID’s Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA) program has been active in building governance capacity in the National Assembly (Parliament) of Afghanistan, yet achievements have been minimal due in part to a 6-month gap that occurred between the predecessor program and the launch of ALBA, but much more so due to systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector concerning budget control and the power of the Executive Branch.

**Discussion.**

USAID's ALBA program, implemented by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) with a budget of approximately $23.4 million, began in March 2013 and will conclude in March 2017. Its goal is to improve the performance of the National
Assembly so it can operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body.

ALBA supports both Houses of Parliament – the House of Elders, or Meshrano Jirga (MJ) and the elected House of the People, or Wolesi Jirga (WJ) – along with parliamentary and administrative staff, and the 33 commissions of both Houses. In addition, ALBA works to improve the National Assembly's public "outreach" efforts and its coordination with relevant stakeholders at the sub-national level. The program also supports legislative reform, including training parliamentary staff on drafting, analyzing, and reviewing legislation, and it provides assistance for the National Assembly's "oversight" functions.

ALBA’s predecessor was the USAID-funded Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistant Program (APAP), which was implemented from 2004 to 2012. APAP operated on a different model, providing direct, technical support for the development of legislation. Unfortunately, a 6-month interruption of support to the National Assembly during the transition between APAP and ALBA resulted in slippage/loss of certain gains made under APAP. For example, standing commissions are now unable to routinely prepare and present reports and recommendations on legislation to the plenary commission, despite procedural rules requiring them to do so and despite previous gains in this workflow. In the area of legislative "outreach" to the public/society, a publicly available legislative-tracking website that was set up and effectively utilized under APAP has been lost.

With regard to "training & education" for building capacity, the Afghanistan Parliamentary Institute (API) has been the main conduit for training/instruction delivered to the National Assembly and its staff. Established under APAP and formally designated an institute of higher education under Afghan law by a presidential decree on 23 May 2011, API offers various "professional development" and "legislative training" courses. Courses are taught by ALBA technical staff, partner organizations, local trainers, and international consultants. Targeted students are Members of Parliament (National Assembly members), Secretariat staff, Parliamentary Fellows, and advisors from the State Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs. The primary goal of the training/courses is to increase the capacity of Members of Parliament and of the National Assembly staff to carry out their functions. In practice, however, attendance by Members of Parliament in API courses has been minimal. Instead, they typically seek, and benefit from, ALBA’s presentations, briefings, and analyses provided directly to priority commissions of the National Assembly as well as to other parliamentary member groups.

On the other hand, API training/instruction has been well attended by the Secretariat staff and Parliamentary Fellows. Results, however, have been mixed. According to trainee perceptions, API's "professional development" courses (computer skills, language skills, etc.) have had a positive impact on developing practical, work-related skills for Secretariat staff personnel. However,
the "legislative training" courses have been less effective. "Legislative training" skills can be highly technical and often require the student to have certain previous governance knowledge. Learning a skill such as "drafting legislation" requires long-term training and mentoring, preferably by senior legislative staff members or legislative experts. The short-term training workshops offered by API have been, by their nature, insufficient to impart the knowledge and skills needed to effectively draft, analyze, and amend legislation. Hence, the Secretariat staff, at large, still lacks essential capacity on the legislative process, including drafting, introducing, and amending legislation.

In contrast to poor results for the Secretariat staff, training of Parliamentary Fellows has been largely successful. Started by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and continued by APAP, the Parliamentary Fellows Program is a competitive program that introduces talented young Afghan university graduates to the National Assembly. The fellowship lasts for six months, with the best-performing fellows offered the possibility of returning for an additional three months. Throughout the program, fellows participate in foundational API courses as well as more specific courses relevant to their individual assignments. Overall, Parliamentary Fellows have notably benefited the Legislative branch, providing helpful technical and administrative support for Secretariat directorates and commissions. In a mid-term evaluation of the Fellows Program, "98% of the supervisors wrote that the fellows are hardworking, quick learners … and 100% said they are qualified people."

Along with supporting "training & education" of legislative personnel, the ALBA program has also provided direct "technical assistance" to the National Assembly, especially on matters concerning the development of legislation. Commission Support Units (CSUs) have been the primary mechanism for this "technical assistance" – which has included demand-driven presentations, reports, and briefings for legislative commissions, usually related to pending legislation. CSUs are formed on an as-needed basis, typically when priority legislation emerges (originating mostly from the Executive Branch). CSUs consist of one ALBA advisor, two Members of Parliament, two commission staff members (a technical assistant and advisor), one researcher from the Secretariat’s research directorate, and sometimes ministry officials or civil society representatives. While the ALBA advisor is meant to shepherd the commission staff members through the process of legislative analysis, in practice the ALBA advisor conducts the bulk of the work. Although commission staff personnel are able to contribute to small portions of an analytical report, such as the legislative history of the draft under consideration, they have not been able to prepare any substantive analysis. Regrettably, ALBA’s "technical assistance" has not been helpful for ensuring host nation ownership or sustainability; it has not established a system for inculcating and sustaining critical legislative skills and task execution. Overall, the immediate needs of Members of Parliament (to address emerging legislation) have taken priority over sustainability of skills and
task execution – with ALBA engaging in capacity substitution (doing the work) vice capacity-building.

Yet another persistent problem for the ALBA program and the National Assembly is the continuous drain of talent from legislative staffs that have benefited from training at API. A significant contributing factor is pay: the salaries for retaining staff members who have gained skills/proficiencies are inadequate; they can get better pay elsewhere, so they move. The National Assembly’s budget is the major obstacle, preventing Members of Parliament and commissions from being able to increase the salaries for qualified advisors. The National Assembly does not plan or execute its own budget. The Executive Branch sets the parliamentary budget and affords the National Assembly little say on how funding is determined. Beyond budget control, Members of Parliament have also complained that the Executive Branch has hindered basic administrative and logistical functions of the National Assembly.

With regard to "oversight" functions of the National Assembly, the most active and important legislative body has been the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Caucus (PACC). ALBA’s support to the PACC has not only aimed to help counter corruption, but has also served the purposes of empowering female Members of Parliament (as there are 22 female members in the PACC) and improving governance & transparency. With ALBA’s support, the PACC has engaged the Executive Branch on numerous issues of governmental misuse of public property and funds. With ALBA’s encouragement, the PACC has also committed to continual follow-up to ensure that actions are actually being taken as a result of the caucus’s oversight reports.

With regard to "outreach" activities of the National Assembly, ALBA’s support to the Assembly has included: (1) preparing a number of publications for public dissemination, including plenary reports and weekly legislative reports; (2) maintaining a legislative tracking matrix; and, (3) streamlining the complaints process. ALBA has also provided support for the Assembly’s provincial outreach events, including public hearings, town-hall-style meetings, and various conferences. Unfortunately, the 6-month gap between the end of APAP and the start of ALBA resulted in some lost ground with respect to transparency of legislative activities. One of APAP’s key achievements had been the development of a publicly-available, online legislative tracking database covering the National Assembly’s actions. That database was available in three languages, and it tracked the entire process of legislation within the National Assembly. It also offered the public current legislative information that enabled them to contact Members of Parliament and staffs and affect the legislative process. Although the database was available online until early 2013, it has since disappeared.

In sum, the ALBA program has made minimal headway in building governance/legislative capacity in Afghanistan. The 6-month gap of support to the National Assembly that occurred during the transition from APAP to ALBA resulted in lost
ground within the National Assembly that ALBA has been unable to make up. Even more problematic, systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector have greatly hindered ALBA’s capacity-building efforts, namely: a disproportionately powerful Executive Branch, no budget independence for the National Assembly, and problems retaining staff members who’ve gained proficiency – due to low pay within the Legislative Branch.

**Recommendation.**

Key recommendations for the ALBA program, as stated in USAID's mid-term evaluation of the program (see “Event Description” paragraph below) include:

1. **Strengthening the Afghanistan Parliamentary Institute (API).** ALBA should take steps to build capacity in API for it to assume responsibility for providing direct legislative/technical support to the National Assembly. ALBA and API should review the schedule of upcoming priority legislation, and should then schedule tailored training & assistance for legislative personnel ahead of those key activities. Support would include formal training seminars for Members of Parliament on topics relevant to their respective roles; associated training & assistance for Secretariat staff personnel; delivery of electronic versions of templates, forms, and checklists for staff to use as part of the workflow process; and the institution of periodic performance evaluations of legislative staff focused on assessment & improvement of job-based skills. Additionally, the API-managed Parliamentary Fellows program should be expanded, including increasing the duration of fellowships/training to 9-12 months. [Primary aim of this recommendation is to ensure host nation ownership and sustainability of actions supporting the Legislative Branch.]

2. **Providing Direct Technical Support to the National Assembly.** [This support is intended to regain and then surpass ground that was lost during the gap between APAP and ALBA programs. Primary aims are to build capacity in the National Assembly to conduct "oversight" and "outreach" activities.] With regard to "oversight" capacity, the ALBA program should use budget activities as opportunities to strengthen the National Assembly's understanding of its overall governmental "oversight" authority/roles, and thereby its ability to assert itself in dealing with the Executive Branch on budget planning and execution. ALBA should also strengthen the National Assembly's "oversight" capacity by increasing support to the Parliament's Anti-Corruption Caucus and by providing additional approaches to, and mechanisms for, combatting corruption. With regard to "outreach" capacity, the ALBA program should help the National Assembly re-establish the publicly-available, online legislative tracking database, as well as set up additional commissions to engage in public hearings on upcoming and pending legislation.

3. **Strengthening Efforts in “Institutional Development.”** The ALBA program should develop capacity within the Secretariats to carry out the equivalent
functions of a Legislative Counsel's Office, with a trained cadre of legal advisors who can analyze and draft legislation, as well as interpret and explain legal issues to Members of Parliament.

**For governance capacity-building in fragile states, in general,** assisting organizations can take heed of Afghanistan's example, especially that: (a) gaps in program support can result in significant setbacks, (b) governance reform requires long-term investments (funds, personnel, training & education, etc.) and periodic monitoring; and, (c) key program elements should include host nation ownership, sustainability of systems/processes, and continuous outreach to the public/civil society.

**Implications.**

If capacity is not built in the API and the legislative staffs for supporting Members of Parliament (drafting legislation, tracking legislation actions, interpreting legal issues, etc.), then the National Assembly will lack a long-term/permanent source of support & expertise vital to conducting its business. Also, if capacity is not built in the National Assembly for conducting "oversight" and "outreach" activities, then opportunities will be lost for improving the Legislative Branch's status in comparison to that of the Executive Branch, as well as for improving the Legislative Branch's credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on "**Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA) Mid-Term Evaluation (March 2013 - June 2015),**" USAID, June 2015.

**Comments.**

The desired endstate of "stable governance" and the cross-cutting principles of "host nation ownership" and "legitimacy" are discussed in detail in "**Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,**" USIP and PKSOI, October 2009.

Several lessons on "host nation ownership" and "legitimacy" are provided in the SOLLIMS Sampler "**Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations,**" PKSOI, July 2015.

The benefits of "outreach" and countering corruption are discussed in "**Fighting Corruption – The 'Common Ground' Approach,**" SOLLIMS Lesson 731, 7 April 2011.

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI
Observation.

Building local governance in a "conflict-affected" state can be a slow, difficult process. In Eastern Afghanistan, local governance efforts made only marginal progress over the 2004-2008 timeframe, with the driving factors proving to be: the level of security vis-a-vis the insurgent threat, the availability of civil servants, the level of corruption among government officials, the country's hold-over system for the administration of local governance, and the availability of resources (both coalition and host nation) for dedicating to local governance efforts.

Discussion.

Building local governance in eastern Afghanistan during the 2004-2008 timeframe was one of three major efforts, or "pillars", in the counterinsurgency strategy of Regional Command-East, with the other two being security and development assistance. Security – building up the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police and conducting operations against various insurgent groups – was Regional Command-East's priority effort and received the greatest resources. Development assistance – improving roads, schools, health clinics, irrigation systems and working with Afghan groups/institutions supporting such projects – also received considerable resources. Local governance was a distant third, receiving the lowest level of resourcing.

Challenges to counterinsurgency and stability operations – in general – were: the size of the area of operations, rugged terrain, harsh winters, the lack of transportation infrastructure, and societal complexities in this unstable/tribal state. SOLLIMS Lesson 678 ("Afghanistan: Transformation Challenges, Root Causes, and Developmental Assistance") speaks to this latter challenge – where the central government is weak, tribal actors strong, local groups set in their ways, and violence pervasive.

During this timeframe (2004-2008), the primary factors specifically affecting local governance efforts in eastern Afghanistan were: the level of security vis-a-vis the insurgent threat, the availability of host nation civil servants, the presence of corruption, the hold-over system for the administration of local governance, and the availability of resources for local governance efforts.

With regard to the level of security and the insurgent threat, extending local governance to certain areas of eastern Afghanistan was highly problematic, if not impossible, given the availability of military resources to provide security and to deal with insurgent threats. British forces deployed to Helmand Province were continuously engaged by Taliban forces, particularly when they established a
presence in the vicinity of district governance facilities. Coalition forces operating in the Bermel district of Paktika Province experienced numerous major attacks, and insurgents twice overran the district government facilities. In parts of Kunar and Nuristan Provinces, particularly in the Pesh, Korangal, and Waygal valleys, localized insurgencies were very strong, threatening firebases and specifically targeting and hindering the growth of local governance. In contrast, where security conditions were favorable, or at least adequate, local governance efforts were able to make headway and improve over time. 2nd Battalion/27th Infantry significantly influenced security conditions in Paktika Province by deploying groups of soldiers to district government centers for weeks at a time, providing enough security for the nascent district governments to take root. In Nangarhar Province, where security conditions became very favorable by 2008, district-level governance was able to expand markedly, owing much to the dedicated efforts of the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a special troops battalion which conducted security operations in support of governance. Also, as the host nation's security forces were built and trained over time, those assets were used increasingly to help provide security for governance, but that process was slow to develop over the 2004-2008 timeframe.

With regard to the availability of host nation civil servants, the huge shortfall/absence of civil servants severely impeded local governance efforts. Decades of war had significantly reduced the pool of civil servants in eastern Afghanistan, most of whom had migrated to Pakistan or other countries. Security risks, hardship, and low pay were the contributing factors in their failure to return to their former districts and municipalities in Afghanistan. Compounding the problem were major deficiencies in governmental infrastructure. In 2004, most governors occupied physical “compounds,” but they lacked basic equipment and supplies. At the district level, conditions were worse. Over the 2004-2008 timeframe, recruiting and training of civil servants in eastern Afghanistan was almost non-existent. One of the very first efforts to address this problem was an initiative by the government of India, in 2008, to recruit and train 500 civil servants.

With regard to the presence of corruption, known and perceived corruption of Afghan officials was a central theme among local communities and local officials during the 2004-2008 timeframe. Corrupt governors were one of the biggest obstacles. Mullahs, business groups, and provincial councils publicly and privately accused provincial governors of corruption. These corrupt provincial governors appointed many of the district governors (at the level beneath them), even though by law they were not charged to do so. Many district governors then lacked legitimacy and were reactive with regard to handling problems in their districts, rather than being proactive with their communities in planning projects and priorities. Many Afghan citizens expected coalition forces to end the wide scale corruption among provincial and district officials. In spite of several efforts by Defense and State Department personnel to confront provincial officials
with charges of corruption when there was compelling evidence, not enough progress was made in this regard.

With regard to the existing, hold-over system for administration of local governance, in eastern Afghanistan (actually in most of Afghanistan) the hold-over system lacked legitimacy in the eyes of local citizens. Elections were held in September 2005 to choose provincial council members, but no elections were scheduled for the lower levels of governance – district and municipality. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) had been responsible for overseeing/administering sub-national governance, but it had acquired a reputation for corruption and inefficiency. To rectify the problem, in August 2007, President Karzai issued a decree establishing the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), with the mandate to:

"consolidate and stabilize, achieve development and equitable economic growth, and to achieve improvements in service delivery through just, democratic processes and institutions of governance at the sub-national level, thus improving the quality of life of Afghan citizens."

IDLG officers began an ambitious program to overhaul governance at the provincial, district, and municipal levels. They asserted themselves as "supervisors" of local officials. They became involved in interactions, meetings, and projects between coalition PRTs and local governments. They improved the coordination among national ministries in Kabul having connections to local governance. In April 2008, with the support of international advisors, IDLG officers developed a "Five Year Strategic Work Plan" which outlined goals for policy development, institution building, and governance, along with entry points where donors could provide financial and technical assistance. Also, the IDLG examined various ways to devolve power from Kabul out to the provinces to give provincial officials greater budgetary and policy authority.

With regard to the availability of resources for governance efforts, there were significant shortfalls both within the Afghan government and within the coalition forces for dedicating to local governance efforts. With respect to coalition forces, there were not enough civilian or military political advisors / pol-mil officers to meet the requirements of building local governance in the many provinces, districts, and municipalities of eastern Afghanistan. Due to their limited numbers, political advisors concentrated their efforts at the provincial level – with less contact and engagement at the district and municipal levels. It was not until 2009 that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul posted officers at the district level in eastern Afghanistan. With respect to the Afghan government's resources, host nation funds and transportation resources to support local governance initiatives were very inadequate. In early 2008, the IDLG approached the international community to establish a "governor's fund" for governance initiatives. With regard to transportation shortfalls, coalition forces and PRTs helped arranged access to helicopters and aircraft to get new IDLG
personnel transported to remote provinces (such as Badghis and Zabul), where dozens of provincial leaders, provincial council members, tribal leaders, and other local leaders would be assembled for discussions on governance, security, and development.

The above discussion presents only a snapshot of the many obstacles to building local governance in eastern Afghanistan during the 2004-2008 timeframe, where coalition forces made marginal progress in this regard. Nonetheless, it was commendable progress—considering the resources at their disposal and the highly demanding, complex environment in which they were operating.

**Recommendation.**

1. Building local governance cannot progress without having security / a secure environment. Security highly depends on the cooperation of local groups. Coalition forces should strive to gain a comprehensive understanding of local groups during planning for operations. Governance assessments, such as "Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan" from the Human Terrain System (HTS), should be developed as early as possible. Coalition forces should also develop a comprehensive engagement strategy to gain the influence/support of local groups. Beyond efforts to establish a secure environment, the sustainment of security will ultimately depend on building the capacity of the host nation’s security forces. Much progress has been made lately in Afghan capacity-building, as discussed in SOLLIMS Lesson 712, “The MoDA Program – Building Ministerial Capacity in Afghanistan.”

2. Building local governance cannot move forward without civil servants. If there has been an exodus of civil servants, efforts should be made to draw them back to the host country. Adequate security and sufficient pay must be addressed. Additionally, to fill any void, coalition forces should work with the host nation government to recruit and train local citizens to become civil servants. The establishment of regional civil service academies should be considered.

3. Building local governance requires taking action on cases of corruption. All military and civilian personnel involved in stability operations should receive predeployment training on corruption, along with periodic reminders about corruption awareness and reporting. Coalition forces should conduct an information campaign to tell the population what is being done about corruption.

4. Building local governance should not ignore the existing, hold-over system for administration of local governance. It should be examined and revised, as appropriate. Programs like the ILDG should be developed and implemented as early as possible. Likewise, district-level elections should be planned and conducted as early as possible.
5. Building local governance requires adequate resourcing, especially in the personnel arena. Coalition forces should be resourced with appropriate numbers of political advisors/pol-mil officers to cover the local communities in their areas of operation – as determined through pre-deployment plans and assessments.

Implications.

If a secure environment is not established, then local governance efforts simply cannot make progress. Moreover, if the civil servant cadre is largely absent and not rebuilt, and if coalition forces do not have sufficient political advisors to work with them, then local governance efforts will be severely handicapped and slow to develop. Significant long-term engagement will be required to overcome these shortfalls.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Local Governance and COIN in Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008," by Robert E. Kemp, Military Review, Jan-Feb 2011.

Comments.

Related articles and lessons:

- "Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan," by HTS-Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, 26 October 2010. This report provides a baseline guide on local communities and governance in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
- “Planning Considerations for Military-Political Engagement in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 669, 23 August 2010. This lesson addresses the importance of incorporating local engagement into the planning process for stability ops.
- “Afghanistan: Transformation Challenges, Root Causes, and Developmental Assistance,” SOLLIMS Lesson 678, 20 October 2010. This lesson discusses challenges to stabilization efforts in an unstable/tribal state such as Afghanistan – where the central government is weak, tribal actors strong, local groups set in their ways, and violence pervasive.
- “Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict,” SOLLIMS Lesson 603, 17 March 2010. This lesson cites the importance of re-building a cadre of public servants for post-conflict countries.
- “The MoDA Program – Building Ministerial Capacity in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 712, 1 March 2011. This lesson discusses the importance of building the capacity of host nation security forces and their ministries.
- “Creating an Epidemic of Unity,” SOLLIMS Lesson 709, 17 March 2011. This lesson cites one organization’s strategy for engaging communities (Iraq context).

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI
**d. TOPIC. Making a Viable Peace – Intervention in Kosovo (1335)**

**Observation.**

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was successful in establishing a viable political framework in its initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy, but relied instead on the pursuit of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts.

**Discussion.**

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provided guidance for UNMIK. The resolution directed the establishment of an interim civil administration in Kosovo and that progress be made toward autonomy and democratic self-government.[i] This presented numerous challenges to a newly formed UNMIK staff that would be responsible for exercising initial governance over a war torn country, as well as developing a new political order that would provide a positive future for the citizens of Kosovo. This could not be accomplished until UNMIK, in conjunction with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), could stabilize the internal security of the country and address the pressing humanitarian conditions.

In all, UNMIK was successful in establishing a viable political framework in its initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy, but relied instead on the pursuit of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts along several lines of effort (LOE). UNMIK avoided announcing goals by relying on a certain amount of ambiguity and allowing progress to accumulate by using a repetitive five-step process.

Jock Covey, the principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General at UNMIK from 1999-2001 presented five key components for a political strategy/process – ambiguity, rhetoric, exit strategies, sustainability, and coercion. These components were critical when considering that there may not yet be a peace to keep when peacekeepers initially enter a conflict area. Adversaries and competitors for political control may have entered the peace process, but with a view towards continuing their wartime goals. Transforming the way the disputants viewed themselves and the process over time was the challenge for the UNMIK peacekeepers.

Carrying out the 5-step process time and again, eventually led to the parties signing the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). This structure was designed as a trilateral agreement between UNMIK, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, and Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – who came to share responsibility for the administration of Kosovo. Eventually, moderate Serb leadership also joined the JIAS. By taking advantage of small victories that compounded over time, UNMIK progressively
moved towards a self-sustaining government that incorporated multiple and diverse ethnic groups.

In evolving a political settlement supported by the major actors, Covey noted that ambiguity was a mediator's friend.[ii] Avoiding predictions that were generally wrong, and many times viewed as prescriptions that may be viewed unfavorably by the parties, and keeping things purposefully a bit "soft" allowed the mediators to maintain credibility and enabled the process to move forward incrementally.

It was also important to avoid unproductive and potentially frictional rhetoric. Terms like "multiethnic" and "multiculturalism" were broad goals used in the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia, but proved unachievable there. This led to a decline in international support for the mission in Bosnia, because the international community eventually viewed the mission as not achieving its goals of establishing a "multiethnic" and "multicultural" administration. Terms like these were not used in UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo.


[ii] Ibid, 103.

**Recommendation.**

Reduce the motivations for continued violent conflict, and nurture the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully. Through such an approach, the attainment of a viable peace is possible – as seen in Kosovo after 18 months of the UNMIK intervention.

**Implications.**

If an alternative approach of demanding immediate results or identifying set goals is pursued, a mission risks alienating competing groups that have little reason to lay down their arms and come to the negotiation table.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on The Quest for Viable Peace, by Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Bryan O'Barr, US Army
e. **TOPIC. Decentralization for Participatory Governance (604)**

**Observation.**

Decentralized government is an effective instrument for building and sustaining peace in post-conflict countries. Decentralization creates a situation in which citizens are more engaged in governance and have a forum to air their views on the development and reconstruction process.

**Discussion.**

Overcentralization and monopolization of power by the central government are a source of conflict in many countries. To counteract the tensions caused by elitism and authoritarian rule, many post-conflict governments have implemented decentralization strategies as a means to ensure that services reach communities and that the voices of local people are heard in the development and reconstruction process. When local governance structures exist, citizens and groups can articulate their interests, mediate differences, receive services, and exercise legal rights and obligations.

All the same, there is a case for designing decentralized systems in post-conflict countries. Decentralization provides a structural arrangement for the orderly negotiation and shared exercise of power, and it facilitates the involvement of the local people in policy decisions about their country's development. Moreover, it offers a means of allocating resources effectively, improving service delivery, and enhancing the prospects for peace.

Decentralization can take two forms. Under **vertical decentralization**, the central government hands down certain powers, functions and resources to local governments. Under **horizontal decentralization**, governance responsibilities are spread more broadly across the society, and civil society organizations (non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, community groups, etc.) are empowered to plan and manage affairs themselves. There is a concerted effort to involve all citizens in public administration, including women, people with disabilities, youth and other groups that were marginalized before the outbreak of conflict.

Elements of successful decentralization include: legal frameworks and structural arrangements; strengthened local government; local government responsiveness and accountability; civil society organizations and the private sector working in partnership with local and national governments; and, evidence of government intent to improve the quality of life in local communities. One of the biggest challenges to decentralization is the political will of central government leaders to share power and authority.
The following are examples of successful decentralization cited in Chapter V of "Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned," by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, February 2010:

- South Africa. A highlight was the structural arrangement that facilitated the formulation of the Integrated Development Plan Representative Forum. Forum participants included council members, traditional community leaders, senior officials from municipal government departments, and representatives from organized stakeholder groups.

- Rwanda. The push for decentralization came from the central government as part of the peacebuilding process. Participatory decision-making, based on local leadership, was encouraged through the establishment of Community Development Committees (CDC) attended by all community members of voting age.

- El Salvador. The El Salvador government, supported by the national association of municipalities, promoted decentralization and community participation immediately after signing the Peace Accords in 1992. Programs were established to foster community participation in identifying priorities, developing local plans, and setting local service requirements.

Recommendation.

Chapter V of "Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned" offers the following lessons/recommendations:

1. Participatory governance at the local level facilitates the involvement of local communities in policy decisions about their own development, thereby creating a shared commitment to peaceful progress that reduces the likelihood of violent conflict.

2. Successful decentralization depends on political will, civic will and capacity development at the local level and careful implementation to ensure appropriate power-sharing arrangements and allocation of resources.

3. Peace cannot be lasting unless both men and women participate in shaping post-conflict reconstruction and are able to equally enjoy its benefits. Barriers to women's participation include traditional notions about gender roles, women's caregiving burdens and their inexperience in leadership positions. Nonetheless, women's participation can be increased by enacting reforms to end gender discrimination, setting quotas for female representation in government, and undertaking capacity development efforts to strengthen women's leadership skills.

4. Peace cannot be lasting unless minority groups are engaged in post-conflict governance, especially when ethnic or religious divisions were a root cause of
the conflict or a contributing factor. It is important to foster dialogue and reconciliation among antagonistic groups, build a shared national identity that trumps ethnic or religious ties, and take concrete steps (such as constitutional reforms or the creation of special mechanisms) to protect minority rights and engage minority groups in participatory decision-making.

Implications.

If recommendations are not adopted:

- Central governments are viewed as exclusionary and not fully supporting a peacebuilding process by including all conflict parties, factions, and stakeholders. This exclusion builds distrust and lack of confidence in the central government. Stakeholders will view the central government as self-serving if local governments, local groups, and municipalities are left out of the process.
- Ethnic, religious, and minority groups will be the main source of conflict as long as they do not share in power and governance. They are at the highest risk of being marginalized during post-conflict reconstruction and development.
- Not including gender-specific issues neglects one of the biggest challenges in many post-conflict areas. The challenges to women's participation is daunting in those countries where women, historically, have not had representation in central governments. Gender perspectives must be included in the formal post-conflict decision-making process to affect policy and development issues especially when women are head of household or have the burden of care in many situations.

If recommendations are adopted:

- Conflict parties can have a venue to provide input and share in a common purpose so that they view a “public good” instead of “group interests.” Minorities and women become invested in development and fostering reconciliation.
- Central governments will have to be committed to training and education if local governments and groups become more involved in the decision-making process and development planning.
- Laws and regulations will have to be created or strengthened to protect minorities and women. That is one step central governments can take to show their commitment to decentralize governance. This can also help social cohesion between different groups.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on Chapter V, "Engaging Citizens in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Decentralization for Participatory Governance," of "Reconstructing
f. **TOPIC.** Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict (603

**Observation.**

Strengthening public servants' knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key to any improvement in government performance, because it is through public servants that services are planned and delivered.

**Discussion.**

The success of government in post-conflict society depends on the performance of the public service in providing critical services to the population and restoring trust and confidence in governance. This is because the public service constitutes the heartbeat of any government. Public servants pervade the entire sphere of government action. They are schoolteachers, medical practitioners, judges, court workers, police officers, military men and women, agricultural extension workers, road constructors, forestry officers, administrative officials, parliamentarians, finance officers, planners, etc. They are engaged in every facet of government activity, but most of them work directly with citizens, to whom they represent the face of government. Therefore, the quality of public servants in terms of knowledge, skills, attitudes and networks can make or break public trust in a post-conflict government.

Post-conflict public administration situations are not always similar. The public services break down in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict and the conditions present afterwards. Consequently, countries will face different challenges in rebuilding their human resources capabilities, and experience gained in one situation may not be relevant in another. For example, in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, the institutions, systems, structures and even personnel of the public service were in place and intact. But they did not reflect South African demographics, as the white minority were vastly over-represented.

The South African situation was different from the one in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, when most public servants were killed. Most of the rest, particularly those implicated in genocidal acts, escaped into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) carrying files, records and other movable public service
assets. When these exiles returned to Rwanda, they took over public offices in an unauthorized, uncoordinated manner. These new self-declared officials had to be removed and the vacancies filled in an orderly fashion. By the time the new regime settled in, knowledgeable and skilled personnel were unavailable, and the public service's systems and institutions, along with equipment, office space and logistics, were severely lacking.

A somewhat similar situation existed in Timor-Leste after 1999. An estimated 7,000 Indonesian civil servants had fled the Territory after Indonesian rule collapsed, and institutions and public records were destroyed or removed. This left a void throughout government because Indonesian officials had formerly occupied most of the technical and management positions. There had been limited development of Timorese skills in administration and governance. Also, whereas some of the Rwandans who returned after the genocide were eager to work and reconstruct their country, the Indonesians who fled Timor-Leste had little interest in returning. When the United Nations took over the administration of the Territory, there was no such thing as the Timor-Leste public service. Initially the United Nations had to rely on Member State volunteers, as new Timorese civil servants were being trained.

Uganda had a very different problem after the civil war that ended in 1986. Uganda's post-conflict public service was overstuffed; bloated by redundant positions with overlapping functions. The system was also plagued by poor remuneration, moonlighting, extensive corruption, and uncommitted personnel. These examples illustrate the wide variation in human resource capacity in post-conflict countries. Not surprisingly, then, approaches to strengthening human resources within the public service will vary from country to country. Where a substantial number of personnel have been inherited from the outgoing regime, the task may be simply to change employees' attitudes towards the new government and towards serving the public. Such was the case in Uganda after 1986. In situations such as Rwanda, where the public service has been flooded by returning exiles without the necessary education, skills or experience, then massive immediate retraining is required, not only to transmit knowledge and skills but also to cultivate a sense of togetherness and a shared work ethic. In a situation like Timor-Leste or Kosovo, where United Nations personnel from different countries and cultures constituted an interim public service, the initial concern is to help everyone work together harmoniously in a new environment that is often insecure.

**Recommendation.**

1. The quality of public servants is crucial to the recovery of a post-conflict government and the trust that people have in it. This makes capacity-building in the public service essential for post-conflict recovery. Strengthening public servants' knowledge, ethics, skills, networks and attitudes is key, because it is through public servants that government services are planned and delivered,
critical innovations conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out, and trust in government restored.

2. The nature of the conflict, the levels of violence and destruction, and the conditions that emerge after the conflict determine the state of human resources in the public service. Reconstruction efforts must be tailored to the specific situation.

3. Reconstruction efforts should proceed from an accurate count of a country's public servants and an accurate picture of their knowledge and skills. Because employee censuses are expensive, they should be planned to fit within the overall strategy for developing human resources in the public service. In addition, censuses should be designed for congruence with the local context to ensure that the government has the capacity to effectively use the data collected.

4. It is highly desirable for oversight of the recruitment process to be managed by independent bodies such as civil service commissions to avoid cronyism, nepotism, and other forms of favoritism. But because it takes time to create and develop such institutions, interim measures need to be devised to address the immediate challenge of recruiting competent personnel. If merit-based recruitment is introduced early, there is a greater chance of limiting patronage and other harmful practices and instead ensuring a well-functioning public service.

5. Violence takes a toll on civil servants not only in terms of their numbers, but also in terms of their behavior and motivation. To rebuild the ranks of qualified personnel, it is not enough to remedy skills deficits and knowledge gaps. Efforts must also be made to restore integrity, ethics and professional conduct in the public service.

6. Diversity within the population should be reflected within the public service. If both men and women, as well as members of all ethnic, religious and other groups, are actively included in the government, then conflict is less likely to erupt. A representative, merit-based, service-oriented public service can provide a model for participation, inclusive decision-making, reconciliation and social cohesion, and proactive peacebuilding.

7. Most post-conflict countries lack the financial resources to pay public servants adequately, and reliance on foreign aid and technical assistance is unsustainable in the long term. Donors thus need to work strategically with post-conflict governments to help them develop pay management and incentive systems that will attract the requisite personnel without overtaxing the budget.

**Implications.**

1. The security situation will have to improve or be at a level so that public servants can conduct their work in relative safety in order to be effective. This will be important if public servants have been killed or driven off from their homeland.
2. Heavy external support will be needed for countries that have undergone devastating violence and upheaval. Host nation governments will likely not have the means and resources to organize, train, and mentor public service personnel following a conflict.

3. Foreign nations will take on many functions of government the longer it takes for host-nation public servants to fill positions in government and become proficient. People's attitudes, confidence and support in their government will be partially affected by who is actually serving their needs. The tipping point is that stage when the consensus is that their own people are serving their needs instead of foreigners.

4. Foreign nations will have to recognize and accept that the resulting public service may not be the one they desire because of ethnic, cultural, or social factors. The key will be to train people to professional and ethical standards.

Event Description.


Lesson Contributor: Jaime Apo, PKSOI

g. **TOPIC.** Public Sector Reform and State-Citizen Relations in Sierra Leone (2415)

**Observation.**

Over the 2002-2015 timeframe, Sierra Leone has seen notable progress in public sector reform and avenues for participation by civil society organizations (CSOs) – owing largely to donor programs / external assistance. Significant challenges remain, however, particularly limited government acceptance of inputs/concerns from CSOs, government favoritism toward a select few CSOs, and capacity shortfalls of CSOs limiting collaboration and influence.

**Discussion.**

A series of institutional reforms involving public sector agencies and governance processes were undertaken in post-conflict Sierra Leone to aid post-conflict recovery. From the outset, Sierra Leone, donors, and development partners were in agreement that reform of public sector institutions would be critical to
improving accountability and transparency in governance. In 2002, they initiated the Public Sector Reform Programme after developing & publishing a Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) report. This was followed by the 2004 National Action Plan (NAP) and the 2009 Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP). This governance reform process for Sierra Leone involved the enactment of several new laws and legal frameworks – such as the 2004 Procurement Act, the 2005 Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBCA), the 2004 Local Government Act (LGA), the 2009 Mines and Minerals Act (MMA), and the 2013 Freedom of Information Act (FOI).

Governance reform in Sierra Leone also included the restructuring of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) in 2002 and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2008 – for the purpose of enhancing citizens’ participation and reducing government corruption, respectively. Since 2002, the NEC has conducted six nationwide elections – presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007 and 2012, and local government elections in 2004, 2008 and 2012. Most election observer missions rated these elections as free, fair and credible. Although elections saw notable successes, electoral reform in Sierra Leone still has significant challenges, evidenced by high election-related violence surrounding the 2008 local government elections and the 2012 national elections. With regard to countering corruption, Transparency International has reported a number of success stories since 2009: increased accountability in governance, the recovery of over $2 million in public money, and the removal of high-ranking officials. However, the level of official and unofficial corruption in Sierra Leone remains high.

A key feature of governance reform in Sierra Leone has been the institutionalization of public consultation in government policy decisions, such as in preparing the annual national budget, formulating economic and development policy plans (poverty alleviation policies), and enacting parliamentary statutes. A ‘public consultation’ clause has been incorporated in the templates for a majority of Sierra Leone’s government policymaking processes at national, provincial, and chiefdom levels – fulfilled through parliamentary public hearings, local councils, town hall meetings, district budget oversight committees (DBOCs), chiefdom councils, and ward development committees (WDCs) (ward meetings). This institutionalization reflects the desires/influence of donors, implementation of their peacebuilding agenda for increasing the role of civil society in governance, and the expanded interests and voices of the CSOs themselves.

Governance reforms have also focused on creating and expanding opportunities for CSOs to engage with the government throughout public policy processes. Three donor-funded initiatives were introduced to support and improve the government’s engagement with CSOs in this regard:

1) ENCISS initiative. The ENCISS program is a capacity-building initiative for civil society groups aimed at strengthening citizens’ access to information, their
participation in decision-making processes, and improving accountability in governance. It seeks to improve state-citizen dialogue on government policies, especially those dealing with poverty reduction, decentralization, and local governance. The program also focuses on enhancing the organizational capacities of excluded groups (poorest communities, women, and people with disabilities) to improve their abilities to design and implement effective projects, and to strengthen their knowledge of accountable governance. The UK and the European Commission have funded ENCISS; Christian Aid manages the program.

2) Open Government Initiative (OGI). This program was designed to improve transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in governance through fostering inclusive and open dialogue between government and citizens; providing responses to citizens’ questions and concerns by relevant government officials and agencies; and, providing periodic feedback by elected representatives to their constituents. The operational strategies include periodic town hall meetings, parliamentary sittings in provincial town headquarters, national and community radio, and publication of policies and programs at district level. UNDP initially funded and managed ODI, but Sierra Leone’s government took over management of OGI in 2010 and integrated it into government consultation mechanisms.

3) Civil Society Platform. In 2012, UNIPSIL facilitated establishment of a Civil Society Platform comprising about 100 CSOs. The aim of the platform is to promote sustained engagement, coordination, collaboration, and shared experiences and expertise among CSOs, and to encourage interaction with the Sierra Leone government, the UN, donor agencies, and international organizations operating in country through monthly meetings. The Civil Society Platform played an important role in the run-up to the 2012 elections through the UNIPSIL/UNDP-funded election support program.

Although public sector reform in Sierra Leone has included numerous programs to strengthen state-citizen relations and to improve governance, these programs have encountered the following challenges:

Firstly, the government’s track record of citizen engagement and consultation in policy process (including the government-run OGI) is known for heavy politicization and limited inclusiveness. Engagement is primarily conducted only with the “pro-government” groups/CSOs. According to one civil society member: “the government has its own civil society … there are organizations and CSO activists that are pro-government and get invited to government consultation, access grants through the government, included on government delegations … for example, the head of the Health for All Coalition never criticizes the APC government because he receives grants from them.” Another CSO member noted that: “since the government took over the OGI, it ceased to be a platform for civil society to interact with government; it has been used for perverted purposes such as election campaign and propaganda through a dubious election monitor-
ing agenda … no criticism of the government is allowed in OGI activities but only praising the APC … it lost its credibility after UNDP withdrew.”

Secondly, the institutional capacity shortfalls of a majority of CSOs in Sierra Leone limit the scope and possibility of functional engagement with the government and of constructive influence on public policies. Donors’ capacity-building initiatives for CSOs have had limited impact. For instance, the Civil Society Platform was unable to address many of the fundamental organizational weakness of CSOs in Sierra Leone, including weak reporting systems, poor project implementation capacity, weak political influence and alignment, and duplication of effort. A 2014 assessment of CSOs found that despite growth in numbers of CSOs, the civil society sector continues to face acute structural deficits, including weak internal governance processes in many CSOs, a weak resource base that compromises CSO effectiveness, and poor networking and collaboration among CSOs.

Thirdly, a considerable number of CSOs have expressed frustrations over the low uptake of suggestions put forward during public policy consultations. Although CSO advocacy has led to policy amendments in a couple of cases, many CSOs claim that government engagement in CSO consultation is limited to a few marginal issues, and even where engagement takes place, it is a mere formality with policy choices seemingly predetermined by government or donors. As evidence, no consultations occurred on the following policy issues of importance to CSOs: the introduction of a 17% goods and sales tax, increases in university fees, the signing of mining license agreements, and the displacement of communities in mining areas.

Finally, many CSO members have noted that CSO engagement and participation in public policy processes has been more effective when backed up by the threat of, or actually conducting, public demonstrations (strikes) to demand policy changes. Evidence suggests that citizens’ engagement with state institutions and businesses is highest when issues central to their livelihoods are affected. The strike cases recorded thus far have been directly triggered by socioeconomic issues such as trade, jobs, working conditions, pay, displacement, land, and the negative impacts of mining on the environment. Similarly, certain violent protests were attributed to the perceived inadequate response by the government to the Ebola epidemic.

Overall, significant progress has been made in Sierra Leone in the governance sector – namely, institutional reforms of public sector agencies and of government policy processes. Various avenues for CSO involvement/consultation have been established and are being used. CSOs are visible and active in public policy debates and policy formulation processes in both the executive and legislative branches of government. The fact that citizens have sometimes been able to force changes in policies by threatening or conducting strikes equates to CSO action/expression and government recognition/response. However, chal-
Challenges still to be overcome include limited uptake/acceptance of inputs from CSOs, especially from CSOs seen as not “pro-government,” and capacity shortfalls of CSOs for greater networking/collaboration and influence.

**Recommendation.**

Based on their analysis of public administration reforms and state-citizen relations in Sierra Leone, the authors of the report “*Striking for Engagement: State-Citizen Relations in Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone*” (See “Event Description” paragraph below) offer the following recommendations for donors/organizations assisting Sierra Leone and more broadly – for donors/organizations implementing programs in other fragile states as well:

1. Focus on indirect approaches (i.e., to address key issues and areas of tension between citizen groups and the government) to improve state-citizen relations in fragile states. State-citizen relations in conflict-affected states are often shaped by indirect events/issues (socioeconomic issues impacting livelihoods, land issues, displacement, health concerns/crises, etc.), and less by official channels and institutional reforms.

2. Invest in programming to support and build state-citizen relations during and after crises (health crises, natural disasters, public agitations/protests, etc.).

3. Identify and support citizens’ formal and informal channels of communication with the government.

4. Ensure that donor programming for improving state-citizen relations is guided by a political-economy analysis to identify issues fundamental to citizens’ livelihoods, and less by generic templates (e.g., public consultation mechanisms, commissions, etc.).

5. Periodically analyze and adjust donor funding mechanisms, scale, and trends in relation to impact on state-citizen relations.

6. Support and strengthen citizens’ capacity to engage with and monitor policy implementation (not just policy formulation).

**Implications.**

If donors do not analyze and incorporate the key issues and concerns of citizen groups/CSOs while formulating and implementing governance reforms in fragile states, then opportunities to build state-citizen relations will be lost, as well as chances to improve the legitimacy of government institutions and processes. Mechanisms/avenues for CSO inputs/consultations in government policy processes and decision-making are helpful; however, periodic assessments of their utility and effectiveness are even more important.
**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the report “Striking for Engagement: State-Citizen Relations in Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone,” by Olawale Ismail, International Alert, May 2015.

**Comments.**

The following lessons provide examples of effective programs/interventions that targeted state-citizen relations, participation, and legitimacy:


Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI

---

**h. TOPIC. What Is “Good Enough” for the Military as an End Point for Governance in Stability Operations? (1071)**

**Observation.**

Contemplating the condition of “good enough” for military involvement in stability operations is very much dependent on the end state strategic criteria and objectives determined by both the host nation and intervening members in establishing effective government and governance.

**Discussion.**

The functions of a state, according to PKSOI’s “Governance Guide” (“Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?”), are dependent on three core functions: 1) effective service delivery; 2) responsiveness to the citizenry; and, 3) security. These three core functions speak to the ability of the government to adequately address and execute USIP/PKSOI’s Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction (i.e., Rule of Law; Safe and Secure Environment; Social Well-Being; Stable Governance; Sustainable Economy) [see Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction] to enable a transformed stable government. More specifically, however, the core functions further require the legitimacy of a functioning government. Legitimacy, as outlined by the PKSOI “Governance Guide,” constitutes more than just a functioning government but the interaction and activities associated with good governance.
The “Governance Guide” states, “Governance refers to the processes and rules through which state and non-state actors in society wield power and authority and how they enact governmental policies and decisions.”

In addressing stability operations which clearly encompasses governance, DoD Instruction 3000.05 indicates stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. However, the same guidance also indicates the military will perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when civilians cannot do so and specifically addresses the fact that stability operations tasks include helping to develop government institutions. Over the past decade, U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has seen significant military support and engagement in all five pillars of stability operations. While security has been a driving force for military support, limited civilian resources have also driven the requirement, as DoD Instruction 3000.05 states, “to help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.” Determining the “end point” for military operations is largely contingent then on addressing not only the strategic “back-home” political considerations, but also the advice and guidance of military commanders on the ground. Some military, civilian and host-nation leader considerations include: the dynamics influencing conflict (both peaceful and violent); transitioning efforts from military to civilian control; and, analyzing the associated tradeoffs and risks with maintaining a military presence vice withdrawing forces (PKSOI “Governance Guide”).

It is also key to highlight that current doctrine, specifically, JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, does not adequately address the complexities of end state determination. While properly addressing the requirement to update key inputs and outputs throughout the dynamic planning process, the current JP 5-0 still lacks a critical discussion outlined by Greenwood and Hammes in their December 2009 Armed Forces Journal article, “War Planning for Wicked Problems”: “Ill-structured problems have no 'stopping rule.' By definition wicked problems have no end state.” The authors further critically submit that current doctrine continues to focus on “developing an end state for every plan.” Indeed it does. JP 5-0 states a military end state “is the required conditions that define achievement of all military objectives” and should be included in planning guidance and the commander’s intent statement.

JP 5-0 requirements for end state determination do not, however, go without solid justification. JP 5-0 justifies the requirement for a clearly articulated end state, supporting what any professional military leader seeks in a campaign; an end state “promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation.” Despite the operational goodness of a clearly identified end state, what joint doctrine fails to capture is how extremely difficult end states are to achieve, influenced by a changing enemy environment, available resources, national will, strategic leader personalities, and, ultimately, political aims and influences.
Recommendation.

Greenwood and Hammes (in “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2009) argue that a military planner, in dealing with wicked problems, must seek a “good enough” solution, not developing a definitive end state, but instead, thinking of it as sustaining a “steady state” over the long term. This applies to considerations of all five pillars, governance included, in achieving conflict transformation.

Implications.

Scholars, both civilian and military alike, will most assuredly continue to write literary commentary on the quality and contributions of joint doctrine in achieving strategic objectives and “end state” determination. This commentary and critique is beneficial and does, in the long run, add to the collection and summary of operational lessons learned. For today’s campaign planners, USIP/PKSO's Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction and joint doctrine are good beginning points for understanding and applying concepts to conflict termination and end state determination. But, effective interagency planning and integration, and an absolute avoidance of a solipsistic attitude regarding adversary will and intent, ultimately evolve from a combination of study, experience, and leadership.

Event Description.

This lesson has been developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2219 – Peace & Stability Operations: Concepts and Principles. It is based on the following references:

- “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009
- “JP 3-0 Joint Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011
- “JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011

Lesson Contributor: Colonel Brent Grometer, US Air Force
3. CONCLUSION

Building stable governance – helping leaders, government personnel, and civil society acquire the skills and tools needed to govern accountably, participate in political processes, and provide core services for the population – is typically a complex, long-term undertaking.

General guidance for building stable governance (Guiding Principles, USIP/PKSOI):

- **Act only with an understanding of the local context.** Understand the specific and unique governance needs of the host nation. Programs aimed at strengthening governance must be based on in-depth needs assessments and specific knowledge of the host nation’s historical, cultural, societal, economic, and political background. This understanding should include input from the host nation population from various sides of the conflict and marginalized groups such as women, minorities, youth, and the poor.

- **Prioritize to stabilize.** Prioritize governance functions that support the delivery of essential services and contribute to political settlements. Focus on producing political settlements that help resolve conflicts that were not addressed in a peace agreement or a mandate. Think hard about the protection of critical state resources – human, natural, financial, cultural, and infrastructure – that are necessary to prevent and mitigate conflict. Priorities should ultimately be determined by their potential to prevent conflict and increase the strength of nonviolent political settlements.

- **Use a conflict lens.** All choices in governance affect power relationships. The choice of an interim minister, the location of a municipal center, the adoption of a regulation, or the award of a contract to a local business has the ability to exacerbate tensions or address and resolve internal conflicts. Be sure to identify and understand the specific sources of conflict and motivations for violence to ensure that governance reform efforts do not reignite violent conflict.

- **Recognize interdependence.** The widely understood core functions of governance – security, the rule of law, meeting basic human needs, and economic governance – are intertwined like a rope. Failure to provide one will unravel the ability to provide the others. The administration and delivery of humanitarian assistance and basic services to the population, for example, depends on adequate security for civilians and some basic rule of law system that prevents banditry and looting of critical supplies and resources. All of these core services depend on sound economic management and governance.
Additional points from the lessons in this Sampler:

- **Local governance / Local understanding.** To ensure the stability, integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is important to establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the local population.

- **Governance capacity-building programs.** Key program elements should include host nation ownership, sustainability of systems/processes, and continuous government outreach to the public/civil society.

- **Security / secure environment.** Building local governance cannot progress without having security – i.e., establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment. Security provides the cornerstone for stable governance – affording government institutions the opportunity to grow/develop and ensuring the safety of new political leaders and processes.

- **Conflict resolution.** Reduce the motivations for violent conflict, and nurture the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully. Pursue multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts.

- **Decentralization.** Successful decentralization depends on political will, civic will, and capacity development at the local level, along with careful implementation and monitoring to ensure appropriate power-sharing arrangements and allocation of resources.

- **Public servants.** Strengthening public servants' knowledge, ethics, skills, networks and attitudes is essential, because it is through public servants that government services are planned and delivered, critical innovations conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out, and trust in government restored.

- **State-citizen relations.** Identify and support citizens’ formal and informal channels of communication with the government. Support and strengthen citizens’ capacity to engage in and monitor public policy implementation, as well as to hold government accountable.

- **End-state for governance.** Seek a “good enough” solution, not developing a definitive end-state, but instead, plan for sustaining a “steady state” over a long term.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons and guidance, through their inclusion in leader education programs, and through senior leader emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future stability operations – to the benefit of all involved in the mission, especially the people of the host nation.
4. COMMAND POC

Publication prepared by: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst. PKSOI reviewer: Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch.
Contact info: Email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.sollims@mail.mil
            Phone: (717) 245-3031
            DSN: 242-3031


U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>COL Dan Pinnell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Proponency and Stability</td>
<td>COL Mark Haseman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Proponency</td>
<td>COL Brian Hammer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Lessons Learned Branch</td>
<td>Dan French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned Analyst</td>
<td>David Mosinski</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A

Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

Guides/Handbooks

- “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009

Studies/Reports/Articles

- “The De-Baathification of Iraq,” Ryan Pavel, University of Michigan, April 2012
- “Elections in Post-Conflict Countries – Lessons Learned from Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Kosovo,” report of a ZIF/KAIPTC Seminar, 12-14 June 2008
• “Good Governance, Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability,” Michael Johnston, Colgate University, 11 June 2003

• “Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave Behind,” Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, Center for American Progress, May 2010


• “Helping Build Democracy that Delivers,” Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 15 November 2007


• “ISAF Lessons Summary #2: Building Effective Government,” Kevin Doyle, PKSOI, 12 June 2013

• “Learning from Iraq,” A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, March 2013

• “Lessons Learned in Preparing and Conducting Elections in Afghanistan,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit 10-16, 9 September 2010

• “Participatory and Inclusive Constitution-Making: Giving Voice to the Demands of Citizens in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” Jason Gluck and Michele Brandt, USIP, 29 January 2015

• “Political Transitions after Peace Agreements: The Importance of Consultative and Inclusive Political Processes,” Katia Papagianni, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, volume 3, number 1, March 2009


• “Strategic Lesson Number 3: Developing and Implementing an Anti-Corruption Strategy,” David Mosinski, PKSOI, 1 March 2012

• “Transition to Local Governance,” SOLLIMS Sampler, PKSOI, October 2010


Journals/Periodicals


US Government Documents

- “Deepening U.S. Government Efforts to Collaborate with and Strengthen Civil Society,” memorandum signed by the President of the United States, 23 September 2014
- “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” [includes section on “Governance and Participation”], US State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), April 2005

US Military Doctrine

- “ADP 3-07 Stability,” Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), August 2012
- “ADRP 3-07 Stability,” HQDA, with change 1, 25 February 2013
- “ATP 3-07.5 Stability Techniques,” HQDA, August 2012
- “FM 3-07 Stability,” HQDA, June 2014
- “FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations,” HQDA, with change 2, 18 April 2014
- “JP 3-07 Stability Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 2011

Websites

- Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
- SOLLIMS (includes “Governance” libraries and “Counter Corruption” portal)
- Transparency International
- UNDP - Democratic Governance and Peacebuilding
- USAID - Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
- US Department of State - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
- World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators
Annex B

What Is Good Governance?

Although “good governance” depends on cultural values and perceptions, the following characteristics are a way to explain what “good governance” entails:

1. Participation. Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.

2. Rule of Law. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.

3. Transparency. Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

4. Responsiveness. Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.

5. Consensus-oriented. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development.

6. Equity and Inclusiveness. A society’s well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

7. Effectiveness and Efficiency. Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment.

8. Accountability. Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.

Annex C

Key Partners for DoD in Governance Strengthening and Support

- The **Department of State (DOS)** has overall policy lead for the USG’s state-building, governance strengthening, and election support efforts. Within the DOS, the **Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)** promotes democracy, the protection of human rights, respect for international religious freedom, and worker rights globally.

- The **American Embassy (AMEMB)** is one of the primary conduits for planning and coordination. The **Country Team** will generally have at least one political officer, a USAID field mission director, and a public diplomacy officer. These officials will be best positioned to advise on the current situation as well as on programs already sponsored by the host government, the USG, and other bilateral and international donors.

- The **US Agency for International Development (USAID)** is the USG’s lead implementing agency for post-conflict development assistance.
  - USAID’S **Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)** promotes democratic and resilient societies. The Bureau’s **Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG)** generates and disseminates knowledge about the global advancement of democracy, human rights, and governance; elevates their role in key USAID, USG, and multilateral strategies; and, provides technical support to USAID missions implementing programs in these areas. The Bureau’s **Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC)** serves as USAID’s primary point of contact with the Department of Defense.

- The **World Bank** provides financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. In addition to funding development efforts, the World Bank provides analysis, advice and information to member country governments. In the areas related to governance, the World Bank staff offers advice and help to governments in the preparation of draft legislation, institutional development plans, country-level strategies, and implementation action plans and can assist governments in introducing new policies or programs. Of particular interest to US military planners, the World Bank publishes the annual **Worldwide Governance Indicators**, one of the most comprehensive cross-country sets of governance and anticorruption indicators currently available.

- The **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** is the UN’s global development network of over 166 offices and global partnerships with democratic governance institutions. In the governance area, the UNDP provides core services to support national processes of democratic transitions that focus on:
  - providing policy advice and technical support
  - strengthening capacity of institutions and individuals
  - advocacy, communications, and public information
  - promoting and brokering dialogue
  - knowledge networking and sharing of good practices

Annex D

Military Contribution – Governance and Participation

- **Support national constitution processes.** When the Host Nation (HN) has no government, as may be the case during immediate post-conflict reconstruction or interventions in failed states, developing a national constitution is typically an important first step to establishing a foundation for governance and the rule of law. This may also be a key part of the process for achieving political settlement. An inclusive and participatory constitutional process that helps build broad based consensus on the country’s political future may help prevent the reemergence of violent conflict. The military can support this process both with Civil Affairs (CA) functional expertise, as required, and the provision of security and logistic support for key constitutional processes such as debates and balloting. Efforts to support national constitution processes are led in the USG by USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), with support from DOS' Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

- **Support transitional governance.** Prior to the return or establishment of viable HN control over ungoverned areas (UGAs), a transitional, interim government may be required. This transitional government may be a transitional military authority, normally established following the military defeat of the adversarial government, a transitional civilian authority, normally established in failed states in which security is not the overriding concern, or a transitional HN government. The military may support transitional governments through civil-military operations (CMO) support to civil administration (SCA) as well as providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all branches of the government. Efforts to support transitional governance are shared between DOS and DoD, with leadership depending on the circumstances.

- **Support local governance.** Even before national governance institutions and processes are established, the joint force should support the establishment of effective governance at the local level. Local governments are necessary to restore and protect the essential services that provide the basic foundations of security and economic stabilization. Additionally, finding political solutions at the local level tends to inform the search for a political settlement at higher levels. The military support to local governance may include restoring essential services as required, providing CMO SCA, or providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all branches of the government. Local governance support is led by DCHA, with support from DRL.

- **Support anticorruption initiatives.** Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a generally unelected, unaccountable, and illegitimate minority, and provides elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. It provides
insurgents, and sometimes legitimate opposition groups, information detrimental to long-term stability. At the same time, the political elites who benefit from corruption and oppose anticorruption initiatives may be the same elites with whom intervening forces must work toward political settlement; this requires a delicate balance in governance programs. Support to anticorruption initiatives is led by DOS' Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with support from DCHA and Department of Justice (DOJ).

- **Support elections.** The ability of the state and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections is a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies and organizations that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. This certainly includes security, but may also include logistic support. Support to elections and other participation programs is led by DCHA with support from DRL.

**Source:** “JP 3-07 Stability Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 2011.

---

Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan (29 March 2014). Brigadier General Daniel D. Yoo, Commanding General, Regional Command Southwest (RC Southwest), greets Amir Mohammad Akhundzada, Nimroz Provincial Governor. The leaders met for a security “shura” to discuss presidential elections and polling station security measures. “To build a nation we need to earn the people’s trust,” said Akhundzada. “It means everything earning their trust. We need to build their confidence in our government, the country and Afghan National Security Forces in order to be successful.”

(Article and photo by Sgt. Frances Johnson and Sgt. Jessica Ostroska, RC Southwest)
Annex E

Preventing Electoral Violence

1. Start early. Analysis, planning, and implementation of measures for the prevention of electoral violence should begin 24-48 months in advance of elections.

2. Use a "Governance and Electoral Cycle Approach." Electoral system reform, political party reform, constitutional reform, and legal reform can all contribute to reducing the likelihood of electoral violence.

3. Effective, early, and joint analysis is critical; scenario planning can help. Analysis should be carried out early in the following four categories: (1) structural/primary causes of instability and root causes of conflict (e.g., deep-seated inequalities between ethnic groups); (2) other/secondary drivers of conflict and instability (e.g., hate speeches); (3) election-specific causes (e.g., lack of trust in Electoral Management Bodies); and, (4) conflict handling capabilities (e.g., national, state/county, and district/community capacities for preventing and mitigating violence).

4. Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Standing capabilities in the form of peace committees, joint operating centers, and trained mediators can all help to address tensions and prevent or reduce cases of violence.

5. Development of national strategies helps. All relevant ministries and state and non-state actors with mandates for elections, peace building, or dealing with possible violence should be included in developing national strategies for elections.

6. Use social media and media campaigns to raise people's awareness of the costs and impacts of violence and to promote violence-free elections.

7. Engage, mobilize, and empower the broad majority of the population to actively participate in peaceful elections.

8. Train and prepare police and security forces to use non-violent responses for election scenarios.

9. Set up effective early warning and critical incident mapping systems for elections – in order to map developing situations where tensions are escalating, allowing for rapid and appropriate responses.

10. Prepare governmental and civil society peace capacities – from local peace teams to networks of mediators – to engage in emergent and actual cases of violence.

11. Coordinate. Establish coordination mechanisms among the many different actors involved in peace building and electoral support.

Annex F

Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers
(available in SOLLIMS library)

Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping (Feb 2016)
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications (Dec 2015)
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief] (Sep 2015)
Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations (Jul 2015)
Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students (May 2015)
Security Sector Reform (Feb 2015)
Reconstruction and Development (Nov 2014)
Women, Peace and Security (Aug 2014)
Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students (Jul 2014)
Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve” (Apr 2014)
Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces (Jan 2014)
Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations (Oct 2013)
Lessons On Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students (Aug 2013)
Multinational Operations (Jul 2013)
Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People (Apr 2013)
Protection of Civilians (Jan 2013)
Medical Assistance / Health Services (Oct 2012)
Reconciliation (Jul 2012)
Civ-Mil Cooperation (Apr 2012)
Building Capacity (Jan 2012)
Ministerial Advising (Oct 2011)
Fighting Corruption (Apr 2011)
Economic Stabilization (Jan 2011)
Transition to Local Governance (Oct 2010)
Rule of Law and Legitimacy (Jul 2010)
Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping (Jun 2010)